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Forced conversion
Forced conversion
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Forced conversion is the adoption of a religion or irreligion under duress.[1] Someone who has been forced to convert to a different religion or irreligion may continue, covertly, to adhere to the beliefs and practices which were originally held, while outwardly behaving as a convert. Crypto-Jews, Crypto-Christians, Crypto-Muslims, Crypto-Hindus and Crypto-Pagans are historical examples of the latter.

Religion and proselytization

[edit]

The religions of the world are divided into two groups: those that actively seek new followers (missionary religions) and those that do not (non-missionary religions). This classification dates back to a lecture given by Max Müller in 1873, and is based on whether or not a religion seeks to gain new converts. The three main religions classified as missionary religions are Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism, while the non-missionary religions include Judaism, Hinduism, and Zoroastrianism. Other religions, such as Primal Religions, Confucianism, and Taoism, may also be considered non-missionary religions.[2]

Religion and power

[edit]

In general, anthropologists have shown that the relationship between religion and politics is complex, especially when it is viewed over the expanse of human history.[3]

While religious leaders and the state generally have different aims, both are concerned about power and order; both use reason and emotion to motivate behavior. Throughout history, leaders of religious and political institutions have cooperated, opposed one another, and/or attempted to co-opt each other, for purposes which are both noble and base, and they have implemented programs with a wide range of driving values, from compassion, which is aimed at alleviating current suffering, to brutal change, which is aimed at achieving long-term goals, for the benefit of groups which have ranged from small cliques to all of humanity. The relationship is far from simple. But religion has frequently been used in a coercive manner, and it has also used coercion.[3]

Buddhism

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People may express their faith through the act of taking refuge, and conversions usually require people to recite their acceptance of the Triple Gems of Buddhism. However, they may always practice Buddhism without fully abandoning their own religion.[4] According to Chin Human Rights Organisation (CHRO), Christians from the Chin ethnic minority group in Myanmar are facing coercion to convert to Buddhism by state actors and programmes.[5]

Christianity

[edit]

Christianity was a minority religion during much of the middle Roman Classical Period, and the early Christians were persecuted during that time. When Constantine I converted to Christianity, it had already grown to be the dominant religion of the Roman Empire. Already under the reign of Constantine I, Christian heretics were being persecuted; beginning in the late 4th century, the ancient pagan religions were also actively suppressed. In the view of many historians, the Constantinian shift turned Christianity from a persecuted religion into a religion which was capable of persecuting and sometimes eager to persecute.[6]

Late Antiquity

[edit]

On 27 February 380, together with Gratian and Valentinian II, Theodosius I issued the decree Cunctos populos, the so-called Edict of Thessalonica, recorded in the Codex Theodosianus xvi.1.2. This declared Trinitarian Nicene Christianity to be the only legitimate imperial religion and the only one entitled to call itself Catholic. Other Christians he described as "foolish madmen".[7] He also ended official state support for the traditional polytheist religions and customs.[8]

The Codex Theodosianus (Eng. Theodosian Code) was a compilation of the laws of the Roman Empire under the Christian emperors since 312. A commission was established by Theodosius II and his co-emperor Valentinian III on 26 March 429[9][10] and the compilation was published by a constitution of 15 February 438. It went into force in the eastern and western parts of the empire on 1 January 439.[9]

It is Our will that all the peoples who are ruled by the administration of Our Clemency shall practice that religion which the divine Peter the Apostle transmitted to the Romans.... The rest, whom We adjudge demented and insane, shall sustain the infamy of heretical dogmas, their meeting places shall not receive the name of churches, and they shall be smitten first by divine vengeance and secondly by the retribution of Our own initiative (Codex Theodosianus XVI 1.2.).[11]

Forced conversions of Jews were carried out with the support of rulers during Late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages in Gaul, the Iberian Peninsula and in the Byzantine Empire.[12]

In Gregory of Tours' writing, he claimed that the Vandals attempted to force all Spanish Catholics to become Arian Christians during their rule in Spain. Gregory also recounted episodes of forced conversion of Jews by Chilperic I and Avitus of Clermont.[13]

Medieval western Europe

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During the Saxon Wars, Charlemagne, King of the Franks, forcibly converted the Saxons from their native Germanic paganism by way of warfare, and law upon conquest. Examples are the Massacre of Verden in 782, when Charlemagne reportedly had 4,500 captive Saxons massacred for rebelling,[14] and the Capitulatio de partibus Saxoniae, a law imposed on conquered Saxons in 785, after another rebellion and destruction of churches and killing of missionary priests and monks,[15] that prescribed death to those who refused to convert to Christianity.[16]

Forced conversion that occurred after the seventh century generally took place during riots and massacres carried out by mobs and clergy without support of the rulers. In contrast, royal persecutions of Jews from the late eleventh century onward generally took the form of expulsions, with some exceptions, such as conversions of Jews in southern Italy of the 13th century, which were carried out by Dominican Inquisitors but instigated by King Charles II of Naples.[12]

Jews were forced to convert to Christianity by the Crusaders in Lorraine, on the Lower Rhine, in Bavaria and Bohemia, in Mainz and in Worms[17] (see Rhineland massacres, Worms massacre (1096)).

Though he strongly condemned and prohibited forced conversion and baptism by decree,[18] Pope Innocent III suggested in a private letter to a bishop in 1201[19] that those who agreed to be baptized to avoid torture and intimidation might be compelled to outwardly observe Christianity:[20]

[T]hose who are immersed even though reluctant, do belong to ecclesiastical jurisdiction at least by reason of the sacrament, and might therefore be reasonably compelled to observe the rules of the Christian Faith. It is, to be sure, contrary to the Christian Faith that anyone who is unwilling and wholly opposed to it should be compelled to adopt and observe Christianity. For this reason a valid distinction is made by some between kinds of unwilling ones and kinds of compelled ones. Thus one who is drawn to Christianity by violence, through fear and through torture, and receives the sacrament of Baptism in order to avoid loss, he (like one who comes to Baptism in dissimulation) does receive the impress of Christianity, and may be forced to observe the Christian Faith as one who expressed a conditional willingness though, absolutely speaking, he was unwilling ...

During the 12th–13th century Northern Crusades against the pagan Finnic, Baltic, and West Slavic peoples around the Baltic Sea forced conversions were a widely used tactic, which received papal sanction.[21] These tactics were first adopted during the Wendish Crusade and became more widespread during the Livonian Crusade and Prussian Crusade, in which tactics included killing hostages, massacre, and devastation of the lands of tribes that had not yet submitted.[22] Most of the populations of these regions were converted only after the repeated rebellion of native populations that did not want to accept Christianity even after initial forced conversion; in Old Prussia, the tactics employed in the initial conquest and subsequent conversion of the territory resulted in the death of most of the native population, whose language consequently became extinct.[23]

Early modern Iberian peninsula

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After the end of Islamic control of Spain, Jews were expelled from Spain in 1492.[24] In Portugal, following an order for their expulsion in 1496, only a handful of them were allowed to leave and the rest of them were forced to convert.[25] Muslims were expelled from Portugal in 1497, and they were gradually forced to convert in the constituent kingdoms of Spain. The forced conversion of Muslims was implemented in the Crown of Castile from 1500 to 1502 and it was implemented in the Crown of Aragon in the 1520s.[26] After the conversions, the so-called "New Christians" were those inhabitants (Sephardic Jews or Mudéjar Muslims) who were baptized under coercion as well as in the face of execution, becoming forced converts from Islam (Moriscos, Conversos and "secret Moors") or converts from Judaism (Conversos, Crypto-Jews and Marranos).

After the forced conversions, when all former Muslims and Jews had ostensibly become Catholic, the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisitions primarily targeted forced converts from Judaism and Islam, who came under suspicion, because they were either accused of continuing to adhere to their old religion, or they were accused of falling back into it. Jewish conversos who still resided in Spain and frequently practiced Judaism in secret were suspected of being Crypto-Jews by the "Old Christians". The Spanish Inquisition generated much wealth and income for the church and individual inquisitors by confiscating the property of the persecuted. The end of Al-Andalus and the expulsion of the Sephardic Jews from the Iberian Peninsula went hand in hand with the increasing amount of Spanish and Portuguese influence in the world, influence which was exemplified by the Christian conquest of the aboriginal Indian populations of the Americas. The Ottoman Empire and Morocco absorbed most of the Jewish and Muslim refugees, but a large majority of them remained in Spain and Portugal by choosing to be Conversos.[27]

European wars of religion

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A Protestant political cartoon satirising the Dragonnades in France

The Peace of Augsburg (1555), signed by Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, stated that German princes could choose the religion (Lutheranism or Catholicism) of their realms according to their conscience (the principle of cuius regio, eius religio). .Subjects, citizens, or residents were generally forced to convert to their prince's religion, through a principle called ius reformandi. Those who did not wish to conform to the prince's choice were given a grace period in which they were free to emigrate to different regions in which their desired religion had been accepted. However, serfs were essentially excluded from this right to emigrate.[28]

After the defeat of the rebellious Protestant Estates of the Kingdom of Bohemia by the Habsburg monarchy at the Battle of White Mountain in 1620, the Habsburgs introduced a Counter-Reformation and forcibly converted all Bohemians, even the Utraquist Hussites, back to the Catholic Church. In 1624, Emperor Ferdinand II issued a patent that allowed only the Catholic religion in Bohemia.[29] In the 1620s, Protestant nobility, burghers, and clergy of Bohemia and Austria were expelled from the Habsburg lands or converted to Catholicism, while peasants were forced to adopt the religion of their new Catholic masters.[30]

The Dragonnades was a policy implemented by Louis XIV in 1681 to force French Protestants known as Huguenots to convert to Catholicism. The dragonnades caused Protestants to flee France, even before the Edict of Fontainebleau of 1685 revoked the religious rights granted them by the Edict of Nantes.

Colonial Americas

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During the European colonization of the Americas, forced conversion of the continents' indigenous, non-Christian population was common, especially in South America and Mesoamerica, where the conquest of large indigenous polities like the Inca and Aztec Empires placed colonizers in control of large non-Christian populations. According to some South American leaders and indigenous groups, there were cases among native populations of conversion under the threat of violence, often because they were compelled to after being conquered, and that the Catholic Church cooperated with civil authority to achieve this end.[31]

Russia

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Upon converting to Christianity in the 10th century, Vladimir the Great, the ruler of Kievan Rus', ordered Kiev's citizens to undergo a mass baptism in the Dnieper river.[32]

In the 13th century the pagan populations of the Baltics faced campaigns of forcible conversion by crusading knight corps such as the Livonian Brothers of the Sword and the Teutonic Order, which often meant simply dispossessing these populations of their lands and property.[33][34]

After Ivan the Terrible's conquest of the Khanate of Kazan, the Muslim population faced slaughter, expulsion, forced resettlement and conversion to Christianity.[35]

In the 18th century, Elizabeth of Russia launched a campaign of forced conversion of Russia's non-Orthodox subjects, including Muslims and Jews.[36]

Goa Inquisition

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The Portuguese carried out the Christianisation of Goa in India in the 16th and 17th centuries. The majority of the natives of Goa had converted to Christianity by the end of the 16th century. The Portuguese rulers had implemented state policies encouraging and even rewarding conversions among Hindu subjects. The rapid rise of converts in Goa was mostly the result of Portuguese economic and political control over the Hindus, who were vassals of the Portuguese crown.[37]

In 1567, the conversion of the majority of the native villagers to Christianity allowed the Portuguese to destroy temples in Bardez, with 300 Hindu temples destroyed. Prohibitions were then declared from December 4, 1567, on public performances of Hindu marriages, sacred thread wearing and cremation. All persons above 15 years of age were compelled to listen to Christian preaching, failing which they were punished. In 1583, Hindu temples at Assolna and Cuncolim were also destroyed by the Portuguese army after the majority of the native villagers there had also converted to Christianity.[38][verification needed] "The fathers of the Church forbade the Hindus under terrible penalties the use of their own sacred books, and prevented them from all exercise of their religion. They destroyed their temples, and so harassed and interfered with the people that they abandoned the city in large numbers, refusing to remain any longer in a place where they had no liberty, and were liable to imprisonment, torture and death if they worshiped after their own fashion the gods of their fathers", wrote Filippo Sassetti, who was in India from 1578 to 1588.[39]

Papal States

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In 1858, Edgardo Mortara was taken from his Jewish parents and raised as a Catholic, because he had been baptized by a maid without his parents' consent or knowledge. This incident was called the Mortara case.

