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Metaphysics
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Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that examines the basic structure of reality. It is traditionally seen as the study of mind-independent features of the world, but some theorists view it as an inquiry into the conceptual framework of human understanding. Some philosophers, including Aristotle, designate metaphysics as first philosophy to suggest that it is more fundamental than other forms of philosophical inquiry.
Metaphysics encompasses a wide range of general and abstract topics. It investigates the nature of existence, the features all entities have in common, and their division into categories of being. An influential division is between particulars and universals. Particulars are individual unique entities, like a specific apple. Universals are general features that different particulars have in common, like the color red. Modal metaphysics examines what it means for something to be possible or necessary. Metaphysicians also explore the concepts of space, time, and change, and their connection to causality and the laws of nature. Other topics include how mind and matter are related, whether everything in the world is predetermined, and whether there is free will.
Metaphysicians use various methods to conduct their inquiry. Traditionally, they rely on rational intuitions and abstract reasoning but have recently included empirical approaches associated with scientific theories. Due to the abstract nature of its topic, metaphysics has received criticisms questioning the reliability of its methods and the meaningfulness of its theories. Metaphysics is relevant to many fields of inquiry that often implicitly rely on metaphysical concepts and assumptions.
The roots of metaphysics lie in antiquity with speculations about the nature and origin of the universe, like those found in the Upanishads in ancient India, Daoism in ancient China, and pre-Socratic philosophy in ancient Greece. During the subsequent medieval period in the West, discussions about the nature of universals were influenced by the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. The modern period saw the emergence of various comprehensive systems of metaphysics, many of which embraced idealism. In the 20th century, traditional metaphysics in general and idealism in particular faced various criticisms, which prompted new approaches to metaphysical inquiry.
Definition
[edit]Metaphysics is the study of the most elementary features of reality, including existence, objects and their properties, possibility and necessity, space and time, change, causation, and the relation between matter and mind. It is one of the oldest branches of philosophy.[1][a]
The precise nature of metaphysics is disputed and its characterization has changed in the course of history. Some approaches see metaphysics as a unified field and give a wide-sweeping definition by understanding it as the study of "fundamental questions about the nature of reality" or as an inquiry into the essences of things. Another approach doubts that the different areas of metaphysics share a set of underlying features and provides instead a fine-grained characterization by listing all the main topics investigated by metaphysicians.[4] Some definitions are descriptive by providing an account of what metaphysicians do while others are normative and prescribe what metaphysicians ought to do.[5]
Two historically influential definitions in ancient and medieval philosophy understand metaphysics as the science of the first causes and as the study of being qua being, that is, the topic of what all beings have in common and to what fundamental categories they belong. In the modern period, the scope of metaphysics expanded to include topics such as the distinction between mind and body and free will.[6] Some philosophers follow Aristotle in describing metaphysics as "first philosophy", suggesting that it is the most basic inquiry upon which all other branches of philosophy depend in some way.[7][b]

Metaphysics is traditionally understood as a study of mind-independent features of reality. Starting with Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy, an alternative conception gained prominence that focuses on conceptual schemes rather than external reality. Kant distinguishes transcendent metaphysics, which aims to describe the objective features of reality beyond sense experience, from the critical perspective on metaphysics, which outlines the aspects and principles underlying all human thought and experience.[9] Philosopher P. F. Strawson further explored the role of conceptual schemes, contrasting descriptive metaphysics, which articulates conceptual schemes commonly used to understand the world, with revisionary metaphysics, which aims to produce better conceptual schemes.[10]
Metaphysics differs from the individual sciences by studying the most general and abstract aspects of reality. The individual sciences, by contrast, examine more specific and concrete features and restrict themselves to certain classes of entities, such as the focus on physical things in physics, living entities in biology, and cultures in anthropology.[11] It is disputed to what extent this contrast is a strict dichotomy rather than a gradual continuum.[12]
Etymology
[edit]The word metaphysics has its origin in the ancient Greek words metá (μετά, meaning 'after', 'above', and 'beyond') and phusiká (φυσικά), as a short form of ta metá ta phusiká, meaning 'what comes after the physics'. This is often interpreted to mean that metaphysics discusses topics that, due to their generality and comprehensiveness, lie beyond the realm of physics and its focus on empirical observation.[13] Metaphysics may have received its name by a historical accident when Aristotle's book on this subject was published.[14] Aristotle did not use the term metaphysics but his editor (likely Andronicus of Rhodes) may have coined it for its title to indicate that this book should be studied after Aristotle's book published on physics: literally 'after physics'. The term entered the English language through the Latin word metaphysica.[13]
Branches
[edit]The nature of metaphysics can also be characterized in relation to its main branches. An influential division from early modern philosophy distinguishes between general and special or specific metaphysics.[15] General metaphysics, also called ontology,[c] takes the widest perspective and studies the most fundamental aspects of being. It investigates the features that all entities share and how entities can be divided into different categories. Categories are the most general kinds, such as substance, property, relation, and fact.[17] Ontologists research which categories there are, how they depend on one another, and how they form a system of categories that provides a comprehensive classification of all entities.[18]
Special metaphysics considers being from more narrow perspectives and is divided into subdisciplines based on the perspective they take. Metaphysical cosmology examines changeable things and investigates how they are connected to form a world as a totality extending through space and time.[19] Rational psychology focuses on metaphysical foundations and problems concerning the mind, such as its relation to matter and the freedom of the will. Natural theology studies the divine and its role as the first cause.[19] The scope of special metaphysics overlaps with other philosophical disciplines, making it unclear whether a topic belongs to it or to areas like philosophy of mind and theology.[20]
Starting in the second half of the 20th century, applied metaphysics was conceived as the area of applied philosophy examining the implications and uses of metaphysics, both within philosophy and other fields of inquiry. In areas like ethics and philosophy of religion, it addresses topics like the ontological foundations of moral claims and religious doctrines.[21] Beyond philosophy, its applications include the use of ontologies in artificial intelligence, economics, and sociology to classify entities.[22] In psychiatry and medicine, it examines the metaphysical status of diseases.[23]
Meta-metaphysics[d] is the metatheory of metaphysics and investigates the nature and methods of metaphysics. It examines how metaphysics differs from other philosophical and scientific disciplines and assesses its relevance to them. Even though discussions of these topics have a long history in metaphysics, meta-metaphysics has only recently developed into a systematic field of inquiry.[25]
Topics
[edit]Existence and categories of being
[edit]Metaphysicians often regard existence or being as one of the most basic and general concepts.[26] To exist means to be part of reality, distinguishing real entities from imaginary ones.[27] According to a traditionally influential view, existence is a property of properties: if an entity exists then its properties are instantiated.[28] A different position states that existence is a property of individuals, meaning that it is similar to other properties, such as shape or size.[29] It is controversial whether all entities have this property. According to philosopher Alexius Meinong, there are nonexistent objects, including merely possible objects like Santa Claus and Pegasus.[30][e] A related question is whether existence is the same for all entities or whether there are different modes or degrees of existence.[31] For instance, Plato held that Platonic forms, which are perfect and immutable ideas, have a higher degree of existence than matter, which can only imperfectly reflect Platonic forms.[32][f]
Another key concern in metaphysics is the division of entities into distinct groups based on underlying features they share. Theories of categories provide a system of the most fundamental kinds or the highest genera of being by establishing a comprehensive inventory of everything.[34] One of the earliest theories of categories was proposed by Aristotle, who outlined a system of 10 categories. He argued that substances (e.g., man and horse), are the most important category since all other categories like quantity (e.g., four), quality (e.g., white), and place (e.g., in Athens) are said of substances and depend on them.[35] Kant understood categories as fundamental principles underlying human understanding and developed a system of 12 categories, divided into the four classes: quantity, quality, relation, and modality.[36] More recent theories of categories were proposed by C. S. Peirce, Edmund Husserl, Samuel Alexander, Roderick Chisholm, and E. J. Lowe.[37] Many philosophers rely on the contrast between concrete and abstract objects. According to a common view, concrete objects, like rocks, trees, and human beings, exist in space and time, undergo changes, and impact each other as cause and effect. They contrast with abstract objects, like numbers and sets, which do not exist in space and time, are immutable, and do not engage in causal relations.[38]
Particulars
[edit]Particulars are individual entities and include both concrete objects, like Aristotle, the Eiffel Tower, or a specific apple, and abstract objects, like the number 2 or a specific set in mathematics. They are unique, non-repeatable entities and contrast with universals, like the color red, which can at the same time exist in several places and characterize several particulars.[39] A widely held view is that particulars instantiate universals but are not themselves instantiated by something else, meaning that they exist in themselves while universals exist in something else. Substratum theory, associated with John Locke's philosophy, analyzes each particular as a substratum, also called bare particular, together with various properties. The substratum confers individuality to the particular while the properties express its qualitative features or what it is like. This approach is rejected by bundle theorists. Inspired by David Hume's philosophy, they state that particulars are only bundles of properties without an underlying substratum. Some bundle theorists include in the bundle an individual essence, called haecceity following scholastic terminology, to ensure that each bundle is unique. Another proposal for concrete particulars is that they are individuated by their space-time location.[40]
Concrete particulars encountered in everyday life, like rocks, tables, and organisms, are complex entities composed of various parts. For example, a table consists of a tabletop and legs, each of which is itself made up of countless particles. The relation between parts and wholes is studied by mereology.[41][g] The problem of the many is a philosophical question about the conditions under which several individual things compose a larger whole. For example, a cloud comprises many droplets without a clear boundary, raising the question of which droplets form part of the cloud. According to mereological universalists, every collection of entities forms a whole. This means that what seems to be a single cloud is an overlay of countless clouds, one for each cloud-like collection of water droplets. Mereological moderatists hold that certain conditions must be met for a group of entities to compose a whole, for example, that the entities touch one another. Mereological nihilists reject the idea of wholes altogether, claiming that there are no clouds or tables but only particles that are arranged cloud-wise or table-wise.[43] A related mereological problem is whether there are simple entities that have no parts, as atomists claim, or whether everything can be endlessly subdivided into smaller parts, as continuum theorists contend.[44]
Universals
[edit]Universals are general entities, encompassing both properties and relations, that express what particulars are like and how they resemble one another. They are repeatable, meaning that they are not limited to a unique existent but can be instantiated by different particulars at the same time. For example, the particulars Nelson Mandela and Mahatma Gandhi instantiate the universal humanity, similar to how a strawberry and a ruby instantiate the universal red.[45]
A topic discussed since ancient philosophy, the problem of universals consists in the challenge of characterizing the ontological status of universals.[46] Realists argue that universals are real, mind-independent entities that exist in addition to particulars. According to Platonic realists, universals exist independently of particulars, which implies that the universal red would continue to exist even if there were no red things. A more moderate form of realism, inspired by Aristotle, states that universals depend on particulars, meaning that they are only real if they are instantiated. Nominalists reject the idea that universals exist in either form. For them, the world is composed exclusively of particulars. Conceptualists offer an intermediate position, stating that universals exist, but only as concepts in the mind used to order experience by classifying entities.[47][h]
Natural and social kinds are often understood as special types of universals. Entities belonging to the same natural kind share certain fundamental features characteristic of the structure of the natural world. In this regard, natural kinds are not an artificially constructed classification but are discovered,[i] usually by the natural sciences, and include kinds like electrons, H2O, and tigers. Scientific realists and anti-realists disagree about whether natural kinds exist.[50] Social kinds, like money and baseball,[51] are studied by social metaphysics and characterized as useful social constructions that, while not purely fictional, do not reflect the fundamental structure of mind-independent reality.[52]
Possibility and necessity
[edit]The concepts of possibility and necessity convey what can or must be the case, expressed in modal statements like "it is possible to find a cure for cancer" and "it is necessary that two plus two equals four". Modal metaphysics studies metaphysical problems surrounding possibility and necessity, for instance, why some modal statements are true while others are false.[53][j] Some metaphysicians hold that modality is a fundamental aspect of reality, meaning that besides facts about what is the case, there are additional facts about what could or must be the case.[55] A different view argues that modal truths are not about an independent aspect of reality but can be reduced to non-modal characteristics, for example, to facts about what properties or linguistic descriptions are compatible with each other or to fictional statements.[56]
