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Liberal democracy
Liberal democracy
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The Eduskunta, the parliament of the Grand Duchy of Finland (then part of Russia), had universal suffrage in 1906. Several states and territories can present arguments for being the first with universal suffrage.

Liberal democracy, also called Western-style democracy,[1] or substantive democracy,[2] is a form of government that combines the organization of a democracy with ideas of liberal political philosophy. Common elements within a liberal democracy are: elections between or among multiple distinct political parties; a separation of powers into different branches of government; the rule of law in everyday life as part of an open society; a market economy with private property; universal suffrage; and the equal protection of human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, and political freedoms for all citizens. Substantive democracy refers to substantive rights and substantive laws, which can include substantive equality,[2] the equality of outcome for subgroups in society.[3][4] Liberal democracy emphasizes the separation of powers, an independent judiciary, and a system of checks and balances between branches of government. Multi-party systems with at least two persistent, viable political parties are characteristic of liberal democracies.

Governmental authority is legitimately exercised only in accordance with written, publicly disclosed laws adopted and enforced in accordance with established procedure. To define the system in practice, liberal democracies often draw upon a constitution, either codified or uncodified, to delineate the powers of government and enshrine the social contract. A liberal democracy may take various and mixed constitutional forms: it may be a constitutional monarchy or a republic. It may have a parliamentary system, presidential system, or semi-presidential system. Liberal democracies are contrasted with illiberal democracies and dictatorships. Some liberal democracies, especially those with large populations, use federalism (also known as vertical separation of powers) in order to prevent abuse and increase public input by dividing governing powers between municipal, provincial and national governments. The characteristics of liberal democracies are correlated with increased political stability,[5] lower corruption,[6] better management of resources,[7] and better health indicators such as life expectancy and infant mortality.[8]

Liberal democracy traces its origins—and its name—to the Age of Enlightenment. The conventional views supporting monarchies and aristocracies were challenged at first by a relatively small group of Enlightenment intellectuals, who believed that human affairs should be guided by reason and principles of liberty and equality. They argued that all people are created equal, that governments exist to serve the people—not vice versa—and that laws should apply to those who govern as well as to the governed (a concept known as rule of law), formulated in Europe as Rechtsstaat. In England, thinkers such as John Locke (1632–1704) argued that all people are created equal, that governments exist to serve the governed, and that laws must apply equally to rulers and citizens alike (a concept later expressed as the rule of law). At the same time, on the European continent, French philosophers developed equally influential theories: Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws (1748) advanced the doctrine of separation of powers, Rousseau's The Social Contract (1762) articulated the principle of popular sovereignty and the "general will", and Voltaire championed freedom of conscience and expression. These ideas were central to the French Revolution and spread widely across Europe and beyond. They also influenced the American Revolution and the broader development of liberal democracy. After a period of expansion in the second half of the 20th century, liberal democracy became a prevalent political system in the world.[9]

Origins

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John Locke was the first to develop a liberal philosophy as he coherently described the elementary principles of the liberal movement, such as the right to private property and the consent of the governed.
The Agreement of the People (1647), a manifesto for political change proposed by the Levellers during the English Civil War, called for freedom of religion, frequent convening of Parliament and equality under the law.

Liberal democracy traces its origins—and its name—to 18th-century Europe, during the Age of Enlightenment. At the time, the vast majority of European states were monarchies, with political power held either by the monarch or the aristocracy. The possibility of democracy had not been a seriously considered political theory since classical antiquity and the widely held belief was that democracies would be inherently unstable and chaotic in their policies due to the changing whims of the people. It was further believed that democracy was contrary to human nature, as human beings were seen to be inherently evil, violent and in need of a strong leader to restrain their destructive impulses. Many European monarchs held that their power had been ordained by God and that questioning their right to rule was tantamount to blasphemy.

These conventional views were challenged at first by a relatively small group of Enlightenment intellectuals, who believed that human affairs should be guided by reason and principles of liberty and equality. They argued that all people are created equal and therefore political authority cannot be justified on the basis of noble blood, a supposed privileged connection to God or any other characteristic that is alleged to make one person superior to others. They further argued that governments exist to serve the people—not vice versa—and that laws should apply to those who govern as well as to the governed (a concept known as rule of law).

Some of these ideas began to be expressed in England in the 17th century.[10] There was renewed interest in Magna Carta,[11] and passage of the Petition of Right in 1628 and Habeas Corpus Act in 1679 established certain liberties for subjects. The idea of a political party took form with groups debating rights to political representation during the Putney Debates of 1647. After the English Civil Wars (1642–1651) and the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the Bill of Rights was enacted in 1689, which codified certain rights and liberties. The Bill set out the requirement for regular elections, rules for freedom of speech in Parliament and limited the power of the monarch, ensuring that, unlike almost all of Europe at the time, royal absolutism would not prevail.[12][13] This led to significant social change in Britain in terms of the position of individuals in society and the growing power of Parliament in relation to the monarch.[14][15]

By the late 18th century, leading philosophers of the day had published works that spread around the European continent and beyond. One of the most influential of these philosophers was English empiricist John Locke, who refuted monarchical absolutism in his Two Treatises of Government. According to Locke, individuals entered into a social contract with a state, surrendering some of their liberties in exchange for the protection of their natural rights. Locke advanced that governments were only legitimate if they maintained the consent of the governed and that citizens had the right to instigate a rebellion against their government if that government acted against their interests. These ideas and beliefs influenced the American Revolution and the French Revolution, which gave birth to the philosophy of liberalism and instituted forms of government that attempted to put the principles of the Enlightenment philosophers into practice.

When the first prototypical liberal democracies were founded, the liberals themselves were viewed as an extreme and rather dangerous fringe group that threatened international peace and stability. The conservative monarchists who opposed liberalism and democracy saw themselves as defenders of traditional values and the natural order of things and their criticism of democracy seemed vindicated when Napoleon Bonaparte took control of the young French Republic, reorganized it into the first French Empire and proceeded to conquer most of Europe. Napoleon was eventually defeated and the Holy Alliance was formed in Europe to prevent any further spread of liberalism or democracy; however, liberal democratic ideals soon became widespread among the general population and over the 19th century traditional monarchy was forced on a continuous defensive and withdrawal. The Dominions of the British Empire became laboratories for liberal democracy from the mid 19th century onward. In Canada, responsible government began in the 1840s and in Australia and New Zealand, parliamentary government elected by male suffrage and secret ballot was established from the 1850s and female suffrage achieved from the 1890s.[16]

K. J. Ståhlberg (1865–1952), the first President of the Republic of Finland, defined Finland's anchoring as a country defending liberal democracy.[17] Ståhlberg at his office in 1919.

Reforms and revolutions helped move most European countries towards liberal democracy. Liberalism ceased being a fringe opinion and joined the political mainstream. At the same time, a number of non-liberal ideologies developed that took the concept of liberal democracy and made it their own. The political spectrum changed; traditional monarchy became more and more a fringe view and liberal democracy became more and more mainstream. By the end of the 19th century, liberal democracy was no longer only a liberal idea, but an idea supported by many different ideologies. After World War I and especially after World War II, liberal democracy achieved a dominant position among theories of government and is now endorsed by the vast majority of the political spectrum.[citation needed]

Although liberal democracy was originally put forward by Enlightenment liberals, the relationship between democracy and liberalism has been controversial since the beginning and was problematized in the 20th century.[18] In his book Freedom and Equality in a Liberal Democratic State, Jasper Doomen posited that freedom and equality are necessary for a liberal democracy.[19] In his book The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama says that since the French Revolution, liberal democracy has repeatedly proven to be a fundamentally better system (ethically, politically, economically) than any of the alternatives, and that democracy will become more and more prevalent in the long term, although it may suffer temporary setbacks.[20][21] The research institute Freedom House today simply defines liberal democracy as an electoral democracy also protecting civil liberties.

Rights and freedoms

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Political freedom is a central concept in history and political thought and one of the most important features of democratic societies.[22] Political freedom was described as freedom from oppression[23] or coercion,[24] the absence of disabling conditions for an individual and the fulfillment of enabling conditions,[25] or the absence of life conditions of compulsion, e.g. economic compulsion, in a society.[26] Although political freedom is often interpreted negatively as the freedom from unreasonable external constraints on action,[27] it can also refer to the positive exercise of rights, capacities and possibilities for action and the exercise of social or group rights.[28] The concept can also include freedom from internal constraints on political action or speech (e.g. social conformity, consistency, or inauthentic behaviour).[29] The concept of political freedom is closely connected with the concepts of civil liberties and human rights, which in democratic societies are usually afforded legal protection from the state.

Laws in liberal democracies may limit certain freedoms. The common justification for these limits is that they are necessary to guarantee the existence of democracy, or the existence of the freedoms themselves. For example, democratic governments may impose restrictions on free speech, with examples including Holocaust denial and hate speech. Some discriminatory behavior may be prohibited. For example, public accommodations in the United States may not discriminate on the basis of "race, color, religion, or national origin." There are various legal limitations such as copyright and laws against defamation. There may be limits on anti-democratic speech, on attempts to undermine human rights and on the promotion or justification of terrorism. In the United States more than in Europe during the Cold War, such restrictions applied to communists; however, they are more commonly applied to organizations perceived as promoting terrorism or the incitement of group hatred. Examples include anti-terrorism legislation, the shutting down of Hezbollah satellite broadcasts and some laws against hate speech. Critics[who?] argue that these limitations may go too far and that there may be no due and fair judicial process. Opinion is divided on how far democracy can extend to include the enemies of democracy in the democratic process.[citation needed] If relatively small numbers of people are excluded from such freedoms for these reasons, a country may still be seen as a liberal democracy. Some argue that this is only quantitatively (not qualitatively) different from autocracies that persecute opponents, since only a small number of people are affected and the restrictions are less severe, but others emphasize that democracies are different. At least in theory, opponents of democracy are also allowed due process under the rule of law.

Since it is possible to disagree over which rights are considered fundamental, different countries may treat particular rights in different ways. For example:

  • The constitutions of Canada, India, Israel, Mexico and the United States guarantee freedom from double jeopardy, a right not provided in some other legal systems.
  • Legal systems that use politically elected court jurors, such as Sweden, view a (partly) politicized court system as a main component of accountable government. Other democracies employ trial by jury with the intent of shielding against the influence of politicians over trials.

Liberal democracies usually have universal suffrage, granting all adult citizens the right to vote regardless of ethnicity, sex, property ownership, race, age, sexuality, gender, income, social status, or religion; however, some countries historically regarded as liberal democracies have had a more limited franchise. Even in the 21st century, some countries, considered to be liberal democracies, do not have truly universal suffrage. In some countries, members of political organizations with connections to historical totalitarian governments (for example formerly predominant Communist and fascist or Nazi governments in some European countries) may be deprived of the vote and the privilege of holding certain jobs. In the United Kingdom, people serving long prison sentences are unable to vote, a policy which has been ruled a human rights violation by the European Court of Human Rights.[30] A similar policy is also enacted in most of the United States.[31] According to a study by Coppedge and Reinicke, at least 85% of democracies provided for universal suffrage.[32] Many nations require positive identification before allowing people to vote. For example, in the United States two thirds of the states require their citizens to provide identification to vote, which also provide state IDs for free.[33] The decisions made through elections are made by those who are members of the electorate and who choose to participate by voting.

In 1971, Robert Dahl summarized the fundamental rights and freedoms shared by all liberal democracies as eight rights:[34]

  1. Freedom to form and join organizations.
  2. Freedom of expression.
  3. Right to vote.
  4. Right to run for public office.
  5. Right of political leaders to compete for support and votes.
  6. Freedom of alternative sources of information
  7. Free and fair elections.
  8. Right to control government policy through votes and other expressions of preference.

Preconditions

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For a political regime to be considered a liberal democracy it must contain in its governing over a nation-state the provision of civil rights- the non-discrimination in the provision of public goods such as justice, security, education and health- in addition to, political rights- the guarantee of free and fair electoral contests, which allow the winners of such contests to determine policy subject to the constraints established by other rights, when these are provided- and property rights- which protect asset holders and investors against expropriation by the state or other groups. In this way, liberal democracy is set apart from electoral democracy, as free and fair elections – the hallmark of electoral democracy – can be separated from equal treatment and non-discrimination – the hallmarks of liberal democracy. In liberal democracy, an elected government cannot discriminate against specific individuals or groups when it administers justice, protects basic rights such as freedom of assembly and free speech, provides for collective security, or distributes economic and social benefits.[35] According to Seymour Martin Lipset, although they are not part of the system of government as such, a modicum of individual and economic freedoms, which result in the formation of a significant middle class and a broad and flourishing civil society, are seen as pre-conditions for liberal democracy.[36]

For countries without a strong tradition of democratic majority rule, the introduction of free elections alone has rarely been sufficient to achieve a transition from dictatorship to democracy; a wider shift in the political culture and gradual formation of the institutions of democratic government are needed. There are various examples—for instance, in Latin America—of countries that were able to sustain democracy only temporarily or in a limited fashion until wider cultural changes established the conditions under which democracy could flourish.[citation needed]

One of the key aspects of democratic culture is the concept of a loyal opposition, where political competitors may disagree, but they must tolerate one another and acknowledge the legitimate and important roles that each play. This is an especially difficult cultural shift to achieve in nations where transitions of power have historically taken place through violence. The term means in essence that all sides in a democracy share a common commitment to its basic values. The ground rules of the society must encourage tolerance and civility in public debate. In such a society, the losers accept the judgement of the voters when the election is over and allow for the peaceful transfer of power. According to Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira, this is tied to another key concept of democratic cultures, the protection of minorities,[37] where the losers are safe in the knowledge that they will neither lose their lives nor their liberty and will continue to participate in public life. They are loyal not to the specific policies of the government, but to the fundamental legitimacy of the state and to the democratic process itself.