Serbs during World War II in Yugoslavia

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During World War II in Yugoslavia, Orthodox Serbs were forcibly converted to Catholicism by the fascist Ustaše movement.[40][41]

Hinduism

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Hindu nationalist groups in southern Chhattisgarh, namely the Bastar subregion, have forced Christian converts to revert back to Hinduism.[42][43] Hindu nationalist groups at Agra, Uttar Pradesh, have reportedly used allurements to convert poor Muslims and Christians to Hinduism against their will.[44]

Apart from the incidents above, there are other reports of forced conversions of Christians and Muslims in India to Hinduism. Some of them were converted under duress or against their will, specifically through the Ghar Wapsi ("returning home") scheme by Hindu extremists, such as Shiv Sena, the VHP & also by the political party of the BJP.[45][46][47][48][49][50][51][52] In 2014, Cardinal Baselios Cleemis protested the forced conversions to Hinduism, that happened through the Ghar Wapsi ("homecoming") scheme, in Uttar Pradesh (UP), Gujarat & Kerala.[53] The Shiv Sena has said that India or Hindustan is not the homeland of Muslims and Christians.[54] Some Hindu extremist groups like the Hindu Mahasabha, have called for mass killings of Christians[55][56] & also particularly for the massacres or forced sterilisations of Muslims.[57][58][59]

Islam

[edit]

Against Christians

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After the Arab conquests, a number of Christian Arab tribes suffered enslavement and forced conversion.[60]

The Teaching of Jacob (written soon after the death of Muhammad), is one of the earliest records on Islam and "implies that Muslims tried, on threat of death to make Christians abjure Christianity and accept Islam.”[61]

Jizya and conversion

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Non-Muslims were required to pay the jizya while pagans were either required to accept Islam, pay the jizya, be exiled, or be killed, depending on which of the four main schools of Islamic law their conqueror followed.[62][63] Some historians believe that forced conversion was rare in early Islamic history,[64][65][66] and most conversions to Islam were voluntary.[66] Muslim rulers were often more interested in conquest than conversion.[66] Ira Lapidus points towards "interwoven terms of political and economic benefits and of a sophisticated culture and religion" as appealing to the masses. He writes that:

The question of why people convert to Islam has always generated the intense feeling. Earlier generations of European scholars believed that conversions to Islam were made at the point of the sword, and that conquered peoples were given the choice of conversion or death. It is now apparent that conversion by force, while not unknown in Muslim countries, was, in fact, rare. Muslim conquerors ordinarily wished to dominate rather than convert, and most conversions to Islam were voluntary. (...) In most cases, worldly and spiritual motives for conversion blended together. Moreover, conversion to Islam did not necessarily imply a complete turning from an old to a totally new life. While it entailed the acceptance of new religious beliefs and membership in a new religious community, most converts retained a deep attachment to the cultures and communities from which they came.[67]

Muslim scholars like Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf stated that the jizya tax should be paid by Non-Muslims (Kuffar) regardless of their religion, some later and also earlier Muslim jurists did not permit Non-Muslims who are not People of the Book or Ahle-Kitab (Jews, Christians, Sabians) pay the jizya. Instead, they only allowed them (non-Ahle-Kitab) to avoid death by choosing to convert to Islam.[68] Of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence, the Hanafi and Maliki schools allow polytheists to be granted dhimmi status, except Arab polytheists. However, the Shafi'i, Hanbali and Zahiri schools only consider Christians, Jews, and Sabians to be eligible to belong to the dhimmi category.[69]

Wael Hallaq states that in theory, Islamic religious tolerance only applied to those religious groups that Islamic jurisprudence considered to be monotheistic "People of the Book", i.e. Christians, Jews, and Sabians if they paid the jizya tax, while to those excluded from the "People of the Book" were only offered two choices: convert to Islam or fight to the death. In practice, the "People of the Book" designation and dhimmi status were even extended to the non-monotheistic religions of the conquered peoples, such as Hindus, Jains, Buddhists, and other non-monotheists.[70]

Druze

[edit]

The Druze have frequently experienced persecution by different Muslim regimes such as the Shia Ismaili Fatimid State,[71] Mamluk,[72] Sunni Ottoman Empire,[73] and Egypt Eyalet.[74][75] The persecution of the Druze included massacres, demolishing Druze prayer houses and holy places and forced conversion to Islam.[76] Those were no ordinary killings and massacres in the Druze's narrative, they were meant to eradicate the whole community according to the Druze narrative.[77]

Early period

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The wars of the Ridda (lit. apostasy) undertaken by Abu Bakr, the first caliph of the Rashidun Caliphate, against Arab tribes who had accepted Islam but refused to pay Zakat and Jizya Tax, have been described by some historians as an instance of forced conversion[78] or "reconversion".[79] The rebellion of these Arab tribes was less a relapse to the pre-Islamic Arabian religion than termination of a political contract they had made with Muhammad.[79] Some of these tribal leaders claimed prophethood, bringing themselves in direct conflict with the Muslim Caliphate.[80]

Two out of the four schools of Islamic law, i.e. Hanafi and Maliki schools, accepted non-Arab polytheists to be eligible for the dhimmi status. Under this doctrine, Arab polytheists were forced to choose between conversion and death. However, according to perception of most Muslim jurists, all Arabs had embraced Islam during the lifetime of Muhammad. Their exclusion therefore had little practical significance after his death in 632.[69]

Arab historian Al-Baladhuri says that Caliph Umar deported Christians who refused to apostatize and convert to Islam, and that he obeyed the order of the prophet who advised: “there shall not remain two religions in the land of Arabia.”[81]

In the 9th century, the Samaritan population of Palestine faced persecution and attempts at forced conversion at the hands of the rebel leader ibn Firāsa, against whom they were defended by Abbasid caliphal troops.[82] Historians recognize that during the Early Middle Ages, the Christian populations living in the lands invaded by the Arab Muslim armies between the 7th and 10th centuries suffered religious discrimination, religious persecution, religious violence, and martyrdom multiple times at the hands of Arab Muslim officials and rulers.[83][84] As People of the Book, Christians under Muslim rule were subjected to dhimmi status (along with Jews, Samaritans, Gnostics, Mandeans, and Zoroastrians), which was inferior to the status of Muslims.[84][85] Christians and other religious minorities thus faced religious discrimination and religious persecution in that they were banned from proselytising (for Christians, it was forbidden to evangelize or spread Christianity) in the lands invaded by the Arab Muslims on pain of death, they were banned from bearing arms, undertaking certain professions, and were obligated to dress differently in order to distinguish themselves from Arabs.[85] Under sharia, Non-Muslims were obligated to pay jizya and kharaj taxes,[84][85] together with periodic heavy ransom levied upon Christian communities by Muslim rulers in order to fund military campaigns, all of which contributed a significant proportion of income to the Islamic states while conversely reducing many Christians to poverty, and these financial and social hardships forced many Christians to convert to Islam.[85] Christians unable to pay these taxes were forced to surrender their children to the Muslim rulers as payment who would sell them as slaves to Muslim households where they were forced to convert to Islam.[85] Many Christian martyrs were executed under the Islamic death penalty for defending their Christian faith through dramatic acts of resistance such as refusing to convert to Islam, repudiation of the Islamic religion and subsequent reconversion to Christianity, and blasphemy towards Muslim beliefs.[83]

Umayyad Caliphate

[edit]

After the Arab conquests a number of Christian Arab tribes suffered enslavement and forced conversion.[60]

During the rise of the Islamic Caliphates, it was increasingly expected for all Arabs to be Muslims and pressure was put on many to convert.[86] The Umayyad Caliph Al-Walid I said to Shamala, the Christian Arab leader of the Banu Taghlib: "As you are a chief of the Arabs you shame them all by worshipping the cross; obey my wish and turn Muslim." He replied, 'How so? I am chief of Taghlib, and I fear lest I become a cause of destruction to them all if I and they cease to believe in christ" Enraged Al-Walid had him dragged away on his face and tortured; afterward he commanded him again to convert to Islam or else prepare to "eat his own flesh." The Christian Arab again refused, and the order was carried out: Walid's servants "cut off a slice from Shamala's thigh and roasted it in the fire, and they thrust it into his mouth" and he was blinded during this as well. This event is confirmed by the Muslim historian Abu al-Faraj al-Isfahani[87][88][89]

In the early eighth century under the Umayyads, 63 out of a group of 70 Christian pilgrims from Iconium were captured, tortured, and executed under the orders of the Arab Governor of Ceaserea for refusing to convert to Islam (seven were forcibly converted to Islam under torture). Soon afterwards, sixty more Christian pilgrims from Amorium were crucified in Jerusalem.[90]

Almohad Caliphate

[edit]

There were forced conversions in the 12th century under the Almohad dynasty of North Africa and al-Andalus, who suppressed the dhimmi status of Jews and Christians and gave them the choice between conversion, exile, and being executed. The treatment and persecution of Jews under Almohad rule was a drastic change.[91] Prior to Almohad rule during the Caliphate of Córdoba, Jewish culture experienced a Golden Age. María Rosa Menocal, a specialist in Iberian literature at Yale University, has argued that "tolerance was an inherent aspect of Andalusian society", and that the Jewish dhimmis living under the Caliphate, while allowed fewer rights than Muslims, were still better off than in Christian Europe.[92] Many Jews migrated to al-Andalus, where they were not just tolerated but allowed to practice their faith openly. Christians had also practiced their religion openly in Córdoba, and both Jews and Christians lived openly in Morocco as well.

The first Almohad ruler, Abd al-Mumin, allowed an initial seven-month grace period.[93] Then he forced most of the urban dhimmi population in Morocco, both Jewish and Christian, to convert to Islam.[94] In 1198, the Almohad emir Abu Yusuf Yaqub al-Mansur decreed that Jews must wear a dark blue garb, with very large sleeves and a grotesquely oversized hat;[95] his son altered the colour to yellow, a change that may have influenced Catholic ordinances some time later.[95] Those who converted had to wear clothing that identified them as Jews since they were not regarded as sincere Muslims.[94] Cases of mass martyrdom of Jews who refused to convert to Islam are recorded.[93]

Many of the conversions were superficial. Maimonides urged Jews to choose the superficial conversion over martyrdom and argued, "Muslims know very well that we do not mean what we say, and that what we say is only to escape the ruler's punishment and to satisfy him with this simple confession."[91][94] Abraham Ibn Ezra (1089–1164), who himself fled the persecutions of the Almohads, composed an elegy mourning the destruction of many Jewish communities throughout Spain and the Maghreb under the Almohads.[91][96] Many Jews fled from territories ruled by the Almohads to Christian lands, and others, like the family of Maimonides, fled east to more tolerant Muslim lands.[97] However, a few Jewish traders still working in North Africa are recorded.[93]

The treatment and persecution of Christians under Almohad rule was a drastic change as well.[98] Many Christians were killed, forced to convert, or forced to flee. Some Christians fled to the Christian kingdoms in the north and west and helped fuel the Reconquista.

Christians under the Almohad rule generally chose to relocate to the Christian principalities (most notably the Kingdom of Asturias) in the north of the Iberian Peninsula, whereas Jews decided to stay in order to keep their properties, and many of them feigned conversion to Islam, while continuing to believe and practice Judaism in secrecy.[99]

During the Almohad persecution, the medieval Jewish philosopher and rabbi Moses Maimonides (1135–1204), one of the leading exponents of the Golden Age of Jewish culture in the Iberian Peninsula, wrote his Epistle on Apostasy, in which he permitted Jews to feign apostasy under duress, though strongly recommending leaving the country instead.[100] There is dispute amongst scholars as to whether Maimonides himself converted to Islam in order to freely escape from Almohad territory, and then reconverted back to Judaism in either the Levant or in Egypt.[101] He was later denounced as an apostate and tried in an Islamic court.[102]

Seljuk Empire

[edit]

In order to increase their numbers in Anatolia, the newly arrived Seljuk Turks took Christian children and forcibly converted them to Islam and turkified them, acts specifically mentioned in Antioch, around Samosata, and in western Asia Minor.[103]

Danishmend's campaigns

[edit]

During his campaigns, Sultan Malik Danishmend swore to forcibly convert the population of the city of Sisiya Comana to Islam and he did so upon capturing it. The governor of Comana forced its population to pray 5 times a day and those who refused to go to the mosque were brought to it by threat of physical violence. Those who continued to drink wine or do other things that Islam forbids were publicly whipped. The fate of the city of Euchaita was similar, with Malik giving the people the option of converting to Islam or death.[104][105]

Yemen

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In the late 1160s, the Yemenite ruler 'Abd-al-Nabī ibn Mahdi left Jews with the choice between conversion to Islam or martyrdom.[106][107] Ibn Mahdi also imposed his beliefs upon the Muslims besides the Jews. This led to a revival of Jewish messianism, but also led to mass-conversion.[107] The persecution ended in 1173 with the defeat of Ibn Mahdi and conquest of Yemen by the brother of Saladin, and they were allowed to return to their Jewish faith.[107][108]

According to two Cairo Genizah documents, the Ayyubid ruler of Yemen, al-Malik al-Mu'izz al-Ismail (reigned from 1197 to 1202) had attempted to force the Jews of Aden to convert. The second document details the relief of Jewish community after his murder, and those who had been forced to convert reverted to Judaism.[109] While he did not impose Islam upon the foreign merchants, they were forced to pay triple the normal rate of poll tax.[107]

A measure listed in the legal works by Al-Shawkānī is of forced conversion of Jewish orphans. No date is given for this decree by modern studies nor who issued it.[110] The forced conversion of Jewish orphans was reintroduced under Imam Yahya in 1922. The Orphans' Decree was implemented aggressively for the first ten years. It was re-promulgated in 1928.[111]

Ottoman Empire

[edit]
Registration of boys for the devşirme. Ottoman miniature painting from the Süleymanname, 1558.