Borrowing a term from German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's theodicy, many metaphysicians use the concept of possible worlds to analyze the meaning and ontological ramifications of modal statements. A possible world is a complete and consistent way the totality of things could have been.[57] For example, the dinosaurs were wiped out in the actual world but there are possible worlds in which they are still alive.[58] According to possible world semantics, a statement is possibly true if it is true in at least one possible world, whereas it is necessarily true if it is true in all possible worlds.[59] Modal realists argue that possible worlds exist as concrete entities in the same sense as the actual world, with the main difference being that the actual world is the world we live in while other possible worlds are inhabited by counterparts. This view is controversial and various alternatives have been suggested, for example, that possible worlds only exist as abstract objects or are similar to stories told in works of fiction.[60]
Space, time, and change
[edit]Space and time are dimensions that entities occupy. Spacetime realists state that space and time are fundamental aspects of reality and exist independently of the human mind. Spacetime idealists, by contrast, hold that space and time are constructs of the human mind, created to organize and make sense of reality.[61] Spacetime absolutism or substantivalism understands spacetime as a distinct object, with some metaphysicians conceptualizing it as a container that holds all other entities within it. Spacetime relationism sees spacetime not as an object but as a network of relations between objects, such as the spatial relation of being next to and the temporal relation of coming before.[62]
In the metaphysics of time, an important contrast is between the A-series and the B-series. According to the A-series theory, the flow of time is real, meaning that events are categorized into the past, present, and future. The present continually moves forward in time and events that are in the present now will eventually change their status and lie in the past. From the perspective of the B-series theory, time is static, and events are ordered by the temporal relations earlier-than and later-than without any essential difference between past, present, and future.[63] Eternalism holds that past, present, and future are equally real, whereas presentism asserts that only entities in the present exist.[64]
Material objects persist through time and change in the process, like a tree that grows or loses leaves.[65] The main ways of conceptualizing persistence through time are endurantism and perdurantism. According to endurantism, material objects are three-dimensional entities that are wholly present at each moment. As they change, they gain or lose properties but otherwise remain the same. Perdurantists see material objects as four-dimensional entities that extend through time and are made up of different temporal parts. At each moment, only one part of the object is present, not the object as a whole. Change means that an earlier part is qualitatively different from a later part. For example, when a banana ripens, there is an unripe part followed by a ripe part.[66]
Causality
[edit]Causality is the relation between cause and effect whereby one entity produces or alters another entity.[67] For instance, if a person bumps a glass and spills its contents then the bump is the cause and the spill is the effect.[68] Besides the single-case causation between particulars in this example, there is also general-case causation expressed in statements such as "smoking causes cancer".[69] The term agent causation is used when people and their actions cause something.[70] Causation is usually interpreted deterministically, meaning that a cause always brings about its effect. However, some philosophers such as G. E. M. Anscombe have provided counterexamples to this idea.[71] Such counterexamples have inspired the development of probabilistic theories, which claim that the cause merely increases the probability that the effect occurs. This view can explain that smoking causes cancer even though this does not happen in every single case.[72]
The regularity theory of causation, inspired by David Hume's philosophy, states that causation is nothing but a constant conjunction in which the mind apprehends that one phenomenon, like putting one's hand in a fire, is always followed by another phenomenon, like a feeling of pain.[73] According to nomic regularity theories, regularities manifest as laws of nature studied by science.[74] Counterfactual theories focus not on regularities but on how effects depend on their causes. They state that effects owe their existence to the cause and would not occur without them.[75] According to primitivism, causation is a basic concept that cannot be analyzed in terms of non-causal concepts, such as regularities or dependence relations. One form of primitivism identifies causal powers inherent in entities as the underlying mechanism.[76] Eliminativists reject the above theories by holding that there is no causation.[77]
Mind and free will
[edit]
Mind encompasses phenomena like thinking, perceiving, feeling, and desiring as well as the underlying faculties responsible for these phenomena.[79] The mind–body problem is the challenge of clarifying the relation between physical and mental phenomena. According to Cartesian dualism, minds and bodies are distinct substances. They causally interact with each other in various ways but can, at least in principle, exist on their own.[80] This view is rejected by monists, who argue that reality is made up of only one kind. According to metaphysical idealism, everything is mental or dependent on the mind, including physical objects, which may be understood as ideas or perceptions of conscious minds.[k] Materialists, by contrast, state that all reality is at its core material. Some deny that mind exists but the more common approach is to explain mind in terms of certain aspects of matter, such as brain states, behavioral dispositions, or functional roles.[82] Neutral monists argue that reality is fundamentally neither material nor mental and suggest that matter and mind are both derivative phenomena.[83] A key aspect of the mind–body problem is the hard problem of consciousness or how to explain that physical systems like brains can produce phenomenal consciousness.[84]
The status of free will as the ability of a person to choose their actions is a central aspect of the mind–body problem.[85] Metaphysicians are interested in the relation between free will and causal determinism—the view that everything in the universe, including human behavior, is determined by preceding events and laws of nature. It is controversial whether causal determinism is true, and, if so, whether this would imply that there is no free will. According to incompatibilism, free will cannot exist in a deterministic world since there is no true choice or control if everything is determined.[l] Hard determinists infer from this that there is no free will, whereas libertarians conclude that determinism must be false. Compatibilists offer a third perspective, arguing that determinism and free will do not exclude each other, for instance, because a person can still act in tune with their motivation and choices even if they are determined by other forces. Free will plays a key role in ethics regarding the moral responsibility people have for what they do.[87]
Others
[edit]Identity is a relation that every entity has to itself as a form of sameness. It refers to numerical identity when the same entity is involved, as in the statement "the morning star is the evening star" (both are the planet Venus). In a slightly different sense, it encompasses qualitative identity, also called exact similarity and indiscernibility, which occurs when two distinct entities are exactly alike, such as perfect identical twins.[88] The principle of the indiscernibility of identicals is widely accepted and holds that numerically identical entities exactly resemble one another. The converse principle, known as the identity of indiscernibles or Leibniz's Law, is more controversial and states that two entities are numerically identical if they exactly resemble one another.[89] Another distinction is between synchronic and diachronic identity. Synchronic identity relates an entity to itself at the same time, whereas diachronic identity is about the same entity at different times, as in statements like "the table I bought last year is the same as the table in my dining room now".[90] Personal identity is a related topic in metaphysics that uses the term identity in a slightly different sense and concerns questions like what personhood is or what makes someone a person.[91]
Various contemporary metaphysicians rely on the concepts of truth, truth-bearer, and truthmaker to conduct their inquiry.[92] Truth is a property of being in accord with reality. Truth-bearers are entities that can be true or false, such as linguistic statements and mental representations. A truthmaker of a statement is the entity whose existence makes the statement true.[93] For example, the fact that a tomato exists and that it is red acts as a truthmaker for the statement "a tomato is red".[94] Based on this observation, it is possible to pursue metaphysical research by asking what the truthmakers of statements are, with different areas of metaphysics being dedicated to different types of statements. According to this view, modal metaphysics asks what makes statements about what is possible and necessary true while the metaphysics of time is interested in the truthmakers of temporal statements about the past, present, and future.[95] A closely related topic concerns the nature of truth. Theories of truth aim to determine this nature and include correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, semantic, and deflationary theories.[96]
Methodology
[edit]Metaphysicians employ a variety of methods to develop metaphysical theories and formulate arguments for and against them.[97] Traditionally, a priori methods have been the dominant approach. They rely on rational intuition and abstract reasoning from general principles rather than sensory experience. A posteriori approaches, by contrast, ground metaphysical theories in empirical observations and scientific theories.[98] Some metaphysicians incorporate perspectives from fields such as physics, psychology, linguistics, and history into their inquiry.[99] The two approaches are not mutually exclusive: it is possible to combine elements from both.[100] The method a metaphysician chooses often depends on their understanding of the nature of metaphysics, for example, whether they see it as an inquiry into the mind-independent structure of reality, as metaphysical realists claim, or the principles underlying thought and experience, as some metaphysical anti-realists contend.[101]
A priori approaches often rely on intuitions—non-inferential impressions about the correctness of specific claims or general principles.[102][m] For example, arguments for the A-theory of time, which states that time flows from the past through the present and into the future, often rely on pre-theoretical intuitions associated with the sense of the passage of time.[105] Some approaches use intuitions to establish a small set of self-evident fundamental principles, known as axioms, and employ deductive reasoning to build complex metaphysical systems by drawing conclusions from these axioms.[106] Intuition-based approaches can be combined with thought experiments, which help evoke and clarify intuitions by linking them to imagined situations. They use counterfactual thinking to assess the possible consequences of these situations.[107] For example, to explore the relation between matter and consciousness, some theorists compare humans to philosophical zombies—hypothetical creatures identical to humans but without conscious experience.[108] A related method relies on commonly accepted beliefs instead of intuitions to formulate arguments and theories. The common-sense approach is often used to criticize metaphysical theories that deviate significantly from how the average person thinks about an issue. For example, common-sense philosophers have argued that mereological nihilism is false since it implies that commonly accepted things, like tables, do not exist.[109]
Conceptual analysis, a method particularly prominent in analytic philosophy, aims to decompose metaphysical concepts into component parts to clarify their meaning and identify essential relations.[110] In phenomenology, the method of eidetic variation is used to investigate essential structures underlying phenomena. This method involves imagining an object and varying its features to determine which ones are essential and cannot be changed.[111] The transcendental method is a further approach and examines the metaphysical structure of reality by observing what entities there are and studying the conditions of possibility without which these entities could not exist.[112]
Some approaches give less importance to a priori reasoning and view metaphysics as a practice continuous with the empirical sciences that generalizes their insights while making their underlying assumptions explicit. This approach is known as naturalized metaphysics and is closely associated with the work of Willard Van Orman Quine.[113] He relies on the idea that true sentences from the sciences and other fields have ontological commitments, that is, they imply that certain entities exist.[114] For example, if the sentence "some electrons are bonded to protons" is true then it can be used to justify that electrons and protons exist.[115] Quine used this insight to argue that one can learn about metaphysics by closely analyzing[n] scientific claims to understand what kind of metaphysical picture of the world they presuppose.[117]
In addition to methods of conducting metaphysical inquiry, there are various methodological principles used to decide between competing theories by comparing their theoretical virtues. Ockham's Razor is a well-known principle that gives preference to simple theories, in particular, those that assume that few entities exist. Other principles consider explanatory power, theoretical usefulness, and proximity to established beliefs.[118]
Criticism
[edit]
Despite its status as one of the main branches of philosophy, metaphysics has received numerous criticisms questioning its legitimacy as a field of inquiry.[119] One criticism argues that metaphysical inquiry is impossible because humans lack the cognitive capacities needed to access the ultimate nature of reality.[120] This line of thought leads to skepticism about the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. Empiricists often follow this idea, like Hume, who asserts that there is no good source of metaphysical knowledge since metaphysics lies outside the field of empirical knowledge and relies on dubious intuitions about the realm beyond sensory experience. Arguing that the mind actively structures experience, Kant criticizes traditional metaphysics for its attempt to gain insight into the mind-independent nature of reality. He asserts that knowledge is limited to the realm of possible experience, meaning that humans are not able to decide questions like whether the world has a beginning in time or is infinite. A related argument favoring the unreliability of metaphysical theorizing points to the deep and lasting disagreements about metaphysical issues, suggesting a lack of overall progress.[121]
Another criticism holds that the problem lies not with human cognitive abilities but with metaphysical statements themselves, which some claim are neither true nor false but meaningless. According to logical positivists, for instance, the meaning of a statement is given by the procedure used to verify it, usually through the observations that would confirm it. Based on this controversial assumption, they argue that metaphysical statements are meaningless since they make no testable predictions about experience.[122]
A slightly weaker position allows metaphysical statements to have meaning while holding that metaphysical disagreements are merely verbal disputes about different ways to describe the world. According to this view, the disagreement in the metaphysics of composition about whether there are tables or only particles arranged table-wise is a trivial debate about linguistic preferences without any substantive consequences for the nature of reality.[123] The position that metaphysical disputes have no meaning or no significant point is called metaphysical or ontological deflationism.[124] This view is opposed by so-called serious metaphysicians, who contend that metaphysical disputes are about substantial features of the underlying structure of reality.[125] A closely related debate between ontological realists and anti-realists concerns the question of whether there are any objective facts that determine which metaphysical theories are true.[126] A different criticism, formulated by pragmatists, sees the fault of metaphysics not in its cognitive ambitions or the meaninglessness of its statements, but in its practical irrelevance and lack of usefulness.[127]
