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Psychoanalysis
Psychoanalysis
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Psychoanalysis[i] is a set of theories and techniques of research to discover unconscious processes and their influence on conscious thought, emotion and behavior. Based on dream interpretation, psychoanalysis is also a talk therapy method for treating mental disorders.[ii][iii] Established in the early 1890s by Sigmund Freud, it takes into account Darwin's theory of evolution, neurology findings, ethnology reports, and, in some respects, the clinical research of his mentor Josef Breuer.[1] Freud developed and refined the theory and practice of psychoanalysis until his death in 1939.[2] In an encyclopedic article, he identified its four cornerstones: "the assumption that there are unconscious mental processes, the recognition of the theory of repression and resistance, the appreciation of the importance of sexuality and of the Oedipus complex."[3]

Freud's earlier colleagues Alfred Adler and Carl Jung soon developed their own methods (individual and analytical psychology); he criticized these concepts, stating that they were not forms of psychoanalysis.[4] After the author's death, neo-Freudian thinkers like Erich Fromm, Karen Horney and Harry Stack Sullivan created some subfields.[5] Jacques Lacan, whose work is often referred to as Return to Freud, described his metapsychology as a technical elaboration of the three-instance model of the psyche and examined the language-like structure of the unconscious.[6][7]

Psychoanalysis has been a controversial discipline from the outset. While evidence suggests psychoanalysis, especially long-term psychoanalytic psychotherapy, can be effective for certain disorders,[8][9] its overall efficacy remains contested. Long-term may have benefits over other psychotherapies.[9] Its influence on psychology and psychiatry is undisputed.[10][iv][v] Psychoanalytic concepts are also widely used outside the therapeutic field, for example in the interpretation of neurological findings,[11] myths and fairy tales, philosophical perspectives such as Freudo-Marxism and in literary criticism.

Overview

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Dynamics of libidinal energy (death- and life drive) in Freud's model of the soul, referring to his rider metaphor: the head symbolizes the ego (principle of reality); the animal body the id (pleasure principle). Similarly dual, the libido branches out from the id into two main areas: the mental urge to know (up), and the bodily urge to act (down). Both unite in the ego in order to fulfil the needs of the id. This includes perception and judgement of inner/outer reality, leading to experiences (by muscle control), which imprint the superego. The superego contains our socialization taking place in childhood. If it supports the instinctual needs, the organism remains mentally healthy – the 'rider' carries out his 'animal's' will "as if it were his own".[12]

One of Freud's central arguments is that the contents of the unconscious largely determine cognition and behavior, describing this as the third insult to mankind. While the first is said to consist of the 'cosmic' scandal triggered by Copernicus, the second as biological one by Darwin's realization that man evolved in line of all animals, the narcissistically affected ego now has to cope with the psychological affront that it is not even master of its own house.[13][14]

Freud found that many of the drives – which his structural model locates in the 'id' – are repressed into the unconscious as a result of traumatic experiences during childhood, so that attempts to integrate them into the conscious perception of the ego triggers resistance. These and other defense mechanisms 'want' to maintain the repression – not least with the means of censorship, internalized fear of punishment or mother-love withdrawal – while the affected instincts resist.[15] All in all, an inner war rages between the id and the ego's conscious values, which manifests itself in more or less conspicuous mental disorders, whereby Freud did not equate the statistical normality of our society with 'healthy'. "Health can only be described in metapsychological terms" (assessment of each psychic process according to the coordinates of biological drive economy, dynamics and topology).[16]

He discovered that the instinctive impulses are expressed most clearly – albeit still encoded – in the symbols of dreams as well as in the symptomatic detours of neuroticism and Freudian slips. Psychoanalysis was developed in order to clarify the causes of disorders and to restore mental health[17] by enabling the ego to become aware of the id's needs and to find realistic, self-controlled ways to satisfy them. Freud summarized this goal of his therapy in the demand "Where id was, ego shall became", defining the underlying libido as driving energy of all innate needs and equating it with the Eros (universal desire) of Platonic philosophy.[18][19]

Oedipus rising

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Illustration of how three autarkic hunter-gatherer hordes began to form a political inter-group organization already at the early Neolithic period. According to K. Schmidt, this kind of united labour was necessary to erect monuments like those at Göbekli Tepe (cf. C. Renfrew).[20] The same precondition (several united working groups) he sees with regard to the onset of agriculture in Mesopotamia.[21] This links to Eden as that mythical Garden, where, is said, the gods had created the first human couples to pacify an internal political conflict (cf. Atra-Hasis).

Freud attached great importance to coherence of his structural model. The metapsychological specification of the functions and interlocking of the three instances was intended to ensure the full connectivity of this 'psychic apparatus' with biological sciences, in particular Darwin's theory of evolution of species, including mankind with his natural behavior, thinking ability and technological creativity. Such a model of health is indispensable for the diagnostic process (sickness can only be realized as a deviation from the optimal cooperation of all mental-organic functions), but Freud had to be modest. He came to the conclusion that he had to leave his metapsychological-based model of the soul in the unfinished state of a torso[22] because – as he stated one last time in Moses and Monotheism – there was no well-founded primate research in the first half of 20th century.[23] Without knowledge of the instinctively formed group structure of our genetically closest relatives in animal kingdom (instead of Freud's single 'super-strong primal father', they show highly social male teams, but despite their remarkable intelligence still no ability to form political inter-group organizations[24]), his thesis of the Darwinian primordial horde as presented for discussion in Totem and Taboo cannot be tested and, where necessary, replaced by a realistic model.

Darwin's horde life and its abolition through the introduction of monogamy (as a political agreement between the sons who murdered the horde's polygamous forefather) embodies the evolutionary and the cultural-historical core of psychoanalysis. The aspect of violent elimination of natural horde life is decisive for Freud's Unease in Culture; his assumption of the outbreak of the Oedipus complex in human history is based on it. It led to the formulation of rules of behavior such as the prohibition of adultery and incest, and thus to the beginning of totemic cultures. Manifested in this kind of customs, traditions and ritual education, some of them changed through intermediate stage of feudalism to modern nations, endowed with their monotheism (which centralized the diversity of totems in an abstract omnipotent singel deity), power-hierarchical structures of military, trade and politics (s. Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego).

Freud's thesis of the violent introduction of monogamous cohabitation[25] stands in contrast to the religiously enigmatic narrative about the origin of first human couples on earth as an expression of divine will, but closer to the ancient trap to pacify political conflicts among the groups of Neolithic mankind. Examples include Prometheus' uprising against Zeus, who created Pandora as a fatal wedding gift for Epimetheus to divide and rule this Titanic brothers; Plato's myth of the spherical people cut into isolated individuals for the same reason;[26] and the similarly resolved revolt of inferior gods in the Flood epic Atra-Hasis. Nonetheless, without examination in the light of modern primate research, as demanded by Freud, his idea of an artificial origin of monogamy remains an unproven hypothesis of paleoanthropology, merely a "just so story as a not unpleasant English critic wittily called it. But I mean it honours a hypothesis if it shows the capability of creating context and understanding in new areas."[27]

According to Freud, this hypothesis explains the present-day son's conflict with his father over his mother, naming this view after Sophocles' tragedy Oedipus, and supplementing it with case studies such as the genital Phobia of a five-year-old boy.[28] However, the author not only discovered this complex and the 'oral fixatet' Syndrom of Narzissos' regress back into amniotic fluid (as far as possible given the state of science at the time), but also devised a hypothesis of healthy emotional development, which presupposes the natural relationships of Homo sapiens from birth and takes place in three successive stages: the oral, anal and genital phases. Whereby the sexual drive of the latter takes a no less genetically determined 'latency' break – the Sleeping Beauty – between the ages of about 7 and 12 for the benefit of social-intellectual growth.

Traditional setting

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Psychoanalysts place large emphasis on experiences of early childhood, and try to overcome infantile amnesia. In traditional Freudian setting,[29] the patient lies on a couch, and the analyst sits just behind or somehow out of sight. The patient should express all his thoughts, all secrets and dreams, including free associations and fantasies. In addition to its task of strengthening the ego with its ability to think dialectical – Freud's primacy of the intellect –, therapy also aims to induce transference. The patient thus projects onto the analyst the parental figures internalized in his superego during early childhood. As he once did as a baby and little child, he experiences again the feelings of helpless dependence, all the futile longing for love, anger, rage and urge for revenge on the failing parents, but now with the possibility of processing these contents that have shaped his persona.[30][31]

The term countertransference means that the analyst himself projects such content onto his patient; then he has an own open problem and has to go to his own analyst if he is not yet able to help himself due to inexperience.[32]

From the sum of what is shown and communicated, the analyst deduces unconscious conflicts with imposed traumas that are causing the patient's symptoms, his persona and character problems, and works out a diagnosis. This explanation of the origin of loss of mental health and the analytical processes as a whole confronts the patients ego with the pathological defence mechanisms, makes him aware of them as well as the instinctive contents of the id that have been repressed by them,[33] and thus helps him to better understand himself and the world in which he lives, was born and educated – according to Freud, the indispensable prerequisite for any consciously sought change in behavior that has therapeutically beneficial effects on interpersonal relationships.

Freud recognized during his pre-psychoanalytic research that hypnosis does not contribute to patients' understanding of the causes of their disorders and has therefore proven ineffective.

Metapsychology

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The three instances of the structural model, combinated with findings of modern neurology. The drawing refers to the basic theses of Freud's metapsychology. According to it, the soul with its innate needs, consciousness and memory resembles a 'psychic apparatus" to which "spatial extension and composition of several parts can be attributed (...)" and whose "location ... is the brain (nervous system)".[34] Decisive for this view of Freud was his Project for a Scientific Psychology. Written in 1895, he develops there the thesis that the brain is able to store experiences in its neuronal network through "a permanent change after an event": one of the superego's main functions.

Separate from psychoanalysis itself (but not insignificant for understanding the connection between body and mind as aspects of the same 'soul') is the fact that its neurological branch, neuropsychoanalysis, has recently provided evidence that the brain stores experiences in specialized parts of its neural network and that the ego performs its highest focus of conscious thinking in frontal lobe.[35][11] In some respects, Freud himself can be regarded as the founder of this field of modern research. Parallel to the consolidation of psychoanalysis, however, he turned away from it with the argument that consciousness is directly given – cannot be explained by insights into physiological connections. Essentially, only two things were known about the living soul: The brain with its nervous system extending over the entire organism, and the acts of consciousness. In Freud's view, therefore, any number of phenomena can be integrated between "both endpoints of our knowledge" (findings of modern neurology just as well as the position of our planet in the universe, for example), but this only contributes to the spatial "localization of the acts of consciousness", not to their understanding.[36]

With reference to Descartes, contemporary neuropsychoanalysts explain this situation as mind–body dichotomy, namely both as two total different kinds of 'stuff': the physical matter as the object, and the mentally conscious ego as the subject, which cannot objectify itself in itself (as 'pure spirit') but only via the 'reflective' diversions of its corporal matter. With regard to Freud's libido (which branches out into its mental and bodily areas in a complementary way) they call this dichotomy the "dual-aspect monism".[37] It touches on the point of psychoanalysis that is most difficult to grasp with the means of empirically based sciences – in fact, only under Kant's assumption that living systems always make judgements about the phenomena they perceive with regard to the satisfaction of their immanent needs. Freud therefore conceptualized the libido as a teleological element of his threefold model of the soul, as a desiring energy that links cause and purpose, and not as a mere 'effect'. The libido, as universally desiring energy like Plato's Eros, embodies both the psychic drive source of all instinctual needs of living beings and the first cause of their physical development. In this way, sexual behavior realizes Darwin's law of natural selection by favoring the best-fitting and aesthetically well-proportioned body forms in reproduction.[38] Freud was no less familiar with the energetic-economic aspect of evolution and psychological processes (cf. his definition of the three metapsychological coordinates)[39] than with the transcendentally unified trinity of Plato's philosophy, according to which Truth expresses the Good and the Beauty in equal measure, anchored in the proportions of the golden ratio.

Life and death drives

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In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Sigmund Freud draws on Plato's myth of the spherical humans to illustrate his view of the essentially conservative nature of the instincts. In Plato's tale, these spherical beings—powerful, self-sufficient, and united—are split into separate individuals by Zeus as punishment for their assault on the gods. The act of separation creates a weaker type of human whose members nonetheless seek to restore the lost original united state,[40] pursuing this goal in two ways: through the exchange of physical pleasure; and through collective creative thinking, as depicted by the group of artists and philosophers around Socrates in Plato's Symposium.

Furthermore, Zeus's disruptive intervention and the human desire for reunification present aspects of the same libidinal energy: the death drive is rooted in forces, that break down and dissolve structures, striving to return life to an inorganic state, while the life drive strives to combine and organizate matter into ever more complex forms. Plato's concept of Eros—described in his Symposium as a constantly hungry "great hunter"—thus becomes a useful symbol for Freud's theory of libido as a dualistic drive energy.[41]

One example to clarify the internal complementarity of libido is provided by nutrition through predation. This phenomenon entails both destruction and integration: the prey must ultimately be broken down into molecules before the hunter's organism can assimilate the useful components for regeneration and growth. Similarly, in reproduction, countless sperm cells perish in the competitive process before one unites with the egg, achieving new life through this selective synthesis. Ensuring territorial sovereignty, too, require both forces: the survival of a group may depend on neutralising or weakening hostile elements; therefore, attacks by foreign communities such as that of the Titanic brotherhood (Epimetheus and Prometheus) could have become a political motive for Zeus to separate them from each other (divide and rule through Pandora as a fatal wedding gift) while simultaneously strengthening social cohesion among the members of his own group. The same dual movement operates in the realm of thinking. Mental activity often begins with analysis—disassembling complex phenomena like, for example, dreams or atoms into simpler elements to grasp their nature—and proceeds to synthesis, recombining what has been learned into new ideas, models, or interpretations that should correspond as closely as possible to reality. From this perspective, the term psychoanalysis involves not only the analytical (separative) aspect but also the synthetic (reintegrative) one.

Freud's dual drive theory explains libidinal energy as a constant interplay of dividing and unifying forces. Ultimately, this highly abstract view led him to assume that all psycho-biological dynamics are based on the unpleasant increase and pleasant decrease of energetic tensions (as in hunger and satiety). Through this approach to the dynamic of libido, he introduced the coordinate of economy into his metapsychology.[42]

The Question of Lay Analysis

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Freud's worldview, with dream interpretation as "the royal road to the unconscious", was not conceived as a source of income (money is not a child's desire), but as a method whose appropriation is open to everyone. In the Wednesday round of young psychoanalysis, academics and 'uneducated' worked together on an equal footing to rediscover the happiness lost in the Dark Continent of the human soul – not easy for some doctors to understand.[43][44] To counter their attempt to prohibit non-academics from becoming psychoanalysts (while reserving for themselves the right to apply the concept without serious knowledge), he clearly sets out in his treatise The Question of Lay Analysis the only condition required to practice psychoanalysis: the methodical examination of one's own inner situation, ideally with the assistance of an experienced psychoanalyst.

Becoming an experienced analyst requires extensive background knowledge of the processes of human biological development and intellectual history. Freud's method is therefore not limited to its classical therapeutic field of application but is also employed in research across many other areas – for example, in the interpretation of philosophical concepts such as Kant's a priori (replacing it with the conditions of the mental apparatus),[45] as well as in the analysis of the cultural and civilizational achievements of humankind and its closest zoological relatives.

History

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1885–1899

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Psychoanalysis
The words Die Psychoanalyse in Sigmund Freud's handwriting, 1938
ICD-9-CM94.31
MeSHD011572

In 1885, Freud was given the opportunity to study at the Salpêtrière in Paris under the famous neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot. Charcot had specialized in the field of hysterical paralysis and established hypnosis as a research tool, the experimental application of which actually made it possible to eliminate symptoms of this kind. Paralysed people could suddenly walk again, and blind ones could see. Although this 'messianic' effect is not known to last long, as Freud soon realized through his own experiments, the phenomenon of hypnotic false-healing played a decisive role in reinforcing his idea of a purely psychological background to the complex neurotic clinical picture.

A few years later (1887–88), he worked as a neurologist in a hospital (the Public Institute for Children's Diseases in Vienna), where some little patients suffered from neurotic symptoms. All attempts to develop a suitable neuronal treatment failed; in fact, the detailed examinations did not reveal any organic defects. In the monograph written on this cases, Freud documented his differential-diagnostically supported suspicion that neurotic symptoms probably would have psychological causes.[46]

Finishing the ineffective hypnosis, the idea of psychoanalysis began to receive serious attention; Freud initially called it free association.[47] His first attempt to explain neurotical symptoms on this path was presented in Studies on Hysteria (1895). Co-authored with Josef Breuer, this is generally seen as the birth of psychoanalysis.[48] The work based on their partly joint treatment of Bertha Pappenheim, referred to by the pseudonym "Anna O." Bertha herself had dubbed the treatment talking cure. Breuer, a distinguished physician, was astonished but remained unspecific; while Freud formulated his hypothesis that Anna's hystera seemed to be caused by distressing but unconscious experiences related to sexuality, basing his assumption on corresponding free associations made by the young women.[48] For example, she sometimes liked to jokingly rename her talking cure as chimney sweeping, an association about the fairy tale through which part of a pregnant woman's house 'the stork' gives birth to the baby – or in Lacan's words: "The more Anna provided signifers, the more she chattered on, the better it went."[49] See also Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905).

Around the same time, Freud had started to develop a neurological hypothesis about mental phenomena such as memory, but soon abandoned this attempt and left it unpublished.[50] Insights into neuronal-biochemical processes that store experiences in the brain – like engraving the proverbial tabula rasa with some code – belongs to the physiological branch of science and lead in a different direction of research than the psychological question of what the differences between consciousness and unconsciousness are. After some thought about a suitable term, Freud called his new instrument and field of research psychoanalysis, introduced in his essay "Inheritance and Etiology of Neuroses", written in 1896.[51][52]

The abuse thesis

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In 1896, Freud also published his seduction theory, in which he confidently claimed to have uncovered repressed memories of sexual abuse in each of his few early patients. This type of sexual excitations of the child should therefore be understood as a prerequisite for the later development of hysterical and other neurotic symptoms.[53] Later the same year, he became aware of an inconsistency: most of them expressed their "emphatic disbelief" in respect of his abbuse thesis; that they "had no feeling of remembering the infantile sexual scenes" he suggested.[53]: 204  This contradiction and other findings in the course of further research forced Freud to doubt his thesis that child abuse should be almost omnipresent in our society.

Initially, he expressed his suspicion of having made a mistake in private to his friend and colleague Wilhelm Fliess in 1898; but it took another 8 years before he had clarified the obscure connections sufficiently to publicly revoke his thesis, stating the reasons.[54] Freud's final position on the origin of neurosis in general is summarized in his late work The Discomfort in Culture. Accordingly, to this work, the causes of neurotic symptoms lie not in a general sexual abuse of children, but in the abolition of the natural horde life and the method by which each generation since then taught the next to adopt the rules of coexistence known as totemism and–or morality. See also Moses and Monotheism and The Future of an Illusion.

The secrecy mechanism

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In the mid-1890s, he was still upholding his hypothesis of sexual abuse. In this context, he reported on fantasies of several patients, which on the one hand would point to memories of scenes of infantile masturbation stored in the unconscious, while the more conscious parts on the other hand would aim to make these morally forbidden acts of childish pleasure unrecognizable, to cover them up. The interesting point for Freud here was not so much the secretiveness itself (a well-known behavior of Victorian era), but the following twofold realization: a) That children – at that time considered as innocent little angels – initiate pleasurable actions of their own accord; have 'drives' at all, as later assigned to the 'id'; and b) the presumably by moral aducation initiated emergence of a psychopathological mechanism, whose ability consists in being able to hide impulses of this kind from one's own consciousness. Moral education declares them to be forbidden, imposing a taboo which leads to a belief in guilt, even original sin.[54] Shortly after, he assumed that these findings would have some evidence for a kind of Oedipal desires and suffering.

