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History of Lebanon

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The history of Lebanon covers the history of the modern Republic of Lebanon and the earlier emergence of Greater Lebanon under the French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, as well as the previous history of the region, covered by the modern state.[1]

The modern State of Lebanon has existed within its current borders since 1920, when Greater Lebanon was created under French and British mandate, resulting from the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I.[2] Before this date, the designation "Lebanon" concerned a territory with vaguely defined borders, encompassing the mountain range of Mount Lebanon and its outskirts (mainly the Mediterranean coast and the plains of Bekaa and Akkar). The idea of an independent Lebanon, however, emerged during the end of the Mount Lebanon Emirate where Maronite clerics vowed for an independent nation.

Prehistory

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Ksar Akil, 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) northeast of Beirut, is a large rock shelter below a steep limestone cliff where excavations have shown occupational deposits reaching down to a depth of 23.6 metres (77 ft) with one of the longest sequences of Paleolithic flint archaeological industry is a very well tained[check spelling] Upper Levalloiso-Mousterian remains with long and triangular lithic flakes. The level above this showed industries accounting for all six stages of the Upper Paleolithic. An Emireh point was found at the first stage of this level (XXIV), at around 15.2 metres (50 ft) below datum with a complete skeleton of an eight-year-old modern human (called Egbert, now in the National Museum of Beirut after being studied in America) was discovered at 11.6 metres (38 ft), cemented into breccia. A fragment of a Neanderthal maxilla was also discovered in material from level XXVI or XXV, at around 15 metres (49 ft). Studies by Hooijer showed wild goat and fallow deer were dominant in the fauna along with the extinct narrow-nosed rhinoceros in later Levalloiso-Mousterian levels.[3]

It is believed to be one of the earliest known sites containing Upper Paleolithic technologies. Artifacts recovered from the site include Ksar Akil flakes, the main type of tool found at the site, along with shells with holes and chipped edge modifications that are suggested to have been used as pendants or beads. These indicate that the inhabitants were among the first in Western Eurasia to use personal ornaments. Results from radiocarbon dating indicate that the early humans may have lived at the site approximately 45,000 years ago or earlier. The presence of personal ornaments at Ksar Akil is suggestive of modern human behavior. The findings of ornaments at the site are contemporaneous with ornaments found at Late Stone Age sites such as Enkapune Ya Muto.[4][5][6]

Ancient Near East

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The earliest prehistoric cultures of Lebanon, such as the Qaraoun culture gave rise to the civilization of the Canaanite period, when the region was populated by ancient peoples, cultivating land and living in sophisticated societies during the 2nd millennium BC. Northern Canaanites are mentioned in the Bible as well as in other Semitic records from that period.

Canaanites were the creators of the oldest known 24-letter alphabet, a shortening of earlier 30-letter alphabets such as Proto-Sinaitic and Ugaritic. The Canaanite alphabet later developed into the Phoenician one (with sister alphabets of Hebrew, Aramaic and Moabite), influencing the writing systems of the entire Mediterranean region, and ultimately much of Africa, Asia, and Europe.

The coastal plain of Lebanon is the historic home of a string of coastal trading cities of Semitic culture, which the Greeks termed Phoenicia, whose maritime culture flourished there for more than 1,000 years. Ancient ruins in Byblos, Berytus (Beirut), Sidon, Sarepta (Sarafand), and Tyre show a civilized nation, with urban centres and sophisticated arts.

Phoenicia was a cosmopolitan centre for many nations and cultures. Phoenician art, customs and religion reveal considerable Mesopotamian and Egyptian influence. The sarcophagi of Sidonian kings Eshmunazzar II and Tabnit reveal that Phoenician royalty adopted Egyptian burial customs.

Phoenician traders exported spices from Arabia, such as cinnamon and frankincense, to the Greeks.[7] This trade likely led to the transmission of the Phoenician alphabet to Greece. Herodotus attests that the Phoenicians

"introduced into Greece upon their arrival a great variety of arts, among the rest that of writing, whereof the Greeks till then had, as I think, been ignorant."[8]

According to legend however, it is Cadmus, Prince of Tyre, who brought the alphabet with him to Greece in his search for his abducted sister Europa. Cadmus ultimately settles in Greece and founds the city of Thebes. Ancient Greek history accepts the Phoenician origin of the Greek alphabet. According to Herodotus,

"[the Greeks] originally they shaped their letters exactly like all the other Phoenicians, but afterwards, in course of time, they changed by degrees their language, and together with it the form likewise of their characters."[8]

Herodotus attests the persistence of traces of the Phoenician alphabet in Greece on tripods in Delphi in what is now known as the 5th century BC.[9] The Phoenicians were equally reputed for their seafaring skills. They were allegedly the first to circumnavigate the African continent. Herodotus writes that Egyptian Pharaoh Necos,

"[...] sent to sea a number of ships manned by Phoenicians, with orders to make for the Pillars of Hercules [the Strait of Gibraltar], and return to Egypt through them, and by the Mediterranean. The Phoenicians took their departure from Egypt by way of the Erythraean sea [the Red Sea], and so sailed into the southern ocean. When autumn came, they went ashore, wherever they might happen to be, and having sown a tract of land with corn, waited until the grain was fit to cut. Having reaped it, they again set sail; and thus it came to pass that two whole years went by, and it was not till the third year that they doubled the Pillars of Hercules, and made good their voyage home. On their return, they declared — I for my part do not believe them, but perhaps others may - that in sailing round Libya [i.e., Africa] they had the sun upon their right hand. In this way was the extent of Libya first discovered."[10]

The last phrase is usually regarded by modern historians as lending credibility to the Phoenician narrative, as they could not have otherwise known that the sun would be on their right hand side as they sailed southwards below the Equator line.

The Phoenicians founded various colonies in the Mediterranean. The most famous of them are Carthage in today's Tunisia, Tripoli in today's Libya, Gadir (Cadiz) and Barcelona in today's Spain, Palermo in today's Italy, Lisbon in today's Portugal.[11][12][13][14]

Phoenicia maintained an uneasy tributary relationship with the neo-Assyrian and neo-Babylonian empires during the 9th to 6th centuries BC.

Classical Antiquity

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After the gradual decline of their strength, the Phoenician city-states on the Lebanese coast were conquered outright in 539 BC by Achaemenid Persia under Cyrus the Great. Under Darius I, the area comprising Phoenicia, Canaan, Syria, and Cyprus was administered in a single satrapy and paid a yearly tribute of three hundred and fifty talents. By comparison, Egypt and Libya paid seven hundred talents.[15] Many Phoenician colonies continued their independent existence—most notably Carthage. The Persians forced some of the population to migrate to Carthage, which remained a powerful nation until the Second Punic War.

The Phoenicians of Tyre showed greater solidarity with their former colony Carthage than loyalty towards Persian king Cambyses, by refusing to sail against the former when ordered.[16]

The Phoenicians furnished the bulk of the Persian fleet during the Greco-Persian Wars.[17] Herodotus considers them as "the best sailors" in the Persian fleet.[18] Phoenicians under Xerxes I were equally commended for their ingenuity in building the Xerxes Canal.[19] Nevertheless, they were harshly punished by the Persian king following the Battle of Salamis, which culminated in a defeat for the Achaemenid Empire.[20]

In 350 or 345 BC, a rebellion in Sidon led by Tennes was crushed by Artaxerxes III. Its destruction was described by Diodorus Siculus.

After two centuries of Persian rule, the Macedonian ruler Alexander the Great, during his war against Persia, attacked and burned Tyre, the most prominent Phoenician city. He conquered what is now Lebanon and other nearby regions in 332 BC.[21] After Alexander's death the region was absorbed into the Seleucid Empire and became known as Coele-Syria.

In 64 BC, the region was conquered by a Roman army under general Pompey and became a part of the Roman state. Christianity was introduced to the coastal plain of Lebanon from neighboring Galilee, already in the 1st century. The region, as with the rest of Syria and much of Anatolia, became a major center of Christianity. Mount Lebanon and its coastal plain became part of the Diocese of the East, divided to provinces of Phoenice Paralia and Phoenice Libanensis (which also extended over large parts of modern Syria).

During the late 4th and early 5th centuries in Lebanon, a hermit named Maron established a monastic tradition, focused on the importance of monotheism and asceticism, near the mountain range of Mount Lebanon. The monks who followed Maron spread his teachings among the native Lebanese Christians and remaining pagans in the mountains and coast of Lebanon. These Lebanese Christians came to be known as Maronites, and moved into the mountains to avoid religious persecution by Roman authorities.[22] During the frequent Roman–Persian Wars that lasted for many centuries, the Sassanid Persians occupied what is now Lebanon from 619 to 629.[23]

Middle Ages

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Islamic rule

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During the 7th century AD the Muslim Arabs conquered Syria soon after the death of Muhammad, establishing a new regime to replace the Romans (or Byzantines as the Eastern Romans are sometimes called). Though Islam and the Arabic language were officially dominant under this new regime, the general populace still took time to convert from Christianity and the Syriac language. In particular, the Maronite community clung to its faith and managed to maintain a large degree of autonomy despite the succession of rulers over Syria. Muslim influence increased greatly in the seventh century, when the nearby city Damascus, in modern-day Syria, was set as the capital of the Umayyad Caliphate.

During the reign of Uthman, who ruled the Rashidun Caliphate between 644 and 656, Islam gained prominence in Damascus, primarily due to Mu'awiya, a relative of Uthman who served as the governor. Mu'awiya deployed forces to Lebanon's coastal region, where he expanded Islamic influence, resulting in conversions to Islam among the coastal residents. However, in the mountainous areas, the local population retained their Christian or other cultural traditions.[24] Moreover, both Christians and Jews were obliged to pay the jizya, or poll tax, to Islamic rulers. The collection of this tax from mountain Christians saw inconsistent enforcement until the First Crusade, where it ceased under Latin rule. A revival occurred under the Mamluks, concluding with its abolition through an Ottoman edict in 1856.[25]

After the Islamic conquest, Mediterranean trade faced a prolonged decline lasting three centuries, attributed to maritime conflicts between the Islamic caliphate and the Byzantines. The partially damaged ports, vital as naval strongholds for the caliphate, struggled to regain prosperity. Despite attempts involving military presence and new settlers, the cities of Tyre, Sidon, Beirut, and Tripoli likely sustained populations of only a few thousand each during the Umayyad and Abbasid periods.[25]

By 758, the Abbasid Caliph al-Mansur tasked the Arab Tanukhids with the defense of the hills around Beirut. In 845, tensions flared as Tanukhs clashed with Christians in Kisrawan.[25]

In the 980s, the Fatimid Caliphate gained dominance over Mount Lebanon. Under Fatimid rule, the region experienced a renaissance in Mediterranean trade along the Lebanese coast, stimulated by commercial connections with Byzantium and Italy. Consequently, Tripoli and Tyre thrived well into the 11th century, specializing in the export of products like cotton and silk textiles, sugar, and glassware.[25]

In the 1020s, the Druze sect began to diverge from Isma’ili Shia Islam. Tanukhid chiefs embraced the "Call," acknowledging Fatimid Caliph Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah as divine, thereby establishing the foundation of the sect in Mount Lebanon.[25] The new faith gained followers in the southern portion of Lebanon.

Crusader kingdoms

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Following the fall of Roman/Christian Anatolia to the Muslim Turks of the Seljuk Empire in the 11th century, the Romans in Constantinople appealed to the Pope in Rome for assistance. There resulted a series of wars known as the Crusades, launched by Latin Christians (of mainly French origin) in Western Europe to reclaim the former Roman territories in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially Syria and Palestine (the Levant). Lebanon stood in the main path of the First Crusade's advance on Jerusalem from Anatolia. Frankish nobles occupied areas within present-day Lebanon as part of the southeastern Crusader States. The southern half of present-day Lebanon formed the northern march of the Kingdom of Jerusalem (founded in 1099); the northern half became the heartland of the County of Tripoli (founded in 1109). Although Saladin eliminated Christian control of the Holy Land around 1190, the Crusader states in Lebanon and Syria were better defended.