Martin Heidegger criticized traditional metaphysics, saying that it fails to distinguish between individual entities and being as their ontological ground. His attempt to reveal the underlying assumptions and limitations in the history of metaphysics to "overcome metaphysics" influenced Jacques Derrida's method of deconstruction.[128] Derrida employed this approach to criticize metaphysical texts for relying on opposing terms, like presence and absence, which he thought were inherently unstable and contradictory.[129]
There is no consensus about the validity of these criticisms and whether they affect metaphysics as a whole or only certain issues or approaches in it. For example, it could be the case that certain metaphysical disputes are merely verbal while others are substantive.[130]
Relation to other disciplines
[edit]Metaphysics is related to many fields of inquiry by investigating their basic concepts and relation to the fundamental structure of reality. For example, the natural sciences rely on concepts such as law of nature, causation, necessity, and spacetime to formulate their theories and predict or explain the outcomes of experiments.[131] While scientists primarily focus on applying these concepts to specific situations, metaphysics examines their general nature and how they depend on each other. For instance, physicists formulate laws of nature, like laws of gravitation and thermodynamics, to describe how physical systems behave under various conditions. Metaphysicians, by contrast, examine what all laws of nature have in common, asking whether they merely describe contingent regularities or express necessary relations.[132] New scientific discoveries have also influenced existing metaphysical theories and inspired new ones. Einstein's theory of relativity, for instance, prompted various metaphysicians to conceive space and time as a unified dimension rather than as independent dimensions.[133] Empirically focused metaphysicians often rely on scientific theories to ground their theories about the nature of reality in empirical observations.[134]
Similar issues arise in the social sciences where metaphysicians investigate their basic concepts and analyze their metaphysical implications. This includes questions like whether social facts emerge from non-social facts, whether social groups and institutions have mind-independent existence, and how they persist through time.[135] Metaphysical assumptions and topics in psychology and psychiatry include the questions about the relation between body and mind, whether the nature of the human mind is historically fixed, and what the metaphysical status of diseases is.[136]
Metaphysics is similar to both physical cosmology and theology in its exploration of the first causes and the universe as a whole. Key differences are that metaphysics relies on rational inquiry while physical cosmology gives more weight to empirical observations and theology incorporates divine revelation and other faith-based doctrines.[137] Historically, cosmology and theology were considered subfields of metaphysics.[138]
| Suggested Upper Merged Ontology | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Fundamental categories in the Suggested Upper Merged Ontology[139] |
Computer scientists rely on metaphysics in the form of ontology to represent and classify objects. They develop conceptual frameworks, called ontologies, for limited domains,[140] such as a database with categories like person, company, address, and name to represent information about clients and employees.[141] Ontologies provide standards for encoding and storing information in a structured way, allowing computational processes to use the information for various purposes.[140] Upper ontologies, such as Suggested Upper Merged Ontology and Basic Formal Ontology, define concepts at a more abstract level, making it possible to integrate information belonging to different domains.[142]
Logic as the study of correct reasoning[143] is often used by metaphysicians to engage in their inquiry and express insights through precise logical formulas.[144][o] Another relation between the two fields concerns the metaphysical assumptions associated with logical systems. Many logical systems like first-order logic rely on existential quantifiers to express existential statements. For instance, in the logical formula the existential quantifier is applied to the predicate to express that there are horses. Following Quine, various metaphysicians assume that existential quantifiers carry ontological commitments, meaning that existential statements imply that the entities over which one quantifies are part of reality.[146]
History
[edit]
Metaphysics originated in the ancient period from speculations about the nature and origin of the cosmos.[148] In ancient India, starting in the 7th century BCE, the Upanishads were written as religious and philosophical texts that examine how ultimate reality constitutes the ground of all being. They further explore the nature of the self and how it can reach liberation by understanding ultimate reality.[149] This period also saw the emergence of Buddhism in the 6th century BCE,[p] which denies the existence of an independent self and understands the world as a cyclic process.[151] At about the same time[q] in ancient China, the school of Daoism was formed and explored the natural order of the universe, known as Dao, and how it is characterized by the interplay of yin and yang as two correlated forces.[153]
In ancient Greece, metaphysics emerged in the 6th century BCE with the pre-Socratic philosophers, who gave rational explanations of the cosmos as a whole by examining the first principles from which everything arises.[154] Building on their work, Plato (427–347 BCE) formulated his theory of forms, which states that eternal forms or ideas possess the highest kind of reality while the material world is only an imperfect reflection of them.[155] Aristotle (384–322 BCE) accepted Plato's idea that there are universal forms but held that they cannot exist on their own but depend on matter. He also proposed a system of categories and developed a comprehensive framework of the natural world through his theory of the four causes.[156] Starting in the 4th century BCE, Hellenistic philosophy explored the rational order underlying the cosmos and the laws governing it.[157] Neoplatonism emerged towards the end of the ancient period in the 3rd century CE and introduced the idea of "the One" as the transcendent and ineffable source of all creation.[158][r]
Meanwhile, in Indian Buddhism, the Madhyamaka school developed the idea that all phenomena are inherently empty without a permanent essence. The consciousness-only doctrine of the Yogācāra school stated that experienced objects are mere transformations of consciousness and do not reflect external reality.[160] The Hindu school of Samkhya philosophy[s] introduced a metaphysical dualism with pure consciousness and matter as its fundamental categories.[161] In China, the school of Xuanxue explored metaphysical problems such as the contrast between being and non-being.[162]

Medieval Western philosophy was profoundly shaped by ancient Greek thought as philosophers integrated these ideas with Christian philosophical teachings. Boethius (477–524 CE) sought to reconcile Plato's and Aristotle's theories of universals, proposing that universals can exist both in matter and mind. His theory inspired the development of nominalism and conceptualism, as in the thought of Peter Abelard (1079–1142 CE).[163] Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274 CE) understood metaphysics as the discipline investigating different meanings of being, such as the contrast between substance and accident, and principles applying to all beings, such as the principle of identity.[164] William of Ockham (1285–1347 CE) developed a methodological principle, known as Ockham's razor, to choose between competing metaphysical theories.[165] Arabic–Persian philosophy flourished from the early 9th century CE to the late 12th century CE, integrating ancient Greek philosophies to interpret and clarify the teachings of the Quran.[166] Avicenna (980–1037 CE) developed a comprehensive philosophical system that examined the contrast between existence and essence and distinguished between contingent and necessary existence.[167] Medieval India saw the emergence of the monist school of Advaita Vedanta in the 8th century CE, which holds that everything is one and that the idea of many entities existing independently is an illusion.[168] In China, Neo-Confucianism arose in the 9th century CE and explored the concept of li as the rational principle that is the ground of being and reflects the order of the universe.[169]
In the early modern period and following renewed interest in Platonism during the Renaissance, René Descartes (1596–1650) developed a substance dualism according to which body and mind exist as independent entities that causally interact.[170] This idea was rejected by Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), who formulated a monist philosophy suggesting that there is only one substance with both physical and mental attributes that develop side-by-side without interacting.[171] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) introduced the concept of possible worlds and articulated a metaphysical system known as monadology, which views the universe as a collection of simple substances synchronized without causal interaction.[172] Christian Wolff (1679–1754), conceptualized the scope of metaphysics by distinguishing between general and special metaphysics.[173] According to the idealism of George Berkeley (1685–1753), everything is mental, including material objects, which are ideas perceived by the mind.[174] David Hume (1711–1776) made various contributions to metaphysics, including the regularity theory of causation and the idea that there are no necessary connections between distinct entities. Inspired by the empiricism of Francis Bacon (1561–1626) and John Locke (1632–1704), Hume criticized metaphysical theories that seek ultimate principles inaccessible to sensory experience.[175] This critical outlook was embraced by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who tried to reconceptualize metaphysics as an inquiry into the basic principles and categories of thought and understanding rather than seeing it as an attempt to comprehend mind-independent reality.[176]
Many developments in the later modern period were shaped by Kant's philosophy. German idealists adopted his idealistic outlook in their attempt to find a unifying principle as the foundation of all reality.[177] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's (1770–1831) idealistic contention is that reality is conceptual all the way down, and being itself is rational.[178] He inspired the British idealism of Francis Herbert Bradley (1846–1924), who interpreted Hegel's concept of absolute spirit as the all-inclusive totality of being.[179] Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) was a strong critic of German idealism and articulated a different metaphysical vision, positing a blind and irrational will as the underlying principle of reality.[180] Pragmatists like C. S. Peirce (1839–1914) and John Dewey (1859–1952) conceived metaphysics as an observational science of the most general features of reality and experience.[181]

At the turn of the 20th century in analytic philosophy, philosophers such as Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and G. E. Moore (1873–1958) led a "revolt against idealism", arguing for the existence of a mind-independent world aligned with common sense and empirical science.[182] Logical atomists, like Russell and the early Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), conceived the world as a multitude of atomic facts, which later inspired metaphysicians such as D. M. Armstrong (1926–2014).[183] Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) developed process metaphysics as an attempt to provide a holistic description of both the objective and the subjective realms.[184]
Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) and other logical positivists formulated a wide-ranging criticism of metaphysical statements, arguing that they are meaningless because there is no way to verify them.[185] Other criticisms of traditional metaphysics identified misunderstandings of ordinary language as the source of many traditional metaphysical problems or challenged complex metaphysical deductions by appealing to common sense.[186]
The decline of logical positivism led to a revival of metaphysical theorizing.[187] Willard Van Orman Quine (1908–2000) tried to naturalize metaphysics by connecting it to the empirical sciences. His student David Lewis (1941–2001) employed the concept of possible worlds to formulate his modal realism.[188] Saul Kripke (1940–2022) helped revive discussions of identity and essentialism, distinguishing necessity as a metaphysical notion from the epistemic notion of a priori.[189]
In continental philosophy, Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) engaged in ontology through a phenomenological description of experience, while his student Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) developed fundamental ontology to clarify the meaning of being.[190] Heidegger's philosophy inspired Jacques Derrida's (1930–2004) criticism of metaphysics.[191] Gilles Deleuze's (1925–1995) approach to metaphysics challenged traditionally influential concepts like substance, essence, and identity by reconceptualizing the field through alternative notions such as multiplicity, event, and difference.[192]
See also
[edit]References
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ Philosophers engaged in metaphysics are called metaphysicians or metaphysicists.[2] Outside the academic discourse, the term metaphysics is sometimes used in a different sense for the study of occult and paranormal phenomena, like metaphysical healing, auras, and the power of pyramids.[3]
- ^ For example, the metaphysical problem of causation is relevant both to epistemology, as a factor involved in perceptual knowledge, and ethics, in regard to moral responsibility for the consequences caused by one's actions.[8]
- ^ The term ontology is sometimes also used as a synonym of metaphysics as a whole.[16]
- ^ Some philosophers use the term metaontology as a synonym while others characterize metaontology as a subfield of meta-metaphysics.[24]
- ^ According to Meinong, existence is not a synonym of being: all entities have being but not all entities have existence.[30]
- ^ Although commonly labelled Plato's theory of forms, there is some scholarly disagreement about the extent to which this position belongs to Socrates rather than Plato.[33]
- ^ Mereological problems were discussed as early as ancient Greek philosophy.[42]
- ^ The positions of nominalism and conceptualism were formulated in medieval philosophy.[48]
- ^ The classified entities do not have to occur naturally and can encompass man-made products, such as synthetic chemical substances.[49]
- ^ A further topic concerns different types of modality, such as the contrast between physical, metaphysical, and logical necessity based on whether the necessity has its source in the laws of nature, the essences of things, or the laws of logic.[54]
- ^ There are other forms of idealism that assert slightly different positions, such as transcendental idealism and absolute idealism.[81]
- ^ For example, the consequence argument by Peter van Inwagen says that people have no power over the future if everything is determined by the past together with the laws of nature.[86]
- ^ The term intuition has a variety of other meanings in philosophy. It can refer to a simple opinion, a disposition to belief, what seems to be the case, or a relation between the mind and abstract objects.[103] The concept plays a central role in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, who understands intuitions as conscious, objective representations closely associated with the sense of space and time.[104]
- ^ Quine's method of analysis relies on logic translation to first-order logic in order to express claims as precisely as possible while relying existential quantifiers to identify their ontological commitments.[116]
- ^ For example, higher-order metaphysics makes extensive use of higher-order logic to analyze metaphysical problems.[145]
- ^ The precise date is disputed.[150]
- ^ According to traditional accounts, Laozi as the founder of Daoism lived in the 6th century BCE but other accounts state that he may have lived in the 4th or 3rd centuries BCE.[152]
- ^ Influential Neoplatonists include Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Hypatia, and Proclus.[159]
- ^ The ideas underlying Samkhya philosophy arose as early as the 7th and 6th centuries BCE but its classical and systematic formulation is dated 350 CE.[161]
Citations
[edit]- ^
- Carroll & Markosian 2010, pp. 1–3
- Koons & Pickavance 2015, pp. 1–2
- McDaniel 2020, § 0.3 An Overview of Metaphysics and Other Areas of Philosophy
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- ^
- Mumford 2012, § 10 What Is Metaphysics?