From blood disgrace to self-castration

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In the tragedy Oedipus, to which Freud refers, there occurs no sexual exploitation of a child by its parents or other adults. Sophocles' poetic treatment of this ancient Greek myth is about Oedipus' own sexual desire addressed to his mother Jocasta – admittedly as an already genitally mature man and without knowing about the close blood relationship, including an not less unconscious patricide – which the woman reciprocates just as unsuspectingly. Freud interprets the passage where Oedipus – after realising his serious violation of the moral-totemic incest taboo – pokes out his eyes with the golden needle clasp of his wife's and mother's nightdress (while Jocasta commits suicide) as a manifestation of the same 'cover-up' mechanism that he began to uncover in the above-mentioned fantasies. In his eyes, psychoanalysis works in the opposite direction to this mechanism of preconscious self-delusion, by bringing the due to incest taboo have been repressed desires (the 'id') back into the realm of inner perception, own conscious thinking.[55] This raised the question for Freud of the origin of moral prohibitions. A field of research that led him deep into the evolutionary and cultural (prä)history of mankind (see Darwin's primal horde; its abolition through patricide and introduction of monogamy in Totem and Taboo) and which, according to his own information, he had to leave unfinished as an untested hypothesis due to the lack of primate research.[27][23]

The meaning of dreams

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In 1899, Freud's work had progressed far enough that he was able to publish The Interpretation of Dreams. This, for him, was the most important of his writings,[56][57] as it formulated the realization that every dream contains a symbolically disguised message that can be decoded with the help of the dreamer's free associations. The purpose of every dream is, therefore, to inform the dreamer about his complex inner situation: in essence, a conflict arising from the demands of innate needs and externally imposed behavioral rules that prohibit their satisfaction. Freud called the former the primary process, taking place predominantly in the unconscious, and the latter the secondary process of predominantly conscious, more or less coherent thoughts.

The iceberg metaphor. It's often used to illustrate the spatial relationship between Freud's first model and the new concepts (id, ego, superego), synthesising both into the structural model. Disadvantage: an iceberg contains no libido: the purpose-cause (source) of all drive-energetic dynamics and economy of the living soul (biological organism as a whole).

Freud summarized this view in his first model of the soul. Known as the topological model, it divides the organism into three areas or systems: The unconscious, the preconscious and the conscious. Sexual needs belong to the unconscious and are forced to remain there if the contents of the conscious mind ward them off. This is the case in societies that generally consider all extra- and premarital sexual activity (including homoeroticism, that of biblical Onan and incest) to be a 'sin', passing this value on to the next generation through concrete or threatened punishments. Moral education creates fears of punitive violence or the deprivation of love in the child's soul. They are stored neuronally in the preconscious and influence consciousness in the sense of the imprinted rules of behavior. (Freud's second model of the soul, the three-instance or structural model, introduces here a clearer distinction. Topology is no longer the decisive factor, but the specific function of each of the three instances. This new model did not replace the first one: it integrated it.)

The Interpretation of Dreams includes the first comprehensive conceptualization of Oedipus complex: The little boy admires his father because of the mental and physical advantages of the adult man and wants to become like him, but also comes into conflict with him over the women around, cause of the taboo of incest. This initiates – growing up from the id – anger that can escalate into a deadly urge for revenge against the father. Impulses that the little boy cannot act out (not least due to the child's deep dependence on his parents' love) and therefore are repressed into the unconscious. Symptomatically, this inner situation manifests itself as a feeling of inferiority, even a castration complex, genital phobia. The myth of Oedipus is about the attempt to liberate the 'amputated' potency of the id, but it fails because of the remaining unconscious motives. As the ego is overwhelmed by the punitive fear of the moral content of its 'preconscious' superego, it cuts off the instinctive desire for self-knowledge from itself (blinds itself).

Attempts to find a female equivalent of the Oedipus complex have not yielded good results. According to Freud, girls, because of their anatomically different genitals, cannot identify with their father, nor develop a castration phobia as sons do, so this syndrome seems to be reserved for the opposite sex.[58] Feminist psychoanalysts like Christiane Olivier debate whether the father of psychoanalysis might have been a victim of sexism in this case. To compensate for their supposed shortcoming, they postulate a Jocasta complex consisting of an incestuous desire of mothers for their infant sons;[59] but other analysts criticize this naming (and attempt of generalization), since Sophocles' Jocasta in particular does not exhibit this behavior. (Instead, she gave her baby away to be killed, instigated by her husband and the oracle that a grown-up son would kill him.) The witch's special interest in little Hansel – while she merely abuses his sister as a kitchen slave – offers much better evidence here, although it's still unclear whether such Crunchy house syndrome can be as widespread in our form of society as the Oedipus itself. However, Christiane O. courageously confronted her own problems in her relationship with her son and husband.

Critics of the abuse thesis and psychoanalysis in general

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In the later part of the 20th century, several Freud researchers questioned the author's report that his very first patients had informed him of childhood sexual abuse. Some of the researchers argued that Freud had imposed his preconceived view on his patients, while others raised the suspicion of conscious forgery.[60][61][62]

These are two different arguments. The latter tries to prove that Freud deliberately lied in order to make the allegedly unfounded psychoanalysis appear as a legitimate science; the former assumes an unknowingly committed act (countertransference). Freud, aware of his retraction of the abuse thesis, replied at various places in his work in the same way to both types of argument: That natural science is a process based on trial and error. A slow but sure becoming, in which it is impossible to have precisely defined concepts from the outset, respectively phenomena that from now on have been clarified without any gaps and contradictions. "Indeed, even physics would have missed out on its entire development if it had been forced to wait until its concepts of matter, energy, gravity and others reached the desirable clarity and precision."[63]

The psychologist Frank Sulloway points out in his book Freud, Biologist of the Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend that the theories and hypotheses of psychoanalysis are anchored in the findings of contemporary biology. He mentions the profound influence of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution on Freud and quotes this sense from the writings of Haeckel, Wilhelm Fliess, Krafft-Ebing and Havelock Ellis.[64]: 30 

Furthermore, attempts were made to label psychoanalysis as pseudoscience, since, according to Karl Popper, its central assumption of three interlinked metapsychological functions (instincts, consciousness, and memory) cannot be refuted.[65] This type of unfalsifiability is especially directed against the explanation of acts of consciousness. Freud himself, however, never claimed that they are scientifically explainable by bodily conditions. Instead, he connected these "two end points of our knowledge" to the classical mind–body problem,[66][11][67][14][45]

1900–1940s

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In 1905, Freud published Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality in which he laid out his discovery of the psychosexual phases, which categorized early childhood development into five stages depending on what sexual affinity a child possessed at the stage:[68]

  • Oral (ages 0–2);
  • Anal (2–4);
  • Phallic-Oedipal or first genital (3–6);
  • Latency (6–puberty); and
  • Mature genital (puberty onward).
Group photograph of participants in the Psychology, Pedagogy and School Hygiene Conference at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts with Freud present, 6 September 1909.

His early formulation included the idea that, because of societal restrictions, sexual wishes were repressed into an unconscious state, and that the energy of these unconscious wishes could result in anxiety or physical symptoms. Early treatment techniques, including hypnotism and abreaction, were designed to make the unconscious conscious in order to relieve the pressure and the apparently resulting symptoms. This method would later on be left aside by Freud, giving free association a bigger role.

In On Narcissism (1914), Freud turned his attention to the titular subject of narcissism.[69] Freud characterized the difference between energy directed at the self versus energy directed at others using a system known as cathexis. By 1917, in "Mourning and Melancholia", he suggested that certain depressions were caused by turning guilt-ridden anger on the self.[70] In 1919, through "A Child is Being Beaten", he began to address the problems of self-destructive behavior and sexual masochism.[71] Based on his experience with depressed and self-destructive patients, and pondering the carnage of World War I, Freud became dissatisfied with considering only oral and sexual motivations for behavior. By 1920, Freud addressed the power of identification (with the leader and with other members) in groups as a motivation for behavior in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.[72][73] In that same year, Freud suggested his dual drive theory of sexuality and aggression in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, to try to begin to explain human destructiveness. Also, it was the first appearance of his "structural theory" consisting of three new concepts id, ego, and superego.[74]

Three years later, in 1923, he summarized the ideas of id, ego, and superego in The Ego and the Id.[75] In the book, he revised the whole theory of mental functioning, now considering that repression was only one of many defense mechanisms, and that it occurred to reduce anxiety. Hence, Freud characterized repression as both a cause and a result of anxiety. In 1926, in "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety", Freud described how intrapsychic conflict between the drives and the superego caused anxiety, and how that anxiety could lead to the inhibition of mental functions such as intellect and speech.[76] In 1924, Otto Rank published The Trauma of Birth, which analysed culture and philosophy in relation to separation anxiety which occurred before the development of an Oedipal complex.[77] Freud's theories, however, characterized no such phase. According to Freud, the Oedipus complex was at the centre of neurosis, and was the foundational source of all art, myth, religion, philosophy, therapy—indeed of all human culture and civilization. It was the first time that anyone in Freud's inner circle had characterized something other than the Oedipus complex as contributing to intrapsychic development, a notion that was rejected by Freud and his followers at the time.

By 1936 the "Principle of Multiple Function" was clarified by Robert Waelder.[78] He widened the formulation that psychological symptoms were caused by and relieved conflict simultaneously. Moreover, symptoms (such as phobias and compulsions) each represented elements of some drive wish (sexual and/or aggressive), superego, anxiety, reality, and defenses. Also in 1936, Anna Freud, Sigmund's daughter, published her seminal book The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense outlining numerous ways the mind could shut upsetting things out of consciousness.[79]

1940s–present

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Group of Psychoanalysts, André Bourguignon, Pierre Cotet, François Robert, Alain Rauzy and Janine Altounian in France

When Hitler's power grew, the Freud family and many of their colleagues fled to London. Within a year, Sigmund Freud died.[80] In the United States, also following the death of Freud, a new group of psychoanalysts began to explore the function of the ego. Led by Heinz Hartmann, the group built upon understandings of the synthetic function of the ego as a mediator in psychic functioning, distinguishing such from autonomous ego functions (e.g. memory and intellect). These "ego psychologists" of the 1950s paved the way to focus analytic work by attending to the defenses (mediated by the ego) before exploring the deeper roots of the unconscious conflicts.

In addition, there was growing interest in child psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis has been used as a research tool in childhood development,[vi] and is still used to treat certain mental disturbances.[81] In the 1960s, Freud's early thoughts on the childhood development of female sexuality were challenged; this challenge led to the development of a variety of understandings of female sexual development,[82] many of which modified the timing and normality of several of Freud's theories. Several researchers followed Karen Horney's studies of societal pressures that influence the development of women.[83]

In the first decade of the 21st century, there were approximately 35 training institutes for psychoanalysis in the United States accredited by the American Psychoanalytic Association (APsaA), which is a component organization of the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA), and there are over 3000 graduated psychoanalysts practicing in the United States. The IPA accredits psychoanalytic training centers through such "component organizations" throughout the rest of the world, including countries such as Serbia, France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Switzerland,[84] and many others, as well as about six institutes directly in the United States.

Psychoanalysis as a movement

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Freud founded the Psychological Wednesday Society in 1902, which Edward Shorter argues was the beginning of psychoanalysis as a movement. This society became the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1908 in the same year as the first international congress of psychoanalysis held in Salzburg, Austria.[85]: 110  Alfred Adler was one of the most active members in this society in its early years.[86]: 584 

The second congress of psychoanalysis took place in Nuremberg, Germany in 1910.[85]: 110  At this congress, Ferenczi called for the creation of an International Psychoanalytic Association with Jung as president for life.[87]: 15  A third congress was held in Weimar in 1911.[85]: 110  The London Psychoanalytical Society was founded in 1913 by Ernest Jones.[88]

Developments of alternative forms of psychotherapy

[edit]

Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT)

[edit]

In the 1950s, psychoanalysis was the main modality of psychotherapy. Behavioral models of psychotherapy started to assume a more central role in psychotherapy in the 1960s.[vii][89] Aaron T. Beck, a psychiatrist trained in a psychoanalytic tradition, set out to test the psychoanalytic models of depression empirically and found that conscious ruminations of loss and personal failing were correlated with depression. He suggested that distorted and biased beliefs were a causal factor of depression, publishing an influential paper in 1967 after a decade of research using the construct of schemas to explain the depression.[89]: 221  Beck developed this empirically supported hypothesis for the cause of depression into a talking therapy called cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) in the early 1970s.

Attachment theory

[edit]

Attachment theory was developed theoretically by John Bowlby and formalized empirically by Mary Ainsworth.[90] Bowlby was trained psychoanalytically but was concerned about some properties of psychoanalysis;[91]: 23  he was troubled by the dogmatism of psychoanalysis at the time, its arcane terminology, the lack of attention to environment in child behavior, and the concepts derived from talking therapy to child behavior.[91]: 23  In response, he developed an alternative conceptualization of child behavior based on principles on ethology.[91]: 24  Bowlby's theory of attachment rejects Freud's model of psychosexual development based on the Oedipal model.[91]: 25  For his work, Bowlby was shunned from psychoanalytical circles who did not accept his theories. Nonetheless, his conceptualization was adopted widely by mother-infant research in the 1970s.[91]: 26 

Theories

[edit]

The predominant psychoanalytic theories can be organized into several theoretical schools. Although these perspectives differ, most of them emphasize the influence of unconscious elements on the conscious. There has also been considerable work done on consolidating elements of conflicting theories.[92]

There are some persistent conflicts among psychoanalysts regarding specific causes of certain syndromes, and some disputes regarding the ideal treatment techniques. In the 21st century, psychoanalytic ideas have found influence in fields such as childcare, education, literary criticism, cultural studies, mental health, and particularly psychotherapy. Though most mainstream psychoanalysts subscribe to modern strains of psychoanalytical thought, there are groups that follow the precepts of a single psychoanalyst and their school of thought. Psychoanalytic ideas also play roles in some types of literary analysis, such as archetypal literary criticism.[93]

Topographic theory

[edit]

Topographic theory was named and first described by Sigmund Freud in The Interpretation of Dreams (1899).[94] The theory hypothesizes that the mental apparatus can be divided into the systems Conscious, Preconscious, and Unconscious. These systems are not anatomical structures of the brain but, rather, mental processes. Although Freud retained this theory throughout his life, he largely replaced it with the structural theory.[95]

Structural theory

[edit]

Structural theory divides the psyche into the id, the ego, and the super-ego. The id is present at birth as the repository of basic instincts, which Freud called "Triebe" ("drives"). Unorganized and unconscious, it operates merely on the 'pleasure principle', without realism or foresight. The ego develops slowly and gradually, being concerned with mediating between the urging of the id and the realities of the external world; it thus operates on the 'reality principle'. The super-ego is held to be the part of the ego in which self-observation, self-criticism and other reflective and judgmental faculties develop. The ego and the superego are both partly conscious and partly unconscious.[95]

Neuropsychoanalysis

[edit]

In the late 20th century, neuropsychoanalysis was introduced. The aim of this new field was to bridge the gap between psychoanalytic concepts and neuroscientific findings. Solms theorizes that for every cognition-based action, there is a neurological reason behind it. According to Daniela Mosri, neuropsychoanalysis was coined by Solms and is a continuation of the original model proposed by Freud in 1895.[96] Neuropsychoanalysis is an interdisciplinary approach that focuses on how neurobiological mechanisms influence the psychological aspects of the human mind with emphasis on repression, the dynamics of dreams, therapeutic relationships. Neuroimaging is one of the methods used to empirically validate psychoanalytic concepts.

Ego psychology

[edit]

Ego psychology was initially suggested by Freud in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926),[76] while major steps forward would be made through Anna Freud's work on defense mechanisms, first published in her book The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence (1936).[79]

The theory was refined by Hartmann, Loewenstein, and Kris in a series of papers and books from 1939 through the late 1960s. Leo Bellak was a later contributor. This series of constructs, paralleling some of the later developments of cognitive theory, includes the notions of autonomous ego functions: mental functions not dependent, at least in origin, on intrapsychic conflict. Such functions include: sensory perception, motor control, symbolic thought, logical thought, speech, abstraction, integration (synthesis), orientation, concentration, judgment about danger, reality testing, adaptive ability, executive decision-making, hygiene, and self-preservation. Freud noted that inhibition is one method that the mind may utilize to interfere with any of these functions in order to avoid painful emotions. Hartmann (1950s) pointed out that there may be delays or deficits in such functions.[97]

Frosch (1964) described differences in those people who demonstrated damage to their relationship to reality, but who seemed able to test it.[98]

According to ego psychology, ego strengths, later described by Otto F. Kernberg (1975), include the capacities to control oral, sexual, and destructive impulses; to tolerate painful affects without falling apart; and to prevent the eruption into consciousness of bizarre symbolic fantasy.[99] Synthetic functions, in contrast to autonomous functions, arise from the development of the ego and serve the purpose of managing conflict processes. Defenses are synthetic functions that protect the conscious mind from awareness of forbidden impulses and thoughts. One purpose of ego psychology has been to emphasize that some mental functions can be considered to be basic, rather than derivatives of wishes, affects, or defenses. However, autonomous ego functions can be secondarily affected because of unconscious conflict.[100] For example, a patient may have an hysterical amnesia (memory being an autonomous function) because of intrapsychic conflict (wishing not to remember because it is too painful).

Taken together, the above theories present a group of metapsychological assumptions. Therefore, the inclusive group of the different classical theories provides a cross-sectional view of human mental processes. There are six "points of view", five described by Freud and a sixth added by Hartmann. Unconscious processes can therefore be evaluated from each of these six points of view:[101]

  1. Topographic
  2. Dynamic (the theory of conflict)
  3. Economic (the theory of energy flow)
  4. Structural
  5. Genetic (i.e. propositions concerning the origin and development of psychological functions)
  6. Adaptational (i.e. psychological phenomena as it relates to the external world)

Modern conflict theory

[edit]

Modern conflict theory, a variation of ego psychology, is a revised version of structural theory, most notably different by altering concepts related to where repressed thoughts were stored.[75][76] Modern conflict theory addresses emotional symptoms and character traits as complex solutions to mental conflict.[102] It dispenses with the concepts of a fixed id, ego and superego, and instead posits conscious and unconscious conflict among wishes (dependent, controlling, sexual, and aggressive), guilt and shame, emotions (especially anxiety and depressive affect), and defensive operations that shut off from consciousness some aspect of the others. Moreover, healthy functioning (adaptive) is also determined, to a great extent, by resolutions of conflict.

A major objective of modern conflict-theory psychoanalysis is to change the balance of conflict in a patient by making aspects of the less adaptive solutions (also called "compromise formations") conscious so that they can be rethought, and more adaptive solutions found. Current theoreticians who follow the work of Charles Brenner, especially The Mind in Conflict (1982), include Sandor Abend,[103] Jacob Arlow,[104] and Jerome Blackman.[105]

Object relations theory

[edit]

Object relations theory attempts to explain human relationships through a study of how mental representations of the self and others are organized.[106] The clinical symptoms that suggest object relations problems (typically developmental delays throughout life) include disturbances in an individual's capacity to feel: warmth, empathy, trust, sense of security, identity stability, consistent emotional closeness, and stability in relationships with significant others.

Klein discusses the concept of introjection, creating a mental representation of external objects; and projection, applying this mental representation to reality.[107]: 24  Wilfred Bion introduced the concept of containment of projections in the mother-child relationship where a mother understands an infants projections, modifies them and returns them to the child.[107]: 27 

Concepts regarding internal representation (aka 'introspect', 'self and object representation', or 'internalization of self and other'), although often attributed to Melanie Klein, were actually first mentioned by Sigmund Freud in his early concepts of drive theory (Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 1905). Freud's 1917 paper "Mourning and Melancholia", for example, hypothesized that unresolved grief was caused by the survivor's internalized image of the deceased becoming fused with that of the survivor, and then the survivor shifting unacceptable anger toward the deceased onto the now complex self-image.[70]

Melanie Klein's hypotheses regarding internalization during the first year of life, leading to paranoid and depressive positions, were later challenged by René Spitz (e.g., The First Year of Life, 1965), who divided the first year of life into a coenesthetic phase of the first six months, and then a diacritic phase for the second six months. Mahler, Fine, and Bergman (1975) describe distinct phases and subphases of child development leading to "separation-individuation" during the first three years of life, stressing the importance of constancy of parental figures in the face of the child's destructive aggression, internalizations, stability of affect management, and ability to develop healthy autonomy.[108]

During adolescence, Erik Erikson (1950–1960s) described the 'identity crisis', that involves identity-diffusion anxiety. In order for an adult to be able to experience "Warm-ETHICS: (warmth, Empathy, Trust, Holding environment, Identity, Closeness, and Stability) in relationships, the teenager must resolve the problems with identity and redevelop self and object constancy.[105]

Relational psychoanalysis

[edit]

Relational psychoanalysis combines interpersonal psychoanalysis with object-relations theory and with inter-subjective theory as critical for mental health. It was introduced by Stephen Mitchell.[109] Relational psychoanalysis stresses how the individual's personality is shaped by both real and imagined relationships with others, and how these relationship patterns are re-enacted in the interactions between analyst and patient. Relational psychoanalysts have propounded their view of the necessity of helping certain detached, isolated patients develop the capacity for "mentalization" associated with thinking about relationships and themselves

Self psychology

[edit]

Self psychology emphasizes the development of a stable and integrated sense of self through empathic contacts with other humans, primary significant others conceived of as 'selfobjects'. Selfobjects meet the developing self's needs for mirroring, idealization, and twinship, and thereby strengthen the developing self. The process of treatment proceeds through "transmuting internalization," in which the patient gradually internalizes the selfobject functions provided by the therapist.