A form of forced conversion became institutionalized during the Ottoman Empire in the practice of devşirme,[112] a human levy in which Christian boys were seized and collected from their families (usually in the Balkans), enslaved, forcefully converted to Islam, and then trained as elite military unit within the Ottoman army or for high-ranking service to the sultan.[112][113] From the mid to late 14th, through early 18th centuries, the devşirmejanissary system enslaved an estimated 500,000 to one million non-Muslim adolescent males.[114] These boys would attain a great education and high social standing after their training and conversion.[115]

In the 17th century, Sabbatai Zevi, a Sephardic Jew whose ancestors were welcomed in the Ottoman Empire during the Spanish Inquisition, proclaimed himself as the Jewish Messiah and called for the abolition of major Jewish laws and customs. After he attracted a large following, he was arrested by the Ottoman authorities and given a choice between execution or conversion to Islam.[116] Zevi opted for a feigned conversion solely to escape the death penalty,[116] and continued to believe and practice Judaism along with his followers in secrecy.[116][117][118] The Byzantine historian Doukas recounts two other cases of forced or attempted forced conversion: one of a Christian official who had offended Sultan Murad II, and the other of an archbishop.[119]

Speros Vryonis cites a pastoral letter from 1338 addressed to the residents of Nicaea indicating widespread, forcible conversion by the Turks after it was conquered: "And they [Turks] having captured and enslaved many of our own and violently forced them and dragging them along alas! So that they took up their evil and godlessness."[120]

After the Siege of Nicaea (1328–1331) The Turks began to force the Christian inhabitants who had escaped the massacres to convert to Islam. The patriarch of Constantinople John XIX wrote a message to the people of Nicea shortly after the city was seized. His letter says that "The invaders endeavored to impose their impure religion on the populace, at all costs, intending to make the inhabitants followers of Muhammad". Patriarch advised the Christians to "be steadfast in your religion" and not to forget that the "Turks are masters of your bodies only, but not of your souls.[121][122][123]

Apostolos Vakalopoulos comments on the first Ottoman invasions of Europe and Dimitar Angelov gives assessment on the Campaigns on Murad II and Mehmed II and their impact on the conquered native Balkan Christians:[124]

From the very beginning of the Turkish onslaught [in Thrace] under Suleiman [son of Sultan Orhan], the Turks tried to consolidate their position by the forcible imposition of Islam. If [the Ottoman historian] Şükrullah is to be believed, those who refused to accept the Moslem faith were slaughtered and their families enslaved. "Where there were bells," writes the same author [Şükrullah], "Suleiman broke them up and cast them into fires. Where there were churches he destroyed them or converted them into mosques. Thus, in place of bells there were now muezzins. Wherever Christian infidels were still found, vassalage was imposed on their rulers. At least in public they could no longer say 'kyrie eleison' but rather 'There is no God but Allah'; and where once their prayers had been addressed to Christ, they were now to "Muhammad, the prophet of Allah."

According to historian Demetrios Constantelos, "Mass forced conversions were recorded during the caliphates of Selim I (1512–1520),...Selim II (1566–1574), and Murat III (1574–1595). On the occasion of some anniversary, such as the capture of a city, or a national holiday, many rayahs were forced to apostacize. On the day of the circumcision of Mehmed III, great numbers of Christians (Albanians, Greeks, Slavs) were forced to convert to Islam."[125][126] After reviewing the martyrology of Christians killed by the Ottomans from the fall of Constantinople all the way to the final phases of the Greek War of Independence, Constantelos reports:[126]

The Ottoman Turks condemned to death eleven Ecumenical Patriarchs of Constantinople, nearly one hundred bishops, and several thousand priests, deacons, and monks. It is impossible to say with certainty how many men of the cloth were forced to apostasize.

For strategic reasons, the Ottomans forcibly converted Christians living in the frontier regions of Macedonia and northern Bulgaria, particularly in the 16th and 17th centuries. Those who refused were either executed or burned alive.[127]

The community budgets of Jews was heavily burdened by the repurchasing of Jewish slaves abducted by Arab, Berber, or Turkish pirates, or by military raids. The mental trauma due to captivity and slavery caused unransomed prisoners who had lost family, money, and friends to convert to Islam.[128]

During his travels through the Salt lake region of central Anatolia, Jean-Baptiste Tavernier observed in the town of Mucur, "there are numbers of Greeks who are forced everyday to become Turks".[129][page needed]

During the genocide and persecution of Greeks in the 20th century, there were cases of forced conversion to Islam[130] (see also Armenian genocide, Assyrian genocide, and Hamidian massacres).

Iran

[edit]

Ismail I, the founder of the Safavid dynasty, decreed Twelver Shiism to be the official religion of state and ordered executions of a number of Sunni intellectuals who refused to accept Shiism.[131][132] Non-Muslims faced frequent persecutions and at times forced conversions under the rule of his dynastic successors.[133] Thus, after the capture of the Hormuz Island, Abbas I required local Christians to convert to Twelver Shia Islam, Abbas II granted his ministers authority to force Jews to become Shia Muslims, and Sultan Husayn decreed forcible conversion of Zoroastrians.[134] In 1839, during the Qajar era the Jewish community in the city of Mashhad was attacked by a mob and subsequently forced to convert to Shia Islam.[135]

In Persia, instances of forced conversion of Jews took place in 1291 and 1318, and those in Baghdad in 1333 and 1344. In 1617 and 1622, a wave of forced conversions and persecution, provoked by the slander of Jewish apostates, swept over the Jews of Persia, sparing neither Nestorian Christians nor Armenians. From 1653 to 1666, during the reign of Shah Abbas II, all the Jews in Persia were Islamized by force. However, religious freedom was eventually restored. A law in 1656 gave Jewish or Christian converts to Islam exclusive rights of inheritance. This law was alleviated for the Christians as a concession to Pope Alexander VII but remained in force for Jews until the end of the nineteenth century. David Cazés mentions the existence in Tunisia of similar inheritance laws favoring converts to Islam.[128]

Indian Subcontinent

[edit]

In an invasion of the Kashmir valley (1015), Mahmud of Ghazni plundered the valley, took many prisoners and carried out conversions to Islam.[136] In his later campaigns, in Mathura, Baran and Kanauj, again, many conversions took place. Those soldiers who surrendered to him were converted to Islam. In Baran (Bulandshahr) alone 10,000 persons were converted to Islam including the king.[137] Tarikh-i-Yamini, Rausat-us-Safa and Tarikh-i-Ferishtah speak of construction of mosques and schools and appointment of preachers and teachers by Mahmud and his successor Masud. Wherever Mahmud went, he insisted on the people to convert to Islam.[138] The raids by Muhammad Ghori and his generals brought in thousands of slaves in the late 12th century, most of whom were compelled to convert as one of the preconditions of their freedom.[138][139][140][141] Sikandar Butshikan (1394–1417) demolished Hindu temples and forcefully converted Hindus.[142]

Aurangzeb employed a number of means to encourage conversions to Islam.[143] The ninth guru of Sikhs, Guru Tegh Bahadur, was beheaded in Delhi on orders of Aurangzeb for refusing to convert to Islam.[144][145] In a Mughal-Sikh war in 1715, 700 followers of Banda Singh Bahadur were beheaded.[146] Sikhs were executed for not apostatizing from Sikhism.[147] Banda Singh Bahadur was offered a pardon if he converted to Islam.[148] Upon refusal, he was tortured,[149][150] and was killed with his five-year-old son.[147] Following the execution of Banda, the emperor ordered to apprehend Sikhs anywhere they were found.[148]

18th century ruler Tipu Sultan persecuted the Hindus, Christians and Mappila Muslims.[151][152] During Sultan's Mysorean invasion of Kerala, hundreds of temples and churches were demolished and ten thousands of Christians and Hindus were killed or converted to Islam by force.[153][154]

Contemporary period

[edit]

South Asia

[edit]
Bangladesh
[edit]

In Bangladesh, the International Crimes Tribunal tried and convicted several leaders of the Islamic Razakar militias, as well as Bangladesh Muslim Awami league (Forid Uddin Mausood), of war crimes committed against Hindus during the 1971 Bangladesh genocide. The charges included forced conversion of Bengali Hindus to Islam.[155][156][157]

India
[edit]

In the 1998 Prankote massacre, 26 Kashmiri Hindus were beheaded by Islamist militants after their refusal to convert to Islam. The militants struck when the villagers refused demands from the gunmen to convert to Islam and prove their conversion by eating beef.[158] During the Noakhali riots in 1946, several thousand Hindus were forcibly converted to Islam by Muslim mobs.[159][160]

Pakistan
[edit]

Members of minority religions in Pakistan face discrimination every day. This leads to socio-political and economic exclusion and severe marginalization in all aspects of life. In a country that is 96 percent Muslim, targeting of its religious minorities (3 percent), especially Shias, Ahmadis, Hindus and Christians, is widespread.[161]

The rise of Taliban insurgency in Pakistan has been an influential and increasing factor in the persecution of and discrimination against religious minorities, such as Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, and other minorities.[162]

The Human Rights Council of Pakistan has reported that cases of forced conversion are increasing.[163][164] A 2014 report by the Movement for Solidarity and Peace (MSP) says about 1,000 women in Pakistan are forcibly converted to Islam every year (700 Christian and 300 Hindu).[165][166][167]

In 2003, a six-year-old Sikh girl was kidnapped by a member of the Afridi tribe in Northwest Frontier Province; the alleged kidnapper claimed the girl was actually 12 years old, had converted to Islam, and therefore could not be returned to her non-Muslim family.[168] In Pakistan's Sindh province, a distressing pattern of crimes has emerged, including the abduction, coerced conversion to Islam, and subsequent marriage to older Muslim men who are often abductors. These crimes primarily target underage girls from impoverished Hindu families.[169]

Rinkle Kumari, a 19-year Pakistani student, Lata Kumari, and Asha Kumari, a Hindu working in a beauty parlor, were allegedly forced to convert from Hinduism to Islam.[170] They told the judge that they wanted to go with their parents.[171] Their cases were appealed all the way to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The appeal was admitted but remained unheard ever after.[172] Rinkle was abducted by a gang and "forced" to convert to Islam, before being head shaved.[173]

Sikhs in Hangu District stated they were being pressured to convert to Islam by Yaqoob Khan, the assistant commissioner of Tall Tehsil, in December 2017. However, the Deputy Commissioner of Hangu Shahid Mehmood denied it occurred and claimed that Sikhs were offended during a conversation with Yaqub though it was not intentional.[174][175][176][177]

Many Hindu girls living in Pakistan are kidnapped, forcibly converted and married to Muslims.[178] According to another report from the Movement for Solidarity and Peace, about 1,000 non-Muslim girls are converted to Islam each year in Pakistan.[179] According to the Amarnath Motumal, the vice chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, every month, an estimated 20 or more Hindu girls are abducted and converted, although exact figures are impossible to gather.[180] In 2014 alone, 265 legal cases of forced conversion were reported mostly involving Hindu girls.[181]

A total of 57 Hindus converted in Pasrur during May 14–19. On May 14, 35 Hindus of the same family were forced to convert by their employer because his sales dropped after Muslims started boycotting his eatable items as they were prepared by Hindus as well as their persecution by the Muslim employees of neighbouring shops according to their relatives. Since the impoverished Hindu had no other way to earn and needed to keep the job to survive, they converted. 14 members of another family converted on May 17 since no one was employing them, later another Hindu man and his family of eight under pressure from Muslims to avoid their land being grabbed.[182]

In 2017, the Sikh community in Hangu district of Pakistan's Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province alleged that they were "being forced to convert to Islam" by a government official. Farid Chand Singh, who filed the complaint, has claimed that Assistant Commissioner Tehsil Tall Yaqoob Khan was allegedly forcing Sikhs to convert to Islam and the residents of Doaba area are being tortured religiously.[183][184] According to reports, about 60 Sikhs of Doaba had demanded security from the administration.[185]

Many Hindus voluntarily convert to Islam in order to acquire Watan Cards and National Identification Cards. These converts are also given land and money. For example, 428 poor Hindus in Matli were converted between 2009 and 2011 by the Madrassa Baitul Islam, a Deobandi seminary in Matli, which pays off the debts of Hindus converting to Islam.[186] Another example is the conversion of 250 Hindus to Islam in Chohar Jamali area in Thatta.[187] Conversions are also carried out by Ex Hindu Baba Deen Mohammad Shaikh mission which converted 108,000 people to Islam since 1989.[188]

Within Pakistan, the southern province of Sindh had over 1,000 forced conversions of Christian and Hindu girls according to the annual report of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan in 2018. According to victims' families and activists, Mian Abdul Haq, who is a local political and religious leader in Sindh, has been accused of being responsible for forced conversions of girls within the province.[189]

More than 100 Hindus in Sindh converted to Islam in June 2020 to escape discrimination and economic pressures. Islamic charities and clerics offer incentives of jobs or land to impoverished minorities on the condition that they convert. New York Times summarised the view of Hindu groups that these seemingly voluntary conversions "take place under such economic duress that they are tantamount to a forced conversion anyway."[190]

In October 2020, the Pakistani High Court upheld the validity of a forced marriage between 44-year-old Ali Azhar and 13-year-old Christian Arzoo Raja. Raja was abducted by Azhar, forcibly wed to Azhar and then forcibly converted to Islam by Azhar.[191] The ruling was overturned a month later, and Raja was returned to her home, with Azhar arrested.[192] Pakistan has been found in breach of its international commitments to safeguard non-Muslim girls from exploitation by influential factions and criminal elements, as forced conversions have become commonplace within the nation. This concerning trend is on the rise, notably observed in the districts of Tharparkar, Umerkot, and Mirpur Khas in Sindh.[193]

Indonesia

[edit]