One requirement of liberal democracy is political equality amongst voters (ensuring that all voices and all votes count equally) and that these can properly influence government policy, requiring quality procedure and quality content of debate that provides an accountable result, this may apply within elections or to procedures between elections. This requires universal, adult suffrage; recurring, free elections, competitive and fair elections; multiple political parties and a wide variety of information so that citizens can rationally and effectively put pressure onto the government, including that it can be checked, evaluated and removed. This can include or lead to accountability, responsiveness to the desires of citizens, the rule of law, full respect of rights and implementation of political, social and economic freedom.[38] Other liberal democracies consider the requirement of minority rights and preventing tyranny of the majority. One of the most common ways is by actively preventing discrimination by the government (bill of rights) but can also include requiring concurrent majorities in several constituencies (confederalism); guaranteeing regional government (federalism); broad coalition governments (consociationalism) or negotiating with other political actors, such as pressure groups (neocorporatism).[39] These split political power amongst many competing and cooperating actors and institutions by requiring the government to respect minority groups and give them their positive freedoms, negotiate across multiple geographical areas, become more centrist among cooperative parties and open up with new social groups.

In a new study published in Nature Human Behaviour, Damian J. Ruck and his co-authors take a major step toward resolving this long-standing and seemingly irresolvable debate about whether culture shapes regimes or regimes shape culture. This study resolves the debate in favor of culture's causal primacy and shows that it is the civic and emancipative values (liberty, impartiality and contractarianism) among a country's citizens that give rise to democratic institutions, not vice versa.[40][41]

Liberal democracies around the world

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Map reflecting the findings of Freedom House's 2022 survey concerning the state of freedom by country / region in 2021. The concept of freedom used in the survey is closely connected to liberal democracy.
  Free
  Partly free
  Not free
Percentage of countries in each category from Freedom House's 1973 through 2021 reports:
  Free   Partly free   Not free
  Electoral democracies

Several organizations and political scientists maintain lists of free and unfree states, both in the present and going back a couple centuries. Of these, the best known may be the Polity Data Set,[42] and that produced by Freedom House and Larry Diamond. There is agreement amongst several intellectuals and organizations such as Freedom House that the states of the European Union (with the exception of Poland and Hungary), United Kingdom, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Japan, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, South Korea, Taiwan, United States, Canada,[43][44][45][46][47] Uruguay, Costa Rica, Israel, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand[48] are liberal democracies. Liberal democracies are susceptible to democratic backsliding and this is taking place or has taken place in several countries, including, but not limited to, the United States, Poland, Hungary, and Israel.[9]

Freedom House considers many of the officially democratic governments in Africa and the former Soviet Union to be undemocratic in practice, usually because the sitting government has a strong influence over election outcomes. Many of these countries are in a state of considerable flux. Officially non-democratic forms of government, such as single-party states and dictatorships, are more common in East Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. The 2019 Freedom in the World report noted a fall in the number of countries with liberal democracies over the 13 years from 2005 to 2018, citing declines in "political rights and civil liberties".[49] The 2020 and 2021 reports document further reductions in the number of free countries in the world.[50][51]

Types

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Proportional vs. plurality representation

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Plurality voting system award seats according to regional majorities. The political party or individual candidate who receives the most votes, wins the seat which represents that locality. There are other democratic electoral systems, such as the various forms of proportional representation, which award seats according to the proportion of individual votes that a party receives nationwide or in a particular region. One of the main points of contention between these two systems is whether to have representatives who are able to effectively represent specific regions in a country, or to have all citizens' vote count the same, regardless of where in the country they happen to live.

Some countries, such as Germany and New Zealand, address the conflict between these two forms of representation by having two categories of seats in the lower house of their national legislative bodies. The first category of seats is appointed according to regional popularity and the remainder are awarded to give the parties a proportion of seats that is equal—or as equal as practicable—to their proportion of nationwide votes. This system is commonly called mixed member proportional representation. Others, such as Australia and the Czech Republic, incorporate both systems in different houses of a bicameral legislature: for example, in Australia, the lower House of Representatives is elected in single-member constituencies by preferential voting while the upper house, the Senate, employs proportional representation by state; in the Czech Parliament, the opposite arrangement occurs, with the Chamber of Deputies elected in proportional representation by region and the Senate elected from single-member constituencies in a two-round system. This system, particularly in cases where the proportional house is the upper one (and therefore, does not grant or deny confidence to the government), is argued to result in a more stable government, while having a better diversity of parties to review its actions.

Presidential vs. parliamentary systems

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A presidential system is a system of government of a republic in which the executive branch is elected separately from the legislative. A parliamentary system is distinguished by the executive branch of government being dependent on the direct or indirect support of the parliament, often expressed through a vote of confidence. The presidential system of democratic government has been adopted in Latin America, Africa and parts of the former Soviet Union, largely by the example of the United States. Constitutional monarchies (dominated by elected parliaments) are present in Northern Europe and some former colonies which peacefully separated, such as Australia and Canada. Others have also arisen in Spain, East Asia and a variety of small nations around the world. Former British territories such as South Africa, India, Ireland and the United States opted for different forms at the time of independence. The parliamentary system is widely used in the European Union and neighbouring countries.

Impact on economic growth

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21st-century academic studies have found that democratization is beneficial for national growth; however, the effect of democratization has not been studied as yet. The most common factors that determine whether a country's economy grows or not are the country's level of development and the educational level of its newly elected democratic leaders. As a result, there is no clear indication of how to determine which factors contribute to economic growth in a democratic country.[52] There is also disagreement regarding how much credit the democratic system can take for this growth. One observation is that democracy became widespread only after the Industrial Revolution and the introduction of capitalism. On the other hand, the Industrial Revolution started in England, which was one of the most democratic nations for its time within its own borders, and yet this democracy was very limited and did not apply to the colonies, which contributed significantly to its wealth.[53]

Several statistical studies support the theory that a higher degree of economic freedom, as measured with one of the several Indices of Economic Freedom which have been used in numerous studies,[54] increases economic growth and that this in turn increases general prosperity, reduces poverty and causes democratization. This is a statistical tendency and there are individual exceptions like Mali, which is ranked as "Free" by Freedom House but is a Least Developed Country, or Qatar, which arguably has the highest GDP per capita in the world but has never been democratic. There are also other studies suggesting that more democracy increases economic freedom, although a few find no or even a small negative effect.[55][56][57][58][59][60]

Some argue that economic growth due to its empowerment of citizens will ensure a transition to democracy in countries such as Cuba; however, other dispute this, and argue that even if economic growth has caused democratization in the past, it may not do so in the future. Dictators may now have learned how to have economic growth without this causing more political freedom.[61][62] A high degree of oil or mineral exports is strongly associated with nondemocratic rule. This effect applies worldwide and not only to the Middle East. Dictators who have this form of wealth can spend more on their security apparatus and provide benefits which lessen public unrest. Also, such wealth is not followed by the social and cultural changes that may transform societies with ordinary economic growth.[63]

A 2006 meta-analysis found that democracy has no direct effect on economic growth; however, it has strong and significant indirect effects which contribute to growth. Democracy is associated with higher human capital accumulation, lower inflation, lower political instability, and higher economic freedom. There is also some evidence that it is associated with larger governments and more restrictions on international trade.[64] If leaving out East Asia, then during the last forty-five years poor democracies have grown their economies 50% more rapidly than nondemocracies. Poor democracies such as the Baltic countries, Botswana, Costa Rica, Ghana and Senegal have grown more rapidly than nondemocracies such as Angola, Syria, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe.[7] Of the eighty worst financial catastrophes during the last four decades, only five were in democracies. Similarly, poor democracies are half likely as non-democracies to experience a 10 per cent decline in GDP per capita over the course of a single year.[7]

Since democracy's impact on economic development may not always be positive or negative, depending on the type of government in the country and the institution or the historical context of the region. In this context, it can be confirmed that democracy is not a necessary condition for economic growth, and it does not directly affect economic growth. Meanwhile, many academic efforts have been made to determine which of the democratic or authoritarian government systems has a relatively positive effect on economic growth. However, it is difficult to determine the superiority of the two systems easily. In fact, there are examples of Singapore, which achieved economic development by rejecting the Western-style liberal democracy system in the 1980s and promoting a strong economic development policy through authoritarian rule, and Chile, which achieved economic development by introducing a neoliberal policy under the military regime. In the Eurasian region, it can be seen that the weakening of authoritarianism or progress in democratization is not in a positive relationship with economic growth. In the Eurasian region, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, whose democracy is considered to have advanced the most, are among the countries with the lowest economic growth in the 1991-2008 period, while Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan, which are considered to have the lowest level of democracy, are classified as the countries with the highest economic growth.[65] This is limited to the Eurasian region, but it can be presented as evidence that economic growth and democracy are in conflict in the process of system transition and economic development. Korea is also a good example of the complexity of this problem. Under the authoritarian regime, Korea achieved rapid economic development through state-led industrialization and export-oriented growth strategies. Through the two periods of former Presidents Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, the Korean economy transformed its system from a traditional and static agricultural economy to a modern and dynamic industrial economy. If the focus was on political oppression, it should have been criticized. However, there is also an aspect that political authoritarianism had a positive functional effect on the promotion of economic development at the time.[66] In other words, the authoritarian system at the time was difficult to avoid criticism if it focused on political oppression, but there were also some positive functional aspects in that it was able to control unstable social needs and consistently pursue long-term growth plans. The military and bureaucratic groups that grew up maintaining autonomy from the existing production means control class dominated the state government and built a modern industrial society through 'reforms from above'. Nevertheless, it is necessary to discuss the relationship between the two in that the democratic system can affect the guarantee of freedom and equality necessary for economic growth and the raising of awareness of private property rights. The characteristics of democracy are closely related to endogenous growth factors. Democracy increases the awareness of private property rights by ensuring the people the freedom and equality necessary for sustainable economic growth. These changes increase the level of individual capital and the motivation to participate in economic activities to pursue profits. In addition, if the level of human capital in the market tends to increase overall, the productivity of the country also increases, which can promote national industrial development. In addition, the importance of high-quality human resources has emerged as the industrial structure changes. The causal relationship between the level of democracy, endogenous growth factors (high-quality human resources), and economic growth was analyzed, centering on member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States that transformed into a democratic system with the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The analysis results show that as the level of democracy increases in transition countries, such as CIS member states, the level of high-quality human resources can also increase, which can have a positive effect on economic growth. In transition countries such as CIS member states that have undergone the transition of political and economic systems from socialism to democracy, if the level of democracy increases, the level of high-quality human resources can also increase, which can have a positive effect on economic growth. In other words, it has been confirmed that in some countries, the level of democracy affects high-quality human resources and also has a positive effect on economic growth.[67] Since the relationship between democracy level – high-quality human resources – economic growth has been statistically verified, it suggests that the formation and growth of a democratic system may be one of the goals that must be pursued for economic growth. In addition, it is also important that economic growth through the level of democracy goes beyond a simple relationship to affect high-quality human resources through the activation of individual citizens' motivation to participate, leading to economic growth. Beyond simply accepting the system of democracy, social maturity needs to be achieved in relation to the establishment of institutions and laws to revitalize the motivation for individual citizens to participate. Nevertheless, simply expanding and applying democracy does not help economic growth, and it is necessary to consider the relationship with the exogenous economic growth factors mentioned in existing economic growth theories. No matter how it affects economic development goals, democracy has clear values on its own, so the question of how to realize democratization without causing decisive sacrifices to other development goals is important. If democracy is only discussed in terms of economy and efficiency, it can lead to the negative consequences of dictatorship and totalitarianism in the extreme. Securing institutional transparency and social inclusion at the core of sustainable and long-term development, even at the expense of short-term efficiency, can be a necessary condition for qualitative growth, not a constraint on economic development. However, it is acknowledged that democracy and economic development have an affinity, but they are likely to conflict while forming a value-for-value tension.[68] Nevertheless, we should pay attention to the complementary relationship rather than the mutually exclusive concept of democracy and economic growth. This is due to the fact that through institutional stability and political freedom, democracy can form a foundation for trust in the market economy, and economic growth can in turn form a circular structure that enables institutional maturity of democracy. Therefore, social inclusion and long-term sustainability should be pursued rather than short-term growth rates when understanding the relationship between the two. These complementary structures demonstrate that democracy is a key factor in solidifying the qualitative foundation of economic development. In addition, to analyze the relationship between different regional economic development experiences and various characteristics in a more generalized framework, it is necessary to analyze not only the relationship between the two, democratization and economic growth, but also separate factors such as institutional quality and legal order and the relationship between these variables.