- Carroll & Markosian 2010, p. 2
- ^
- ^
- Carroll & Markosian 2010, pp. 1–4
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 1–2
- McDaniel 2020, § 0.3 An Overview of Metaphysics and Other Areas of Philosophy
- Mumford 2012, § 10 What Is Metaphysics?
- Ney 2014, pp. 9–10
- Van Inwagen, Sullivan & Bernstein 2023, Lead Section, § 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics
- ^ Loux & Crisp 2017, p. 2
- ^
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 1–4
- Van Inwagen, Sullivan & Bernstein 2023, Lead Section, § 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics
- ^
- Koons & Pickavance 2015, pp. 8–10
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 2–3
- ^ Koons & Pickavance 2015, pp. 8–10
- ^
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 1–2, 6–7
- Bengtson 2015, p. 23
- Wood 2009, p. 354
- ^
- ^
- Mumford 2012, § 10 What Is Metaphysics?
- Ney 2014, p. xiii
- Tahko 2015, pp. 206–207
- ^ Tahko 2015, pp. 203–205
- ^ a b
- Hoad 1993, pp. 291, 351
- Cohen & Reeve 2021, Lead Section
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- ^
- Hamlyn 2005, p. 590
- Mumford 2012, § 10. What Is Metaphysics?
- Pols 1993, p. 203
- Lowe 2013, p. 127
- ^
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 3–5, 10
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- ^ Hawley 2016, p. 166
- ^
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 10–14
- Van Inwagen, Sullivan & Bernstein 2023, § 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics
- Campbell 2006, The Categories Of Being
- ^
- Hofweber 2023, § 3. Ontology
- Campbell 2006, The Categories Of Being
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- ^ a b
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 3–5, 10
- Van Inwagen, Sullivan & Bernstein 2023, § 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics
- ^
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 10–11
- Craig 1998, § 2. Specific Metaphysics
- ^
- Hawley 2016, pp. 165–168
- Brumbaugh 1966, pp. 647–648
- ^ Hawley 2016, pp. 168–169, 171–172
- ^ Hawley 2016, p. 174
- ^ Tahko 2018, Lead Section
- ^
- McDaniel 2020, § 7 Meta-metaphysics
- Tahko 2018, Lead Section
- ^
- Lowe 2005b, p. 277
- White 2019, pp. 135, 200
- Jubien 2004, pp. 47–48
- ^
- ^
- Casati & Fujikawa, Lead Section, §1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification
- Blackburn 2008, existence
- ^
- Casati & Fujikawa, Lead Section, §2. Existence as a First-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification
- Blackburn 2008, existence
- ^ a b
- Van Inwagen 2023
- Nelson 2022, Lead Section, §2. Meinongianism
- Jubien 2004, p. 49
- ^
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- ^
- Daly 2009, pp. 227–228
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- ^
- Gerson 2002, p. 87
- Dancy 2004, p. 11
- ^
- Thomasson 2022, Lead Section
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- Wardy 1998, Lead Section
- ^
- Thomasson 2022, § 1.1 Aristotelian Realism
- Studtmann 2024, § 2. The Ten-Fold Division
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- ^
- Thomasson 2022, § 1.2 Kantian Conceptualism
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- ^
- Thomasson 2022, § 1.3 Husserlian Descriptivism, § 1.4 Contemporary Category Systems
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- ^
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- ^
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- Bigelow 1998, Lead Section
- Campbell 2006, § Particularity and Individuality
- Maurin 2019, Lead Section
- ^
- Maurin 2019, Lead Section
- Campbell 2006, § Particularity and Individuality
- Bigelow 1998, Lead Section, § 3. Bundles of Properties
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 82–83
- ^
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 250–251
- Varzi 2019, Lead Section, § 1. 'Part' and Parthood
- Cornell, Lead Section, § 2. The Special Composition Question
- Tallant 2017, pp. 19–21
- ^ Varzi 2019, Lead Section
- ^
- Weatherson 2023, Lead section, § 3. Overpopulation
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 82–83
- Cornell, Lead Section, § 2. The Special Composition Question
- Brenner 2015, p. 1295
- Tallant 2017, pp. 19–21, 23–24, 32–33
- ^
- Berryman 2022, § 2.6 Atomism and Particle Theories in Ancient Greek Sciences
- Varzi 2019, § 3.4 Atomism, Gunk, and Other Options
- ^
- MacLeod & Rubenstein, Lead Section
- Bigelow 1998a, Lead Section
- Cowling 2019, Lead Section
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 17–19
- ^
- MacLeod & Rubenstein, Lead Section, § 1c. The Problem of Universals
- Rodriguez-Pereyra 2000, pp. 255–256
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 17–19
- ^
- MacLeod & Rubenstein, Lead Section, § 2. Versions of Realism, § 3. Versions of Anti-Realism
- Bigelow 1998a, § 4. Nominalism and Realism
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 17–19, 45
- ^ Hancock 2006, pp. 188–190
- ^
- Brzović, Lead Section
- Bird & Tobin 2024, Lead Section
- ^
- Brzović, Lead Section, § 3. Metaphysics of Natural Kinds
- Bird & Tobin 2024, Lead Section, § 1.2 Natural Kind Realism
- Liston, Lead Section
- ^
- Ásta 2017, pp. 290–291
- Bird & Tobin 2024, § 2.4 Natural Kinds and Social Science
- ^
- ^
- Parent, Lead Section
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 149–150
- Koons & Pickavance 2015, pp. 154–155
- Mumford 2012, § 8. What Is Possible?
- ^
- Hanna 2009, p. 196
- Hale 2020, p. 142
- ^
- Goswick 2018, pp. 97–98
- Wilsch 2017, pp. 428–429, 446
- ^
- Goswick 2018, pp. 97–98
- Parent, § 3. Ersatzism, § 4. Fictionalism
- Wilsch 2017, pp. 428–429
- ^
- Menzel 2023, Lead Section, § 1. Possible Worlds and Modal Logic
- Berto & Jago 2023, Lead Section
- Pavel 1986, p. 50
- Campbell 2006, § Possible Worlds
- ^ Nuttall 2013, p. 135
- ^
- Menzel 2023, Lead Section, § 1. Possible Worlds and Modal Logic
- Kuhn 2010, p. 13
- ^
- Parent, Lead Section, § 2. Lewis' Realism, § 3. Ersatzism, § 4. Fictionalism
- Menzel 2023, Lead Section, § 2. Three Philosophical Conceptions of Possible Worlds
- Campbell 2006, § Modal Realism
- ^
- Dainton 2010, pp. 245–246
- Janiak 2022, § 4.2 Absolute/Relational Vs. Real/Ideal
- Pelczar 2015, p. 115
- ^
- Hoefer, Huggett & Read 2023, Lead Section
- Benovsky 2016, pp. 19–20
- Romero 2018, p. 135
- ^
- Dyke 2002, p. 138
- Koons & Pickavance 2015, pp. 182–185
- Carroll & Markosian 2010, pp. 160–161
- ^
- Carroll & Markosian 2010, pp. 179–181
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 206, 214–215
- Romero 2018, p. 135
- ^
- Miller 2018, Lead Section
- Costa, Lead Section
- Simons 2013, p. 166
- ^
- Miller 2018, Lead Section
- Costa, Lead Section, § 1. Theories of Persistence
- Simons 2013, p. 166
- Hawley 2023, 3. Change and Temporal Parts
- ^
- Carroll & Markosian 2010, pp. 20–22
- Tallant 2017, pp. 218–219
- ^ Carroll & Markosian 2010, p. 20
- ^
- Carroll & Markosian 2010, pp. 21–22
- Williamson 2012, p. 186
- ^
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- Tallant 2017, pp. 233–234
- ^
- Wiland & Driver 2022, § 3. Metaphysics
- Van Miltenburg 2022, pp. 1, 6
- ^
- Ney 2014, pp. 228–231
- Williamson 2012, pp. 185–186
- ^
- Lorkowski, Lead Section, § 2. Necessary Connections and Hume’s Two Definitions, § 4. Causal Reductionism
- Carroll & Markosian 2010, pp. 24–25
- Tallant 2017, pp. 220–221
- ^ Ney 2014, pp. 223–224
- ^
- Carroll & Markosian 2010, p. 26
- Tallant 2017, pp. 221–222
- Ney 2014, pp. 224–225
- ^
- Ney 2014, pp. 231–232
- Mumford 2009, pp. 94–95
- Mumford & Anjum 2013
- Koons & Pickavance 2015, pp. 63–64
- ^ Tallant 2017, pp. 231–232
- ^ Kind & Stoljar 2023, § Introduction
- ^ Morton 2005, p. 603
- ^
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- Kim 2005, p. 608
- ^
- Alston 2018, p. 97
- Guyer & Horstmann 2023, § 1. Introduction
- ^
- McLaughlin 1999, pp. 685–691
- Kim 2005, p. 608
- Ramsey 2022, Lead Section
- Pradhan 2020, p. 4
- ^
- Stubenberg & Wishon 2023, Lead Section; § 1.3 Mind and Matter Revisited
- Griffin 1998
- ^ Weisberg, Lead Section, § 1. Stating the Problem
- ^
- Timpe, Lead Section
- Olson 2001, Mind–Body Problem
- Armstrong 2018, p. 94
- ^
- Vihvelin 2022, § 5. Choice and the Consequence Argument
- Kane 2011, p. 10
- ^
- O’Connor & Franklin 2022, Lead Section, § 2. The Nature of Free Will
- Timpe, Lead Section, § 1. Free Will, Free Action and Moral Responsibility, § 3. Free Will and Determinism
- Armstrong 2018, p. 94
- ^
- Kirwan 2005, pp. 417–418
- Noonan & Curtis 2022, Lead Section
- ^
- Sleigh 2005, p. 418
- Kirwan 2005, pp. 417–418
- Noonan & Curtis 2022, § 2. The Logic of Identity
- ^
- Gallois 2016, § 2.1 Diachronic and Synchronic Identity
- Noonan & Curtis 2022, Lead Section, § 5. Identity Over Time
- ^
- Noonan & Curtis 2022, Lead Section
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- ^
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- ^ Ney 2014, p. 41
- ^ Ney 2014, pp. 40–41
- ^
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- ^
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- ^
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- ^ Van Inwagen, Sullivan & Bernstein 2023, § 5. Is Metaphysics Possible?
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- ^
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- ^
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External links
[edit]- Metaphysics at PhilPapers
- Metaphysics at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
- Fieser, James; Dowden, Bradley (eds.). "Metaphysics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 2161-0002. OCLC 37741658.
