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Islamic terrorism
Islamic terrorism
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Islamic terrorism[note 1] is a form of religious terrorism carried out by fundamentalist militant Islamists and Islamic extremists with the aim of achieving various political or religious objectives, such as jihad.[1][2][3]

Since at least the 1990s, Islamist terrorist incidents have occurred around the world and targeted both Muslims and non-Muslims.[4] Most attacks have been concentrated in Muslim-majority countries,[5] with studies finding 80–90% of terrorist victims to be Muslim.[6][7][8] The annual number of fatalities from terrorist attacks grew sharply from 2011 to 2014, when it reached a peak of 33,438, before declining to 13,826 in 2019.[9] From 1979 to April 2024, five Islamic extremist groups—the Taliban, Islamic State, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaeda—were responsible for more than 80% of all victims of Islamist terrorist attacks.[10][11][12] In some of the worst-affected Muslim-majority regions, these terrorists have been met by armed, independent resistance groups.[13] Islamist terrorism has also been roundly condemned by prominent Islamic figures and groups.[14][15][16]

Justifications given for attacks on civilians by Islamic extremist groups come from their interpretations of the Quran,[3] the hadith,[17][18] and Sharia.[3] These killings include retribution by armed jihad for the perceived injustices of unbelievers against Muslims;[19] the belief that many self-proclaimed Muslims have violated Islamic law and are disbelievers (takfir);[20] the perceived necessity of restoring Islam by establishing Sharia as the source of law, including by reestablishing the Caliphate as a pan-Islamic state (e.g., ISIS);[21] the glory and heavenly rewards of martyrdom (istishhad);[22][23][24][18] and the belief in the supremacy of Islam over all other religions.[note 2] Justification of violence without permitted declarations of takfir (excommunication) has been criticized.[27]

The use of the phrase "Islamic terrorism" is disputed. In Western political speech, it has variously been called "counter-productive", "highly politicized, intellectually contestable" and "damaging to community relations", by those who disapprove of the characterization 'Islamic'.[28][29][30] It has been argued that "Islamic terrorism" is a misnomer for what should be called "Islamist terrorism".[31]

Terminology

[edit]

George W. Bush and Tony Blair (US president and UK Prime Minister respectively at the time of the September 11 attacks) repeatedly stated that the war against terrorism has nothing to do with Islam.[32] Others inside and out of the Islamic world who oppose its use on the grounds there is no connection between Islam and terrorism include Imran Khan, the prime minister of Pakistan, and academic Bruce Lawrence.[33] Former US president Barack Obama explained why he used the term "terrorism" rather than "Islamic terrorism" in a 2016 town hall meeting saying, "There is no doubt, ... terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda or ISIL – They have perverted and distorted and tried to claim the mantle of Islam for an excuse for basically barbarism and death ... But what I have been careful about when I describe these issues is to make sure that we do not lump these murderers into the billion Muslims that exist around the world ..."[34]

It has been argued that "Islamic terrorism" is a misnomer for what should be called "Islamist terrorism".[31]

In January 2008, the US Department of Homeland Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties issued a report titled Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims,[35] which opened with

Words matter. The terminology that senior government officials use must accurately identify the nature of the challenges that face our generation. [...] At the same time, the terminology should also be strategic – it should avoid helping the terrorists by inflating the religious bases and glamorous appeal of their ideology.

The office "consulted with some of the leading U.S.-based scholars and commentators on Islam to discuss the best terminology to use when describing the terrorist threat." Among the experts they consulted,

There was a consensus that the [US Government] should avoid unintentionally portraying terrorists, who lack moral and religious legitimacy, as brave fighters, legitimate soldiers, or spokesmen for ordinary Muslims. Therefore, the experts counseled caution in using terms such as, "jihadist," "Islamic terrorist," "Islamist," and "holy warrior" as grandiose descriptions.

History

[edit]

Growth in Islamist attacks and killings around the world[10]

50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
1979–2000
2001–2012
2013–2024
  •   Attacks
  •   Deaths

Pre-20th century

[edit]

Whether Islamic terrorism is a recent phenomenon is disputed. Some maintain that there was no terrorism in Islam prior to late 20th and early 21st century, while others, such as Ibn Warraq, claim that from the beginning of Islam, "violent movements have arisen" such as the Kharijites,[36] Sahl ibn Salama, Barbahari, Kadizadeli movement, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, etc., "seeking to revive true Islam, which its members felt had been neglected in Muslim societies, who were not living up to the ideals of the earliest Muslims".[37] The 7th century Kharijites, according to some, started from an essentially political position but developed extreme doctrines that set them apart from both mainstream Sunni and Shi'a Muslims. The group was particularly noted for adopting a radical approach to takfir, whereby they declared Muslim opponents to be unbelievers and therefore worthy of death,[38] and also by their strong resemblance to contemporary ISIL.[39]

1960s–1970s

[edit]

During the era of the anti-colonial struggle in North Africa and the Middle East, coinciding with the creation of Israel in 1948, a series of Marxist-Leninist and anti-imperialist movements swept throughout the Arab and Islamic world. These movements were nationalist and revolutionary, but not Islamic. However, their view that terrorism could be effective in reaching their political goals generated the first phase of modern international terrorism. In the late 1960s, Palestinian secular movements such as Al Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) began to target civilians outside the immediate arena of conflict. Following Israel's victory over Arab forces in 1967, Palestinian leaders began to realize that the Arab world was unable to defeat Israel in the battlefield. At the same time, lessons drawn from the Jewish struggle against the British in Palestine and revolutionary movements across Latin America, North Africa and Southeast Asia, motivated the Palestinians to turn away from guerrilla warfare towards urban terrorism. These movements were secular in nature, though their international reach served to spread terrorist tactics worldwide.[40] Moreover, the Arab Cold War between mostly US-aligned conservative Islamic monarchies (Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan) and Soviet-aligned secular national-revolutionary governments (Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Libya, Iraq) inspired a growth of religiously motivated Islamic movements in the Middle East, supported by Saudi Arabia, which came into conflict with the predominant secular (Nasserist and Ba'athist) nationalist ideologies at the time.[40][41]

The book The Revolt by Menachem Begin, leader of the Irgun militia and future Israeli Prime Minister, influenced both Carlos Marighella's urban guerrilla theory and Osama bin Laden's Islamist al-Qaeda organization.[42] Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman in the book Rise and Kill First asserted that Hezbollah's 1983 campaign of coordinated terrorist attacks against American, French and Israeli military installations in Beirut drew inspiration from and directly mirrored the Haganah's and Irgun's 1946 bombing campaign against the British: both succeeded in creating an atmosphere of widespread fear which eventually forced the enemy to withdraw. Bergman further asserts that the influence of Israeli-sponsored terrorist operations on the emerging Islamists was also of operational nature: the Israeli proxy Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners had carried out multiple deadly truck bombings in Lebanon long before the emergence of Hezbollah. An Israeli Mossad agent told Bergman: "I saw from a distance one of the cars blowing up and demolishing an entire street. We were teaching the Lebanese how effective a car bomb could be. Everything that we saw later with Hezbollah sprang from what they saw had happened after these operations."[43]

The year 1979 is widely considered a turning point in the rise of religiously motivated radicalism in the Muslim world. Several events are thought to be crucial for the proliferation of Islamist terrorism in the next decade, such as the Soviet–Afghan War and unprecedented support from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the US for anti-Soviet jihadists; the Iranian Revolution and subsequent Iran–Iraq War as well as Khomeini's active support for Shia groups fighting the Israeli occupation of Lebanon; the Grand Mosque seizure in Mecca and subsequent Wahhabization of the Saudi government; and the Egypt–Israel peace treaty that was highly unpopular in some sections of the Muslim world.[44]

According to Bruce Hoffman of the RAND Corporation, in 1980, 2 out of 64 terrorist groups were categorized as having religious motivation while in 1995, almost half (26 out of 56) were religiously motivated with the majority having Islam as their guiding force.[45][40]

1980s–1990s

[edit]

The Soviet–Afghan War and the subsequent anti-Soviet mujahedin war, lasting from 1979 to 1989, started the rise and expansion of terrorist groups. Since their beginning in 1994, the Pakistani-supported Taliban militia in Afghanistan has gained several characteristics traditionally associated with state-sponsors of terrorism, providing logistical support, travel documentation, and training facilities. Since 1989 the increasing willingness of religious extremists to strike targets outside immediate country or regional areas highlights the global nature of contemporary terrorism. The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, and the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, are representative of this trend.[40]

2000s–2010s

[edit]

According to research by the German newspaper Welt am Sonntag, between 11 September 2001 and 21 April 2019, there were 31,221 Islamist terrorism attacks, in which at least 146,811 people were killed. Many of the victims were Muslims, including most of the victims who were killed in attacks involving 12 or more deaths.[46][47][48]

2010s

[edit]

According to the Global Terrorism Index, deaths from terrorism peaked in 2014 and have fallen each year since then until 2019 (the last year the study had numbers for), making a decline of more than half (59% or 13,826 deaths) from their peak. The five countries "hardest hit" by terrorism continue to be Muslims countries—Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Syria and Somalia. [note 3]

Attacker profiles and motivations

[edit]

The motivation of Islamic terrorists has been disputed. Some (such as Maajid Nawaz, Graeme Wood, and Ibn Warraq) attribute it to extremist interpretations of Islam;[50][51][37] others (Mehdi Hasan) to some combination of political grievance and social-psychological maladjustment;[52] and still others (such as James L. Payne and Michael Scheuer) to a struggle against "U.S./Western/Jewish aggression, oppression, and exploitation of Muslim lands and peoples".[53]

Religious motivation

[edit]

Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, in their book, The Age of Sacred Terror, argue that Islamic terrorist attacks are motivated by religious fervor. They are seen as "a sacrament ... intended to restore to the universe a moral order that had been corrupted by the enemies of Islam." Their attacks are neither political nor strategic but an "act of redemption" meant to "humiliate and slaughter those who defied the hegemony of God".[54]

According to Indonesian Islamic leader Yahya Cholil Staquf in a 2017 Time interview, within the classical Islamic tradition, the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims is assumed to be one of segregation and enmity. In his view, extremism and terrorism are linked with "the basic assumptions of Islamic orthodoxy" and that radical Islamic movements are nothing new. He also added that Western politicians should stop pretending that extremism is not linked to Islam.[55][56]

According to journalist Graeme Wood "much of what" one major Islamic terror group -- ISIS -- "does looks nonsensical except in light of a sincere, carefully considered commitment to returning civilization to a seventh-century legal environment" of Muhammad and his companions, "and ultimately to bringing about the apocalypse" and Judgement day. ISIS group members insist "they will not—cannot—waver from governing precepts that were embedded in Islam by the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers".[57]

Shmuel Bar argues that while the importance of political and socioeconomic factors in Islamist terrorism is not in doubt, "In order to comprehend the motivation for these acts and to draw up an effective strategy for a war against terrorism, it is necessary to understand the religious-ideological factors — which are deeply embedded in Islam."[58]

Examining Europe, two studies of the background of Muslim terrorists—one from the UK and one from France—found little connection between terrorist acts performed in the name of Islam and the religious piety of the operatives. A "restricted" 2008 UK report of hundreds of case studies by the domestic counter-intelligence agency MI5 found that there was no "typical profile" of a terrorist and that

Far from being religious zealots, a large number of those involved in terrorism do not practise their faith regularly. Many lack religious literacy and could actually be regarded as religious novices. Very few have been brought up in strongly religious households, and there is a higher than average proportion of converts. Some are involved in drug-taking, drinking alcohol and visiting prostitutes. MI5 says there is evidence that a well-established religious identity actually protects against violent radicalisation.[59]

However, while the motivations of the individuals directly involved in carrying out the terror attacks are not necessarily religious and may stem from other reasons, religiously motivated organizations and governments are very often behind such attacks. Fundamentalist organizations and governments often encourage, fund, assist, incentivize, or reward the actions of individuals they recognize as susceptible to being coerced into committing terror attacks, thus using people who are not always religiously motivated to achieve religious ends. Hamas, for example, is known for paying the families of imprisoned terrorists and of suicide bombers. The Islamic Republic of Iran intends billions of US dollars annually for militia fighters and terrorists,[60] exploiting the extreme economic difficulties faced by people in countries such as Yemen, Lebanon and Syria by offering them cash in exchange for terror activity.[61]

A 2015 "general portrait" of "the conditions and circumstances" under which people living in France become "Islamic radicals" (terrorists or would-be terrorists) by Olivier Roy (see above) found radicalisation was not an "uprising of a Muslim community that is victim to poverty and racism: only young people join, including converts".[62]

Roy believes terrorism/radicalism is "expressed in religious terms" because

  1. most of the radicals have a Muslim background, which makes them open to a process of re-Islamisation ("almost none of them having been pious before entering the process of radicalisation"), and[62]
  2. jihad is "the only cause on the global market". If you kill in silence, it will be reported by the local newspaper; "if you kill yelling 'Allahu Akbar', you are sure to make the national headlines". Other extreme causes—ultra-left or radical ecology—are "too bourgeois and intellectual" for the radicals.[62]

Somewhat in contradiction to this, a study surveying Muslims in Europe to examine how much Islamist ideology increases support for terrorism found that "in Western countries affected by homegrown terrorism ... justifying terrorism is strongly associated with an increase in religious practice". (This is not the case in European "countries where Muslims are predominant"—Bosnia, Albania, etc.—where the opposite seems to be true, i.e., the more importance respondents assigned to religion in their life, the less likely they were to "justifying political violence".)[63]

Denominations/Ideologies

[edit]

Most strains of thought/schools/sects/movements/denominations/traditions of Islam do not support or otherwise associate themselves with terrorism.[note 4] According to Mir Faizal, only three sects or movements of Islam—the Sunni sects of Salafi, Deobandi, and Barelvi.[note 5]—have been associated with violence against civilians.[64] Of the three, only Salafi Islam—specifically Salafi jihadism Islam—can be called involved in global terrorism, as it is connected with Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram and other groups. (Terrorism among some members of the Barelvi sect is limited to attacks on alleged blasphemers in Pakistan, and the terrorism among Deobandi groups has "almost no" influence beyond Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.)[64] Another sect/movement known as Wahhabism (intertwined with non-jihadist Salafism) has been accused of being the ideology behind Islamic terrorist groups,[65] but Al Qaeda and other terrorists are more commonly described as following a fusion of Qutbism and Wahhabism.[66][67][68]

Outside of these sects or religious movements, the religious ideology of Qutbism has influenced Islamic terrorism, along with religious themes and trends including Takfir, suicide attacks, and the belief that Jews and Christians are not People of the Book but infidels/kafir waging "war on Islam". (These ideas are often related and overlapping.)

Qutbism
[edit]

Qutbism is named after Egyptian Islamist theoretician Sayyid Qutb, who wrote a manifesto (known as Milestones), while in prison. Qutb is said to have laid out the ideological foundation of Salafi jihadism (according to Bruce Livesey);[69] his ideas are said to have formed "the modern Islamist movement" (according to Gilles Kepel);[note 6] which along with other "violent Islamic thought", became the ideology known as "Qutbism that is the "center of gravity" of al-Qaeda and related groups (according to U.S. Army Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier).[50] Qutb is thought to be a major influence on Al-Qaeda #2 leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri.[71][note 7]

In his manifesto (called "one of the most influential works in Arabic of the last half century"),[74] Qutb preached:

  • the absolute necessity of enforcement of sharia law ("even more necessary than the establishment of the Islamic belief", without which Islam does not exist);[75]
  • the need for violent jihad as well as preaching to bring back sharia law and spread Islam, (a vanguard "movement" will use "physical power and Jihad",[76] to remove "material obstacles");[77]
  • that offensive jihad—attacking non-Muslim territory—ought not neglected by true Muslims in favor of defensive jihad, (this "diminish[s] the greatness of the Islamic way of life",[78] and is the work of those who have been "defeated by the attacks of the treacherous Orientalists!"[79] Muslims should not let lack of non-Muslim aggression stop them from waging Jihad to spread sharia law because "truth and falsehood cannot coexist on earth" in peace.[80]
  • a loathing of "the West" (a "rubbish heap ... filth ... hollow and worthless");[81]
  • ... which is deliberately undermining Islam (pursuing a "well-thought-out scheme" to "demolish the structure of Muslim society");[82]
  • ... despite the fact it "knows" it is inferior to Islam (It "knows that it does not possess anything which will satisfy its own conscience and justify its existence", so that when confronted with the "logic, beauty, humanity and happiness" of Islam, "the American people blush");[83]
  • and a loathing and hatred of Jews ("world Jewry, whose purpose is to eliminate ... the limitations imposed by faith and religion, so that Jews may penetrate into body politics of the whole world and then may be free to perpetuate their evil designs [such as] usury, the aim of which is that all the wealth of mankind end up in the hands of Jewish financial institutions ...").[84]

Eikmeier summarizes the tenets of Qutbism as being:

  • A belief that Muslims have deviated from true Islam and must return to "pure Islam" as originally practiced during the time of Muhammad.
  • The path to that "pure Islam" is only through a literal and strict interpretation of the Quran and Hadith, along with implementation of Muhammad's commands.
  • Muslims should interpret the original sources individually without being bound to follow the interpretations of Islamic scholars.
  • Any interpretation of the Quran from a historical, contextual perspective is a corruption, and that the majority of Islamic history and the classical jurisprudential tradition is mere sophistry.[50]

While Sayyid Qutb preached that all of the Muslim world had become apostate or jahiliyah, he did not specifically takfir or call for the execution of any apostates, even those governing non-sharia governments [note 8] Qutb did however emphasize that "the organizations and authorities" of the putatively Muslim countries were irredeemably corrupt and evil[86] and would have to be abolished by "physical power and Jihad",[86] by a "vanguard"[87] movement of true Muslims.[88]

One who did argue this was Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj, the main theoretician of the Islamist group that assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. In his book Al-Farida al-gha'iba (The Neglected Duty), he cited a fatwa issued in 1303 CE by the celebrated strict medieval jurist Ibn Taymiyyah. He had ruled that fighting and killing of the Mongol invaders who were invading Syria was not only permitted but obligatory according to Sharia. This was because the Mongols did not follow sharia law, and so even though they had converted to Islam (Ibn Taymiyyah argued) they were not really Muslims.[89] Faraj preached that rulers such as Anwar Sadat were "rebels against the Laws of God [the shari'ah]",[90][91] and "apostates from Islam" who have preserved nothing of Islam except its name.[92]

Wahabism/Salafism
[edit]

Another Islamic movement accused of being involved in terrorism is known as Wahabism.[93][94][95][96][65]

Sponsored by oil exporting power Saudi Arabia, Wahabism is deeply conservative and anti-revolutionary (its founder taught that Muslims are obliged to give unquestioned allegiance to their ruler, however imperfect, so long as he leads the community according to the laws of God),[97][98] Nonetheless, this ideology and its sponsors have been accused of assisting terrorism both

Up until at least 2017 or so (when Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman declared Saudi Arabia was returning to "moderate Islam"),[108] Saudi Arabia spent many billions, not only through the Saudi government but through Islamic organizations, religious charities, and private sources,[109] on dawah wahhabiya, i.e. spreading the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam,[110] This funding incentivized Muslim "schools, book publishers, magazines, newspapers, or even governments" around the world to "shape their behavior, speech, and thought in such a way as to incur and benefit from Saudi largesse," and so propagate Wahhabi doctrines;[111]

The hundreds of Islamic colleges and Islamic centers, over a thousand mosques and schools for Muslim children, it financed [note 9] often featured Wahhabi-friendly curriculum and religious materials[114][115][116] such as textbooks explaining that all forms of Islam except Wahhabism were deviation,[117] or the twelfth grade Saudi text that "instructs students that it is a religious obligation to do 'battle' against infidels in order to spread the faith".[118]

Wahhabi-friendly works distributed for free "financed by petroleum royalties" included those of Ibn Taymiyyah[119] (author of the fatwa mentioned above against rulers who do not rule by sharia law).[90][91]

Not least, the successful 1980–1990 jihad against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan—that inspired non-Afghan jihad veterans to continue jihad in their own country or others—benefited from billions of dollars in Saudi financing, as well as "weaponry and intelligence". [120]

Religious interpretations

[edit]

The "root cause" of Muslim terrorism is extremist ideology, according to Pakistani theologian Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, specifically the teachings that:

  • "Only Muslims have the right to rule, non-Muslims are meant to be subjugated";
  • "Modern nation states are unIslamic and constitute kufr (disbelief)";
  • the only truly Islamic form of state is a unified Muslim Caliphate;
  • "when Muslims obtain power they will overthrow non-Muslim governments and rule";
  • "The punishment of kufr (disbelief) and irtidad (apostasy) is death and must be implemented".[121]

Other authors have noted other elements of extremist Islamic ideology.