In 2012, over 1000 Catholic children in East Timor, removed from their families, were reported to being held in Indonesia without consent of their parents, forcibly converted to Islam, educated in Islamic schools and naturalized.[194] Other reports claim forced conversion of minority Ahmadiyya sect Muslims to Sunni Islam, with the use of violence.[195][196][197]

In 2001 the Indonesian army evacuated hundreds of Christian refugees from the remote Kesui and Teor islands in Maluku after the refugees stated that they had been forced to convert to Islam. According to reports, some of the men had been circumcised against their will, and a paramilitary group involved in the incident confirmed that circumcisions had taken place while denying any element of coercion.[198]

In 2017, many members of the Orang Rimba tribe, especially children, were being forced to renounce their folk religion and convert to Islam.[199]

West Asia

[edit]

There have been a number of reports of attempts to forcibly convert religious minorities in Iraq. The Yazidi people of northern Iraq, who follow an ethnoreligious syncretic faith, have been threatened with forced conversion by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, who consider their practices to be Satanism.[200] UN investigators have reported mass killings of Yazidi men and boys who refused to convert to Islam.[201] In Baghdad, hundreds of Assyrian Christians fled their homes in 2007 when a local extremist group announced that they had to convert to Islam, pay the jizya or die.[202] In March 2007, the BBC reported that people in the Mandaean ethnic and religious minority in Iraq alleged that they were being targeted by Islamist insurgents, who offered them the choice of conversion or death.[203]

In 2006, two journalists of the Fox News Network were kidnapped at gunpoint in the Gaza Strip by a previously unknown militant group. After being forced to read statements on videotape proclaiming that they had converted to Islam, they were released by their captors.[204]

Allegations of Coptic Christian girls being forced to marry Arab Muslim men and convert to Islam in Egypt have been reported by a number of news and advocacy organizations[205][206][207] and have sparked public protests.[208] According to a 2009 report by the US State Department, observers have found it extremely difficult to determine whether compulsion was used, and in recent years no such cases have been independently verified.[209]

Coptic women and girls are abducted, forced to convert to Islam and marry Muslim men.[210] In 2009, the Washington, D.C.–based group Christian Solidarity International published a study of the abductions and forced marriages and the anguish felt by the young women because returning to Christianity is against the law. Further allegations of organised abduction of Copts, trafficking and police collusion continue in 2017.[211]

United Kingdom

[edit]

According to the UK prison officers' union, some Muslim prisoners in the UK have been forcibly converting fellow inmates to Islam in prisons.[212] An independent government report published in 2023 found that there have been multiple cases of Muslim gangs threatening non-Muslim prisoners to "convert or get hurt".[213]

In 2007, a Sikh girl's family claimed that she had been forcibly converted to Islam, and they received a police guard after being attacked by an armed gang, although the "Police said no one was injured in the incident".[214]

In response to these news stories, an open letter to Sir Ian Blair, signed by ten Hindu academics, argued that claims that Hindu and Sikh girls were being forcefully converted were "part of an arsenal of myths propagated by right-wing Hindu supremacist organisations in India".[215] The Muslim Council of Britain issued a press release pointing out there is a "lack of evidence" of any forced conversions and suggested it is an underhand attempt to smear the British Muslim population.[216]

An academic paper by Katy Sian published in the journal South Asian Popular Culture in 2011 explored the question of how "'forced' conversion narratives" arose around the Sikh diaspora in the United Kingdom.[217] Sian, who reports that claims of conversion through courtship on campuses are widespread in the UK, indicates that rather than relying on actual evidence they primarily rest on the word of "a friend of a friend" or on personal anecdote. According to Sian, the narrative is similar to accusations of "white slavery" lodged against the Jewish community and foreigners to the UK and the US, with the former having ties to antisemitism that mirror the Islamophobia betrayed by the modern narrative. Sian expanded on these views in 2013's Mistaken Identities, Forced Conversions, and Postcolonial Formations.[218]

In 2018, a report by a Sikh activist organisation, Sikh Youth UK, entitled "The Religiously Aggravated Sexual Exploitation of Young Sikh Women Across the UK" made allegations of similarities between the case of Sikh Women and the Rotherham child sexual exploitation scandal.[219] However, in 2019, this report was criticised by researchers and an official UK government report led by two Sikh academics for false and misleading information.[220][221] It noted: "The RASE report lacks solid data, methodological transparency and rigour. It is filled instead with sweeping generalisations and poorly substantiated claims around the nature and scale of abuse of Sikh girls and causal factors driving it. It appealed heavily to historical tensions between Sikhs and Muslims and narratives of honour in a way that seemed designed to whip up fear and hate".[221]

Judaism

[edit]

Under the Hasmonean Kingdom, the Idumeans were forced to convert to Judaism, by threat of exile or death, depending on the source.[222][223] In Eusebíus, Christianity, and Judaism, Harold W. Attridge claims that Josephus' account was accurate and that John Hyrcanus (around 115 BCE) demolished the city of Pella in Moab, because the inhabitants refused to adopt Jewish national customs.[224] Maurice Sartre writes of the "policy of forced Judaization adopted by Hyrcanos, Aristobulus I and Jannaeus", who offered "the conquered peoples a choice between expulsion or conversion,"[225] William Horbury postulates that an existing small Jewish population in Lower Galilee was massively expanded by forced conversion around 104 BCE.[226] Yigal Levin, conversely, argues that many non-Jewish communities, such as Idumeans, voluntarily assimilated in Hasmonean Judea, based on archaeological evidence and cultural affinities between the groups.[227]

In 2009, the BBC claimed that in 524 CE the Himyarite Kingdom, who had adopted Judaism as the de facto state religion two centuries earlier, led by King Yusuf Dhu Nuwas, had offered residents of a village in what is now Saudi Arabia the choice between conversion to Judaism or death, and that 20,000 Christians had then been massacred.[228] During the reign of Dhu Nuwas, a political-power transferring process began and during it, the Himyarite kingdom became a tributary of the Kingdom of Aksum, which had adopted Christianity as its de facto state religion two centuries earlier. This process was completed by the time of the reign of Ma'dīkarib Yafur (519-522), a Christian who was appointed by the Aksumites. A coup d'état ensued, with Dhu Nuwas assuming authority after the killing of the Aksumite garrison in Zafar. A general was sent against Najrān, a predominantly Christian oasis, with a good number of Jews, who refused to recognize his authority. The general blocked the caravan route which connected Najrān with Eastern Arabia and he also persecuted the Christian population of Najrān.[229][230][231] Dhu Nuwas campaign eventually killed between 11,500 and 14,000, and took a similar number of prisoners.[232]

Some Ethiopian Jews (also known as Beta Israel) were forcibly converted to mainstream Rabbinical Judaism following their covert evacuation to Israel during Operation Moses and Operation Solomon. Their native form of Judaism, commonly called Haymanot, is looked down upon by the Israeli government and the Chief Rabbinate of Israel.[233][234] In 1973, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef ruled that Ethiopian Jews are indeed Jewish according to Jewish law, which was a crucial step in paving the way for their immigration to Israel. Despite his initial ruling, the Chief Rabbinate, over the objections of many in the community, later required symbolic conversions for many immigrants to ensure full acceptance by all rabbinic authorities. In 2020, the Chief Rabbinate Council officially adopted the 1973 ruling of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, confirming full recognition of the Jewishness of the Ethiopian community without the need for conversion. [235]

Other instances of forced conversion to Judaism are unknown.[236]

Atheism

[edit]
"St. Theodora Church in downtown Chişinău was converted into the city's Museum of Scientific Atheism".
Andrei Brezianu[237]

Eastern Bloc

[edit]

Under the doctrine of state atheism in the Soviet Union, there was a "government-sponsored program of forced conversion to atheism" conducted by communists.[238][239][240] This program included the overarching objective to establish not only a fundamentally materialistic conception of the universe, but to foster "direct and open criticism of the religious outlook" by means of establishing an "anti-religious trend" across the entire school.[241] The Russian Orthodox Church, for centuries the strongest of all Orthodox Churches, was violently suppressed.[242] Revolutionary leader Vladimir Lenin wrote that every religious idea and every idea of God "is unutterable vileness... of the most dangerous kind, 'contagion of the most abominable kind".[243] Many priests were killed and imprisoned. Thousands of churches were closed, some turned into hospitals. In 1925, the government founded the League of Militant Atheists to intensify the persecution.[244]

Christopher Marsh, a professor at Baylor University writes that "Tracing the social nature of religion from Schleiermacher and Feurbach to Marx, Engels, and Lenin... the idea of religion as a social product evolved to the point of policies aimed at the forced conversion of believers to atheism."[245] Jonathan Blake of the Department of Political Science at Columbia University elucidates the history of this practice in the USSR, stating that:[246]

God, however, did not simply vanish after the Bolshevik revolution. Soviet authorities relied heavily on coercion to spread their idea of scientific atheism. This included confiscating church goods and property, forcibly closing religious institutions and executing religious leaders and believers or sending them to the gulag... Later, the United States passed the Jackson–Vanik amendment which harmed US–Soviet trade relations until the USSR permitted the emigration of religious minorities, primarily Jews. Despite the threat from coreligionists abroad, however, the Soviet Union engaged in forced atheism from its earliest days.[246]

Across Eastern Europe following World War II, the parts of the Nazi Empire conquered by the Soviet Red Army, and Yugoslavia became one party communist states and the project of coercive conversion continued.[247][248] The Soviet Union ended its war time truce against the Russian Orthodox Church, and extended its persecutions to the newly communist Eastern bloc: "In Poland, Hungary, Lithuania and other Eastern European countries, Catholic leaders who were unwilling to be silent were denounced, publicly humiliated or imprisoned by the communists. Leaders of the national Orthodox Churches in Romania and Bulgaria had to be cautious and submissive", wrote Blainey.[242] While the churches were generally not as severely treated as they had been in the USSR, nearly all their schools and many of their churches were closed, and they lost their formerly prominent roles in public life. Children were taught atheism, and clergy were imprisoned by the thousands.[249]

In the Eastern Bloc, Christian churches, Jewish synagogues and Islamic mosques were forcibly "converted into museums of atheism."[250][251] Historical essayist Andrei Brezianu expounds upon this situation, specifically in the Socialist Republic of Romania, writing that scientific atheism was "aggressively applied to Moldova, immediately after the 1940 annexation, when churches were profaned, clergy assaulted, and signs and public symbols of religion were prohibited"; he provides an example of this phenomenon, further writing that "St. Theodora Church in downtown Chişinău was converted into the city's Museum of Scientific Atheism".[237] Marxist-Leninist regimes treated religious believers as subversives or abnormal, sometimes relegating them to psychiatric hospitals and reeducation.[252][253] Nevertheless, historian Emily Baran writes that "some accounts suggest the conversion to militant atheism did not always end individuals' existential questions".[254]

French Revolution

[edit]

During the French Revolution, a campaign of dechristianization happened which included removal and destruction of religious objects from places of worship; English librarian Thomas Hartwell Horne and biblical scholar Samuel Davidson write that "churches were converted into 'temples of reason,' in which atheistical and licentious homilies were substituted for the proscribed service".[255][256][257][258]

Unlike later establishments of state atheism by communist regimes, the French Revolutionary experiment was short (seven months), incomplete and inconsistent.[259][better source needed] Even though it was brief, the French experiment was particularly notable because it influenced atheists such as Ludwig Feuerbach, Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx.[252]

East Asia

[edit]

The emergence of communist states across East Asia after World War Two saw religion purged by atheist regimes across China, North Korea and much of Indo-China.[260] In 1949, China became a communist state under the leadership of Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party. Prior to this takeover, China itself was previously a cradle of religious thought since ancient times, being the birthplace of Confucianism and Daoism, and Buddhists arrived in the first century CE. Under Mao, China became an officially atheist state, and even though some religious practices were permitted to continue under State supervision, religious groups which are considered a threat to law and order have been suppressed—such as Tibetan Buddhism from 1959 and Falun Gong in recent years.[261] Religious schools and social institutions were closed, foreign missionaries were expelled, and local religious practices were discouraged.[260] During the Cultural Revolution, Mao instigated "struggles" against the Four Olds: "old ideas, customs, culture, and habits of mind".[262] In 1999, the Communist Party launched a three-year drive to promote atheism in Tibet, saying that intensifying atheist propaganda is "especially important for Tibet because atheism plays an extremely important role in promoting economic construction, social advancement and socialist spiritual civilization in the region".[263]

As of November 2018, in present-day China, the government has detained many people in internment camps, "where Uighur Muslims are remade into atheist Chinese subjects".[264] For children who were forcibly taken away from their parents, the Chinese government has established "orphanages" with the aim of "converting future generations of Uighur Muslim children into loyal subjects who embrace atheism".[264]

Revolutionary Mexico

[edit]

Articles 3, 5, 24, 27, and 130 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 as originally enacted were anticlerical and enormously restricted religious freedoms.[265] At first the anticlerical provisions were only sporadically enforced, but when President Plutarco Elías Calles took office, he enforced the provisions strictly.[265] Calles' Mexico has been characterized as an atheist state[266] and his program as being one to eradicate religion in Mexico.[267]

All religions had their properties expropriated, and these became part of government wealth. There was a forced expulsion of foreign clergy and the seizure of Church properties.[268] Article 27 prohibited any future acquisition of such property by the churches, and prohibited religious corporations and ministers from establishing or directing primary schools.[268] This second prohibition was sometimes interpreted to mean that the Church could not give religious instruction to children within the churches on Sundays, seen as destroying the ability of Catholics to be educated in their own religion.[269]

The Constitution of 1917 also closed and forbade the existence of monastic orders (article 5), forbade any religious activity outside of church buildings (now owned by the government), and mandated that such religious activity would be overseen by the government (article 24).[268]

On June 14, 1926, President Calles enacted anticlerical legislation known formally as The Law Reforming the Penal Code and unofficially as the Calles Law.[270] His anti-Catholic actions included outlawing religious orders, depriving the Church of property rights and depriving the clergy of civil liberties, including their right to a trial by jury (in cases involving anti-clerical laws) and the right to vote.[270][271] Catholic antipathy towards Calles was enhanced because of his vocal atheism.[272]

Cristeros hanged in Jalisco

Due to the strict enforcement of anti-clerical laws, people in strongly Catholic areas, especially the states of Jalisco, Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Colima and Michoacán, began to oppose him, and this opposition led to the Cristero War from 1926 to 1929, which was characterized by brutal atrocities on both sides. Some Cristeros applied terrorist tactics, while the Mexican government persecuted the clergy, killing suspected Cristeros and supporters and often retaliating against innocent individuals.[273] In Tabasco state, the so-called "Red Shirts" began to act.