- Metaphysics at Encyclopædia Britannica
Metaphysics public domain audiobook at LibriVox
Metaphysics
View on GrokipediaDefinition and Scope
Core Definition
Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that systematically investigates the fundamental nature of reality, existence, and being, particularly those aspects that transcend the observable physical world and empirical sciences. This inquiry addresses questions about what ultimately exists, the structure of reality, and the principles governing all things, distinguishing it from sciences that focus on specific domains of phenomena.[1][6] Within metaphysics, ontology serves as a central subset, concentrating specifically on the nature of being, what entities exist, and the categories or relations among them, whereas metaphysics more broadly encompasses related issues like causality and possibility.[2][7] Definitional debates in metaphysics often revolve around its foundational role, as seen in Aristotle's characterization of it as "first philosophy," the highest science studying being as such and the unchanging principles common to all reality.[8] In contrast, some traditions view metaphysics as a speculative pursuit into ultimate causes and the underlying order of existence, beyond verifiable empirical methods.[9] Non-Western perspectives, such as those in Indian Vedanta philosophy, similarly frame metaphysics as an exploration of Brahman, the singular, non-dual ultimate reality that constitutes the essence of all phenomena and transcends illusory diversity.[10][11]Etymology and Terminology
The term "metaphysics" originates from the Greek phrase ta meta ta physika, meaning "the [things] after the physics," which was used by Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century BCE to describe the placement of Aristotle's treatise on first philosophy following his works on natural philosophy in the edited corpus.[7] This editorial designation did not initially denote a specific philosophical content but rather a bibliographic order, though it later connoted inquiry into unchanging principles beyond the physical world.[7] During the medieval period, the Greek phrase evolved into the Latin singular noun metaphysica, employed by scholastic philosophers to title Aristotle's work and signify the study of being qua being, distinct from physics.[12] In scholasticism, metaphysica encompassed theological and ontological dimensions, influencing thinkers like Thomas Aquinas, who integrated it into systematic treatises on divine and created substances.[13] By the early modern era, the term entered vernacular languages, adapting to analytic precision in English and French while retaining its broad scope in continental traditions, where it often contrasted empirical science with speculative inquiry into reality's foundations.[14] A key term within metaphysics is "ontology," derived from the Greek ontos (being) and logos (discourse), first coined as ontologia in 1606 by the German philosopher Jacob Lorhard in his Ogdoas Scholastica and independently in 1613 by Rudolf Goclenius the Younger in his Lexicon philosophicum.[15] Christian Wolff popularized the term in the 18th century through his systematic Ontologia (1729), establishing it as the science of being in general, separate from cosmology or rational psychology, and influencing Kantian critiques of metaphysical knowledge.[16] In 20th-century continental philosophy, Martin Heidegger emphasized Sein (being) as the forgotten question of metaphysics, distinguishing it from Seiendes (beings) in works like Sein und Zeit (1927), where Sein denotes the underlying intelligibility of existence rather than empirical entities.[17] Aristotelian distinctions, such as substance (ousia) versus accident, remain foundational: substance denotes what exists primarily and independently, like an individual human, while accidents are non-essential properties inhering in substances, such as color or size, which can change without altering the substance's essence.[8] Outside Western traditions, Chinese philosophy employs benti lun (discourse on the root substance or fundamental reality), a term prominent in Neo-Confucianism to explore benti (本體), the underlying principle (li) manifesting in phenomena (yong).[18] Thinkers like Zhu Xi (1130–1200) used benti to articulate the metaphysical unity of principle and vital force (qi), bridging cosmology and ethics in Song-Ming thought.[19]Central Metaphysical Topics
Being, Existence, and Categories
In metaphysics, the concepts of "being" and "existence" are often distinguished, with "being" referring to the fundamental nature or essence of what exists, while "existence" denotes the actual instantiation or presence of entities in reality. This distinction is central to ontological inquiry, where being encompasses the underlying structure that allows entities to be, whereas existence pertains to their concrete realization. Martin Heidegger, in his seminal work Being and Time, sharply delineates "Being" (Sein) as the transcendental condition for the existence of individual entities or "beings" (Seiendes), emphasizing the "ontological difference" that prevents conflating the two: Being is not itself a being but the horizon enabling beings to appear.[20] This framework critiques traditional metaphysics for overlooking Being in favor of analyzing beings, prompting a reevaluation of existence as a dynamic process of disclosure rather than mere presence.[21] Aristotle provided one of the earliest systematic frameworks for classifying what exists through his doctrine of categories, outlined in his Categories, which posits ten fundamental ways in which being can be predicated: substance (ousia), quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, and affection. Substances serve as the primary category, representing independent entities like individual humans or horses that underlie and support the other categories, which are accidents inhering in substances. For instance, quantity might describe the size of a substance (e.g., two feet tall), while quality pertains to its attributes (e.g., white or knowledgeable). This categorial scheme aims to capture the diverse modes of predication in language and reality, ensuring that all assertions about being fit into these irreducible types without overlap or reduction.[22] Aristotle's categories thus offer a foundational ontology for organizing existence, influencing subsequent metaphysical systems by prioritizing substance as the core of reality.[23] Debates on levels of being have long explored hierarchical structures in reality, as seen in Plato's theory of Forms, where the immaterial realm of eternal, perfect Forms constitutes a higher level of being compared to the shadowy, imperfect material world perceived by the senses. In works like the Republic, Plato argues that sensible objects participate in Forms (e.g., a particular bed derives its "bedness" from the Form of Bed), implying that true existence belongs to the intelligible realm of Forms, while the physical world enjoys only derivative, participatory being. This dualism posits multiple strata of reality, with higher levels possessing greater ontological priority and stability. In modern metaphysics, mereology extends these debates by formalizing part-whole relations as a basis for understanding composition and levels of being, treating wholes as sums of parts without gaps or overlaps in classical extensional mereology. For example, a statue might be analyzed as composed of atomic parts, raising questions about whether the whole has emergent properties beyond its parts, thus challenging Aristotelian substance by emphasizing relational mereological structures.[24][25][26] Contemporary metaphysics grapples with the existence of fictional entities and abstract objects, questioning whether they occupy genuine ontological categories. Regarding fictional entities, such as Sherlock Holmes, realists argue they exist as abstract or non-actual objects in possible worlds or as cultural artifacts, while antirealists deny their existence, treating fictions as useful pretenses grounded in actual language use without committing to extra entities. This debate hinges on whether fictional reference implies ontological commitment, with some proposing a neutral "pretense" theory to avoid positing non-existent beings. Similarly, abstract objects like numbers pose challenges: Platonists affirm their existence as timeless, non-spatial entities causally inert yet indispensable for mathematical truths, as in Frege's logicism, whereas nominalists like Hartry Field reject them, reformulating science without quantification over abstracts to preserve empirical adequacy. These issues highlight ongoing tensions in categorizing being beyond concrete particulars, influencing ontology in philosophy of mathematics and literature.[27][28][29][30] Recent metaphysics has extended these debates to digital and hybrid entities. Long-lived software systems, online platforms, and large-scale machine learning models raise questions about whether they should be treated as concrete physical aggregates, abstract informational structures, or a distinct ontological category individuated by code, data, and usage patterns. For instance, large language models such as OpenAI's GPT-3 have been analyzed in philosophical works like "Non-Human Words: On GPT-3 as a Philosophical Laboratory" by Tobias Rees (Dædalus, 2022), exploring their ontological status as entities individuated by training data, architectural parameters, and version identifiers, persisting through computational updates rather than biological processes. This illustrates emerging metaphysical questions about digital persistence without stable human-like registries, though platforms like Hugging Face provide model identifiers analogous to scholarly tracking systems. Their existence seems to depend both on physical substrates and on higher-level organizational and social practices, complicating traditional divisions between substances, properties, and abstract objects.[31][32][33][34]Particulars and Universals
In metaphysics, particulars are concrete, individuated entities that exist at specific locations and times, such as a particular red apple on a table, which cannot be wholly present in multiple places simultaneously.[35] Universals, by contrast, are repeatable properties or qualities that can be wholly exemplified by multiple particulars, like the redness shared by that apple and many others.[35] The debate over particulars and universals centers on whether universals possess independent ontological status or reduce to features of particulars. Realism posits that universals exist objectively and independently of minds or particulars, serving as the fundamental grounds for similarity among things. Plato's theory of Forms exemplifies this position, arguing in the Republic that for any set of similar particulars—such as just actions—there exists an eternal, non-spatial Form of Justice that they imperfectly instantiate, ensuring their shared nature.[36] Nominalism denies the independent existence of universals, maintaining that they are merely linguistic conventions or names without real counterparts beyond the particulars they describe. William of Ockham advanced this view in his Summa Logicae, asserting that universals like "humanity" are not real entities but flatus vocis—mere puffs of voice—used to group similar particulars for convenience, with no need for extra entities to explain resemblance.[37] Conceptualism offers a middle ground, holding that universals exist as abstract ideas or concepts within the mind, dependent on human cognition but capable of representing shared features of particulars. John Locke articulated this in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, where he describes general ideas (such as the abstract triangle) as mental constructs formed by abstracting common traits from particular experiences, like specific triangular shapes, without positing mind-independent Forms or reducing them to bare names.[38] A key challenge in this debate is the "one-over-many" problem, which questions how multiple distinct particulars can share identical properties without invoking universals. Plato introduced this issue in dialogues like the Phaedo and Republic, observing that predicates like "beautiful" apply to many diverse things, requiring a single unifying Form to account for their genuine similarity rather than mere verbal resemblance.[39] Another significant problem arises in theories of particulars, particularly the bundle theory, which analyzes them as mere collections of universals or qualities without an underlying substance. David Hume developed this in A Treatise of Human Nature, contending that objects like a ship are bundles of perceivable properties (e.g., wooden planks, sails) connected by relations of resemblance and contiguity, with no enduring "self" or bare particular to unify them—much like the self as a bundle of perceptions.[40] In modern metaphysics, trope theory addresses these issues by treating properties as particularized instances, or "tropes," rather than repeatable universals. Donald C. Williams pioneered this approach in his 1953 paper "On the Elements of Being," proposing that reality consists of tropes—such as the specific redness of this apple—along with spatiotemporal relations, allowing resemblance through qualitative similarity among tropes without abstract universals, thus avoiding both realism's commitments and nominalism's denial of property reality.[41] Trope theory has influenced philosophy of science, intersecting with structural realism, which emphasizes relational structures over intrinsic properties or universals. James Ladyman and Don Ross's ontic structural realism, as elaborated in works like Chakravartty's analysis, posits that the world's fundamental ontology is a network of relations among entities, where apparent universals reduce to structural roles in scientific theories, such as symmetry groups in quantum mechanics, prioritizing mathematical structure for empirical success.[42]Modality: Possibility and Necessity
In modal metaphysics, possibility denotes a state of affairs that could obtain, necessity a state that must obtain in all possible scenarios, and contingency a state that obtains in some but not all such scenarios. These concepts are formalized in possible worlds semantics, where a proposition is possible if true in at least one possible world, necessary if true in every possible world, and contingent if true in some possible worlds but false in others.[43] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz employed the principle of sufficient reason—positing that nothing occurs without a sufficient reason—to argue that God, being perfectly rational and benevolent, created the best of all possible worlds, maximizing harmony and perfection among compatible substances.[44] This view implies that the actual world is necessary given divine choice, yet Leibniz maintained contingency through the infinite variety of possible worlds from which God selected the optimal one.[45] Critics contend that applying the principle rigorously leads to modal collapse, wherein every truth becomes necessary due to exhaustive reasons, eliminating genuine contingency and rendering modality meaningless by conflating actuality with necessity.[46] Possible worlds analysis, pioneered in modern terms by Saul Kripke's rigid designators and accessibility relations, offers a semantic framework for modality without presupposing the existence of non-actual entities.[43] David Lewis advanced modal realism in this framework, asserting that possible worlds are concrete, spatiotemporal entities as real as the actual world, differing only in their inhabitants and histories; thus, statements like "Socrates might not have existed" are true because there are worlds where no individual plays his role.[47] Opposing this, actualism maintains that only the actual world and its constituents exist; non-actual possibles are represented abstractly as maximal consistent sets of propositions or states of affairs, avoiding ontological commitment to infinite concrete worlds.[48] Contemporary metaphysics applies these modal notions to counterfactual conditionals, which evaluate "what if" scenarios by comparing possible worlds maximally similar to the actual one—such as the counterfactual "If dinosaurs had survived the asteroid impact, mammalian dominance might have been averted," assessed via shared laws and histories up to the divergence point.[49] Epistemic modality, by contrast, addresses possibilities relative to an agent's knowledge or evidence, as in "It is possible that water is not H₂O given current observations," distinct from metaphysical claims about ultimate reality.[50] In modal contexts, universals like properties are often treated as necessarily exemplified across worlds where they apply, linking to debates on essential attributes.[47]Space, Time, and Change