A map of Mount Lebanon c. AD 1180

One of the most lasting effects of the Crusades in this region was the contact between the crusaders (mainly French) and the Maronites. Unlike most other Christian communities in the region, who swore allegiance to Constantinople or other local patriarchs, the Maronites proclaimed allegiance to the Pope in Rome. As such the Franks saw them as Roman Catholic brethren. These initial contacts led to centuries of support for the Maronites from France and Italy, even after the later fall of the Crusader states in the region.

Mamluk rule

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Muslim control of Lebanon was reestablished in the late 13th century under the Mamluk sultans of Egypt, who reinstated Sunni Islamic dominance. Initially sacking Crusader towns and punishing perceived infidels and heretics in the mountains, the Mamluks later became more discerning in their actions. They demolished less fortified ports south of Sidon, and reconstructed Sidon, Beirut, and Tripoli. This resulted in the decline of Tyre while propelling Tripoli to prominence as the region's foremost port town. Now a provincial capital, Tripoli evolved into a center for Sunni religious education and became the primary hub for long-distance trade in Syria. The Mamluks also invested in Baalbek as an inland center.[25]

Despite facing the devastating impact of the Black Death in 1348–1349, which reduced the population by a third and curtailed economic activity for over two centuries, the Mamluks contributed to the enduring architectural legacy of the region, including the restoration of the Crusader Citadel of Tripoli and the construction of stone buildings and mosques.[25]

Ottoman rule

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Starting from the 16th century, the Ottoman Turks formed an empire which came to encompass the Balkans, Middle East and North Africa. The Ottoman sultan Selim I (1516–20), after defeating the Persians, conquered the Mamluks. His troops, invading Syria, destroyed Mamluk resistance in 1516 at Marj Dabiq, north of Aleppo.[26]

Ottoman control was uncontested during the early modern period, but the Lebanese coast became important for its contacts and trades with the maritime republics of Venice, Genoa other Italian city-states. (See also Levantines)

The mountainous territory of Mount Lebanon has long been a shelter for minority and persecuted groups, including its historic Maronite Christian majority and Druze communities. It was an autonomous region of the Ottoman Empire.

During the conflict between the Mamluks and the Ottomans, the amirs of Lebanon linked their fate to that of Ghazali, governor (pasha) of Damascus.[26] He won the confidence of the Ottomans by fighting on their side at Marj Dabiq and, apparently pleased with the behavior of the Lebanese amirs, introduced them to Salim I when he entered Damascus.[26] Salim I decided to grant the Lebanese amirs a semiautonomous status.[26] The Ottomans, through the two main feudal families, the Maans who were Druze and the Chehabs who were Sunni Muslim Arab converts to Maronite Christianity, ruled Lebanon until the middle of the nineteenth century.[26] During Ottoman rule the term Syria was used to designate the approximate area including present-day Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel/Palestine.[26]

Maans dynasty (1517–1697)

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The Maans came to Lebanon in 1120.[27] They were a tribe and dynasty of Qahtani Arabs who settled on the southwestern slopes of the Lebanon Mountains and soon adopted the Druze religion.[27] Their authority began to rise with Fakhr ad-Din I, who was permitted by Ottoman authorities to organize his own army, and reached its peak with Fakhr ad-Din II (1570–1635).[27] (The existence of "Fakhr ad-Din I" has been questioned by some scholars.[28])

Fakhreddine II

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Fakhreddine II

Fakhr al-Din II was born in Baakline to a Druze family, his father died when he was 13, and his mother entrusted her son to another princely family, the Maronite Khazens. In 1608, Fakhr-al-Din forged an alliance with the Italian Grand Duchy of Tuscany. The alliance contained both a public economic section and a secret military one. Fakhr-al-Din's ambitions, popularity and unauthorized foreign contacts alarmed the Ottomans who authorized Hafiz Ahmed Pasha, Muhafiz of Damascus, to mount an attack on Lebanon in 1613 in order to reduce Fakhr-al-Din's growing power. Professor Abu-Husayn has made the Ottoman archives relevant to the emir's career available. Faced with Hafiz's army of 50,000 men, Fakhr-al-Din chose exile in Tuscany, leaving affairs in the hands of his brother Emir Yunis and his son Emir Ali Beg. They succeeded in mainlining most of the forts such as Banias (Subayba) and Niha which were a mainstay of Fakhr ad-Din's power. Before leaving, Fakhr ad-Din paid his standing army of soqbans (mercenaries) two years wages in order to secure their loyalty.

Hosted in Tuscany by the Medici Family, Fakhr-al-Din was welcomed by the grand duke Cosimo II, who was his host and sponsor for the two years he spent at the court of the Medici. He spent a further three years as guest of the Spanish Viceroy of Sicily and then Naples, the Duke Osuna. Fakhr-al-Din had wished to enlist Tuscan or other European assistance in a "Crusade" to free his homeland from Ottoman domination, but was met with a refusal as Tuscany was unable to afford such an expedition. The prince eventually gave up the idea, realizing that Europe was more interested in trade with the Ottomans than in taking back the Holy Land. His stay nevertheless allowed him to witness Europe's cultural revival in the 17th century, and bring back some Renaissance ideas and architectural features. By 1618, political changes in the Ottoman sultanate had resulted in the removal of many of Fakhr-al-Din's enemies from power, allowing Fahkr-al-Din's return to Lebanon, whereupon he was able quickly to reunite all the lands of Lebanon beyond the boundaries of its mountains; and having revenge from Emir Yusuf Pasha ibn Siyfa, attacking his stronghold in Akkar, destroying his palaces and taking control of his lands, and regaining the territories he had to give up in 1613 in Sidon, Tripoli, Bekaa among others. Under his rule, printing presses were introduced and Jesuit priests and Catholic nuns encouraged to open schools throughout the land.

Fakhreddine II Palace in Deir el Qamar

In 1623, the prince angered the Ottomans by refusing to allow an army on its way back from the Persian front to winter in the Bekaa. This (and instigation by the powerful Janissary garrison in Damascus) led Mustafa Pasha, Governor of Damascus, to launch an attack against him, resulting in the battle at Majdel Anjar where Fakhr-al-Din's forces although outnumbered managed to capture the Pasha and secure the Lebanese prince and his allies a much needed military victory. The best source (in Arabic) for Fakhr ad-Din's career up to this point is a memoir signed by al-Khalidi as-Safadi, who was not with the Emir in Europe but had access to someone who was, possibly Fakhr ad-Din himself. However, as time passed, the Ottomans grew increasingly uncomfortable with the prince's increasing powers and extended relations with Europe. In 1632, Kuchuk Ahmed Pasha was named Muhafiz of Damascus, being a rival of Fakhr-al-Din and a friend of Sultan Murad IV, who ordered Kuchuk Ahmed Pasha and the sultanate's navy to attack Lebanon and depose Fakhr-al-Din.

This time, the prince had decided to remain in Lebanon and resist the offensive, but the death of his son Emir Ali Beik in Wadi el-Taym was the beginning of his defeat. He later took refuge in Jezzine's grotto, closely followed by Kuchuk Ahmed Pasha. He surrendered to the Ottoman general Jaafar Pasha, whom he knew well, under circumstances that are not clear.

Fakhr-al-Din was taken to Constantinople and kept in the Yedikule (Seven Towers) prison for two years. He was then summoned before the sultan. Fakhr-al-Din, and one or two of his sons, were accused of treason and executed there on 13 April 1635. There are unsubstantiated rumors that the younger of the two boys was spared and raised in the harem, later becoming Ottoman ambassador to India.

Portrait of Fakhreddine while he was in Tuscany, stating "Faccardino grand emir dei Drusi" translated as "Fakhreddine: great emir of the Druze"

Although Fakhr ad-Din II's aspirations toward complete independence for Lebanon ended tragically, he greatly enhanced Lebanon's military and economic development.[29] Noted for religious tolerance, the prince attempted to merge the country's different religious groups into one Lebanese community.[29] In an effort to attain complete independence for Lebanon, he concluded a secret agreement with Ferdinand I, grand duke of Tuscany.[29]

Following his return from Tuscany, Fakhr ad-Din II, realizing the need for a strong and disciplined armed force, channeled his financial resources into building a regular army.[29] This army proved itself in 1623, when Mustafa Pasha, the new governor of Damascus, underestimating the capabilities of the Lebanese army, engaged it in battle and was decisively defeated at Anjar in the Biqa Valley.[29]

In addition to building up the army, Fakhr ad-Din II, who became acquainted with Italian culture during his stay in Tuscany, initiated measures to modernize the country.[29] After forming close ties and establishing diplomatic relations with Tuscany, he brought in architects, irrigation engineers, and agricultural experts from Italy in an effort to promote prosperity in the country.[29] He also strengthened Lebanon's strategic position by expanding its territory, building forts as far away as Palmyra in Syria, and gaining control of Palestine.[29] Finally, the Ottoman sultan Murad IV of Istanbul, wanting to thwart Lebanon's progress toward complete independence, ordered Kutshuk, then governor of Damascus, to attack the Lebanese ruler.[29] This time Fakhr ad-Din was defeated, and he was executed in Istanbul in 1635. No significant Maan rulers succeeded Fakhr ad-Din II.[29]

Fakhreddine is regarded by the Lebanese as the best leader and prince the country has ever seen. Lebanon has achieved during Fakhreddine's reign enormous heights that the country had and would never witness again.

Shihab dynasty (1697–1842)

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The Shihabs succeeded the Maans in 1697[30] after the Battle of Ain Dara, a battle that changed the face of Lebanon when a clash between two Arab clans, the Qaysis and the Yemenis, broke out. The Qaysis, then led by Ahmad Shihab, won, and expelled the Yemenis from Lebanon to Syria. This has led to an enormous decrease to the Druze population in Mount-Lebanon, who were a majority at the time and helped the Christians overcome the Druze demographically. This Qaysi "victory" allowed the Shihab, who were Qaysis themselves and the allies of Lebanon, to rule over Mount-Lebanon. The Shihabs originally lived in the Hawran region of southwestern Syria and settled in Wadi al-Taym in southern Lebanon.[30]

During the Russo-Turkish War of 1768 to 1774, responding to Admiral Alexei Orlov's Russian naval First Archipelago Expedition operating in the Mediterranean, local Lebanese authorities briefly attempted to place themselves under Russian protection.[31]

The most prominent Shihab, Bashir Shihab II,[30] ruled as Emir of Mount Lebanon from 1789 to 1840. The events of 1799 tested his ability as a statesman when Napoleon besieged Acre, a well-fortified coastal city in Palestine, about forty kilometers south of Tyre.[30] Both Napoleon and Al Jazzar, the governor of Acre, requested assistance from the Shihab leader; Bashir, however, remained neutral, declining to assist either combatant.[30] Unable to conquer Acre, Napoleon returned to Egypt, and the death of Al Jazzar in 1804 removed Bashir's principal opponent in the area.

The Shihabs were originally a Sunni Muslim family, but converted to Christianity[30] in the late-18th century.