A truce was negotiated with the assistance of U.S. Ambassador Dwight Whitney Morrow.[274] Calles, however, did not abide by the terms of the truce – in violation of its terms, he had approximately 500 Cristero leaders and 5,000 other Cristeros shot, frequently in their homes in front of their spouses and children.[274] Particularly offensive to Catholics after the supposed truce was Calles' insistence on a complete state monopoly on education, suppressing all Catholic education and introducing "socialist" education in its place: "We must enter and take possession of the mind of childhood, the mind of youth".[274] The persecution continued as Calles maintained control under his Maximato and did not relent until 1940, when President Manuel Ávila Camacho, a believing Catholic, took office.[274] This attempt to indoctrinate the youth in atheism was begun in 1934 by amending Article 3 to the Mexican Constitution to eradicate religion by mandating "socialist education", which "in addition to removing all religious doctrine" would "combat fanaticism and prejudices", "build[ing] in the youth a rational and exact concept of the universe and of social life".[265] In 1946 this "socialist education" was removed from the constitution and the document returned to the less egregious generalized secular education. The effects of the war on the Church were profound. Between 1926 and 1934 at least 40 priests were killed.[274] Where there were 4,500 priests operating within the country before the rebellion, in 1934 there were only 334 priests licensed by the government to serve fifteen million people, the rest having been eliminated by emigration, expulsion, and assassination.[274][275] By 1935, 17 states had no priest at all.[276]

Southeast Asia

[edit]

From April 1975 to January 1979, the Khmer Rouge ruled Democratic Kampuchea led by Pol Pot under an official policy of state atheism, regarding all forms of religion as “reactionary” and incompatible with the revolutionary ideology.[277] The regime abolished religious institutions, prohibited worship, and criminalised the possession of religious texts or symbols.[278]

Buddhism, followed by the majority of Cambodians, was particularly affected. Monastic life was dismantled when monks were forcibly defrocked and sent to perform agricultural labour, pagodas were closed or destroyed, and statues of the Buddha were defaced or smashed.[279] Estimates suggest that out of approximately 60,000 monks in Cambodia before 1975, fewer than 3,000 survived by 1979, with many executed or dying from forced labour, starvation, or illness.[280] The destruction extended to Buddhist libraries, manuscripts, and ritual objects, effectively dismantling the country’s centuries-old monastic traditions.[281]

These policies formed part of the Khmer Rouge's broader attempt to eradicate all pre-revolutionary cultural and social structures in what they called “Year Zero”.[282] Although the regime did not use the term “conversion to atheism”, the enforced abandonment of religious practice, combined with indoctrination into the state's ideology, effectively compelled the population to adopt an atheist stance in public life.[280]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Forced conversion is the coercive imposition of a new or on individuals or groups through threats of , economic penalty, enslavement, or state-mandated penalties, often suppressing or eradicating prior beliefs under duress rather than through persuasion or conviction. This practice has recurred across civilizations, particularly during conquests and empire-building, where religious uniformity served political consolidation, as seen in Charlemagne's (772–804 CE), which prescribed death for refusing baptism, the mass coerced baptisms of amid the 1391 Iberian pogroms, and episodes under Almohad rule in and (12th century), where non-Muslims faced ultimatums of conversion, exile, or execution. In colonial contexts, such as Portuguese (16th–17th centuries) and , inquisitorial mechanisms and military dominance enforced Catholic adherence, frequently blending overt force with incentives like land grants. While doctrinal texts in faiths like and nominally reject compulsion—Qur'an 2:256 states "no compulsion in ," and early Christian evangelism emphasized voluntary —historical implementation often prioritized expansion over these ideals, yielding superficial or relapsed conversions amid resistance, , or underground persistence of original practices. Empirical assessments of remain contested, with coerced adherents frequently reverting or maintaining dual allegiances upon eased enforcement, underscoring causal limits of force in altering deeply held convictions.

Conceptual Framework

Definition and Distinctions

Forced conversion denotes the adoption of a or under duress, typically involving threats of physical , economic penalties, legal prosecution, or social ostracism, rather than arising from personal conviction or rational persuasion. This compulsion overrides individual , compelling outward compliance irrespective of internal assent, as evidenced in historical and contemporary analyses of coercive religious practices. Such conversions differ fundamentally from proselytism, which relies on voluntary engagement through discourse, testimony, or exemplary living without penalties for dissent, and from gradual , where shifts occur via societal influence absent direct enforcement. Coerced adoptions often produce nominal adherence or crypto-practices, wherein individuals feign while preserving original beliefs in secret, as anthropological studies of dissimulation under pressure demonstrate; this reveals coercion's limited capacity to effect genuine transformation, frequently resulting in superficial or hypocritical professions. Causal realism underscores that authentic emerges solely from uncoerced , as external threats cannot engender voluntary assent essential to faith's cognitive and volitional components; compelled submission thus equates to behavioral , not internalized commitment, a principle echoed in philosophical inquiries into formation. Doctrinal variances highlight this: Islamic legal traditions have prescribed death for , creating a unidirectional coercive structure that deters and incentivizes entry under penalty, while Christian stresses inner regeneration over enforced ritual, viewing as incompatible with faith's relational essence.

Methods of Coercion

Direct physical coercion in forced conversions has encompassed threats of execution, , or enslavement to compel adherence to the dominant faith. Historical instances include ultimatums demanding conversion or death, as issued by the to in northern on July 18, 2014, where refusal led to execution or expulsion. Enslavement similarly functioned as a punitive measure, with non-converts captured and bound in servitude under the new to erode resistance and enforce compliance. Indirect economic pressures operated through discriminatory taxation systems, creating material incentives for conversion. Under Islamic governance, the jizya poll tax imposed on non-Muslims exempted converts, thereby alleviating financial burdens and prompting shifts in allegiance; during the Umayyad era, this policy spurred large-scale conversions among Sogdians upon waiving the tax for new Muslims. Economic modeling of such poll taxes in medieval Egypt further demonstrates their role in widening socioeconomic gaps between non-Muslims and Muslims, accelerating conversion rates as a rational response to fiscal disparity. Social and familial mechanisms leveraged personal vulnerabilities, including abductions of children and forced marriages to integrate targets into the coercing community. In , minority Hindu and Christian girls endure frequent kidnappings followed by coerced and matrimony, with UK government assessments documenting at least 100 Christian cases annually as of April 2024. These acts, often enabled by local power imbalances and inadequate , exploit family ties to perpetuate demographic assimilation. Institutional frameworks amplified coercion via state or ecclesiastical authority, such as inquisitorial tribunals employing isolation, threats, and to extract professions of faith from suspected deviants. Residential boarding schools for indigenous populations institutionalized separation from kin and cultural suppression, embedding religious indoctrination to supplant ancestral beliefs; Canada's system, active from the to the late , systematically disrupted native spiritual practices through prolonged isolation and punitive assimilation. These methods, backed by legal mandates, yielded measurable declines in traditional adherence without overt violence in every instance. In Islamic theology, 9:5, known as the , instructs believers to slay polytheists after the have passed unless they repent, perform prayer, and give , providing a doctrinal basis for lethal confrontation tied to conversion demands in contexts of broken treaties. Complementary hadiths reinforce this, such as 1:2:25, where states he was ordered to fight people until they testify that there is no god but and he is His messenger, framing as a mechanism to compel verbal submission or face combat. 9:29 extends subjugation to , mandating war against those who do not believe until they pay in humbled submission, establishing status as a tolerated but inferior condition that doctrinally incentivizes eventual conversion through systemic disadvantage rather than immediate force. Classical codifies (riddah) as a capital offense, drawing from hadiths like 9:84:57—"Whoever changes his religion, kill him"—to legally enforce retention within , treating departure as against the divine order and justifying execution to prevent communal erosion. Christian doctrine presents inherent tensions, with New Testament passages emphasizing voluntary faith, such as John 6:44 stating no one can come to unless drawn by the Father, rejecting inherent . Yet, justifications for force emerged through interpretive lenses, notably Augustine of Hippo's of Luke 14:23's —"compel people to come in"—in his Letter 185 (also referenced in Letter 93), arguing that external compulsion could aid internal conversion, as seen in Paul's blinding on the Damascus road (), thus rationalizing against heretics like Donatists to preserve ecclesiastical unity. Old Testament models of conquest, including Deuteronomy 7:1-5's commands to destroy Canaanite nations and their altars to eliminate , supplied precedents for against false worship, analogized in later theology to justify aggressive expansion or crusading as divine mandates to eradicate and secure promised lands. Secular ideologies, particularly Marxist-Leninist , frame as a delusional barrier to rational progress, with Karl Marx's 1843 description of it as "the "—a sigh of the oppressed that consoles but perpetuates alienation—positing its abolition as essential for true emancipation by dismantling ideological chains that sustain class exploitation. echoed this in "Socialism and Religion" (1905), declaring integral to and urging combat against faith through materialist education, viewing as a bourgeois tool that must yield to proletarian science for societal reconstruction, thereby doctrinally endorsing state-driven suppression to enforce ideological conformity. Legally, this contrasts sharia's penalties with Western frameworks like the U.S. First Amendment's , which prohibits compelled belief, though secular regimes historically inverted this to mandate , treating religious adherence as counterrevolutionary sabotage warranting eradication for causal advancement toward .

Under Christianity

Late Antiquity and Early Medieval Period

In 380 CE, Emperor , along with and , issued the , which declared the official religion of the and branded all other Christian sects as heretics subject to divine and imperial punishment. This edict initiated a policy of religious exclusivity, prohibiting public worship by non-Nicene groups and setting the stage for broader suppression. Subsequent Theodosian decrees between 391 and 392 CE escalated enforcement by banning pagan sacrifices, closing temples, and imposing civil penalties such as fines, confiscation of property, and exile on pagans and heretics who persisted in their practices. These measures, codified in the Theodosian Code, reflected the fusion of imperial authority with ecclesiastical doctrine to consolidate power amid the empire's fragmentation, prioritizing state stability over voluntary adherence. Empirical records indicate widespread compliance through coercion rather than conviction, as temple destructions and legal proscriptions dismantled pagan institutions without eliminating private holdouts. In the early medieval Visigothic kingdom of Hispania, following the realm's conversion to Nicene Catholicism at the Third Council of Toledo in 589 CE, rulers pursued similar unification to bind diverse subjects under a single faith. King Sisebut, reigning from 612 to 621 CE, promulgated an edict around 613–614 CE mandating the baptism of all Jews or their expulsion, with non-compliance punishable by enslavement or death; this affected an estimated Jewish population integral to urban economies but viewed as a threat to religious homogeneity. Forced baptisms under produced widespread , where nominal converts secretly observed Jewish rites, as evidenced by later Visigothic legislation targeting relapsed practitioners and records of underground communities persisting into the seventh century. Limited long-term adherence is corroborated by recurrent Jewish revolts and the need for repeated edicts under successors like (642–653 CE), indicating that coercion yielded superficial compliance rather than doctrinal shift, driven by the monarchy's reliance on church councils for legitimacy in a precarious post-Roman order. This state-church alliance contrasted with later traditions emphasizing personal faith, underscoring how political imperatives, not theological purity alone, propelled enforcement.