Martyrdom/Istishhad
[edit]

Terror attacks requiring the death of the attacker are generally referred to as suicide attacks/bombings by the media, but when done by Islamists their perpetrators generally call such an attack Istishhad (or in English "martyrdom operation"),[122] and the suicide attacker shahid (pl. shuhada, literally 'witness' and usually translated as 'martyr'). The idea being that the attacker died in order to testify his faith in God, for example while waging jihad bis saif (jihad by the sword). The term "suicide" is never used because Islam has strong strictures against taking one's own life.

According to author Sadakat Kadri, "the very idea that Muslims might blow themselves up for God was unheard of before 1983, and it was not until the early 1990s that anyone anywhere had tried to justify killing innocent Muslims who were not on a battlefield." After 1983 the process was limited among Muslims to Hezbollah and other Lebanese Shi'a factions for more than a decade.[123]

Since then, the "vocabulary of martyrdom and sacrifice", videotaped pre-confession of faith by attackers have become part of "Islamic cultural consciousness", "instantly recognizable" to Muslims (according to Noah Feldman),[citation needed] while the tactic has spread through the Muslim world "with astonishing speed and on a surprising course".[citation needed]

First the targets were American soldiers, then mostly Israelis, including women and children. From Lebanon and Israel, the technique of suicide bombing moved to Iraq, where the targets have included mosques and shrines, and the intended victims have mostly been Shiite Iraqis. ... [In] Afghanistan, ... both the perpetrators and the targets are orthodox Sunni Muslims. Not long ago, a bombing in Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand Province, killed Muslims, including women, who were applying to go on pilgrimage to Mecca. Overall, the trend is definitively in the direction of Muslim-on-Muslim violence. By a conservative accounting, more than three times as many Iraqis have been killed by suicide bombings in just three year (2003–6) as have Israelis in ten (from 1996–2006). Suicide bombing has become the archetype of Muslim violence – not just to Westerners but also to Muslims themselves.[124]

Jihadist comparisons of life and death

Below are jihadist statements comparing life and death:

  • "We love death like our enemies love life" (Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh on Al-Aqsa TV in 2014)[125]
  • "The Americans love Pepsi-Cola, we love death." (Afghan jihadist Maulana Inyadullah addressing a British reporter in 2001)[126]
  • "The world is but a passage ... what is called life in this world is not life but death" (Ayatollah Khomeini in 1977, commemorating his son's death)
  • "...The sons of the land of the two holiest sites [Mecca and Medina] ... I say this to you, These youths love death as you love life" (Osama bin Laden addressing U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry in 1996 fatwa)[127]
Justification for killing noncombatants
[edit]

Al-Qaeda justification for the killing of civilian bystanders following its first attack (see above) based on Ibn Taymiyyah's fatwa was described by author Lawrence Wright,

Ibn Taymiyyah had issued a historic fatwa: Anyone who aided the Mongols, who bought goods from them or sold to them or was merely standing near them, might be killed as well. If he is a good Muslim, he will go to Paradise; if he is bad, he will go to hell, and good riddance. Thus the dead tourist and the hotel worker [killed by Al-Qaeda] would find their proper reward.[128]

An influential tract Management of Savagery (Idarat at-Tawahhush), explains away mass killing in part by the fact that even "if the whole umma [community of Muslims] perishes they would all be martyrs".[129][130] Similarly, author Ali A. Rizvi has described the chat room reaction of a Taliban supporter to his (Rizvi's) condemnation of the 2014 Peshawar school massacre—that the 132 school children the Taliban slaughtered were "not dead" because they had been killed "in the way of God ... Don't call them dead. They are alive, but we don't perceive it" (citing, Quran 3:169 Never think of those martyred in the cause of Allah as dead. In fact, they are alive with their Lord, well provided for—), and maintaining that those whose Islamic faith is "pure" would not be upset with the Taliban's murder of children either.[131]

"War against Islam"
[edit]

A tenant of Qutbism and other militant Islamists is that Western policies and society are not just un-Islamic or exploitive, but actively anti-Islamic, or as it is sometimes described, waging a "War on Islam". Islamists (such as Qutb) often identify what they see as a historical struggle between Christianity and Islam, dating back as far as the Crusades,[132] among other historical conflicts between practitioners of the two respective religions.

In 2006, Britain's then head of MI5 Eliza Manningham-Buller said of Al-Qaeda that it "has developed an ideology which claims that Islam is under attack, and needs to be defended". "This," she said "is a powerful narrative that weaves together conflicts from across the globe, presenting the West's response to varied and complex issues, from long-standing disputes such as Israel/Palestine and Kashmir to more recent events as evidence of an across-the-board determination to undermine and humiliate Islam worldwide."[133] She said that the video wills of British suicide bombers made it clear that they were motivated by perceived worldwide and long-standing injustices against Muslims; an extreme and minority interpretation of Islam promoted by some preachers and people of influence; their interpretation as anti-Muslim of UK foreign policy, in particular the UK's involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan."[133]

In his call for jihad, Osama bin Laden almost invariably described his enemies as aggressive and his action against them as defensive.[134]

Enmity towards non-Muslims and LGBT+
[edit]

The enmity towards non-Muslims among Islamist militants, leaders and scholars is driven by theological beliefs that deem Christians and Jews as "infidels". This hostility is further extended to Western society due to its secular values and practices, which are viewed as contrary to Islamic principles. These include issues such as the proliferation of pornography, perceived immorality, and the acceptance of homosexuality and feminism.

An example of this ideological stance in practice was provided by Karam Kuhdi, an Islamist arrested in Egypt in 1981 for his involvement in a series of robberies and murders targeting Christian goldsmiths. In this period, tourists, often non-Muslim, were also frequently targeted by Islamic terrorists in Egypt. During police interrogation, Kuhdi surprised authorities with his unconventional beliefs. He rejected the traditional Islamic doctrine that Christians were "People of the Book" entitled to protection as dhimmis, instead considering them infidels subject to violent jihad. Kuhdi supported his stance by citing Quranic verses such as 'Those who say that God is Jesus, son of Mary, are infidels' and 'combat those of the people of the book who are infidels', explaining the Islamists view that the infidels are "the People of the Book, since they have not believed in this book".[135]

According to a doctrine known as al-wala' wa al-bara' (literally, "loyalty and disassociation"), Wahhabi founder Abd al-Wahhab argued that it was "imperative for Muslims not to befriend, ally themselves with, or imitate non-Muslims or heretical Muslims", and that this "enmity and hostility of Muslims toward non-Muslims and heretical had to be visible and unequivocal".[136]

Although bin Laden almost always emphasized the alleged oppression of Muslims by America and Jews when talking about the need for jihad in his messages, in his "Letter to America", he answered the question, "What are we calling you to, and what do we want from you?" with:

We call you to be a people of manners, principles, honour, and purity; to reject the immoral acts of fornication, homosexuality, intoxicants, gambling's, and trading with interest (...) You separate religion from your policies, (...) You are the nation that permits Usury, which has been forbidden by all the religions (...) You are a nation that permits the production, trading and usage of intoxicants (...) You are a nation that permits acts of immorality (...) You are a nation that permits gambling in its all forms. (...) You use women to serve passengers, visitors, and strangers to increase your profit margins. You then rant that you support the liberation of women.[137]

This principle has been emphasized by Ayman al-Zawahiri (leader of al-Qaeda since June 2011), Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Jihadi theorist), Hamoud al-Aqla al-Shu'aybi (conservative Sudi scholar who supported the 9/11 attacks), and a number of Salafi preachers, Ahmad Musa Jibril, Abdullah el-Faisal.[138]

Following the 2016 Orlando nightclub shooting, described as an "act of hate" and an "act of terror by President Barack Obama due to the victims being customers of an LGBT nightclub,[139][140][141] allegedly targeted in retaliation for American airstrikes against ISIS. According to the Clarion Project, the official ISIS magazine Dabiq responded: "A hate crime? Yes. Muslims undoubtedly hate liberalist sodomites. An act of terrorism? Most definitely. Muslims have been commanded to terrorize the disbelieving enemies of Allah".[142][138] During the shooting, the shooter said it was an act of retaliation for the airstrike killing of Abu Waheeb and three other alleged militants the previous month. He told the negotiator to tell America to stop the bombing.[143][144] His words were: "That's what triggered it, OK? They should have not bombed and killed Abu [Waheeb]".[143]

Takfir
[edit]

According to traditional Islamic law, the blood of someone who leaves Islam is "forfeit"—i.e. they are condemned to death.[85] This applies not only to self-proclaimed ex-Muslims, but to those who still believe themselves to be Muslims but who (in the eyes of their accusers) have deviated too far from orthodoxy.[note 10]

Many contemporary liberal/modernist/reformist Muslims believe killing appostates to be in violation of the Quranic injunction 'There is no compulsion in religion....' (Al-Baqara 256), but even earlier generations of Islamic scholars warned against making such accusations (known as takfir), without great care and usually reserved the punishment of death for "extreme, persistent and aggressive" proponents of religious innovation (bidʻah).[147] The danger, according to some (such as Gilles Kepel), was that "used wrongly or unrestrainedly, ... Muslims might resort to mutually excommunicating one another and thus propel the Ummah to complete disaster."[85]

Kepel noted that some of Qutb's early followers believed that his declaration that the Muslim world has reverted to pre-Islamic ignorance (Jahiliyyah), should be taken literally and everyone outside of their movement takfired;[70] and Wahhabis has been known for their willingness to takfir non-Wahhabi Muslims.[148][149]

Since the last half of the 20th century, a "central ideology"[150] of insurgent Wahhabist/Salafi jihadist groups[151] has been the "sanctioning" of "violence against leaders" of Muslim majority states[150] who do not enforce sharia (Islamic law) or are otherwise "deemed insufficiently religious".[150] Some insurgent groups - Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya of Egypt, and later GIA, the Taliban, and ISIL) - are thought to have gone even further, applying takfir and its capital punishment against not only to Sunni government authorities and Shia Muslims, but to ordinary Sunni civilians who disagree with/disobeyed insurgent policies such as reinstituting slavery.

In 1977, the group Jama'at al-Muslimin (known to the public as Takfir wal-Hijra), kidnapped and later killed an Islamic scholar and former Egyptian government minister Muhammad al-Dhahabi. The founder of Jama'at al-Muslimin, Shukri Mustaf had been imprisoned with Sayyid Qutb, and had become one of Qutb's "most radical" disciples.[152] He believed that not only was the Egyptian government apostate, but so was "Egyptian society as a whole" because it was "not fighting the Egyptian government and had thus accepted rule by non-Muslims".[153] While police broke up the group, it reorganized with thousands of members,[154] some of whom went on to help assassinate the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat,[155] and join the Algerian Civil War and Al-Qaeda.[156] During the 1990s, a violent Islamic insurgency in Egypt, primarily perpetrated by Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, targeted not only police and government officials but also civilians, killing or wounding 1106 persons in one particularly bloody year (1993).[157]

In the brutal 1991–2002 Algerian Civil War, takfir of the general Algerian public was known to have been declared by the hardline Islamist Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA). The GIA amir, Antar Zouabri claimed credit for two massacres of civilians (Rais and Bentalha massacres), calling the killings an "offering to God" and declaring impious the victims and all Algerians who had not joined its ranks.[158] He declared that "except for those who are with us, all others are apostates and deserving of death,"[159] (Tens, and sometimes hundreds, of civilians were killed in each of a series of massacres that started in April 1998.[160] However, how many murders were the doing of GIA and how many of the security forces—who had infiltrated the insurgents and were not known for their probity—is not known.)[161][162]

In August 1998 the Taliban insurgents slaughtered 8000 mostly Shia Hazara non-combatants in Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan. Comments by Mullah Niazi, the Taliban commander of the attack and newly installed governor, declared in a number of post-slaughter speeches from Mosques in Mazar-i-Sharif: "Hazaras are not Muslim, they are Shi'a. They are kofr [infidels]. The Hazaras killed our force here, and now we have to kill Hazaras. ... You either accept to be Muslims or leave Afghanistan. ...",[163] indicated that along with revenge, and/or ethnic hatred, takfir was a motive for the slaughter.

From its inception in 2013 to 2020, directly or through affiliated groups, Daesh, "has been responsible for 27,947 terrorist deaths", the majority of these have been Muslims,[note 11] "because it has regarded them as kafir".[164]

One example of Daesh takfir is found in the 13th issue of its magazine Dabiq, which dedicated "dozens of pages ... to attacking and explaining the necessity of killing Shia", who the group refers to by the label Rafidah

Initiated by a sly Jew, [the Shia] are an apostate sect drowning in worship of the dead, cursing the best companions and wives of the Prophet, spreading doubt on the very basis of the religion (the Qur'ān and the Sunnah), defaming the very honor of the Prophet, and preferring their "twelve" imāms to the prophets and even to Allah! ...Thus, the Rāfidah are mushrik [polytheist] apostates who must be killed wherever they are to be found, until no Rāfidī walks on the face of earth, even if the jihād claimants despise such...[165]

Daesh not only called for the revival of slavery of non-Muslims (specifically of the Yazidi minority group), but declared takfir on any Muslim who disagreed with their policy.

Yazidi women and children [are to be] divided according to the Shariah amongst the fighters of the Islamic State who participated in the Sinjar operations ... Enslaving the families of the kuffar and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of the Shariah that if one were to deny or mock, he would be denying or mocking the verses of the Koran and the narrations of the Prophet ... and thereby apostatizing from Islam.[21]

Starting in 2013, Daesh began "encouraging takfir of Muslims deemed insufficiently pure in regard of tawhid (monotheism)". The Taliban were found "to be "a 'nationalist' movement, all too tolerant" of Shia.[166] In 2015 ISIL "pronounced Jabhat al-Nusrat - then al-Qaida's affiliate in Syria - an apostate group."[166]

Interpretations of the Qur'an and Hadith
[edit]

Donald Holbrook, a Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, analyzes a sample of 30 works by jihadist propagandists for references to Islamic scripture that justifies the objectives of violent jihad.[17] An-Nisa (4:74–75) is quoted most frequently; other popular passages are At-Taubah (9:13–15, 38–39, 111), Al-Baqarah (2:190–191, 216), and Surah 9:5:

But when these months, prohibited (for fighting), are over, slay the idolaters wheresoever you find them, and take them captive or besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every likely place. But if they repent and fulfill their devotional obligations and pay the zakat, then let them go their way, for God is forgiving and kind.

Holbrook notes that the first part "slay the idolaters ..." is oft quoted but not the limiting factors at the end of the ayat.[17]

Jihad and Islamic jurisprudence

[edit]

Techniques of war are restricted by classical Islamic jurisprudence, but its scope is not. Bernard Lewis states that ultimately Jihad ends when the entire world is brought under Islamic rule and law.[167] Classical Islamic jurisprudence imposes, without limit of time or space, the duty to subjugate non-Muslims, (according to Lewis).[168] Wael Hallaq writes that some radical Islamists go beyond the classical theory to insist that the purpose of jihad is to overthrow regimes oppressing Muslims and bring non-Muslims to convert to Islam. In contrast, Islamic modernists–who Islamists despise–view jihad as defensive and compatible with modern standards of warfare.[169] To justify their acts of religious violence, jihadist individuals and networks resort to the nonbinding genre of Islamic legal literature (fatwa) developed by jihadi-Salafist legal authorities, whose legal writings are shared and spread via the Internet.[3]

Al-Qaeda

While Islamic opponents of attacks on civilians have quoted numerous prophetic hadith and hadith by Muhammad's first successor Abu Bakr,[170] Al-Qaeda believes its attacks are religiously justified. After its first attack on a US target that killed civilians instead (a 1992 bombing of a hotel in Aden Yemen), Al Qaeda justified the killing of civilian bystanders through an interpretation (by one Abu Hajer) based on medieval jurist Ibn Taymiyyah (see above).

In a post-9/11 work, "A Statement from Qaidat al-Jihad Regarding the Mandates of the Heroes and the Legality of the Operations in New York and Washington", Al-Qaeda provided a more systematic justification—one that provided "ample theological justification for killing civilians in almost any imaginable situation."[19] Among these justifications are that America is leading the countries of the West in waging war on Islam, which (al-Qaeda alleges) targets "Muslim women, children and elderly". This means any attacks on America are a defense of Islam, and any treaties and agreements between Muslim majority states and Western countries that would be violated by attacks are null and void. Other justifications for killing and situations where killings is allowed based on precedents in early Islamic history include: killing non-combatants when it is too difficult to distinguish between them and combatants when attacking an enemy "stronghold" (hist), and/or non-combatants remain in enemy territory; killing those who assist the enemy "in deed, word, mind", this includes civilians since they can vote in elections that bring enemies of Islam to power; necessity of killing in the war to protect Islam and Muslims; when the prophet was asked whether Muslim fighters could use the catapult against the village of Taif, even though the enemy fighters were mixed with a civilian population, he indicated in the affirmative; killing women, children and other protected groups is allowed when they serve as human shields for the enemy; killing of civilians is permitted if the enemy has broken a treaty. [19]

Supporters of bin Laden have pointed to reports according to which the Islamic prophet Muhammad attacked towns at night or with catapults, and argued that he must have condoned incidental harm to noncombatants, since it would have been impossible to distinguish them from combatants during such attacks.[171][172] These arguments were not widely accepted by Muslims.[172]

Management of Savagery

Al-Qaeda's splinter groups and competitors, Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, are thought to have been heavily influenced[173][174][175][176][177] by a 2004 work on jihad entitled Management of Savagery (Idarat at-Tawahhush), written by Abu Bakr Naji[177] and intended to provide a strategy to create a new Islamic caliphate by first destroying "vital economic and strategic targets" and terrifying the enemy with cruelty to break its will.[178]

The tract asserts that "one who previously engaged in jihad knows that it is naught but violence, crudeness, terrorism, deterrence and massacring,"[179] and that even "the most abominable of the levels of savagery" of jihad are better "than stability under the order of unbelief"—those orders being any regime other than ISIL.[173][180] Victims should not only be beheaded, shot, burn alive in cages or gradually submerged until drowned, but these events should be publicized with videos and photographs.[181]

The Jurisprudence of Blood
The Houthi flag, with the top saying "God is the greatest", the next line saying "Death to America", followed by "Death to Israel", followed by "A curse upon the Jews", and the bottom saying "Victory to Islam".