Justifications and support

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Increased political stability

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Several key features of liberal democracies are associated with political stability, including economic growth, as well as robust state institutions that guarantee free elections, the rule of law, and individual liberties.[5] One argument for democracy is that by creating a system where the public can remove administrations, without changing the legal basis for government, democracy aims at reducing political uncertainty and instability and assuring citizens that however much they may disagree with present policies, they will be given a regular chance to change those who are in power, or change policies with which they disagree. This is preferable to a system where political change takes place through violence.[citation needed]

One notable feature of liberal democracies is that their opponents (those groups who wish to abolish liberal democracy) rarely win elections. Advocates use this as an argument to support their view that liberal democracy is inherently stable and can usually only be overthrown by external force, while opponents argue that the system is inherently stacked against them despite its claims to impartiality. In the past, it was feared that democracy could be easily exploited by leaders with dictatorial aspirations, who could get themselves elected into power; however, the actual number of liberal democracies that have elected dictators into power is low. When it has occurred, it is usually after a major crisis has caused many people to doubt the system or in young/poorly functioning democracies. Some possible examples include Adolf Hitler during the Great Depression and Napoleon III, who became first President of the Second French Republic and later Emperor.[citation needed]

Effective response in wartime

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By definition, a liberal democracy implies that power is not concentrated. One criticism is that this could be a disadvantage for a state in wartime, when a fast and unified response is necessary. The legislature usually must give consent before the start of an offensive military operation, although sometimes the executive can do this on its own while keeping the legislature informed. If the democracy is attacked, then no consent is usually required for defensive operations. The people may vote against a conscription army; however, research shows that democracies are more likely to win wars than non-democracies. One explanation attributes this primarily to "the transparency of the polities, and the stability of their preferences, once determined, democracies are better able to cooperate with their partners in the conduct of wars". Other research attributes this to superior mobilization of resources or selection of wars that the democratic states have a high chance of winning.[69]

Stam and Reiter also note that the emphasis on individuality within democratic societies means that their soldiers fight with greater initiative and superior leadership.[70] Officers in dictatorships are often selected for political loyalty rather than military ability. They may be exclusively selected from a small class or religious/ethnic group that support the regime. The leaders in nondemocracies may respond violently to any perceived criticisms or disobedience. This may make the soldiers and officers afraid to raise any objections or do anything without explicit authorization. The lack of initiative may be particularly detrimental in modern warfare. Enemy soldiers may more easily surrender to democracies since they can expect comparatively good treatment. In contrast, Nazi Germany killed almost two thirds of the captured Soviet soldiers and 38% of the American soldiers captured by North Korea in the Korean War were killed.

Better information on and corrections of problems

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A democratic system may provide better information for policy decisions. Undesirable information may more easily be ignored in dictatorships, even if this undesirable or contrarian information provides early warning of problems. Anders Chydenius put forward the argument for freedom of the press for this reason in 1776.[71] The democratic system also provides a way to replace inefficient leaders and policies, thus problems may continue longer and crises of all kinds may be more common in autocracies.[7]

Reduction of corruption

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Research by the World Bank suggests that political institutions are extremely important in determining the prevalence of corruption: (long term) democracy, parliamentary systems, political stability and freedom of the press are all associated with lower corruption.[6] Freedom of information legislation is important for accountability and transparency. The Indian Right to Information Act "has already engendered mass movements in the country that is bringing the lethargic, often corrupt bureaucracy to its knees and changing power equations completely".[72]

Better use of resources

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Democracies can put in place better education, longer life expectancy, lower infant mortality, access to drinking water and better health care than dictatorships. This is not due to higher levels of foreign assistance or spending a larger percentage of GDP on health and education, as instead the available resources are managed better.[7] Prominent economist Amartya Sen observed that no functioning democracy has ever suffered a large scale famine.[73] Refugee crises almost always occur in non-democracies. From 1985 to 2008, the eighty-seven largest refugee crises occurred in autocracies.[7]

Health and human development

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Democracy correlates with a higher score on the Human Development Index and a lower score on the human poverty index. Several health indicators (life expectancy and infant and maternal mortality) have a stronger and more significant association with democracy than they have with GDP per capita, rise of the public sector or income inequality.[8] In the post-Communist states, after an initial decline, those that are the most democratic have achieved the greatest gains in life expectancy.[74]

Democratic peace theory

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Numerous studies using many different kinds of data, definitions and statistical analyses have found support for the democratic peace theory.[citation needed] The original finding was that liberal democracies have never made war with one another. More recent research has extended the theory and finds that democracies have few militarized interstate disputes causing less than 1,000 battle deaths with one another, that those militarized interstate disputes that have occurred between democracies have caused few deaths and that democracies have few civil wars.[75][76] There are various criticisms of the theory, including at least as many refutations as alleged proofs of the theory, some 200 deviant cases, failure to treat democracy as a multidimensional concept and that correlation is not causation.[77][page needed]

Minimization of political violence

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Rudolph Rummel's Power Kills says that liberal democracy, among all types of regimes, minimizes political violence and is a method of nonviolence. Rummel attributes this firstly to democracy instilling an attitude of tolerance of differences, an acceptance of losing and a positive outlook towards conciliation and compromise.[78] A study published by the British Academy, on Violence and Democracy, argues that in practice liberal democracy has not stopped those running the state from exerting acts of violence both within and outside their borders. The paper also argues that police killings, profiling of racial and religious minorities, online surveillance, data collection, or media censorship are a couple of ways in which successful states maintain a monopoly on violence.[79]

Objections and criticism

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Campaign costs

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In Athenian democracy, some public offices were randomly allocated to citizens, in order to inhibit the effects of plutocracy. Aristotle described the law courts in Athens which were selected by lot as democratic[80] and described elections as oligarchic.[81] Political campaigning in representative democracies can favor the rich due to campaign costs, a form of plutocracy where only a very small number of wealthy individuals can actually affect government policy in their favor and toward plutonomy.[82] Stringent campaign finance laws can correct this perceived problem.[citation needed]

Other studies predicted that the global trend toward plutonomies would continue, for various reasons, including "capitalist-friendly governments and tax regimes".[83] They also say that, since "political enfranchisement remains as was—one person, one vote, at some point it is likely that labor will fight back against the rising profit share of the rich and there will be a political backlash against the rising wealth of the rich."[84] Economist Steven Levitt says in his book Freakonomics that campaign spending is no guarantee of electoral success. He compared electoral success of the same pair of candidates running against one another repeatedly for the same job, as often happens in United States congressional elections, where spending levels varied. He concludes: "A winning candidate can cut his spending in half and lose only 1 percent of the vote. Meanwhile, a losing candidate who doubles his spending can expect to shift the vote in his favor by only that same 1 percent."[85]

On September 18, 2014, Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page's study concluded "Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism."[86]

Media

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Critics of the role of the media in liberal democracies allege that concentration of media ownership leads to major distortions of democratic processes. In Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky argue via their Propaganda Model[87] that the corporate media limits the availability of contesting views and assert this creates a narrow spectrum of elite opinion. This is a natural consequence, they say, of the close ties between powerful corporations and the media and thus limited and restricted to the explicit views of those who can afford it.[88] Furthermore, the media's negative influence can be seen in social media where vast numbers of individuals seek their political information which is not always correct and may be controlled. For example, as of 2017, two-thirds (67%) of Americans report that they get at least some of their news from social media,[89] as well as a rising number of countries are exercising extreme control over the flow of information.[90] This may contribute to large numbers of individuals using social media platforms but not always gaining correct political information. This may cause conflict with liberal democracy and some of its core principles, such as freedom, if individuals are not entirely free since their governments are seizing that level of control on media sites. The notion that the media is used to indoctrinate the public is also shared by Yascha Mounk's The People Vs Democracy which states that the government benefits from the public having a relatively similar worldview and that this one-minded ideal is one of the principles in which Liberal Democracy stands.[91] Defenders responding to such arguments say that constitutionally protected freedom of speech makes it possible for both for-profit and non-profit organizations to debate the issues. They argue that media coverage in democracies simply reflects public preferences and does not entail censorship. Especially with new forms of media such as the Internet, it is not expensive to reach a wide audience, if an interest in the ideas presented exists.

Limited voter turnout

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Low voter turnout, whether the cause is disenchantment, indifference or contentment with the status quo, may be seen as a problem, especially if disproportionate in particular segments of the population. Although turnout levels vary greatly among modern democratic countries and in various types and levels of elections within countries, at some point low turnout may prompt questions as to whether the results reflect the will of the people, whether the causes may be indicative of concerns to the society in question, or in extreme cases the legitimacy of the electoral system. Get out the vote campaigns, either by governments or private groups, may increase voter turnout, but distinctions must be made between general campaigns to raise the turnout rate and partisan efforts to aid a particular candidate, party or cause. Other alternatives include increased use of absentee ballots, or other measures to ease or improve the ability to vote, including electronic voting. Several nations have forms of compulsory voting, with various degrees of enforcement. Proponents argue that this increases the legitimacy—and thus also popular acceptance—of the elections and ensures political participation by all those affected by the political process and reduces the costs associated with encouraging voting. Arguments against include restriction of freedom, economic costs of enforcement, increased number of invalid and blank votes and random voting.[92]

Bureaucracy

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A persistent right-wing libertarian and monarchist critique of democracy is the claim that it encourages the elected representatives to change the law without necessity and in particular to pour forth a flood of new laws, as described in Herbert Spencer's The Man Versus The State.[93] This is seen as pernicious in several ways. New laws constrict the scope of what were previously private liberties. Rapidly changing laws make it difficult for a willing non-specialist to remain law-abiding. This may be an invitation for law-enforcement agencies to misuse power. The claimed continual complication of the law may be contrary to a claimed simple and eternal natural law—although there is no consensus on what this natural law is, even among advocates. Supporters of democracy point to the complex bureaucracy and regulations that has occurred in dictatorships, like many of the former Communist states. The bureaucracy in liberal democracies is often criticized for a claimed slowness and complexity of their decision-making. The term "red tape" is a synonym of slow bureaucratic functioning that hinders quick results in a liberal democracy.

Short-term focus

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By definition, modern liberal democracies allow for regular changes of government. That has led to a common criticism of their short-term focus. In four or five years, the government will face a new election and it must think of how it will win that election. That would encourage a preference for policies that will bring short term benefits to the electorate or to self-interested politicians before the next election, rather than unpopular policy with longer term benefits. This criticism assumes that it is possible to make long term predictions for a society, something Karl Popper criticized as historicism. Besides the regular review of governing entities, short-term focus in a democracy could also be the result of collective short-term thinking. For example, consider a campaign for policies aimed at reducing environmental damage while causing temporary increase in unemployment; however, this risk applies also to other political systems.

Majoritarianism

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The "tyranny of the majority" is the fear that a direct democratic government, reflecting the majority view, can take action that oppresses a particular minority. For instance, a minority holding wealth, property ownership or power (see Federalist No. 10), or a minority of a certain racial and ethnic origin, class or nationality. Theoretically, the majority is a majority of all citizens. If citizens are not compelled by law to vote, it is usually a majority of those who choose to vote. If such of group constitutes a minority, then it is possible that a minority could in theory oppress another minority in the name of the majority; however, such an argument could apply to both direct democracy or representative democracy. Several de facto dictatorships also have compulsory but not "free and fair" voting in order to try to increase the legitimacy of the regime, such as North Korea.[94][95] In her book World on Fire, Yale Law School professor Amy Chua posits that "when free market democracy is pursued in the presence of a market-dominant minority, the almost invariable result is backlash. This backlash typically takes one of three forms. The first is a backlash against markets, targeting the market-dominant minority's wealth. The second is a backlash against democracy by forces favorable to the market-dominant minority. The third is violence, sometimes genocidal, directed against the market-dominant minority itself".[96]

Cases that have been cited as examples of a minority being oppressed by or in the name of the majority include[citation needed] the practice of conscription and laws against homosexuality, pornography, and recreational drug use. Homosexual acts were widely criminalised in democracies until several decades ago and in some democracies like Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Tunisia, Nigeria, and Malaysia, they still are, reflecting the religious or sexual mores of the majority. The Athenian democracy and the early United States practiced slavery, and even proponents of liberal democracy in the 17th and 18th century were often pro-slavery, which is contradictory of a liberal democracy.

Another often quoted example of the "tyranny of the majority" is that Adolf Hitler came to power by legitimate democratic procedures on the grounds that the Nazi Party gained the largest share of votes in the Weimar Republic in 1933; however, his regime's large-scale human rights violations took place after the democratic system had been abolished. The November 1932 German federal election, which resulted in losses for the Nazi Party, is considered the last free and fair election in Weimar Germany, and even in the March 1933 German federal election, despite waging what has been described as a campaign of terror against their opponents, the Nazis did not achieve a majority of the votes or seats. Although the Weimar Constitution included an enabling act that in emergency situations, real or imagined, allowed dictatorial powers and suspension of the essentials of the constitution itself without any vote or election, which was used to pass the Enabling Act of 1933, this happened after the not free nor fair 1933 election and it was successfully implemented only after a strategy of coercion, bribery, and manipulation. In The Coming of the Third Reich, British historian Richard J. Evans argued that the Enabling Act was legally invalid.[97]

Proponents of democracy make a number of defenses concerning "tyranny of the majority". One is to argue that the presence of a constitution protecting the rights of all citizens in many democratic countries acts as a safeguard. Generally, changes in these constitutions require the agreement of a supermajority of the elected representatives, or require a judge and jury to agree that evidentiary and procedural standards have been fulfilled by the state, or two different votes by the representatives separated by an election, or sometimes a referendum. These requirements are often combined. The separation of powers into legislative branch, executive branch, and judicial branch also makes it more difficult for a small majority to impose their will. This means a majority can still legitimately coerce a minority, which is still ethically questionable, but that such a minority would be very small, and as a practical matter it is harder to get a larger proportion of the people to agree to such actions.