High Middle Ages and Inquisitions

The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, convened by , mandated measures against heresy, including the identification of Jews and Muslims through distinctive clothing and the suppression of groups like the Cathars in , whose dualist beliefs rejected Catholic sacraments and material creation. This council's decrees facilitated the (1209–1229), launched against Cathar strongholds in , where crusaders under Simon de Montfort employed massacres and coerced baptisms, culminating in events like the 1210 burning of over 200 Cathars at Minerve and the 1244 , where 200–400 were executed after refusing recantation. Despite these efforts, conversions often proved superficial, as underground Cathar practices persisted, requiring subsequent inquisitorial interventions to root out relapsed heretics, evidencing the limits of coercion in fostering authentic adherence. In the 13th century, the Baltic Crusades, authorized by papal bulls from 1147 onward and intensified under the , targeted pagan Prussians, , and , involving forced baptisms following military conquests, such as the 1236 and the subjugation of by 1290. initially prohibited compelling non-Christians to convert, yet crusaders rationalized mass baptisms as preparatory for Christian rule, often nominal due to revolts like the Great Prussian Uprising (1260–1274), where thousands rejected Christianity, destroying churches and indicating coerced faith's instability. Similarly, during the Reconquista's advances, such as the 1212 Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, Christian forces imposed baptisms on captured in frontier zones, but resistance manifested in crypto-Islamic practices and periodic rebellions, underscoring institutional coercion's failure to eradicate prior allegiances. The , established in 1478 by and with papal approval from Sixtus IV, systematized scrutiny of conversos—Jews baptized en masse after 1391 pogroms—and later Moriscos, Muslims compelled to convert following Granada's 1492 fall and edicts like Valencia's 1525 ultimatum of baptism or exile. Inquisitors employed torture and executions to detect Judaizing or Islamic recidivism, with over 2,000 conversos tried for relapse by 1530, yet persistent secret observances, such as Morisco retention of Arabic texts, revealed coerced uniformity's superficiality, breeding resentment rather than conviction. Medieval , drawing from Augustine's allowance for heretic to prevent societal harm but emphasizing voluntary interior assent for , clashed with these mechanisms, as forced rites produced external compliance without transformative belief, fueling later upheavals like the 1525 , where agrarian grievances intertwined with demands for gospel-based liberty against imposed doctrines.

Early Modern Europe and Colonial Expansion

The Wars of Religion in 16th- and 17th-century Europe intensified intra-Christian coercion, as Catholic and Protestant rulers vied for dominance and demanded religious uniformity to consolidate power. In France, the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre of August 24-25, 1572, resulted in the deaths of 5,000 to 30,000 Huguenots in Paris alone, with subsequent killings across provinces totaling up to 70,000 victims; while primarily exterminatory, the violence pressured survivors into coerced conformity and abjurations of Protestantism to evade further persecution. Similar dynamics unfolded in the Schmalkaldic War (1546-1547) and the Eighty Years' War (1568-1648), where territorial control often hinged on enforcing confessional allegiance, though outright mass conversions were rarer than expulsions or warfare. The revocation of the by on October 18, 1685, exemplified state-orchestrated pressure on Protestants. Preceding the edict, —military billeting of troops in Huguenot homes from 1681—terrorized families into conversions, with estimates of 200,000 to 400,000 abjuring under duress by 1685; the revocation then banned Protestant worship, closed schools, and mandated Catholic for children, prompting a of 200,000-300,000 refugees while pressuring others to feign adherence. These measures reflected absolutist aims to eradicate , yielding nominal compliance but fostering underground resistance and emigration to Protestant strongholds like and . Iberian colonial expansion amplified coercion through imperial structures blending evangelization with exploitation. In , the system, formalized in the 1500s, granted conquistadors labor rights over indigenous groups in exchange for their Christian instruction, resulting in mass baptisms—often immediate and without catechesis—to legitimize subjugation and access royal protections; by 1550, millions of natives had been nominally converted, though enforcement varied by region and friars like decried abuses as antithetical to true faith. In , the , active from 1560 to 1812, targeted crypto-Hindus, , and relapsed converts with trials, , and executions, compelling thousands to renounce non-Christian practices; edicts like the 1736 inquisitorial decree mandated public renunciation rituals, eradicating visible Hindu temples and customs while driving underground adherence. Empirical outcomes revealed limits to coerced assimilation, with high nominal conversion rates—near-total in core Spanish viceroyalties by the late —belied by syncretic survivals. Indigenous and African populations blended Catholic rites with pre-existing beliefs, as in , which emerged under French colonialism (analogous to Iberian patterns) by fusing Yoruba loa with saints, allowing slaves to maintain ancestral spirits covertly beneath baptismal veneers; this hybridity persisted despite inquisitorial scrutiny, underscoring that coercion yielded superficial adherence rather than doctrinal erasure. Such persistence challenged claims of wholesale cultural extirpation, as colonial records document recurring relapses and mestizo folk practices integrating native cosmologies.

19th-20th Century Imperialism and Conflicts

In the of the 19th century, state and Orthodox Church policies systematically encouraged the conversion of non-Orthodox populations, including and , through a combination of legal restrictions, missionary efforts, and social incentives that imposed practical disadvantages on nonconformists. An estimated 69,400 underwent baptism into the during this period, often motivated by escape from discriminatory laws confining them to the Pale of Settlement or barring them from certain professions and education. While overt mass baptisms were rare after the mid-century abolition of the Cantonist system—which had conscripted Jewish boys for and conversion from 1827 to 1856—covert pressures persisted via administrative favoritism toward converts and sporadic pogroms that heightened vulnerability. Among Muslim subjects, particularly in newly conquered Caucasian territories, assimilationist policies during the (1763–1864) complemented expulsions with selective conversions, as Russian authorities viewed Islam as incompatible with imperial loyalty and promoted Orthodox Christianity to integrate survivors. European colonial powers in the 19th and early 20th centuries backed Christian missions in and , where state authority enabled indirect coercion through monopolized education, healthcare, and land access tied to religious instruction. In , Protestant and Catholic missions established over 10,000 schools by 1914, enrolling millions and prioritizing Bible-based curricula that supplanted indigenous beliefs, with colonial governors enforcing attendance in regions like British and German . Empirical studies indicate these efforts accelerated cultural shifts, as mission proximity correlated with higher conversion rates and reduced traditional practices, though outright physical force waned after abolitionist reforms. A stark example unfolded in Canada's Indian residential school system, launched under the 1876 and expanded from the 1880s to the 1960s, where federal policy compelled over 150,000 Indigenous children into church-operated institutions for assimilation, banning native languages, ceremonies, and spirituality while mandating Christian worship and doctrine. The program's architect, , articulated its goal in 1920 as "to continue the process of civilization" by eradicating Indigenous identity, resulting in documented abuses including physical punishments for religious noncompliance; the last school closed in 1996. By the 20th century, overt forced conversions linked to Christian declined amid in Western metropoles and rising nationalist resistances in colonies, though conflicts retained religious dimensions. In the (1908–1960), state-leased missions wielded authority to enforce Christian observance among forced laborers, contributing to over 50% by independence, but local revolts and ethical scandals curbed extremes. Post-World War II and instruments, notably Article 18 of the 1948 prohibiting in religious belief, further eroded state-backed proselytism in former empires. In and , theological justifications for compulsion faded with Enlightenment-derived liberalism, yielding to voluntary evangelism; data from the era show Christian expansion in and —reaching 500 million adherents by 2000—driven primarily by indigenous agency rather than imperial fiat. This shift marked a causal pivot from to , as global norms prioritized individual over confessional uniformity.

Under Islam

Prophetic Era and Rashidun Caliphate

During Muhammad's Prophetic era, military engagements such as the on March 13, 624 CE, where 313 Muslims defeated a larger Meccan force, and the on March 23, 625 CE, which resulted in significant Muslim casualties but reinforced calls for tribal allegiance, framed conflicts as imperatives for submission to , leading to coerced conversions among some defeated groups. The Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, signed in March 628 CE, provided a ten-year truce with the of , allowing limited pilgrimage access but including provisions for returning Muslim converts who fled , which underscored ongoing pressures on religious affiliation and set the stage for the 630 CE , where mass submissions to occurred under the threat of subjugation. A pivotal example of enforcement arose with the Jewish tribe in following the in April 627 CE; after a 25-day for alleged in aiding besieging forces, the tribe surrendered, and an arbitrator ruled for the execution of 600 to 900 adult males, with women and children enslaved, reflecting the severe repercussions for non-Muslim tribes refusing alignment with the emerging Islamic polity, though framed as punishment for breach of pact rather than direct conversion refusal. Such incidents, rooted in doctrinal views of loyalty to , contributed to the consolidation of as an Islamic center, with empirical growth tied to conquest rather than voluntary propagation alone. Under the , Abu Bakr's (Wars of Apostasy) from June 632 to 633 CE targeted Arabian tribes that, after Muhammad's death on June 8, 632 CE, either renounced , withheld zakat, or rebelled against central authority, involving eleven major campaigns that reimposed submission through military means, resulting in thousands of deaths and the restoration of unified Islamic governance across the peninsula, causally accelerating and doctrinal adherence. This enforcement differed from apologist interpretations emphasizing Quranic verse 2:256 ("no compulsion in religion"), as primary accounts indicate subjugation as the operational default for maintaining caliphal expansion, with conversions often following defeat rather than preceding it. Subsequent Rashidun conquests under (r. 634–644 CE), including victories over Byzantine and Sasanian forces by 651 CE, established pacts offering conquered populations—such as in Persia and the —conversion to , payment of poll tax for status with restricted rights, or war, as per Quranic directive in At-Tawbah 9:29 to fight non-believers until they submit through tribute, fostering empirical growth via systemic incentives for Islamization amid discriminatory protections that pressured long-term assimilation. These early dynamics prioritized conquest-driven expansion over later caliphal periods' relative laxity, with historical records showing rapid territorial gains from 632 to 661 CE correlating directly with enforced religious-political unity.

Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates

Under the (661–750 CE), the imposition of —a levied exclusively on non-Muslim adult males in conquered regions such as and Persia—established a systemic economic disparity that incentivized gradual . Following the rapid conquests of the (633–651 CE), Zoroastrians and other non-Muslims were required to pay in exchange for protection and exemption from , while Muslims faced only the lighter or land-based in some cases; failure to pay could result in enslavement, imprisonment, or execution. Fiscal records from the period, including papyri and administrative documents, reveal that this burden disproportionately affected lower-income groups, accelerating conversion rates as households sought relief from the tax's compounding effects, with Islamization in remaining limited to urban elites until the but expanding under sustained pressure. In , Umayyad expansion from 647 CE onward involved similar policies, where Berber tribes, initially resisting conquest, underwent mass conversions amid military subjugation; however, post-conversion discrimination—such as continued subjection to and preferential treatment of Arab settlers—sparked the Great Berber Revolt of 740 CE under Maysara al-Matghari. This uprising, centered in and spreading across the , highlighted coercive elements, as Berber forces, including recent Muslim converts influenced by Kharijite , rebelled against fiscal exploitation and second-class status, leading to brutal suppressions that reinforced Islam's dominance through violence and renewed incentives. Unlike Byzantine or Sassanid poll taxes applied uniformly within religious majorities, the 's tie to non-Muslim identity created a causal mechanism for demographic shift, evidenced by evolving tax rolls showing declining populations over generations. The Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258 CE), shifting the capital to Baghdad in 762 CE, perpetuated the dhimmi framework but introduced juristic debates on non-Muslim obligations, with caliphs like al-Mahdi (r. 775–785 CE) and al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–861 CE) enforcing stricter dress codes (ghiyar), church demolitions, and jizya collections to curb perceived encroachments. These measures, applied to Christians and Jews in urban centers like Baghdad, imposed veiled coercion through social humiliation and economic strain, prompting conversions among artisans and merchants to access guild privileges and tax exemptions; occasional violence, including riots against dhimmis, underscored the system's instability, though massacres were rarer than under prior conquests. Empirical data from Egyptian and Iraqi fiscal archives indicate conversion acceleration among the poor due to the tax's regressive nature, contrasting with non-mandatory Christian levies that lacked faith-based exemptions, thus highlighting fiscal policy as a primary driver of Islamization rather than doctrinal compulsion alone.

Medieval Islamic Dynasties and Invasions

In the 12th century, the Almohad Caliphate, founded by Ibn Tumart and expanded under Abd al-Mu'min (r. 1130–1163), pursued a doctrinal revivalism centered on strict tawhid (monotheism) that rejected accommodations for non-Muslims, leading to the revocation of dhimmi protections in North Africa and al-Andalus. Following conquests such as Cordoba in 1148, Jews and Christians faced ultimatums of conversion to Islam, exile, or execution, with estimates of thousands affected across Morocco, Algeria, and Iberia; many outwardly converted while practicing Judaism or Christianity in secret (crypto-Judaism or crypto-Christianity). This policy marked a departure from earlier pragmatic tolerance under Umayyad and Abbasid rule, driven by Almohad ideology's intolerance for scriptural "anthropomorphism" attributed to Jewish and Christian texts, resulting in mass flights—including that of philosopher Maimonides (1138–1204), who escaped Cordoba with his family and penned the Iggeret ha-Shemad (Epistle on Forced Conversion) advising strategic compliance to preserve life and faith. In Anatolia and the Balkans during the 11th–13th centuries, Seljuk Turks and their vassals, including the Danishmendids, advanced through ghazi (raider-warrior) campaigns following the Battle of Manzikert in 1071, which eroded Byzantine control and facilitated demographic shifts via warfare, enslavement, and border pressures rather than centralized decrees. Seljuk sultans like Alp Arslan (r. 1063–1072) and Malik Shah (r. 1072–1092) prioritized territorial expansion over systematic coercion, with Islamization proceeding gradually through Sufi missionary efforts, intermarriage, and economic incentives amid Turkish migrations numbering in the hundreds of thousands; however, Danishmendid emirs in eastern Anatolia enforced conversions in captured areas, including through abduction of rural Christians and forced assimilation of slaves, contributing to the region's transition from majority Christian to Muslim by the 13th century. These dynamics reflected revivalist zeal among frontier ghazis, contrasting with core Seljuk pragmatism that retained dhimmi taxes for revenue. In , Zaydi imams from the onward periodically invoked Shi'i-derived edicts compelling the conversion of Jewish orphans to , as per interpretations of dhimmi custody laws requiring state guardianship to prevent non-Muslim upbringing; this practice, rooted in medieval Zaydi , affected communities in Sana'a and highlands, prompting Jewish strategies like early marriages to avert orphan status, though enforcement varied and often prioritized fiscal exploitation over total eradication of . Such episodic coercions stemmed from doctrinal assertions of 's supremacy, exacerbating expulsions and migrations, yet differed from Almohad absolutism by allowing persistence under payments when politically expedient. Overall, these dynasties' stricter phases arose from puritanical reinterpretations of shari'a amid expansionist fervor, favoring expulsions and selective force over the Umayyad-era balance of protection-for-tribute, though pragmatic lulls occurred under weaker rulers.

Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal Empires

The employed the devshirme system from the late 14th century through the , forcibly recruiting Christian boys aged 8 to 18 primarily from regions such as , , and , converting them to , and training them as elite infantry or administrators. This levy, occurring every few years and affecting thousands—up to 3,000 per cycle in peak periods—ensured a loyal, slave-soldier class unbound by tribal or familial ties, bolstering military effectiveness during expansions under sultans like (r. 1520–1566). While the system enhanced state control by severing recruits' original religious and ethnic identities, it generated enduring resentment among Christian communities, contributing to periodic revolts and contributing to the Janissaries' later corruption and resistance to reform by the . In the Safavid Empire, founded in 1501 by Shah Ismail I, policies of forced conversion transformed from a Sunni-majority region to a Twelver Shia stronghold through mass executions of Sunni scholars, , and resistors, alongside mandatory Shia rituals and disseminated by imported Lebanese Shia clerics. By the mid-16th century under Shah (r. 1524–1576), coercion included public cursing of Sunni caliphs and destruction of Sunni shrines, affecting an estimated 90% of the population through intimidation and violence, though superficial conversions persisted in rural areas. These measures consolidated dynastic legitimacy against Sunni Ottoman rivals but provoked Sunni tribal uprisings, such as those by the and , fostering sectarian resentment that undermined internal stability and fueled cross-border conflicts. The under (r. 1658–1707) revived the on non-Muslims in April 1679, applying it discriminatorily to with escalating rates based on wealth—12 to 48 rupees annually—while exempting converts, thereby incentivizing conversions amid economic hardship. Concurrently, imperial orders led to the documented destruction of over 200 Hindu temples between 1669 and 1680, including the Vishwanath Temple in in 1669 and the Kesava Deo Temple in in 1670, often as reprisals for or to repurpose sites for mosques, pressuring Hindu elites and communities toward submission or Islam. Unlike the Ottoman , Mughals lacked a systematic child-levy for conversion, relying instead on fiscal and punitive ; these policies strengthened orthodox Islamic temporarily but ignited widespread Hindu revolts, such as the Jat uprising in 1669 and Maratha resistance, eroding Mughal authority and accelerating territorial fragmentation.

19th-20th Century Reforms and Nationalism

The era (1839–1876) marked a pivotal shift in Ottoman policy toward non-Muslims, with reforms promulgating legal equality across religious lines and abolishing the on dhimmis in 1856, thereby undermining the institutional incentives for coerced conversions under classical Islamic law. These measures, driven by the empire's need to counter European pressures and internal decay, modernized the legal framework by curtailing sharia's discriminatory elements, though enforcement varied regionally and provoked backlash from ulema who viewed equality as a dilution of Islamic supremacy. Despite these liberalizations, sporadic forced conversions persisted in rural areas resistant to central edicts, as local authorities and mobs exploited transitional chaos to enforce religious conformity. In (1789–1925), Shi'a clerical influence intensified persecutions of religious dissenters, particularly Baha'is—who originated from the Babi movement in the 1840s—through mass executions, property seizures, and demands for recantation to Islam. Historical records indicate that following uprisings like the 1850 Battle of Fort Tabarsi, Iranian authorities executed over 20,000 Babis and coerced survivors into public rituals, framing refusal as against the faith. Such episodes, often instigated by mujtahids in cities like and , blended theological rejection of Baha'i claims to prophethood with political suppression, perpetuating a pattern of amid modernization efforts under Naser al-Din Shah. The (1912–1913) accelerated Ottoman territorial losses, displacing over 400,000 Muslims from newly independent states like and , where Christian majorities imposed expulsions and, in cases such as Pomak communities, coerced reconversions from to Orthodox Christianity, resulting in 27% mortality among affected Muslim civilians from violence and privation. Ottoman responses, amid pan-Islamic rallying cries, included localized efforts to reclaim apostate Muslims through reconversion campaigns in , though these were overshadowed by the empire's military collapse and the rise of Young Turk secularism. Post-World War I conflicts saw heightened Islamization during the Ottoman collapse, as in the 1915 Armenian deportations where authorities systematically forced conversions—especially of women and orphans—into Muslim families to erase , with tens of thousands absorbed via and as part of demographic homogenization. Paralleling this, the Assyrian Genocide () involved massacres in southeastern and Hakkari, where Kurdish and Ottoman irregulars compelled survivors to convert to under threat of death, integrating them into tribal structures while destroying Syriac Christian communities numbering around 250,000 pre-war. These acts, rationalized as wartime security measures against perceived disloyalty, reflected a fusion of nationalist homogenization with religious erasure. Twentieth-century Arab nationalism, from the Mandate era through Ba'athist regimes in and , nominally prioritized secular unity over religious hierarchy, diminishing state-enforced conversions compared to prior caliphal models. Yet, its emphasis on Arabo-Islamic cultural synthesis exerted subtler pressures on minorities like and Assyrians, with state policies favoring Muslim-majority narratives in and administration, as noted in contemporary analyses of assimilation dynamics. In practice, reduced overt coexisted with social incentives for conversion, such as access to power, amid the movement's evolution from anti-colonial to authoritarian .

Contemporary Islamist Enforcement

In , hundreds of Hindu and Christian girls, often minors, are abducted annually and subjected to forced conversions to followed by marriages to Muslim men, with perpetrators leveraging social pressures, threats, and falsified documents to evade . reports from 2020 to 2025 document patterns in province, where weak enforcement of minimum marriage age laws and police complicity enable over 1,000 such incidents yearly among Hindus alone, though official underreporting persists due to minority communities' fear of reprisal. laws under Sections 295-B and 295-C of the exacerbate this by inciting mob violence; accusations, frequently baseless and spread via , lead to extrajudicial killings or coerced public recantations and conversions to appease crowds, as authorities often prioritize de-escalation over protection. The self-proclaimed (ISIS) during its 2014–2019 in and imposed explicit forced conversion policies on non-Sunni populations, including , , and Shia Muslims, offering enslavement, taxation, or death as alternatives to adopting its interpretation of . In and , ISIS fighters systematically separated families, sexually enslaved women and girls after nominal conversions under duress, and executed resisters, with UN-documented cases exceeding thousands among alone by 2017. Survivor testimonies and forensic evidence from mass graves confirm that refusals triggered immediate executions, contrasting ISIS claims of voluntary adherence with empirical records of . In , blasphemy laws under Article 156(a) of the have compelled apostasy reversals, as convictions for "insulting" —often tied to perceived deviations—result in and societal pressuring defendants to reaffirm Muslim identity. The 2023 revisions expanded these provisions to explicitly criminalize , with at least 50 prosecutions since 2010 involving to recant, per monitoring by religious freedom advocates. In , Baha'is endure state-orchestrated , including property seizures and educational bans, creating indirect pressures to convert to or conceal faith; while overt forced baptisms are rare, arrests of over 200 Baha'is since 2020 for "" often involve interrogations demanding renunciation. Yemen's penal code treats as evidence of , punishable by death or flogging, enforcing conformity amid Houthi control, though data scarcity limits precise case counts. Islamist apologists and in these contexts frequently portray conversions as genuine spiritual shifts, dismissing coercion allegations as Western fabrications; however, cross-verified victim accounts, satellite imagery of destroyed minority sites, and quantitative analyses from organizations like USCIRF and substantiate systemic enforcement, underscoring discrepancies between official narratives and ground-level realities.

Under Other Religions

Judaism

In the 2nd century BCE, during the Hasmonean dynasty's expansion, High Priest and ruler conquered Idumea () around 125 BCE and compelled its inhabitants to undergo and adopt practices as an alternative to exile or death, marking one of the few documented instances of forced conversion perpetrated by Jewish authorities. This policy integrated the Idumeans into Judean society but was exceptional, driven by territorial consolidation rather than doctrinal universalism, and later Hasmonean kings like extended similar coercive measures against other groups such as the Itureans. In contrast, the conversion of the Khazar elite to in the 8th or 9th century CE is regarded by historians as voluntary, stemming from geopolitical neutrality between Christian and Muslim caliphates rather than imposition. Judaism's theological framework, rooted in the Torah's depiction of the as a particular "" bound by covenant (Deuteronomy 7:6-8), eschews aggressive , emphasizing instead the Noahide laws for non-Jews as sufficient for without requiring full conversion. This particularism—prioritizing ethnic and covenantal identity over universal salvation—has historically constrained the scale of any coercive efforts, rendering forced conversions rare and non-systematic compared to expansionist faiths. Post-Hasmonean rabbinic tradition further discouraged insincere or coerced entrants, viewing them as potential sources of instability, as evidenced by Talmudic reservations about converts bringing "hardship." In modern times, instances of Jews enforcing conversions remain negligible, with Israel's facilitating for those with Jewish ancestry but not mandating religious change for others. Jewish communities have instead predominantly experienced the reverse, serving as targets of under Christian and Islamic regimes, though such victimhood underscores the asymmetry rather than perpetration. This dynamic aligns with Judaism's non-missionary ethos, limiting causal incentives for widespread coercion.

Hinduism

Hinduism, characterized as a non-missionary , lacks historical records of systematic forced conversions to the under indigenous rule. Unlike proselytizing religions that expanded through , Hindu kingdoms in ancient and did not institutionalize for religious adherence, with showing conversions occurred primarily through , intermarriage, or voluntary adoption rather than state-enforced mandates. Scholarly analysis confirms no strong evidence of Hindu rulers compelling mass conversions as policy, distinguishing it from patterns observed in external invasions. During the medieval period under Mughal dominance, Hindu resistance to Islamic conversion pressures manifested through the , which emphasized personal devotion and vernacular expression to preserve cultural identity amid temple destructions and fiscal incentives like that encouraged shifts away from . Bhakti saints, such as and , promoted egalitarian worship that countered Sufi outreach and coercive tactics, enabling Hindu continuity despite documented violence and enslavement in invasions that claimed millions of lives and led to demographic changes. This devotional resurgence, peaking from the 15th to 17th centuries, functioned as a non-violent bulwark, with low conversion rates to Hinduism reflecting defensive rather than aggressive strategies. In the , "ghar wapsi" (homecoming) initiatives, prominent since 2014 under organizations like the , involve reconversions of individuals claiming ancestral Hindu roots after prior shifts to or , often facilitated by missionaries or economic incentives. Participants in documented cases, such as families in and , have affirmed voluntariness, citing disillusionment with proselytizing faiths and a return to heritage without reported . These efforts, numbering in the thousands annually but dwarfed by historical scales elsewhere, counter narratives of Hindu aggression, as allegations of force often stem from biased reporting in minority advocacy sources lacking participant testimony. Empirical prevalence remains low, with no state policy mirroring the institutionalized conversions under prior Islamic empires, where primary records detail widespread temple razings and enslavements driving adherence. Claims of systematic Hindu thus appear inflated, unsubstantiated by comparative historical data.

Buddhism and Other Eastern Traditions

In the history of Buddhism, instances of forced conversion have been rare and limited compared to proselytizing Abrahamic traditions, attributable to its non-theistic framework emphasizing personal enlightenment over exclusive salvation or damnation, which reduces incentives for coercive expansion. Following the around 261 BCE, Emperor (r. 268–232 BCE) of the converted to out of remorse for the estimated 100,000 deaths and 150,000 deportations, subsequently inscribing rock and pillar edicts across his realm to promote dhamma—a policy of ethical conduct, non-violence, and tolerance—influenced by Buddhist principles but extended to all religious communities without mandating adherence to Buddhism itself. These edicts, such as Major Rock Edict 7, explicitly urged respect for other sects' doctrines and rituals, reflecting a voluntary dissemination model rather than enforcement, as Ashoka subsidized mendicants from multiple traditions and avoided doctrinal exclusivity. In , widespread emerged as a rather than a mechanism for forced conversion; by the early , monks comprised up to 20% of the male population in some regions, often through familial or societal expectations rather than of non-Buddhists, with historical records showing no systematic campaigns to convert conquered populations, as in Tibetan or Mongolian expansions. Similarly, other Eastern traditions like and , lacking imperatives, exhibited minimal coercive elements; integrated with folk practices through , while functioned as a state ethic in imperial without demanding , prioritizing hierarchical harmony over doctrinal uniformity. During Japan's (1868–1912), assimilation policies targeted the indigenous Ainu, banning traditional animist practices and compelling adoption of Japanese customs, including state-promoted rites after the 1868 separation of from , but these measures emphasized cultural erasure over explicit conversion to , which had been syncretized with prior to disestablishment. In contemporary , Buddhist nationalist groups like the have fueled violence against the Muslim Rohingya since 2012, resulting in over 700,000 displacements by 2017, yet empirical accounts indicate exclusionary and expulsionary motives rooted in rather than efforts to compel Buddhist conversion, with perpetrators framing actions as defensive preservation rather than evangelistic. This pattern underscores Buddhism's empirically pacifist profile in conversion dynamics, diverging from conquest models in theistic faiths where eternal stakes incentivize compulsion.