Some observers[20][182][183] have noted the evolution in the rules of jihad—from the original "classical" doctrine to that of 21st-century Salafi jihadism.[177] According to the legal historian Sadarat Kadri,[182] during the last couple of centuries, incremental changes in Islamic legal doctrine (developed by Islamists who otherwise condemn any bid'ah (innovation) in religion), have "normalized" what was once "unthinkable".[182] "The very idea that Muslims might blow themselves up for God was unheard of before 1983, and it was not until the early 1990s that anyone anywhere had tried to justify killing innocent Muslims who were not on a battlefield."[182]

The first or the "classical" doctrine of jihad which was developed towards the end of the 8th century, emphasized the "jihad of the sword" (jihad bil-saif) rather than the "jihad of the heart",[184] but it contained many legal restrictions which were developed from interpretations of both the Quran and the Hadith, such as detailed rules involving "the initiation, the conduct, the termination" of jihad, the treatment of prisoners, the distribution of booty, etc. Unless there was a sudden attack on the Muslim community, jihad was not a "personal obligation" (fard 'ayn); instead it was a "collective one" (fard al-kifaya),[185] which had to be discharged "in the way of God" (fi sabil Allah),[186] and it could only be directed by the caliph, "whose discretion over its conduct was all but absolute."[186] (This was designed in part to avoid incidents like the Kharijia's jihad against and killing of Caliph Ali, since they deemed that he was no longer a Muslim).[20] Martyrdom resulting from an attack on the enemy with no concern for your own safety was praiseworthy, but dying by your own hand (as opposed to the enemy's) merited a special place in Hell.[187] The category of jihad which is considered to be a collective obligation is sometimes simplified as "offensive jihad" in Western texts.[188]

Based on the 20th-century interpretations of Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, Ruhollah Khomeini, al-Qaeda and others, many if not all of those self-proclaimed jihad fighters believe that defensive global jihad is a personal obligation, which means that no caliph or Muslim head of state needs to declare it. Killing yourself in the process of killing the enemy is an act of martyrdom and it brings you a special place in Heaven, not a special place in Hell; and the killing of Muslim bystanders (nevermind Non-Muslims), should not impede acts of jihad. Military and intelligent analyst Sebastian Gorka described the new interpretation of jihad as the "willful targeting of civilians by a non-state actor through unconventional means."[183]

Islamic theologian Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir has been identified as one of the key theorists and ideologues behind modern jihadist violence.[177][189][190][191] His theological and legal justifications influenced Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda member and former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, as well as several other jihadi terrorist groups, including ISIL and Boko Haram.[177][189][190][191] Zarqawi used a 579-page manuscript of al-Muhajir's ideas at AQI training camps that were later deployed by ISIL, known in Arabic as Fiqh al-Dima and referred to in English as The Jurisprudence of Jihad or The Jurisprudence of Blood.[177][189][190][191][192] The book has been described by counter-terrorism scholar Orwa Ajjoub as rationalizing and justifying "suicide operations, the mutilation of corpses, beheading, and the killing of children and non-combatants".[177] The Guardian's journalist Mark Towsend, citing Salah al-Ansari of Quilliam, notes: "There is a startling lack of study and concern regarding this abhorrent and dangerous text [The Jurisprudence of Blood] in almost all Western and Arab scholarship".[191] Charlie Winter of The Atlantic describes it as a "theological playbook used to justify the group's abhorrent acts".[190] He states:

Ranging from ruminations on the merits of beheading, torturing, or burning prisoners to thoughts on assassination, siege warfare, and the use of biological weapons, Muhajir's intellectual legacy is a crucial component of the literary corpus of ISIS—and, indeed, whatever comes after it—a way to render practically anything permissible, provided, that is, it can be spun as beneficial to the jihad. [...] According to Muhajir, committing suicide to kill people is not only a theologically sound act, but a commendable one, too, something to be cherished and celebrated regardless of its outcome. [...] neither Zarqawi nor his inheritors have looked back, liberally using Muhajir's work to normalize the use of suicide tactics in the time since, such that they have become the single most important military and terrorist method—defensive or offensive—used by ISIS today. The way that Muhajir theorized it was simple—he offered up a theological fix that allows any who desire it to sidestep the Koranic injunctions against suicide.[190]

Clinical psychologist Chris E. Stout also discusses the al Muhajir-inspired text in his essay, Terrorism, Political Violence, and Extremism (2017). He assesses that jihadists regard their actions as being "for the greater good"; that they are in a "weakened in the earth" situation that renders Islamic terrorism a valid means of solution.[192]

Economic motivation

[edit]
Osama in November 2001
Osama Bin Laden, the founder of multinational terrorist group Al-Qaeda, in November 2001.

Following the 9/11 attack, commentators noted the poverty of Afghanistan, and speculated that blame might partly fall on a lack of a "higher priority to health, education, and economic development" funding by richer countries,[193] and "stagnant economies and a paucity of jobs" in poorer countries.[194]

Among the acts of oppression against Muslims by the United States and its allies alleged by the head of Al-Qaeda, are economic exploitation. In a 6 October 2002 message by Osama bin Laden 'Letter to America', he alleges

You steal our wealth and oil at paltry prices because of your international influence and military threats. This theft is indeed the biggest theft ever witnessed by mankind in the history of the world. ... If people steal our wealth, then we have the right to destroy their economy.[195][196]

In a 1997 interview, he claimed that "since 1973, the price of petrol has increased only $8/barrel while the prices of other items have gone up three times. The oil prices should also have gone up three times but this did not happen",[197][note 12] (On the other hand, in an interview five weeks after the destruction the World Trade Center towers his operation was responsible for, bin Laden described the towers as standing for—or "preaching"—not exploitation or capitalism, but "freedom human Rights, and equality".)[199]

In 2002, academics Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova found "a careful review of the evidence provides little reason for optimism that a reduction in poverty or an increase in educational attainment would by themselves, meaningfully reduce international terrorism."[200] Alberto Abadie found "the risk of terrorism is not significantly higher for poorer countries, once other country-specific characteristics are considered", but instead seems to correlate with a country's "level of political freedom".[201]

Martin Kramer has argued that while terrorist organizers are seldom poor, their "foot-soldiers" often are.[202] Andrew Whitehead states that "poverty creates opportunity" for terrorists, who have hired desperate poor children to do grunt work in Iraq and won the loyalty of poor in Lebanon by providing social services.[203]

Western foreign policy

[edit]
Al-Qaeda members pose with grenades and rifles, 2010

Many believe that groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS are reacting to aggression by non-Muslim (especially US) powers, and that religious beliefs are overstated if not irrelevant in their motivation. According to a graph by U.S. State Department, terrorist attacks escalated worldwide following the United States' 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and 2003 invasion of Iraq.[204][unreliable source?] Dame Eliza Manningham Buller, the former head of MI5, told the Iraq inquiry, the security services warned Tony Blair launching the War on Terror would increase the threat of terrorism.[204][better source needed] Robert Pape has argued that at least terrorists utilizing suicide attacks—a particularly effective[205] form of terrorist attack—are driven not by Islamism but by "a clear strategic objective: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from the territory that the terrorists view as their homeland".[206] However, Martin Kramer, who debated Pape on origins of suicide bombing, stated that the motivation for suicide attacks is not just strategic logic but also an interpretation of Islam to provide a moral logic. For example, Hezbollah initiated suicide bombings after a complex reworking of the concept of martyrdom. Kramer explains that the Israeli occupation of the South Lebanon Security Zone raised the temperature necessary for this reinterpretation of Islam, but occupation alone would not have been sufficient for suicide terrorism.[207] "The only way to apply a brake to suicide terrorism," Kramer argues, "is to undermine its moral logic, by encouraging Muslims to see its incompatibility with their own values."[207]

Breaking down the content of Osama bin Laden's statements and interviews collected in Bruce Lawrence's Messages to the World (Lawrence shares Payne's belief in US imperialism and aggression as the cause of Islamic terrorism), James L. Payne found that 72% of the content was on the theme of "criticism of U.S./Western/Jewish aggression, oppression, and exploitation of Muslim lands and peoples" while only 1% of bin Laden's statements focused on criticizing "American society and culture".[53]

Former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer argues that terrorist attacks (specifically al-Qaeda attacks on targets in the United States) are not motivated by a religiously inspired hatred of American culture or religion, but by the belief that U.S. foreign policy has oppressed, killed, or otherwise harmed Muslims in the Middle East,[208] condensed in the phrase "They hate us for what we do, not who we are." U.S. foreign policy actions Scheuer believes are fueling Islamic terror include: the US–led intervention in Afghanistan and invasion of Iraq; Israel–United States relations, namely, financial, military, and political support for Israel;[209][210][211][212] U.S. support for "apostate" police states in Muslim nations such as Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and Kuwait;[213] U.S. support for the creation of an independent East Timor from territory previously held by Muslim Indonesia; perceived U.S. approval or support of actions against Muslim insurgents in India, the Philippines, Chechnya, and Palestine.[214]

Maajid Nawaz and Sam Harris argue that in many cases there is simply no connection between acts of Islamic extremism and Western intervention in Muslim lands.

Nawaz: ... What does killing the Yazidi population on Mount Sinjar have to do with US foreign policy? What does enforcing headscarves (tents in fact) on women in Waziristan and Afghanistan, and lashing them, forcing men to grow beards under threat of a whip, chopping off hands, and so forth, have to do with US foreign policy?
Harris: This catalogue of irrelevancy could be extended indefinitely. What does the Sunni bombing of Shia and Ahmadi mosques in Pakistan have to with Israel or US foreign policy?[215]

Nawaz also argues that suicide bombers in non-Muslim majority countries such as the 7 July 2005 bombers can be said to motivated by ideology not by any desire to compel UK military to withdraw from "their homeland", as they were born and raised in Yorkshire. They had never set foot in Iraq and do not speak its language.[51]

Socio-psychological motivations

[edit]

Socio-psychological development

[edit]

A motivator of violent radicalism (not just found in Al-Qaeda and ISIS) is psychological development during adolescence.[216] Cally O'Brien found many terrorists were "not exposed to the West in a positive context, whether by simple isolation or conservative family influence, until well after they had established a personal and social identity." Looking at theories of psychological personal identity Seth Schwartz, Curitis Dunkel and Alan Waterman found two types of "personal identities" susceptible to radicalization leading to terrorism:

  1. "Foreclosed and authoritarian" — Principally conservative Muslims who are often taught by their family and communities from early childhood to not deviate from a strict path and to either consider inferior or hate outside groups. When exposed to (alien) western culture, they are likely to judge it relative to their perception of the correct order of society, as well as perceive their own identities and mental health to be at risk.[217][218][216]
  2. "Diffuse and aimless" — Principally converts whose lives are characterized by "aimlessness, uncertainty and indecisiveness" and who have neither explored different identities nor committed to a personal identity. Such people are "willing to go to their deaths for ideas [such as jihadism] that they have appropriated from others" and that give their lives purpose and certainty.[218][216]

Characteristics of terrorists

[edit]

In 2004, a forensic psychiatrist and former foreign service officer, Marc Sageman, made an "intensive study of biographical data on 172 participants in the jihad" in his book Understanding Terror Networks.[219] He concluded social networks, the "tight bonds of family and friendship", rather than emotional and behavioral disorders of "poverty, trauma, madness, [or] ignorance", inspired alienated young Muslims to join the jihad and kill.[220]

According to anthropologist Scott Atran, a NATO researcher studying suicide terrorism, as of 2005, the available evidence contradicts a number of simplistic explanations for the motivations of terrorists, including mental instability, poverty, and feelings of humiliation.[221] The greatest predictors of suicide bombings[broken anchor]—one common type of terror tactic used by Islamic terrorists—turns out to be not religion but group dynamics. While personal humiliation does not turn out to be a motivation for those attempting to kill civilians, the perception that others with whom one feels a common bond are being humiliated can be a powerful driver for action. "Small-group dynamics involving friends and family that form the diaspora cell of brotherhood and camaraderie on which the rising tide of martyrdom actions is based".[222] Terrorists, according to Atran, are social beings influenced by social connections and values. Rather than dying "for a cause", they might be said to have died "for each other".[221]

In a 2011 doctoral thesis, anthropologist Kyle R. Gibson reviewed three studies documenting 1,208 suicide attacks from 1981 to 2007 and found that countries with higher polygyny rates correlated with greater production of suicide terrorists.[223][224] Political scientist Robert Pape has found that among Islamic suicide terrorists, 97 percent were unmarried and 84 percent were male (or if excluding the Kurdistan Workers' Party, 91 percent male),[225] while a study conducted by the U.S. military in Iraq in 2008 found that suicide bombers were almost always single men without children aged 18 to 30 (with a mean age of 22), and were typically students or employed in blue-collar occupations.[226] In addition to noting that countries where polygyny is widely practiced tend to have higher homicide rates and rates of rape, political scientists Valerie M. Hudson and Bradley Thayer have argued that because Islam is the only major religious tradition where polygyny is still largely condoned, the higher degrees of marital inequality in Islamic countries than most of the world causes them to have larger populations susceptible to suicide terrorism, and that promises of harems of virgins for martyrdom serves as a mechanism to mitigate in-group conflict within Islamic countries between alpha and non-alpha males by bringing esteem to the latter's families and redirecting their violence towards out-groups.[227]

Along with his research on the Tamil Tigers, Scott Atran found that Palestinian terrorist groups (such as Hamas) provide monthly stipends, lump-sum payments, and massive prestige to the families of suicide terrorists.[228][229] Citing Atran and other anthropological research showing that 99 percent of Palestinian suicide terrorists are male, that 86 percent are unmarried, and that 81 percent have at least six siblings (larger than the average Palestinian family size), cognitive scientist Steven Pinker argues in The Better Angels of Our Nature (2011) that because the families of men in the West Bank and Gaza often cannot afford bride prices and that many potential brides end up in polygynous marriages, the financial compensation of an act of suicide terrorism can buy enough brides for a man's brothers to have children to make the self-sacrifice pay off in terms of kin selection and biological fitness (with Pinker also citing a famous quotation attributed to evolutionary biologist J. B. S. Haldane when Haldane quipped that he would not sacrifice his life for his brother but would for "two brothers or eight cousins").[230]

In 2007, scholar Olivier Roy described the background of the hundreds of global (as opposed to local) terrorists who were incarcerated or killed and for whom authorities have records, as being surprising in a number of ways: The subjects frequently had a Westernized background; there were few Palestinians, Iraqis, or Afghans "coming to avenge what is going on in their country"; there was a lack of religiosity before radicalization through being "born again" in a foreign country; a high percentage of subjects had converted to Islam; their backgrounds were "de-territorialized "—meaning, for example, they were "born in a country, then educated in another country, then go to fight in a third country and take refuge in a fourth country"; and their beliefs about jihad differed from traditional ones—i.e. they believed jihad to be permanent, global, and "not linked with a specific territory."[231] Roy believes terrorism/radicalism is "expressed in religious terms" among the terrorists studied because

  1. most of the radicals have a Muslim background, which makes them open to a process of re-Islamisation ("almost none of them having been pious before entering the process of radicalisation"), and[62]
  2. jihad is "the only cause on the global market". If you kill in silence, it will be reported by the local newspaper; "if you kill yelling 'Allahu Akbar', you are sure to make the national headlines". Other extreme causes—ultra-left or radical ecology are "too bourgeois and intellectual" for the radicals.[62]

Author Lawrence Wright described the characteristic of "displacement" of members of the most famous Islamic terrorist group, al-Qaeda:

What the recruits tended to have in common—besides their urbanity, their cosmopolitan backgrounds, their education, their facility with languages, and their computer skills—was displacement. Most who joined the jihad did so in a country other than the one in which they were reared. They were Algerians living in expatriate enclaves in France, Moroccans in Spain, or Yemenis in Saudi Arabia. Despite their accomplishments, they had little standing in the host societies where they lived.[232]

This profile of global Jihadists differs from that found among more recent local Islamist suicide bombers in Afghanistan. According to a 2007 study of 110 suicide bombers by Afghan pathologist Dr. Yusef Yadgari, 80% of the attackers studied had some kind of physical or mental disability. The bombers were also "not celebrated like their counterparts in other Muslim nations. Afghan bombers are not featured on posters or in videos as martyrs."[233] Daniel Byman, a Middle East expert at the Brookings Institution, and Christine Fair, an assistant professor in peace and security studies at Georgetown University, argue that many of the Islamic terrorists are foolish and untrained, perhaps even untrainable, with one in two Taliban suicide bombers killing only themselves.[234]

Studying 300 cases of people charged with jihadist terrorism in the United States since 11 September 2001, author Peter Bergen found the perpetrators were "generally motivated by a mix of factors", including "militant Islamist ideology;" opposition to "American foreign policy in the Muslim world; a need to attach themselves to an ideology or organization that gave them a sense of purpose"; and a "cognitive opening" to militant Islam that often was "precipitated by personal disappointment, like the death of a parent".[235][better source needed]

However, two studies of the background of Muslim terrorists in Europe—one of the UK and one of France—found little connection between religious piety and terrorism among the terrorist rank and file. A "restricted" report of hundreds of case studies by the UK domestic counter-intelligence agency MI5 found that

[f]ar from being religious zealots, a large number of those involved in terrorism do not practise their faith regularly. Many lack religious literacy and could actually be regarded as religious novices. Very few have been brought up in strongly religious households, and there is a higher than average proportion of converts. Some are involved in drug-taking, drinking alcohol and visiting prostitutes. MI5 says there is evidence that a well-established religious identity actually protects against violent radicalisation.[59]

A 2015 "general portrait" of "the conditions and circumstances" under which people living in France become "Islamic radicals" (terrorists or would-be terrorists) by Olivier Roy (see above) found radicalisation was not an "uprising of a Muslim community that is victim to poverty and racism: only young people join, including converts".[62]

Refutations, criticisms and explanations for decline

[edit]

Refuting Islamic terrorism

[edit]

Along with explaining Islamic terrorism, many observers have attempted to point out their inconsistencies and the flaws in their arguments, often suggesting means of de-motivating potential terrorists.

Princeton University Middle Eastern scholar Bernard Lewis argues that although bin Laden and other radical Islamists claim they are fighting to restore shariah law to the Muslim world, their attacks on civilians violate the classical form of that Islamic jurisprudence. The "classical jurists of Islam never remotely considered [jihad] the kind of unprovoked, unannounced mass slaughter of uninvolved civil populations".[236] In regard to the September 11 attacks Lewis noted,

Being a religious obligation, jihad is elaborately regulated in sharia law, which discusses in minute detail such matters as the opening, conduct, interruption and cessation of hostilities, the treatment of prisoners and noncombatants, the use of weapons, etc.[237] Similarly, the laws of Jihad categorically preclude wanton and indiscriminate slaughter.[238] The warriors in the holy war are urged not to harm non-combatants, women and children, "unless they attack you first". ... A point on which they insist is the need for a clear declaration of war before beginning hostilities, and for proper warning before resuming hostilities after a truce. What the classical jurists of Islam never remotely considered is the kind of unprovoked, unannounced mass slaughter of uninvolved civil populations that we saw in New York two weeks ago. For this there is no precedent and no authority in Islam.[239]

Similarly, Timothy Winter writes that the proclamations of bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri "ignore 14 centuries of Muslim scholarship", and that if they "followed the norms of their religion, they would have had to acknowledge that no school of mainstream Islam allows the targeting of civilians."[240]

Researcher Donald Holbrook notes that while many jihadists quote the beginning of the famous sword verse (or ayah):

  • But when these months, prohibited (for fighting), are over, slay the idolaters wheresoever you find them, and take them captive or besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every likely place. ...