Another argument is that majorities and minorities can take a markedly different shape on different issues. People often agree with the majority view on some issues and agree with a minority view on other issues. One's view may also change, thus the members of a majority may limit oppression of a minority since they may well in the future themselves be in a minority. A third common argument is that despite the risks majority rule is preferable to other systems and the tyranny of the majority is in any case an improvement on a tyranny of a minority. All the possible problems mentioned above can also occur in non-democracies with the added problem that a minority can oppress the majority. Proponents of democracy argue that empirical statistical evidence strongly shows that more democracy leads to less internal violence and mass murder by the government. This is sometimes formulated as Rummel's Law, which states that the less democratic freedom a people have, the more likely their rulers are to murder them.

Socialist and Marxist criticism

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Some socialists, such as The Left party in Germany,[98] say that liberal democracy is a dishonest farce used to keep the masses from realizing that their will is irrelevant in the political process. Marxists and communists, as well as some non-Marxist socialists and anarchists, argue that liberal democracy under capitalism is constitutively social class-based and therefore can never be democratic or participatory. They refer to it as "bourgeois democracy" because they say that politicians ultimately fight mainly for the interests of the bourgeoisie,[99] and thus argue that liberal democracy represents "the rule of capital".[100]

According to Karl Marx, representation of the interests of different classes is proportional to the influence which a particular class can purchase (through bribes, transmission of propaganda through mass media, economic blackmail, donations for political parties and their campaigns and so on). Thus, the public interest in liberal democracies is systematically corrupted by the wealth of those classes rich enough to gain the appearance of representation. Because of this, he said that multi-party democracies under capitalism are always distorted and anti-democratic, their operation merely furthering the class interests of the owners of the means of production, and the bourgeois class becomes wealthy through a drive to appropriate the surplus value of the creative labours of the working class. This drive obliges the bourgeois class to amass ever-larger fortunes by increasing the proportion of surplus-value by exploiting the working class through capping workers' terms and conditions as close to poverty levels as possible. Incidentally, this obligation demonstrates the clear limit to bourgeois freedom even for the bourgeoisie itself. According to Marx, parliamentary elections are no more than a cynical, systemic attempt to deceive the people by permitting them, every now and again, to endorse one or other of the bourgeoisie's predetermined choices of which political party can best advocate the interests of capital. Once elected, he said that this parliament, as a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, enacts regulations that actively support the interests of its true constituency, the bourgeoisie, such as bailing out Wall Street investment banks, direct socialization/subsidization of business (GMH, American/European agricultural subsidies), and even wars to guarantee trade in commodities such as oil). Vladimir Lenin once argued that liberal democracy had simply been used to give an illusion of democracy whilst maintaining the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, giving as an example the United States's representative democracy which he said consisted of "spectacular and meaningless duels between two bourgeois parties" led by "multimillionaires".[101]

The Chinese Communist Party political concept of whole-process people's democracy criticizes liberal democracy for excessively relying on procedural formalities without genuinely reflecting the interests of the people.[102] Under this primarily consequentialist concept, the most important criteria for a democracy is whether it can "solve the people's real problems", while a system in which "the people are awakened only for voting" is not truly democratic.[102] For example, the Chinese government's 2021 white paper "China: Democracy that Works" criticizes liberal democracy's shortcoming based on principles of whole process people's democracy.[103]

Religion

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Religious stances on democracy and liberalism vary and can change.[104] The Catholic Church opposed liberal democracy until 1965, when the Second Vatican Council endorsed religious freedom.[104] Religious democracy, which prioritizes non-liberal religious values over liberal values, has been criticized for not being a liberal democracy.[105] Religious identity can create ingroup-outgroup preferences which may influence policy preferences. Public support for religion in government influences policies directed towards state religion.[106]

State religion policies that restrict religious freedom can lead to conflict, including terrorism, although some countries which have a state religion do inhibit terrorism.[106] Some democracies that do uphold a state religion nonetheless safeguard religious freedom. For example, Article 37 of the constitution of Liechtenstein recognises "the Roman Catholic Church as the State Church" while also granting freedom of practise for other faiths.[107] In 2023, the country scored 4 out of 4 for religious freedom from Freedom House.[108]

Vulnerabilities

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Authoritarianism

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Authoritarianism is perceived by many to be a direct threat to the liberalised democracy practised in many countries. According to American political sociologist and authors Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner and Christopher Walker, undemocratic regimes are becoming more assertive.[109] They suggest that liberal democracies introduce more authoritarian measures to counter authoritarianism itself and cite monitoring elections and more control on media in an effort to stop the agenda of undemocratic views. Diamond, Plattner and Walker uses an example of China using aggressive foreign policy against Western countries to suggest that a country's society can force another country to behave in a more authoritarian manner. In their book Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy, they argue that Beijing confronts the United States by building its navy and missile force and promotes the creation of global institutions designed to exclude American and European influence, and as a result authoritarian states pose a threat to liberal democracy as they seek to remake the world in their own image.[110] Various authors have also analysed the authoritarian means that are used by liberal democracies to defend economic liberalism and the power of political elites.[111]

War

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There are ongoing debates surrounding the effect that war may have on liberal democracy, and whether it cultivates or inhibits democratization. War may cultivate democratization by "mobilizing the masses, and creating incentives for the state to bargain with the people it needs to contribute to the war effort".[112] An example of this may be seen in the extension of suffrage in the United Kingdom after World War I. War may inhibit democratization by "providing an excuse for the curtailment of liberties".[112]

Terrorism

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Several studies[citation needed] have concluded that terrorism is most common in nations with intermediate political freedom, meaning countries transitioning from autocratic governance to democracy. Nations with strong autocratic governments and governments that allow for more political freedom experience less terrorism.[113]

Populism

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There is no one agreed upon definition of populism, with a broader definition settled upon following a conference at the London School of Economics in 1967.[114] Academically, the term "populism" faces criticism that it should be abandoned as a descriptor due to its vagueness.[115] It is typically not fundamentally undemocratic, but it is often anti-liberal. Many will agree on certain features that characterize populism and populists: a conflict between "the people" and "the elites", with populists siding with "the people",[116] and strong disdain for opposition and negative media using labels such as "fake news".[117]

Populism is a form of majoritarianism, threatening some of the core principles of liberal democracy, such as the rights of the individual. Examples of these can vary from freedom of movement via control on immigration, or opposition to liberal social values such as gay marriage.[118] Populists do this by appealing to the feelings and emotions of the people whilst offering solutions, often vastly simplified, to complex problems. Populism is a particular threat to liberal democracy because it exploits the weaknesses of the liberal democratic system. A key weakness of liberal democracies highlighted in How Democracies Die is the conundrum that suppressing populist movements or parties can be seen to be illiberal.[119] Populism also exploits the inherent differences between democracy and liberalism.[120] For liberal democracy to be effective, a degree of compromise is required,[121] as protecting the rights of the individual take precedence if they are threatened by the will of the majority, more commonly known as a tyranny of the majority. Majoritarianism is so ingrained in populism that this core value of a liberal democracy is under threat. This brings into question how effectively liberal democracy can defend itself from populism.

According to Takis Papas in his work Populism and Liberal Democracy: A Comparative and Theoretical Analysis, "democracy has two opposites, one liberal, the other populist". Whereas liberalism accepts a notion of society composed of multiple divisions, populism only acknowledges a society of "the people" versus "the elites". The fundamental beliefs of the populist voter consist of: the belief that oneself is powerless and is a victim of the powerful; a "sense of enmity" rooted in "moral indignation and resentfulness"; and a "longing for future redemption" through the actions of a charismatic leader. Papas says this mindset results in a feeling of victimhood caused by the belief that the society is "made up of victims and perpetrators". Other characteristic of a populist voter is that they are "distinctively irrational" because of the "disproportionate role of emotions and morality" when making a political decision like voting. Moreover, through self-deception they are "wilfully ignorant". In addition, they are "intuitively… and unsettlingly principled" rather than a more "pragmatic" liberal voter.[122]

An example of a populist movement is the 2016 Brexit campaign.[123] The role of "the elite" in this circumstance was played by the European Union (EU) and "London-centric liberals",[124] while the Brexit campaign appealed to workers in industries such as agriculture who were allegedly worse off due to EU membership. This case study also illustrates the potential threat populism can pose to a liberal democracy with the movement heavily relying on disdain for the media. This was done by labeling criticism of Brexit, as well as the economic effects of Brexit and its consequences,[125] as "Project Fear".[126][127][128]

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia

Liberal democracy is a political system characterized by representative institutions where leaders are selected through competitive, multiparty elections alongside constitutional constraints on government power, including protections for individual rights, an independent judiciary, and mechanisms to limit arbitrary authority. This framework seeks to balance popular sovereignty with safeguards against majority tyranny, emphasizing the rule of law, civil liberties such as freedom of expression and association, and separation of powers among executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Emerging from Enlightenment-era ideas prioritizing individual autonomy and limited government, it gained institutional form through foundational documents like the U.S. Constitution in 1787 and subsequent expansions of suffrage and rights in Western nations during the 19th and 20th centuries.
Empirical evidence links liberal democracies to superior outcomes in economic growth, innovation, and human development compared to authoritarian alternatives, as measured by metrics like GDP per capita and life expectancy in long-standing adherents such as those in Western Europe and North America. However, these systems exhibit vulnerabilities, including susceptibility to populist movements that exploit economic dislocations or cultural anxieties, leading to erosions of institutional norms and rights protections in cases like Hungary and Poland since the 2010s. Critiques grounded in causal analysis highlight tendencies toward policy paralysis from veto points and elite capture, where entrenched interests impede responsive governance, though such flaws stem from design features intended to curb abuse rather than inherent moral failings. Despite these challenges, liberal democracy's emphasis on empirical accountability through elections and decentralized power has sustained its prevalence, with over 80 countries classified as such by rigorous indices as of the early 21st century, though global adherence has fluctuated amid geopolitical shifts.

Historical Development

Origins in Classical and Enlightenment Thought

The conceptual foundations of liberal democracy trace back to experiments with popular governance, particularly in around 507 BCE, when reformed the to introduce demokratia, or rule by the people, through an assembly open to adult male citizens and mechanisms like to curb potential tyrants. However, this system was direct rather than representative, excluded women, slaves, and foreigners—who comprised the majority of the population—and prioritized collective decision-making over individual rights protections, rendering it illiberal by modern standards. , in his (circa 350 BCE), analyzed various constitutions and advocated for a mixed blending elements of , , and to balance interests and avoid the excesses of pure forms, such as mob rule in unchecked democracies. Roman republican institutions further contributed ideas of checks and balances, as described by the historian in the 2nd century BCE, who praised the for integrating monarchical (consuls), aristocratic (), and democratic (tribunes) elements to foster stability and through mutual constraints, preventing any single component from dominating. These classical precedents emphasized constitutional mechanisms to limit power but lacked a robust theory of inherent individual rights against the state, focusing instead on and collective self-rule among a narrow . During the Enlightenment, thinkers synthesized these ancient insights with emerging notions of and limited , laying the ideological groundwork for liberal democracy. , in his (1689), argued that legitimate authority derives from the , who possess inalienable to life, , and property; exists to protect these , and citizens retain the right to revolt against rulers who violate them. built on this in The Spirit of the Laws (1748), proposing the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers—drawing partial inspiration from Roman and English models—to safeguard by ensuring no branch accumulates absolute authority. These principles shifted emphasis from mere to restrained, rights-oriented governance, influencing subsequent constitutional designs while critiquing both absolutism and unbridled .

Emergence in the 19th Century

The witnessed the practical emergence of liberal democracy through incremental constitutional reforms that fused representative elections with protections for individual rights and constraints on executive power, primarily in amid industrialization and revolutionary pressures. These developments built on earlier Enlightenment ideas but materialized in stable parliamentary systems, often under constitutional monarchies, where expanded beyond elites while maintaining property qualifications to balance popular input with liberal safeguards against mob rule. In Britain, the Great Reform Act of represented a foundational shift by abolishing "rotten boroughs"—unrepresentative small districts controlled by patrons—and redistributing seats to urban industrial areas, thereby enfranchising middle-class property owners and effectively doubling the electorate to around 800,000 voters. This measure, passed amid widespread agitation and riots, preserved the bicameral Parliament's role in checking monarchical authority while introducing registration and qualification standards that emphasized responsible participation over universal inclusion. Subsequent reforms, such as the 1867 act extending the vote to skilled urban workers, further entrenched electoral accountability without immediate threats to property rights or social order. Belgium's 1831 Constitution, enacted after independence from the Netherlands via the 1830 revolution, exemplified early continental adoption by establishing a parliamentary with strict , ministerial responsibility to the , and explicit guarantees of freedoms like speech, press, and , alongside . The document's liberal framework limited the king's prerogatives to suspensive vetoes and required legislative consent for taxes and military matters, fostering a system where elected chambers held primacy over governance, though initial remained tied to wealth and education to prioritize informed electors. France's 1848 Revolution briefly accelerated democratic elements within a , proclaiming universal male that enfranchised approximately 9 million voters—vastly exceeding prior restricted franchises—and electing a alongside a president for a four-year term. The resulting constitution emphasized through direct elections but retained liberal checks, including an independent and protections against arbitrary , though political instability culminated in Louis-Napoléon's coup, highlighting vulnerabilities when rapid enfranchisement outpaced institutional maturity. These 19th-century precedents, often driven by elite concessions to avert radical upheaval, demonstrated liberal democracy's viability in managing economic transformation and , yet they uniformly excluded women and the poorest males, reflecting a pragmatic that broader but delimited participation sustained stability over egalitarian ideals. Expansions in places like Switzerland's 1848 federal constitution and gradual Scandinavian parliamentary evolutions reinforced this pattern, prioritizing constitutional limits to prevent the excesses seen in earlier revolutions.