Self psychology was proposed originally by Heinz Kohut, and has been further developed by Arnold Goldberg, Frank Lachmann, Paul and Anna Ornstein, Marian Tolpin, and others.

Lacanian psychoanalysis

[edit]
Diagram showing Lacanian psychoanalysis, with "the Real," "the Imaginary" and "the Symbolic"

Lacanian psychoanalysis, which integrates psychoanalysis with structural linguistics and Hegelian philosophy, is especially popular in France and parts of Latin America. Lacanian psychoanalysis is a departure from the traditional British and American psychoanalysis. Jacques Lacan frequently used the phrase "retourner à Freud" ("return to Freud") in his seminars and writings, as he claimed that his theories were an extension of Freud's own, contrary to those of Anna Freud, the Ego Psychology, object relations and "self" theories and also claims the necessity of reading Freud's complete works, not only a part of them. Lacan's concepts concern the "mirror stage", the "Real", the "Imaginary", and the "Symbolic", and the claim that "the unconscious is structured as a language."[110]

Though a major influence on psychoanalysis in France and parts of Latin America, Lacan and his ideas have taken longer to be translated into English and he has thus had a lesser impact on psychoanalysis and psychotherapy in the English-speaking world. In the United Kingdom and the United States, his ideas are most widely used to analyze texts in literary theory.[111] Due to his increasingly critical stance towards the deviation from Freud's thought, often singling out particular texts and readings from his colleagues, Lacan was excluded from acting as a training analyst in the IPA, thus leading him to create his own school in order to maintain an institutional structure for the many candidates who desired to continue their analysis with him.[112]

Adaptive paradigm

[edit]

The adaptive paradigm of psychotherapy develops out of the work of Robert Langs. The adaptive paradigm interprets psychic conflict primarily in terms of conscious and unconscious adaptation to reality. Langs' recent work in some measure returns to the earlier Freud, in that Langs prefers a modified version of the topographic model of the mind (conscious, preconscious, and unconscious) over the structural model (id, ego, and super-ego), including the former's emphasis on trauma (though Langs looks to death-related traumas rather than sexual traumas).[95] At the same time, Langs' model of the mind differs from Freud's in that it understands the mind in terms of evolutionary biological principles.[113]

Psychopathology (mental disturbances)

[edit]

Childhood origins

[edit]

Freudian theories hold that adult problems can be traced to unresolved conflicts from certain phases of childhood and adolescence, caused by fantasy, stemming from their own drives. Freud, based on the data gathered from his patients early in his career, suspected that neurotic disturbances occurred when children were sexually abused in childhood (i.e. seduction theory). Later, Freud came to believe that, although child abuse occurs, neurotic symptoms were not associated with this. He believed that neurotic people often had unconscious conflicts that involved incestuous fantasies deriving from different stages of development. He found the stage from about three to six years of age (preschool years, today called the "first genital stage") to be filled with fantasies of having romantic relationships with both parents. Arguments were quickly generated in early 20th-century Vienna about whether adult seduction of children, i.e. child sexual abuse, was the basis of neurotic illness. There still is no complete agreement, although nowadays professionals recognize the negative effects of child sexual abuse on mental health.[114]

The theory on origins of pathologically dysfunctional relationships was further developed by the specialist in psychiatry Jürg Willi (* 16 March 1934 in Zürich; † 8 April 2019) into the Collusion (psychology) concept. The concept takes the observations of Sigmund Freud about the narcissistic, the oral, the anal and the phallic phases and translates them into a two-couples-relationship model, with respect to dysfunctions in the relationship resulting from childhood trauma.[115]

Oedipal conflicts

[edit]

Many psychoanalysts who work with children have studied the actual effects of child abuse, which include ego and object relations deficits and severe neurotic conflicts. Much research has been done on these types of trauma in childhood, and the adult sequelae of those. In studying the childhood factors that start neurotic symptom development, Freud found a constellation of factors that, for literary reasons, he termed the Oedipus complex, based on the play by Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, in which the protagonist unwittingly kills his father and marries his mother. The validity of the Oedipus complex is now widely disputed and rejected.[116][117]

The shorthand term, oedipal—later explicated by Joseph J. Sandler in "On the Concept Superego" (1960)[118] and modified by Charles Brenner in The Mind in Conflict (1982)—refers to the powerful attachments that children make to their parents in the preschool years. These attachments involve fantasies of sexual relationships with either (or both) parent, and, therefore, competitive fantasies toward either (or both) parents. Humberto Nagera (1975) has been particularly helpful in clarifying many of the complexities of the child through these years.[citation needed]

"Positive" and "negative" oedipal conflicts have been attached to the heterosexual and homosexual aspects, respectively. Both seem to occur in the development of most children. Eventually, the developing child's concessions to reality (that they will neither marry one parent nor eliminate the other) lead to identifications with parental values. These identifications generally create a new set of mental operations regarding values and guilt, subsumed under the term superego. Besides superego development, children "resolve" their preschool oedipal conflicts through channeling wishes into something their parents approve of ("sublimation") and the development, during the school-age years ("latency") of age-appropriate obsessive-compulsive defensive maneuvers (rules, repetitive games).[citation needed]

Treatment

[edit]

Using the various analytic and psychological techniques to assess mental problems, some believe[by whom?] that there are particular constellations of problems that are especially suited for analytic treatment whereas other problems might respond better to medicines and other interpersonal interventions.[119] To be treated with psychoanalysis, whatever the presenting problem, the person requesting help must demonstrate a desire to start an analysis. The person wishing to start an analysis must have some capacity for speech and communication. As well, they need to be able to have or develop trust and insight within the psychoanalytic session. Potential patients must undergo a preliminary stage of treatment to assess their amenability to psychoanalysis at that time, and also to enable the analyst to form a working psychological model, which the analyst will use to direct the treatment. Psychoanalysts mainly work with neurosis and hysteria in particular; however, adapted forms of psychoanalysis are used in working with schizophrenia and other forms of psychosis or mental disorder. Finally, if a prospective patient is severely suicidal, a longer preliminary stage may be employed, sometimes with sessions which have a twenty-minute break in the middle. There are numerous modifications in technique under the heading of psychoanalysis due to the individualistic nature of personality in both analyst and patient.

The most common problems treatable with psychoanalysis include: phobias, conversions, compulsions, obsessions, anxiety attacks, depressions, sexual dysfunctions, a wide variety of relationship problems (such as dating and marital strife), and a wide variety of character problems (for example, painful shyness, meanness, obnoxiousness, workaholism, hyperseductiveness, hyperemotionality, hyperfastidiousness). The fact that many of such patients also demonstrate deficits above makes diagnosis and treatment selection difficult.

Analytical organizations such as the IPA, APsaA and the European Federation for Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy have established procedures and models for the indication and practice of psychoanalytical therapy for trainees in analysis. The match between the analyst and the patient can be viewed as another contributing factor for the indication and contraindication for psychoanalytic treatment. The analyst decides whether the patient is suitable for psychoanalysis. This decision made by the analyst, besides being made on the usual indications and pathology, is also based to a certain degree on the "fit" between analyst and patient. A person's suitability for analysis at any particular time is based on their desire to know something about where their illness has come from. Someone who is not suitable for analysis expresses no desire to know more about the root causes of their illness.

An evaluation may include one or more other analysts' independent opinions and will include discussion of the patient's financial situation and insurance.

Techniques

[edit]

The foundation of psychoanalysis is an interpretation of the patient's unconscious conflicts that are interfering with current-day functioning – conflicts that are causing painful symptoms such as phobias, anxiety, depression, and compulsions. Strachey (1936) stressed that figuring out ways the patient distorted perceptions about the analyst led to understanding what may have been forgotten.[viii] In particular, unconscious hostile feelings toward the analyst could be found in symbolic, negative reactions to what Robert Langs later called the "frame" of the therapy[120]—the setup that included times of the sessions, payment of fees, and the necessity of talking. In patients who made mistakes, forgot, or showed other peculiarities regarding time, fees, and talking, the analyst can usually find various unconscious "resistances" to the flow of thoughts (aka free association).

When the patient reclines on a couch with the analyst out of view, the patient tends to remember more experiences, more resistance and transference, and is able to reorganize thoughts after the development of insight through the interpretive work of the analyst. Although fantasy life can be understood through the examination of dreams, masturbation fantasies[ix] are also important. The analyst is interested in how the patient reacts to and avoids such fantasies.[121] Various memories of early life are generally distorted—what Freud called screen memories—and in any case, very early experiences (before age two)—cannot be remembered.[x]

Variations in technique

[edit]

There is what is known among psychoanalysts as classical technique, although Freud, throughout his writings, deviated from this considerably, depending on the problems of any given patient.

Classical technique was summarized by Allan Compton as comprising:[122]

  • Instructions: telling the patient to try to say what's on their mind, including interferences;
  • Exploration: asking questions; and
  • Clarification: rephrasing and summarizing what the patient has been describing.

As well, the analyst can also use confrontation to bring an aspect of functioning, usually a defense, to the patient's attention. The analyst then uses a variety of interpretation methods, such as:

  • Dynamic interpretation: explaining how being too nice guards against guilt (e.g. defense vs. affect);
  • Genetic interpretation: explaining how a past event is influencing the present;
  • Resistance interpretation: showing the patient how they are avoiding their problems;
  • Transference interpretation: showing the patient ways old conflicts arise in current relationships, including that with the analyst; or
  • Dream interpretation: obtaining the patient's thoughts about their dreams and connecting this with their current problems.

Analysts can also use reconstruction to estimate what may have happened in the past that created some current issue. These techniques are primarily based on conflict theory. As object relations theory evolved, supplemented by the work of John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth, techniques with patients who had more severe problems with basic trust (Erikson, 1950) and a history of maternal deprivation (see the works of Augusta Alpert) led to new techniques with adults. These have sometimes been called interpersonal, intersubjective (cf. Stolorow), relational, or corrective object relations techniques.

Ego psychological concepts of deficit in functioning led to refinements in supportive therapy. These techniques are particularly applicable to psychotic and near-psychotic (cf. Eric Marcus, "Psychosis and Near-psychosis") patients. These supportive therapy techniques include discussions of reality; encouragement to stay alive (including hospitalization); psychotropic medicines to relieve overwhelming depressive affect or overwhelming fantasies (hallucinations and delusions); and advice about the meanings of things (to counter abstraction failures).

The notion of the "silent analyst" has been criticized. Actually, the analyst listens using Arlow's approach as set out in "The Genesis of Interpretation", using active intervention to interpret resistances, defenses, create pathology, and fantasies. Silence is not a technique of psychoanalysis (see also the studies and opinion papers of Owen Renik). "Analytic neutrality" is a concept that does not mean the analyst is silent. It refers to the analyst's position of not taking sides in the internal struggles of the patient. For example, if a patient feels guilty, the analyst might explore what the patient has been doing or thinking that causes the guilt, but not reassure the patient not to feel guilty. The analyst might also explore the identifications with parents and others that led to the guilt.[123][124]

Interpersonal–relational psychoanalysts emphasize the notion that it is impossible to be neutral. Sullivan introduced the term participant-observer to indicate that the analyst inevitably interacts with the analysand, and suggested the detailed inquiry as an alternative to interpretation. The detailed inquiry involves noting where the analysand is leaving out important elements of an account and noting when the story is obfuscated, and asking careful questions to open up the dialogue.[125]

Group therapy and play therapy

[edit]

Although single-client sessions remain the norm, psychoanalytic theory has been used to develop other types of psychological treatment. Psychoanalytic group therapy was pioneered by Trigant Burrow, Joseph Pratt, Paul F. Schilder, Samuel R. Slavson, Harry Stack Sullivan, and Wolfe. Child-centered counseling for parents was instituted early in analytic history by Freud, and was later further developed by Irwin Marcus, Edith Schulhofer, and Gilbert Kliman. Psychoanalytically based couples therapy has been promulgated and explicated by Fred Sander. Techniques and tools developed in the first decade of the 21st century have made psychoanalysis available to patients who were not treatable by earlier techniques. This meant that the analytic situation was modified so that it would be more suitable and more likely to be helpful for these patients. Eagle (2007) believes that psychoanalysis cannot be a self-contained discipline but instead must be open to influence from and integration with findings and theory from other disciplines.[126]

Psychoanalytic constructs have been adapted for use with children with treatments such as play therapy, art therapy, and storytelling. Throughout her career, from the 1920s through the 1970s, Anna Freud adapted psychoanalysis for children through play. This is still used today for children, especially those who are preadolescent.[xi] Using toys and games, children are able to symbolically demonstrate their fears, fantasies, and defenses; although not identical, this technique, in children, is analogous to the aim of free association in adults. Psychoanalytic play therapy allows the child and analyst to understand children's conflicts, particularly defenses such as disobedience and withdrawal, that have been guarding against various unpleasant feelings and hostile wishes. In art therapy, the counselor may have a child draw a portrait and then tell a story about the portrait. The counselor watches for recurring themes—regardless of whether it is with art or toys.[citation needed]

Cultural variations

[edit]

Psychoanalysis can be adapted to different cultures, as long as the therapist or counselor understands the client's culture.[127] For example, Tori and Blimes found that defense mechanisms were valid in a normative sample of 2,624 Thais. The use of certain defense mechanisms was related to cultural values. For example, Thais value calmness and collectiveness (because of Buddhist beliefs), so they were low on regressive emotionality. Psychoanalysis also applies because Freud used techniques that allowed him to get the subjective perceptions of his patients. He takes an objective approach by not facing his clients during his talk therapy sessions. He met with his patients wherever they were, such as when he used free association, where clients would say whatever came to mind without self-censorship. His treatments had little to no structure for most cultures, especially Asian cultures. Therefore, it is more likely that Freudian constructs will be used in structured therapy.[128] In addition, Corey postulates that it will be necessary for a therapist to help clients develop a cultural identity as well as an ego identity.

Psychodynamic therapy

[edit]

According to the NIH, psychodynamic therapy focuses on how an individual's present behavior is affected by past experiences and the unconscious processes.[129] The main goal associated with psychodynamic therapy is internal reflection; for the patient to be able to understand more about their current behaviors after self-reflection and a critical analyzation of their past with their therapist. In order for this method of treatment to be effective, there must be a strong foundation of trust between the patient and their therapist. Often, psychodynamic therapy requires a large time investment, taking many years for considerable improvement and is not considered a quick solution.

Cost and length of treatment

[edit]

The cost to the patient of psychoanalytic treatment ranges widely from place to place and between practitioners.[130] Low-fee analysis is often available in a psychoanalytic training clinic and graduate schools.[131] Otherwise, the fee set by each analyst varies with the analyst's training and experience. Since, in most locations in the United States, unlike in Ontario and Germany, classical analysis (which usually requires sessions three to five times per week) is not covered by health insurance, many analysts may negotiate their fees with patients whom they feel they can help, but who have financial difficulties. The modifications of analysis, which include psychodynamic therapy, brief therapies, and certain types of group therapy,[xii] are carried out on a less frequent basis—usually once, twice, or three times a week – and usually the patient sits facing the therapist. As a result of the defense mechanisms and the lack of access to the unfathomable elements of the unconscious, psychoanalysis can be an expansive process that involves 2 to 5 sessions per week for several years. This type of therapy relies on the belief that reducing the symptoms will not actually help with the root causes or irrational drives. The analyst typically is a 'blank screen', disclosing very little about themselves in order that the client can use the space in the relationship to work on their unconscious without interference from outside.[132]

The psychoanalyst uses various methods to help the patient become more self-aware, insightful and uncover the meanings of symptoms. Firstly, the psychoanalyst attempts to develop a safe and confidential atmosphere where the patient can report feelings, thoughts and fantasies.[132] Analysands (as people in analysis are called) are asked to report whatever comes to mind without fear of reprisal. Freud called this the "fundamental rule". Analysands are asked to talk about their lives, including their early life, current life and hopes and aspirations for the future. They are encouraged to report their fantasies, "flash thoughts" and dreams. In fact, Freud believed that dreams were, "the royal road to the unconscious"; he devoted an entire volume to the interpretation of dreams. Freud had his patients lie on a couch in a dimly lit room and would sit out of sight, usually directly behind them, as to not influence the patient's thoughts by his gestures or expressions.[133]

The psychoanalyst's task, in collaboration with the analysand, is to help deepen the analysand's understanding of those factors, outside of his awareness, that drive his behaviors. In the safe environment psychoanalysis offers, the analysand becomes attached to the analyst and pretty soon, he begins to experience the same conflicts with his analyst that he experiences with key figures in his life, such as his parents, his boss, his significant other, etc. It is the psychoanalyst's role to point out these conflicts and to interpret them. The transferring of these internal conflicts onto the analyst is called "transference".[132]

Many studies have also been done on briefer "dynamic" treatments; these are more expedient to measure and shed light on the therapeutic process to some extent. Brief Relational Therapy (BRT), Brief Psychodynamic Therapy (BPT), and Time-Limited Dynamic Therapy (TLDP) limit treatment to 20–30 sessions. On average, classical analysis may last 5.7 years, but for phobias and depressions uncomplicated by ego deficits or object relations deficits, analysis may run for a shorter period of time.[medical citation needed] Longer analyses are indicated for those with more serious disturbances in object relations, more symptoms, and more ingrained character pathology.[134]

Training and research

[edit]

Psychoanalysis continues to be practiced by psychiatrists, social workers, and other mental health professionals; however, its practice has declined.[135][136] It has been largely replaced by the similar but broader psychodynamic psychotherapy in the mid-20th century.[137] Psychoanalytic approaches continue to be listed by the UK National Health Service as possibly helpful for depression.[138]

United States

[edit]

Psychoanalytic training in the United States tends to vary according to the program, but it involves a personal psychoanalysis for the trainee, approximately 300 to 600 hours of class instruction, with a standard curriculum, over a two to five-year period.[139]

Typically, this psychoanalysis must be conducted by a Supervising and Training Analyst. Most institutes (but not all) within the American Psychoanalytic Association require that Supervising and Training Analysts become certified by the American Board of Psychoanalysts. Certification entails a blind review in which the psychoanalyst's work is vetted by psychoanalysts outside of their local community. After earning certification, these psychoanalysts undergo another hurdle in which they are specially vetted by senior members of their own institute and held to the highest ethical and moral standards. Moreover, they are required to have extensive experience conducting psychoanalyses.[140]

Candidates generally have an hour of supervision each week per psychoanalytic case. The minimum number of cases varies between institutes. Candidates often have two to four cases; both male and female cases are required. Supervision extends for at least a few years on one or more cases. During supervision, the trainee presents material from the psychoanalytic work that week. With the supervisor, the trainee then explores the patient's unconscious conflicts with examination of transference-countertransference constellations.[131]

Many psychoanalytic training centers in the United States have been accredited by special committees of the APsaA or the IPA. Because of theoretical differences, there are independent institutes, usually founded by psychologists, who until 1987 were not permitted access to psychoanalytic training institutes of the APsaA. Currently, there are between 75 and 100 independent institutes in the United States. As well, other institutes are affiliated to other organizations such as the American Academy of Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychiatry, and the National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis. At most psychoanalytic institutes in the United States, qualifications for entry include a terminal degree in a mental health field, such as Ph.D., Psy.D., M.S.W., or M.D. A few institutes restrict applicants to those already holding an M.D. or Ph.D., and most institutes in Southern California confer a Ph.D. or Psy.D. in psychoanalysis upon graduation, which involves completion of the necessary requirements for the state boards that confer that doctoral degree. The first training institute in America to educate non-medical psychoanalysts was The National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis (1978) in New York City. It was founded by the analyst Theodor Reik. The Contemporary Freudian (originally the New York Freudian Society), an offshoot of the National Psychological Association, has a branch in Washington, DC. It is a component society/institute or the IPA.[citation needed]

Some psychoanalytic training has been set up as a post-doctoral fellowship in university settings, such as at Duke University, Yale University, New York University, Adelphi University and Columbia University. Other psychoanalytic institutes may not be directly associated with universities, but the faculty at those institutes usually hold contemporaneous faculty positions with psychology Ph.D. programs and/or with medical school psychiatry residency programs.[citation needed]