... they fail to quote and discuss limiting factors that follow,

  • ".... But if they repent and fulfill their devotional obligations and pay the zakat, then let them go their way, for God is forgiving and kind."

showing how they are (Holbrook argues) "shamelessly selective in order to serve their propaganda objectives."[17]

The scholarly credentials of the ideologues of extremism are also "questionable".[50] Dale C. Eikmeier notes

With the exception of Abul Ala Maududi and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, none of Qutbism's main theoreticians trained at Islam's recognized centers of learning. Although a devout Muslim, Hassan al-Banna was a teacher and community activist. Sayyid Qutb was a literary critic. Mohammed Abdul-Salam Farag was an electrician. Ayman al-Zawahiri is a physician. Osama bin Laden trained to be a businessman.[50]

Michael Sells and Jane I. Smith (a professor of Islamic Studies) write that barring some extremists like al-Qaeda, most Muslims do not interpret Qur'anic verses as promoting warfare today but rather as reflecting historical contexts.[241][242] According to Sells, most Muslims "no more expect to apply" the verses at issue "to their contemporary non-Muslim friends and neighbors than most Christians and Jews consider themselves commanded by God, like the Biblical Joshua, to exterminate the infidels."[241]

In his book No god but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam, Iranian-American academic Reza Aslan argues that there is an internal battle currently taking place within Islam between individualistic reform ideals and the traditional authority of Muslim clerics.[243] The struggle is similar to that of the 16th-century reformation in Christianity, and in fact is happening when the religion of Islam is as "old" as Christianity was at the time of its reformation.[244] Aslan argues that "the notion that historical context should play no role in the interpretation of the Koran—that what applied to Muhammad's community applies to all Muslim communities for all time—is simply an untenable position in every sense."[245]

Despite their proclaimed devotion to the virtue of Sharia law, Jihadists have not always avoided association with the pornography of the despised West. The Times (London) newspaper has pointed out that Jihadists were discovered by one source to have sought anonymity through some of the same dark networks used to distribute child pornography—quite ironic given their proclaimed piety.[246] Similarly, Reuters news agency reported that pornography was found among the materials seized from Osama bin Laden's Abbottabad compound that was raided by U.S. Navy SEALs.[247]

Takfir

Despite the fact that a founding principle of modern violent jihad is the defense of Islam and Muslims, most victims of attacks by Islamic terrorism ("the vast majority" according to one source—J.J. Goldberg)[248] are self-proclaimed Muslims. Many if not all Salafi-Jihadi groups practice takfir—i.e. proclaim that some self-proclaimed Muslims (especially government officials and security personnel) are actually apostates deserving of death.

Furthermore, the more learned salafi-jihadi thinkers and leaders are (and were), the more reluctance they are/were to embrace takfir (according to a study by Shane Drennan).[249] The late Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, "the godfather of the Afghan jihad", for example, was an Islamic scholar and university professor who avoided takfir and preached unity in the ummah (Muslim community). The Islamic education of Al-Qaeda's number two leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was early and much more informal—he was not a trained scholar—and al-Zawahiri expanded the definition of kafir to include many self-proclaimed Muslims. He has maintained that civilian government employees of Muslim states, security forces and any persons collaborating or engaging with these groups are apostates, for example.[249]

Two extreme takfiris -- Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Sunni jihadist leader in Iraq, and Djamel Zitouni, leader of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA) during the Algerian civil war—had even broader definitions of apostasy and less religious knowledge. Al-Zarqawi was a petty criminal who had no religious training until he was 22 and limited training thereafter. Famous for bombing targets other jihadis thought off limits,[250] his definition of apostates included all Shia Muslims and "anyone violating his organization's interpretation of Shari'a".[249] Djamel Zitouni was the son of a chicken farmer with little Islamic education. He famously expanded the GIA's definition of apostate until he concluded the whole of Algerian society outside of the GIA "had left Islam". His attacks led to the deaths of thousands of Algerian civilians.[249]

De-radicalization

Evidence that more religious training may lead to less extremism has been found in Egypt. That country's largest radical Islamic group, al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya — which killed at least 796 Egyptian policemen and soldiers from 1992 to 1998 — renounced bloodshed in 2003 in a deal with the Egyptian government where a series of high-ranking members were released (as of 2009 "the group has perpetrated no new terrorist acts"). A second group Egyptian Islamic Jihad made a similar agreement in 2007. Preceding the agreements was program where Muslim scholars debated with imprisoned group leaders arguing that true Islam did not support terrorism.[251]

Muslim attitudes toward terrorism

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The opinions of Muslims on the subject of attacks on civilians by Islamist groups vary. Fred Halliday, a British academic specialist on the Middle East, argues that most Muslims consider these acts to be egregious violations of Islam's laws.[252] Muslims living in the West denounce the 11 September attacks against United States, while Hezbollah contends that their rocket attacks against Israeli targets are defensive jihad by a legitimate resistance movement rather than terrorism.[253][254]

Views of modern Islamic scholars

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In reference to suicide attacks, Hannah Stuart notes there is a "significant debate among contemporary clerics over which circumstance permit such attacks." Qatar-based theologian, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, criticized the 9/11 attacks but previously justified suicide bombings in Israel on the grounds of necessity and justified such attacks in 2004 against American military and civilian personnel in Iraq. According to Stuart, 61 contemporary Islamic leaders have issued fatawa permitting suicide attacks, 32 with respect to Israel. Stuart points out that all of these contemporary rulings are contrary to classical Islamic jurisprudence.[255]

Charles Kurzman and other authors have collected statements by prominent Muslim figures and organizations condemning terrorism.[14] In September 2014, an open letter to ISIS by "over 120 prominent Muslim scholars" denounced that group for "numerous religious transgressions and abominable crimes".[256][257]

Huston Smith, an author on comparative religion, argued that extremists have hijacked Islam, just as has occurred periodically in Christianity, Hinduism and other religions throughout history. He added that the real problem is that extremists do not know their own faith.[258]

Ali Gomaa, former Grand Mufti of Egypt, stated not only for Islam but in general: "Terrorism cannot be born of religion. Terrorism is the product of corrupt minds, hardened hearts, and arrogant egos, and corruption, destruction, and arrogance are unknown to the heart attached to the divine."[259]

A 600-page legal opinion (fatwa) by Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri condemned suicide bombings and other forms of terrorism as kufr (unbelief),[260] stating that it "has no place in Islamic teaching and no justification can be provided for it, or any kind of excuses or ifs or buts."[261] Iranian Ayatollah Ozma Seyyed Yousef Sanei has preached against suicide attacks and stated in an interview: "Terror in Islam, and especially Shiite, is forbidden."[262][263]

A group of Pakistani clerics of Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnah (Barelvi movement) who were gathered for a convention denounced suicide attacks and beheadings as un-Islamic in a unanimous resolution.[264] On 2 July 2013 in Lahore, 50 Muslim scholars of the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) issued a collective fatwa against suicide bombings, the killing of innocent people, bomb attacks, and targeted killings. It considers them to be forbidden.[265]

Tactics

[edit]

Suicide attacks

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Hezbollah was the first group to use suicide bombers in the Middle East.[40] An increasingly popular tactic used by terrorists is suicide bombing.[266] This tactic is used against civilians, soldiers, and government officials of the regimes the terrorists oppose. A recent clerical ruling declares terrorism and suicide bombing as forbidden by Islam.[267]

Hijackings

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Islamic terrorism sometimes employs the hijacking of passenger vehicles. The most infamous were the "9/11" attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people on a single day in 2001, effectively ending the era of aircraft hijacking.

Hostage taking, kidnappings and executions

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Along with bombings and hijackings, Islamic terrorists have made extensive use of highly publicised kidnappings and executions (i.e. ritualized murders), often circulating videos of the acts for use as propaganda. A frequent form of execution by these groups is decapitation, another is shooting. In the 1980s, a series of abductions of American citizens by Hezbollah during the Lebanese Civil War resulted in the 1986 Iran–Contra affair. During the chaos of the Iraq War, more than 200 kidnappings foreign hostages (for various reasons and by various groups, including purely criminal) gained great international notoriety, even as the great majority (thousands) of victims were Iraqis. In 2007, the kidnapping of Alan Johnston by Army of Islam resulted in the British government meeting a Hamas member for the first time.

Motivations

Islamist militants, including Boko Haram, Hamas, al-Qaeda and the ISIS, have used kidnapping as a method of fundraising, as a means of bargaining for political concessions, and as a way of intimidating potential opponents.[268]

As political tactic

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An example of political kidnapping occurred in September 2014, in the Philippines. The German Foreign Ministry reported that the Islamist militant group Abu Sayyaf had kidnapped two German nationals and was threatening to kill them unless the German government withdraw its support for the war against ISIS and also pay a large ransom.[269] In September 2014 an Islamist militant group kidnapped a French national in Algeria and threatened to kill the hostage unless the government of France withdrew its support for the war against ISIS.[270]

Islamist self-justifications
[edit]

ISIL justified various acts internally, including beheadings and its kidnapping of Yazidi women and forcing them to become sex slaves or concubines.[271]

Abubakar Shekau, the leader of the Nigerian extremist group Boko Haram, said in a 2014 interview claiming responsibility for the 2014 Chibok kidnapping of 270+ schoolgirls, "Slavery is allowed in my religion, and I shall capture people and make them slaves".[272]

Kidnapping as revenue

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Nasir al-Wuhayshi leader of the Islamist militant group Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula describes kidnapped hostages as "an easy spoil... which I may describe as a profitable trade and a precious treasure."[273]

A 2014 investigation, by journalist Rukmini Maria Callimachi published in The New York Times demonstrated that between 2008 and 2014, Al Qaeda and groups directly affiliated with al-Qaeda took in over US$125 million from kidnapping, with $66 million of that total paid in 2013 alone. The article showed that from a somewhat haphazard beginning in 2003, kidnapping grew into the group's main fundraising strategy, with targeted, professional kidnapping of civilians from wealthy European countries—principally France, Spain and Switzerland—willing to pay huge ransoms. US and UK nationals are less commonly targeted since these governments have shown an unwillingness to pay ransom.[273]

Boko Haram kidnapped Europeans for the Ransom their governments would pay in the early 2010s.[274][275][276]

According to Yochi Dreazen writing in Foreign Policy, although ISIS received funding from Qatar, Kuwait and other Gulf oil states, "traditional criminal techniques like kidnapping", are a key funding source for ISIS.[277] Armin Rosen writing in Business Insider, kidnapping was a "crucial early source" of funds as ISIS expanded rapidly in 2013.[278] In March, upon receiving payment from the government of Spain, ISIS released 2 Spanish hostages working for the newspaper El Mundo, correspondent Javier Espinosa and photographer Ricardo Garcia Vilanova, who had been held since September 2013.[279] Philip Balboni, CEO of GlobalPost told the press that he had spent "millions" in efforts to ransom journalist James Foley, and an American official told the Associated Press that demand from ISIS was for 100 million ($132.5).[280] In September 2014, following the release of ISIS Beheading videos of journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff, British Prime Minister David Cameron appealed to members of the G7 to abide by their pledges not to pay ransom "in the case of terrorist kidnap".[281]

Holding foreign journalists as hostages is so valuable to ISIS that Rami Jarrah, a Syrian who has acted as go-between in efforts to ransom foreign hostages, told the Wall Street Journal that ISIS had "made it known" to other militant groups that they "would pay" for kidnapped journalists.[282] ISIS has also kidnapped foreign-aid workers and Syrians who work for foreign-funded groups and reconstruction projects in Syria.[282] By mid-2014, ISIS was holding assets valued at US$2 billion.[283]

Kidnapping as psychological warfare
[edit]

Boko Haram has been described as using kidnapping as a means of intimidating the civilian population into non-resistance.[284][285]

According to psychologist Irwin Mansdorf, Hamas demonstrated effectiveness of kidnapping as a form of psychological warfare in the 2006 capture of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit when public pressure forced the government of Israel to release 1027 prisoners, including 280 convicted of terrorism by Israel, in exchange for his release.[286] According to The New York Times, "Hamas has recognized the pull such incidents have over the Israeli psyche and clearly has moved to grab hostages in incidents such as the death and ransoming of Oron Shaul."[287]

Internet recruiting

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In the beginning of the 21st century, emerged a worldwide network of hundreds of web sites that inspire, train, educate and recruit young Muslims to engage in jihad against the United States and other Western countries, taking less prominent roles in mosques and community centers that are under scrutiny.

Examples of organizations

[edit]
The "black flag of Jihad", used by various Islamist organizations since the late 1990s, consists of a white-on-black shahada.

Africa

[edit]

The African continent has been affected by significant Islamist terrorist activity across the continent, involving various militant groups responsible for widespread violence and instability.[288][289][290] In East Africa, Al-Shabaab[291] has been a central figure in conflicts, particularly in Somalia and Kenya.[292][293] North and West Africa have seen major incidents tied to groups like Boko Haram,[294][290][295] which has caused severe disruptions in Nigeria and neighboring countries. Additionally, nations such as Egypt,[296][297][298] Algeria, Tunisia,[299][300][301] and Morocco[302][303] have experienced deadly attacks linked to broader extremist networks. These activities have led to extensive casualties and displacement across the region.[citation needed] Civilians have been the main targets of terrorist attacks by Islamist militants.[304][305][306]

Asia

[edit]

In Afghanistan,Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin forces have attacked civilians.[307] Kyrgyz-American brothers were behind the Boston Marathon bombing. In Tajikistan, the IMU was blamed for a 2010 suicide bombing that killed two policemen.[308] Uzbekistan saw multiple attacks,[309][310] including the 1999 Tashkent bombings targeting President Karimov.[311][312] China has faced attacks linked to Xinjiang separatism. In Bangladesh, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen[313][314] and Ansarullah Bangla[315] have been involved in bombings and attacks on activists. In India, Lashkar-e-Taiba[316][317] and Jaish-e-Mohammed[318][319] are responsible for numerous attacks,[320] while Pakistan and Sri Lanka have also faced Islamist attacks.[321] The Abu Sayyaf Group[322] in the Philippines continued a long-running insurgency until 2024.[323][322]

Europe

[edit]
Planned and foiled Jihadist terror attacks in Europe. Numbers for 2017 and 2018 are preliminary.[324]

The Europe has seen significant Islamist terrorist attacks,[325][326][327][328] including the 2004 Madrid bombings,[329][330] the 2005 London bombings,[331][332] and the 2015 Paris attacks,[333][334][335] all of which caused numerous casualties. A report highlights that jihadist terrorism has been responsible for the majority of deaths from terrorism in Europe from 2001 to 2014.[336] It also discusses how jihadists in Europe have financed their activities through petty crime and how terrorist attacks have increasingly targeted people rather than property.[337][338] Countries like Belgium,[339][340] Netherlands,[341][342][343] France,[344][345][346] and Germany have faced multiple attacks,[347] with Belgium being a significant base for planning attacks like the 2015 Paris attacks. Despite proximity to conflict zones, Italy has had relatively fewer jihadist incidents.[348][349] The EU report found that most Islamist terror suspects were second or third-generation immigrants,[350] while over 99% of attempted terrorist attacks in Europe in the past three years were committed by non-Muslims.[350]: 48 

In Norway, two men were sentenced in 2012 under anti-terror legislation for plotting against cartoonist Kurt Westergaard.[351] Russia has faced politically and religiously motivated attacks,[352] particularly in Chechnya, including the 2002 Moscow theater[353][354] and 2004 Beslan school hostage crises,[355][356] linked to groups like the Caucasus Emirate. Spain has seen jihadist activity since the 1990s, highlighted by the 2004 Madrid train bombings[329][330] and the 2017 Barcelona attacks.[357] In Sweden, terrorist incidents have occurred like the 2010 Stockholm bombings[358][359][360] and the 2017 Stockholm truck attack.[361][362]

Middle East

[edit]

Militant Islamism in Turkey primarily has Kurdish roots,[363] with groups like Turkish Hizbullah[364] and İBDA-C[365] opposing Turkish secularism. Iraq has experienced terrorist activity,[366] especially during the US-led Iraq War.[367][368] In Palestine and Israeli territories, groups such as Hamas[369][370][371] and the Islamic Jihad Movement[372] have launched numerous attacks against Israel. Additionally, Fatah al-Islam[373] operates in Lebanon with goals of establishing Islamic law in Palestinian refugee camps.[374][375]

Americas

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In Canada, the government identifies terrorism as a significant threat,[376] particularly emphasizing domestic radicalization,[377] as seen in the 2006 Ontario terrorism plot involving an Al-Qaeda-inspired cell.[378] In the United States, the 9/11 attacks resulted in nearly 3,000 fatalities[379] and initiated the War on Terror, with homegrown extremism highlighted as a major concern.[380][381] Australia and New Zealand have also experienced notable attacks, such as the Lindt Café siege[382][383] and the Auckland supermarket stabbing.[384][385][386] In Argentina, the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy[387] and the 1994 AMIA bombing[388][389] were linked to terrorist groups and Iran,[390] resulting in significant casualties and political repercussions.

Transnational

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Al-Qaeda's stated aim is the use of jihad to defend and protect Islam against Zionism, Christianity, the secular West, and Muslim governments such as Saudi Arabia, which it sees as insufficiently Islamic and too closely tied to the United States.[391][392][393][394]

Organizations

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Sunni

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Shia

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See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Bibliography

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Islamic terrorism denotes the perpetration of violent acts by individuals, networks, or organizations invoking radical Islamist ideologies—chiefly Salafi-jihadism—to coerce political change, enforce strict interpretations of sharia, or combat perceived enemies of Islam, including non-Muslims, secular regimes, and rival Muslim factions deemed apostate. These ideologies derive from literalist readings of Quranic verses and hadiths prescribing defensive or offensive jihad as obligatory warfare against infidels or oppressors, often rejecting modern nation-states in favor of transnational caliphates. Emerging prominently in the late 20th century through movements like the Afghan mujahideen against Soviet occupation, it has since dominated global terrorism, with jihadist groups responsible for the plurality of attacks and fatalities outside conflict-specific ethno-nationalist violence. Prominent organizations such as al-Qaeda, Islamic State (IS), al-Shabaab, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), and Boko Haram exemplify this phenomenon, conducting suicide bombings, mass shootings, beheadings, and vehicle rammings across regions from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe and South Asia. In 2024, IS and its affiliates alone caused 1,805 deaths across 22 countries, while the Sahel region's jihadist insurgencies accounted for over half of worldwide terrorism fatalities, underscoring the concentration in areas of weak governance and ongoing conflicts where ideological mobilization thrives. Empirical analyses from databases like the Global Terrorism Database reveal that Islamist perpetrators have inflicted higher per-attack casualties than other ideological variants, driven by tactics emphasizing indiscriminate civilian targeting to instill fear and provoke overreactions. Defining characteristics include the sacralization of martyrdom, fatwas legitimizing attacks on civilians, and propagation via online dawah (proselytizing), which sustains recruitment despite military defeats of territorial caliphates. Controversies persist over causal attributions, with data indicating ideological indoctrination rooted in scriptural supremacism as the primary driver over socioeconomic grievances alone, though institutional analyses from Western academia often underemphasize this to favor structural explanations.