Under Atheist and Secular Ideologies

Enlightenment and Revolutionary Periods

The Enlightenment's emphasis on reason over faith portrayed as a repository of that hindered human progress and perpetuated irrational . Thinkers such as critiqued religious as fostering and intolerance, arguing that , rather than genuine piety, underlay much of ecclesiastical power, while asserted that " is more injurious to God than ," prioritizing skeptical inquiry to dismantle faith-based claims. This rationalist framework justified coercive by positing the state as the arbiter of truth, enabling policies to eradicate religious influence in favor of a monopoly on civic grounded in empirical observation and causal explanation. During the French Revolution's dechristianization campaign of 1793–1794, amid the , revolutionary authorities intensified efforts to suppress Catholicism through forced secular oaths and executions. The , enacted on July 12, 1790, mandated priests swear loyalty to the state over the , dividing into "jurors" who complied and "non-jurors" who faced deportation, imprisonment, or death; by 1793, public worship was banned in October, churches were desecrated or repurposed for the —a civic venerating —and non-compliant priests were executed en masse, with estimates of hundreds killed and around 30,000 exiled. The Law of 17 September 1793 formalized this by compelling clerical renunciation of faith, framing refusal as counter-revolutionary treason and substituting festivals honoring reason for Christian rituals to inculcate secular devotion. In the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920), anticlerical provisions of the 1917 Constitution enforced by prohibiting in schools, nationalizing Church properties, and restricting numbers and activities, effectively compelling adherence to state-mandated rationalism over Catholic doctrine. Article 3 required exclusively secular public instruction, indoctrinating youth with antireligious curricula to supplant faith-based worldviews, while Article 130 mandated priest registration and barred them from political rights or wearing habits publicly, aiming to dismantle ecclesiastical influence. These measures, rooted in revolutionary ideology viewing the Church as an obstacle to modernization, forced nominal compliance through legal penalties, prioritizing causal state control over individual belief.

Communist Regimes

In the , the League of Militant Atheists, founded in 1925 and dissolved in 1947, coordinated aggressive anti-religious propaganda, museum exhibits mocking faith, and pressure campaigns that facilitated the closure of thousands of churches, mosques, and synagogues. By 1939, only about 500 Orthodox churches remained operational out of over 50,000 before the revolution, with the regime employing forced renunciations through workplace and union coercion to boost nominal rates. Stalin's 1930s targeted religious leaders as "counter-revolutionaries," resulting in the execution of an estimated 20,000 to 40,000 and the imprisonment of tens of thousands more, while famines like the (1932–1933) exacerbated mortality among rural believers resistant to atheistic collectivization. These measures produced official statistics claiming near-universal , yet archival data post-1991 reveal persistent underground networks, with rebounding to 40–50% of the population by the 1990s. Mao Zedong's (1966–1976) mobilized —youth militias numbering up to 10 million—to demolish religious sites under the "Smash the " directive, destroying or damaging an estimated 80–90% of China's , including temples, monasteries, and mosques. Coercion involved public struggle sessions where believers were humiliated, beaten, or forced to desecrate sacred objects and declare , affecting millions; in alone, all but a handful of 6,000 monasteries were razed, with thousands of monks imprisoned or killed. State propaganda and education systems reinforced this, claiming over 90% atheistic adherence by 1976, though clandestine practices endured, as evidenced by the rapid resurgence of religious identification after Deng Xiaoping's reforms, with hundreds of millions reporting faith by the 1980s. Albania under Enver Hoxha declared itself the world's first atheist state in 1967, enacting laws that prohibited all religious observance, demolished over 2,000 churches and mosques, and imprisoned or executed . The 1976 formalized religion's eradication, with forced secular oaths required for and , yielding near-total nominal ; Hoxha's regime documented the destruction of religious artifacts and burial of leaders in unmarked graves to sever cultural ties. Despite this, empirical surveys post-1991 showed 70–80% of identifying with pre-communist faiths, indicating superficial compliance and covert transmission of beliefs. In states like the German Democratic Republic (GDR), communist policies mandated atheistic indoctrination in schools and youth organizations, such as the rite replacing Christian , which by the enrolled over 90% of adolescents and correlated with declining to under 10% officially. These efforts drove mass nominal apostasies—state records claimed 75% non-belief by 1989—but relied on and career penalties for dissent, while underground smuggling and secret seminaries sustained religious cores, as confirmed by the swift post-unification church growth to 25% attendance.

Modern Secular Assimilation Policies

In the late 19th and 20th centuries, the operated a network of federal Indian boarding schools designed to assimilate Native American children into mainstream American by suppressing indigenous languages, customs, and tribal affiliations in favor of English-language , vocational , and Western cultural norms. From 1819 to 1969, this encompassed 408 schools across 37 states or territories, enrolling tens of thousands of children who were often forcibly removed from families, with policies emphasizing "civilizing" metrics such as literacy rates and economic self-sufficiency while prohibiting native practices. Government officials, including founder of the (established 1879), advocated this as a secular path to integration, encapsulated in Pratt's 1892 statement to "kill the Indian in him, and save the man," prioritizing national unity over ethnic preservation despite church involvement in operations. Assimilation outcomes included high rates of cultural disconnection, with empirical data from federal records showing widespread language loss—over 90% of students barred from speaking native tongues—and elevated mortality from disease and neglect, though proponents cited increased employment in non-tribal economies as success. Similarly, in , assimilation policies from the early 20th century targeted Aboriginal and Islander children through forced removals known as the Stolen Generations, aiming to integrate them into white settler society via institutional upbringing focused on domestic skills, wage labor, and into non-indigenous families. Between approximately 1910 and 1970, state legislation such as ' Aborigines Protection Act (1909, amended 1915) empowered authorities to remove children deemed "neglected," affecting up to one in three indigenous children in some regions, with estimates of 100,000 total removals based on archival inquiries. These efforts, framed by policymakers as benevolent modernization to break cycles of "tribal" dependency, measured success through metrics like school attendance and assimilation into urban economies, but survivor testimonies and government reports document causal links to intergenerational trauma, including identity erasure evidenced by suppressed ties and cultural knowledge transmission. In contemporary China, since 2017, the government has expanded "vocational education and training centers" in targeting and other Muslim minorities, compelling participation in programs that promote , , and secular nationalist ideology while curtailing Islamic practices to foster "ethnic fusion" into the dominant culture. Estimates from , leaked documents, and defector accounts indicate over 1 million detainees across hundreds of facilities, subjected to mandatory sessions on , Mandarin proficiency, and loyalty oaths, with policies justified as and poverty alleviation to achieve measurable assimilation indicators like employment in state industries. Official narratives portray this as secular modernization countering , yet from detainee interviews reveals enforced renunciation of religious customs—such as or —correlating with reported identity dilution, including family separations and cultural reprogramming that prioritize Han-centric metrics over minority . Chinese attributes reduced "extremist" incidents to these interventions, though independent analyses highlight biases in self-reported data, underscoring causal pressures toward .

Societal Impacts and Responses

Demographic and Cultural Consequences

Forced conversions under Islamic rule in the contributed to a profound demographic shift among Christian populations, reducing their share from a historical in regions like the and prior to the 7th-century conquests to approximately 4.2% by 2020, down from 12.7% in 1900. This decline, continuing from 13.6% in 1910, reflects sustained pressures including taxation, social discrimination, sporadic forced conversions, and violence, which incentivized assimilation over generations rather than isolated events. In areas under recent Islamist control, such as Gaza and , Christian populations have plummeted by up to 90% due to coercion and insecurity, underscoring causal links between enforcement and exodus or conversion. In contrast, forced Christianization in Latin America during the colonial era resulted in widespread syncretism rather than demographic erasure of indigenous elements, fostering hybrid practices like the veneration of saints overlaid on pre-Columbian deities, which preserved cultural continuity within a dominant Christian framework. By the 21st century, Latin America hosts over 40% of global Catholics, with syncretic expressions enduring without reducing Christianity to minority status, as initial coercion blended with voluntary adoption and lacked perpetual second-class penalties. Under atheist regimes like the , coercive suppression of religion yielded nominal compliance but shallow adherence, evidenced by a rapid post-1991 revival where Christian identification surged in former republics, with religious belief increasing by 22% in alone. This reversal highlights how forced disrupts but does not eradicate underlying cultural affinities, leading to resurgence upon policy relaxation, unlike more permanent shifts under enduring discriminatory systems. The Ottoman devshirme system exemplifies broader genetic and cultural dilution from forced conversion, as Christian boys from Balkan families were systematically extracted, Islamized, and integrated into elite Muslim roles, accelerating the transition of regions like and Bosnia to Muslim majorities through severed lineages and incentivized emulation. Such mechanisms debunk narratives of purely voluntary Islamization, as empirical demographic trajectories link to lasting reconfiguration, with Balkan Christian percentages dropping below 20% in affected areas by the empire's end. Overall, data indicate that fosters superficial or reversible changes in open contexts but entrenches dilution where paired with institutional privileges for converts. Historical instances of resistance to forced conversion often involved clandestine adherence to original beliefs, known as crypto-practices. In 16th-century , Moriscos—Muslims nominally converted to under duress—maintained secret Islamic rituals and cultural elements as a form of passive resistance against assimilation pressures, despite inquisitorial scrutiny and eventual mass expulsion between 1609 and 1614. This crypto-Islam persisted as a survival mechanism, underscoring the limited long-term efficacy of coerced baptisms without genuine enforcement of prohibitions on reversion. In contemporary contexts, reconversion movements have emerged alongside legal frameworks aimed at reversing or preventing coerced shifts. India's Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, promulgated in 2020 and enacted as law in 2021, targets conversions induced by , , or allurement, particularly in interfaith marriages, with penalties up to 10 years . Amendments in 2024 stiffened penalties for mass conversions and introduced survey mechanisms for oversight, leading to over 400 reported cases prosecuted by mid-2025, often tied to marriage-related . Proponents argue these statutes facilitate reconversions—termed "ghar wapsi" by Hindu organizations—by enabling legal challenges to dubious conversions, with empirical patterns indicating reduced incidence in rigorously enforced districts through deterrence of fraudulent inducements. Conversely, in , anti-forced conversion efforts have faltered due to enforcement gaps, as documented in 2025 reports from the National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) and allied bodies like the National Commission on the Status of Women, which highlight persistent abductions and coerced marriages of Hindu and Christian girls, numbering in the hundreds annually despite nominal prohibitions. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has repeatedly designated Pakistan a Country of Particular Concern, citing systemic failures in addressing these cases and urging , though domestic courts often validate conversions post-facto, exacerbating minority vulnerabilities. Legal challenges to forced conversions invoke competing principles: human rights advocates, including USCIRF, frame as a violation of religious freedom and bodily autonomy under international norms like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, while defenders of preservationist laws in contend they safeguard cultural continuity against demographic erosion via deceitful means, with data from enforced jurisdictions showing measurable declines in contested conversions compared to lax areas. Enforcement rigor causally correlates with lower reported incidences, as weak implementation in perpetuates cycles of impunity, whereas India's model demonstrates partial success in curbing fraudulently induced shifts through prosecutorial action and reconversion provisions.

Human Rights Frameworks and Ongoing Debates

Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted in 1948, affirms the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, explicitly including the freedom to change one's religion or belief, thereby prohibiting coercive practices that impair this liberty. Similarly, Article 18(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ratified by over 170 states, states that no one shall be subject to coercion that would impair their freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of choice. These provisions establish a global norm against forced conversion, yet enforcement remains inconsistent, particularly in jurisdictions where domestic laws conflict with treaty obligations. In states applying Sharia-based legal systems, apostasy—often equated with renunciation of Islam—is frequently criminalized, leading to penalties ranging from loss of and employment to imprisonment or execution, despite ICCPR commitments. For instance, several Muslim-majority countries maintain laws that override international protections, with non-enforcement of ICCPR stemming from reservations or prioritization of religious over secular standards. This creates enforcement gaps, as evidenced by ongoing prosecutions or social against converts, contrasting with the treaty's intent to safeguard individual from communal or state pressure. Contemporary debates surrounding forced conversion often pit accusations of Islamophobia against documentation of empirical risks, such as fatwas and mob violence targeting apostates in during the 2020s, where face extrajudicial threats despite no formal statute. Critics arguing equivalence across ideologies overlook data indicating apostasy punishable by death in at least 13 Muslim-majority nations, a pattern absent in other religious or secular frameworks today. In atheist regimes like China's, legacies of communist-era suppression persist through "" policies forcing religious alignment with state ideology, including mass detentions of over one million since 2017 to eradicate Islamic practices. Realist analyses emphasize causal disparities over , noting that while historical forced occurred under communist rule, current global incidence of ties more directly to theocratic enforcement of than to comparable mechanisms elsewhere, as per annual religious freedom reports. This selective application undermines universal frameworks, with calls for prioritizing verifiable threats—such as documented cases in contexts—over narratives dismissing scrutiny as bias.

References

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