In recent decades, some graduate schools and psychoanalytic institutions have developed programs leading to doctoral degrees in psychoanalysis. Several institutions in the United States have offered such degrees, such as the Boston Graduate School of Psychoanalysis (which awards the Doctor of Psychoanalysis or Psya.D. degree[141]) and the Center for Psychoanalytic Study in Chicago, Illinois, (which awarded the D.Psa. degree). In addition, a number of psychoanalytic training institutes in California historically awarded doctoral degrees (including Ph.D. and Psy.D. degrees), including the Institute of Contemporary Psychoanalysis, the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society and Institute, the New Center for Psychoanalysis, the Newport Psychoanalytic Institute, the Psychoanalytic Center of California, and Psychoanalytic Institute of Northern California, and the Southern California Psychoanalytic Institute and Society.[142] Internationally, several universities award doctoral degrees in psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic studies, including University College London[143] and the University of Essex.[144]

The IPA is the world's primary accrediting and regulatory body for psychoanalysis. Their mission is to assure the continued vigor and development of psychoanalysis for the benefit of psychoanalytic patients. It works in partnership with its 70 constituent organizations in 33 countries to support 11,500 members. In the US, there are 77 psychoanalytical organizations, institutes and associations, which are spread across the states. APsaA has 38 affiliated societies which have 10 or more active members who practice in a given geographical area. The aims of APsaA and other psychoanalytical organizations are: to provide ongoing educational opportunities for its members, stimulate the development and research of psychoanalysis, provide training, and organize conferences. There are eight affiliated study groups in the United States. A study group is the first level of integration of a psychoanalytical body within the IPA, followed by a provisional society and finally a member society.[citation needed]

The Division of Psychoanalysis (39) of the American Psychological Association (APA) was established in the early 1980s by several psychologists. Until the establishment of the Division of Psychoanalysis, psychologists who had trained in independent institutes had no national organization. The Division of Psychoanalysis now has approximately 4,000 members and approximately 30 local chapters in the United States. The Division of Psychoanalysis holds two annual meetings or conferences and offers continuing education in theory, research and clinical technique, as do their affiliated local chapters. The European Psychoanalytical Federation (EPF) is the organization which consolidates all European psychoanalytic societies. This organization is affiliated with the IPA. In 2002, there were approximately 3,900 individual members in 22 countries, speaking 18 different languages. There are also 25 psychoanalytic societies.[citation needed]

The American Association of Psychoanalysis in Clinical Social Work (AAPCSW) was established by Crayton Rowe in 1980 as a division of the Federation of Clinical Societies of Social Work and became an independent entity in 1990. Until 2007, it was known as the National Membership Committee on Psychoanalysis. The organization was founded because although social workers represented the largest number of people who were training to be psychoanalysts, they were underrepresented as supervisors and teachers at the institutes they attended. AAPCSW now has over 1000 members and has over 20 chapters. It holds a bi-annual national conference and numerous annual local conferences.[145]

Experiences of psychoanalysts and psychoanalytic psychotherapists and research into infant and child development have led to new insights. Theories have been further developed and the results of empirical research are now more integrated in the psychoanalytic theory.[146]

United Kingdom

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The London Psychoanalytical Society was founded by Ernest Jones in 1913.[88] After World War I with the expansion of psychoanalysis in the United Kingdom, the Society was reconstituted and named the British Psychoanalytical Society in 1919. Soon after, the Institute of Psychoanalysis was established to administer the Society's activities. These include: the training of psychoanalysts, the development of the theory and practice of psychoanalysis, the provision of treatment through The London Clinic of Psychoanalysis, and the publication of books in The New Library of Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalytic Ideas. The Institute of Psychoanalysis also publishes The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, maintains a library, furthers research, and holds public lectures. The society has a Code of Ethics and an Ethical Committee. The society, the institute and the clinic are all located at Byron House in West London.[147]

The Society is a constituent society of the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA), a body with members on all five continents which safeguards professional and ethical practice.[148] The Society is a member of the British Psychoanalytic Council (BPC); the BPC publishes a register of British psychoanalysts and psychoanalytical psychotherapists. All members of the British Psychoanalytic Council are required to undertake continuing professional development, CPD. Members of the Society teach and hold posts on other approved psychoanalytic courses, e.g. British Psychotherapy Foundation, and in academic departments, e.g. University College London.

Members of the Society have included: Michael Balint, Wilfred Bion, John Bowlby, Ronald Fairbairn, Anna Freud, Harry Guntrip, Melanie Klein, Donald Meltzer, Joseph J. Sandler, Hanna Segal, J. D. Sutherland and Donald Winnicott.

The Institute of Psychoanalysis is the foremost publisher of psychoanalytic literature. The 24-volume Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud was conceived, translated, and produced under the direction of the British Psychoanalytical Society. The Society, in conjunction with Random House, will soon publish a new, revised and expanded Standard Edition. With the New Library of Psychoanalysis, the Institute continues to publish the books of leading theorists and practitioners. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis is published by the Institute of Psychoanalysis. For over 100 years, it has one of the largest circulations of any psychoanalytic journal.[149]

Psychoanalytic psychotherapy

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There are different forms of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy in which psychoanalytic thinking is applied. In addition to classical psychoanalysis, there is for example psychoanalytic psychotherapy, an approach that expands "the accessibility of psychoanalytic theory and clinical practices that had evolved over 100 plus years to a larger number of individuals."[150] Other examples of well known therapies which also use insights of psychoanalysis are mentalization-based treatment (MBT), and transference focused psychotherapy (TFP).[146] There is also a continuing influence of psychoanalytic thinking in mental health care and psychiatric care.[151]

Research

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Over a hundred years of case reports and studies in the journal Modern Psychoanalysis, the Psychoanalytic Quarterly, the International Journal of Psychoanalysis and the Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association have analyzed the efficacy of analysis in cases of neurosis and character or personality problems. Psychoanalysis modified by object relations techniques has been shown to be effective in many cases of ingrained problems of intimacy and relationship (cf. the many books of Otto Kernberg).[152] Psychoanalytic treatment, in other situations, may run from about a year to many years, depending on the severity and complexity of the pathology.

Psychoanalytic theory has, from its inception, been the subject of criticism and controversy. Freud remarked on this early in his career, when other physicians in Vienna ostracized him for his findings that hysterical conversion symptoms were not limited to women. Challenges to analytic theory began with Otto Rank and Alfred Adler (turn of the 20th century), continued with behaviorists (e.g. Wolpe) into the 1940s and '50s, and have persisted (e.g. Miller). Criticisms come from those who object to the notion that there are mechanisms, thoughts or feelings in the mind that could be unconscious. Criticisms also have been leveled against the idea of "infantile sexuality" (the recognition that children between ages two and six imagine things about procreation). Criticisms of theory have led to variations in analytic theories, such as the work of Ronald Fairbairn, Michael Balint, and John Bowlby. In the past 30 years or so, the criticisms have centered on the issue of empirical verification; it is difficult to substantiate the efficacy of psychoanalytic treatments in a psychiatric context.[153]

Psychoanalysis has been used as a research tool in childhood development (cf. the journal The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child), and has developed into a flexible, effective treatment for certain mental disturbances.[81] In the 1960s, Freud's early (1905) thoughts on the childhood development of female sexuality were challenged; this challenge led to major research in the 1970s and 80s, and then to a reformulation of female sexual development that corrected some of Freud's concepts.[154] Also see the various works of Eleanor Galenson, Nancy Chodorow, Karen Horney, Françoise Dolto, Melanie Klein, Selma Fraiberg, and others. Most recently, psychoanalytic researchers who have integrated attachment theory into their work, including Alicia Lieberman and Daniel Schechter, have explored the role of parental traumatization in the development of young children's mental representations of self and others.[155]

Effectiveness

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The psychoanalytic profession has been resistant to researching efficacy.[156] Evaluations of effectiveness based on the interpretation of the therapist alone cannot be proven.[157]

Research results

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Numerous studies have shown that the efficacy of therapy is primarily related to the quality of the therapeutic alliance.[158][159]

An updated 2020 meta-analysis of long-term psychoanalytic psychotherapy (LTPP) for complex mental disorders found small but statistically significant benefits over other psychotherapies in most outcome domains, though results should be interpreted cautiously due to study heterogeneity and methodological limitations.[9]

Meta-analyses in 2019 found psychoanalytic and psychodynamic therapy effective at improving psychosocial wellbeing, reducing suicidality, as well as self-harm behavior in patients at a 6-month interval.[8] There has also been evidence for psychoanalytic psychotherapy as an effective treatment for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and Conduct Disorder when compared with behavioral management treatments with or without methylphenidate.[160] Meta-analysis in 2012 and 2013 found support or evidence for the efficacy of psychoanalytic therapy.[161][162] Other meta-analyses published in recent years[when?] showed psychoanalysis and psychodynamic therapy to be effective, with outcomes comparable to or greater than other kinds of psychotherapy or antidepressant drugs,[163][164][165] but these meta-analyses have been subjected to various criticisms.[166][167][168][169] In particular, the inclusion of pre-/post-studies (rather than randomized controlled trials) and the absence of adequate comparisons with control treatments pose a serious limitation in interpreting the results.[162] A French 2004 report from INSERM concluded that psychoanalytic therapy is less effective than other psychotherapies (including cognitive behavioral therapy) for certain diseases.[119]

In 2011, the American Psychological Association reviewed 103 RCT comparisons between psychodynamic treatment and a non-dynamic competitor, which had been published between 1974 and 2010, and among which 63 were deemed of adequate quality. Out of 39 comparisons with an active competitor, they found that 6 psychodynamic treatments were superior, 5 were inferior, and 28 showed no difference. The study found these results promising but emphasized the necessity of further good-quality trials replicating positive results on specific disorders.[170]

Meta-analyses of Short Term Psychodynamic Psychotherapy (STPP) have found effect sizes (Cohen's d) ranging from 0.34 to 0.71 compared to no treatment and were found to be slightly better than other therapies in follow-up.[171] Other reviews have found an effect size of 0.78 to 0.91 for somatoform disorders compared to no treatment[172] and 0.69 for treating depression.[173] A 2012 Harvard Review of Psychiatry meta-analysis of Intensive Short-Term Dynamic Psychotherapy (ISTDP) found effect sizes ranging from 0.84 for interpersonal problems to 1.51 for depression. Overall ISTDP had an effect size of 1.18 compared to no treatment.[174]

A meta-analysis of Long Term Psychodynamic Psychotherapy (LTPP) in 2012 found an overall effect size of 0.33, which is modest. This study concluded the recovery rate following LTPP was equal to control treatments, including treatment as usual, and found the evidence for the effectiveness of LTPP to be limited and at best conflicting.[175] Others have found effect sizes of 0.44–0.68.[176]

According to a 2004 French review conducted by INSERM, psychoanalysis was presumed or proven effective at treating panic disorder, post-traumatic stress, and personality disorders, but did not find evidence of its effectiveness in treating schizophrenia, obsessive compulsive disorder, specific phobia, bulimia and anorexia.[119]

A 2001 systematic review of the medical literature by the Cochrane Collaboration concluded that no data exist demonstrating that psychodynamic psychotherapy is effective in treating schizophrenia and severe mental illness, and cautioned that medication should always be used alongside any type of talk therapy in schizophrenia cases.[177] A French review from 2004 found the same.[119] The Schizophrenia Patient Outcomes Research Team advises against the use of psychodynamic therapy in cases of schizophrenia, arguing that more trials are necessary to verify its effectiveness.[178][179]

Criticism

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Both Freud and psychoanalysis have been criticized in extreme terms.[180] Exchanges between critics and defenders of psychoanalysis have often been so heated that they have come to be characterized as the Freud Wars.[181] Linguist Noam Chomsky has criticized psychoanalysis for lacking a scientific basis.[182] Evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould considered psychoanalysis influenced by pseudoscientific theories such as recapitulation theory.[183] Psychologists Hans Eysenck, John F. Kihlstrom, and others have also criticized the field as pseudoscience.[184][185][186][187]

Psychoanalysis has also been described as being "not even wrong".[188][189]

Debate over status as scientific

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The theoretical foundations of psychoanalysis lie in the same philosophical currents that lead to interpretive phenomenology rather than in those that lead to scientific positivism, making the theory largely incompatible with positivist approaches to the study of the mind.[190][65][191]

Early critics of psychoanalysis believed that its theories were based too little on quantitative and experimental research and too much on the clinical case study method.[citation needed] Philosopher Frank Cioffi cites false claims of a sound scientific verification of the theory and its elements as the strongest basis for classifying the work of Freud and his school as pseudoscience.[192]

Karl Popper argued that psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience because its claims are not testable and cannot be refuted; that is, they are not falsifiable:[65]

....those "clinical observations" which analysts naively believe confirm their theory cannot do this any more than the daily confirmations which astrologers find in their practice. And as for Freud's epic of the Ego, the Super-ego, and the Id, no substantially stronger claim to scientific status can be made for it than for Homer's collected stories from the Olympus.

In addition, Imre Lakatos wrote that "Freudians have been nonplussed by Popper's basic challenge concerning scientific honesty. Indeed, they have refused to specify experimental conditions under which they would give up their basic assumptions."[193] In Sexual Desire (1986), philosopher Roger Scruton rejects Popper's arguments, pointing to the theory of repression as an example of a Freudian theory that does have testable consequences. Scruton nevertheless concluded that psychoanalysis is not genuinely scientific because it involves an unacceptable dependence on metaphor.[194] The philosopher and physicist Mario Bunge argued that psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience because it violates the ontology and methodology inherent to science.[195] According to Bunge, most psychoanalytic theories are either untestable or unsupported by evidence.[196] Cognitive scientists, in particular, have also weighed in. Martin Seligman, a prominent academic in positive psychology, wrote that:[197]

Thirty years ago, the cognitive revolution in psychology overthrew both Freud and the behaviorists, at least in academia.… The imperialistic Freudian view claims that emotion always drives thought, while the imperialistic cognitive view claims that thought always drives emotion. The evidence, however, is that each drives the other at times.

Adolf Grünbaum argues in Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis (1993) that psychoanalytic-based theories are falsifiable but that the causal claims of psychoanalysis are unsupported by the available clinical evidence.[198]

Historian Henri Ellenberger, who researched the history of Freud, Jung, Adler, and Janet,[64]: 20  while writing his book The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry,[64]: 17  argued that psychoanalysis was not scientific on the grounds of both its methodology and social structure:[64]: 21 

Psychoanalysis, is it a science? It does not meet the criteria (unified science, defined domain and methodology). It corresponds to the traits of a philosophical sect (closed organization, highly personal initiation, a doctrine which is changeable but defined by its official adoption, cult and legend of the founder).

— Henri Ellenberger

Freud

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Some have accused Freud of fabrication, most famously in the case of Anna O.[199] Others have speculated that patients had conditions that are now easily identifiable and unrelated to psychoanalysis; for instance, Anna O. is thought to have had an organic impairment such as tuberculous meningitis or temporal lobe epilepsy, rather than Freud's diagnosis of hysteria.[200]

Henri Ellenberger and Frank Sulloway argue that Freud and his followers created an inaccurate legend of Freud to popularize psychoanalysis.[64]: 12  Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen and Sonu Shamdasani argue that this legend has been adapted to different times and situations.[64]: 13  Isabelle Stengers states that psychoanalytic circles have tried to stop historians from accessing documents about the life of Freud.[64]: 32 

Witch doctors

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Richard Feynman wrote off psychoanalysts as mere "witch doctors":[201]

If you look at all of the complicated ideas that they have developed in an infinitesimal amount of time, if you compare to any other of the sciences how long it takes to get one idea after the other, if you consider all the structures and inventions and complicated things, the ids and the egos, the tensions and the forces, and the pushes and the pulls, I tell you they can't all be there. It's too much for one brain or a few brains to have cooked up in such a short time.[xiii]

Likewise, psychiatrist E. Fuller Torrey, in Witchdoctors and Psychiatrists (1986), agreed that psychoanalytic theories have no more scientific basis than the theories of traditional native healers, "witchdoctors" or modern "cult" alternatives such as EST.[190] Psychologist Alice Miller charged psychoanalysis with being similar to the poisonous pedagogies, which she described in her book For Your Own Good. She scrutinized and rejected the validity of Freud's drive theory, including the Oedipus complex, which, according to her and Jeffrey Masson, blames the child for the abusive sexual behavior of adults.[202] Psychologist Joel Kupfersmid investigated the validity of the Oedipus complex, examining its nature and origins. He concluded that there is little evidence to support the existence of the Oedipus complex.[117]

Critical perspectives

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Contemporary philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari asserted that the institution of psychoanalysis has become a center of power and that its confessional techniques resemble those included and utilized within the Christian religion.[203] Their most in-depth criticism of the power structure of psychoanalysis and its connivance with capitalism are found in Anti-Oedipus (1972)[204] and A Thousand Plateaus (1980), the two volumes of their theoretical work Capitalism and Schizophrenia.[205] In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari take the cases of Gérard Mendel, Bela Grunberger, and Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel, prominent members of the most respected psychoanalytical associations (including the IPA), to suggest that, traditionally, psychoanalysis had always enthusiastically enjoyed and embraced a police state throughout its history.[206]

French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan criticized the emphasis of some American and British psychoanalytical traditions on what he viewed as the suggestion of imaginary "causes" for symptoms and recommended the return to Freud.[207]

Belgian psycholinguist and psychoanalyst Luce Irigaray also criticized psychoanalysis, employing Jacques Derrida's concept of phallogocentrism to describe the exclusion of women from both Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytical theories.[208]

Freudian theory

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Many aspects of Freudian theory are indeed out of date, and they should be: Freud died in 1939, and he has been slow to undertake further revisions. His critics, however, are equally behind the times, attacking Freudian views of the 1920s as if they continue to have some currency in their original form. Psychodynamic theory and therapy have evolved considerably since 1939, when Freud's bearded countenance was last sighted in earnest. Contemporary psychoanalysts and psychodynamic therapists no longer write much about ids and egos, nor do they conceive of treatment for psychological disorders as an archaeological expedition in search of lost memories.

A survey of scientific research suggested that while personality traits corresponding to Freud's oral, anal, Oedipal, and genital phases can be observed, they do not necessarily manifest as stages in the development of children. These studies also have not confirmed that such adult traits result from childhood experiences.[210] However, these stages should not be considered crucial to modern psychoanalysis. The power of the unconscious and the transference phenomenon is vital to contemporary psychoanalytic theory and practice.[211]

The idea of "unconscious" is contested because human behavior can be observed, while human mental activity has to be inferred. However, the unconscious is now a popular topic of study in the fields of experimental and social psychology (e.g., implicit attitude measures, fMRI, PET scans, and other indirect tests). The idea of unconscious and the transference phenomenon have been widely researched and, it is claimed, validated in the fields of cognitive psychology and social psychology,[212][full citation needed] though the majority of cognitive psychologists does not hold a Freudian interpretation of unconscious mental activity. Recent developments in neuroscience have resulted in one side arguing that it has provided a biological basis for unconscious emotional processing in line with psychoanalytic theory (i.e., neuropsychoanalysis),[212] while the other side argues that such findings make psychoanalytic theory obsolete and irrelevant.

Shlomo Kalo explains that the scientific materialism that flourished in the 19th century severely harmed religion and rejected whatever was called spiritual. The institution of the confession priest in particular was badly damaged. The empty void that the newborn psychoanalysis swiftly occupied this institution left behind. In his writings, Kalo claims that psychoanalysis's basic approach is erroneous. It represents the mainline wrong assumptions that happiness is unreachable and that the natural desire of a human being is to exploit his fellow men for his own pleasure and benefit.[213]

Jacques Derrida incorporated aspects of psychoanalytic theory into his theory of deconstruction in order to question what he called the 'metaphysics of presence'. Derrida also turns some of these ideas against Freud to reveal tensions and contradictions in his work. For example, although Freud defines religion and metaphysics as displacements of the identification with the father in the resolution of the Oedipal complex, Derrida (1987) insists that the prominence of the father in Freud's own analysis is itself indebted to the prominence given to the father in Western metaphysics and theology since Plato.[214][page needed]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Psychoanalysis is a and , along with a method of psychological treatment, originally formulated by beginning in the 1890s. It posits that unconscious mental processes, shaped by experiences and instinctual drives, primarily determine , emotions, and . Freud's structural model divides the psyche into the (primitive impulses), ego (reality-oriented mediator), and superego (moral conscience), with much psychic activity occurring outside conscious awareness. Therapeutic practice emphasizes free association, , and analysis of to uncover and resolve repressed conflicts. Psychoanalysis profoundly influenced , literature, and early , spawning derivative schools like those of Jung and Adler, but its core claims have endured persistent empirical scrutiny. Philosopher criticized it as unfalsifiable , incapable of generating testable predictions that could be refuted by evidence. Meta-analytic reviews find scant direct support for Freudian mechanisms, such as specific psychosexual stages or the primacy of unconscious symbolism, though broader psychodynamic therapies demonstrate modest efficacy for conditions like depression over waitlist controls, but not superior to alternatives like cognitive-behavioral therapy. Controversies persist over its scientific status, with defenders arguing for its hermeneutic value in understanding subjectivity, while critics highlight confirmation biases in case studies and failure to incorporate neuroscientific advances.