20th Century Spread and Post-War Institutionalization

The early 20th century witnessed an initial expansion of liberal democratic institutions following , with new constitutions adopted in countries such as (1918), (1921), and the , alongside extensions of in established democracies like the (universal male suffrage 1918, female 1928). However, this progress reversed sharply in the , as economic crises and political instability facilitated authoritarian takeovers, including Mussolini's Fascist regime in (1922), the collapse of the in (1933), and military dictatorships in (1939) and much of , reducing the global count of functioning democracies to fewer than 12 by 1940. World War II further eroded democratic systems, but its aftermath marked a pivotal phase of reconstruction and institutionalization under Allied, particularly American, influence. In , liberated nations like (1946 constitution) and (1946 republican referendum) reaffirmed parliamentary systems with strong constitutional protections for rights and rule of law, while adopted the in 1949, establishing federalism, judicial review, and human rights guarantees amid denazification efforts. , under U.S. occupation from 1945 to 1952, enacted a 1947 that enshrined , , and , transforming its imperial structure into a with multiparty elections. These reforms were supported by economic stabilization measures, including the U.S. (1948–1952), which disbursed over $13 billion to 16 European nations, fostering conditions for democratic consolidation by prioritizing market-oriented recovery and anti-communist alliances. Post-war institutionalization extended beyond national levels through multilateral frameworks embedding liberal democratic norms. The , founded in 1949, promoted via the (1950), which established enforceable standards for fair trials and freedoms of expression and association among member states. NATO's formation in 1949 included commitments to democratic governance in its , while the (1957) integrated economic cooperation with political stability requirements, laying groundwork for supranational oversight of rule-of-law principles. These structures countered Soviet expansion during the , incentivizing allied states to maintain electoral accountability, independent judiciaries, and protections against arbitrary power. The late 20th century accelerated the spread through what political scientist termed the "third wave" of , commencing in 1974 with Portugal's , which ended its authoritarian Estado Novo regime and inspired transitions in (1975, post-Franco) and (1974, post-junta). This wave encompassed over 30 countries by 1990, doubling the global number of democracies: Latin American shifts included (1983), Brazil (1985), and (1990); East Asian examples featured the (1986), (1987), and (1996); and the 1989–1991 Eastern European revolutions dismantled communist systems in , , , and the Soviet successor states, adopting constitutions with multiparty elections and market reforms. Institutionalization involved adopting bills of rights, electoral commissions, and international monitoring, though not all transitions yielded stable liberal democracies, as some retained weak constraints on executive power or clientelistic practices. By 2000, assessments identified 120 electoral democracies worldwide, representing 63% of countries—the highest proportion in history—driven by ideological rejection of and economic pressures favoring open systems.

Defining Elements

Rule of Law and Constitutional Limits

The in liberal democracy requires that government officials and institutions be accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, ensuring no one is above the law. This principle distinguishes liberal democracies from majoritarian systems by constraining arbitrary exercises of power, including by elected majorities, through fixed legal standards that protect individual rights and limit state authority. Empirical data from the World Justice Project's Index, covering over 140 countries from 2012 to 2023, show that higher rule of law scores correlate with greater political stability and reduced , as measured by factors like government powers limited by the and absence of corruption, underscoring its role in sustaining democratic governance. Constitutional limits operationalize the by establishing supreme legal frameworks that enumerate and restrict government powers, often through written constitutions that mandate , , and mechanisms like . For instance, the U.S. Constitution of explicitly divides authority among legislative, executive, and judicial branches while reserving unenumerated powers to states and individuals via the Bill of Rights, preventing any branch from dominating. In practice, —exemplified by the U.S. Supreme Court's 1803 decision in , which asserted the power to strike down unconstitutional laws—serves as a check on legislative and executive overreach, a feature adopted in many liberal democracies to enforce constitutional supremacy. This framework addresses the risk of "," where unchecked democratic processes could erode , as evidenced by historical cases like post-Revolutionary France's sans-culottide excesses in 1793, where without legal bounds led to arbitrary executions. Independent judiciaries are central to these limits, insulating legal interpretation from political pressure and ensuring consistent application of laws. Studies, such as those from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) tracking 202 countries since 1789, indicate that robust judicial constraints on executives—measured by indicators like legislative oversight and —predict lower , with countries scoring high on these metrics in 2022 experiencing 30% fewer instances of executive aggrandizement than low-scorers. Without such limits, as seen in illiberal regimes like under since 2010, governments have curtailed media and judicial autonomy through laws overriding constitutional checks, eroding democratic quality despite electoral facades. Thus, constitutionalism in liberal democracy prioritizes procedural fairness and predictability over expediency, fostering long-term institutional trust essential for viable .

Individual Rights and Liberties

Individual rights and liberties constitute a core defining feature of liberal democracy, serving to constrain governmental authority and prevent the subordination of minorities to majority will. These protections encompass negative liberties, which safeguard individuals from or interference by the state or others, including freedoms of speech, , , assembly, association, and , as well as rights to and equality under the law. Such rights are enshrined in constitutions to ensure their precedence over legislative enactments, thereby mitigating risks of arbitrary power exercise. The philosophical foundations trace to Enlightenment thinkers, particularly , whose (1689) asserted natural rights to life, liberty, and property as pre-political entitlements that legitimate government only insofar as it secures them through consent. further elaborated in (1859) the , limiting interference to cases preventing harm to others, thus prioritizing individual autonomy for and societal progress. , observing early American democracy, identified the "tyranny of the majority" as a peril where popular opinion could suppress dissent, advocating institutional checks like and to preserve liberties. Institutionally, liberal democracies implement these via bills of rights, independent judiciaries, and constitutional courts empowered with to invalidate infringing laws. For instance, mechanisms such as the U.S. First Amendment and precedents protect expressive freedoms against legislative overreach, while European counterparts like the enforce similar standards across member states. These arrangements uphold the supremacy of individual over collective imperatives, fostering environments where personal initiative and drive social order rather than state direction.

Electoral Accountability and Representation

Electoral in liberal democracies operates through periodic, competitive elections that enable voters to reward or punish incumbents based on their performance in office, thereby constraining policy-making and incentivizing responsiveness to public preferences. This mechanism relies on voters' ability to attribute outcomes to specific governments, with demonstrating retrospective economic voting as a primary driver: higher GDP growth correlates with increased support for incumbents, while recessions lead to electoral losses, as observed in analyses of countries from 1946 to 2000. Political representation complements accountability by ensuring elected officials reflect and advance constituents' interests, either through descriptive similarity (e.g., demographic matching) or substantive alignment. Studies indicate that substantive representation emerges where voter preferences influence legislative behavior, particularly in systems with strong electoral connections, though gaps persist for underrepresented groups. Electoral systems shape this dynamic: majoritarian systems, such as first-past-the-post, foster clearer by linking district outcomes directly to individual representatives, enhancing geographic representation and sanctioning potential, whereas systems promote broader ideological mirroring but can dilute responsibility through governments. Despite these strengths, challenges undermine electoral and representation, including information asymmetries that hinder voter assessment, incumbency advantages that insulate officials from sanctions, and institutional factors like or low turnout that distort representation. highlights that clarity of responsibility—stronger in single-party majorities—affects voting patterns, with fragmented governments facing weaker economic . In practice, these limitations reveal that while elections provide a foundational check, supplementary mechanisms like and judicial oversight are essential to bolster effective in liberal democracies.

Preconditions for Viability

Economic Foundations

Secure property rights constitute a fundamental economic precondition for the viability of liberal democracy, as they protect individuals and enterprises from arbitrary expropriation, thereby encouraging long-term , , and essential for sustaining democratic institutions. Without reliable enforcement of these rights through impartial legal systems, economic agents face disincentives to productive activity, leading to stagnation that undermines public support for democratic processes and increases vulnerability to authoritarian alternatives. Empirical analyses confirm that robust property rights correlate with higher rates, which in turn bolster democratic stability by generating resources for electoral competition, , and civic participation. Market-oriented economic systems, characterized by minimal government intervention in pricing, , and production, further underpin liberal democracy by promoting efficient and widespread . Cross-national data reveal a strong positive correlation between indices—assessing , regulatory burdens, and market openness—and democracy indices measuring and , with freer economies exhibiting greater resistance to democratic . For instance, countries scoring above 7.5 on the Fraser Institute's index from 2000 to 2020 maintained average Polity IV democracy scores exceeding 8, compared to below 5 for those scoring under 5. This linkage arises because capitalist growth expands the , whose stake in stable institutions demands and limits populist expropriation. Economic preconditions also mitigate risks of inequality-driven instability, as growth from free markets historically diffuses wealth sufficiently to align and interests with democratic norms, though unchecked can erode these foundations. Studies indicate that liberal democracies with high experience lower levels, as measured by Transparency International's index, due to competitive pressures and transparent contracting that reinforce . In contrast, resource-dependent or heavily state-controlled economies show higher democratic reversals, underscoring the causal role of market discipline in preserving electoral accountability.

Cultural and Social Requirements

Liberal democracies depend on a foundation of interpersonal trust and to facilitate voluntary , enforce contracts without excessive state intervention, and sustain electoral among diverse citizens. Empirical analyses from the across multiple countries demonstrate that higher levels of generalized social trust—defined as the belief that most people can be trusted—positively correlate with support for democratic norms and institutions, mediating through channels like reduced perceptions and increased civic participation. This trust enables citizens to accept outcomes of while protecting minorities, as low-trust environments foster preferences for authoritarian alternatives that promise order over pluralism. Cultural emphasis on , rather than collectivism, underpins viable liberal democracy by prioritizing personal agency and over group subordination, fostering and restraint against majoritarian excesses. Modeling from cross-national shows individualistic cultures exhibit higher democratic stability, as they align with institutional demands for independent voters and entrepreneurs who challenge state overreach. observed in 1830s America that democratic success hinged on ""—customs of , voluntary associations, and religious morality—that tempered equality's passions and prevented centralized , arguing these habits, not just laws, preserved by encouraging local initiative over to . Conversely, collectivist orientations, prevalent in some non-Western societies, correlate with weaker adherence to , as loyalty to kin or undermines impartial institutions. Ethnic and cultural homogeneity supports social cohesion essential for democratic viability, with rapid diversity often eroding trust and participation in the short term. Robert Putnam's 2007 analysis of U.S. communities found that greater ethnic diversity predicts lower —measured by trust, altruism, and —leading residents to "hunker down" and withdraw from collective endeavors, a dynamic that strains democratic and increases polarization. Stable liberal democracies like those in historically benefited from relative homogeneity, enabling high-trust equilibria; interventions to accelerate diversity without assimilation have inversely correlated with trust declines in subsequent surveys. Samuel Huntington argued that Western cultural prerequisites, including Protestant-derived values of and secular governance, provide the substrate for democracy's endurance, with non-Western imports facing adaptation barriers that explain uneven third-wave transitions post-1974. Tolerance for pluralism and , rooted in cultural acceptance of and , remains critical to avert populist capture. Surveys indicate societies valuing these traits—often tied to Enlightenment legacies—exhibit resilience against illiberal , whereas cultures prioritizing harmony over contestation favor hybrid regimes. High and levels, as social enablers, amplify these by equipping citizens for informed voting; historical data from 19th-century expansions show democracies thriving where exceeded 50% by 1900, enabling mass participation without . Absent such cultural moorings, formal institutions falter, as evidenced by post-colonial failures where transplanted constitutions ignored local mores favoring rule. Liberal democracies rely on institutional arrangements that distribute power across branches of government to prevent any single entity from dominating, a principle rooted in the doctrine articulated by thinkers like and implemented in systems such as the U.S. of 1787. Checks and balances enable each branch—legislative, executive, and judicial—to monitor and constrain the others, for instance through legislative vetoes over executive actions, executive vetoes subject to legislative override, and of laws for constitutionality. This framework mitigates risks of authoritarian consolidation by requiring consensus across institutions for major policy shifts, as evidenced in the U.S. system's resistance to unilateral executive overreach, where controls funding and the confirms appointments. Empirical analysis shows that robust checks correlate with lower democratic backsliding rates; countries with strong bicameral legislatures and independent executives, like post-1949, have sustained liberal institutions amid polarization. An independent judiciary serves as a critical legal safeguard, empowered to enforce constitutional limits and protect individual rights against majority encroachments or state overreach. , formalized in cases like (1803) in the U.S., allows courts to invalidate legislation or executive orders violating entrenched principles such as and equal protection. In viable liberal democracies, judges are appointed through processes insulating them from partisan control, such as lifetime tenure or fixed terms with removal only for misconduct, as in the framework under the 1950 Convention. This independence has proven effective in curbing executive aggrandizement; for example, India's in 1973's case established the "basic structure" doctrine, barring amendments that undermine core democratic features like and . However, judicial efficacy depends on mechanisms and public legitimacy, with data from the Varieties of Democracy project indicating that judiciaries insulated from political interference reduce by up to 20% in established systems. Legal safeguards extend to and measures, ensuring accountability without enabling subversion. Independent electoral commissions, as in Canada's established under the 1920 Dominion Elections Act, oversee voting processes with mandates for transparency, fraud detection via audits, and dispute resolution, preventing manipulation that could erode representation. Constitutional term limits on executives, adopted in over 130 countries by 2020 per the Comparative Constitutions Project, constrain indefinite rule; Mexico's 2014 reform capped presidential terms at six years without reelection, stabilizing transitions post-PRI dominance. bodies with prosecutorial autonomy, like Singapore's since 1952, enforce laws neutrally, correlating with sustained rule-of-law indices above 1.5 standard deviations in global metrics. These institutions collectively form bulwarks against , though their viability hinges on adherence; instances of erosion, such as Hungary's 2011 constitutional changes packing courts, underscore that formal safeguards require vigilant enforcement to avert capture.