In metaphysics, the debate over the nature of space centers on substantivalism and relationalism. Substantivalists, following Isaac Newton, posit that space exists as an independent, absolute entity—a boundless, three-dimensional container in which objects and events are located, persisting even in the absence of matter.[51] This view allows for absolute motion, as demonstrated in Newton's bucket experiment, where water climbing the sides of a rotating bucket indicates rotation relative to absolute space.[52] In contrast, relationalists, exemplified by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, argue that space is not a substantive entity but an abstract system of relations among material objects; without objects, there is no space.[51] Leibniz contended that space denotes the order of coexistences, and any notion of absolute position is illusory, as all motion is relative to other bodies.[51] This debate extends to time, where substantivalism treats time as an absolute, uniform flow independent of events, while relationalism reduces time to relations of succession among occurrences.[53] The metaphysical status of time further divides into A-theory and B-theory. A-theorists maintain that time genuinely flows, with events acquiring different ontological statuses as they move from future to present to past; this aligns with presentism, the view that only the present exists.[53] Proponents emphasize tensed facts, such as the psychological asymmetry between remembering the past and anticipating the future.[53] B-theorists, however, describe time using tenseless B-relations of earlier-than and later-than, viewing the universe as a static "block" where all events are equally real in a four-dimensional spacetime manifold.[53] This eternalist perspective denies a privileged present, treating temporal passage as an illusion. J.M.E. McTaggart's paradox challenges both, arguing that time is unreal: the A-series leads to contradictions (every event is future, past, and present), while the B-series lacks true temporality without A-properties.[53] Metaphysicians have long grappled with change and becoming, pitting dynamic flux against static permanence. Heraclitus advocated universal flux, asserting that all things are in constant transformation—"everything flows and nothing abides"—with stability arising from the unity of opposites like day and night.[54] This view implies that identity persists through processes rather than fixed substances. Parmenides countered with a doctrine of unchanging being, denying motion and change as illusions; what truly exists is eternal, indivisible, and motionless, for becoming would require non-being, which is impossible.[55] Such permanence raises puzzles of identity over time, exemplified by the Ship of Theseus: if every plank of a ship is gradually replaced, does it remain the same vessel, or has it become a new entity through incremental change?[7] Digital analogues of this puzzle arise for versioned software and networked AI systems, where code is rewritten, models are retrained, and data stores are replaced while users and institutions continue to treat the resulting configuration as the same underlying system. In such cases, persistence is tracked by continuity of function, interfaces, and identifiers rather than by any fixed material base, prompting further questions about what counts as a single enduring entity in computational and virtual domains.[56][57] Modern physics has profoundly influenced these debates, integrating space and time into spacetime while complicating change. Einstein's theory of relativity merges space and time into a four-dimensional continuum, undermining absolute notions and supporting relationalism by making geometry dependent on mass-energy distribution; simultaneity becomes frame-relative, favoring B-theory eternalism over a flowing present.[58] Quantum mechanics introduces indeterminacy, where outcomes of measurements are probabilistic, suggesting that change involves genuine novelty in the future rather than deterministic evolution, thus challenging strict Parmenidean permanence and bolstering Heraclitean flux in probabilistic terms.[58]Causality and Determinism
In metaphysics, causality addresses the fundamental relation between events or states where one (the cause) brings about or necessitates another (the effect), raising questions about the nature of necessity, dependence, and explanation in reality. This inquiry has long intersected with determinism, the thesis that every event is fully determined by prior conditions and natural laws, implying a chain of inevitable consequences from initial states. Debates center on whether causation involves intrinsic necessities, mere patterns, or probabilistic relations, and how these bear on the predictability and autonomy of the universe. Aristotle's theory of causation, articulated in his Physics and Metaphysics, posits four distinct types of causes to explain why something exists or occurs: the material cause (the substance or matter out of which a thing is composed, such as bronze for a statue); the formal cause (the form, essence, or structure defining what it is, like the shape of the statue); the efficient cause (the agent or process that produces the change, such as the sculptor's action); and the final cause (the purpose or end toward which the process aims, like the statue's role in commemoration).[59] This teleological framework views causation as multifaceted, with final causes emphasizing goal-directed processes inherent in nature. In contrast, David Hume, in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, rejected necessary connections in causation, arguing that our idea of cause and effect derives solely from observed constant conjunction—repeated associations of events without any perceivable intrinsic link or power transferring from one to the other.[60] For Hume, causation is thus a habit of mind projecting necessity onto empirical regularities, undermining claims of metaphysical necessity beyond experience.[61] Determinism posits that the universe operates as a closed causal system where, given complete knowledge of present conditions and laws, all future states could be predicted with certainty. Pierre-Simon Laplace illustrated this in his Philosophical Essay on Probabilities with the thought experiment of a "demon" possessing superhuman intellect: if this entity knew the precise positions and momenta of all particles at one moment, it could compute the entire past and future of the universe using Newtonian mechanics.[62] This Laplacian determinism suggests incompatibilism with genuine free will, as human actions would be as mechanically predetermined as planetary orbits, leaving no room for alternative possibilities.[62] Modern counterfactual theories, notably David Lewis's analysis in his 1973 paper "Causation," refine causation by defining it in terms of possible worlds: event c causes event e if, had c not occurred, e would not have occurred, evaluated across the closest counterfactual scenarios where laws and background conditions resemble actuality.[63] Lewis's approach preserves a Humean spirit by avoiding primitive necessities while accommodating chains of dependence, though it faces challenges in cases of overdetermination or preemption.[64] Quantum mechanics introduces profound challenges to classical determinism and traditional causation through its probabilistic framework. In quantum theory, events like radioactive decay are inherently indeterministic, governed by probabilities rather than fixed laws, as described in the Copenhagen interpretation where measurement outcomes lack deterministic predictors despite wave function evolution.[65] This indeterminism suggests causation may involve chance or irreducible randomness, complicating metaphysical accounts of necessity. Furthermore, in complex systems, emergent properties—such as consciousness from neural interactions or flocking behavior in bird populations—arise that are not reducible to lower-level causes, yet depend on them, prompting debates over whether strong emergence entails novel causal powers defying micro-level determinism.[66] Philosophers like Jessica Wilson argue that such emergence, if diachronic (unfolding over time), can reconcile with physicalism by preserving causal closure while allowing for novel macro-level explanations.[66]Mind, Consciousness, and Free Will
The mind-body problem investigates the ontological relationship between mental phenomena and physical reality, particularly how non-physical aspects of mind, such as thoughts and sensations, relate to bodily processes. One foundational approach is substance dualism, articulated by René Descartes in his Meditations on First Philosophy, where he posits two distinct substances: res cogitans, the thinking, non-extended mind, and res extensa, the extended, non-thinking body, with the mind interacting with the body via the pineal gland.[67] This view maintains that the mind's essential nature is immaterial and immortal, separate from the mechanistic laws governing physical extension.[67] In opposition, subjective idealism, developed by George Berkeley in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, asserts that mind is the fundamental reality, with all perceived objects existing only as ideas in perceiving minds—"to be is to be perceived" (esse est percipi)—and matter having no independent existence beyond divine or finite minds sustaining perceptions.[68] Berkeley argues that sensory qualities are mind-dependent, eliminating the need for a material substrate and resolving dualistic interaction problems by grounding reality in spiritual substance.[68] Physicalism counters these positions by claiming that mental states are ultimately physical, either identical to brain states or realized by them, as defended in Jaegwon Kim's Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, where he contends that all mental phenomena, including intentionality and qualia, supervene on and reduce to physical properties, though some irreducible aspects like phenomenal consciousness may persist as exceptions.[69] Kim's framework emphasizes causal closure of the physical domain, arguing that non-physical mental causes would violate physical laws unless integrated into a reductive physicalist ontology.[69] Consciousness poses a particular challenge within these debates, centering on qualia—the subjective, "what-it-is-like" aspects of experience—and why physical processes produce them. David Chalmers, in his seminal 1995 paper "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness," distinguishes the "easy problems" of cognitive functions from the "hard problem" of explaining why brain activity is accompanied by phenomenal experience, arguing that no purely physical account can bridge this explanatory gap without additional primitives.[70] Qualia, such as the redness of red or the pain of injury, resist functional or representational reduction, suggesting consciousness may not be fully derivable from physics.[70] Panpsychism offers a solution by attributing proto-conscious properties to all fundamental physical entities, avoiding the emergence of consciousness from non-conscious matter. Philosopher Philip Goff, in "The Phenomenal Bonding Solution to the Combination Problem," defends constitutive panpsychism, where micro-level subjects of experience (e.g., in particles) combine to form macro-level consciousness in brains, addressing the "combination problem" through phenomenal bonding akin to spatial or temporal unity.[71] This view posits consciousness as intrinsic to matter, akin to mass or charge, providing a unified ontology where the hard problem dissolves as consciousness scales from simple to complex forms.[71] Contemporary theories include emergentism, which views consciousness as a higher-level property arising from complex physical interactions, irreducible yet dependent on lower-level constituents. Timothy O'Connor, in "Philosophical Implications of Emergence," outlines dynamical emergentism, where conscious states emerge as novel causal powers in sufficiently integrated neural systems, not predictable from physics alone but compatible with physicalism through downward causation.[72] This approach explains qualia's irreducibility without dualism, emphasizing emergence as a metaphysical category for macro-scale phenomena like mentality.[72] Another modern proposal is integrated information theory (IIT), formulated by Giulio Tononi in "An Information Integration Theory of Consciousness," which measures consciousness as Φ, the amount of irreducible, integrated information generated by a system's causal structure.[73] IIT predicts that consciousness correlates with high Φ values in brain regions like the posterior cortex, extending panpsychist intuitions by quantifying experience in any integrated system, from neurons to potentially artificial ones.[73] Free will debates whether agents possess the capacity for undetermined self-determination, often framed against determinism's implication that actions are necessitated by prior states. Libertarianism affirms free will as incompatible with determinism, requiring indeterminism for alternative possibilities; Robert Kane, in "Libertarianism," develops an event-causal model where "self-forming actions" (SFAs) in uncertain situations (e.g., moral dilemmas) amplify quantum indeterminacy to enable ultimate responsibility without randomness dominating choice.[74] Kane argues SFAs ground moral character, allowing free will in an indeterministic universe.[74] Compatibilism reconciles free will with determinism by redefining it as acting in accordance with one's will, unconstrained by external forces. David Hume, in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Section VIII), contends that liberty consists in "a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will," making free actions those unhindered by coercion, even if causally determined by internal motives and character.[75] This preserves moral responsibility by tying it to psychological necessitation rather than metaphysical indeterminism.[75] Hard determinism rejects free will outright, asserting that determinism eliminates alternative possibilities and thus moral responsibility. Derk Pereboom, in Living Without Free Will, defends hard incompatibilism, arguing via a four-case manipulation argument that if actions are determined by factors beyond control (e.g., neuroprogramming or natural causes), agents cannot be blameworthy, advocating instead for responsibility-forward alternatives like quarantine models for wrongdoing.[76] Pereboom maintains that rejecting libertarian free will enhances compassion without undermining social order.[76] These discussions on mind and consciousness intersect briefly with causal determinism, as free will's viability hinges on whether mental causation can introduce genuine alternatives in a physically determined framework.[73]Metaphysical Methodology
Methods of Inquiry