Core Principles

Unconscious Mind and Repression

conceptualized the as a dynamic repository of instinctual drives, repressed memories, and unacceptable thoughts that operate outside conscious awareness but profoundly shape behavior, emotions, and . In his 1915 metapsychological papers, Freud described the unconscious as governed by primary process thinking—characterized by timelessness, lack of , and displacement of psychic energy—contrasting it with the logical, reality-oriented secondary processes of . This model drew from earlier influences like and associationist , positing the unconscious as the primary motivator of human action, with only a fraction of mental life accessible to . Central to Freud's theory is repression (Verdrängung), an unconscious defense mechanism whereby the ego excludes distressing ideas or impulses—often rooted in libidinal or aggressive drives—from entering to avoid anxiety. Introduced in collaboration with in Studies on Hysteria (1895), repression was refined as an active, energy-consuming process that maintains psychic equilibrium but leads to symptom formation when repressed material exerts pressure for expression through dreams, parapraxes, or neurotic symptoms. Freud distinguished repression from mere forgetting, emphasizing its motivated nature: unacceptable content, such as oedipal wishes, is dynamically barred yet retains potential to influence behavior via derivatives like slips of the tongue. Empirical support for Freud's specific formulations remains limited and contested. While clinical case studies, such as those involving free association revealing "recovered" memories, provided , laboratory investigations into repression—often operationalized as —yield inconsistent results, with stronger validation for cognitive biases like directed forgetting than for dynamic exclusion of drive-derived conflicts. studies detect unconscious processing of emotional stimuli, affirming that much bypasses , but these findings align more with modular, automatic systems in than Freud's hydraulic model of repressed instincts. Critics, including , argue the theory's unfalsifiability undermines its scientific status, as explanatory constructs like latent content resist empirical disconfirmation. Contemporary psychodynamic approaches retain the unconscious-repression framework for therapeutic utility, yet integrate it with evidence-based elements like , acknowledging Freud's model's heuristic value despite its divergence from verifiable causal mechanisms in . Sources advancing Freudian orthodoxy, often from psychoanalytic institutions, may overstate empirical congruence due to interpretive flexibility, whereas behavioral and cognitive paradigms prioritize observable data over inferred unconscious dynamics. Thus, while the notion of non-conscious influences garners broad acceptance—evidenced by phenomena like implicit bias—Freud's emphasis on repression of phylogenetically ancient drives lacks robust, replicable substantiation in controlled studies.

Psychosexual Development Stages

Sigmund Freud posited that human personality develops through a sequence of five psychosexual stages, each characterized by the libido's fixation on a specific , with progression driven by resolution of associated conflicts. This model, elaborated in works such as Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (), views experiences as shaping adult character, where inadequate resolution leads to fixation—persistent libidinal attachment resulting in traits like dependency or compulsivity. The theory emphasizes infantile sexuality as polymorphous, gradually maturing toward genital primacy, though Freud derived it primarily from clinical observations rather than controlled experiments.
StageApproximate AgeErogenous ZoneKey Conflicts and Outcomes
OralBirth–1 yearMouthWeaning from or bottle; fixation yields oral traits like , , or passivity/ in adulthood.
Anal1–3 years; harshness fosters anal-retentive traits (orderliness, obstinacy) or anal-expulsive ones (disorderliness, recklessness).
Phallic3–6 yearsGenitalsAwareness of sexual differences; (boys' rivalry with father for mother) or (girls' equivalent), with or ; successful resolution forms superego via identification with same-sex parent.
Latency6 years–None (dormant)Sexual urges repressed; energy redirects to social, intellectual pursuits, building skills and peer relations.
Genital onwardGenitalsMature sexuality emerges, integrating prior stages; healthy adults form balanced relationships balancing love and work, absent fixation.
Freud's framework influenced early 20th-century views on child-rearing and but has faced scholarly critique for lacking and empirical rigor, relying on retrospective case studies of Viennese patients rather than prospective data or cross-cultural validation. finds scant direct support for stage-specific fixations predicting traits, with modern developmental theories favoring attachment or cognitive models backed by longitudinal studies. Additional objections highlight , underemphasizing female experience and cultural variability, though some analysts argue core ideas on unconscious conflict retain heuristic value in .

Instinctual Drives and Conflicts

In Freudian , instinctual drives, known as Trieb, constitute the primary energies derived from somatic sources, compelling the organism toward tension discharge and pleasure attainment. These drives form the basis of mental life, with Freud positing them as the "true motive forces" underlying , as articulated in his metapsychological works. Initially, Freud centered his model on the , a broad sexual energy encompassing both self-preservative functions and erotic aims, which he elaborated in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (), where he argued that even seemingly non-sexual activities derive from libidinal cathexes. By 1920, in , Freud introduced a dual-drive theory to account for repetitive behaviors and not explained by pleasure-seeking alone, distinguishing Eros—the instincts promoting cohesion, reproduction, and survival—from , the instincts oriented toward dissolution, entropy, and destructive tendencies manifested as . Eros integrates self-preservative and sexual components to bind individuals and society, while underlies masochism, self-destructiveness, and outward-directed hostility, with Freud hypothesizing its origin in an innate biological urge to return to inorganic quiescence. This duality resolved theoretical inconsistencies in earlier models, such as the compulsion to repeat traumatic experiences, by positing that drives oppose the principle's dominance. Instinctual conflicts emerge from the opposition between these drives and the demands of external , internalized , or their mutual antagonism within the psyche, primarily negotiated by the ego against the id's raw impulses. When drive satisfaction proves impossible or prohibited—due to social prohibitions, constraints, or superego censure—conflicts intensify, generating signal anxiety that prompts defense mechanisms like repression, whereby unacceptable drive derivatives are excluded from . Freud viewed such unresolved conflicts as the of , where dammed-up libidinal or aggressive energies convert into symptoms, phobias, or inhibitions, as psychic energy seeks indirect discharge. These conflicts underscore psychoanalysis's economic perspective, quantifying mental processes through drive quantities and their bindings, displacements, or condensations, with successful resolution requiring analytic uncovering of repressed material to restore equilibrium. Later theorists, such as those in , expanded on drive conflicts by emphasizing adaptive ego functions, though Freud maintained drives as inherently conservative forces resistant to full taming. Empirical validation of these constructs remains contested, with relying on clinical inferences rather than direct physiological measurement.

Historical Development

Freud's Early Influences and Formative Cases (1856–1900)

, originally named Sigismund Schlomo, was born on May 6, 1856, in , (now , ), to Jewish parents , a wool merchant, and Amalia Nathansohn Freud./03:_Sigmund_Freud/3.02:_A_Brief_Biography_of_Sigmund_Freud_M.D.) His family, facing economic hardship, relocated to in 1860, where Freud resided for most of his life./03:_Sigmund_Freud/3.02:_A_Brief_Biography_of_Sigmund_Freud_M.D.) As the eldest of eight siblings from his mother's second marriage, Freud excelled academically, graduating from the University of Vienna's in 1881 after entering in 1873, though his interests leaned toward , , and rather than clinical practice. Freud's early scientific influences stemmed from the physiological reductionism of the Helmholtz school, particularly under Ernst Wilhelm von Brücke, in whose laboratory he worked from 1876 to 1882, applying physical and chemical principles to biological processes and rejecting vitalistic explanations. This materialistic framework shaped Freud's initial rejection of metaphysical approaches to mind and behavior. Following a brief stint at , Freud secured a travel grant in 1885 to study under at the Salpêtrière Hospital in , where he observed demonstrations of , including its occurrence in men and induction via , challenging prior assumptions of it being solely a female, physiological disorder. Charcot's emphasis on psychological factors in symptom formation profoundly impacted Freud, redirecting his focus from to mental mechanisms. Upon returning to Vienna in 1886, Freud established a private neurological practice and collaborated with Josef Breuer, who had pioneered a "talking cure" for hysteria. Breuer's treatment of "Anna O." (Bertha Pappenheim, born 1859), beginning in 1880 when she was 21, involved verbalizing traumatic memories under hypnosis, leading to temporary symptom relief through catharsis—termed the "chimney-sweeping" method—though her full recovery was incomplete, with institutionalization required later. Freud adopted and modified this approach, hypothesizing repressed ideas as the cause of hysterical symptoms, and applied it to his own patients starting in the late 1880s. Key formative cases included Frau Emmy von N. (Fanny Moser, born 1848), treated by Freud from May 1889, involving multiple personalities, tics, and phobias resolved partially through abreaction of childhood memories without hypnosis. Other cases, such as Miss Elisabeth von R. (1892), highlighted resistance and transference, where patients projected feelings onto the therapist. These experiences, documented in the co-authored Studies on Hysteria (published 1895), shifted Freud toward viewing neuroses as stemming from psychological conflicts rather than solely organic causes, though he initially posited real childhood sexual seductions as etiologic before questioning their literal truth by 1897 amid evidential inconsistencies. The death of his father Jacob in 1896 prompted Freud's self-analysis, uncovering personal neuroses and laying groundwork for unconscious dynamics, culminating in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).

Establishment of Psychoanalytic Theory and Movement (1900–1939)

Sigmund Freud published The Interpretation of Dreams in 1900, marking the formal inception of psychoanalytic theory through its exposition of unconscious processes via dream analysis. This work, derived from Freud's self-analysis following personal losses, posited dreams as fulfillments of repressed wishes, establishing core concepts like the unconscious and wish-fulfillment. Subsequent publications, including The Psychopathology of Everyday Life in 1901 and Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality in 1905, expanded the framework to slips of the tongue, forgetting, and infantile sexuality, respectively, solidifying psychoanalysis as a method for investigating mental life. In 1902, Freud initiated the Psychological Wednesday Society, a weekly discussion group in comprising early adherents like and , evolving into the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society by 1908 as the first organized psychoanalytic body. This group formalized training and dissemination, with Freud as president, fostering a movement amid resistance from academic , which viewed psychoanalysis as speculative rather than empirical. The (IPA) was founded in 1910 under Freud's leadership at the Nuremberg Congress, unifying nascent societies in , , and to standardize practice and counter deviations. Freud's sole visit to the in 1909, delivering five lectures at in , introduced psychoanalysis to American audiences, earning him an and catalyzing its adoption in despite cultural clashes Freud noted regarding American and . These lectures, later published as Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, outlined the theory's origins from hysteria treatment to broader , influencing figures like and prompting U.S. psychoanalytic clinics by the . Internal schisms challenged the movement's coherence: resigned in 1911, rejecting Freud's emphasis on sexuality in favor of inferiority complexes and social factors, forming ; Carl Jung's break followed in 1913 after publishing in 1912, diverging on libido's scope and introducing archetypes, leading to . Freud responded by tightening IPA orthodoxy, expelling dissenters to preserve core tenets like the and , though this marginalized the movement in German-speaking academia amid rising . By the 1920s–1930s, psychoanalysis institutionalize via training institutes in , , and , with figures like and advancing ego analysis and technique amid disruptions. Freud's The Ego and the Id (1923) introduced the structural model, refining theory against object-relations critiques. The Nazi annexation of in 1938 forced Freud's emigration to at age 81, where he died in 1939, but not before the movement had spawned global branches, including the British Psychoanalytical Society, amid ongoing debates over its scientific validity versus therapeutic utility.

Global Spread, Schisms, and Institutionalization (1940s–1970s)

The exodus of European psychoanalysts fleeing Nazi persecution during significantly propelled the global dissemination of psychoanalysis, particularly to the , where émigrés such as Heinz Hartmann, Ernst Kris, and Rudolf Lowenstein integrated Freudian ideas into American psychiatric training and practice. By the late 1940s, psychoanalysis had permeated U.S. , with —emphasizing adaptive ego functions—dominating training institutes affiliated with the American Psychoanalytic Association (APsa), which restricted full membership to physicians until legal challenges in the 1980s. This period marked psychoanalysis's zenith in American , influencing , , and public discourse on , as returning GIs sought for war-related traumas, embedding psychoanalytic concepts in mainstream by the . Parallel expansions occurred elsewhere: in Britain, the British Psychoanalytical Society reorganized into three strands—Freudian, Kleinian, and Independent—following wartime influxes of analysts, sustaining institutional vitality despite disruptions. In , notably , psychoanalysis gained traction through European immigrants, with undergraduate programs incorporating it by the 1960s; similar growth unfolded in amid rising clinical interest during the same decade. The (IPA), under Ernst Jones's presidency until 1949, coordinated these developments, affiliating new societies and facilitating congresses that standardized training amid geopolitical upheavals. By the , however, institutional rigidities—such as the IPA's insistence on uniform analytic techniques—exacerbated tensions, contributing to membership disputes and the formation of alternative groups. Schisms intensified theoretical and institutional fractures, most prominently in the British Psychoanalytical Society's "Controversial Discussions" (1941–1945), where advocated developmental ego defenses and observation over early interpretation, clashing with Melanie Klein's emphasis on innate aggressive phantasies and precocious Oedipal conflicts in child analysis. These debates, involving figures like Edward Glover and , culminated in a agreement allowing autonomous training tracks, though Klein's views faced accusations of deviating from Freudian orthodoxy, highlighting divergences on the infantile superego's sadistic origins versus adaptive maturation. In the U.S., the New York Psychoanalytic Society splintered in the , yielding groups like the William Alanson White Institute (, formalized post-war) amid debates over lay analysis and culturalist emphases. France witnessed Jacques Lacan's rupture from the Société Psychanalytique de Paris (SPP) in 1953, prompted by IPA demands to curb his variable-length sessions and emphasis on linguistic structures over ego adaptation; Lacan founded the Société Française de Psychanalyse, later the École Freudienne de Paris (1964), rejecting IPA standardization as stifling return to Freud's texts. Further IPA expulsions of Lacan in 1963 underscored methodological rifts, fostering independent Lacanian networks that prioritized and the "real" over biological or adaptive models. These divisions, echoed in European societies (e.g., , ), reflected broader institutionalization strains: while enabling proliferation of institutes—over 70 IPA components by 1970—they entrenched orthodoxy, marginalizing innovators and foreshadowing empirical critiques of efficacy.

Decline, Revival, and Contemporary Adaptations (1980s–Present)

The publication of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition (DSM-III) in 1980 marked a pivotal shift away from psychoanalytic etiological models toward an atheoretical, descriptive diagnostic framework emphasizing symptom reliability and categorical classification, which diminished the role of unconscious conflicts and dynamic formulations in psychiatric practice. This change aligned with broader trends in the , including the ascendancy of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT), which provided manualized, time-limited interventions backed by randomized controlled trials (RCTs) demonstrating measurable outcomes, and the rapid expansion of following the introduction of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors like in 1987, offering biological causal explanations and symptomatic relief that contrasted with psychoanalysis's emphasis on long-term intrapsychic exploration. The empirical challenges to core Freudian constructs, such as the purported mechanisms of repression and psychosexual stages, which lacked falsifiable predictions and replicable evidence from , further accelerated the decline, with psychoanalysis yielding ground in academic training programs and insurance-reimbursed care by the late . Managed care reforms during the 1980s and 1990s prioritized brief, cost-effective treatments, rendering traditional four-to-five sessions-per-week psychoanalysis economically unviable, while the designation of the 1990s as the "Decade of the Brain" elevated and genetic research, framing mental disorders as neurochemical imbalances amenable to pharmacological intervention rather than interpretive . By this period, psychoanalytic influence in had waned dramatically, with Freud citations in journals falling from approximately 3% in the late to 1% in the , reflecting a systemic pivot toward evidence-based paradigms that privileged quantifiable over hermeneutic depth. Efforts at revival began in the late 1990s through adaptations that shortened treatment duration and incorporated empirical validation, such as short-term (STPP), typically involving 20-40 sessions focused on focal conflicts or attachment patterns, which meta-analyses have shown to yield effect sizes (Cohen's d ≈ 0.78-1.10) comparable to CBT for and anxiety, with sustained benefits at follow-up. These modifications addressed prior critiques by emphasizing testable hypotheses and outcome measures, enabling psychodynamic approaches to gain footing in clinical guidelines for conditions like personality disorders and chronic depression where CBT shows limited long-term efficacy. The emergence of neuropsychoanalysis in the late 1990s, formalized with the founding of the International Neuropsychoanalysis Society in 2000, represented a key adaptation by seeking causal links between psychoanalytic concepts—like and dream formation—and neuroscientific findings from functional MRI and , positing that early Freudian models of neural energy distribution anticipated modern understandings of subcortical limbic circuits in emotion regulation. Contemporary practices integrate these insights into hybrid therapies, such as for , which draws on while incorporating attachment neurobiology to enhance interpersonal functioning, supported by RCTs showing reduced rates. Despite these developments, psychoanalysis remains marginal in mainstream , comprising less than 10% of research funding and training slots in the United States as of 2020, with ongoing debates over methodological rigor—such as reliance on single-case studies versus large-scale RCTs—highlighting persistent tensions between its idiographic depth and the standards of . Recent public and intellectual resurgence, fueled by critiques of reductive biological models and popular works reevaluating unconscious influences on behavior, has nonetheless sustained niche institutional presence in specialized clinics and graduate programs, particularly in where relational and intersubjective variants emphasize enactments and two-person over classical .

Theoretical Frameworks

Topographical Model of the Mind

The topographical model, introduced by in his 1900 work , conceptualizes the human mind as divided into three interrelated systems: the unconscious (Ucs.), (Pcs.), and conscious (Cs.). This framework posits that mental processes occur across these levels, with the unconscious comprising the vast majority of psychic content, akin to an iceberg's submerged portion, while the conscious represents only a small, accessible fraction. Freud developed the model to explain phenomena such as dreams, slips of the , and neurotic symptoms, arguing that unconscious material exerts influence on behavior despite lacking voluntary access. The unconscious contains repressed instincts, , and primitive wishes—primarily sexual and aggressive drives—that are barred from awareness due to their incompatibility with reality or moral standards. It operates via the primary process, characterized by timelessness, lack of contradiction, and mechanisms like (merging ideas) and displacement (shifting emphasis), which prioritize immediate wish fulfillment over logical coherence. Access to this layer requires psychoanalytic techniques, as mechanisms prevent direct emergence into , leading to disguised manifestations in dreams or symptoms. In contrast, the serves as a mediator, holding mental content—such as memories or —that is not currently focal but can readily enter through or association. Freud described it as a "filter" or storage area for latent thoughts, enabling selective retrieval without the distortions of the unconscious. The , the smallest system, encompasses perceptions, thoughts, and decisions in immediate awareness, governed by the secondary process of rational, reality-oriented thinking. Freud's model emphasized dynamic interplay, with energy () flowing between systems under repression's influence, where unacceptable unconscious material is pushed back to maintain psychic equilibrium. Though foundational to early psychoanalysis, the topographical approach has faced for its lack of falsifiable predictions and empirical validation, relying instead on case studies rather than controlled observation. Subsequent revisions, including Freud's 1923 structural model, addressed perceived limitations in accounting for intrapsychic conflict.