Emir Bashir II

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Bashir Shihab II

In 1788 Bashir Shihab II (or Bachir in French sources) would rise to become the Emir. Born into poverty, he was elected emir upon the abdication of his predecessor, and would rule under Ottoman suzerainty, being appointed wali or governor of Mt Lebanon, the Biqa valley and Jabal Amil. Together this is about two thirds of modern-day Lebanon. He would reform taxes and attempt to break the feudal system, in order to undercut rivals, the most important of which was also named Bashir: Bashir Jumblatt, whose wealth and feudal backers equaled or exceeded Bashir II—and who had increasing support in the Druze community. In 1822 the Ottoman wali of Damascus went to war with Acre, which was allied with Muhammad Ali, the pasha of Egypt. As part of this conflict one of the most remembered massacres of Maronite Christians by Druze forces occurred, forces that were aligned with the wali of Damascus. Jumblatt represented the increasingly disaffected Druze, who were both shut out from official power and angered at the growing ties with the Maronites by Bashir II, who was himself a Maronite Christian.

Bashir II was overthrown as wali when he backed Acre, and fled to Egypt, later to return and organize an army. Jumblatt gathered the Druze factions together, and the war became sectarian in character: the Maronites backing Bashir II, the Druze backing Bashir Jumblatt. Jumblatt declared a rebellion, and between 1821 and 1825 there were massacres and battles, with the Maronites attempting to gain control of the Mt. Lebanon district, and the Druze gaining control over the Biqa valley. In 1825 Bashir II, helped by the Ottomans and the Jezzar, defeated his rival in the Battle of Simqanieh. Bashir Jumblatt died in Acre at the order of the Jezzar. Bashir II was not a forgiving man and repressed the Druze rebellion, particularly in and around Beirut. This made Bashir Chehab the only leader of Mount Lebanon. However, Bashir Chehab was depicted as a nasty leader because Bashir Jumblatt was his all-time friend and has saved his life when the Keserwan peasants tried to kill the prince, by sending 1000 of his men to save him. Also, days before the Battle of Simqania, Bashir Jumblatt had the chance to kill Bashir II when he was returning from Acre when he reportedly kissed the Jezzar's feet in order to help him against Jumblatt, but Bashir II reminded him of their friendship and told Jumblatt to "pardon when you can". The high morals of Jumblatt led him to pardon Bashir II, a decision he should have regretted.

Bashir II, who had come to power through local politics and nearly fallen from power because of his increasing detachment from them, reached out for allies, allies who looked on the entire area as "the Orient" and who could provide trade, weapons and money, without requiring fealty and without, it seemed, being drawn into endless internal squabbles. He disarmed the Druze and allied with France, governing in the name of the Egyptian Pasha Muhammad Ali, who entered Lebanon and formally took overlordship in 1832. For the remaining 8 years, the sectarian and feudal rifts of the 1821–1825 conflict were heightened by the increasing economic isolation of the Druze, and the increasing wealth of the Maronites.

During the nineteenth century the town of Beirut became the most important port of the region, supplanting Acre further to the south. This was mostly because Mount Lebanon became a centre of silk production for export to Europe. This industry made the region wealthy, but also dependent on links to Europe. Since most of the silk went to Marseille, the French began to have a great impact in the region.

Sectarian conflict: European powers begin to intervene

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Christian Church and Druze Khalwa in Shuf Mountains: Historically; the Druzes and the Christians in the Shuf Mountains lived in complete harmony.[32]

The discontent grew to open rebellion, fed by both Ottoman and British money and support: Bashir II fled, the Ottoman Empire reasserted control and Mehmed Hüsrev Pasha, whose sole term as Grand Vizier ran from 1839 to 1841, appointed another member of the Shihab family, who styled himself Bashir III. Bashir III, coming on the heels of a man who by guile, force and diplomacy had dominated Mt Lebanon and the Biqa for 52 years, did not last long. In 1841 conflicts between the impoverished Druze and the Maronite Christians exploded: There was a massacre of Christians by the Druze at Deir al Qamar, and the fleeing survivors were slaughtered by Ottoman regulars. The Ottomans attempted to create peace by dividing Mt Lebanon into a Christian district and a Druze district, but this would merely create geographic powerbases for the warring parties, and it plunged the region back into civil conflict which included not only the sectarian warfare but a Maronite revolt against the Feudal class, which ended in 1858 with the overthrow of the old feudal system of taxes and levies. The situation was unstable: the Maronites lived in the large towns, but these were often surrounded by Druze villages living as perioikoi.

Christian refugees during the 1860 strife between Druze and Maronites in Lebanon

The relationship between the Druze and Christians has been characterized by harmony and peaceful coexistence,[33][34][35][32] with amicable relations between the two groups prevailing throughout history, with the exception of some periods, including 1860 Mount Lebanon civil war.[36][37] In 1860, this would boil back into full scale sectarian war, when the Maronites began openly opposing the power of the Ottoman Empire. Another destabilizing factor was France's support for the Maronite Christians against the Druze which in turn led the British to back the Druze, exacerbating religious and economic tensions between the two communities. The Druze took advantage of this and began burning Maronite villages. The Druze had grown increasingly resentful of the favoring of the Maronites by Bashir II, and were backed by the Ottoman Empire and the wali of Damascus in an attempt to gain greater control over Lebanon; the Maronites were backed by the French, out of both economic and political expediency. The Druze began a military campaign that included the burning of villages and massacres, while Maronite irregulars retaliated with attacks of their own. However, the Maronites were gradually pushed into a few strongholds and were on the verge of military defeat when the Concert of Europe intervened[38] and established a commission to determine the outcome.[39] The French forces deployed there were then used to enforce the final decision. The French accepted the Druze as having established control and the Maronites were reduced to a semi-autonomous region around Mount Lebanon, without even direct control over Beirut itself. The Province of Lebanon would be controlled by the Maronites, but the entire area was placed under direct rule of the governor of Damascus, and carefully watched by the Ottoman Empire.

The long siege of Deir al-Qamar found a Maronite garrison holding out against Druze forces backed by Ottoman soldiers; the area in every direction was despoiled by the besiegers. In July 1860, with European intervention threatening, the Turkish government tried to quiet the strife, but Napoleon III of France sent 7,000 troops to Beirut and helped impose a partition: The Druze control of the territory was recognized as the fact on the ground, and the Maronites were forced into an enclave, arrangements ratified by the Concert of Europe in 1861. They were confined to a mountainous district, cut off from both the Biqa and Beirut, and faced with the prospect of ever-growing poverty. Resentments and fears would brood, ones which would resurface in the coming decades.

Lebanese soldiers, 1861–1914

Youssef Bey Karam,[40] a Lebanese nationalist played an influential role in Lebanon's independence during this era.

In December 1831 Tyre fell under the rule of Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt, after an army led by his son Ibrahim Pasha had entered Jaffa and Haifa without resistance.[41] Two years later, Shiite forces under Hamad al-Mahmud from the Ali al-Saghir dynasty rebelled against the occupation. They were supported by the British Empire and Austria-Hungary: Tyre was captured on 24 September 1839 after allied naval bombardments.[42] For their fight against the Egyptian invaders, al-Mahmud and his successor Ali El-Assaad – a relative – were rewarded by the Ottoman rulers with the restoration of Shiite autonomy in Jabal Amel. However, in Tyre it was the Mamluk family that gained a dominant position. Its head Jussuf Aga ibn Mamluk was reportedly a son of the anti-Shiite Jazzar Pasha.

Late 19th century to early 20th century

[edit]
Lebanese dress from the late 19th century.

The Maronite Catholics and the Druze founded modern Lebanon in the early eighteenth century, through the ruling and social system known as the "Maronite-Druze dualism" in Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate.[43] The remainder of the 19th century saw a relative period of stability, as Muslim, Druze and Maronite groups focused on economic and cultural development which saw the founding of the American University of Beirut and a flowering of literary and political activity associated with the attempts to liberalize the Ottoman Empire. Late in the century there was a short Druze uprising over the extremely harsh government and high taxation rates, but there was far less of the violence that had scalded the area earlier in the century.

In the approach to World War I, Beirut became a center of various reforming movements, and would send delegates to the Arab Syrian conference and Franco-Syrian conference held in Paris. There was a complex array of solutions, from pan-Arab nationalism, to separatism for Beirut, and several status quo movements that sought stability and reform within the context of Ottoman government. The Young Turk revolution brought these movements to the front, hoping that the reform of Ottoman Empire would lead to broader reforms. The outbreak of hostilities changed this, as Lebanon was to feel the weight of the conflict in the Middle East more heavily than most other areas occupied by the Syrians.

Great famine in Lebanon, 1915–1918

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They lost so many loved ones during that time. My father once said that the rich families survived as they were able to bribe and get supplies on the black market. It was the unemployed, the middle class and the poor that were dying in the streets.

— Teresa Michel, son of famine survivors[44]

About half the population of the Mount Lebanon subdivision, overwhelmingly Maronites, starved to death (200,000 killed out of 400,000 of the total populace) throughout the years of 1915–1918 during what is now known as the Great Famine of Mount Lebanon,[45] as a consequence of a mixed combination of crop failure, punitive governance practices, naval blockade of the coast by the Allies, and an Ottoman military ban on exports from Syria into Lebanon, during World War I.[46] Dead bodies were piled in the streets and starving Lebanese civilians were reported to be eating street animals while some even resorted to cannibalism.[47]

League of Nations Mandate (1920–1939)

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Greater Lebanon (green) in the Mandate of Syria
1862 map drawn by the French expedition of Beaufort d'Hautpoul[49]
Black dashed line shows the borders of the 1861–1918 Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate
The first map, drawn by the French in 1862, was used as a template for the 1920 borders of Greater Lebanon.[48] The second map shows the borders of the 1861–1918 Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate, overlaid on a map of modern day Lebanon showing religious groups distribution

Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the League of Nations mandated the five provinces that make up present-day Lebanon to the direct control of France. Initially the division of the Arabic-speaking areas of the Ottoman Empire were to be divided by the Sykes–Picot Agreement; however, the final disposition was at the San Remo conference of 1920, whose determinations on the mandates, their boundaries, purposes and organization was ratified by the League in 1921 and put into effect in 1922.

According to the agreements reached at San Remo, France had its control over what was termed Syria recognised, the French having taken Damascus in 1920. Like all formerly Ottoman areas, Syria was a Class A Mandate, deemed to "... have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory." The entire French mandate area was termed "Syria" at the time, including the administrative districts along the Mediterranean coast. Wanting to maximize the area under its direct control, contain an Arab Syria centered on Damascus, and ensure a defensible border, France moved the Lebanon-Syrian border to the Anti-Lebanon Mountains, east of the Beqaa Valley, territory which had historically belonged to the province of Damascus for hundreds of years, and was far more attached to Damascus than Beirut by culture and influence. This doubled the territory under the control of Beirut, at the expense of what would become the state of Syria.

Flag of Greater Lebanon during the French mandate (1920–1943)

On October 27, 1919, the Lebanese delegation led by Maronite Patriarch Elias Peter Hoayek presented the Lebanese aspirations in a memorandum to the Paris Peace Conference. This included a significant extension of the frontiers of the Lebanon Mutasarrifate,[50] arguing that the additional areas constituted natural parts of Lebanon, despite the fact that the Christian community would not be a clear majority in such an enlarged state.[50] The quest for the annexation of agricultural lands in the Bekaa and Akkar was fueled by existential fears following the death of nearly half of the Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate population in the Great Famine; the Maronite church and the secular leaders sought a state that could better provide for its people.[51] The areas to be added to the Mutasarrifate included the coastal towns of Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre and their respective hinterlands, all of which belonged to the Beirut Vilayet, together with four Kazas of the Syria Vilayet (Baalbek, the Bekaa, Rashaya and Hasbaya).[50]

As a consequence of this also, the demographics of Lebanon were profoundly altered, as the added territory contained people who were predominantly Muslim; Lebanese Christians, of which the Maronites were the largest subgrouping, now constituted barely more than 50% of the population, while Sunni Muslims and Shi'ite Muslims saw their numbers increase. Modern Lebanon's constitution, drawn up in 1926, specified a balance of power between the various religious groups. The president was required to be a Christian (in practice, a Maronite), the prime minister a Sunni Muslim. On the basis of the 1932 census, parliament seats were divided according to a six-to-five Christian/Muslim ratio. The constitution gave the president veto power over any legislation approved by parliament, virtually ensuring that the 6:5 ratio would not be revised in case the population distribution changed. By 1960, Muslims were thought to constitute a majority of the population, which contributed to Muslim unrest regarding the political system.