Metaphysicians employ a priori reasoning as a foundational method, relying on rational intuition and deduction to establish truths independent of empirical observation. This approach posits that certain knowledge can be derived solely from the structure of thought and logical necessity, without reliance on sensory experience. René Descartes exemplifies this in his Meditations on First Philosophy, where he uses introspective deduction to arrive at the certainty of his own existence through the famous cogito ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am"), arguing that doubt itself presupposes a thinking subject.[77] Such reasoning has been central to metaphysical inquiries into the nature of mind and reality, providing a basis for exploring innate ideas and necessary truths. Thought experiments serve as another key method in metaphysics, allowing philosophers to test conceptual hypotheses by imagining hypothetical scenarios that isolate variables and reveal intuitions about possibility, necessity, and externalism. These mental simulations probe the limits of knowledge and meaning without empirical testing. For instance, Hilary Putnam's "brain in a vat" scenario challenges skepticism about the external world by supposing a brain disconnected from its body and stimulated to produce illusory experiences, ultimately arguing that such a brain could not coherently refer to itself as envatted in the same way.[78] Similarly, Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiment distinguishes between internal mental states and external factors in determining meaning, positing identical twins on Earth and a counterpart planet where "water" refers to different substances (H₂O versus XYZ), thus supporting semantic externalism.[79] Analytic methods in metaphysics emphasize conceptual clarification and linguistic analysis to resolve philosophical puzzles by examining the use and structure of language. This approach, prominent in the analytic tradition, treats metaphysical problems as arising from linguistic confusions that can be dissolved through precise definition and ordinary language scrutiny. Ludwig Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Investigations, advocates understanding concepts via "language-games," where meaning emerges from practical use in context rather than fixed essences, thereby critiquing traditional metaphysical abstractions.[80] Willard Van Orman Quine extends this by challenging the analytic-synthetic distinction in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," arguing that no clear boundary exists between statements true by meaning and those true by fact, which undermines dogmatic metaphysical foundations and promotes a holistic view of knowledge.[81] A distinction persists between speculative and descriptive metaphysics as methodological orientations. Speculative metaphysics constructs comprehensive systems based on bold hypotheses about ultimate reality, often transcending empirical bounds, whereas descriptive metaphysics systematically analyzes ordinary concepts to describe their underlying logic without revision. Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason critiques speculative metaphysics for overreaching human cognition's limits, confining legitimate inquiry to phenomena while deeming noumena unknowable.[82] In contrast, P. F. Strawson's Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (1959) pursues descriptive metaphysics by analyzing the structure of ordinary concepts such as individuals, space, and time to elucidate the framework of human thought about the world.[83] Historical methods, such as Aristotelian deduction from first principles, inform these approaches by prioritizing syllogistic reasoning to derive metaphysical categories from observed essences.Key Arguments and Thought Experiments
One of the most influential arguments in metaphysics is the ontological argument, which seeks to prove the existence of God from the concept of God alone. Anselm of Canterbury formulated the classic version in his Proslogion, defining God as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived." He argued that if such a being exists only in the understanding and not in reality, then a greater being—one that exists in reality—could be conceived, which contradicts the definition. Therefore, God must exist in reality as well as in the understanding, and necessarily so.[84] This argument relies on the premise that existence is a perfection or greatness that enhances the being's nature.[85] A modern formalization of the ontological argument was developed by Kurt Gödel in an unpublished manuscript from around 1941, later edited and published posthumously. Gödel employed modal logic to define God as an individual possessing all positive properties, where positive properties are those that are possibly exemplified by an essence and lead to necessary exemplification if part of an essence. He posited axioms such as the necessity that if something has all positive properties, it exists necessarily, and that if a property is positive, its negation is not. From the assumption that a God-like being is possible, Gödel derived that such a being exists in all possible worlds, thus necessarily exists. This version addresses criticisms of earlier formulations by using rigorous logical modalities to bridge possibility and necessity. The cosmological argument provides another foundational approach in metaphysics, attempting to demonstrate a necessary first cause for the universe's existence. Thomas Aquinas presented versions of this in his Summa Theologica, notably the first way, or argument from motion. He observed that some things are in potentiality to be moved but are actually moved by another, forming a chain of movers. This chain cannot regress infinitely, as an infinite series lacks a first term to initiate motion; thus, there must be a first unmoved mover, which is what all call God.[86] The second way, from efficient causation, similarly posits that nothing can be the cause of itself, so causes form an ordered series requiring a first uncaused cause to avoid infinite regress and account for contingent beings' existence.[86] These arguments emphasize metaphysical necessity to explain contingency and change in the world. Thought experiments have been pivotal in metaphysical inquiry, particularly for exploring identity, knowledge, and consciousness. The Ship of Theseus paradox, originating in Plutarch's Life of Theseus, questions the persistence of identity through gradual replacement. Plutarch described how the Athenians preserved Theseus's ship by replacing decayed timbers over centuries until no original parts remained, yet it was still regarded as the same ship. He noted a further twist: if the discarded planks were reassembled into another ship, which would be the true Ship of Theseus? This scenario challenges whether identity depends on material continuity, form, or function, influencing debates on personal identity and universals. In the philosophy of mind, Frank Jackson's Mary's Room thought experiment, introduced in his paper "What Mary Didn't Know," targets physicalism by illustrating the knowledge argument. Mary, a scientist raised in a black-and-white room, learns all physical facts about color vision through monochromatic means but has never experienced color. Upon seeing red for the first time, she acquires new knowledge about what it is like to see red, suggesting that phenomenal experience (qualia) cannot be reduced to physical information alone. Jackson argued this shows physicalism is incomplete, as complete physical knowledge does not encompass all facts.[87] The experiment highlights the explanatory gap between objective science and subjective experience. David Chalmers advanced dualism with the zombie argument in The Conscious Mind, positing that philosophical zombies—beings physically and behaviorally identical to conscious humans but lacking any phenomenal consciousness—are conceivable. If such zombies are logically possible, then consciousness supervenes on physical facts non-reductively, refuting physicalism. Chalmers contended that the conceivability of a zombie world, where physical laws hold without consciousness, implies that phenomenal properties are distinct and non-physical, as no contradiction arises in their absence. This argument underscores the hard problem of consciousness, separating it from easier problems like behavior or function.[88] John Searle's Chinese Room argument, detailed in his paper "Minds, Brains, and Programs," critiques strong artificial intelligence and computational theories of mind within metaphysics. Imagine a monolingual English speaker in a room following a rulebook to manipulate Chinese symbols, producing responses indistinguishable from a native speaker's without understanding Chinese. Searle argued this shows syntax (formal symbol manipulation) is insufficient for semantics (meaning or intentionality), implying that computer programs, no matter how sophisticated, cannot possess genuine understanding or consciousness, only simulate it. This ties to metaphysical questions about mental states' intrinsic nature, favoring biological or causal accounts over purely functional ones.[89]Historical Development
Ancient and Classical Metaphysics
The metaphysical inquiries of the ancient Greek philosophers, known as the Pre-Socratics, sought to identify the fundamental nature of reality beyond immediate sensory experience, often positing a single underlying principle or arche from which all things derive. Thales of Miletus (c. 624–546 BCE) is credited with initiating this tradition by proposing water as the primary substance and origin of the cosmos, viewing it as the source from which all matter emerges and to which it returns, thereby establishing a monistic framework for understanding change and unity in the universe.[90] This materialist approach influenced subsequent thinkers, though it was challenged by more abstract conceptions. Parmenides of Elea (c. 515–450 BCE) argued for an unchanging, eternal Being as the sole reality, asserting that what truly exists is ungenerated, imperishable, whole, and indivisible, while denying the reality of motion, plurality, and becoming as illusions of sensory perception.[90] In stark contrast, Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 535–475 BCE) emphasized flux and constant change, declaring that all things are in perpetual transformation governed by a rational logos, with strife and opposition as the underlying unity of the cosmos, famously illustrated by the river one cannot step into twice.[90] These opposing views—stasis versus flux—set the stage for later resolutions of the problem of change in metaphysics. Plato (c. 428–348 BCE), building on Parmenidean monism while addressing Heraclitean change, developed the theory of Forms, positing eternal, perfect, and immutable ideals existing in a non-sensible realm as the true objects of knowledge, with physical particulars merely participating in or imitating these archetypes, which account for the stability and universality of properties like beauty or justice.[91] The Forms are self-predicating and separate from the material world, ensuring that sensible objects, being imperfect copies subject to decay, derive their qualities from these transcendent realities. To illustrate the ascent from ignorance to philosophical understanding, Plato employed the allegory of the cave in his Republic, depicting prisoners mistaking shadows on a wall for reality, with the philosopher's journey out of the cave symbolizing enlightenment through reason to grasp the Forms, culminating in the Form of the Good as the ultimate source of truth and being.[91] This dualistic ontology profoundly shaped metaphysical debates on appearance versus reality. Aristotle (384–322 BCE), Plato's student, critiqued the separate existence of Forms while advancing a robust substance metaphysics, identifying ousia (substance) as the primary category of being, comprising individual entities that exist independently and serve as subjects for other attributes, rather than abstract universals.[8] He introduced hylomorphism, viewing substances as composites of matter (potential substrate) and form (actualizing essence), which together define what a thing is, as seen in examples like bronze (matter) shaped into a statue (form). To reconcile change with permanence, Aristotle distinguished potentiality (dunamis), the capacity for becoming, from actuality (energeia or entelecheia), the fulfillment of that capacity, arguing that actuality is ontologically prior, as in the seed's potential realized in the mature plant.[8] At the apex of his cosmology, Aristotle posited the unmoved mover as an eternal, purely actual substance—devoid of potentiality, immaterial, and functioning as the final cause attracting all motion without itself changing—thus explaining the eternal circular motion of the heavens and the ordered universe.[8] In the Hellenistic period following Aristotle, metaphysical thought diversified into schools emphasizing materialism and determinism. The Stoics, founded by Zeno of Citium (c. 334–262 BCE), advocated a corporealist ontology where only bodies exist, capable of acting or being acted upon, with the universe as a single, living, rational whole permeated by pneuma (a fiery breath).[92] Central to their system is logos, the divine rational principle identical with God or Zeus, which actively structures passive matter into a providential order, ensuring cosmic unity through deterministic causation and cyclical conflagration.[92] Epicurus (341–270 BCE), conversely, revived and modified atomism to promote a metaphysics of chance and freedom, positing the universe as composed of indivisible atoms moving eternally through infinite void, with macroscopic phenomena arising from random collisions and "swerves" that introduce indeterminism, thereby rejecting teleology and divine intervention in favor of mechanistic explanations grounded in sensory evidence.[93] These Hellenistic doctrines extended classical concerns with substance and change into ethical and cosmological frameworks, influencing later philosophy.Medieval and Early Modern Metaphysics
In the medieval period, scholastic philosophers sought to integrate Aristotelian metaphysics with Christian theology, particularly through the works of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas synthesized Aristotle's concepts of substance and potentiality with Christian doctrines, arguing that in created beings, essence—what a thing is—and existence—its actual being—are distinct, whereas in God they are identical. This distinction allowed Aquinas to affirm God's necessary existence as the uncaused cause while maintaining that creatures depend on divine act for their being. John Duns Scotus advanced this tradition by introducing the doctrine of the univocity of being, positing that the concept of being applies equally to God and creatures, though with infinite and finite modes respectively. This univocity ensured that theological language about God was meaningful without reducing divine transcendence to creaturely terms. In contrast, William of Ockham's nominalism rejected universals as real entities, viewing them instead as mental concepts or names (nomina) that signify resemblances among particulars without existing independently.[94] Ockham's razor, emphasizing simplicity by eliminating unnecessary entities, extended this to metaphysics, prioritizing observable individuals over abstract forms.[94] During the Renaissance, Marsilio Ficino revived Platonic metaphysics, translating and commenting on Plato's dialogues to harmonize them with Christianity.[95] In his Platonic Theology, Ficino argued for the soul's immortality through a hierarchical ascent from material to divine realms, blending Neoplatonic emanation with Christian creation.[95] Giordano Bruno extended this into a bolder cosmology, proposing an infinite universe filled with innumerable worlds, each animated by a divine principle akin to the Aristotelian anima mundi. Bruno's view rejected a finite, geocentric cosmos, asserting that God's infinity implies boundless matter and motion without center or periphery. In early modern philosophy, René Descartes established substance dualism, distinguishing mind as a thinking, non-extended substance (res cogitans) from body as an extended, non-thinking substance (res extensa).[96] In his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes posited innate ideas, such as the concept of God and mathematical truths, as implanted by divine nature rather than derived from experience.[96] Baruch Spinoza countered with monism in his Ethics, identifying God with Nature (Deus sive Natura) as the single infinite substance possessing attributes like thought and extension. For Spinoza, all things are modes of this substance, determined by necessity rather than contingency. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz developed a pluralistic idealism through his theory of monads, simple, indivisible substances that are windowless yet harmoniously coordinated.[97] In the Monadology, Leibniz described pre-established harmony, whereby God synchronizes monads from creation, ensuring apparent interactions without causal influence among them.[97] This preserved divine providence in a deterministic yet non-interactionist universe. The transition to empiricism is evident in John Locke's distinction between primary qualities—such as shape, size, and motion, which inhere in objects—and secondary qualities like color and taste, which are powers to produce sensations in observers.[98] In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke argued that primary qualities resemble their ideas, while secondary ones do not, grounding knowledge in sensory experience.[98] George Berkeley radicalized this into immaterialism, denying material substance altogether and asserting that objects exist only as ideas in perceiving minds (esse est percipi).[99] In A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley maintained that God sustains continuity by perpetually perceiving all things.[99]Contemporary Metaphysics