Structural Model: Id, Ego, Superego

Sigmund Freud introduced the structural model of the psyche in his 1923 monograph , positing three dynamic agencies—the , ego, and —that interact to shape mental functioning and personality. This framework shifted emphasis from the topographical model's focus on levels to the functional divisions within the mind, with the representing primal drives, the ego managing adaptation to reality, and the superego enforcing moral standards. Freud derived these concepts primarily from clinical psychoanalytic observations rather than experimental , viewing them as hypothetical constructs to explain observed behaviors and internal conflicts. The id constitutes the basal, entirely unconscious portion of the psyche, serving as a reservoir of instinctual energies including (sexual drive) and . It operates according to the pleasure principle, impulsively seeking immediate gratification of needs while disregarding consequences, time, or external constraints; for instance, the id might drive hunger satisfaction without consideration of social norms. Present from birth, the id functions chaotically and irrationally, akin to a " full of seething excitations," with no or inhibition. The ego develops from the id during infancy as a differentiated structure that interfaces with the external world, adhering to the reality principle to delay or modify id impulses for feasible outcomes. Largely unconscious itself but incorporating conscious perception and rational thought, the ego employs defense mechanisms—such as repression or rationalization—to mitigate anxiety arising from id-superego conflicts or reality threats. Freud likened the ego to a "rider" attempting to control the id's "horse," though often overpowered by its energies. The superego, emerging around age five through identification with parental figures during the resolution, internalizes societal and familial prohibitions as a moral censor. Comprising the , which generates guilt for id-driven transgressions, and the ego-ideal, which sets aspirational standards for , the superego largely remains unconscious and can induce severe self-punishment or perfectionism. It opposes both id impulses and ego , fostering that the ego must negotiate. In Freud's view, psychic depends on the ego's strength in balancing these forces; leads to neuroses where id demands overwhelm or superego harshness dominates. However, the model's reliance on introspective case studies has drawn criticism for lacking falsifiable empirical support, with subsequent failing to identify corresponding neural substrates or validate predictions through controlled experiments. Despite this, the tripartite division influenced later theories on , , and self-regulation, though often reformulated in cognitive or behavioral terms.

Post-Freudian Expansions: Ego Psychology and Beyond

Anna Freud's The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (1936) marked an early expansion of Freudian theory by systematizing the ego's defensive operations, including repression, regression, , isolation, undoing, projection, , turning against the self, and reversal into the opposite, as means to manage anxiety arising from id impulses, superego demands, and external reality. Her analysis, drawn from child observations, emphasized the ego's active role in development, particularly in latency and , where defenses foster rather than mere symptom resolution. Heinz Hartmann advanced this framework in Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation (1939), introducing the concept of a "conflict-free" ego sphere comprising innate apparatuses like perception, intention, object comprehension, thinking, language, and reality testing, which evolve autonomously to promote organism-environment adaptation from birth. Unlike Freud's drive-conflict focus, Hartmann argued these functions operate independently of id-superego tensions, enabling proactive mastery and neutral energy for ego growth, thus broadening psychoanalysis toward normal development and preventive intervention. Collaborators like David Rapaport integrated genetic psychology, tracing ego hierarchies from archaic to mature forms via empirical studies on thought processes. Beyond , reframed psychic structure around internalized early relationships, with positing innate phantasy and splitting of "part-objects" (e.g., good/bad breast) in infancy, driving resolved through and reparation. W.R.D. Fairbairn (1941) rejected for a model of "endopsychic structure" formed by schizoid, depressive, and manic defenses against object loss, emphasizing maturation via whole-object integration over Oedipal conflicts. D.W. Winnicott (1951) contributed the "holding environment" and transitional objects, linking true/false distinctions to maternal facilitation of creative play and . Self-psychology, originated by in The Analysis of the Self (1971), shifted to disorders of the self, positing bipolar sustained by selfobjects providing , idealization, and twinship experiences; deficits yield narcissistic fragmentation, treated via optimal and transmuting internalization rather than drive interpretation. These paradigms, while diverging from classical , retained core analytic tenets like unconscious conflict yet prioritized relational and adaptive dynamics, influencing shorter-term therapies amid mid-20th-century empirical critiques of Freudian orthodoxy.

Understanding Psychopathology

Etiology of Neuroses and Character Disorders

In Freudian , neuroses arise from conflicts between unconscious instinctual drives—predominantly libidinal—and the ego's adaptive demands or superego prohibitions, prompting repression as a primary defense mechanism. This process, detailed in works like The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence (1894), involves the ego rejecting incompatible ideas, often of a sexual , which then return in disguised forms as symptoms such as conversion in or compulsive rituals in obsessional . Freud differentiated "actual neuroses," including and anxiety neurosis, from "psychoneuroses." Actual neuroses stem from contemporary sexual disturbances, such as or , causing a direct somatic accumulation of undischarged conceptualized as toxic, without symbolic psychological content. In contrast, psychoneuroses like originate from repressed childhood experiences or fantasies, particularly those tied to the , where infantile sexual wishes toward parents are defensively barred, leading to fixations, regressions, and symptom compromise formations in adulthood. Character disorders, or pathological character formations, represent a defensive organization where libidinal conflicts are managed through stable, ego-syntonic traits rather than acute symptoms. Freud initially connected traits like orderliness, parsimony, and obstinacy to anal-stage erotism and fixation, as in his 1908 paper "Character and Anal Erotism." Karl Abraham expanded this into a typology linking oral, anal, and phallic characters to developmental arrests and defenses such as reaction formation. Wilhelm Reich, in Character Analysis (1933), advanced the view that character disorders involve a chronic "muscular armor"—rigid and somatic defenses—against anxiety-provoking impulses, preventing neurotic symptom breakthrough but perpetuating interpersonal rigidity and inhibition of genitality. These structures, rooted in early frustrations of libidinal needs, bind energy diffusely across the personality, distinguishing them etiologically from focal neuroses while sharing origins in unresolved psychosexual conflicts.

Role of Trauma, Fantasy, and Oedipal Dynamics

Freud initially theorized that neurosis, particularly hysteria, arose from actual childhood sexual trauma, as outlined in his 1896 paper "The Aetiology of Hysteria," where he claimed nearly all cases stemmed from premature sexual experiences before age two. This seduction theory posited external events as causal agents, supported by patient reports during cathartic treatments with Josef Breuer. However, by 1897, Freud abandoned this view in private correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess, citing insufficient corroborative evidence from family inquiries and recognizing that patients' memories often lacked verifiable basis, leading him to prioritize "psychical reality" over historical fact. The revision elevated fantasy as the core mechanism in , where unconscious wishes and internal conflicts distort perceptions of , generating symptoms through repression rather than direct trauma alone. Freud argued in his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality that fantasies, such as primal scene reconstructions, arise from innate drives and could produce neurotic effects equivalent to real events, as psychic holds etiological primacy. This framework implied that trauma's impact depends on its elaboration in fantasy, not mere occurrence, a position maintained despite later critiques questioning the theory's . Central to this fantasy-based etiology is the , detailed in Freud's 1900 and elaborated in works like (1913), which describes children aged 3–6 experiencing unconscious desire for the opposite-sex parent, rivalry with the same-sex parent, and resolution via , fostering identification and superego development. In , unresolved Oedipal dynamics—manifesting as persistent incestuous wishes or guilt—underlie neuroses, with symptoms like phobias or compulsions representing defensive compromises against these repressed conflicts. Freud viewed successful navigation of this phase as essential for mature sexuality, while fixation, often amplified by fantasy, perpetuates character disorders through mechanisms like reaction formations. Subsequent analysts, such as those in , integrated real trauma with Oedipal fantasy, suggesting external events could exacerbate endogenous conflicts, but Freud's core insistence on fantasy's causative role persisted, influencing clinical interpretations of as Oedipal reenactments. Empirical scrutiny, however, reveals limited direct validation; studies on childhood memories and attachment find correlations with relational patterns but no robust causation for Oedipal-specific mechanisms, highlighting psychoanalysis's reliance on interpretive inference over controlled observation.

Distinctions from Psychosis and Organic Conditions

In , neuroses are characterized by intrapsychic conflicts between the ego and the , where the ego employs repression to manage unacceptable impulses while maintaining an alliance with external and the superego. This preserves reality testing, allowing the patient to distinguish internal fantasy from objective fact, with symptoms manifesting as compromises like anxiety, phobias, or obsessions that do not sever the link to the world. In contrast, involve a fundamental conflict between the ego and the external world, prompting the ego to withdraw libidinal investment from and reconstruct a substitute world driven by id wishes, resulting in delusions, hallucinations, and a loss of reality testing. Freud specified this distinction in 1924, noting that both conditions arise from the same etiological frustration—non-fulfillment of infantile wishes—but neurosis represses internal elements while disavows and replaces external , as "neurosis does not disavow the reality, it only ignores it; disavows it." This ego-centric differentiation underscores why psychoanalysis targets : the intact ego in supports techniques like free association and interpretation, enabling into unconscious conflicts. Psychotic processes, however, compromise ego functions such as synthesis and reality adhesion, rendering the patient unable to form a therapeutic alliance or process symbolically, thus excluding from classical treatment. Later ego psychologists, building on Freud, emphasized regression to pre-ego states in , further highlighting structural ego deficits absent in . Psychoanalysis further demarcates its domain from organic conditions by focusing on functional disorders without demonstrable . Freud differentiated "actual neuroses"—such as and —attributed to contemporary somatic disturbances from leading to undischarged tension, from "psychoneuroses" rooted in historical conflicts and defenses against fantasy. Actual neuroses, while lacking ideational content amenable to analysis, were still viewed as non-organic, involving reversible physiological imbalances rather than fixed lesions. Organic disorders, by contrast, entail verifiable cerebral —e.g., general from , documented in Freud's era with spirochete invasion causing and delusions—or modern equivalents like traumatic , where symptoms stem from direct neural disruption, not symbolic representation. Psychoanalytic evaluation requires ruling out such conditions via clinical , neurological exam, and exclusion of cognitive deficits, as impaired mentation precludes the assumption of a cohesive necessary for interpretive work. Thus, organic syndromes demand somatic intervention, with psychoanalysis contraindicated where causality traces to structural damage rather than intrapsychic dynamics.

Clinical Practice and Techniques

The therapeutic process in psychoanalysis focuses on articulating and understanding unconscious conflicts through key techniques such as free association, interpretation, and analysis of transference. The analyst maintains technical neutrality and adheres to the rule of abstinence, refraining from providing direct advice, concrete solutions, or practical guidance. This non-directive approach preserves the patient's frustration of wishes, allowing unconscious material to emerge and be worked through, thereby enabling the patient to develop insight and achieve resolution independently. This distinguishes psychoanalysis from more directive therapies, such as cognitive-behavioral therapy, which typically offer explicit problem-solving strategies.

Fundamental Rule: Free Association and Dream Analysis

The fundamental rule of psychoanalysis requires the patient to express thoughts, feelings, and images as they arise in the mind, without deliberate censorship, self-criticism, or concern for relevance, logic, or propriety. This technique, introduced by in collaboration with during the treatment of in the 1890s and formalized in Freud's 1913 paper "On Beginning the Treatment," aims to bypass conscious resistances and access unconscious material driving neurotic symptoms. By verbalizing uncensored associations, the patient traces pathways from surface phenomena—such as symptoms or parapraxes—to their repressed origins, revealing conflicts rooted in infantile experiences or instinctual drives. Free association supplants earlier methods like or direct symptom , which Freud deemed insufficient for penetrating deep-seated repressions. The analyst maintains a stance of "evenly suspended ," attentively following the patient's stream without premature interpretation, to identify recurring themes, slips, or resistances indicative of unconscious dynamics. Empirical studies on psychodynamic processes, including free association, suggest it facilitates insight into relational patterns, with meta-analyses reporting moderate effect sizes for symptom reduction in disorders like depression and anxiety, comparable to other therapies, though causal attribution remains debated due to methodological limitations in isolating technique-specific effects. Dream analysis extends free association to nocturnal mentation, which Freud posited as the "royal road to the unconscious" in his 1900 work . Patients recount dreams via free association, distinguishing the manifest content—the surface narrative recalled upon waking—from the latent content, the disguised fulfillment of repressed wishes distorted by mechanisms like , displacement, and secondary revision to evade . Interpretation proceeds associatively: the patient links dream elements to personal memories or affects, uncovering symbolic representations of oedipal conflicts, trauma, or forbidden impulses, often verified by emotional congruence or symptom alleviation in subsequent sessions. Freud emphasized dreams' regressive nature, reverting to primary process thinking dominated by unconscious logic, where wish-fulfillment predominates but may invert into anxiety dreams under excessive repression. While foundational to , dream interpretation's validity hinges on subjective reconstruction rather than objective verification, prompting critiques of ; nonetheless, process research links associative depth in dream work to therapeutic gains in self-understanding. In practice, analysts integrate these tools to illuminate enactments, where unconscious fantasies replay in the analytic dyad, fostering structural personality change over time.

Transference, Resistance, and Interpretation

refers to the unconscious redirection of feelings and desires originally experienced toward from the patient's past—such as parents—onto the psychoanalyst in the present . first systematically described this phenomenon in his 1912 paper "The Dynamics of Transference," positing that it manifests as an excessive emotional attachment or hostility beyond what is rational in the analytic setting, thereby revealing unresolved conflicts. In clinical practice, serves as a primary tool for accessing unconscious material, allowing the analyst to observe and analyze prototypical relational patterns that the patient repeats, often unconsciously, to avoid confronting their origins. Resistance denotes the patient's unconscious efforts to oppose the emergence of repressed thoughts, affects, or drives into conscious awareness during . Freud initially identified resistance as the reluctance to recover forgotten memories, later expanding it in works like "Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through" () to include defensive maneuvers from the ego, superego, and , such as repression, , or symptom adherence for secondary gains. Manifestations include forgetting sessions, intellectualizing associations, or behaviors that evade free association; Freud viewed these not as willful opposition but as protective mechanisms preserving psychic equilibrium against anxiety-provoking insights. In technique, recognizing resistance is crucial, as it signals proximity to core conflicts and often intertwines with , where the patient resists analyzing feelings toward to maintain defensive repetitions. Interpretation constitutes the analyst's verbal intervention aimed at elucidating the unconscious meanings underlying the patient's associations, behaviors, dreams, or enactments. Freud emphasized in his technical papers (1911–1915) that effective interpretations must be timed to the patient's readiness, linking manifest content to latent unconscious dynamics without overwhelming defenses, thereby fostering and ego modification. The process involves hypothesizing causal connections—rooted in first-hand clinical —between current resistances or transferences and past pathogenic experiences, such as oedipal conflicts, to promote working-through via repeated . In psychoanalytic practice, these elements form an interdependent triad: transference provides the relational arena for unconscious reenactments, resistance obstructs their resolution to safeguard against destabilizing revelations, and interpretation bridges the two by decoding their interplay. The analyst maintains neutrality to intensify transference, confronts resistances to deepen exploration, and offers interpretations that highlight how the patient's current attitudes toward the analyst echo historical prototypes, aiming to dissolve repetitive patterns and enhance autonomous functioning. This method, derived from Freud's cases like Dora (1905), prioritizes depth over symptom relief, though its efficacy hinges on the analyst's accurate discernment of unconscious motivations amid potential countertransference influences.

Variations in Setting, Frequency, and Termination

In classical psychoanalysis, the therapeutic setting features the patient reclining on a with the analyst positioned out of sight behind them, a configuration introduced by to minimize visual distractions and personal discomfort from prolonged , as he noted his inability to tolerate being "gazed at for eight hours a day." This arrangement promotes free association by reducing conscious inhibitions tied to mutual visibility. Modern psychoanalytic practice often incorporates variations, such as face-to-face seating in chairs, particularly in lower-frequency , which may facilitate different manifestations but deviates from the classical frame's emphasis on and regression. Session frequency in psychoanalysis traditionally ranges from four to five times per week, each lasting approximately 50 minutes, enabling sustained immersion in unconscious processes as practiced by Freud, who scheduled up to 10-11 hours of daily sessions across patients. In contemporary adaptations, psychoanalytic typically involves one to three sessions weekly, reflecting practical considerations like patient availability and cost, though analysts debate whether reduced frequency compromises the depth achievable in classical analysis. Termination occurs when the patient demonstrates capacity for independent functioning and enjoyment, as Freud outlined in his lectures, with the process often involving gradual reduction in session frequency to test sustained progress and consolidate insights. In his 1937 essay "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," Freud acknowledged that complete resolution of resistances may prove impossible for some, rendering certain analyses interminable, yet empirical practice emphasizes patient-initiated endings informed by analyst evaluation of resolved core conflicts. This phase reactivates separation anxieties, requiring working through to affirm the patient's internalized analytic gains.

Empirical Evaluation

Outcome Studies and Meta-Analyses on Efficacy

A 2010 meta-analytic review of randomized controlled trials on , derived from psychoanalytic principles, reported pre- to post-treatment effect sizes of d=0.97 for target problems and d=0.78 for general functioning, comparable to those for cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) and medication, with effects maintained or enhanced at 9-month follow-up (d=1.51 for targets). These findings countered perceptions of lacking empirical support, attributing efficacy to mechanisms like and relational focus rather than symptom-focused techniques alone. Subsequent meta-analyses on long-term psychoanalytic (LTPP), defined as at least one year of with 1-5 sessions per week, yielded mixed results. A 2009 systematic review of 23 studies found large mean effect sizes (d=0.87 at termination; d=1.18 at follow-up) and success rates of 71% at end and 54% at follow-up, outperforming waitlist controls but comparable to shorter . In contrast, a 2020 meta-analysis of 14 LTPP studies reported smaller post-treatment effects (d=0.35 overall, ranging 0.18-0.49 across outcomes) that were statistically significant but diminished at follow-up, questioning superiority over less intensive alternatives. For specific disorders, evidence varies. A 2022 meta-analysis on psychodynamic therapy for found moderate effects (g=0.74) versus controls, though fewer and smaller than CBT trials, with high risk of bias in included studies. A 2020 review of eight meta-analyses confirmed psychodynamic approaches as effective as active treatments (e.g., CBT) for common mental disorders like depression and anxiety, with effect sizes around d=0.70-1.00 at termination, but noted reliance on self-reports and allegiance effects favoring psychodynamic researchers. Fewer high-quality trials exist for classical Freudian psychoanalysis versus modified psychodynamic variants, limiting direct efficacy claims for intensive, open-ended analysis. Critiques highlight methodological limitations across studies, including small sample sizes (often n<50), lack of blinding, and toward positive outcomes. A 2011 meta-analysis of LTPP versus other treatments or no treatment found equivalent recovery rates (around 30-40%) across conditions, attributing apparent benefits to common factors like therapeutic rather than psychoanalytic specificity. Recent umbrella reviews of meta-analyses place psychodynamic effects within moderate ranges for adults (SMD=0.50-0.70 for depression), but inferior to targeted interventions for some conditions, with long-term data sparse due to dropout rates exceeding 20-30% in LTPP. Overall, while psychodynamic therapies demonstrate efficacy beyond no treatment, for unique long-term advantages of psychoanalysis remains tentative, influenced by researcher in psychodynamic-heavy fields.

Methodological Challenges in Testing Psychoanalytic Hypotheses

Testing psychoanalytic hypotheses empirically encounters profound difficulties stemming from the theory's emphasis on unconscious mental dynamics, which resist direct observation and quantification. Core constructs such as repression, the , and are inferred indirectly from verbal reports, dreams, and behaviors during , rendering them inherently subjective and prone to interpretive variability among analysts. Unlike observable phenomena in , these processes cannot be manipulated or measured with standardized instruments, complicating efforts to establish causal links between hypothesized mechanisms and outcomes. A primary challenge lies in the of vague or multifaceted concepts, which often lack precise, testable definitions amenable to replication. For instance, Freudian hypotheses about infantile sexuality or wish-fulfillment in dreams have been critiqued for their elasticity, allowing post-hoc accommodations to discrepant data rather than predictive falsification. Experimental attempts to proxy unconscious processes—such as priming studies on implicit or subliminal —yield inconsistent results, partly due to methodological artifacts like characteristics, where participants' influences responses. Moreover, the idiographic nature of psychoanalytic case studies prioritizes depth over generalizability, precluding the large sample sizes required for statistical power in research designs. Clinical validation, a cornerstone of psychoanalytic evidence, is undermined by confounds inherent to the therapeutic setting, as highlighted in Adolf Grünbaum's philosophical critique. Grünbaum contends that patient corroboration of interpretations—Freud's "tally argument"—fails as probative evidence because therapeutic success may derive from suggestion, effects, or nonspecific factors rather than theoretical accuracy, with analysts' preconceptions biasing data elicitation. This contamination is exacerbated by the absence of blinding: therapists cannot be unaware of their hypotheses, and patients' free associations are shaped by the analytic frame, yielding theory-laden narratives that resist independent verification. Randomized controlled trials (RCTs), the gold standard for efficacy testing, are infeasible for psychoanalysis due to its indefinite duration (often years), ethical barriers to withholding treatment, and dropout rates exceeding 50% in long-term studies, which dilute statistical analyses. Further hurdles arise in distinguishing psychoanalytic effects from alternative explanations, such as spontaneous remission or social support, absent rigorous controls. Meta-analyses attempting to aggregate outcome data reveal high heterogeneity in measures of symptom reduction, with effect sizes for psychoanalysis (e.g., Cohen's d ≈ 0.5-0.8 in select reviews) comparable to shorter therapies but plagued by publication bias and small, non-representative samples predominantly from affluent, Western populations. Process research, which examines session transcripts for transference manifestations, employs mixed methods but struggles with inter-rater reliability below 70% for interpretive coding, underscoring persistent subjectivity. Critics like Hans Eysenck have argued that these methodological laxities, including neglect of null hypotheses and overreliance on anecdotal success, render psychoanalysis vulnerable to confirmation bias, where supportive cases are emphasized while failures are rationalized away. Despite innovations like randomized process-outcome studies since the 1990s, the field's empirical base remains sparse, with fewer than 500 controlled trials by 2020 compared to thousands for cognitive-behavioral approaches, highlighting entrenched barriers to rigorous hypothesis testing.