World War II and independence

[edit]

During World War II when the Vichy government assumed power over French territory in 1940, General Henri Fernand Dentz was appointed as high commissioner of Lebanon. This new turning point led to the resignation of Lebanese president Émile Eddé on April 4, 1941. After five days, Dentz appointed Alfred Naqqache for a presidency period that lasted only three months. The Vichy authorities allowed Nazi Germany to move aircraft and supplies through Syria to Iraq where they were used against British forces. Britain, fearing that Nazi Germany would gain full control of Lebanon and Syria by pressure on the weak Vichy government, sent its army into Syria and Lebanon.[52]

After the fighting ended in Lebanon, General Charles de Gaulle visited the area. Under various political pressures from both inside and outside Lebanon, de Gaulle decided to recognize the independence of Lebanon. On November 26, 1941, General Georges Catroux announced that Lebanon would become independent under the authority of the Free French government.

Flag as drawn and approved by the members of the Lebanese parliament during the declaration of independence in 1943

Elections were held in 1943 and on November 8, 1943, the new Lebanese government unilaterally abolished the mandate. The French reacted by throwing the new government into prison. In the face of international pressure, the French released the government officials on November 22, 1943, and accepted the independence of Lebanon.

Republic of Lebanon

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Independence and following years

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The allies kept the region under control until the end of World War II. The last French troops withdrew in 1946.

Lebanon's history since independence has been marked by alternating periods of political stability and turmoil interspersed with prosperity built on Beirut's position as a freely trading regional center for finance and trade. Beirut became a prime location for institutions of international commerce and finance, as well as wealthy tourists, and enjoyed a reputation as the "Paris of the Middle East" until the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War.

In the aftermath of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, Lebanon became home to more than 110,000 Palestinian refugees.

Beirut in 1950

Economic prosperity and growing tensions

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In 1958, during the last months of President Camille Chamoun's term, an insurrection broke out, and 5,000 United States Marines were briefly dispatched to Beirut on July 15 in response to an appeal by the government. After the crisis, a new government was formed, led by the popular former general Fuad Chehab.

During the 1960s, Lebanon enjoyed a period of relative calm, with Beirut-focused tourism and banking sector-driven prosperity.[citation needed] Lebanon reached the peak of its economic success in the mid–1960s—the country was seen as a bastion of economic strength by the oil-rich Persian Gulf Arab states, whose funds made Lebanon one of the world's fastest growing economies. This period of economic stability and prosperity was brought to an abrupt halt with the collapse of Yousef Beidas' Intra Bank, the country's largest bank and financial backbone, in 1966.

Additional Palestinian refugees arrived after the 1967 Arab–Israeli War. Following their defeat in the Jordanian civil war, thousands of Palestinian militiamen regrouped in Lebanon, led by Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization, with the intention of replicating the modus operandi of attacking Israel from a politically and militarily weak neighbour. Starting in 1968, Palestinian militants of various affiliations began to use southern Lebanon as a launching pad for attacks on Israel. Two of these attacks led to a watershed event in Lebanon's inchoate civil war. In July 1968, a faction of George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an Israeli El Al civilian plane en route to Algiers; in December, two PFLP gunmen shot at an El Al plane in Athens, resulting in the death of an Israeli.

As a result, two days later, an Israeli commando flew into Beirut's international airport and destroyed more than a dozen civilian airliners belonging to various Arab carriers. Israel defended its actions by informing the Lebanese government that it was responsible for encouraging the PFLP. The retaliation, which was intended to encourage a Lebanese government crackdown on Palestinian militants, instead polarized Lebanese society on the Palestinian question, deepening the divide between pro- and anti-Palestinian factions, with the Muslims leading the former grouping and Maronites primarily constituting the latter. This dispute reflected increasing tensions between Christian and Muslim communities over the distribution of political power, and would ultimately foment the outbreak of civil war in 1975.

In the interim, while armed Lebanese forces under the Maronite-controlled government sparred with Palestinian fighters, Egyptian leader Gamal Abd al-Nasser helped to negotiate the 1969 "Cairo Agreement" between Arafat and the Lebanese government, which granted the PLO autonomy over Palestinian refugee camps and access routes to northern Israel in return for PLO recognition of Lebanese sovereignty. The agreement incited Maronite frustration over what were perceived as excessive concessions to the Palestinians, and pro-Maronite paramilitary groups were subsequently formed to fill the vacuum left by government forces, which were now required to leave the Palestinians alone. Notably, the Phalange, a Maronite militia, rose to prominence around this time, led by members of the Gemayel family.[53]

In September 1970 Suleiman Franjieh, who had left the country briefly for Latakia in the 1950s after being accused of killing hundreds of people including other Maronites, was elected president by a very narrow vote in parliament. In November, his personal friend Hafiz al-Assad, who had received him during his exile, seized power in Syria. Later, in 1976, Franjieh would invite the Syrians into Lebanon.[54]

For its part, the PLO used its new privileges to establish an effective "mini-state" in southern Lebanon, and to ramp up its attacks on settlements in northern Israel. Compounding matters, Lebanon received an influx of armed Palestinian militants, including Arafat and his Fatah movement, fleeing the 1970 Jordanian crackdown. The PLO's "vicious terrorist attacks in Israel"[55] dating from this period were countered by Israeli bombing raids in southern Lebanon, where "150 or more towns and villages...have been repeatedly savaged by the Israeli armed forces since 1968," of which the village of Khiyam is probably the best-known example.[56] Palestinian attacks claimed 106 lives in northern Israel from 1967, according to official IDF statistics, while the Lebanese army had recorded "1.4 Israeli violations of Lebanese territory per day from 1968–74"[57] Where Lebanon had no conflict with Israel during the period 1949–1968, after 1968 Lebanon's southern border began to experience an escalating cycle of attack and retaliation, leading to the chaos of the civil war, foreign invasions and international intervention. The consequences of the PLO's arrival in Lebanon continue to this day.

In 1974, the Amal Movement, a Shi’ite political party and former militia was founded by Musa al-Sadr and Hussein el-Husseini.[58] Its goals were geared towards improving the social and political conditions of Lebanon's poor population. Although its primary focus was on the Shi'ite community, the movement operated as a secular entity and enjoyed the support of other communities.[59]

The Lebanese Civil War: 1975–1990

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Map showing power balance in Lebanon, 1976:
Dark Green – controlled by Syria;
Purple – controlled by Maronite groups;
Light Green – controlled by Palestinian militias

The Lebanese Civil War had its origin in the conflicts and political compromises of Lebanon's post-Ottoman period and was exacerbated by the nation's changing demographic trends, inter-religious strife, and proximity to Syria, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Israel. By 1975, Lebanon was a religiously and ethnically diverse country with most dominant groups of Maronite Christians, Eastern Orthodox Christians, Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims; with significant minorities of Druze, Kurds, Armenians, and Palestinian refugees and their descendants.

Events and political movements that contributed to Lebanon's violent implosion include, among others, the emergence of Arab nationalism, Arab socialism in the context of the Cold War, the Arab–Israeli conflict, Ba'athism, the Iranian Revolution, Palestinian militants, Black September in Jordan, Islamic fundamentalism, and the Iran–Iraq War.

In all, it is estimated that more than 100,000 were killed, and another 100,000 handicapped by injuries, during Lebanon's 16-year war. Up to one-fifth of the pre-war resident population, or about 900,000 people, were displaced from their homes, of whom perhaps a quarter of a million emigrated permanently.[60] Thousands of people lost limbs during many stages of planting of land-mines.

The War can be divided broadly into several periods: The initial outbreak in the mid–1970s, the Syrian and then Israeli intervention of the late 1970s, escalation of the PLO-Israeli conflict in the early 1980s, the 1982 Israeli invasion, a brief period of multinational involvement, and finally resolution which took the form of Syrian occupation.

Constitutionally guaranteed Christian control of the government had come under increasing fire from Muslims and leftists, leading them to join forces as the National Movement in 1969, which called for the taking of a new census and the subsequent drafting of a new governmental structure that would reflect the census results. Political tension became military conflict, with full-scale civil war in April 1975. The leadership called for Syrian intervention in 1976, leading to the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon, and an Arab summit in 1976 was called to stop the crisis.

In the south, military exchanges between Israel and the PLO led Israel to support Saad Haddad's South Lebanon Army (SLA) in an effort to establish a security belt along Israel's northern border, an effort which intensified in 1977 with the election of new Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin. In March 1978 Israel invaded Lebanon in response to Fatah attacks in Israel. During Fatah attack also known as Coastal Road Massacre, Palestinian terrorists hijacked a bus on the Coastal Highway of Israel and murdered its occupants; 38 Israeli civilians, including 13 children. Eventually, Israel took control of most of the area south of the Litani River. It resulted in the evacuation of at least 100,000 Lebanese,[61] as well as approximately 2,000 deaths.[62]

Map showing power balance in Lebanon, 1983: Green – controlled by Syria, purple – controlled by Christian groups, yellow – controlled by Israel, blue – controlled by the United Nations

The UN Security Council passed Resolution 425 calling for an immediate Israeli withdrawal and creating the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), charged with maintaining peace. Israeli forces withdrew later in 1978, leaving an SLA-controlled border strip as a protective buffer against PLO cross-border attacks.

In addition to the fighting between religious groups, there was rivalry between Maronite groups. In June 1978 one of Suleiman Franjieh's sons, Tony, was killed along with his wife and infant daughter in a nighttime attack on their town, reportedly by Bashir Gemayel, Samir Geagea, and their Phalangist forces.[63]

Concurrently, tension between Syria and Phalange increased Israeli support for the Maronite group and led to direct Israeli-Syrian exchanges in April 1981, leading to American diplomatic intervention. Philip Habib was dispatched to the region to head off further escalation, which he successfully did via an agreement concluded in May.

Intra-Palestinian fighting and PLO-Israeli conflict continued, and July 24, 1981, Habib brokered a cease-fire agreement with the PLO and Israel: the two sides agreed to cease hostilities in Lebanon proper and along the Israeli border with Lebanon.

After continued PLO-Israeli exchanges, Israel invaded Lebanon on June 6, 1982, using the codename Operation Peace for Galilee. By June 15 of the same year, Israeli units were entrenched in the outskirts of Beirut and Yassir Arafat attempted through negotiations to evacuate the PLO. It is estimated[64] that during the entire campaign, including the Israeli siege on Beirut from June to August,[65] approximately 20,000 were killed on all sides, including many civilians. These figures do not include the Sabra and Shatila massacre, in which between 700-3500 Palestinians were killed.[64] A multinational force composed of U.S. Marines and French and Italian units arrived to ensure the departure of the PLO and protect civilians. Nearly 15,000 Palestinian militants were evacuated by September 1.

The Green Line that separated West and East Beirut, 1982

Although Bashir Gemayel did not cooperate with the Israelis publicly, his long history of tactical collaboration with Israel counted against him in the eyes of many Lebanese, especially Muslims. Although the only announced candidate for the presidency of the republic, the National Assembly elected him by the second-narrowest margin in Lebanese history (57 votes out of 92) on August 23, 1982; most Muslim members of the Assembly boycotted the vote. Nine days before he was due to take office, Gemayel was assassinated along with twenty-five others in an explosion at the Kataeb party headquarters in Beirut's Christian neighborhood of Achrafieh on September 14, 1982.