Institutional Forms

Electoral Mechanisms

Electoral mechanisms in liberal democracies center on periodic, competitive elections that enable citizens to hold governments accountable by selecting or replacing representatives. These systems typically require universal adult suffrage, extending voting rights to all citizens aged 18 or older without discrimination based on sex, race, or property ownership, a standard achieved in most Western liberal democracies by the mid-20th century, such as New Zealand granting women suffrage in 1893 and the United States via the 19th Amendment in 1920. Elections must be free and fair, with safeguards against fraud, including independent oversight and transparent vote counting, as measured by indices like V-Dem's electoral democracy components, which assess suffrage inclusiveness and election cleanliness on a 0-1 scale. A defining feature is the , which prevents voter intimidation and bribery by concealing individual choices, originating in in 1856 and widely adopted to ensure genuine expression of preferences. Multi-party competition is essential, allowing voters to choose among ideologically diverse options, with regulations on party registration and campaigning to maintain pluralism while barring authoritarian dominance. Empirical analyses indicate that such mechanisms foster retrospective accountability, where voters punish incumbents for poor performance, as evidenced in studies of electoral responses to economic downturns in established democracies. Liberal democracies employ varied electoral systems to translate votes into seats, broadly categorized as majoritarian, proportional, or mixed. Majoritarian systems, like first-past-the-post (FPTP) used in the and , award seats to candidates with the most votes in single-member districts, promoting stable governments but often resulting in disproportional outcomes where parties win large seat majorities with minority vote shares, as seen in the UK's where the Conservatives secured 56% of seats with 43% of votes. Proportional representation (PR) systems, prevalent in and the , allocate seats based on vote proportions across multi-member districts or national lists, enhancing minority representation and policy congruence but risking fragmented parliaments and coalition instability. Mixed systems, such as Germany's, combine district winners with party-list proportionality to balance local and broader representation. These mechanisms empirically support governance , with research showing that PR systems can moderate party fragmentation to reduce instability compared to pure majoritarian setups, though both types enable voter-driven alternations in power, as in over 100 peaceful government turnovers in liberal democracies since 1945. However, challenges persist, including low turnout—averaging below 70% in many liberal democracies—and in district-based systems, which can undermine perceived fairness despite legal mitigations. Voter information levels critically influence effectiveness, with informed electorates better enforcing through coordinated .

System of Government

In liberal democracies, the system of government delineates the institutional interplay between executive and legislative authority, ensuring mechanisms for democratic accountability while safeguarding against concentrated power. The predominant forms are parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential systems, each adapting the separation or fusion of powers to maintain electoral responsiveness and constitutional constraints. Parliamentary systems, the most common in long-established liberal democracies, integrate executive selection with legislative confidence, as the prime minister and cabinet derive authority from and remain answerable to parliament via mechanisms like no-confidence votes. This fusion promotes policy alignment but demands ongoing legislative support, exemplified in nations such as the United Kingdom, where the executive's survival hinges on majority backing, and Germany, where coalition dynamics enforce compromise. Presidential systems, conversely, enforce strict separation through direct popular election of the president as and , coupled with fixed terms independent of legislative cycles, fostering dual democratic legitimacy from voters for both branches. This design, as —where the president serves four-year terms and cannot dissolve —prioritizes stability and checks against legislative overreach but can engender during , when opposing partisan control impedes policymaking. Such systems are rarer among enduring liberal democracies, comprising fewer than 20% of cases in and the , with prevalence higher in , where they correlate with elevated risks of executive-legislative deadlock. Semi-presidential systems blend features, featuring a directly elected president sharing executive duties with a accountable to , whose power balance varies by constitutional design—stronger presidential influence in , for instance, as in since its 1958 Fifth Republic . This hybrid, adopted in about 30% of democracies globally, offers flexibility but invites dual legitimacy conflicts, particularly during "" when president and parliamentary majority diverge. Empirical analyses across 150+ countries from 1946 to 2002 reveal parliamentary systems yield superior democratic survival rates, with breakdown probabilities 10-15 percentage points lower than in presidential regimes, attributed to adaptive leadership transitions averting crises. Nonetheless, exceptions like the underscore that robust and judicial oversight can mitigate presidential vulnerabilities, sustaining liberal democratic continuity for over two centuries.

Division of Powers

In liberal democracies, the division of powers—often termed —allocates authority among distinct branches of government to avert the concentration of power in any single entity, thereby safeguarding individual liberties against potential tyranny. This principle posits that legislative authority resides in bodies responsible for enacting laws, executive power in entities enforcing them, and judicial power in courts interpreting and applying them, with each branch exercising oversight over the others through mechanisms of checks and balances. articulated this framework in The Spirit of the Laws (1748), drawing from observations of the English post-1688 , where he identified functional distinctions that moderated monarchical rule, influencing subsequent constitutional designs like the U.S. Constitution of 1787. The legislative branch, typically a or elected by the populace, holds primacy in lawmaking and budgetary control, as exemplified by Article I of the U.S. Constitution, which vests "all legislative Powers" in . Executive authority, vested in a president or , encompasses policy implementation, , and command of armed forces, subject to legislative approval for appointments and funding; for instance, the U.S. president requires Senate confirmation for key officials under Article II. The judiciary maintains independence to adjudicate disputes, review laws for constitutionality—a power affirmed in (1803)—and protect rights, insulated from political interference through lifetime appointments in systems like the U.S. federal courts. Checks and balances operationalize this division: executives may veto legislation (overridable by supermajorities), legislatures impeach officials, and courts invalidate unconstitutional acts, as structured in the U.S. framework to induce mutual dependence among branches. Liberal democracies exhibit variations in this division, particularly between presidential and parliamentary systems. Presidential systems enforce stricter separation, with the executive independently elected and not deriving authority from the , reducing risks of legislative dominance but potentially causing , as analyzed in cross-national studies showing higher instability in such regimes under . Parliamentary systems fuse executive and legislative powers, as the emerges from and remains accountable to the majority party in —evident in the UK's unwritten constitution—facilitating efficient policymaking yet relying on to mimic separation through internal checks. Both forms preserve judicial autonomy, though empirical data indicate that higher political competition correlates with greater across democracies, enhancing adherence and correlating with improved scores in indices like those from (2022 data showing top-quartile democracies averaging 1.2-point higher judicial independence metrics). This institutional arrangement empirically underpins liberal democracy's resilience, with studies of 180 countries from 1970–2020 revealing that robust separation correlates with lower executive tenure extensions and reduced indices (e.g., World Bank's Control of metric averaging 0.8 standard deviations higher in high-separation systems). However, erosion occurs when branches encroach, as in executive overreach via powers or legislative packing of courts, underscoring the causal necessity of vigilant to sustain democratic .

Empirical Evidence of Outcomes

Economic Performance

Empirical analyses demonstrate that liberal democracies exhibit higher long-term GDP compared to authoritarian regimes, with transitions to democracy associated with approximately 20% increases in GDP over 15-25 years. This effect persists after controlling for country fixed effects, historical trends, and reverse causality, as shown in dynamic panel regressions using and other . Earlier cross-sectional studies often found weak or null correlations between regime type and growth rates, but instrumental variable approaches addressing endogeneity reveal a causal positive impact of democratic institutions on economic output. Mechanisms include enhanced investment, accumulation, and reduced , as democratic accountability incentivizes policies favoring broad-based prosperity over . Liberal democracies also correlate strongly with —encompassing , property rights, and open markets—which exhibits a 0.74 with GDP and drives higher levels, with top-quintile free economies averaging five times the of the bottom quintile. In contrast, authoritarian regimes frequently overstate GDP growth by around 35%, as evidenced by discrepancies between official figures and satellite night-lights data, inflating perceived performance. Innovation metrics further underscore this disparity: democracies generate more patents per capita and sustain technological advancement through open information flows and competitive markets, whereas authoritarian controls stifle creative disruption despite state-directed efforts. While some autocracies, such as , achieve rapid short-term growth via , these trajectories often falter due to misallocation, debt accumulation, and vulnerability to shocks, lacking the adaptive resilience of inclusive institutions. Overall, liberal democracies avoid catastrophic downturns and deliver superior sustained prosperity, though outcomes vary with complementary factors like cultural norms and initial conditions.

Political Stability and Corruption Control

Liberal democracies exhibit robust mechanisms for controlling corruption, primarily through independent judiciaries, free media scrutiny, and electoral accountability that incentivize public officials to avoid malfeasance. The 2023 (CPI) by ranks established liberal democracies at the top, with Denmark scoring 90 out of 100, 87, 85, 84, and 82 each, and the 79, reflecting perceptions of low public-sector graft based on expert assessments and surveys from 13 sources. These scores correlate with institutional features like rule-of-law enforcement and transparency laws, which empirical studies link to reduced and in consolidated democracies compared to autocracies, where unchecked power enables systemic . Cross-national research confirms an inverted U-shaped relationship between democracy levels and corruption: partial or transitional regimes often see elevated graft due to weak checks, but full liberal democracies—characterized by high electoral competition, civil liberties, and vertical accountability—achieve the lowest levels, outperforming both autocracies and hybrid systems. For instance, a study analyzing Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data finds that high-democracy polities reduce corruption by fostering public goods provision over private gain, with causal evidence from natural experiments showing democratic transitions lowering perceived corruption by 0.5-1 standard deviations. The World Bank's 2023 Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) further substantiate this, assigning control-of-corruption estimates near the maximum (2.5 on a -2.5 to 2.5 scale) to liberal democracies like those in Scandinavia and Oceania, derived from over 30 data sources including enterprise and citizen surveys. While some autocracies like Singapore score highly (CPI 83), its hybrid model relies on non-liberal elements such as restricted speech, underscoring that liberal institutions—press freedom and opposition pluralism—provide more sustainable anti-corruption dynamics than top-down authoritarian controls, which falter post-leader. On political stability, liberal democracies record fewer violent upheavals, coups, and regime breakdowns than autocracies, with peaceful electoral turnovers averaging over 90% of power changes since 1946 per Polity IV data. Cross-national regressions from 180 countries (1960-2000) demonstrate that democracies are 20-30% less prone to , measured by crises or protests escalating to , due to institutionalized bargaining and mitigating grievances. The World Bank's WGI Political Stability indicator for 2023 percentiles high-performing liberal democracies (e.g., , above 90th percentile) against autocratic volatility, where sudden elite fractures trigger collapses, as seen in 40% of post-1970 autocratic failures versus under 5% in democracies. Empirical analyses of three democratic waves link stability to liberal safeguards like and , which absorb shocks from inequality or polarization, contrasting autocracies' brittleness under resource windfalls or succession crises.
IndicatorLiberal Democracies Average (e.g., democracies)Autocracies Average (e.g., closed regimes per )
CPI Score (2023)75+ (top quartile)30-40 (bottom half)
WGI Control of Corruption (2023 est.)1.5 to 2.0-0.5 to 0.5
WGI Political Stability Percentile (2023)80th+Below 50th
This table aggregates data for illustrative comparison; outliers exist, but patterns hold across panels controlling for income and culture. Recent populist challenges in some democracies, such as policy volatility from coalition shifts, test but do not erode core stability, as evidenced by zero successful coups in since . Autocracies, conversely, face higher baseline instability risks, with 70% of 20th-century breakdowns occurring in non-democracies due to unaccountable rule fostering factional violence.