Definition and Terminology

Core Definitions and Scope

Islamic terrorism, also referred to as Islamist terrorism, consists of premeditated acts or threats of targeting civilians, non-combatants, or symbolic sites, perpetrated by individuals or groups who explicitly invoke Islamic religious to justify their actions. These perpetrators typically frame their as fulfilling religious obligations, such as defensive or offensive against perceived apostates, infidels, or corrupting influences within Muslim societies, often aiming to establish governance under strict law or a . Unlike driven by nationalist, leftist, or separatist motives, Islamic terrorism derives its rationale from theological interpretations that prioritize the supremacy of over secular or rival systems, with attackers frequently citing scriptural sources to sanctify indiscriminate killing. The scope of Islamic terrorism extends globally but is empirically concentrated in regions with large Muslim populations or geopolitical flashpoints, including the , , , and parts of and . It encompasses diverse tactics such as suicide bombings, mass casualty shootings, vehicle-ramming attacks, beheadings, and kidnappings, often amplified through propaganda videos to recruit and intimidate. Major perpetrators include hierarchical organizations like , which pioneered transnational operations, and decentralized affiliates of the (IS), responsible for coordinated assaults in multiple continents. Data from comprehensive databases underscore the scale: the Global Terrorism Database records over 200,000 incidents worldwide from 1970 to 2020, with Islamist groups linked to a disproportionate share of fatalities, particularly post-2000, peaking during IS's territorial caliphate from 2014 to 2019 when they conducted thousands of attacks killing tens of thousands, mostly in Iraq, Syria, and Nigeria. The 2025 Global Terrorism Index notes that IS and affiliates remain the deadliest terrorist entity, causing over 1,000 deaths annually in recent years, with 95% of terrorism deaths outside Afghanistan occurring in conflict zones driven by Islamist insurgencies in the Sahel and elsewhere; this represents a 4% rise in global deaths excluding Afghanistan. While some institutional analyses hesitate to label it "Islamic" to avoid broader stigmatization, perpetrator manifestos and claims of religious authority provide direct evidentiary basis for the classification, distinguishing it from other ideologies.

Distinctions from Other Forms of Terrorism

Islamic terrorism, particularly in its jihadist form, is fundamentally distinguished from secular variants—such as left-wing revolutionary groups (e.g., the or ), right-wing ethno-nationalist movements (e.g., neo-Nazis or white supremacists), or separatist organizations (e.g., IRA or )—by its grounding in a religious imperative that frames violence as a sacred obligation to advance divine will. Perpetrators interpret Islamic texts, including calls to , as mandating offensive warfare against perceived enemies of the faith, including "infidels," apostate regimes, and insufficiently pious Muslims, thereby transcending mere political grievances. This theological absolutism removes moral restraints on targeting civilians, as non-combatants are deemed legitimate if they obstruct God's order, contrasting with secular terrorists who often adhere to some ethical limits or discriminate targets to maintain public sympathy. Jihadist objectives emphasize establishing a supranational governed by law, seeking to overturn secular nation-states and impose a universal Islamic polity, rather than pursuing bounded goals like territorial autonomy or ideological reform within existing systems. Groups like and explicitly articulate this apocalyptic vision, viewing the conflict as a cosmic struggle between dar al-Islam and dar al-harb, which fuels transnational recruitment and operations unbound by geography. In empirical contrast, nationalist terrorism typically ceases upon achieving independence, while left- or right-wing variants focus on domestic societal reconfiguration without eschatological aims. Tactically, jihadist terrorism features disproportionate reliance on suicide bombings, with roughly 98% of such attacks worldwide since the linked to Salafi-jihadist ideologies, driven by promises of martyrdom and paradise that incentivize . Secular groups rarely employ this method, preferring survival to sustain campaigns, as evidenced by the near-exclusivity of suicide tactics to religious extremists post-1979. Global data further reveal jihadist attacks as more lethal per incident than right- or left-wing equivalents, reflecting higher violence thresholds justified by religious sanction. These distinctions manifest in intra-Muslim targeting, where jihadists frequently assail co-religionists for doctrinal deviation—accounting for a significant share of fatalities in conflicts like those in and —unlike ethno-nationalist centered on out-groups or secular ideologies avoiding to preserve unity. While all exploits grievances, the causal primacy of in enables self-radicalization via online fatwas and global networks, differentiating it from grievance-based mobilization in non-religious contexts.

Ideological and Theological Foundations

Scriptural Justifications in Quran and Hadith

Islamist terrorists draw scriptural authority from select verses in the and collections, interpreting them literally as imperatives for violence to establish Islamic supremacy, subdue non-Muslims, and punish or insufficient faith. These texts, considered authentic by Sunni Muslims including Salafi-jihadists, emphasize fighting unbelievers, striking fear through beheadings or terror, and continuing until submission to Islam. Jihadist propagandists, such as those from and , routinely excerpt these without broader context to recruit and rationalize attacks on civilians, contrasting with mainstream scholarly views that limit them to defensive wars or historical specificity. 9:5, dubbed the "" in Surah , declares: "And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they should repent, establish prayer, and give zakah, let them [go] on their way." Jihadists invoke this to endorse offensive strikes against non-Muslims post-truce periods, viewing it as abrogating earlier peaceful verses and mandating conversion or death. Surah 9 overall contains the highest density of references, fueling ideologies of unrelenting conflict against infidels. Quran 9:29 extends this to "" (Jews and ): "Fight those who do not believe in or in the Last Day and who do not consider unlawful what and His Messenger have made unlawful... until they give the jizyah willingly while they are humbled." Groups like cite it to justify subjugation taxes or elimination of resistant minorities, as seen in their 2014 caliphate declarations targeting and others. Verses prescribing graphic violence include Quran 8:12 from Surah Al-Anfal: "I will cast terror into the hearts of those who disbelieved, so strike [them] upon the necks and strike from them every fingertip," and Quran 47:4 from Surah Muhammad: "So when you meet those who disbelieve, strike [their] necks until, when you have inflicted slaughter upon them..." These are brandished in beheading videos by affiliates and to claim divine sanction for terror tactics, equating them to prophetic battles. In , Sahih Bukhari 25 records the Prophet Muhammad stating: "I have been commanded to fight against the people until they testify that none has the right to be worshipped but ... and if they perform that, then they save their lives and property from me except for Islamic laws otherwise." Salafi-jihadists read this as an eternal obligation for offensive to impose globally, overriding no-compulsion claims like Quran 2:256. Another, Sahih Bukhari 2926, prophesies eschatological fighting: "The Hour will not be established until you fight with the ..." fueling antisemitic attacks. Hadiths in Sahih Bukhari's Book of (Volume 4) glorify martyrdom, promising paradise for those killed striving against unbelievers, with rewards like 72 virgins in some variants, motivating bombings as "lesser jihad" equivalents. These primary sources, compiled in the 9th century from earlier traditions, underpin modern fatwas by figures like , who in 1998 cited them to declare war on the U.S. and allies as duty-bound aggressors. While apologists argue historical constraints, jihadists' literalism—rooted in Salafi methodology rejecting contextual abrogation—drives persistent invocation for .

The Doctrine of Jihad and Its Interpretations

Jihad, derived from the Arabic root j-h-d meaning "to strive" or "to exert effort," constitutes a central doctrinal concept in Islam, encompassing various forms of struggle in obedience to Allah. In the Quran, the term appears 41 times, frequently linked to efforts against disbelief and oppression, as in Surah Al-Hajj 22:78, which commands believers to "strive for Allah with the striving due to Him." Primary sources like the Quran and authentic hadith emphasize jihad as both an individual and communal obligation, with martial dimensions prescribed in verses such as Surah Al-Baqarah 2:216: "Fighting has been enjoined upon you while it is hateful to you." Sahih al-Bukhari records the Prophet Muhammad stating, "I have been ordered to fight the people until they testify that there is no deity but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah." Classical Islamic jurisprudence, as articulated in the four Sunni madhhabs (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali), categorizes into defensive and offensive types. Defensive (*jihad al-daf') becomes obligatory (fard 'ayn for individuals or fard kifaya for the community) in response to direct aggression against Muslim lands or persons. Offensive (jihad al-talab or jihad al-ibtidad), by contrast, aims to expand the domain of (dar al-Islam) by subjugating non-Muslim territories, inviting conversion, or enforcing submission via tax, as per 9:29: "Fight those who do not believe in ... from among the until they pay the jizyah willingly while they are humbled." Jurists like and Ibn Taymiyyah upheld offensive as a recurrent duty to propagate , potentially without requiring a caliph's explicit declaration, provided conditions like Muslim superiority in arms were met. The purported distinction between "greater jihad" (spiritual self-struggle) and "lesser jihad" (armed combat), attributed to a where the reportedly called return from battle the shift "from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad," lacks authentication in major collections like or ; scholars classify it as weak (da'if) or fabricated. This narrative, popularized in Sufi and modernist circles to emphasize internal piety, is rejected by Salafi-jihadists who prioritize martial jihad as the pinnacle of faith, citing 9:111 where believers "fight in the cause of , so they kill and are killed." Mainstream contemporary interpretations, influenced by post-colonial contexts, often confine jihad to defensive actions, aligning with nation-state sovereignty and , yet classical texts permit offensive campaigns absent modern constraints. Salafi-jihadist ideology, drawing from medieval revivalists like Ibn Taymiyyah and modern thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb, reinterprets jihad as an eternal, individual obligation to overthrow "apostate" Muslim regimes and combat global infidel powers perceived as occupying Islamic lands. Groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS invoke doctrines of takfir (declaring Muslims apostates) and perpetual enmity (al-wala wal-bara, loyalty to believers and disavowal of others) to justify indiscriminate violence, extending offensive jihad to urban terrorism despite classical prohibitions on harming non-combatants, women, and children unless they actively aid enemies. This interpretation posits the ummah's current weakness as abrogating peace treaties, mandating global confrontation until a caliphate restores sharia supremacy, as articulated in al-Qaeda's foundational fatwas. While academic sources often frame such views as fringe distortions, jihadist exegetes claim fidelity to unadulterated scriptural imperatives, highlighting interpretive divergences rooted in source prioritization over consensus (ijma).

Modern Salafi-Jihadi Ideology

Modern Salafi-jihadism represents a militant variant of Salafism that emerged in the late , emphasizing armed as an individual religious obligation ( ayn) to overthrow apostate Muslim regimes and combat perceived enemies of worldwide, with the ultimate aim of establishing a global governed by strict law. Unlike quietist Salafis, who prioritize personal piety and avoid politics, or political Salafis, who engage in electoral processes, Salafi-jihadis view contemporary Muslim societies as (pre-Islamic ignorance) warranting (declaration of ) against rulers and populations failing to enforce pure (). This ideology frames violent not merely as defensive but as offensive and perpetual until divine sovereignty is restored, venerating martyrdom () as the highest aspiration and deeming non-participation a grave sin. Central to the ideology is a selective, literalist interpretation of Islamic texts, drawing on medieval scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah for justifications of rebellion against unjust rulers, but amplified in modern contexts to legitimize global insurgency. enables the targeting of fellow Muslims, including civilians, as accomplices in kufr (disbelief), while is portrayed as the pinnacle of faith, obligatory on all able-bodied believers regardless of caliphal authority. The doctrine also incorporates hijra (migration to jihad fronts) as a precursor to combat, fostering transnational networks. This framework rejects democratic governance, , and interfaith coexistence as innovations () corrupting Islam, insisting on dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) versus dar al-harb (abode of war) binary. Pivotal thinkers shaped this ideology's crystallization. , an Egyptian Islamist executed in 1966, articulated in his 1964 manifesto Milestones the need for a vanguard (tali'a) to wage against jahili states, influencing thought by equating modern Muslim governments with idolatry. Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian scholar active in the 1980s Afghan against Soviet forces (1979–1989), globalized these ideas by declaring a collective then individual duty, recruiting thousands via fatwas and writings like Join the Caravan, and mentoring . Subsequent figures, including , refined it into a strategy of spectacular attacks to provoke wider conflict, as seen in al-Qaeda's formation in 1988. By the 1990s–2010s, groups like operationalized it through territorial declarations, such as in 2014, enforcing punishments and slavery revivals as emulations of early Islamic conquests. Despite tactical adaptations, the ideology persists in decentralized networks, prioritizing ideological purity over pragmatic alliances.

Historical Development

Pre-Modern Roots in Islamic Expansion

The doctrine of , encompassing armed struggle to expand Islamic dominion, originated in the during the formative conquests that transformed Arabia into a vast caliphate. Following Muhammad's death in 632 CE, Caliph launched the (632–633 CE) to quell apostate tribes, enforcing religious and political unity through military coercion justified as defensive jihad against threats to the nascent . This rapidly evolved into offensive campaigns under Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634–644 CE), targeting the exhausted Byzantine and Sassanid empires; key victories included the Battle of Yarmouk (636 CE), which secured , and the conquest of by 638 CE, extending to Persia's fall by 651 CE. These expansions, framed doctrinally as fard ayn (individual duty) to propagate into dar al-harb (lands of war), relied on tribal Arab forces motivated by promises of booty and martyrdom, subjugating populations numbering in the millions across diverse terrains. While surrenders often spared cities through negotiated status—tax-paying submission for non-Muslims—resistance provoked retributive violence, including sieges and executions, to compel acquiescence and deter future opposition. A paradigmatic pre-conquest instance was the 627 CE judgment against the tribe in , where, after their alleged collusion during the , an arbitrator ruled for the beheading of 600–900 adult males, with women and children enslaved, as under emerging Islamic . Similar harshness marked resistant holds during expansions, such as the subjugation of Persian garrison towns, where holdouts faced slaughter or deportation to consolidate control. These tactics, rooted in Quranic imperatives like Surah 9:29 to fight non-believers until they pay "while they are humbled," instilled terror as a coercive mechanism, embedding precedents of religiously motivated exemplary violence that later jihadist ideologies would invoke to justify targeting civilians for submission. Medieval iterations amplified asymmetric elements akin to terrorism, as seen in the Nizari Ismaili sect's operations from 1090 CE onward. Founded by Hassan-i Sabbah at fortress amid Sunni-Shia rivalries, the "Hashashin" (derogatorily linked to alleged use) deployed operatives for public dagger assassinations of high-profile targets, including Seljuk viziers like (1092 CE) and Crusader figures such as Raymond II of Tripoli (1152 CE). This low-resource strategy maximized psychological impact, paralyzing foes through fear of undetectable strikes and forcing concessions without pitched battles, until Mongol forces razed their strongholds in 1256 CE. Paralleling broader expansionist raids, such as the Seljuks' 1064 CE sack of —yielding uncounted deaths and 30,000 enslaved—these methods perpetuated jihad's logic of dominance via intimidation, providing tactical and motivational archetypes for pre-modern Islamic violence that echoed the initial conquests' fusion of theology and conquest.

20th-Century Precursors and Ideological Shifts

The , founded in on March 22, 1928, by , emerged as a pivotal precursor to modern Islamist militancy by promoting a comprehensive revival of Islamic governance to counter Western secularism and colonial influences. Al-Banna's organization blended social welfare with political activism, establishing a "secret apparatus" for paramilitary activities, including assassinations and attacks on British forces and Egyptian officials during the 1940s. Its foundational motto—" is our objective; the is our law; is our way; dying in the way of is our highest hope"—embedded as a core element, influencing subsequent radical groups despite the Brotherhood's later emphasis on electoral participation. A significant ideological shift occurred through Sayyid Qutb, a Brotherhood intellectual imprisoned after the 1954 assassination attempt on Egyptian President , where he radicalized amid torture and isolation. In his 1964 manifesto Milestones, Qutb reconceptualized modern Muslim societies as —a state of pre-Islamic ignorance—arguing that sovereignty (hakimiyyah) belongs solely to God, thus justifying (declaring fellow Muslims apostates) and offensive by a vanguard minority to overthrow "un-Islamic" regimes. This marked a departure from al-Banna's gradualist reformism toward revolutionary violence, framing apostate rulers and their systems as legitimate targets equivalent to non-believers, a doctrine that diverged from classical Islamic jurisprudence limiting jihad to defensive contexts. Qutb's execution by hanging on August 29, 1966, for alleged conspiracy elevated him to martyr status, amplifying his ideas' dissemination through Brotherhood networks and inspiring offshoots like , which assassinated President in 1981. These shifts prioritized global ideological purity over , laying groundwork for Salafi-jihadism by merging Wahhabi puritanism with activist confrontation, though mainstream Brotherhood leaders post-1970 distanced from overt violence while retaining doctrinal sympathy for jihadist ends.

The Surge After 1979

The year 1979 marked a turning point for Islamic terrorism, coinciding with three pivotal events: the Iranian Revolution, the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Iranian Revolution in February overthrew Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and established an Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, inspiring Islamist movements worldwide and leading to state-sponsored terrorism through entities like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah, which conducted attacks such as the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings killing 241 U.S. personnel and 58 French paratroopers. The Mecca siege from November 20 to 25 by Wahhabi extremists led by Juhayman al-Otaybi challenged the Saudi monarchy's religious legitimacy, resulting in hundreds of deaths and prompting Saudi Arabia to intensify support for transnational jihadist causes to deflect internal radicalism. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 24 galvanized a global jihadist response, with Afghan mujahideen—framed as defensive jihad against infidels—drawing over 35,000 foreign Arab fighters by the war's end in 1989, funded by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United States via Operation Cyclone, which provided $3-20 billion in aid. This conflict served as a training ground and ideological incubator for Salafi-jihadism, with figures like Abdullah Azzam promoting transnational holy war through his Maktab al-Khidamat network, which recruited and radicalized volunteers, laying groundwork for al-Qaeda's formation in 1988 by Osama bin Laden. The Afghan jihad's success in expelling Soviet forces by 1989 validated militant Islamism, exporting battle-hardened fighters and tactics to conflicts in Algeria, Bosnia, and Chechnya, while fostering networks that executed attacks like the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Data from the and related analyses indicate a marked escalation in Islamist-motivated incidents post-, with Islamist terrorist attacks accounting for a growing share of global ; for instance, between and 2024, such attacks numbered over 52,000, causing more than 210,000 deaths, predominantly in Muslim-majority countries, reflecting the shift from localized to ideologically driven global violence. This surge contrasted with pre- patterns dominated by secular nationalist groups, as religious justifications from Quranic interpretations of gained prominence, unmoored from state control and amplified by petrodollar-funded madrasas in that indoctrinated a generation in Wahhabi-Salafi doctrines.

Peak and Global Spread in the 2000s–2010s

The September 11, 2001, attacks orchestrated by al-Qaeda marked a pivotal escalation in the scale and global impact of Islamic terrorism, resulting in 2,977 deaths in the United States from hijacked planes crashing into the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania. This event catalyzed widespread attention to jihadist networks, prompting U.S.-led military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq that inadvertently fueled recruitment and operational expansion for groups like al-Qaeda. Post-9/11, al-Qaeda affiliates proliferated, with attacks such as the 2002 Bali bombings killing 202 people, primarily targeting Western interests to inspire a broader caliphate vision. In the mid-2000s, the Iraq insurgency saw the rise of (AQI) under , which conducted over 1,000 suicide bombings between 2003 and 2006, contributing to tens of thousands of civilian and military deaths amid . This period witnessed the global spread of jihadist tactics, including high-casualty bombings in , such as the 2004 Madrid train attacks (191 killed) and 2005 bombings (52 killed), both linked to al-Qaeda-inspired cells exploiting local . Al-Qaeda formalized regional branches, including (AQAP) in by 2009 and (AQIM) in , extending operations to Africa and while core leadership in directed plots against the West. The 2010s represented the quantitative peak of Islamic terrorism, with global fatalities exceeding 40,000 annually around 2014-2015, driven largely by jihadist groups in , , , , and according to the . The (ISIS), evolving from AQI, declared a in June 2014 across swathes of and , controlling territory the size of Britain and attracting 30,000-40,000 foreign fighters from over 100 countries through sophisticated online . ISIS affiliates emerged globally, including ISIS-West Africa Province (from ) and ISIS-Khorasan in , perpetrating attacks like the 2015 assaults (130 killed) and inspiring lone-actor incidents worldwide, such as the 2016 Orlando nightclub (49 killed). This era's intensity stemmed from territorial control enabling resource generation and training, contrasting al-Qaeda's decentralized model, though both competed for jihadist loyalty. By 2019, while ISIS's core was territorially defeated, its sustained thousands of attacks annually.