Bachir Gemayel with Philipe Habib

Phalangists entered Palestinian camps on September 16 at 6:00 PM and remained until the morning of September 19, massacring 700-3500 Palestinians,[64] "none apparently members of any PLO unit".[66] This attack, known as the Sabra and Shatila massacre, was enabled by an Israeli advance in West Beirut which was in breach of a ceasefire agreement.[67] It is believed that the Phalangists considered it retaliation for Gemayel's assassination and for the Damour massacre which PLO fighters had committed earlier in a Christian town.[68]

Bachir Gemayel was succeeded as president by his older brother Amine Gemayel, who served from 1982 to 1988. Rather different in temperament, Amine Gemayel was widely regarded as lacking the charisma and decisiveness of his brother, and many of the latter's followers were dissatisfied.

Amine Gemayel focused on securing the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces. A May 17, 1983, agreement among Lebanon, Israel, and the United States arranged an Israeli withdrawal conditional on the departure of Syrian troops. Syria opposed the agreement and declined to discuss the withdrawal of its troops, effectively stalemating further progress.

In 1983 the IDF withdrew southward and left the Chouf, and would remain only in the "security zone" until the year 2000. That led to the Mountain War between the Druze Progressive Socialist Party and the Maronite Lebanese Forces. The PSP won the decisive battle that occurred in the Chouf and Aley District and inflected heavy losses to the LF. The result was the expulsion of the Christians from the Southern Mount Lebanon.

Explosion at the Marine barracks seen from afar

Intense attacks against U.S. and Western interests, including two truck bombings of the US Embassy in 1983 and 1984 and the landmark attacks on the U.S. Marine and French parachute regiment barracks on October 23, 1983, led to an American withdrawal.

The virtual collapse of the Lebanese Army in the 6 February 1984 Intifada in Beirut, led by the PSP and Amal, the two main allies, was a major blow to the government. On March 5, as a result of the Intifada and the Mountain War, the Lebanese Government canceled the 17 May 1983 agreement. The US Marines departed a few weeks later.

Between 1985 and 1989, heavy fighting took place in the "War of the Camps". The Shi'a Muslim Amal militia sought to rout the Palestinians from Lebanese strongholds.

Combat returned to Beirut in 1987, with Palestinians, leftists and Druze fighters allied against Amal. After winning the battle, the PSP controlled West Beirut. The Syrians then entered Beirut. This combat was fueled by the Syrians in order to take control of Beirut by taking as a pretext of stopping the fights between the brothers, the PSP and Amal. Violent confrontation flared up again in Beirut in 1988 between Amal and Hezbollah.

Meanwhile, on the political front, Prime Minister Rashid Karami, head of a government of national unity set up after the failed peace efforts of 1984, was assassinated on June 1, 1987. President Gemayel's term of office expired in September 1988. Before stepping down, he appointed another Maronite Christian, Lebanese Armed Forces Commanding General Michel Aoun, as acting prime minister, as was his right under the Lebanese constitution of 1943. This action was highly controversial.

Muslim groups rejected the move and pledged support to Selim al-Hoss, a Sunni who had succeeded Karami. Lebanon was thus divided between a Christian government in East Beirut and a Muslim government in West Beirut, with no president.

In February 1989, General Aoun launched the "War of liberation", a war against the Syrian Armed Forces in Lebanon. His campaign was partially supported by a few foreign nations but the method and approach was disputed within the Christian community. This led to the Lebanese forces to abstain from the Syrian attack against Aoun. In October 1990, the Syrian air force, backed by the US and pro-Syrian Lebanese groups (including Hariri, Joumblatt, Berri, Geagea and Lahoud) attacked the Presidential Palace at B'abda and forced Aoun to take refuge in the French embassy in Beirut and later go into exile in Paris. October 13, 1990, is regarded as the date the civil war ended, and Syria is widely recognized as playing a critical role in its end.[69]

The Taif Agreement of 1989 marked the beginning of the end of the war, and was ratified on November 4. President Rene Mouawad was elected the following day, but was assassinated in a car bombing in Beirut on November 22 as his motorcade returned from Lebanese independence day ceremonies. He was succeeded by Elias Hrawi, who remained in office until 1998.

In August 1990, the parliament and the new president agreed on constitutional amendments embodying some of the political reforms envisioned at Taif. The National Assembly expanded to 128 seats and was divided equally between Christians and Muslims. In March 1991, parliament passed an amnesty law that pardoned most political crimes prior to its enactment, excepting crimes perpetrated against foreign diplomats or certain crimes referred by the cabinet to the Higher Judicial Council.

In May 1991, the militias (with the important exception of Hizballah) were dissolved, and the Lebanese Armed Forces began to slowly rebuild themselves as Lebanon's only major non-sectarian institution.

Some violence still occurred. In late December 1991 a car bomb (estimated to carry 100 kg (220 lb) of TNT) exploded in the Muslim neighborhood of Basta. At least thirty people were killed, and 120 wounded, including former prime minister Shafik Wazzan, who was riding in a bulletproof car. It was the deadliest car bombing in Lebanon since June 18, 1985, when an explosion in the northern Lebanese port of Tripoli killed sixty people and wounded 110.

The last of the Westerners kidnapped by Hezbollah during the mid–1980s were released in May 1992.

Second Lebanese Republic

[edit]

Since the end of the war, the Lebanese have conducted several elections, most of the militias have been weakened or disbanded, and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have extended central government authority over about two-thirds of the country. Only Hezbollah retained its weapons, and was supported by the Lebanese parliament in doing so, as they had defended Lebanon against the Israeli occupation. Syria on the other hand kept its military presence in most of Lebanon, also holding various government institutions in the country, strengthening its occupation. The Israeli forces finally withdrew from south of Lebanon in May 2000, though the Syrian occupation of most Lebanon still continued.

By early November 1992, a new parliament had been elected, and Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri had formed a cabinet, retaining for himself the finance portfolio. The formation of a government headed by a successful billionaire businessman was widely seen as a sign that Lebanon would make a priority of rebuilding the country and reviving the economy. Solidere, a private real estate company set up to rebuild downtown Beirut, was a symbol of Hariri's strategy to link economic recovery to private sector investment. After the election of then-commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces Émile Lahoud as president in 1998 following Hrawi's extended term as president, Salim al-Hoss again served as prime minister. Hariri returned to office as prime minister in November 2000. Although problems with basic infrastructure and government services persist, and Lebanon is now highly indebted, much of the civil war damage has been repaired throughout the country, and many foreign investors and tourists have returned.

Postwar social and political instability, fueled by economic uncertainty and the collapse of the Lebanese currency, led to the resignation of Prime Minister Omar Karami, also in May 1992, after less than 2 years in office. He was replaced by former prime minister Rachid Solh, who was widely viewed as a caretaker to oversee Lebanon's first parliamentary elections in 20 years.

If Lebanon has in part recovered over the past decade from the catastrophic damage to infrastructure of its long civil war, the social and political divisions that gave rise to and sustained that conflict remain largely unresolved. Parliamentary and more recently municipal elections have been held with fewer irregularities and more popular participation than in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, and Lebanese civil society generally enjoys significantly more freedoms than elsewhere in the Arab world. However, there are continuing sectarian tensions and unease about Syrian and other external influences.

Portrait of Elie Hobeika

In the late 1990s, the government took action against Sunni Muslim extremists in the north who had attacked its soldiers, and it continues to move against groups such as Asbat al-Ansar, which has been accused of being partnered with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida network. On January 24, 2002, Elie Hobeika, another former Lebanese Forces figure associated with the Sabra and Shatilla massacres who later served in three cabinets and the parliament, was assassinated in a car bombing in Beirut.

During Lebanon's civil war, Syria's troop deployment in Lebanon was legitimized by the Lebanese Parliament in the Taif Agreement, supported by the Arab League, and is given a major share of the credit for finally bringing the civil war to an end in October 1990. In the ensuing fifteen years, Damascus and Beirut justified Syria's continued military presence in Lebanon by citing the continued weakness of a Lebanese armed forces faced with both internal and external security threats, and the agreement with the Lebanese Government to implement all of the constitutional reforms in the Taif Agreement. Under Taif, the Hezbollah militia was eventually to be dismantled, and the LAF allowed to deploy along the border with Israel. Lebanon was called on to deploy along its southern border by UN Security Council Resolution 1391, urged to do so by UN Resolution UN Security Council Resolution 1496, and deployment was demanded by UN Security Council Resolution 1559. The Syrian military and intelligence presence in Lebanon was criticised by some on Lebanon's right-wing inside and outside of the country, others believed it helped to prevent renewed civil war and discourage Israeli aggression, and others believed its presence and influence was helpful for Lebanese stability and peace but should be scaled back.[70] Major powers United States and France rejected Syrian reasoning that they were in Lebanon by the consent of the Lebanese government. They insist that the latter had been co-opted and that in fact Lebanon's Government was a Syrian puppet.[71]

Up to 2005, 14–15,000 Syrian troops (down from 35,000)[72] remained in position in many areas of Lebanon, although the Taif called for an agreement between the Syrian and Lebanese Governments by September 1992 on their redeployment to Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. Syria's refusal to exit Lebanon following Israel's 2000 withdrawal from south Lebanon first raised criticism among the Lebanese Maronite Christians[73] and Druze, who were later joined by many of Lebanon's Sunni Muslims.[74] Lebanon's Shiites, on the other hand, have long supported the Syrian presence, as has the Hezbollah militia group and political party. The U.S. began applying pressure on Syria to end its occupation and cease interfering with internal Lebanese matters.[75] In 2004, many believe Syria pressured Lebanese MPs to back a constitutional amendment to revise term limitations and allow Lebanon's two term pro-Syrian president Émile Lahoud to run for a third time. France, Germany and the United Kingdom, along with many Lebanese politicians joined the U.S. in denouncing alleged Syrian interference.[76] On September 2, 2004, the UN Security Council adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1559, authored by France and the U.S. in an uncommon show of cooperation. The resolution called "upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon" and "for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias".