Human Flourishing and Social Metrics

Liberal democracies exhibit superior performance on key metrics of human flourishing, including human development, , and health outcomes, as evidenced by cross-national data. The Development Programme's (HDI), which aggregates , , and , places established liberal democracies at the forefront: in the 2023/2024 report, the top-ranked countries— (HDI 0.967), (0.966), (0.959), SAR (0.956, though with eroding democratic institutions), (0.951), (0.948), (0.947), (0.945), (0.942), and (0.941)—are predominantly liberal democracies with robust electoral and . These nations score above 0.94 on the V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index, reflecting high , , and individual rights, in contrast to autocracies averaging below 0.3. Subjective well-being metrics further underscore this pattern. The World Happiness Report's rankings, based on life evaluations from Gallup World Poll data, consistently feature liberal democracies in the top positions: , , , , , , , , , and topped the 2023 edition, with average scores exceeding 7.2 on a 0-10 scale. Analysis of 2020 data reveals a strong positive (Pearson's r = 0.68) between national happiness scores and the V-Dem electoral democracy index, with liberal democracies averaging 1.2 points higher than electoral autocracies. Multilevel studies confirm that liberal and egalitarian varieties of democracy predict higher , independent of income levels, attributing gains to accountable and social protections. Health and longevity metrics align similarly. Democracies demonstrate an average advantage of 11 years over non-democracies, alongside 62.5% lower rates, per global panel data from 1960-2010. Transitions from to correlate with 94% reductions in over decades, as seen in post-1980s cases like and . Liberal democracies also exhibit reduced lifespan inequalities, particularly for men, due to effective policies and reduced premature mortality from non-communicable diseases. Social cohesion indicators, such as rates and interpersonal trust, show liberal democracies sustaining low violence levels comparable to strong autocracies but achieved through institutional rather than . Full democracies average rates below 2 per 100,000, versus 5-10 in hybrid regimes, per 1990-2015 data across 150 countries. Liberal democratic institutions modestly bolster social trust, with stable regimes reporting 10-20% higher generalized trust than autocracies, facilitating voluntary cooperation and lower conflict. These outcomes persist after controlling for confounders like GDP per capita, suggesting causal links via responsive policymaking and rights protections.

Foreign Policy and Conflict Reduction

Liberal democracies demonstrate a empirically observed tendency toward reduced interstate conflict, particularly in dyads involving two such regimes, as articulated in the . Analyses of interstate wars from to the present, drawing on datasets like the project, reveal zero instances of full-scale war between established liberal democracies—defined typically by high levels of electoral competition, , and institutional accountability—after accounting for definitional thresholds such as Polity IV scores exceeding 6. This pattern persists post-World War II, where despite numerous global conflicts, no mature liberal democracies have engaged in war with one another, contrasting with over 100 wars involving at least one non-democracy in the same period. Sensitivity tests on these findings indicate that overturning the negative association between joint democracy and conflict initiation would require implausibly strong unobserved confounders, such as factors forty-seven times more prevalent in non-democratic dyads. Mechanisms underlying this conflict reduction include institutional features that impose high domestic costs on leaders contemplating , such as electoral accountability and transparent deliberation, which deter bluffing and encourage credible signaling in crises. Normative cultures emphasizing compromise and rule-bound resolution further reinforce dyadic , as evidenced by lower rates of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between democracies compared to mixed or autocratic pairs, with joint democratic dyads experiencing disputes at rates 30-50% below expected under null hypotheses of regime irrelevance. In , liberal democracies prioritize multilateral institutions and alliances—such as , founded in 1949, whose 32 members have avoided intra-alliance wars despite historical rivalries—facilitating deterrence and without escalation to violence among participants. These structures correlate with broader dividends, including the European Union's role in eliminating interstate among Western European democracies since 1945 through and shared . While liberal democracies initiate conflicts against non-democracies at rates comparable to autocracies overall, they exhibit lower propensity for severe or prolonged wars and higher reliance on diplomatic or economic , contributing to net conflict mitigation in the international system. Post-1945 data show democracies involved in approximately 20% fewer battle deaths in interstate wars than non-democracies, attributable to constrained escalation and public aversion to casualties. However, foreign policy activism, including interventions to counter threats or promote stability (e.g., U.S.-led coalitions in Korea 1950-1953 and the Gulf War 1990-1991), underscores that effects are dyadic rather than absolute , with alliances amplifying deterrence against external aggressors. This framework has underpinned extended periods of relative great-power , as joint democratic relations reduce miscalculation risks through information transparency and .

Theoretical Rationales

First-Principles Arguments

Liberal democracy derives foundational legitimacy from the principle that individuals possess natural rights to life, liberty, and property, independent of governmental grant. These rights, as articulated by in his Second Treatise of Government, exist in the and necessitate a political order to secure them against infringement, with government's authority stemming solely from the to form a for mutual protection. Locke's framework posits that without such consent-based institutions, individuals retain the right to dissolve tyrannical governments, establishing a causal link between unprotected rights and justified revolution, which underscores the need for accountable representative mechanisms over arbitrary rule. Representative democracy, as a practical extension of this contract, channels through elected delegates rather than direct assembly, mitigating the inefficiencies and passions of pure democracy in extended . , in , reasoned from first principles that factions—arising from human nature's propensity for self-interest—threaten liberty, but a large filters and enlarges views through representation, reducing the risk of majority tyranny while preserving individual rights via constitutional limits. This structure aligns incentives causally: rulers, facing periodic elections, are compelled to prioritize the to retain power, fostering stability absent in systems lacking such feedback loops. Separation of powers and checks and balances further emanate from the axiom that concentrated invites abuse, as unchecked power deviates from its protective purpose. Locke's emphasis on legislative supremacy tempered by executive , combined with Madison's for distributed among branches, ensures no single entity monopolizes , preserving the equilibrium where serves rather than subverting them. Empirical causality reinforces this: historical instances of fused powers, from absolute monarchies to modern autocracies, correlate with erosion, validating the principled division as a bulwark against entropy toward . Market-like competition in liberal democracies—via multipartisan elections and free expression—facilitates error correction and truth approximation, grounded in the recognition that no ruler possesses infallible knowledge. Drawing from theory, this competitive process mirrors voluntary exchange in , where dispersed decision-making outperforms centralized fiat, as individuals best judge their interests when rights to dissent and associate are inviolate. Such principles yield a system resilient to human fallibility, prioritizing causal over ideological fiat.

Causal Theories of Superiority

Causal theories of liberal democracy's superiority posit that its structural features—such as competitive elections, , and protections for individual —generate incentives and feedback mechanisms that systematically produce better outcomes than authoritarian alternatives. These mechanisms include alignment of leader incentives with broad societal interests, enforcement of property to spur , and mechanisms for error correction through , which collectively foster economic , reduced , and adaptive policymaking. Unlike correlational evidence, these theories emphasize directionality: democratic institutions causally shape elite behavior and in ways that prioritize long-term over short-term extraction. One prominent framework is , developed by and colleagues, which models political survival as a function of size. In liberal democracies, the selectorate (those who effectively choose leaders) and winning (subset whose support is essential) are large due to broad and electoral competition, compelling incumbents to provide public goods—like , , and services—distributed widely to secure reelection. This contrasts with autocracies, where small coalitions enable leaders to sustain power via private rents to loyal elites, discouraging investments in productivity-enhancing policies. The predicts and explains why democracies exhibit higher rates and lower policy volatility, as leaders avoid predation to maintain encompassing support bases. Empirical tests, including cross-national data on coalition size and fiscal outcomes, support this causal link, showing larger coalitions correlate with increased public goods provision and GDP growth. Complementing this, and James Robinson's theory of inclusive versus extractive institutions argues that liberal democracies establish political pluralism and economic openness, which causally enable ""—the innovation-driven replacement of obsolete technologies and firms. Inclusive systems secure property rights and contract enforcement for a broad populace, incentivizing and , while checks on executive power prevent that stifles competition. Extractive autocracies, by contrast, centralize control to benefit narrow insiders, leading to stagnation as rulers block innovations threatening their rents. Historical evidence, such as colonial institutional legacies influencing post-independence growth paths, underscores this causality: societies inheriting inclusive frameworks experienced sustained prosperity through reinforced incentives for accumulation and technological adoption. Critiques note potential endogeneity in institution formation, but instrumental variable approaches using settler mortality rates as exogenous shocks affirm the directional impact on income levels. Additional causal channels include enhanced information aggregation and . Democratic deliberation and free media disseminate dispersed to policymakers, enabling superior problem-solving, as theorized in models where voting aggregates preferences more efficiently than top-down directives. Regular elections impose accountability, filtering out incompetent or corrupt leaders faster than autocratic purges, which often perpetuate inefficiency. These dynamics reduce and policy errors, with studies showing democracies' lower crisis propensity stems from such adaptive mechanisms rather than mere stability. While academic sources advancing these theories may reflect institutional preferences in Western scholarship, their reliance on formal modeling and historical case controls mitigates bias toward unsubstantiated optimism.

Evidence-Based Criticisms

Structural Incompatibilities

Liberal democracy incorporates both democratic mechanisms of through elections and liberal constraints such as constitutional protections for , an independent , and , yet these elements harbor inherent tensions that can undermine the system's stability. The democratic emphasis on often conflicts with liberalism's prioritization of limiting governmental power to safeguard minorities and personal liberties, allowing elected majorities to erode institutional checks when public sentiment demands it. For instance, structural provisions intended to prevent "," as theorized by in 1835, prove vulnerable under sustained populist pressure, as seen in cases where democratic mandates lead to the packing of courts or media capture. A primary incompatibility arises from the tension between short-term electoral incentives and long-term policy exigencies. Representatives in liberal democracies face reelection pressures every 2–5 years, fostering policies that prioritize immediate voter —such as expansive welfare expansions or —over fiscal sustainability, which contributes to rising public debt levels; by 2023, advanced liberal democracies averaged debt-to-GDP ratios exceeding 100%, correlating with slowed growth and intergenerational inequities. This dynamic structurally incentivizes "democratic overload," where majority preferences for redistribution clash with liberal economic principles of market efficiency and property rights, potentially leading to as observed in post-1970s welfare states with persistent high taxation and regulatory burdens. Another structural flaw manifests in the incompatibility between and heterogeneous electorates. As populations diversify through , democratic voting can amplify irreconcilable value systems, where majorities rooted in illiberal cultural norms challenge core liberal tenets like free speech or secular governance; empirical analyses show that in European liberal democracies, rising non-Western immigrant shares since the 1990s have correlated with increased support for policies restricting expression, straining . This tension is exacerbated by the system's reliance on shared civic norms, which erode when democratic inclusion extends to groups with low adherence to , as evidenced by surveys indicating declining trust in institutions amid cultural fragmentation in countries like and by 2022. Finally, the , while designed to balance democratic energy with liberal restraint, often results in institutional gridlock that frustrates public will and invites executive overreach. , for example, between 2011 and 2019 led to legislative paralysis on issues like , prompting unilateral actions that bypass and weaken rule-of-law principles. Such dynamics reveal a structural predisposition to either paralysis or authoritarian shortcuts, as majorities perceive liberal veto points—like —as undemocratic barriers, fueling cycles of reform that incrementally consolidate power in elected branches.

Operational Shortcomings

Policy arises frequently in liberal democracies with robust and multipartisan systems, where veto points such as bicameral legislatures and executive overrides hinder timely decision-making, resulting in legislative inaction on pressing issues. Empirical analysis of the U.S. from 1964 to 2016 identifies increasing polarization and institutional fragmentation as primary drivers, with the 113th (2013–2015) enacting only 72 public laws, the lowest since post-World War II records began. This stasis exacerbates public frustration, as evidenced by experimental studies showing prompts support for norm-eroding to bypass constraints. In parliamentary systems like those in , coalition governments similarly produce , with bundling incentives amplifying deadlock under leverage dynamics. Lobbying and interest group influence distort policy outcomes by privileging organized minorities over diffuse majorities, often amounting to legalized capture that undermines egalitarian representation. Scholarly models distinguish from outright but highlight its role in channeling resources to sway regulators and legislators, with data from advanced democracies showing higher lobbying expenditures correlate with policy favors for donors, as in U.S. where corporate PACs directed over $4 billion in the 2020 cycle. manifests when agencies like the U.S. prioritize industry incumbents, delaying innovations and entrenching monopolies, a theorized as dynamic where bureaucrats' career incentives align with regulated entities over . While some argue formalized reduces illicit bribery by providing transparent channels, empirical reviews indicate it sustains grand in grey zones, eroding trust without proportional accountability. Electoral cycles foster short-termism, as incumbents manipulate fiscal and regulatory policies for immediate voter approval, neglecting long-horizon investments like or environmental safeguards. Cross-national studies of parliamentary democracies reveal spending surges pre-election, with deficits rising by 0.5–1% of GDP in election years, contributing to accumulated debt burdens as seen in the Eurozone crisis where Greece's pre-2009 profligacy exemplified cycle-driven myopia. This bias undervalues future generations' interests, rationalized by where politicians discount distant payoffs, leading to policy failures in areas like pension reforms or climate adaptation, where U.K. underinvestment in northern transport persists due to electoral myopia. In the , short-term incentives amplified risk-taking, with regulatory forbearance prioritizing growth over stability. Bureaucratic expansion compounds inefficiencies through hierarchical rigidities and unaccountable , where agencies accrue power via expertise but deliver suboptimal outcomes due to internal pathologies. Theoretical frameworks posit that political incentivizes inefficient bureaucracies to buffer against turnover, with from federal systems showing bloated administrations correlate with slower service delivery, as in EU regulatory delays averaging 2–3 years for approvals. Hierarchical designs foster and capture, with U.S. examples like the EPA's rule-making overload generating compliance costs exceeding $300 billion annually while yielding marginal benefits. Critics note that while bureaucracies mitigate electoral volatility, their insulation from democratic oversight—via protections—enables , as in the U.S. administrative state's expansion beyond congressional intent. Voter behavior introduces operational flaws through low information and participation, enabling irrational or manipulated choices that deviate from competent . Rational ignorance theory explains why individual voters invest minimally in policy knowledge, given negligible impact on outcomes, leading to systematic errors like overvaluing symbolic issues; Anthony Downs's model predicts preferences for simplistic under such conditions. Turnout hovers below 60% in U.S. presidential elections and 40% in midterms, skewing representation toward higher-SES groups and amplifying , though some analyses argue low turnout filters uninformed votes, potentially enhancing efficiency over inclusivity. In , rates exceeding 50% in EP elections (2019) correlate with policy disconnects, where non-voters' interests—often economic losers—are sidelined, fostering alienation without resolving competence deficits.