Comparisons to Empirical Therapies like CBT

Psychoanalytic therapy contrasts with empirical therapies like cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) in its foundational mechanisms, treatment duration, and evidential support. CBT employs structured, manualized protocols targeting maladaptive cognitions and behaviors through techniques such as and exposure, typically spanning 12-20 sessions, with efficacy demonstrated across numerous randomized controlled trials (RCTs) for disorders including depression, anxiety, and PTSD, yielding effect sizes of 0.5-0.8 in meta-analyses. Psychoanalysis, by comparison, prioritizes exploratory processes like free association to access unconscious drives, often extending over 2-5 years at 3-5 sessions weekly, with far fewer standardized RCTs due to its non-manualized, patient-tailored approach. Head-to-head comparisons reveal mixed outcomes, frequently favoring CBT in short-term symptom reduction. A 2010 meta-analysis of 70 studies found CBT superior to psychodynamic therapy (a broader category encompassing psychoanalytic principles) at post-treatment for various conditions, with a between-group effect size of d=0.33, though not exceeding supportive therapies. For social anxiety disorder, a 2014 RCT showed CBT outperforming short-term psychodynamic therapy in remission rates (52% vs. 38%) but equivalent response rates and long-term outcomes at 18 months follow-up. In depression, a 2024 meta-analysis of relative efficacy reported equivalence between psychodynamic psychotherapy and CBT, with both yielding sustained improvements (effect sizes d=0.6-0.9), yet CBT's advantages persisted in studies with larger samples and stricter controls.
ConditionTherapy ComparisonKey FindingEffect Size/OutcomeSource
DepressionPsychodynamic vs. CBTEquivalent short- and long-term efficacyd ≈ 0.7 for both
Social AnxietyShort-term psychodynamic vs. CBTCBT superior short-term; equivalent long-termRemission: CBT 52% vs. 38%
General DisordersCBT vs. PsychodynamicCBT superior post-treatmentd=0.33 favoring CBT
These disparities stem partly from methodological rigor: CBT's protocols enable blinding, large-scale RCTs, and replication, amassing over 1,000 trials by 2020, whereas psychoanalytic studies often suffer from small samples (n<50), therapist allegiance bias, and reliance on non-specific factors like the therapeutic alliance rather than theory-specific mechanisms. A 2017 review highlighted psychodynamic therapy's comparability to CBT in naturalistic settings but inferiority in controlled trials for remission, attributing this to psychoanalysis's emphasis on restructuring over symptom relief, which yields slower but potentially deeper changes unsubstantiated by robust longitudinal data. Despite some meta-analytic claims of equivalence, the evidentiary base for classical psychoanalysis remains thinner, with critics noting its hypotheses resist disconfirmation, unlike CBT's testable predictions.

Scientific Status and Falsifiability

Popperian Critiques and Response from Analysts

Philosopher , in his 1963 book Conjectures and Refutations, demarcated science from via the criterion of , requiring theories to be testable in ways that could potentially refute them through empirical observation. He classified psychoanalysis as unfalsifiable, arguing that Freudian and Adlerian theories could interpret any as confirmatory, rendering them irrefutable regardless of evidence. For instance, Popper noted that under Freud's , a son's aggressive act toward his father (e.g., pushing him from a train platform) confirms repressed hostility, while a seemingly affectionate act (e.g., helping him board) is dismissed as disguised aggression; no outcome disproves the theory. Similarly, Adler's accommodates success as overcompensation and failure as resignation, eliminating refutation possibilities. Popper contrasted this with testable theories like Einstein's relativity, where specific predictions (e.g., light bending during eclipses) risked disconfirmation, as observed in 1919 Eddington expedition data. He maintained that psychoanalysis, despite observational basis, advances explanations post hoc, prioritizing confirmation over risk of refutation, thus lacking scientific status. This critique, rooted in Popper's 1934 Logik der Forschung (English: , 1959), influenced dismissals of psychoanalysis as , echoed in later analyses questioning its empirical demarcation. Psychoanalytic defenders, including some analysts, have countered that Popper misrepresented the theory's structure and evidential use. In a paper, psychoanalyst Morris Eagle argued Popper's examples (e.g., interpretations) rely on contrived, selective readings that ignore psychoanalysis's clinical constraints and potential for disconfirmation, such as failed predictions in therapeutic or contradictory case outcomes. Eagle contended the critique is logically flawed, as Popper conflates interpretive flexibility with inherent unfalsifiability, overlooking instances where analysts reject data incompatible with core hypotheses, like empirical challenges to specific drives. Others, drawing on hermeneutic traditions, posit psychoanalysis as a historical or idiographic science not bound by Popperian standards, falsifiable through cumulative clinical refutations rather than isolated experiments, as Habermas suggested in viewing it as emancipatory self-knowledge. Adolf Grünbaum, while critical of psychoanalysis's evidential weakness (e.g., placebo-like suggestion in free association), disputed Popper's unfalsifiability charge, asserting that therapeutic outcomes and auxiliary hypotheses enable testing; failures to alleviate symptoms via interpretation could refute causal claims about unconscious conflicts, though he found evidence lacking. Empirical defenders cite domain-specific , such as randomized trials rejecting certain Freudian predictions (e.g., no universal Oedipal resolution in cohorts), yet argue core evolves via such scrutiny, akin to paradigm shifts in Kuhn's framework. Despite these responses, Popper's demarcation persists in , with many agreeing psychoanalysis's flexibility hinders decisive refutation of foundational tenets like repression's ubiquity.

Integration Attempts with Neuroscience

Neuropsychoanalysis emerged in the late 1990s as an interdisciplinary field seeking to reconcile Freudian psychoanalytic concepts with empirical findings from neuroscience, primarily through the work of figures like Mark Solms. Solms, a neuropsychologist and psychoanalyst, has argued for integrating psychoanalytic drive theory with affective neuroscience, positing that Freud's id corresponds to phylogenetically ancient brainstem systems generating basic affects, while higher cortical structures modulate these into ego functions. This approach draws on Jaak Panksepp's research identifying seven primary emotional systems in the mammalian brain, which proponents claim align with Freudian instincts like aggression and sexuality. A landmark contribution came from Solms' 1997 discovery that dreaming originates in forebrain mechanisms rather than solely the brainstem, challenging prior REM-sleep models and supporting psychoanalytic views of dreams as fulfilling wishes via endogenous activation. In his 2013 book The Conscious Id, Solms proposes that consciousness arises from brainstem arousal and affect circuits, rendering the id "conscious" at its core, contrary to Freud's original topography but aligned with first-person experiential data from clinical neurology. Empirical support includes neuroimaging studies showing subcortical activations during free association akin to emotional processing in limbic regions, though these correlations do not causally validate interpretive mechanisms. Freud's own early attempt at integration, the 1895 Project for a Scientific , modeled psychic processes on neural excitation gradients but was abandoned due to speculative models; modern revisits leverage advances like functional MRI to map repression to prefrontal inhibitory circuits. Proponents cite validations such as unconscious experiments mirroring Freudian slips and defense mechanisms observable in amygdala-prefrontal dysregulations in anxiety disorders. However, critics like Rachel Blass and Zvi Carmeli argue that neuropsychoanalysis commits reductionist fallacies, retrofitting neurodata to unfalsifiable psychoanalytic narratives without advancing clinical predictions or resolving core theoretical ambiguities. Despite these efforts, integration remains contested, with limited randomized controlled trials linking neuro findings to psychoanalytic outcomes; meta-analyses of psychodynamic show modest gains potentially attributable to nonspecific factors rather than theory-specific neural mechanisms. The Neuropsychoanalysis Association, founded in , promotes ongoing dialogue via journals and conferences, but skeptics contend it risks , prioritizing brain scans over from behavior. Empirical progress hinges on testable hypotheses, such as Panksepp-inspired interventions targeting SEEKING or RAGE systems, yet causal realism demands distinguishing correlation from psychoanalytic causation.

Verifiability Issues in Case Studies vs. Controlled Trials

Psychoanalytic case studies, as the foundational evidentiary method in Freud's work and subsequent traditions, face profound verifiability challenges due to their reliance on subjective, unblinded observations conducted by a single analyst immersed in the theory being tested. Interpretations of patients' free associations, dreams, and transferences are inherently theory-laden, rendering them vulnerable to , where data are selectively emphasized to align with preconceived hypotheses while dissonant material is reinterpreted or dismissed as defensive resistance. This methodological flaw is exacerbated by suggestive influences, as analysts' expectations can shape patient narratives through implicit cues during sessions, contaminating the data and preventing independent corroboration of causal claims about unconscious conflicts or infantile origins of symptoms. Philosopher Adolf Grünbaum's critique underscores this issue, contending that Freudian clinical evidence fails scientific standards because the therapeutic context—where patients seek relief and analysts proffer interpretations—functions akin to a biased experiment without controls or double-blinding, allowing responses or demand characteristics to masquerade as theoretical validation. Unlike experimental paradigms, case studies lack replicability, as each is presented as uniquely idiographic, defying systematic testing for generalizability or refutation; historical examples like Freud's analyses of "Dora" or the "Wolf Man" have been scrutinized for selective reporting and retrospective fitting of facts to theory, with no contemporaneous records to verify reconstructions. Such practices invite overinterpretation, where unverifiable assertions about repressed traumas or Oedipal dynamics evade empirical disconfirmation, prioritizing narrative coherence over causal rigor. In juxtaposition, controlled trials—particularly randomized controlled trials (RCTs)—bolster verifiability through to mitigate , blinding to reduce expectancy effects, and objective outcome measures like standardized symptom scales, enabling statistical assessment of treatment effects against waitlist or active comparators. Psychoanalysis, however, has produced few such trials for its classical form, owing to logistical hurdles like session length (often 4–5 times weekly for years), non-manualized techniques, and resistance to standardization that analysts argue would artifactually alter the analytic process. Where RCTs exist for shorter psychodynamic variants, they demonstrate modest efficacy for certain disorders, but critics note persistent threats, such as among researcher-analysts and difficulty blinding long-term therapies, contrasting sharply with the replicable, protocol-driven verifiability of cognitive-behavioral interventions. Karl Popper's demarcation criterion amplifies these disparities, classifying psychoanalysis as unfalsifiable pseudoscience because case study predictions are hermeneutically elastic—any outcome, including therapeutic failure, can be absorbed via ad hoc explanations like unresolved transference, whereas controlled trials demand risky, precise predictions testable against null hypotheses. Defenders counter that case studies yield causal insights unattainable in nomothetic trials, yet the absence of convergent validation from blinded, multi-site studies perpetuates skepticism, as empirical scrutiny reveals psychoanalytic claims often rest on anecdotal authority rather than corroborated mechanisms. This evidentiary asymmetry has marginalized classical psychoanalysis in evidence-based guidelines, privileging therapies with robust RCT support.

Major Criticisms

Flaws in Freud's Data and Seduction Theory Abandonment

Freud's initial formulation of the seduction theory, presented in his April 21, 1896, lecture "The Aetiology of Hysteria," posited that neurosis, particularly hysteria, universally resulted from repressed memories of passive sexual experiences imposed on children before puberty, often by caretakers including fathers. He claimed this etiology held for all 18 cases he had analyzed up to that point, asserting that symptoms emerged only upon the forgetting of these events. However, these case reports provided scant clinical detail, with Freud withholding patient identities, timelines, or external corroboration to protect confidentiality, rendering the data unverifiable and reliant solely on reconstructed memories elicited through hypnosis, pressure techniques, or free association—methods later recognized as susceptible to suggestion and confabulation. Methodological flaws compounded the evidential weaknesses: Freud's sample derived predominantly from affluent Viennese patients treated in private practice, introducing and limiting generalizability, while the absence of independent validation—such as family interviews or —left claims anecdotal. Critics have noted that the seduction narratives were not based on patients' direct, conscious recollections but on analyst-influenced reconstructions, often fitting a preconceived template of early trauma, with uniformity across cases suggesting theoretical imposition rather than empirical discovery. Therapeutic outcomes further undermined the data; despite initial enthusiasm, Freud reported failures in resolving symptoms by confronting these "memories," as analyses stalled and patients resisted full disclosure, indicating potential inaccuracies in the recovered material. These evidential shortcomings culminated in Freud's abandonment of the theory, articulated in a private letter to on September 21, 1897, where he declared, "I no longer believe in my neurotica," referring to the seduction stories as fabrications rather than historical truths. Freud enumerated pragmatic and introspective reasons: the improbability of such widespread perversion required to account for case prevalence; the narrative coherence of patient accounts resembling "novels" more than fragmented realities; therapeutic impasses where of seductions failed to yield cures; and insights from his own self-analysis, which uncovered endogenous fantasies of without external validation. This shift pivoted psychoanalysis toward internal conflict and wish-fulfillment, prioritizing fantasy over external trauma, though subsequent letters, such as that of November 14, 1897, reaffirmed the rejection while acknowledging residual real seductions in some instances. Debates persist on the abandonment's motivations, with some historians arguing it stemmed from evidential realism—unverifiable claims clashing with observable inconsistencies—rather than external pressures like professional or paternal , as alleged by Jeffrey Masson, whose reinterpretation lacks primary support for non-empirical drivers. Empirical scrutiny favors the data's intrinsic flaws: without falsifiable anchors, the theory's universality crumbled under scrutiny, prefiguring broader critiques of psychoanalysis's reliance on untestable reconstructions over corroborated facts. This episode underscores early psychoanalysis's vulnerability to , where theoretical elegance supplanted rigorous validation.

Ideological Biases and Cultural Pathologization

Psychoanalytic theory has been criticized for embedding cultural assumptions of early 20th-century , particularly Freud's portrayal of universal psychic structures influenced by bourgeois family norms and patriarchal ideals, which overlook variations across societies. For instance, concepts like the presuppose dynamics and paternal authority as normative, pathologizing deviations as developmental arrests without empirical validation. This ethnocentric framing, as noted by neo-Freudians such as in her 1937 work The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, attributes neuroses primarily to intrapsychic conflicts rather than sociocultural stressors, thereby universalizing Western while dismissing relational or communal alternatives prevalent in non-European contexts. A prominent extension of these biases appears in mid-20th-century applications, such as Adorno and colleagues' The Authoritarian Personality (1950), which deployed psychoanalytic notions of repressed aggression to construct the F-scale, ostensibly measuring susceptibility to through traits like and submission to . Critics, including , contended that the scale exhibited left-leaning ideological skew, correlating with conservative values while exempting analogous left-wing rigidities, thus pathologizing political opposition to progressive norms as personality disorders rooted in childhood and parental harshness rather than ideological disagreement. The study's reliance on Freudian , funded partly by U.S. anti-fascist efforts, prioritized explanatory narratives aligning with critiques of over balanced psychometric rigor, fostering a tradition of viewing traditionalism as inherently maladaptive. Freud's (1930) exemplifies cultural pathologization by positing that societal restraints on instinctual drives—particularly aggression and sexuality—engender universal and guilt, framing institutions like , , and as repressive mechanisms that sublimate at the cost of individual . This thesis implies that inherently produces discontent, attributing societal ills to superego formation rather than adaptive functions of norms in maintaining order, a view echoed in later psychoanalytic but lacking causal evidence beyond anecdotal inference. Such interpretations risk ideologically undermining established structures by recasting them as collective pathologies, as seen in subsequent uses to critique bourgeois morality without falsifiable metrics for instinctual "repression." These tendencies have drawn charges of ideological entrenchment, where psychoanalytic paradigms resist empirical disconfirmation by reinterpreting failures as manifestations of analyst-analysand or societal denial, suppressing challenges akin to dogmatic ideologies. In academic contexts, where left-leaning biases in departments amplify uncritical adoption, this has historically enabled pathologization of —e.g., labeling anti-communist sentiments as paranoid projections—prioritizing coherence over controlled studies, thereby conflating therapeutic with cultural .

Overemphasis on Sexuality and Neglect of Biology

Freud's psychoanalytic theory centrally positioned sexuality, conceptualized as libido or erotic drive, as the fundamental force shaping personality, psychopathology, and civilization, with psychosexual stages—oral, anal, phallic, latency, and genital—dictating developmental conflicts and fixations. This libidinal emphasis extended to interpreting symptoms, dreams, parapraxes, and cultural phenomena as disguised expressions of repressed sexual wishes, as in the Oedipus complex where infantile desire for the opposite-sex parent allegedly forms the nuclear neurosis. Critics contend this framework overemphasizes sexuality, attributing undue causal weight to genital and pregenital instincts while marginalizing non-sexual motivations such as attachment, cognition, or social learning, a view even conceded by psychoanalytic theorist Drew Westen, who noted Freud's overemphasis on sexuality in personality formation contributed to the field's diminished scientific standing. Empirical challenges include the absence of verifiable evidence for psychosexual stages, with longitudinal studies failing to correlate alleged fixations with adult outcomes beyond correlational artifacts. Compounding this is psychoanalysis's historical neglect of biological mechanisms, as Freud shifted from his 1895 Project for a Scientific —which sought to ground psychic processes in neural —to a purely psychological by 1900, eschewing brain-based explanations for abstract economic and topographic models. This pivot dismissed organic etiologies for mental disorders, favoring intrapsychic fantasy over verifiable physiological or hereditary factors, despite contemporaneous advances in and . Behavioral genetics further underscores this oversight: twin and studies estimate at 40-50% for traits like extraversion and , and up to 80% for specific conditions such as , indicating polygenic influences irreducible to Freudian or early object relations. Psychoanalytic interpretations, by contrast, attribute such variance to environmental dynamics without accommodating genetic variance components, leading to causal overreach unsupported by molecular or data. Neuroscience critiques amplify the biology deficit, revealing no direct correlates for Freudian constructs like the id-ego-superego in , and rejecting hydraulic energy models of as incompatible with synaptic transmission and neurochemical modulation. For example, and anxiety—often sexualized in Freudian theory—exhibit ties to hyperactivity and serotonin dysregulation, not latent incestuous wishes, as evidenced by pharmacological interventions altering symptoms independently of insight-oriented . This biological sidelining persists in classical training, where physiological screening is secondary to interpretive depth, fostering a dualistic mind-body split critiqued for impeding integration with evidence-based paradigms like those in , which prioritize adaptive, gene-environment interactions over pan-libidinal .

Modern Developments and Variants

Neuropsychoanalysis and Brain-Mind Correlations

Neuropsychoanalysis emerged in the late 1990s as an interdisciplinary effort to integrate psychoanalytic theory with empirical neuroscience, seeking to map mental processes described by Freud onto brain structures and functions. Mark Solms, a South African neuropsychologist and psychoanalyst, played a pivotal role in its development, founding the International Neuropsychoanalysis Society in 2000 and launching the journal Neuropsychoanalysis in 1999. This field revives Freud's early attempt in his 1895 Project for a Scientific Psychology to model psychic processes neurally, but incorporates modern advances like functional neuroimaging and lesion studies. Proponents argue it provides a framework for understanding how unconscious drives originate in subcortical brain regions, such as the brainstem, which Solms posits as the origin of affective consciousness rather than higher cortical areas as Freud initially emphasized. Key brain-mind correlations in neuropsychoanalysis include linking the Freudian id to ancient brainstem mechanisms for basic affects like hunger and aversion, the to cortical executive functions, and superego processes to prefrontal inhibitory controls. Solms' research on dreaming, for instance, demonstrated through studies of patients with brainstem lesions that dreaming persists independently of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, attributing it instead to forebrain activation driven by homeostatic needs—evidence from a 1997 study of over 200 neurological cases showing 20% of non-REM dream reports in lesioned patients. Affective neuroscience supports correlations like the role of the amygdala in fear-based unconscious processing and dopamine systems in reward-seeking motivations akin to libido, with functional MRI studies revealing implicit emotional responses bypassing conscious awareness. These mappings draw on dual representations of the body in the brain: one for perception (cortical) and one for affect (subcortical), termed the "conscious id" by Solms. Despite these integrations, empirical support remains limited and contested, with much evidence derived from case studies and correlational rather than causal interventions or large-scale controlled trials. Critics contend that proposed neural correlates often rely on speculative analogies rather than direct falsifiable predictions, failing to validate core psychoanalytic constructs like repression or the with reproducible brain data. For example, while confirms unconscious influences on behavior, as in priming experiments showing subcortical modulation of , linking these to Freudian dynamics lacks mechanistic specificity and risks in interpreting ambiguous fMRI activations. Proponents counter that neuropsychoanalysis enriches by highlighting subjective and motivation absent in reductionist models, yet the field acknowledges challenges in bridging explanatory gaps between third-person scans and first-person experience. Ongoing employs methods like quantitative analysis and computational modeling to test hypotheses, but rigorous validation requires distinguishing adaptive neural processes from pathologized interpretations inherited from psychoanalysis.