Map of the Shebaa farms

On May 25, 2000, Israel completed its withdrawal from the south of Lebanon in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 425.[77] A 50-square-kilometre piece of mountain terrain, commonly referred to as the Shebaa farms, remains under the control of Israel. The UN has certified Israel's pullout,[78] and regards the Shebaa Farms as occupied Syrian territory, while Lebanon and Syria have stated they regard the area as Lebanese territory.[79] The January 20, 2005, UN Secretary-General's report on Lebanon stated: "The continually asserted position of the Government of Lebanon that the Blue Line is not valid in the Shab'a farms area is not compatible with Security Council resolutions. The Council has recognized the Blue Line as valid for purposes of confirming Israel's withdrawal pursuant to resolution 425 (1978). The Government of Lebanon should heed the Council's repeated calls for the parties to respect the Blue Line in its entirety."[80]

In Resolution 425, the UN had set a goal of assisting the Lebanese government in a "return of its effective authority in the area", which would require an official Lebanese army presence there. Further, UN Security Council Resolution 1559 requires the dismantling of the Hezbollah militia. Yet, Hezbollah remains deployed along the Blue Line.[81] Both Hezbollah and Israel have violated the Blue Line more than once, according to the UN.[82][83] The most common pattern of violence have been border incursions by the Hezbollah into the Shebaa Farms area, and then Israeli air strikes into southern Lebanon.[84] The UN Secretary-General has urged "all governments that have influence on Hezbollah to deter it from any further actions which could increase the tension in the area".[85] Staffan de Misura, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon stated that he was "deeply concerned that air violations by Israel across the Blue Line during altercations with Hezbollah are continuing to take place",[86] calling "upon the Israeli authorities to cease such violations and to fully respect the Blue Line".[87] In 2001 de Misura similarly expressed his concern to Lebanon's prime minister for allowing Hezbollah to violate the Blue Line, saying it was a "clear infringement" of UN Resolution 425, under which the UN certified Israel's withdrawal from south Lebanon as complete.[88] On January 28, 2005, UN Security Council Resolution 1583 called upon the Government of Lebanon to fully extend and exercise its sole and effective authority throughout the south, including through the deployment of sufficient numbers of Lebanese armed and security forces, to ensure a calm environment throughout the area, including along the Blue Line, and to exert control over the use of force on its territory and from it.[80] On January 23, 2006, The UN Security Council called on the Government of Lebanon to make more progress in controlling its territory and disbanding militias, while also calling on Syria to cooperate with those efforts. In a statement read out by its January President, Augustine Mahiga of Tanzania, the council also called on Syria to take measures to stop movements of arms and personnel into Lebanon.[89]

On September 3, 2004, the National Assembly voted 96–29 to amend the constitution to allow the pro-Syrian president, Émile Lahoud, three more years in office by extending a statute of limitations to nine years. Many regarded this as a second time Syria had pressured Lebanon's Parliament to amend the constitution in a way that favored Lahoud (the first allowing for his election in 1998 immediately after he had resigned as commander-in-chief of the LAF.)[90] Three cabinet ministers were absent from the vote and later resigned. The USA charged that Syria exercised pressure against the National Assembly to amend the constitution, and many of the Lebanese rejected it, saying that it was considered as contradictive to the constitution and its principles.[91] Including these is the Maronite Patriarch Mar Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir—the most eminent religious figure for Maronites—and the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt.

To the surprise of many, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, who had vehemently opposed this amendment, appeared to have finally accepted it, and so did most of his party. However, he ended up resigning in protest against the amendment. He was assassinated soon afterwards, triggering the Cedar Revolution. This amendment comes in discordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which called for a new presidential election in Lebanon.

On October 1, 2004, one of the main dissenting voices to Émile Lahoud's term extension, the newly resigned Druze ex-minister Marwan Hamadeh was the target of a car bomb attack as his vehicle slowed to enter his Beirut home. Mr. Hamadeh and his bodyguard were wounded and his driver killed in the attack. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt appealed for calm, but said the car bomb was a clear message for the opposition.[92] UN Secretary General Kofi Annan expressed his serious concern over the attack.[93]

On October 7, 2004, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan reported to the Security Council that Syria had failed to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. Mr. Annan concluded his report saying that "It is time, 14 years after the end of hostilities and four years after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, for all parties concerned to set aside the remaining vestiges of the past. The withdrawal of foreign forces and the disbandment and disarmament of militias would, with finality, end that sad chapter of Lebanese history.".[94] On October 19, 2004, following the UN Secretary General's report, the UN Security Council voted unanimously (meaning that it received the backing of Algeria, the only Arab member of the Security Council) to put out a statement calling on Syria to pull its troops out of Lebanon, in accordance with Resolution 1559.[95]

The funeral of the assassinated Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri

On October 20, 2004, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri resigned; the next day former prime minister and loyal supporter of Syria Omar Karami was appointed prime minister.[96] On February 14, 2005, former prime minister Hariri was assassinated in a car-bomb attack which killed 21 and wounded 100. On February 21, 2005, tens of thousand Lebanese protestors held a rally at the site of the assassination calling for the withdrawal of Syria's peacekeeping forces and blaming Syria and the pro-Syrian president Lahoud for the murder.[97]

Hariri's murder triggered increased international pressure on Syria. In a joint statement U.S. President Bush and French president Chirac condemned the killing and called for full implementation of UNSCR 1559. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced that he was sending a team led by Ireland's deputy police commissioner, Peter FitzGerald, to investigate the assassination.[98] And while Arab League head Amr Moussa declared that Syrian president Assad promised him a phased withdrawal over a two-year period, the Syrian Information Minister Mahdi Dakhlallah said Mr Moussa had misunderstood the Syrian leader. Mr Dakhlallah said that Syria will merely move its troops to eastern Lebanon. Russia,[99] Germany,[100] and Saudi Arabia[100] all called for Syrian troops to leave.

Local Lebanese pressure mounted as well. As daily protests against the Syrian occupation grew to 25,000, a series of dramatic events occurred. Massive protests such as these had been quite uncommon in the Arab world, and while in the 90s most anti-Syrian demonstrators were predominantly Christian, the new demonstrations were Christian and Sunni.[101] On February 28 the government of pro-Syrian prime minister Omar Karami resigned, calling for a new election to take place. Mr Karami said in his announcement: "I am keen the government will not be a hurdle in front of those who want the good for this country." The tens of thousands gathered at Beirut's Martyrs' Square cheered the announcement, then chanted "Karami has fallen, your turn will come, Lahoud, and yours, Bashar".[102] Opposition MPs were also not satisfied with Karami's resignation, and kept pressing for full Syrian withdrawal. Former minister and MP Marwan Hamadeh, who survived a similar car bomb attack on October 1, 2004, said "I accuse this government of incitement, negligence and shortcomings at the least, and of covering up its planning at the most... if not executing". Two days later Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad announced that his troops will leave Lebanon completely "in the next few months". Responding to the announcement, opposition leader Walid Jumblatt said that he wanted to hear more specifics from Damascus about any withdrawal: "It's a nice gesture but 'next few months' is quite vague—we need a clear-cut timetable".[103]

On March 5 Syrian leader Assad declared in a televised speech that Syria would withdraw its forces to the Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon, and then to the border between Syria and Lebanon. Assad did not provide a timetable for a complete withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon—14,000 soldiers and intelligence agents.[104] Meanwhile, Hezbollah leader Nasrallah called for a "massive popular gathering" on Tuesday against UN Resolution 1559 saying "The resistance will not give up its arms ... because Lebanon needs the resistance to defend it", and added "all the articles of UN resolution give free services to the Israeli enemy who should have been made accountable for his crimes and now finds that he is being rewarded for his crimes and achieves all its demands".[105] In opposition to Nasrallah's call, Monday, March 7 saw at least 70,000 people—with some estimates putting the number at twice as high—gathered at central Martyrs' Square to demand that Syria leave completely.[106]

The following day a pro-Syrian demonstration set a new record when Hezbollah amassed 400,000–500,000 protestors at Riad Solh square in Beirut, most of them bussed in from the heavily Shi'ite south Lebanon and eastern Beka'a valley. The show of power demonstrated Hezbollah's influence, wealth and organization as the sole Lebanese party allowed to hold a militia by Syria. In his speech Nasrallah blasted UN Security-Council Resolution 1559, which calls for Hezbollah's militia to be disbanded, as foreign intervention. Nasrallah also reiterated his earlier calls for the destruction of Israel saying "To this enemy we say again: There is no place for you here and there is no life for you among us. Death to Israel!". Though Hezbollah organized a very successful rally, opposition leaders were quick to point out that Hezbollah had active support from Lebanon's government and Syria. While the pro-democracy rallies had to deal with road blocks forcing protestors to either turn back or march long distances to Martyr's Square, Hezbollah was able to bus people directly to Riad Solh square. Dory Chamoun, an opposition leader, pointed out that "the difference is that in our demonstrations, people arrive voluntarily and on foot, not in buses". Another opposition member said the pro-Syrian government pressured people to turn out and some reports said Syria had bused in people from across the border. But on a mountain road leading to Beirut, only one bus with a Syrian license plate was spotted in a convoy of pro-Syrian supporters heading to the capital and Hezbollah officials denied the charges.[107] Opposition MP Akram Chehayeb said "That is where the difference between us and them lies: They asked these people to come and they brought them here, whereas the opposition's supporters come here on their own. Our protests are spontaneous. We have a cause. What is theirs?".[108]

Anti-Syrian protesters heading to Martyrs' Square in Beirut on foot and in vehicles, 13 March 2005

One month after Hariri's murder, an enormous anti-Syrian rally gathered at Martyr's Square in Beirut. Multiple news agencies estimated the crowd at between 800,000 and 1 million—a show of force for the Sunni Muslim, Christian and Druze communities. The rally was double the size of the mostly Shi'ite pro-Syrian one organized by Hezbollah the previous week.[109] When Hariri's sister took a pro-Syrian line saying that Lebanon should "stand by Syria until its land is liberated and it regains its sovereignty on the[110] occupied Golan Heights" the crowd jeered her.[111] This sentiment was prevalent among the rally participants who opposed Hezbollah's refusal to disarm based on the claim that Lebanese and Syrian interests are linked.[112]

Cedar Revolution and 2006 War (2005–2006)

[edit]

Jamil Al Sayyed, a Syrian ally in the Lebanese security forces, resigned on 25 April, just a day before the final Syrian troops pulled out of Lebanon.

On 26 April 2005, the last 250 Syrian troops left Lebanon. During the departure ceremonies, Ali Habib, Syria's chief of staff, said that Syria's president had decided to recall his troops after the Lebanese army had been "rebuilt on sound national foundations and became capable of protecting the state."

UN forces led by Senegalese Mouhamadou Kandji and guided by Lebanese Imad Anka were sent to Lebanon to verify the military withdrawal which was mandated by Security Council resolution 1559.

Following the Syrian withdrawal a series of assassinations of Lebanese politicians and journalists with the anti-Syrian camp had begun. Many bombings have occurred to date and have triggered condemnations from the UN Security Council and UN Secretary General.[113]

Eight months after Syria withdrew from Lebanon under intense domestic and international outrage over the assassination of Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri the UN investigation has yet to be completed. While UN investigator Detlev Mehlis has pointed the finger at Syria's intelligence apparatus in Lebanon he has yet to be allowed full access to Syrian officials who are suspected by the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) as being behind the assassination.[114] In its latest report UNIIIC said it had "credible information" that Syrian officials had arrested and threatened close relatives of a witness who recanted testimony he had previously given the commission, and that two Syrian suspects it questioned indicated that all Syrian intelligence documents on Lebanon had been burned.[115] A campaign of bomb attacks against politicians, journalists and even civilian neighborhoods associated with the anti-Syrian camp has provoked much negative attention for Syria in the UN[113] and elsewhere.

On December 15, 2005, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the UNIIIC.

On December 30, 2005, Syria's former vice-president, Abdul Halim Khaddam, said that "Hariri received many threats" from Syria's President Bashar Al-Assad.[116] Prior to Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon Mr Khaddam was in charge of Syria's Lebanon policy and mainly responsible for Syria's abuse of Lebanon's resources. Many believe that Khaddam seized the opportunity to clear his history of corruption and blackmail.

Parliament voted for the release of the former Lebanese Forces warlord Samir Geagea in the first session since election were held in the spring of 2005. Geagea was the only leader during the civil war to be charged with crimes related to that conflict. With the return of Michel Aoun, the climate was right to try to heal wounds to help unite the country after former prime minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated on 14 February 2005. Geagea was released on 26 July 2005 and left immediately for an undisclosed European nation to undergo medical examinations and convalesce.