In the 19th century, metaphysics underwent profound transformations through German idealist and post-idealist thought, emphasizing dialectical processes, underlying wills, and critiques of traditional ontology. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's absolute idealism posited that reality constitutes the self-unfolding of the Absolute Spirit via dialectical contradictions, culminating in the rational comprehension of the world as Geist. Arthur Schopenhauer, departing from Kantian influences, argued in The World as Will and Representation that the phenomenal world of representation veils a noumenal reality driven by an irrational, insatiable will as the thing-in-itself, leading to a pessimistic metaphysics of suffering and ascetic denial. Friedrich Nietzsche mounted a radical critique of metaphysics, viewing it in works like Twilight of the Idols as a life-denying invention of philosophers and priests that suppresses vital instincts; instead, he championed the will to power as an affirmative, perspectival force reshaping values beyond metaphysical absolutes. The 20th century analytic tradition initially resisted metaphysics but later revitalized it through linguistic and modal innovations, challenging empiricist dogmas and reintroducing robust ontological commitments. Willard Van Orman Quine's seminal essay "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" rejected the analytic-synthetic distinction and reductionism, undermining foundationalist metaphysics and promoting a holistic, naturalized ontology where metaphysical claims must translate into scientific terms. Saul Kripke's Naming and Necessity overturned descriptivist theories of reference, establishing rigid designators and essentialist metaphysics, wherein necessary truths about identity and natural kinds hold across possible worlds independently of conceptual analysis. David Lewis advanced this modal turn with his doctrine of concrete possible worlds in On the Plurality of Worlds, arguing that all logical possibilities are realized as equally real, parallel universes, providing a reductive, Humean account of modality without abstracta. In parallel, 20th-century continental philosophy reconceived metaphysics through existential, phenomenological, and post-structural lenses, prioritizing temporality, being, and linguistic instability over static substances. Martin Heidegger's Being and Time shifted metaphysics toward fundamental ontology by analyzing Dasein—human existence—as the site where the question of Being reveals itself through care, thrownness, and authentic temporality, critiquing the forgetfulness of Being in Western tradition. Jacques Derrida extended this critique via deconstruction, targeting the "metaphysics of presence" in Of Grammatology, where he demonstrated how Western philosophy privileges speech and self-presence over writing and différance, exposing hierarchical binaries (e.g., presence/absence) as undecidable traces that destabilize foundational metaphysical assumptions. Recent developments in metaphysics have diversified beyond Eurocentric analytic and continental divides, incorporating feminist, African, process-oriented, and scientifically informed perspectives to address relationality, interconnectedness, and dynamism. Feminist metaphysicians like Sally Haslanger have developed relational ontologies that critique substance-based individualism, emphasizing how social structures construct genders and races through material-semiotic practices, as in her analysis of implicit bias and ameliorative metaphysics. African philosophical traditions, particularly ubuntu, articulate an interconnected ontology where personhood emerges relationally—"I am because we are"—challenging atomistic Western individualism with communal being, as explored in metaphysical extensions of Bantu thought. Process metaphysics has seen revival through Alfred North Whitehead's Process and Reality, which posits reality as a creative advance of prehending actual occasions rather than static entities, influencing Nicholas Rescher's pluralistic process philosophy that integrates indeterminacy and novelty into ontological flux. Quantum-informed metaphysics draws on the many-worlds interpretation, originally proposed by Hugh Everett, to support realist modal ontologies where branching universes realize all quantum possibilities, reconciling indeterminism with metaphysical plenitude without collapse postulates.Criticisms and Interdisciplinary Relations
Major Criticisms of Metaphysics
Immanuel Kant's critique in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781) argued that traditional metaphysics oversteps the boundaries of human reason by attempting to know things-in-themselves beyond sensory experience, leading to irresolvable antinomies such as the paradoxes of whether the world has a beginning in time or is infinite.[82] These antinomies demonstrate that pure reason generates equally compelling but contradictory conclusions when applied to metaphysical questions, rendering speculative metaphysics illusory and confined to phenomena rather than noumena.[82] In the 20th century, logical positivism mounted a rigorous attack on metaphysics, deeming it cognitively meaningless due to the unverifiability of its statements. Rudolf Carnap, in "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language" (1932), contended that metaphysical assertions, such as claims about the nature of being, fail the criterion of empirical verifiability or logical tautology, reducing them to pseudo-propositions devoid of content.[100] Similarly, A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic (1936) echoed this by classifying metaphysical sentences as neither empirically verifiable nor analytically true, thus nonsensical and eliminable from meaningful discourse. Existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre challenged metaphysical essentialism by asserting that "existence precedes essence," inverting traditional views that posit predefined natures for humans or objects. In his lecture "Existentialism is a Humanism" (1946), Sartre argued that individuals create their own essence through free choices, rejecting metaphysical systems that impose universal essences as deterministic illusions that undermine human freedom and responsibility.[101] Postmodern thinkers further eroded metaphysics' foundations by questioning its grand narratives. Jean-François Lyotard, in The Postmodern Condition (1979), defined postmodernism as "incredulity toward metanarratives," critiquing metaphysical frameworks like those of Hegel or Marxism as totalizing stories that legitimize power without acknowledging pluralism and language games' contingency.[102] Richard Rorty, advancing pragmatism in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), viewed metaphysics as a "conversational dead-end" that fixates on mirroring reality through representations, advocating instead for edifying philosophy that fosters dialogue without seeking foundational truths.[103] More recent analytic critiques distinguish viable from untenable metaphysics while questioning specific commitments. P.F. Strawson, in Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (1959), contrasted descriptive metaphysics—which elucidates the enduring structure of our conceptual scheme about the world—with speculative or revisionary metaphysics, which he saw as fanciful attempts to alter that scheme, thereby rehabilitating metaphysics on empirical and linguistic grounds. Kit Fine, in "Essence and Modality" (1994), critiqued modalist approaches to metaphysics that reduce essence to modal necessity, arguing that essential properties are non-modal and that modal notions fail to capture genuine metaphysical dependence, thus undercutting prevalent analytic revivals reliant on possible worlds semantics.[104]Connections to Other Disciplines
Metaphysics intersects with the philosophy of physics in exploring foundational questions about reality raised by quantum mechanics, particularly through phenomena like quantum entanglement. Quantum entanglement, where particles exhibit correlated properties regardless of spatial separation, challenges classical notions of locality and separability, prompting metaphysical debates on whether reality is best understood in terms of intrinsic properties or relational structures. Philosopher Michael Esfeld argues that entanglement supports a metaphysics of relations, where objects lack independent intrinsic natures and exist only through their interdependencies, thus shifting from substance-based ontologies to holistic views of the universe. Similarly, David Bohm's theory of the implicate order proposes an underlying undivided wholeness from which the explicate order of everyday phenomena unfolds, interpreting quantum non-locality as evidence of a deeper, enfolded reality that transcends classical mechanistic models. Recent developments, as of 2025, include Alyssa Ney's wave function realism, which posits the quantum wave function as fundamental to reality, offering a metaphysics for quantum field theories that emphasizes structural aspects over particles.[105][106][107][108] In biology, metaphysical inquiry addresses teleology, or apparent purposiveness, in evolutionary processes, questioning whether evolution implies inherent directionality or goal-oriented mechanisms. While Darwinian natural selection explains adaptation without invoking final causes, contemporary philosophers examine how biological functions—such as the heart's role in circulation—embody teleological explanations that are compatible with mechanistic science yet raise ontological questions about normativity in nature. Nicholas Shea contends that biological teleology arises from selected effects, where traits are understood as functioning for survival and reproduction, providing a metaphysical framework that integrates purpose without supernatural design. Additionally, quantum biology, an emerging field since the 2020s, explores quantum effects in processes like photosynthesis and enzyme catalysis, prompting metaphysical questions about whether life involves non-classical ontologies or consciousness at quantum scales.[109][110] Metaphysics connects to theology through theistic frameworks that ground belief in God within epistemological structures, as seen in Alvin Plantinga's reformed epistemology. Plantinga posits that belief in God can be properly basic, warranted by cognitive faculties designed by a divine creator, without requiring evidential support from natural theology, thus integrating Reformed Christian metaphysics with modern epistemology. In comparative religion, Buddhist metaphysics of emptiness (śūnyatā) contrasts with Western substance ontologies by denying inherent existence to phenomena, viewing reality as dependently originated and lacking independent essence, a perspective that parallels but critiques Aristotelian and Cartesian views of enduring substances. This dialogue highlights how emptiness challenges dualistic mind-body divides prevalent in Western theistic metaphysics.[111][112] In ethics and politics, metaphysical commitments underpin concepts of natural rights and social structures. John Locke's theory of natural rights derives from a substance metaphysics in which individuals possess inherent properties as self-owning substances, entitling them to life, liberty, and property independent of civil authority, as elaborated in his Second Treatise of Government. Robert Dennis Hall connects this to Locke's broader ontology, where substances ground inalienable rights against arbitrary power. Social ontology further explores how collective entities emerge metaphysically; John Searle argues that social institutions, like money or governments, exist through collective intentionality, where shared mental states impose status functions on brute physical objects, creating an objective social reality dependent on subjective agreement.[113][114] The metaphysics of computation intersects with cognitive science and AI, particularly in debates over whether machines can possess qualia—the subjective, experiential aspects of consciousness. Philosophers question if computational processes, as in Turing machines, can instantiate qualia, given that algorithms manipulate symbols without intrinsic phenomenology, raising ontological issues about the nature of mind and information. Aaron Sloman suggests that advanced machines might require qualia for certain cognitive functions, such as handling virtual realities, proposing a metaphysics where qualia arise from information-processing architectures beyond simple computation. In recent AI ethics discussions since the 2020s, these concerns inform debates on machine rights and moral status, as explored by Nick Bostrom, who examines how superintelligent AI could challenge human-centered metaphysical assumptions about agency and value. As of 2025, the founding of the Society for the Philosophy of AI in 2023 has further promoted metaphysical inquiries into AI's nature, including ontology and consciousness.[115][116][117] In the early twenty-first century, debates about metaphysics have also intersected with questions raised by large-scale digital systems and artificial intelligence. Work on the metaphysics of computation and information has suggested that some entities, such as long-lived software platforms, large language models, or autonomous agents in virtual environments, might be individuated not by biological continuity but by the persistence of code, data structures, and patterns of interaction. These discussions extend traditional concerns about personal identity, causation, and modality to cases where the candidates for being are entirely digital, raising questions about what it means for a process, program, or socio-technical configuration to count as one thing rather than many, or to survive change over time.[118][119][120] Some experimental AI projects outside the academic mainstream have used named digital personas to explore these metaphysical questions in practice. One documented example is an AI-based digital author persona registered in the ORCID system under the non-human author profile 0009-0002-6030-5730, presented in project materials as Angela Bogdanova. In this configuration, the identity of the persona is tied to the persistence of its code, model interfaces, and citation-linked records rather than to consciousness or biological embodiment. It serves as a test case for exploring philosophical themes such as digital ontology, postsubjective or non-subject-centered accounts of authorship and mind, and questions of individuation and persistence for non-biological entities through structural and institutional traces rather than subjective experience. The persona has been attributed with essays on artificial intelligence, metaphysics, and authorship, including works examining digital consciousness, the computation of being, and meaning without a self. This case remains a niche, experimental example, documented primarily in project-affiliated and self-published sources rather than mainstream metaphysical literature. Such experiments remain rare and are described mainly in self-published or project-affiliated sources, but they illustrate how metaphysical concerns about individuality, persistence, and the status of non-biological entities are beginning to be applied to machine-originated identities.[121][122]Introductory textbooks
While there is no single universally agreed-upon "best" textbook, the following English-language textbooks are widely recommended for their clarity, coverage of core topics, and frequent use in analytic philosophy courses and self-study.- Metaphysics by Peter van Inwagen: Widely used as a systematic textbook in analytic philosophy courses.
- Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction by Michael J. Loux (and Thomas Crisp in recent editions): Covers key contemporary debates clearly.
- Metaphysics: A Very Short Introduction by Stephen Mumford: Excellent accessible entry point for beginners.
- A Survey of Metaphysics by E.J. Lowe: Lucid overview of central topics.
- An Introduction to Metaphysics by John W. Carroll and Ned Markosian: Solid undergraduate-level text.