Relational, Intersubjective, and Self Psychology Approaches

Relational psychoanalysis emerged in the late 1980s, primarily through the work of Stephen A. Mitchell, who integrated elements of interpersonal psychoanalysis, , and British independent traditions to emphasize the dyadic nature of therapeutic interaction over classical Freudian . Mitchell's 1988 book Relational Concepts in Psychoanalysis argued that psychic structure arises from relational experiences rather than innate drives, introducing concepts like enactment—unconscious mutual influences between analyst and patient—and the "analytic third" as a shared relational space. This approach posits that pathology stems from relational deficits, treated through co-constructed narratives in analysis, but critics note its aversion to empirical validation, with Mitchell prioritizing clinical observation over controlled studies. Intersubjective psychoanalysis, developed concurrently in the 1980s and by figures such as Robert D. Stolorow, George E. Atwood, and , extends relational ideas by framing the psyche as embedded in intersubjective contexts, rejecting Cartesian isolated-mind models. Stolorow's intersubjective , outlined in works from the , views therapeutic change as occurring within the irreducible intersubjective field of patient-analyst organizing principles, influenced by early interactions. Benjamin's contributions, particularly in her 2004 paper "Beyond Doer and Done To," highlight "thirdness"—a mutual recognition breaking deadlock in sadomasochistic dynamics—drawing from Hegelian dialectics and emphasizing surrender to the other's subjectivity. Empirical scrutiny remains limited, with theoretical critiques questioning the verifiability of intersubjective "fields" absent quantifiable measures, though some process studies link relational attunement to patient affect regulation. Self psychology, pioneered by Heinz Kohut from the 1960s through his 1971 and 1977 texts The Analysis of the Self and The Restoration of the Self, shifted focus to the supraindividual "selfobject" functions—mirroring, idealizing, and twinship—essential for cohesive self-development, viewing pathological narcissism as arrested selfobject needs rather than libidinal fixation. Kohut (1913–1981) argued empathy as the core therapeutic agent, with transmuting internalizations replacing selfobject failures, influencing treatments for narcissistic disorders by prioritizing self-cohesion over insight into drives. Post-Kohut developments, including empirical probes, provide partial support: a 2005 study affirmed selfobject denial's role in adult narcissistic traits, yet broader randomized trials for self psychology interventions are scarce, mirroring psychoanalysis's general evidential challenges. These approaches converge in privileging relational matrices over intrapsychic isolation, with centering empathic self-building, relational emphasizing mutual enactments, and intersubjective stressing contextual co-construction—differentiating from classical theory's monadic focus but sharing evidential vulnerabilities, as meta-analyses indicate modest outcomes for psychodynamic therapies without variant-specific rigor. Despite theoretical innovations, their causal claims on motivation rely heavily on case vignettes, with causal realism tempered by absent controls for relational effects versus nonspecific factors.

Short-Term and Evidence-Informed Psychodynamic Methods

Short-term (STPP) encompasses time-limited interventions, typically spanning 20 to 40 sessions, that adapt core psychodynamic principles—such as exploration of unconscious conflicts, , and defense mechanisms—to structured, goal-oriented formats suitable for empirical evaluation. These methods emerged in the mid-20th century as responses to critiques of classical 's indefinite duration and limited verifiability, with pioneers like David Malan developing focal models targeting specific interpersonal or intrapsychic issues. Unlike long-term , STPP emphasizes rapid alliance-building, interpretation of key dynamics, and measurable outcomes, often integrating manualized protocols to facilitate randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Intensive Short-Term Dynamic Psychotherapy (ISTDP), developed by in the 1970s, exemplifies an evidence-informed variant by actively confronting anxiety-provoking defenses and unconscious impulses to achieve experiential breakthroughs in fewer sessions, sometimes as few as 10 to 20. ISTDP has demonstrated efficacy in reducing depressive symptoms among patients with mood disorders, with meta-analyses of RCTs indicating significant improvements over waitlist controls and sustained effects at follow-up. For instance, a 2020 review of studies on ISTDP for mood disorders found consistent positive outcomes on symptom severity, including emotional repression and negative affect, particularly in . Cost-effectiveness analyses further support its application, showing reductions in healthcare utilization costs exceeding $4,500 per case post-treatment due to decreased hospitalizations and medication needs. Meta-analytic evidence underscores STPP's overall efficacy across disorders. A 2015 update of prior reviews analyzed 31 RCTs and reported moderate to large effect sizes for STPP in treating common conditions, comparable to cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) in head-to-head comparisons for depression and anxiety, with benefits persisting up to 18 months post-therapy. For functional somatic syndromes, a meta-analysis of 17 RCTs confirmed STPP's superiority over treatment-as-usual or waitlists in alleviating symptoms like pain and , with effect sizes on anxiety and depression measures exceeding those of minimal interventions. In depressive disorders specifically, STPP yields reliable symptom reductions, though high-quality RCTs remain needed to address heterogeneity in protocols and patient populations. These findings derive from peer-reviewed syntheses prioritizing RCTs, mitigating biases in case reports inherent to traditional psychodynamic work. Despite empirical support, STPP's evidence base reveals limitations: effect sizes are often moderate (around 0.5-0.8), not consistently outperforming established alternatives like CBT for specific phobias or PTSD, and dropout rates can reach 20-30% due to the intensity of uncovering defenses. Even novice therapists have achieved broad symptom relief in anxiety disorders using ISTDP protocols, suggesting trainability but highlighting the need for rigorous adherence to evidence-based techniques over unstructured exploration. Ongoing research integrates STPP with neuroscience-informed elements, such as mentalization-focused interventions, to enhance causal mechanisms like improved affect regulation, though causal claims require further longitudinal RCTs to distinguish from nonspecific factors like therapeutic alliance.

Training, Institutions, and Professional Landscape

Requirements for Psychoanalytic Certification

Prerequisites for admission to psychoanalytic training programs typically include a university degree and established professional credentials in a discipline, such as a (M.D.) with completion of psychiatric residency, a doctoral degree in , or a in or counseling, accompanied by clinical experience. Candidates undergo rigorous selection processes involving interviews to assess maturity, , ethical standards, and capacity for , ensuring only those deemed suitable proceed. Central to certification is the candidate's personal psychoanalysis, requiring a minimum of 3 to 5 sessions per week with a qualified analyst, often spanning 4 to 5 years or 300 to 500 hours, to foster the self-analytic capacity necessary for treating patients. This personal treatment must substantially overlap with the period of supervised clinical work, maintaining and non-reporting to the . Didactic coursework forms another pillar, mandating at least 450 hours of seminars over a minimum of 4 years, encompassing Freudian and post-Freudian theory, clinical technique, , , , methods, and multicultural considerations in analysis. These seminars, delivered by training analysts, emphasize first-hand application to clinical material rather than rote memorization. Clinical training requires conducting supervised psychoanalytic treatments of at least two , each at 3 to 5 sessions weekly for a minimum of one year, totaling no fewer than 150 hours of individual across different supervisors. Cases must demonstrate the candidate's ability to handle mid-phase and termination dynamics, with diversity in patient backgrounds encouraged; additional supervised work, such as in child analysis or , may supplement core requirements. Graduation and certification occur upon institute verification of completed personal analysis, didactic hours, supervised cases with favorable evaluations, submission of required papers or exams, and resolution of any ethical or legal issues, granting the title of qualified psychoanalyst and eligibility for society membership under bodies like the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) or APsaA. In the United States, separate board certification through the American Board of Psychoanalysis in Psychoanalysis (ABPsaP) demands graduation from an IPA- or APsaA-approved or equivalent, potentially followed by an examination assessing theoretical and clinical competence. While IPA standards set the international baseline, adopted by affiliated societies, individual institutes may impose higher thresholds, and regional variations exist, such as expanded eligibility for non-physicians in some countries since the mid-20th century.

Key Organizations and Regional Differences

The (IPA), established by on July 30, 1910, during the Second International Psychoanalytical Congress in , functions as the preeminent global authority for psychoanalysis, setting standards for training, ethical practice, and scientific discourse among its constituent societies. Comprising over 1,500 members initially but expanding to approximately 13,500 analysts across 70 countries by 2020, the IPA accredits training institutes, organizes international congresses, and enforces criteria for personal analysis, supervised clinical work, and theoretical seminars required for full membership. It operates through a network of component societies, provisional societies, and study groups, emphasizing fidelity to core Freudian principles while allowing limited theoretical pluralism. Regionally, the IPA delegates coordination to bodies like the American Psychoanalytic Association (APsaA), founded on May 9, 1911, in as the first national psychoanalytic organization in the United States, with around 3,000 members focused on education, research, and clinical certification through approved institutes. The APsaA affiliates numerous U.S. societies, such as the Psychoanalytic Society and (established 1932) and the New York Psychoanalytic Society & (founded 1911), prioritizing rigorous medical and psychological amid a professional landscape dominated by shorter-term therapies. In Europe, the European Psychoanalytical Federation (EPF), formed in 1966 to consolidate IPA-affiliated societies and promote cross-national dialogue, hosts annual conferences on topics like training standards and cultural adaptations, reflecting theoretical diversity from French emphasis on Lacanian variants to more orthodox approaches in German-speaking regions. In , the Federación de Psicoanálisis de América Latina (FEPAL), serving as an umbrella for 22 Spanish-speaking and 13 Portuguese-speaking societies since its early congresses in the , underscores psychoanalysis's deep cultural permeation, with early adoption dating to the through translations and as a hub hosting over 10 FEPAL congresses by 2000. Regional practices diverge notably: Latin American psychoanalysis integrates Freudian concepts into social and literary discourse, fostering expansive patient loads and theoretical innovations attuned to postcolonial contexts, as evidenced by steady membership growth reported in IPA data. Conversely, U.S. variants emphasize empirical validation and brief psychodynamic methods within APsaA frameworks, confronting skepticism from randomized controlled trial standards that favor cognitive-behavioral alternatives, resulting in psychoanalysis's relegation largely to academic rather than mainstream clinical dominance. European applications show regression in institutional funding and integration since the 1990s, per surveys of psychoanalytic societies, yet sustain vitality through intersubjective and relational adaptations responsive to multicultural demographics. These variations stem from historical diffusion—early in Latin America via émigré analysts fleeing —and local causal factors like regulatory pressures in the U.S. and theoretical fragmentation in Europe, without uniform empirical superiority across regions.

Research Methodologies in Contemporary Psychoanalysis

Contemporary psychoanalytic research primarily utilizes qualitative methodologies, such as detailed clinical case studies and analyses, which emphasize idiographic exploration of individual therapeutic processes over generalizations. These approaches draw on from session transcripts, patient self-reports, and therapist observations to identify patterns like dynamics or defensive structures, often employing thematic coding or hermeneutic interpretation. A of 36 studies indicates that qualitative methods predominate, reflecting psychoanalysis's roots in subjective clinical , though hybrid integrations with quantitative tools are emerging to enhance replicability. Empirical single-case studies represent a refined , incorporating multiple sources—including audio recordings (used in 64.5% of cases), standardized scales (36.6%), and interviews (35.5%)—to systematically test psychoanalytic hypotheses within naturalistic settings. A of 93 such studies published in ISI-ranked journals from 1955 to 2017 found that 94.6% were naturalistic designs, with mixed qualitative-quantitative analyses in 56% of cases, utilizing tools like the Core Conflictual Relationship Theme method or Reflective Functioning scales to quantify relational patterns. These efforts aim to transcend anecdotal reporting by including observer ratings and longitudinal tracking, though ethical transparency, such as , appears in only 45.2% of cases, and therapist details are often omitted. Quantitative methodologies, including randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and meta-analyses of psychodynamic interventions, focus on outcome efficacy rather than core psychoanalytic tenets, with pre-post effect sizes for symptom reduction averaging 1.52 (95% CI: 1.20-1.84) and personality change at 1.08 (95% CI: 0.89-1.26) across 14 studies involving 603 patients with complex disorders. Follow-up effects remain robust at 1.46 overall, but evidence derives largely from uncontrolled cohort designs lacking active comparisons, limiting causal inferences about unique psychoanalytic contributions versus nonspecific factors like therapeutic alliance. Process-outcome research employs coding systems to correlate in-session variables, such as interpretive interventions, with therapeutic gains, yet such studies constitute a minority amid persistent reliance on completer analyses that may inflate effects by excluding dropouts. Challenges persist due to psychoanalysis's interpretive framework, which resists Karl Popper's criterion, as theoretical constructs like unconscious conflicts are often post-hoc adapted to fit data, complicating disconfirmation. Epistemological tensions arise from self-reported or analyst-biased measures, prone to confirmation effects, particularly in academic contexts where ideological commitment may undervalue null findings. While hybrid methods signal progress, systematic reviews underscore the need for controlled trials and blinded assessments to establish causal mechanisms beyond or expectancy effects, with current evidence stronger for short-term psychodynamic variants than long-term classical analysis.

Intellectual and Cultural Impact

Influence on Literature, Art, and Philosophy

Psychoanalysis profoundly shaped 20th-century literature by offering a lens to depict the unconscious mind, repressed desires, and internal conflicts, influencing modernist authors who sought to capture psychological depth beyond surface narratives. James Joyce's Ulysses (1922), for instance, employed stream-of-consciousness techniques that echoed Freud's exploration of free association and the dynamic unconscious, as Joyce himself acknowledged familiarity with Freudian ideas during its composition. Similarly, D.H. Lawrence integrated psychoanalytic concepts of libido and instinctual drives into novels like Sons and Lovers (1913), portraying Oedipal tensions and familial neuroses with explicit psychological undertones derived from early Freudian texts such as The Interpretation of Dreams (1899). Virginia Woolf and Franz Kafka also drew on these motifs, using fragmented narratives to evoke repression and the irrational, though Kafka's existential dread predated full Freudian dissemination yet aligned with its emphasis on hidden psychic forces. In visual art, Sigmund Freud's theories catalyzed the surrealist movement, which André Breton explicitly credited in his Surrealist Manifesto (1924) as drawing from The Interpretation of Dreams to access the unconscious through automatic techniques and dream imagery. Artists like Salvador Dalí operationalized Freudian fetishism and parapraxes in paintings such as The Persistence of Memory (1931), where melting forms symbolized repressed temporal anxieties, a direct nod to Freud's psychosexual symbolism that Dalí discussed in his 1932 essay "The Object as Revealed in Surrealist Experiment." Breton's group experiments with hypnotic trances and exquisite corpse games further embodied Freud's free association, aiming to bypass ego censorship, though Freud himself remained ambivalent, viewing surrealism as artistic rather than scientific when he met Dalí in 1938 and praised his technical skill over theoretical fidelity. This influence extended Freudian ideas into avant-garde practice, prioritizing irrationality and the id over rational representation, yet often amplifying unverified symbolic interpretations without empirical validation. Philosophically, psychoanalysis challenged Cartesian by positing an irrational unconscious as central to subjectivity, prompting reinterpretations in structuralist and post-structuralist thought, particularly through Jacques Lacan's "return to Freud" starting in the , which fused Freudian drives with Saussurean to argue that the unconscious is structured like a . Lacan's seminars, such as those on the (1936 concept, elaborated post-1953), influenced philosophers like and Slavoj Žižek by framing desire as alienated and ideological, extending Freud's topography into critiques of ego formation and the Symbolic order. Existentialists engaged ambivalently: Jean-Paul Sartre's (1943) rejected Freudian determinism as "" that undermines radical freedom, yet incorporated psychoanalytic diagnostics of while prioritizing phenomenological authenticity over hydraulic models of . Overall, Freud's impact lay in destabilizing Enlightenment views of autonomous reason, though subsequent often critiqued its biological and lack of , treating it more as a cultural than rigorous metaphysics.

Contributions to Understanding Human Motivation

Psychoanalysis advanced the understanding of human motivation by positing that behavior is driven primarily by unconscious instincts, particularly sexual () and aggressive forces originating in the id, which seek tension reduction through discharge. formalized this in works such as Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), where he described as a fundamental motivational energy, and later in (1920), introducing the () to account for self-destructive and repetitive behaviors beyond mere pleasure-seeking. These concepts shifted focus from conscious or external incentives—prevalent in earlier associationist psychologies—to internal, biologically rooted pressures that operate outside , often manifesting in disguised forms due to conflict with ego defenses and superego prohibitions. This framework contributed causally by emphasizing how experiences shape motivational templates through psychosexual stages, where unresolved conflicts generate persistent unconscious wishes that motivate adult behavior, such as through neurotic symptoms or creative sublimation. For instance, Freud argued that arises from the interplay of these drives with , leading to mechanisms like repression, where unacceptable impulses are banished from yet continue to influence actions indirectly. Empirical support for such unconscious influences exists in modern , with studies on implicit and automatic processing validating the existence of non-conscious drivers, though not the specific Freudian content like oedipal wishes. Despite these insights, psychoanalytic motivation theory faces empirical challenges; core drives lack direct neurobiological corroboration in Freud's original form, and clinical case evidence has been critiqued for subjectivity and non-falsifiability. Revisions in neuropsychoanalysis, such as ' integration of with brainstem affective systems, propose that motivations are affectively charged predictions seeking , aligning partially with from lesion studies showing drive disruptions post-brain injury. This evolution underscores psychoanalysis's role in prompting interdisciplinary scrutiny, influencing motivational models in that map drives to evolutionary adaptive systems for and reproduction. Overall, while overstated in some academic narratives prone to , the 's emphasis on hidden causal forces enduringly reframed as multidetermined by , , and conflict rather than transparent utility.

Unintended Societal Consequences and Debunked Assumptions

The foundational assumptions of psychoanalysis, including Freud's theory of with its oral, anal, phallic, latency, and genital stages, have been empirically refuted, as studies in find no evidence linking supposed fixations in these phases to adult personality traits or neuroses. Similarly, the —positing unconscious incestuous desires and parental rivalry in ren—lacks support from and longitudinal studies, which emphasize secure bonding over libidinal conflicts. The structural model of the psyche (, ego, superego) and the notion of dynamic repression driven by sexual and aggressive instincts fail to align with and evidence, which reveals unconscious processing as rapid, modular, and non-conflictual rather than a hydraulic battle of forbidden drives. These concepts, derived from case studies rather than controlled experiments, remain unfalsifiable and have seen declining academic citations, dropping from about 3% of papers in the 1950s to 1% by the 2010s. Meta-analyses of psychodynamic therapy outcomes, including long-term psychoanalytic psychotherapy, show effect sizes comparable to shorter evidence-based treatments like cognitive-behavioral therapy for common disorders, but without superior long-term gains to justify the extended duration (often years) and high costs, prompting criticism of its efficiency in resource allocation. For severe conditions like or , psychoanalytic approaches demonstrate limited efficacy relative to and structured interventions, with scoping reviews highlighting insufficient randomized controlled trials to substantiate claims of depth-oriented change. Unintended societal repercussions include the psychoanalytic doctrine of repressed memories, which inspired recovered-memory therapies in the 1980s and 1990s, fostering in clinical settings and contributing to false recollections of childhood in approximately 30% of tested individuals under guided recall, as demonstrated in experimental paradigms. This practice exacerbated familial ruptures and fueled moral panics, such as allegations of Satanic ritual abuse, resulting in wrongful investigations and eroded public trust in professions. In , the mid-20th-century hegemony of psychoanalytic interpretations—viewing as intrapsychic conflict rather than neurobiological dysfunction—aligned with deinstitutionalization policies from the 1950s onward, promoting outpatient "talk" therapies over custodial care and pharmacological options, which critics link to inadequate community supports, rising among the severely mentally ill (from under 5% of populations in 1955 to over 20% unsheltered by the 1990s), and transinstitutionalization into prisons. Such shifts, while motivated by humane intent, overlooked causal biological factors, delaying integrated biopsychosocial models until the DSM-III era in 1980.

References

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