During the Cedar Revolution Hezbollah organized a series of pro-Syrian rallies. Hezbollah became a part of the Lebanese government following the 2005 elections but is at a crossroads regarding the UNSCR 1559 call for its militia to be dismantled. On 21 November 2005, Hezbollah launched an attack along the entire border with Israel, the heaviest in the five and a half years since Israel's withdrawal. The barrage was supposed to provide tactical cover for an attempt by a squad of Hezbollah special forces to abduct Israeli troops in the Israeli side of the village of Al-Ghajar.[117] The attack failed when an ambush by the IDF Paratroopers killed 4 Hezbollah members and scattered the rest.[118] The UN Security Council accused Hezbollah of initiating the hostilities.[119]

A building in Ghazieh, near Sidon, bombed by the Israeli Air Force (IAF), 20 July 2006

On 27 December 2005, Katyusha rockets fired from Hezbollah territory smashed into houses in the Israeli village of Kiryat Shmona wounding three people.[120] UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called on the Lebanese Government "to extend its control over all its territory, to exert its monopoly on the use of force, and to put an end to all such attacks".[121] Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Saniora denounced the attack as "aimed at destabilizing security and diverting attention from efforts exerted to solve the internal issues prevailing in the country".[122] On December 30, 2005, the Lebanese army dismantled two other Katyusha rockets found in the border town of Naqoura, an action suggesting increased vigilance following PM Saniora's angry remarks. In a new statement Saniora also rejected claims by Al-Qaeda that it was responsible for the attack and insisted again that it was a domestic action challenging his government's authority.[123]

The 2006 Lebanon War was a 34-day military conflict in Lebanon and northern Israel. The principal parties were Hezbollah paramilitary forces and the Israeli military. The conflict started on 12 July 2006, and continued until a United Nations-brokered ceasefire went into effect in the morning on 14 August 2006, though it formally ended on 8 September 2006 when Israel lifted its naval blockade of Lebanon.

Instability and Syrian War spillover

[edit]

In 2007, the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp became the center of the 2007 Lebanon conflict between the Lebanese Army and Fatah al-Islam. At least 169 soldiers, 287 insurgents and 47 civilians were killed in the battle. Funds for the reconstruction of the area have been slow to materialize.[124]

Between 2006 and 2008, a series of protests led by groups opposed to the pro-Western Prime Minister Fouad Siniora demanded the creation of a national unity government, over which the mostly Shia opposition groups would have veto power. When Émile Lahoud's presidential term ended in October 2007, the opposition refused to vote for a successor unless a power-sharing deal was reached, leaving Lebanon without a president.

On 9 May 2008, Hezbollah and Amal forces, sparked by a government declaration that Hezbollah's communications network was illegal, seized western Beirut,[125] leading to the 2008 conflict in Lebanon.[126] The Lebanese government denounced the violence as a coup attempt.[127] At least 62 people died in the resulting clashes between pro-government and opposition militias.[128] On 21 May 2008, the signing of the Doha Agreement ended the fighting.[125][128] As part of the accord, which ended 18 months of political paralysis,[129] Michel Suleiman became president and a national unity government was established, granting a veto to the opposition.[125] The agreement was a victory for opposition forces, as the government caved in to all their main demands.[128]

In early January 2011, the national unity government collapsed due to growing tensions stemming from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which was expected to indict Hezbollah members for the Hariri assassination.[130] The parliament elected Najib Mikati, the candidate for the Hezbollah-led March 8 Alliance, Prime Minister of Lebanon, making him responsible for forming a new government.[131] Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah insists that Israel was responsible for the assassination of Hariri.[132] A report leaked by the Al-Akhbar newspaper in November 2010 stated that Hezbollah has drafted plans for a takeover of the country if the Special Tribunal for Lebanon issues an indictment against its members.[133][134]

In 2012, the Syrian Civil War threatened to spill over in Lebanon, causing more incidents of sectarian violence and armed clashes between Sunnis and Alawites in Tripoli.[135] As of 6 August 2013, more than 677,702 Syrian refugees are in Lebanon.[136] As the number of Syrian refugees increases, the Lebanese Forces Party, the Kataeb Party, and the Free Patriotic Movement fear the country's sectarian based political system is being undermined.[137]

2019 Protests due to liquidity Crisis

[edit]
Protesters in Beirut. Mohammad Al-Amin Mosque, 20 October 2019

In October 2019 a series of country-wide protests began in response to many of the government's failures and malfeasances. In the months leading up to the protests there was an ever deepening foreign reserves liquidity crisis.[138][139] Days before protests broke out, a series of about 100 major wildfires in Chouf, Khroub and other Lebanese areas displaced hundreds of people and caused enormous damage to Lebanese wildlife. The Lebanese government failed to deploy its firefighting equipment due to lack of maintenance and misappropriation of funds. Lebanon had to rely on aid from neighboring Cyprus, Jordan, Turkey and Greece.[140][141] In November 2019, commercial banks responded to the liquidity crises by imposing illegal capital controls to protect themselves, despite there being no official law by the BDL regarding banking controls.[142][143]

The protests created a political crisis in Lebanon, with Prime Minister Saad Hariri tendering his resignation and echoing protesters' demands for a government of independent specialists.[144] A cabinet headed by Hassan Diab was formed in 2020.

2020 meltdown of Banque du Liban

[edit]

Concurrently with the COVID–19 pandemic, the Banque du Liban (BdL) in March 2020 defaulted on $90 billion of sovereign debt obligations, triggering a collapse in the value of the Lebanese pound.[145][146] The decision was taken unanimously at a cabinet meeting under the chairmanship of Hassan Diab on 7 March. That in turn caused the complex and opaque financial engineering with which the BdL maintained the nation's tenuous stability to crash and burn.[146] Simultaneously, commercial banks imposed "informal capital controls limiting the amount of dollars depositors can withdraw as well as transfers abroad."[145] Capital controls were expected to remain in place until at least 2025.[145] It was remarked at the time that Lebanon, whose population is under 7 million, "produces little and imports about 80 percent of the goods it consumes."[145] Debt servicing had consumed 30 percent of recent budgets.[145]

On 25 June the IMF estimated the losses at $49 billion, equivalent "to 91 per cent of Lebanon’s total economic output in 2019, according to World Bank figures... almost equal to the total of value of the deposits held by the Banque du Liban from the country’s commercial banks."[146] The government of Lebanon concurred with the IMF estimates.[146] The value of the pound, which had been artificially pegged at £L1,507.5 per U.S. dollar by the BdL, traded on the informal market in June 2020 at £L5,000 to the dollar, and concurrently the BdL welcomed in an official publication the involvement of the IMF.[146]

It came to light in an audit of 2018 BdL finances whose results were revealed on 23 July that the governor of the BdL, Riad Salameh, had fictionalized assets, used creative accounting and cooked the books.[147] Two days earlier the government had announced its contract with New York-based Alvarez & Marsal to conduct "a forensic audit" of BdL finances.[148]

Beirut port explosion and state of emergency

[edit]
Aftermath of the 4 August 2020 Beirut explosion

On 4 August 2020, the Beirut explosion occurred in the port sector of the city, destroying hectares of buildings and killing over 200 people. It was felt throughout the country. 4 days later on 8 August, a peaceful protest was organized starting from the port of Beirut and destined for the parliament building.[149] The demonstrators were faced with brutal, deadly, and extreme excessive force including the use of live-ammunition by the security apparatus to oppress and subdue demonstrators. 728 demonstrators were injured during the 8 August protests and at least 153 injuries were severe enough to be treated in surrounding hospitals.[150] Amid much popular unrest, the entire cabinet of Hassan Diab resigned on 10 August, and a state of emergency, which gave "the army broad powers to prevent gatherings, censor media and arrest anyone deemed to be a security threat", was declared on 13 August by the caretaker government. On 14 August, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah "referred to the possibility of civil war" were the anti-government protestors to force an early election. Meanwhile, Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif complained about the presence of "French and British warships that were deployed to assist in the delivery of medical assistance and other aid."[151][152] Also on 14 August, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) launched a $565 million appeal for donors of aid to victims of the explosion. The UN effort was to focus on: meals, first aid, shelters, and repair of schools.[153]

Following the resignation of Prime Minister Hassan Diab in August 2020, both Mustafa Adib and Saad Hariri failed to form a government. Najib Mikati was designated to fill the role on 26 July 2021.[154] He received 72 votes out of 128 MPs.[155] On September 10, 2021, Mikati was able to form a government.[156] He announced that he wanted to ask for help from Arab countries to try to get Lebanon out of the crisis it is going through.[157]

On 14 October 2021, clashes erupted in Beirut between the Christian militia Lebanese Forces and Hezbollah fighters supported by the Amal Movement.[158]

In May 2022, Lebanon held its first election since a painful economic crisis dragged it to the brink of becoming a failed state. Lebanon's crisis has been so severe that more than 80 percent of the population is now considered poor by the United Nations. In the election Iran-backed Shia Muslim Hezbollah movement and its allies lost their parliamentary majority. Hezbollah did not lose any of its seats, but its allies lost seats. Hezbollah's ally, President Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement, was no longer the biggest Christian party after the election. A rival Christian party, led by Samir Geagea, with close ties to Saudi Arabia, the Lebanese Forces (LF), made gains. Sunni Future Movement, led by former prime minister Saad Hariri, did not participate the election, leaving a political vacuum to other Sunni politicians to fill.[159][160][161]

As of 2023, some consider Lebanon to have become a failed state, suffering from chronic poverty, economic mismanagement and a banking collapse.[162]

Spillover of the Israel–Hamas war

[edit]

The Gaza war sparked a renewed Israel–Hezbollah conflict. On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah began launching rockets at northern Israel, displacing over 60,000 Israelis.[163] Hezbollah has said it will not stop attacking Israel until Israel ceases its attacks and military operations in Gaza,[164] where more than 1,600 Israelis and 40,000 Palestinians have been killed.[165] with the Israeli explosion of Hezbollah pagers and walkie talkies in September 2024,[166] the conflict escalated severely,[167] with the 23 September 2024 Israeli airstrikes on Lebanon killing at least 569 over September 23 and 24, and sparking a mass evacuation of Southern Lebanon.[168] On 27 September 2024, Hassan Nasrallah, the longtime leader of Hezbollah, was killed in a massive Israeli air attack on Beirut. Nasrallah was often described as the most powerful person in Lebanon.[169]

In November 2024, a ceasefire deal was signed between Israel and the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah to end 13 months of conflict. According to the agreement, Hezbollah was given 60 days to end its armed presence in southern Lebanon and Israeli forces were obliged to withdraw from the area over the same period.[170] The fall of Assad’s Baathist regime in Syria was another blow to its Lebanese ally, Hezbollah, which was already weakened because of Israeli military actions.[171] The Syrian regime change in December 2024 was said to start a new chapter in Lebanese politics.[172] In January 2025, Joseph Aoun, the Lebanese army commander, was elected Lebanese 14th president after a two-year vacancy.[173] In February 2025, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, former president of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), formed a new government of 24 ministers after two-year caretaker cabinet.[174] On 26 February 2025, Lebanon's government of Nawaf Salam won a confidence vote in parliament.[175]

See also

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References

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Bibliography

[edit]

Grokipedia

from Grokipedia
The history of Lebanon encompasses the developments in the Levantine coastal region of the modern republic from prehistoric times, with notable recorded events beginning in the Bronze Age when Canaanite populations established city-states that evolved into the Phoenician civilization around 1500 BCE, famed for pioneering maritime trade networks across the Mediterranean and inventing one of the earliest alphabetic writing systems.[1][2] This area endured conquests by Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian, Roman, Byzantine, and early Islamic forces, followed by the medieval era's Crusader states, Mamluk sultanate, and Ottoman Empire incorporation in 1516, during which Mount Lebanon gained semi-autonomous status under local emirs and later the 1861 Mutasarrifate to mitigate sectarian strife between Druze and Maronites.[3] Under Ottoman rule until 1918, the region's diverse religious communities—predominantly Maronite Christians, Druze, Sunni and Shia Muslims—fostered a patchwork of power-sharing arrangements, but post-World War I French Mandate from 1920 expanded boundaries to include Beirut and the south, prioritizing Maronite influence while institutionalizing confessionalism based on a 1932 census favoring Christians.[4] Independence was declared on November 22, 1943, via the National Pact preserving elite confessional allocations, yet demographic shifts from higher Muslim birth rates and influxes of Palestinian refugees after 1948 eroded the balance, culminating in the 1975–1990 civil war triggered by clashes between Christian militias and Palestinian fighters amid Syrian and Israeli interventions.[5] The war, which killed over 150,000 and displaced many, exposed the fragility of Lebanon's multi-sectarian framework, leading to the 1989 Taif Agreement that adjusted power toward Muslims but entrenched militia influence and foreign meddling, including Hezbollah's rise as an Iran-backed Shia force; subsequent decades saw reconstruction under Syrian oversight until 2005, economic booms and busts, and ongoing tensions from refugee crises and regional conflicts, underscoring causal links between unbalanced demographics, external proxies, and state weakness rather than abstract ideological narratives.[5][6]