Ideological and Cultural Conflicts

Liberal democracies encounter ideological conflicts between their core tenets of individual rights, equal treatment under , and universalist principles, and the particularist demands of cultural, religious, or identity-based groups that seek exemptions or preferential policies. These tensions often manifest as challenges to merit-based systems, free expression, and social cohesion, exacerbated by mass and the promotion of without robust assimilation requirements. For instance, in , acknowledged in April 2022 that the country's integration of immigrants over the past two decades had failed, resulting in parallel societies and gang violence disproportionately linked to migrant communities. Similarly, empirical studies in indicate that a 1-percentage-point increase in shares correlates with 1.7–2.5 percentage-point rises in incidents, highlighting causal links between poor integration and public safety erosion. Cultural pluralism, while ostensibly compatible with liberal tolerance, frequently generates asymmetrical pressures where majority norms are subordinated to minority claims, fostering resentment and political backlash. Critics argue that multiculturalism privileges illiberal practices—such as honor-based violence or demands for religious courts—over democratic equality, leading to societal fragmentation rather than unity. In , the influx of Islamist ideologies has intensified these rifts, with events like the 2024 attacks in , , and underscoring Islamist rejection of liberal democratic values such as secular and . reports document how Islamist networks exploit democratic freedoms to advance supremacist agendas, including parallel legal systems that undermine state authority. Identity politics further strains liberal institutions by prioritizing group-based equity over individual agency, eroding trust in impartial processes like and . This shift, prominent in Western academia and media—domains exhibiting systemic progressive bias—manifests in policies like , which empirical analyses show perpetuate division by framing outcomes as zero-sum competitions between identities rather than universal opportunities. In liberal democracies, such dynamics contribute to polarization, as group loyalties supplant , with surveys revealing heightened perceptions of societal threat among both majority and minority populations. Free speech, a of liberal democracy, clashes with expanding definitions of "" and informal mechanisms like , which suppress dissent on cultural issues. In , hate speech laws—varying from broad prohibitions in to narrower ones in the UK—have been criticized for chilling debate on and integration, with organizations like documenting a "free speech recession" where prevails. U.S. surveys from 2022 indicate that 62% of Americans view as a threat to democratic freedoms, reflecting its role in enforcing ideological conformity over open inquiry. These conflicts underscore a broader : accommodating diversity without diluting the principled neutrality that sustains liberal order.

Modern Challenges and Erosion

Patterns of Backsliding

Democratic backsliding refers to the incremental degradation of democratic institutions and norms by incumbents, often through legalistic means rather than violent seizures of power. Empirical studies document a global shift since the mid-2000s from overt disruptions like coups or election-day fraud to subtler tactics, with executive aggrandizement emerging as the dominant mechanism. This involves elected leaders exploiting legislative majorities to weaken horizontal accountability institutions, such as courts and media regulators, while maintaining the facade of electoral competition. A core pattern is the strategic manipulation of electoral frameworks outside polling day, including alterations to districting, voter registration rules, and oversight bodies to tilt outcomes in favor of incumbents. For instance, changes justified as enhancing security—such as stringent identification requirements or centralized electoral commissions—can disproportionately affect opposition voters, reducing without immediate detection. This contrasts with historical promissory coups, where opposition figures promise democratic restoration but fail to deliver, though such cases have declined. Data from analyses show autocratization affecting 71 countries between 2014 and 2024, with 42 undergoing active erosion in 2023 alone, primarily through these non-violent channels. Judicial and media capture constitute another recurring sequence, where governments enact reforms to replace independent actors with loyalists, often under the guise of efficiency or anti-corruption drives. In cases like post-2010 and from 2015 to 2023, constitutional amendments and legislative overrides diminished judicial autonomy, enabling rulings favorable to ruling parties. reports highlight parallel media consolidations, with state-aligned oligarchs acquiring outlets, leading to a 15-year streak of declining press freedom scores globally as of 2022. These patterns thrive amid polarization, where incumbents frame institutional reforms as countermeasures to "" or "foreign" interference, eroding in neutral arbiters. Civil liberties often erode in tandem, with restrictions on assembly, speech, and opposition activities normalized via powers or security laws. V-Dem's multidimensional indices reveal that liberal components of democracy—encompassing these —deteriorate faster than electoral ones during episodes, affecting over one-third of the world's by 2024. While some reforms may address legitimate flaws, empirical evidence links sustained institutional capture to reduced policy responsiveness and heightened risks, as measured by indices like the Varieties of Democracy project's corruption metrics. This distinguishes modern , allowing it to evade early international or domestic backlash until entrenchment occurs.

Rise of Populism and Internal Threats

The rise of in liberal democracies since the mid-2010s has manifested through electoral breakthroughs by parties emphasizing national sovereignty, cultural preservation, and skepticism toward supranational institutions and elite consensus. In the United States, Donald Trump's presidential victory, securing 304 electoral votes despite losing the popular vote by 2.1 percentage points, exemplified this trend, driven by voter discontent over globalization's economic dislocations and policies. Similarly, the United Kingdom's referendum resulted in a 51.9% vote to leave the , reflecting widespread frustration with ' regulatory overreach and free movement policies that strained public services. In Europe, populist parties gained parliamentary seats in national elections, such as Italy's Lega and forming a in 2018 with over 60% of the vote, and France's advancing to the presidential runoff in 2022. By 2024, right-wing populist parties achieved significant gains in elections, with Germany's securing second place nationally and France's topping the poll, signaling a shift from fringe to mainstream influence. These outcomes correlate empirically with stagnant wages for low-skilled workers amid and , as well as rapid demographic changes from , fostering perceptions of elite detachment from native majorities' concerns. Populism poses internal threats to liberal democracy by prioritizing direct expressions of popular will over institutional mediation, often framing liberal elites—judiciaries, media, and bureaucracies—as corrupt intermediaries thwarting the "real people." Leaders like Hungary's , in power since 2010, have restructured courts and media to align with executive preferences, reducing scores in indices tracking democratic quality. In Poland, the party's 2015-2023 rule involved purging the constitutional tribunal and public broadcasters, actions justified as countering post-communist liberal holdovers but criticized for undermining pluralism. Empirical studies indicate that populist governance correlates with declines in democratic indicators, such as freedom of expression and , particularly when combined with weak opposition and high executive powers, though outright authoritarian consolidation requires additional factors like acquiescence. Trump's post-2020 election challenges, including the , 2021, Capitol events, tested U.S. transfer-of-power norms, eroding public trust in electoral processes to levels where 30% of Republicans in 2023 polls questioned the 2020 results' legitimacy, amplifying polarization. Yet, scholarly assessments reveal 's dual nature, functioning not solely as a corrosive force but as a corrective to liberal democracy's representational deficits, where entrenched parties ignore economic insecurity and cultural anxieties. Analyses of over 50 countries show populist episodes rarely lead to full democratic breakdown without pre-existing institutional frailties, with many instances—such as Brazil's under (2019-2023)—resulting in electoral defeat rather than permanent erosion. Root causes, including globalization's unequal benefits and digital media's amplification of grievances, suggest populism reflects causal failures in liberal systems to address working-class decline, with displacing 20-30% of jobs in advanced economies since 2000. Internal threats intensify when populists capture power amid low elite accountability, but evidence indicates that robust constitutional designs can contain these impulses, as seen in the U.S. Supreme Court's role in limiting executive overreach. Mainstream analyses from academia, often aligned with liberal paradigms, may overstate existential risks while underemphasizing populism's role in realigning policies toward voter priorities, such as stricter controls that polls show majority support for in multiple democracies.

External Pressures from Non-Democratic Systems

Authoritarian regimes, notably and , impose external pressures on liberal democracies via hybrid tactics that blend economic leverage, , cyber operations, and to undermine democratic institutions without direct confrontation. These efforts aim to erode , polarize societies, and promote autocratic models as alternatives, often exploiting open democratic systems' vulnerabilities such as free speech and . China's influence operations target Western democracies through , , and economic dependencies, with state-linked entities investing over $280 million in U.S. political influence from 2017 to 2023, surpassing other foreign actors. Tactics include the Work Department's efforts to co-opt communities, academics, and politicians, as seen in the establishment of Institutes on university campuses until widespread closures due to concerns by 2021. has also employed economic , such as imposing bans on Australian exports worth billions following Canberra's 2020 call for a origins inquiry, demonstrating how market access is weaponized to deter policy independence. Russia escalates hybrid warfare against NATO members, with cyber attacks on alliance states rising 25% in the year ending October 2025, alongside sabotage operations targeting in . Moscow's playbook includes disinformation campaigns amplifying social divisions, as during the 2016 U.S. election interference via hacked emails released through , and weaponizing migration, such as Belarus's 2021 orchestration of border crises to strain EU resources. These actions, coordinated by military intelligence units like GRU, seek to test alliance resolve and foster hesitancy in supporting , where Russian aggression since February 2022 has indirectly pressured European democracies through energy blackmail and refugee inflows exceeding 6 million by mid-2023. Such pressures compound when autocracies co-opt international norms, as in China's push to reshape global institutions toward authoritarian preferences, evidenced by its 2020 vetoes in UN bodies favoring state sovereignty over scrutiny. Democracies face challenges in responding due to internal divisions and reluctance to mirror coercive tactics, yet coordinated measures like the EU's sanctions regime and NATO's hybrid threat centers have mitigated some impacts, though vulnerabilities persist amid supply chain reliance on non-democratic suppliers.

Technological and Informational Disruptions

The advent of digital platforms has fundamentally altered the informational landscape underpinning liberal democracies, shifting from gatekept to decentralized, algorithm-driven networks that prioritize user engagement over deliberative discourse. enables instantaneous global reach for political messaging, but this has facilitated the proliferation of and fragmented audiences into ideological silos, undermining the shared factual basis essential for electoral and civic . Empirical analyses indicate that exposure to such environments correlates with heightened affective polarization, where partisan animus intensifies beyond disagreements. Algorithmic curation exacerbates these dynamics by amplifying emotionally charged or extreme content to maximize retention, fostering echo chambers that reinforce preexisting biases rather than exposing users to diverse viewpoints. A comprehensive of Twitter's revealed that algorithms preferentially elevate political content, with right-leaning material receiving disproportionate amplification in certain contexts, contributing to asymmetric polarization. Similarly, a 2023 experimental study across platforms like and demonstrated that removing algorithmic recommendations modestly reduced users' exposure to political news and slightly attenuated partisan hostility, suggesting that default amplification mechanisms causally drive attitudinal divides. Recent modeling further posits that core mechanics—posting, reposting, and following—intrinsically generate polarization even absent explicit algorithms, as network effects concentrate influence among ideologically clustered users. Misinformation campaigns, often state-sponsored or virally propagated, have eroded public confidence in electoral processes by sowing doubt about vote integrity and outcomes. , false narratives surrounding the 2020 presidential election, amplified via platforms like and , persisted into subsequent cycles, with surveys showing sustained belief in fraud claims among segments of the electorate, correlating with diminished trust in democratic institutions. Internationally, similar disruptions occurred in the 2024 global elections across over 60 countries, where targeted voter suppression and result delegitimization, though direct vote swings proved limited; instead, impacts manifested in behavioral nudges like reduced turnout or heightened contestation. research attributes this erosion to the velocity of false information outpacing corrections, destabilizing perceptions of procedural fairness without altering core voter preferences en masse. Emerging technologies pose escalating risks through generative tools enabling deepfakes and that fabricate credible audiovisual deceptions, potentially impersonating candidates or altering event narratives to influence voter behavior. During the U.S. primaries, AI-generated audio mimicking President Biden discouraged New Hampshire Democratic voters from participating, marking an early instance of electoral manipulation via accessible tools; globally, deepfakes proliferated in Indian, Slovakian, and other contests, fabricating scandals or endorsements despite regulatory efforts. While saw no systemic election overturns from AI—due partly to platform mitigations and voter resilience—experts forecast amplified threats by 2028, as open-source models democratize fabrication, outstripping detection capabilities and amplifying narrative distortions in low-trust environments. Cyber vulnerabilities compound these informational threats by targeting electoral infrastructure, including databases, tabulation systems, and campaign networks, often via state actors seeking disruption or intelligence. In liberal democracies, incidents such as Russian attempts to probe U.S. vendors in 2016 and Iranian hacks on campaign emails in 2024 underscore persistent risks, with DDoS attacks and straining administrative resilience without always altering tallies. The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security reported elevated threats during 2025 federal preparations, emphasizing that even unsuccessful intrusions erode procedural legitimacy by fueling post-hoc skepticism. These assaults exploit digitized systems' interconnectedness, where a single breach can cascade into widespread doubt, particularly when paired with parallel operations.

References

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