Persistence and Evolution Post-2014 to 2025

In 2016, four of the five deadliest perpetrator movements worldwide were Islamist extremist groups, which accounted for 88% of 2,916 attacks and 99% of 14,017 deaths from the top five perpetrators. Following the territorial defeat of the 's self-proclaimed in and by March 2019, the group transitioned to a decentralized model, retaining operational capacity through sleeper cells, provincial affiliates, and online networks. In and alone, the claimed 153 attacks between January and June 2024, putting it on track to exceed prior yearly totals and demonstrating sustained low-level violence despite the loss of urban strongholds like in 2017 and Baghouz in 2019. This evolution emphasized guerrilla tactics, ambushes on security forces, and targeted assassinations, with the group's core leadership repeatedly replenished amid ongoing operations by U.S.-led coalitions and local militias. Globally, the and its affiliates remained the deadliest terrorist entity in 2024, responsible for 1,805 deaths across 22 countries, underscoring a shift from territorial control to inspirational and networked violence. In , Islamic State affiliates drove a surge in jihadist activity, transforming the into the epicenter of global by 2024, where attacks accounted for over half of worldwide terrorism fatalities. Groups such as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and (ISWAP) conducted hundreds of operations annually, with ISWAP alone launching 240 attacks in , , and in recent years, exploiting governance vacuums, ethnic tensions, and military withdrawals by Western forces. In the Democratic Republic of Congo and , and its offshoots targeted civilians and state forces, contributing to thousands of displacements and deaths; for instance, recorded nearly 2,000 terrorism killings in 2023 from 258 incidents. This persistence reflected adaptive strategies, including alliances with local militias and funding from extortion and smuggling, amid regional shifts like juntas aligning with over traditional partners. affiliates, such as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in the , paralleled this growth, blending ideological purity with pragmatic local insurgencies. In , the 's 2021 recapture of enabled a partial resurgence of networks under their protection, though internal stability limited overt transnational plotting; U.S. assessments noted al-Qaeda's reconstitution with training camps and propaganda output, raising concerns of Afghanistan reverting to a launchpad for external operations. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) emerged as a rival, conducting high-profile attacks like the 2021 Kabul airport bombing killing 13 U.S. service members and 170 Afghans, while clashing with Taliban forces. Globally, jihadist trends post-2014 showed a 4% rise in deaths outside Afghanistan by 2024, fueled by lone-actor inspirations via digital platforms and affiliates' autonomy from central commands. The October 7, 2023, assault on , which killed 1,195 people and took 251 hostages, exemplified intertwined Islamist motivations blending jihadist ideology with territorial grievances, inspiring copycat attacks and escalating involvement by through cross-border rocket barrages starting October 8, 2023. These actions, framed by perpetrators as defensive , highlighted the doctrinal continuity of offensive operations against perceived enemies of , even as maintained ties to broader Sunni networks. In the West, jihadist threats evolved toward inspired lone-wolf incidents, with 140 U.S. plots or attacks recorded from 1994 to early 2025, often radicalized online rather than via direct organizational direction. Overall, post-2014 adaptations—, regional , and digital resilience—ensured jihadist groups' endurance, with Africa's theaters surpassing Middle Eastern hotspots in lethality by 2025.

Perpetrator Motivations and Profiles

Dominant Religious and Theological Drivers


Perpetrators of Islamic terrorism are predominantly motivated by Salafi-jihadist ideology, a theological framework that derives violent imperatives directly from literalist interpretations of the and , framing terrorism as a religious to purify , overthrow apostate regimes, and subjugate non-believers under law. This ideology emphasizes tawhid (absolute monotheism) and rejects , , and secular governance as shirk (), obligating believers to wage to restore the modeled on the Prophet Muhammad's early community. Empirical analyses of jihadist manifestos, recruitment materials, and interrogations reveal that self-identified religious conviction—rooted in these doctrines—overrides secondary factors like politics or in driving and attacks.
The doctrine of jihad constitutes the core driver, interpreted as an individual obligation (fard ayn) for offensive warfare to expand dar al-Islam (house of Islam) and combat perceived crusaders, Zionists, and apostates, rather than solely defensive struggle. Salafi-jihadists cite Quranic verses such as Surah 9:5 ("slay the idolaters wherever you find them") and Surah 9:29 ("fight those who believe not in Allah... until they pay the jizyah with willing submission") to justify indiscriminate violence against civilians in non-Muslim lands and Muslim "hypocrites" (munafiqun). These texts, selectively emphasized while ignoring pacifist verses, are propagated in fatwas and propaganda like al-Qaeda's Inspire magazine and ISIS's Dabiq, portraying attacks as emulation of the Prophet's military campaigns. Hadith collections, including Sahih Bukhari (Volume 4, Book 52, Hadith 177), which states "I have been ordered to fight the people till they say: 'None has the right to be worshipped but Allah,'" reinforce jihad as the pinnacle of faith, extended by ideologues like Ibn Taymiyyah to perpetual conflict. Takfir, the excommunication of Muslims for deviations like supporting Western alliances or failing to enforce punishments, further fuels intra-ummah violence, enabling groups like to target Shia, Sufis, and moderate Sunnis as legitimate enemies. This doctrine, drawn from medieval jurists and amplified by modern thinkers like , transforms political disagreements into theological mandates for killing, as evidenced in the 2014–2017 and bombings of mosques. The allure of martyrdom (shahada) incentivizes suicide operations, with perpetrators assured of paradise's rewards—72 virgins and intercession for 70 relatives—based on such as Sunan al-Tirmidhi's promise of divine favor for those dying in Allah's path. Studies of foreign fighters in and confirm that eschatological beliefs in apocalyptic battles, tied to on the and black flags from , propel participation in high-casualty tactics.

Secondary Grievances: Politics, Economics, and Psychology

While jihadist perpetrators primarily cite theological imperatives rooted in interpretations of Islamic doctrine, secondary political grievances often frame Western foreign policies—such as military interventions in (2003) and (2001), or support for —as humiliations warranting retaliation, though empirical analyses indicate these serve more as ideological justifications than direct causes of violence, with attacks rarely altering targeted policies. For instance, Al-Qaeda's 1998 explicitly invoked U.S. presence in and backing of as , yet post-9/11 U.S. withdrawals from certain bases did not diminish subsequent attacks, suggesting political rhetoric amplifies rather than originates the drive for global . Studies of convicted jihadists reveal co-occurring motivations including resentment toward secular Muslim regimes perceived as apostate, but these political framings consistently subordinate to Salafi-jihadist eschatology aiming for restoration over pragmatic state concessions. Economically, jihadist profiles defy assumptions of deprivation-fueled ; data from profiles of over 400 European jihadists arrested between 1993 and 2005 showed most held jobs or were students, with higher-than-average levels, including attendance among 20-30% in some cohorts. Cross-country econometric models confirm that while aggregate correlates with reduced incidence—e.g., a 1% GDP increase linked to fewer attacks—individual perpetrators hail disproportionately from middle-class or urban backgrounds, as seen in the 9/11 operatives (many engineers or professionals from stable families) and foreign fighters, where rates mirrored or undercut regional norms. theories falter empirically, as foreign fighter flows from peaked amid welfare states' relative prosperity, underscoring ideology's role in exploiting economic frustrations without them being necessary preconditions. Psychologically, involves social identity shifts and over innate ; meta-reviews find no elevated rates of mental illness among jihadists compared to general populations, with only 5-10% exhibiting disorders like or antisocial traits in forensic samples. Instead, processes like resolution—e.g., reconciling personal failures with narratives of divine purpose—emerge in interviews with former Swedish jihadists, where initial thrill-seeking or peer bonding evolves into commitment via sunk-cost escalation. from or cultural alienation affects second-generation migrants, yet longitudinal studies of homegrown cases attribute persistence to ideological in echo chambers, not isolated trauma; for example, behavioral analyses of U.S. Salafi-jihadists highlight "trigger events" like online amplifying latent grievances into action, but absent doctrinal appeal, these yield desistance rates over 80% in monitored cohorts.

Demographic and Socio-Psychological Characteristics

Perpetrators of Islamic terrorism are overwhelmingly male, with studies of Western foreign fighters joining groups like estimating 83% male and 17% female participants. Globally, jihadist attackers exhibit similar gender imbalances, as suicide bombers and operational leaders in organizations such as and have been nearly exclusively male in documented cases from the 1980s through the 2010s. Age profiles cluster among young adults, typically 18-35 years old; for instance, analyses of 132 Muslim extremists linked to global jihadist networks found most aged 18-38, while Western recruits averaged 26 for men and 21 for women. This youth skew aligns with recruitment patterns emphasizing for and ideological fervor, as seen in foreign fighter flows to and peaking among those under 30 from 2011-2015. Ethnically and religiously, perpetrators are predominantly Sunni Muslims from majority-Muslim countries or diasporas, including second- and third-generation immigrants in and ; converts represent a minority, often under 10% in Western cohorts. Education levels exceed population averages in many datasets: 71% of sampled jihadists had some college education, with 43% in professional occupations, contradicting narratives of universal deprivation. Socioeconomic status varies regionally—lower in European samples with high (e.g., 71% from deprived areas in one Swedish study)—but globally, attackers like those in operations came from middle- or upper-income brackets relative to peers. Criminal histories appear elevated in (e.g., 64% of Dutch fighters had priors) but lower in , suggesting contextual rather than inherent criminality. Socio-psychologically, no singular "terrorist personality" exists, with empirical reviews finding jihadists psychologically normal within their cultural norms and lacking widespread mental illness—prevalence of disorders matches or falls below general populations. often proceeds through social networks and peer bonds, with 66% of Salafi jihadists joining via collective group processes rather than isolated . Common drivers include perceived grievances like political or identity crises, fused with religious absolutism that justifies without remorse, as evidenced in interviews with captured extremists. Unlike psychopathic profiles, many exhibit dedication and enabled by ideological framing of actions as divine duty, with heterogeneity across roles (e.g., leaders showing rigidity, followers conformity).

Operational Tactics and Strategies

Suicide Attacks and High-Impact Violence

Suicide attacks in Islamist terrorism typically involve perpetrators equipped with vests, belts, or vehicle-borne improvised devices (VBIEDs) who detonate upon reaching a target, ensuring their own death to maximize lethality and terror. This tactic combines low operational costs—often under $1,000 per attack—with high psychological impact due to its apparent disregard for the attacker's life, fostering a of divine martyrdom that recruits ideologically motivated individuals. Groups such as , , and have refined these methods to target civilians, military personnel, and symbolic sites, achieving disproportionate casualties relative to resources expended. The tactic's adoption by Islamist militants traces to Shia groups in during the 1980s, influenced by Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution and its export of revolutionary zeal. On April 18, 1983, a suicide truck bombing targeted the U.S. Embassy in , killing 63 people, including 17 ; this was followed on October 23, 1983, by coordinated VBIED attacks on U.S. Marine and French , killing 241 U.S. servicemen and 58 French paratroopers. These operations, attributed to precursors like under Iranian guidance, marked early large-scale use of suicidal missions against Western forces. Sunni jihadists initially resisted the tactic due to theological qualms over suicide prohibition in classical but embraced it in the 1990s amid the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. pioneered its use against Israeli civilians with the April 6, 1994, Afula bus bombing, killing eight; during the Second Intifada (2000–2005), Palestinian groups including and executed over 130 such attacks, killing more than 500 Israelis. High-impact variants escalated with Al-Qaeda's globalization of the method, culminating in the September 11, 2001, attacks where 19 hijackers crashed commercial airliners into the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and a Pennsylvania field, killing 2,977 people in coordinated suicide missions. Earlier, Al-Qaeda's October 12, 2000, suicide boat bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen killed 17 U.S. sailors. Post-2003 Iraq invasion, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, industrialized suicide bombings, conducting hundreds annually—often using foreign fighters—to target Shiite civilians and security forces, contributing to sectarian carnage exceeding 10,000 deaths yearly at peak. This model influenced ISIS, which from 2014 deployed suicide attackers in urban battles for Mosul and Raqqa, and abroad in operations like the November 13, 2015, Paris attacks (130 killed via coordinated shootings and suicide vests) and the March 22, 2016, Brussels bombings (32 killed). Empirical data underscores the tactic's dominance in Islamist violence: the University of Chicago's CPOST Database on Suicide Attacks records over 5,700 global incidents from 1982 to 2019, with Islamist groups perpetrating the majority post-2000, inflicting tens of thousands of casualties. In , and ISIS-K affiliates conducted 1,000+ suicide attacks from 2007–2021, per U.S. government assessments, often in VBIED form against military convoys. High-impact evolutions include vehicle-ramming-suicides, as in the July 14, 2016, Nice attack (86 killed by ISIS-inspired perpetrator) and October 7, 2023, incursions combining suicide tactics with mass infiltration. Despite countermeasure adaptations like barriers and intelligence, the tactic persists in hotspots like , , and regions, where groups like and JNIM deploy child bombers for deniability and surprise.
PeriodKey ExamplesCasualties (Killed)Group
1983Beirut barracks bombings299 (241 U.S., 58 French)Hezbollah precursors
1994–2005Palestinian suicide campaign>500 , PIJ
20012,977
2003–2010 suicide bombings peak>10,000 annually at heightAQI
2014–2019 global operationsThousands (e.g., 130 )
Counterterrorism responses, including perimeter hardening and drone surveillance, have reduced success rates in the West but shifted emphasis to "martyrdom operations" in ungoverned spaces, sustaining the tactic's utility for asymmetric warfare.

Kidnappings, Executions, and Hostage Tactics

Islamist terrorist groups frequently employ kidnappings to generate revenue through ransoms, facilitate prisoner exchanges, and exert psychological pressure on adversaries, with jihadist entities responsible for the abduction of numerous Westerners since the early 2000s. A 2015 analysis identified 36 jihadist groups involved in such kidnappings, attributing nearly 70 percent of Western hostage cases to precursors of the Islamic State, al-Qaeda in Iraq, or the Taliban. Al-Qaeda affiliates, including Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen and groups in the Sahel, have sustained operations via kidnapping-for-ransom schemes, prompting European governments to pay tens of millions in ransoms between 2008 and 2013, thereby funding further attacks. In Nigeria, Boko Haram's April 14, 2014, abduction of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok exemplifies mass kidnappings targeting civilians to deter education and enforce ideological control, with 82 girls remaining in captivity as of April 2024 despite partial releases through negotiations and escapes. Executions, often public and filmed for dissemination, serve to intimidate populations, recruit sympathizers, and signal ideological purity, with beheading emerging as a distinctive method among Sunni jihadists since the . The (ISIS) popularized ritualistic beheadings of hostages, producing videos of at least a dozen Western captives killed between 2014 and 2015, including American journalists James Foley on August 19, 2014, and shortly thereafter, to coerce policy concessions and amplify global reach via online . These acts drew from Salafi-jihadist interpretations of Islamic permitting execution of enemies, but ISIS scaled them for media impact, subjecting captives to mock executions and beforehand to extract confessions or break resistance. In alone, ISIS militants admitted roles in the deaths of four American hostages through such methods between 2013 and 2014, contributing to broader patterns where beheadings accounted for a significant portion of the group's documented killings of prisoners. Hostage-taking extends beyond isolated abductions into prolonged sieges or coordinated operations to paralyze governments and extract territorial or political gains, often combining detention with threats of execution. On October 7, 2023, militants seized approximately 250 hostages during attacks in southern , using them as bargaining chips for prisoner releases and ceasefires amid ongoing conflict, with over 100 still held or unaccounted for as of late 2024 despite mediated exchanges. In regions like the , al-Qaeda-linked groups such as have shifted kidnappings from pure ransom motives toward territorial expansion, detaining locals and foreigners to control populations and disrupt state authority. These tactics exploit no-concession policies of governments like the , which refuse ransoms, leading to higher execution rates in some cases, while contrasting with approaches yielding financial inflows elsewhere.

Propaganda, Recruitment, and Cyber Operations

Islamic terrorist groups disseminate propaganda through multimedia channels that glorify violence as a religious imperative, selectively invoking Quranic verses and hadiths to frame attacks as defensive jihad or paths to martyrdom. The Islamic State (ISIS) emphasized themes of urgency amid perceived Sunni persecution, individual agency in striking enemies, authentic extremism, and narratives of inevitable victory, producing polished videos like the 62-minute "Clanging of the Swords, Part Four" in spring 2014, which foreshadowed the group's capture of Mosul on June 10, 2014. Al-Qaeda affiliates countered with publications such as Inspire magazine, launched by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in July 2010, which provided operational guides for "lone jihad" attacks and ideological primers, contributing to self-radicalization cases including the Tsarnaev brothers' Boston Marathon bombing on April 15, 2013. These materials often feature nasheeds (acapella chants) and testimonials to evoke emotional resonance, with ISIS evolving from Iraq-focused content pre-2013 to global appeals in multiple languages post-caliphate declaration. Recruitment strategies target demographics prone to alienation, including young Muslim men in Western communities, leveraging personal networks, prisons, and online echo chambers to foster gradual . , in particular, recruited over 30,000 foreign fighters from at least 85 countries by December 2015, using tailored messaging like the June 2014 video "There is No Life Without ," which showcased British and Australian recruits urging Western Muslims to join. amplified this, with coordinating via approximately 60,000 accounts by September 2014 and running hashtag campaigns involving 3,000 users in summer 2014 to build virtual communities and solicit pledges of allegiance. emphasized selective vetting for ideological purity, but post-2009 shifted toward inspiring remote attacks through digital , attracting U.S.-born converts and younger profiles (average age 26.7 years for cases versus 30.5 for ). Empirical data from U.S. cases show 476 individuals linked to Islamist foreign terrorist organizations since 9/11, with dominating post-2014 (150 conspirators versus 9 for core), often via decentralized appeals to adventure, empowerment, and anti-Western grievances rather than structured cells. Cyber operations by these groups prioritize over disruptive hacking, focusing on resilient dissemination amid platform crackdowns. ISIS orchestrated through and coordinated bot-like amplification on before 2014 territorial peaks, while promoted encrypted tools in Inspire for operational anonymity. Offensive cyber efforts remain rudimentary, with rare instances like attempted DDoS attacks by sympathizers or low-level website defacements, but jihadist hackers pose risks through insider threats or social engineering rather than advanced persistent threats. Adaptation includes migration to Telegram and forums post-2015 bans, enabling persistent recruitment; for instance, post-caliphate ISIS cells used for plotting, sustaining low-level threats into 2025 despite territorial losses. These tactics exploit dual-use affordances, blending with veiled calls to action, though counter-efforts like content removal have reduced visibility without eradicating underlying networks.

Key Organizations and Networks

Core Sunni Jihadi Entities

Al-Qa'ida (AQ), founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden amid the Soviet-Afghan War, emerged as a vanguard of transnational Sunni jihadism, emphasizing the establishment of a global caliphate through armed struggle against perceived enemies of Islam, including Western powers and apostate regimes. Its Salafi-jihadist doctrine, articulated in bin Laden's 1996 and 1998 fatwas, prioritizes attacking the "far enemy" (e.g., the United States) to weaken support for local tyrants, as demonstrated by the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (killing 224) and the USS Cole attack in 2000 (killing 17 sailors). AQ's peak notoriety came with the September 11, 2001, attacks, which killed 2,977 people using hijacked aircraft against U.S. targets, prompting global counterterrorism operations that degraded its central leadership—bin Laden was killed in 2011, and successor Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2022. By design, AQ maintains a decentralized structure, relying on core operatives for strategic direction while empowering semi-autonomous affiliates like Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP, active since 2009, responsible for the 2009 Christmas Day bomb plot) and Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, evolved from 2002 roots, linked to over 100 kidnappings for ransom). As of 2025, AQ's influence persists through ideological inspiration and regional branches, though its operational capacity remains constrained by sustained U.S. drone strikes and partner forces, with an estimated 400-600 core fighters in Afghanistan-Pakistan. The (IS, also or ISIL), tracing origins to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's in 2004 during the insurgency, represents a rival strain of Sunni that broke from AQ in 2013 over tactical and theological disputes, declaring a in June 2014 under (killed 2019) across swathes of and . IS's ideology amplifies extremism, justifying mass killings of Shia Muslims, , and other minorities as apostates, with documented atrocities including the 2014 Sinjar genocide (killing or enslaving thousands of ) and beheadings publicized via propaganda videos to recruit globally—peaking at 30,000-40,000 foreign fighters by 2015. Unlike AQ's phased approach, IS pursued immediate territorial control and apocalyptic , enforcing brutal via institutions like religious police and a proto-state from oil sales (up to $50 million monthly at height). coalitions dismantled its by March 2019, reducing held territory to near zero, but IS endures through 20+ provinces (wilayats), such as (ISIS-K, formed 2015, perpetrator of the 2021 Kabul airport bombing killing 13 U.S. troops and 170 Afghans) and (linked to 2,500 deaths in 2023). In 2025, IS's core in - numbers 2,000-3,000 fighters, shifting to insurgent tactics and inspiring attacks like the March 2024 concert hall assault (140 killed), amid warnings of resurgence exploiting regional instability. These entities, while ideologically aligned in Salafi-jihadism's call for perpetual () against non-Muslims and insufficiently pious Muslims, diverge in strategy—AQ favoring infiltration and long-term subversion versus IS's overt brutality and state-building—yet both draw from Wahhabi-influenced texts like Sayyid Qutb's Milestones and Ibn Taymiyyah's fatwas on rebellion. Affiliates like Al-Shabaab (, 2008 designation, controls rural areas with 7,000-12,000 fighters) and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, 2007 formation, 6,000-7,000 members as of 2024) extend their reach, often pledging (allegiance) while adapting locally, contributing to over 80% of global jihadist attacks in 2023 per U.S. assessments. U.S. designations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations since 1999 (AQ) and 2004 (IS precursors) underscore their threat, with sanctions disrupting financing but not eradicating ideological appeal among disaffected Sunni populations.

Shia Islamist Militant Groups

Shia Islamist militant groups, often backed by , conduct terrorism as part of proxy warfare to expand Tehran's regional influence, targeting adversaries such as , the , and Sunni-led governments, while prioritizing defense of Shia holy sites and populations over global ideological conquest. These entities differ from Sunni counterparts by relying more on state sponsorship, exhibiting lower suicide bombing rates, and focusing on sustained guerrilla operations rather than indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks. 's () [Quds Force](/page/Quds Force) provides funding, training, and weaponry to these groups, enabling coordinated operations across the . Hezbollah, established in 1982 amid Lebanon's with Iranian Revolutionary Guard assistance, emerged as a potent Shia militant force opposing Israeli occupation and Western influence. The group orchestrated the October 1983 , killing 241 American and 58 French peacekeepers, and the 1994 in that claimed 85 lives. has since evolved into a hybrid political-military entity, maintaining an arsenal estimated at 150,000 rockets by 2023 and engaging in cross-border attacks against , including the . Designated a foreign terrorist organization by the in 1997, the for its military wing in 2013, and numerous other states, continues global operations, including plots in Europe and . In , the Houthi movement, or Ansar —a Zaydi Shia group—seized in September 2014, overthrowing the internationally recognized government and establishing control over significant territory. Backed by Iranian arms and advisors, the Houthis have launched ballistic missiles and drones at since 2015, escalating to attacks on international shipping in the starting November 2023, disrupting global trade and prompting U.S. and allied naval responses. The designated Ansar Allah a in January 2024 and initiated Foreign Terrorist Organization proceedings in 2025 under Executive Order 14175, citing threats to navigation and alliances. Iranian-aligned Shia militias in Iraq, formalized under the (PMF) after 2014's fight against , include groups like (founded 2007), , and . These entities employed explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) against U.S. forces during the , causing hundreds of deaths, and resumed drone and rocket attacks on American bases post-October 2023, totaling over 170 incidents by mid-2024. The U.S. has designated multiple such groups as terrorist organizations since 2009, including Kata'ib Imam Ali in June 2025, despite their integration into Iraq's state security apparatus. In , recruits Shia foreign fighters through brigades like (Afghan recruits, formed 2014) and Liwa Zainabiyoun (Pakistani recruits), deploying over 20,000 personnel to bolster Bashar al-Assad's regime since 2012. These units have participated in urban combat, sieges, and reported atrocities in and , with U.S. designations as terrorist groups in 2019. Smaller outfits, such as Bahrain's Saraya al-Ashtar Brigades, conduct bombings and assassinations against the Sunni monarchy, with Iranian support evident in seized weaponry. Overall, these groups' actions, coordinated via Iran's axis of resistance, have resulted in thousands of casualties and heightened sectarian tensions across the region.

Regional and Affiliate Branches

Al-Qaeda's regional affiliates adapt its global salafi-jihadi ideology to local insurgencies, often prioritizing anti-Western attacks alongside territorial control in unstable regions. (AQAP), formed in January 2009 through the merger of al-Qaeda's i and Saudi branches, operates primarily in and has attempted high-profile external operations against the and its allies. has led AQAP since February 2020, following the U.S. drone strike that killed his predecessor . AQAP has exploited Yemen's to expand influence, including ramping up anti-Western amid the Israel-Hamas conflict as of May 2024. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), established as an affiliate, focuses on and the , where it engages in kidnappings, , and attacks on local forces to impose governance. AQIM's activities have evolved into a persistent threat, contributing to the growth of jihadist networks in the amid state fragility as of September 2025. Elements of AQIM merged into Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) in 2017, which maintains allegiance to and conducts operations across , , and . Al-Shabaab, Somalia's al-Qaeda affiliate since its 2012 pledge of allegiance, remains one of the network's most resilient branches, controlling rural territories and launching attacks in . As of May 2025, Al-Shabaab has demonstrated continued operational capacity despite counterterrorism pressures, including territorial gains in central . It enforces strict ideological control to prevent defections to and sustains funding through extortion and foreign fighter networks allied with al-Qaeda. The Islamic State's (ISIS) affiliate branches, designated as "provinces," extend its ambitions through decentralized insurgencies, with heightened activity in 2024 resulting in 1,805 deaths across 22 countries. , active in , , and , conducted mass-casualty attacks including the March 2024 Crocus City Hall assault in that killed over 140 people. ISIS-K has targeted regional adversaries like the and inspired lone-actor plots abroad, maintaining transnational reach despite leadership losses. ISIS-West Africa Province (ISIS-WA), evolved from a Boko Haram splinter in 2016, controls territory in northeastern and the Basin, displacing thousands and killing civilians in ambushes and bombings. As one of ISIS's most lethal branches in , ISIS-WA engages the formal financial sector for funding while clashing with rivals and government forces. In the , ISIS's Greater Sahara branch operates in , , and , originally linked to al-Qaeda groups before shifting allegiance. These provinces sustain ISIS's global threat through local governance experiments and opportunistic alliances, even as core territories in and diminish.

Terrorist Financing

Jihadist organizations rely on a mix of licit and illicit funding streams to sustain operations, adapting to sanctions through informal networks and digital innovation. Primary methods include exploitation of charities, online appeals, and alternative transfer systems, as identified in U.S. Treasury and FATF assessments.

Charitable Fronts and Sham Organizations

Groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS have diverted funds from ostensibly humanitarian charities, using them as fronts to collect donations from sympathizers. These sham entities, often registered in Europe or the Gulf, channel resources to training camps or weapons procurement, with U.S. designations exposing networks supporting AQ in conflict zones.

Online and Digital Fundraising

Crowdfunding platforms and social media enable small-scale "financial jihad" donations, disguised as aid campaigns. ISIS and AQ affiliates exploit Telegram and similar channels for global solicitation, raising funds for propaganda or fighters; FATF notes vulnerabilities in peer-to-peer transfers and cryptocurrencies.

Hawala and Similar Transfer Systems

Hawala networks facilitate anonymous remittances, preferred by jihadists for bypassing regulated finance. Al-Qaeda and ISIS use these trust-based systems for diaspora funding and illicit proceeds transfers, particularly in South Asia and the Middle East, due to their speed and lack of paper trails.

State and Regional Involvement

Authoritative reports document state sponsorship for aligned groups, such as Iran's support for Shia militias, alongside private regional donors aiding Sunni networks; international efforts have reduced overt flows, but gaps in oversight persist.

Empirical Impact and Data

From to April 2024, Islamist terrorist attacks worldwide numbered at least 66,872, resulting in a minimum of 249,941 fatalities, with the vast majority—88.9% of attacks and fatalities—occurring in Muslim-majority countries, which comprise about 25% of the global population. This concentration indicates significantly higher per capita rates of Islamist terrorism in Muslim-majority countries compared to non-Muslim-majority regions like the US and Europe during 2020-2025. These figures, compiled by the Fondation pour l'innovation politique (Fondapol), emphasize the concentration of violence in regions like , , and the , where groups such as Al-Shabaab (responsible for 9,327 deaths) and the have inflicted disproportionate casualties. Casualty trends exhibit a marked escalation following the September 11, 2001, attacks, with annual deaths surging into the tens of thousands during the Islamic State's territorial peak from 2014 to 2017, particularly in and , where bombings, executions, and territorial conquests drove fatalities to historic highs. Global deaths from terrorism, predominantly Islamist-driven, reached approximately 44,000 in 2014 alone before declining sharply after the dismantling of the by 2019, reflecting successful military coalitions against core territories. This post-2017 reduction was accompanied by a geographic shift, with declining fatalities in the offset by rising insurgencies in and under Taliban resurgence. In recent years, Islamist terrorism casualties have shown renewed upward momentum outside traditional hotspots, with the Sahel region accounting for over half of global terrorism deaths in 2024, driven by affiliates of and exploiting state fragility in and neighboring states. branches caused 1,805 deaths across 22 countries that year, underscoring persistent lethality despite territorial losses. Outside , where deaths fell 9% amid the Taliban's state consolidation, terrorism fatalities rose 4% globally in the same period, signaling adaptation by jihadist networks to decentralized operations amid waning international focus.

Geographic Distribution and Hotspots

The geographic distribution of Islamic terrorism reveals a heavy concentration in Muslim-majority regions plagued by governance failures, ethnic conflicts, and ideological mobilization, with over 95% of attacks and fatalities occurring in the , , , and between 2020 and 2024. This pattern aligns with the operational bases of major jihadist networks, which exploit porous borders, ungoverned spaces, and local grievances to establish footholds, rather than evenly dispersing globally, resulting in significantly lower per capita rates in non-Muslim-majority regions like the US and Europe. While sporadic attacks occur in the West—often lone-actor operations inspired by online —such incidents remain rare, with few completed attacks (e.g., the 2020 Vienna shooting and the 2025 New Orleans truck attack) yielding negligible per capita impacts compared to concentrated violence in countries like Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria; the empirical epicenters remain in conflict zones where groups like (IS) affiliates and branches sustain high-volume insurgencies. The of stands as the preeminent hotspot, responsible for over 50% of worldwide deaths in 2024, fueled by the rapid expansion of Sunni jihadist groups amid military coups and French withdrawal. epitomizes this surge, with jihadists linked to IS and JNIM (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) perpetrating 258 incidents that killed nearly 2,000 people in 2023 alone, comprising about 25% of global totals and displacing over 2 million. Adjacent nations like and have similarly deteriorated, with JNIM and IS-Sahel conducting ambushes on convoys and villages, exploiting ethnic divides between Fulani herders and sedentary farmers; attacks rose 35% year-over-year in the tri-border area by 2024. Violence has spilled southward toward coastal states like and , threatening Atlantic trade routes as insurgents adapt to drone strikes by decentralizing into rural cells. Elsewhere in , Somalia hosts persistent al-Shabaab operations, with the group launching over 1,000 attacks annually since 2020, primarily suicide bombings and raids targeting and bases, resulting in 1,000-2,000 deaths yearly. In Nigeria's northeast, and its IS-loyal splinter ISWAP have sustained a decade-long , killing over 3,000 civilians in 2022-2023 through kidnappings and market bombings, though fatalities dipped slightly post-2023 due to internal fractures and Nigerian offensives. The features residual IS activity in and , where low-intensity guerrilla tactics—such as vehicle-borne IEDs—claimed 500+ lives in 2024 across desert hideouts, alongside Shia militant actions like Houthi drone strikes on Saudi infrastructure and shipping in the , designated as terrorism by the U.S. Yemen remains a dual hotspot for (AQAP) ambushes and Houthi campaigns, exacerbating and displacement. In South Asia, Afghanistan under Taliban rule has seen IS-Khorasan (ISKP) emerge as a rival, orchestrating high-profile bombings like the 2021 Kabul airport attack (170+ killed) and targeting Shia minorities, with 2024 incidents spilling into Pakistan via Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) cross-border raids that killed over 800 security personnel. Pakistan's northwest tribal areas recorded a TTP resurgence post-2021, with suicide attacks doubling to 150+ annually by 2024. These hotspots collectively drove an 11% rise in jihadist fatalities in 2024, per data from the four deadliest groups (IS, ISKP, al-Shabaab, JNIM), underscoring how affiliates adapt to counterterrorism by franchising in peripheral zones.
Top Hotspots (2024 Data)Primary GroupsEst. Terrorism Deaths
(Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger)IS-Sahel, JNIM>5,000 (regional total)
al-Shabaab1,000+
, ISWAP500+
/ISKP, TTP1,200+
//IS remnants, Houthis, AQAP800+

Broader Societal and Economic Consequences

Islamic terrorism has inflicted substantial economic damage in regions under direct threat, particularly through territorial control and infrastructure destruction by groups like . In and , ISIS governance from 2014 to 2017 resulted in severe local economic contraction, including electricity shortages, reduced agricultural output, and massive displacement of populations, with output losses estimated at 10-20% of GDP in affected areas due to disrupted trade, oil production, and . The group's activities also accelerated refugee flows exceeding 5 million from alone by 2017, straining host economies in neighboring countries like and with costs for shelter, healthcare, and lost remittances totaling billions annually. Globally, the indirect costs manifest in elevated expenditures and sectoral disruptions. The has allocated roughly $2.8 trillion to efforts since 2001, primarily in response to al-Qaeda's 9/11 attacks and subsequent threats, encompassing military operations, intelligence, and homeland security enhancements. In , Islamist attacks have depressed , a key economic driver; for instance, studies of post-2015 incidents in , , and show declines in international arrivals by 5-15% in the year following major events, translating to revenue losses of €1-2 billion per country due to among visitors. These effects compound through reduced foreign investment and insurance premiums in high-risk zones, with broader opportunity costs from diverted public spending away from and . Societally, Islamist terrorism fosters polarization and shifts in public attitudes, amplifying divisions along ideological and cultural lines. Empirical analyses indicate that such attacks intensify affective polarization by reinforcing preexisting partisan leanings and elevating divisive issues like and , as observed in European contexts post-2015 attacks. Proximity to incidents correlates with heightened anti- sentiment, with surveys showing increased opposition to Muslim inflows by 5-10 percentage points in affected countries, influencing policy toward stricter border controls and asylum restrictions. This dynamic erodes social cohesion, elevates negative emotions like fear and anger across populations, and prompts behavioral changes such as avoidance of public spaces, while contributing to stigmatization of Muslim communities and debates over integration. Over time, persistent threats undermine trust in institutions and democratic norms, as evidenced by rising support for authoritarian measures in polls from and the following repeated attacks.

Counterterrorism Measures and Outcomes

Military Interventions and Kinetic Operations

The launched on October 7, 2001, in response to the , employing airstrikes, raids, and ground operations to target leadership and dismantle safe havens in . Coalition partners, including the and , contributed troops, leading to the 's ouster from major cities by December 2001 and the disruption of 's central command structure. U.S. military fatalities in the operation reached 2,459 by August 2021, with estimates of 25,000 to 40,000 and fighters killed through kinetic engagements. In March 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced with a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, justified in part by intelligence on Saddam Hussein's alleged ties to terrorist networks and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Ground forces, supported by precision , captured within weeks and eliminated the Ba'athist regime, but the ensuing insurgency, including the emergence of under , inflicted over 4,400 U.S. fatalities by 2011. Kinetic operations, such as the 2006 killing of Zarqawi via U.S. , temporarily degraded the group, though doctrinal motivations persisted amid . Parallel to conventional invasions, the U.S. expanded targeted killings via strikes under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, conducting over 400 in alone by 2016, primarily against and remnants. These operations eliminated key figures, including in a May 2011 SEAL raid in , , and disrupted operational planning as evidenced by captured documents showing leadership flight and hesitation. Effectiveness analyses indicate short-term degradation of command hierarchies but mixed long-term results, with civilian casualties—estimated at 2-4% of targets in some assessments—potentially aiding recruitment despite precision improvements. The rise of the prompted in June 2014, uniting a 89-member Global Coalition for airstrikes, , and support to Iraqi and Kurdish forces in and . Coalition kinetic actions, including over 30,000 airstrikes by 2019, enabled the recapture of in July 2017 and in October 2017, culminating in the territorial collapse of the caliphate by March 2019. U.S. losses remained low at under 100 fatalities, with partnered forces bearing primary ground risks, though remnants adapted via guerrilla tactics, sustaining low-level attacks post-defeat. Beyond U.S.-centric efforts, regional interventions included France's in the from 2014 to 2022, targeting affiliates and branches through raids and airstrikes that neutralized over 1,000 jihadists but faced logistical challenges and local backlash. Collectively, these operations inflicted substantial attrition on terrorist networks—killing or capturing tens of thousands of fighters—but failed to eradicate ideological drivers, as evidenced by resurgent affiliates in post-2021 withdrawal and persistent global plots. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the restructured its intelligence apparatus to enhance counterterrorism capabilities against jihadist networks, establishing the in 2004 to oversee 17 agencies and the in 2004 to integrate threat analysis and operations. These reforms facilitated improved information sharing, contributing to operations such as the 2011 raid that killed , based on intelligence derived from detainee interrogations and signals intelligence tracking his courier. European agencies, including the UK's , similarly intensified efforts, reporting the disruption of 31 late-stage Islamist terror plots between 2017 and 2021 through and . Surveillance programs expanded significantly, with the National Security Agency's (NSA) Section 702 of the , reauthorized periodically since 2008, enabling targeted collection of foreign communications, which U.S. officials credit with thwarting multiple jihadist plots, including the 2010 cargo bomb attempt originating from . Bulk metadata collection under Section 215 of the , however, yielded limited direct contributions to foiled attacks—officials cited involvement in fewer than 10 cases from 2001 to 2013—prompting its curtailment in 2015 amid privacy concerns and debates over efficacy against decentralized threats. Internationally, alliances shared to preempt attacks, such as the , though revelations of overreach, as in Edward Snowden's 2013 disclosures, highlighted tensions between security gains and erosion. Domestic legal responses centered on the USA PATRIOT Act of October 26, 2001, which broadened surveillance authorities, allowed roving wiretaps, and enhanced financial tracking, enabling the disruption of over 50 homegrown jihadist plots in the U.S. by 2012 through better inter-agency coordination and material support prosecutions. The Act's provisions facilitated the conviction of hundreds in terrorism financing cases via the amendments in 2015, which preserved key tools while adding oversight. Military commissions at Guantanamo Bay, authorized under the 2006 Military Commissions Act, handled high-value detainees, though legal challenges persisted, with 40 individuals charged by 2023 for war crimes tied to and activities. Internationally, 1373 (2001) obligated states to criminalize , freeze assets, and suppress safe havens, forming the basis for sanctions regimes like the 1267 Al-Qaida/ committee, which by 2025 had designated over 300 entities and individuals, disrupting millions in funds. (2014) targeted foreign terrorist fighters, requiring prosecutions or rehabilitation, influencing domestic laws in over 100 countries to penalize travel for . These measures, enforced through and bilateral extraditions, contributed to a decline in large-scale attacks in the West, though enforcement gaps in sympathetic regimes limited overall impact. Outcomes demonstrate partial success: U.S. foiled numerous plots, reducing spectacular attacks akin to 9/11, but persistent threats from lone actors and online underscore limitations against encrypted communications. Critics, including advocates, argue legal expansions risked overreach without proportional threat reduction, as evidenced by low conviction rates from bulk data programs, while proponents cite empirical disruptions as justification despite biases in threat assessment favoring ideological over behavioral indicators.

Deradicalization and Ideological Countermeasures

Deradicalization programs aim to rehabilitate individuals radicalized toward Islamist violence by addressing behavioral disengagement and, in some cases, ideological reevaluation, often through counseling, , and social reintegration. These initiatives, implemented in countries like , , and , typically involve religious scholars who provide theological guidance, psychological support, and vocational training to counter extremist interpretations of . However, distinguishing true ideological deradicalization—fundamental rejection of supremacist doctrines—from mere disengagement, where participants cease violence without altering beliefs, remains challenging, as self-reported changes may mask persistent sympathies. Saudi Arabia's Mohammed Bin Naif Counseling and Care Center, launched in 2004, has treated over 3,000 detainees, emphasizing religious correction by state-approved clerics who affirm core Salafi tenets while condemning violence against Muslim rulers. Official reports claim rates below 10% as of 2015, with graduates monitored via and community support, yet independent analyses question these figures due to limited transparency and instances of program alumni later joining groups like . A 2010 survey of global programs, including Saudi efforts, found short-term compliance high but long-term ideological shifts rare, attributing success more to incentives like than doctrinal overhaul. In , Denmark's Aarhus model, initiated in 2007, focuses on voluntary mentoring for at-risk youth and returning fighters, integrating with ideological dialogue; a 2016 evaluation reported 330 participants with no subsequent attacks by 2014, though sample size and self-selection limit generalizability. Singapore's Religious Rehabilitation Group, targeting detainees since 2003, uses imams to refute al-Qaeda-inspired fatwas, achieving zero among 100+ graduates by 2018 per government data, but critics note the program's reliance on a compliant detainee population and lack of external validation. Broader studies indicate for Islamist extremists post-release averages 20-40% in Western prisons, higher than for non-ideological offenders, underscoring prisons as hotspots where often fails without sustained post-release oversight. Ideological countermeasures seek to undermine jihadist narratives through counter-messaging and theological rebuttals, often disseminated via online campaigns or scholarly works. Efforts like the U.S. State Department's "Think Again, Turn Away" initiative, active from 2011-2014, produced videos highlighting ISIS atrocities to deter , but a 2020 peer-reviewed study found such narratives reduced stated ISIS support by only 0.5-1 point on a 7-point scale in experimental groups, with effects dissipating after weeks. Theological refutations, such as those by ex-jihadists like Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (Dr. Fadl) in 2007 , argue militant lacks scriptural basis without caliphal authority and violates Islamic rules of war, influencing some defectors but failing to dent broader Salafi-jihadist appeal due to jihadists' selective scriptural literalism. Challenges persist because many programs sidestep direct confrontation with doctrines like or supremacy, prioritizing grievance-based explanations over scriptural causality, which aligns with academic biases downplaying ideology's role. Peer-reviewed reviews conclude counter-narratives yield marginal prevention effects, as jihadist ideology's resilience stems from its alignment with primary Islamic texts, requiring deeper doctrinal reforms unlikely under state-sponsored efforts constrained by political sensitivities. Successful cases often involve personal disillusionment from operational failures rather than ideological persuasion, with risks elevated among those exposed to unchecked online post-program.

Attitudes Within Muslim Communities

Condemnations by Islamic Scholars and Authorities

Numerous Islamic scholars and religious authorities have publicly condemned , issuing and declarations that deem acts such as suicide bombings, targeting civilians, and indiscriminate violence as violations of law and incompatible with Islamic principles. These statements often emphasize that true excludes aggression against non-combatants and that extremists misinterpret Quranic verses to justify atrocities. For instance, following the , 2001 attacks, over 100 Muslim organizations and scholars worldwide, including the Council of , issued a joint stating that is forbidden in and that must report terrorist plots to authorities. The 2004 , initiated by King and endorsed by more than 500 scholars from Sunni, Shia, and other Islamic traditions, explicitly rejects terrorism and (declaring fellow Muslims apostates) as deviations from orthodox , affirming that such acts contradict the religion's emphasis on peace and justice. In 2010, Pakistani scholar released a 600-page titled Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings, which systematically argues that terrorism, including attacks on civilians, constitutes kufr (disbelief) and warrants from the Muslim community, drawing on Quranic , , and classical . Against groups like and , condemnations have been pointed and theological. In September 2014, 126 leading Islamic scholars, including figures from and Saudi Arabia's Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and Fatwas, published an " to al-Baghdadi" refuting 's ideology point-by-point, declaring slavery, crucifixion of prisoners, and suicide bombings as and innovations () alien to Islam. 's Grand Imam issued a 2014 invalidating 's self-proclaimed , labeling its members khawarij (extremist rebels) whose actions defy Islamic consensus. Similarly, in 2018, 70 clerics from Indonesia's , , and jointly fatwa'd that and contravene core Islamic tenets, urging Muslims to combat such ideologies. Saudi Arabia's , Abdulaziz Al ash-Sheikh, has repeatedly denounced ; in a 2009 statement, he affirmed that " has no place in " and called for unity against extremists who harm Muslims and non-Muslims alike. These pronouncements, often disseminated through official channels like sermons and , aim to delegitimize terrorist groups doctrinally, though their impact varies amid ongoing doctrinal disputes over jihad's parameters.

Survey Data on Support and Sympathy

Surveys conducted by reputable organizations such as reveal varying levels of support for suicide bombings and violence against civilians in the name of among Muslim populations, with acceptance generally low in most countries but higher in specific conflict zones. In a 2011 Pew survey across multiple Muslim-majority nations, 68% of Palestinian Muslims stated that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets to defend are often or sometimes justified, compared to 40% in , 39% in , and under 15% in countries like , , and . By 2013, support had declined in several nations, including (down to 29% saying often/sometimes justified) and , though it remained elevated in Palestinian territories at around 40%. Polls on sympathy for specific terrorist acts show similar patterns of limited but regionally concentrated endorsement. A Gallup poll of Muslims in 35 countries following the 9/11 attacks found that 7% viewed the strikes as morally justified, while a majority condemned them outright, though interpretations of "sympathy" for underlying grievances varied. Support for groups like has been consistently low globally; a 2015 Pew survey indicated unfavorable views exceeding 90% in (94%), (94%), and (91%), with only 1-5% expressing sympathy in some Arab states. In Palestinian territories, surveys by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) highlight higher sympathy for Hamas-linked violence, particularly post-October 7, 2023. A December 2023 PCPSR poll found 72% of Palestinians believed the Hamas attack on Israel was correct, with support for Hamas rising to 42% overall. This figure dipped to two-thirds by June 2024 amid ongoing conflict, and further to 50% by May 2025, yet remained substantial, especially in the West Bank (64%). Favorable views of Hezbollah and other Iran-backed groups have also increased in Egypt, with 75% positive toward Hamas in a 2024 poll. Among Muslim Americans, support remains marginal; Pew and Gallup data from 2011-2017 show 81-92% rejecting violence against civilians, with only 8% justifying suicide bombings in defense of . These findings underscore geographic and contextual variations, with higher sympathy correlating to proximity to Israel-Palestine conflicts rather than uniform doctrinal endorsement.

Patterns of Denial, Justification, and Apologetics

In responses to major Islamist terrorist attacks, such as the 2015 Paris attacks by affiliates that killed 130 people on November 13, 2015, a recurring pattern among some Muslim community leaders and organizations has involved denying any substantive link between the perpetrators' actions and Islamic doctrine, often framing the violence as an aberration unrepresentative of the faith. For instance, statements from groups like the emphasized that " has nothing to do with these cowardly acts," attributing them instead to geopolitical tensions or individual deviance rather than explicit religious motivations cited by the attackers, such as enforcing and punishing perceived insults to . This denial aligns with broader rhetorical strategies observed post-9/11, where figures like CAIR executives described the 2001 attacks as rooted in U.S. grievances rather than al-Qaeda's proclaimed against "infidels and apostates." Justification patterns frequently invoke external grievances, portraying terrorist acts as retaliatory responses to Western interventions, Israeli policies, or perceived oppression of . Survey data from the 2015 ICM poll of 1,081 British revealed that 39% expressed agreement with the statement that "many of the recent actions of the jihadis in and are justified," often contextualized by respondents as defenses against Assad's or foreign occupations, despite the groups' targeting of civilians and fellow . Similarly, Research Center's 2013 global survey across 11 Muslim-majority countries found medians of 7-15% of respondents viewing bombings and against civilians as often or sometimes justified "in defense of ," with higher figures in conflict zones like the territories (40%) and (17%), where narratives of resistance to occupation predominate. These views persist despite the jihadist groups' ideological aims transcending specific grievances, as evidenced by ISIS's global declarations unrelated to localized conflicts. Apologetic responses often minimize religious incentives by emphasizing socio-economic factors, mental health issues, or cultural alienation over doctrinal drivers like interpretations of and . In the aftermath of the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing by Salman Abedi, an ISIS-inspired attacker who killed 22 on May 22, 2017, some UK Muslim commentators and community forums deflected scrutiny of radical mosque preaching by highlighting youth disenfranchisement and Islamophobia, with only 2% in the ICM poll outright rejecting all sympathy for "those who fight for the establishment of an ," but broader discourse framing such sympathies as understandable reactions to marginalization. Longitudinal U.S. data from Pew's 2011 survey of Muslim Americans showed 8% believing aspects of 9/11 conspiracy theories that absolved al-Qaeda's religious rationale, while a 2007-2011 indicated 5-10% consistently justifying bombings "in defense of ," often rationalized through lenses of rather than theological endorsement. Such apologetics, while not majority views—Pew data consistently shows 70-90% rejection of violence in most surveyed populations—sustain environments where empirical links between Islamist ideology and terrorism are downplayed, complicating unambiguous communal repudiation.

Key Controversies and Analytical Debates

Theological Legitimacy: Inherent to Islam or Aberration?

The debate over the theological legitimacy of Islamic terrorism centers on whether its ideological drivers—supremacist violence to impose Islamic dominance—are rooted in 's foundational texts and traditions or represent deviant misinterpretations. Advocates of the aberration view, including many contemporary Muslim authorities and Western analysts, contend that 's essence promotes coexistence and defensive struggle only, portraying terrorism as a perversion influenced by political grievances or Wahhabi . However, primary sources such as the and contain unambiguous directives for offensive combat against non-Muslims to establish Islamic , which classical jurists systematized as obligatory when Muslim power permits, indicating an inherent doctrinal basis rather than isolated aberration. Quranic injunctions form the core of this theology, with Surah At-Tawbah 9:5—the "Verse of the Sword"—commanding believers, after the expire, to "kill the polytheists wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush," unless they repent, establish prayer, and pay . Classical exegeses, like Ibn Kathir's tafsir, interpret this as abrogating over 100 earlier Meccan verses urging tolerance, mandating perpetual fighting until non-believers testify to 's oneness and 's prophethood, or submit via as in 9:29. Authentic reinforce this: records stating, "I have been commanded to fight against people till they testify that there is no god but , that is the messenger of , and they establish prayer, and pay ," framing conversion or subjugation as the cessation condition. These texts, revealed during Medina's militarization phase (622–632 CE), prioritize jihad's expansionary role over . Classical Islamic across Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali schools endorses offensive (jihad al-talab) as a communal duty to propagate and conquer non-Muslim lands when the ummah holds sufficient strength, distinguishing it from defensive (jihad al-daf') triggered by invasion. This manifested historically in the Caliphate's conquests post-632 CE, overrunning Byzantine and Sassanid empires to establish dar al-Islam from Iberia to Persia within decades, explicitly justified as executing Quranic mandates for global supremacy rather than mere survival. Influential scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328 CE) amplified this by deeming obligatory against any regime—Muslim or not—failing strict enforcement, licensing and violence to restore purity, a framework echoed in Salafi-jihadist ideologies. Modern condemnations of groups like , such as the 2014 to al-Baghdadi by 126 scholars, decry terrorist methods as breaches of 's conduct rules (e.g., sparing non-combatants) but uphold core tenets like caliphal authority to declare offensive , of sharia-deficient rulers, and enmity toward apostates or crusaders. These critiques often emphasize procedural lapses over doctrinal rejection, reflecting adaptations to post-colonial Muslim disunity and military inferiority—conditions absent in classical expansions—rather than disavowal of supremacist imperatives. Empirical patterns, including 's self-citation of these same sources to recruit globally (e.g., 30,000+ foreign fighters by 2015), underscore that operationalizes inherent amid perceived opportunities, not mere aberration.

Causal Primacy: Doctrine vs. External Grievances

Analyses of Islamic terrorism's drivers distinguish between doctrinal factors—rooted in interpretations of , enforcement, and Islamic supremacy—and external grievances such as Western interventions, poverty, or discrimination. Proponents of the grievances thesis, often prevalent in academic and media discourse, posit that political humiliations (e.g., the or Israeli-Palestinian conflict) or socioeconomic marginalization fuel by creating alienated recruits. However, undermines this view's causal primacy, revealing weak or inverse correlations with such factors, while ideological commitment consistently predicts involvement. Socioeconomic deprivation shows negligible linkage to Islamist terrorism. Econometric studies demonstrate that terrorists frequently hail from middle- or upper-class backgrounds with higher-than-average levels; for instance, the 9/11 hijackers included university graduates from affluent families in and the UAE, not impoverished slums. Cross-country data further indicate terrorism thrives in medium-income nations amid rapid , not the world's poorest states, where unrest manifests as riots rather than organized attacks. Alan Krueger's research refutes the "poverty breeds terrorism" narrative, finding and income positively associated with participation in prominent incidents like the 1994 Hezbollah bombing of an Israeli embassy or the 9/11 plot. Geopolitical grievances fare no better as primary causes. While jihadists invoke U.S. policies or colonial legacies, these serve as doctrinal triggers rather than origins; violence persists in grievance-absent contexts (e.g., intra-Muslim conflicts like the for violations) and among groups lacking direct exposure, such as European converts. Profiles of recruits—often integrated professionals radicalized via mosques or online sermons—highlight ideology's role in framing grievances as religious warranting , not mere political redress. Psychological reviews confirm terrorists exhibit normalcy, sustained by absolutist ideologies offering transcendent purpose (e.g., martyrdom rewards), rather than psychopathology or desperation. Doctrinal elements, conversely, exhibit stronger causal weight. Surveys across 21 European countries link fundamentalist adherence—belief in 's supremacy and literalist scripture interpretation—to terrorism justification, outperforming variables like or . ideologies, drawing from Salafi interpretations of Quranic verses on warfare (e.g., Surah 9:5's "sword verse") and prophetic traditions, recast defensive as offensive duty against perceived dominance, enabling tactics absent in pre-modern but rationalized via eschatological promises. Self-reported motivations in interrogations and manifestos prioritize restoration over material redress; al-Qaeda's 1998 , for example, subordinates U.S. basing complaints to broader religious warfare imperatives. Shmuel Bar contends that orthodox 's framework, including sleeper cell precedents, undergirds radicalism, with grievances merely catalyzing pre-existing theological licenses for violence. Commentators Bill Maher and Sam Harris offer counterarguments against attributing primary causality to U.S. foreign policy, acknowledging such grievances but maintaining they are not the root cause, as similar factors like colonialism or drone strikes affecting other groups do not produce equivalent scales of jihadist terrorism; polls showing widespread support for strict sharia and hudud punishments in Muslim-majority countries predate recent U.S. wars, positioning ideology as the engine transforming grievances into global jihad. This doctrinal primacy aligns with causal realism: ideologies supply the normative structure interpreting events as existential threats, absent which grievances dissipate into non-violent protest, as seen among other aggrieved populations (e.g., Latin American leftists). Mainstream reluctance to emphasize doctrine, amid institutional biases favoring socio-political explanations, risks misallocating counterterrorism resources away from ideological confrontation.

Biases in Media, Academia, and Policy Narratives

In Western media coverage of Islamist terrorist attacks, a recurring pattern involves minimizing or contextualizing the religious-ideological motivations professed by perpetrators, often prioritizing alternative explanations such as issues, personal grievances, or socioeconomic factors to mitigate perceptions of collective Muslim culpability. For instance, following the attack in , where assailants explicitly invoked Islamic vengeance for , major outlets like the and initially emphasized the satirical nature of the targets over the jihadist rationale, with headlines avoiding terms like "Islamic extremists" in favor of neutral descriptors such as "gunmen." This framing aligns with broader critiques documenting how media narratives disproportionately attribute non-Islamist attacks (e.g., far-right incidents) to systemic ideologies while depicting Islamist ones as aberrations disconnected from doctrinal texts like those endorsing against unbelievers. Empirical analyses, such as those reviewing U.S. and European press from 2001–2020, reveal that while Islamist attacks garner more volume of coverage—accounting for over 90% of terrorism-related stories in peak years like —the ideological component is diluted, with only 25–30% of reports citing perpetrators' explicit references to Islamic scriptures or caliphate goals. Academic discourse on Islamist terrorism exhibits a parallel reluctance to prioritize doctrinal causation, frequently elevating "root causes" like colonial legacies, Western interventions, or economic deprivation despite contradictory data on perpetrator profiles. Research by and others demonstrates that Islamist terrorists are not disproportionately from impoverished backgrounds; for example, 9/11 hijackers were middle-class and educated, and analyses from 1970–2019 show no strong correlation between national poverty levels and Islamist attack frequency, with —evidenced by fatwas and manifestos—emerging as the consistent driver. Yet, peer-reviewed works in journals like Terrorism and Political Violence often frame as a response to "grievances" rather than scriptural imperatives, such as Quranic verses on warfare against apostates, reflecting an institutional aversion to critiquing Islamic amid post-colonial sensitivities. This downplaying persists even as surveys of jihadist literature reveal near-universal invocation of religious duty, with groups like distributing over 40,000 items by 2018 explicitly rooted in Salafi-jihadist . Policy narratives in Western governments, particularly under administrations sensitive to , have institutionalized avoidance of religious specificity, substituting terms like "" for "Islamist terrorism" to foster alliances with Muslim-majority states and domestic communities. The Obama administration's 2011 counterterrorism strategy explicitly rejected "Islamic" descriptors, arguing they alienated partners and played into terrorist hands, as articulated in a 2016 speech where President Obama stated such would "concede the terrain" to extremists without addressing core distortions of . A 2008 Department of memorandum reinforced this by advising against terms like "" or "Islamic terrorism" to deny legitimacy, despite internal assessments acknowledging their centrality to groups like . This approach extended to the EU's Radicalisation Awareness Network, which by 2020 emphasized "counter-narratives" treating Islamist ideology akin to other extremisms, even as reports indicated Islamist plots comprised 70–80% of thwarted attacks in from 2015–2023, underscoring a disconnect between empirical threat assessments and politically calibrated rhetoric. Critics, including congressional hearings, argue this semantic evasion hampers targeted deradicalization by obscuring the theological contestation required to refute jihadist claims.

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