Prehistory and Ancient History

Prehistoric Settlements

The region encompassing modern Lebanon exhibits evidence of human occupation from the Lower Paleolithic onward, with archaeological surveys identifying more than 200 Paleolithic sites, primarily caves, rockshelters, and open-air locations along the coastal plain and inland valleys.[7] These early settlements reflect exploitation of diverse environments, including marine resources from the Mediterranean coast and terrestrial fauna from adjacent highlands, as indicated by lithic assemblages and faunal remains at sites like Ras el Kelb and Adlun.[8] Lower and Middle Paleolithic industries, characterized by handaxes, Levallois techniques, and flake tools, suggest repeated occupations by archaic hominins adapting to fluctuating climatic conditions during the Pleistocene.[9] Ksar Akil, a prominent rockshelter located 10 kilometers northeast of Beirut in the foothills of Mount Lebanon, provides one of the most detailed stratigraphic records of Upper Paleolithic activity in the Levant, with a 23-meter-deep sequence spanning from the Middle to Epipaleolithic periods.[10] Excavations conducted between the 1930s and 1950s uncovered lithic tools associated with the Initial Upper Paleolithic (layers XXV–XXI), radiocarbon dated to approximately 45,000–30,000 years before present, alongside evidence of bladelet production and bone tools indicative of modern human technological innovation.[11][12] The site's Emireh layer yields transitional artifacts, such as Emireh points, potentially reflecting interactions or succession between Neanderthals and incoming Homo sapiens populations along the Levantine corridor.[13] Transitioning to the Neolithic, settlements shifted toward semi-sedentary villages with evidence of early agriculture and domestication, as seen at coastal and near-coastal sites like Tell Koubba in northern Lebanon, where Pre-Pottery Neolithic layers reveal occupation from around 8000 BCE, including grinding tools and faunal evidence of managed herds.[14][15] A small Neolithic village near Beirut's international airport, dated to circa 4000 BCE, yielded pottery, hearths, and structural remains, underscoring the role of Lebanon's fertile littoral in the Neolithic Revolution's spread through the Near East.[16] Approximately 20 Epipaleolithic and Neolithic sites have been documented, highlighting a gradual intensification of resource use prior to the Chalcolithic.[15]

Phoenician Civilization and Maritime Trade

The Phoenicians, a Semitic-speaking people who inhabited the narrow coastal strip of modern Lebanon from roughly 1500 BCE to 300 BCE, developed a thalassocratic culture centered on independent city-states such as Byblos, Sidon, and Tyre. These urban centers, strategically positioned with dual natural harbors, facilitated their dominance in Mediterranean commerce after the Bronze Age collapse around 1200 BCE, when centralized powers like the Egyptians and Hittites weakened, allowing local Canaanite populations to evolve into the Phoenician polity. Byblos, the oldest continuously inhabited city in the region with evidence of trade ties to Egypt dating back to 3000 BCE, transitioned into a Phoenician hub by exporting Lebanese cedar timber—prized for shipbuilding and temple construction—in exchange for Egyptian papyrus and gold.[17][18] Sidon and Tyre emerged as economic powerhouses during the Iron Age (c. 1200–539 BCE), with Tyre's island fortress providing defensible access to offshore fishing grounds rich in murex snails, the source of the labor-intensive Tyrian purple dye that fetched exorbitant prices in markets from Mesopotamia to Greece. Phoenician shipwrights constructed robust galleys capable of long voyages, propelled by oars and square sails, enabling trade networks that spanned the Mediterranean, Atlantic coasts of Iberia and North Africa, and possibly as far as the British Isles for tin. Key exports included cedar logs (up to 100,000 annually to Egypt in peak periods), textiles dyed purple (requiring 10,000 snails per gram of dye), glass beads, and wine in amphorae, while imports comprised silver from Tartessos in Spain, ivory from Africa, and incense from Arabia.[17][19][20] Maritime expansion led to the establishment of over 300 colonies and trading outposts starting around 1100 BCE, including Utica in modern Tunisia (c. 1100 BCE) and Carthage (814 BCE), which served as emporia rather than territorial empires, prioritizing commercial footholds over conquest. This diaspora disseminated Phoenician innovations, notably the 22-consonant alphabetic script developed c. 1050 BCE from earlier Proto-Sinaitic and Proto-Canaanite systems, simplifying Egyptian hieroglyphs into phonetic symbols inscribed on durable materials like ivory and clay for mercantile records. Adopted by Greeks around 800 BCE and evolving into Latin script, this system revolutionized literacy by reducing memorization needs from thousands of signs to two dozen, enabling precise accounting in far-flung trade.[21][17][19] Phoenician commerce thrived under loose confederations of city-states, often paying tribute to overlords like the Assyrians (from 868 BCE) to maintain autonomy in exchange for naval services, such as supplying 600 ships against Egypt in 609 BCE. Archaeological evidence from shipwrecks off Israel and Sicily confirms hauls of Levantine pottery, metals, and luxury goods, underscoring a profit-driven economy where family-based merchant clans dominated, unburdened by rigid state monopolies. This model of decentralized, sea-borne exchange laid foundational patterns for later Mediterranean globalization, with Phoenician weights and measures standardized across outposts for fair dealing.[18][19][20]

Conquests by Regional Empires

The Neo-Assyrian Empire initiated systematic domination of Phoenician city-states along the Lebanese coast in the mid-9th century BC, beginning with tribute extraction by Ashurnasirpal II (r. 883–859 BC) from Tyre, Sidon, and Byblos.[22] Shalmaneser III (r. 859–824 BC) enforced vassalage through military pressure, notably after the Battle of Qarqar in 853 BC, where a coalition including Tyre's King Baal-Eser II contributed forces against Assyria, followed by tribute payments in 841 BC.[23] Tiglath-Pileser III (r. 745–727 BC) intensified control by conquering Damascus in 732 BC and incorporating Phoenician kings into tribute lists by 738 BC, transforming the region into Assyrian provinces with heavy taxation and deportation policies to suppress revolts.[24] Subsequent Assyrian kings maintained hegemony through punitive campaigns: Sargon II (r. 722–705 BC) resettled populations and fortified outposts, while Sennacherib (r. 705–681 BC) besieged Tyre in 701 BC during his Levantine expedition, forcing King Luli to flee though the island city held out via naval aid.[25] Esarhaddon (r. 681–669 BC) razed rebellious Sidon in 678 BC, renaming its site Kar-Esarhaddon and exiling its king Abdi-Milkutti, while Tyre's Baal I submitted after initial resistance tied to Egypt's invasion.[26] Ashurbanipal (r. 668–627 BC) extracted massive tribute from Tyre—gold, silver, and timber—during his Egyptian campaigns in 667–663 BC, sustaining Assyrian oversight until the empire's collapse amid Median-Babylonian assaults on Nineveh in 612 BC.[27] These conquests disrupted Phoenician autonomy, redirecting maritime wealth to Assyrian coffers and integrating local elites into imperial administration, evidenced by cuneiform records of tribute and royal correspondence.[28] Following Assyria's fall, the Neo-Babylonian Empire under Nebuchadnezzar II (r. 605–562 BC) asserted control after defeating Egypt at Carchemish in 605 BC, subjecting Phoenicia as a buffer against western threats.[29] The pivotal event was the 13-year siege of Tyre (ca. 586–573 BC), initiated after Jerusalem's fall, where Babylonian forces razed the mainland suburb ("Old Tyre") and constructed causeways, compelling King Ethbaal III to surrender the island citadel and pay tribute, though without full naval blockade success due to Tyre's maritime escapes.[30] Other cities like Sidon and Byblos submitted more readily, providing shipwrights and timber for Babylonian fleets, while deportations of artisans bolstered Mesopotamian crafts.[22] Babylonian rule, lasting until 539 BC, emphasized economic extraction over direct governance, with Phoenician kings retaining thrones under oversight, as attested in Babylonian chronicles and Ezekiel's contemporary prophecies.[31] The Achaemenid Persian conquest transitioned Phoenicia seamlessly in 539 BC when Cyrus the Great (r. 559–530 BC) captured Babylon, prompting local rulers—such as Tyre's Baal II—to pledge loyalty without recorded resistance, valuing Persian tolerance for native dynasties.[29] Cyrus's policy of autonomy for vassals, coupled with infrastructure investments, integrated Phoenicia into the empire's satrapy of "Beyond the River" (Eber-Nari), where cities supplied pivotal naval forces for campaigns, including 300 vessels at Salamis in 480 BC under Xerxes I.[22] Darius I (r. 522–486 BC) formalized administration via royal roads and standardized coinage, fostering trade while quelling minor revolts, as in Sidon's 345 BC uprising under Persian governor Tennes, later suppressed.[32] This era marked relative stability, with Phoenician fleets enabling Persian expansion, though underlying tensions from tribute demands persisted until Alexander's arrival in 332 BC.[33]

Hellenistic and Roman Periods

Alexander's Conquest and Hellenistic Rule

Following his victory over the Persians at the Battle of Issus in November 333 BC, Alexander the Great advanced southward along the Levantine coast into Phoenicia to secure his flank and neutralize the Persian naval threat posed by the Phoenician fleet.[34] The cities of Aradus, Marathus, Byblos, and Sidon submitted without resistance, providing Alexander with over 100 triremes that bolstered his navy for the subsequent siege.[35] Tyre, however, refused entry, citing religious objections to allowing sacrifices outside its temple of Melqart and fearing loss of autonomy; its king Azemilcus had withdrawn to the island citadel with 40,000 inhabitants.[35] The siege of Tyre, lasting from January to July 332 BC, marked a pinnacle of Alexandrian engineering and military innovation.[34] Alexander constructed a 70-yard-wide causeway using rubble from the mainland city and Lebanese cedars, extending over 500 meters to the island despite fierce Tyrian counterattacks with fire ships and boulders; he deployed catapults, battering rams, and a blockade fleet augmented by defected Phoenician vessels from Sidon.[35][34] The final assault involved scaling the walls with ladders amid naval feints, resulting in the city's capture; approximately 8,000 Tyrians were killed in the fighting, 2,000 male survivors crucified along the shore, and 30,000 civilians sold into slavery, while Alexander spared the king and temple priests.[35][34] This conquest ended Persian control over Phoenicia, integrating the region into Alexander's empire and facilitating his march to Egypt.[35] Upon Alexander's death in 323 BC, Phoenicia was initially assigned as a satrapy to Laomedon under the partition at Babylon, but Ptolemy I Soter seized control by 320 BC, incorporating it into his Egyptian domain.[36] The Ptolemies maintained dominance for roughly 70 years, defending Phoenicia in the Syrian Wars against Antigonid and later Seleucid incursions, including a 15-month resistance by Tyre in 314 BC.[36] By 198 BC, following Antiochus III's victory over Ptolemaic forces at Paneion, Phoenician cities transferred allegiance to the Seleucids without battle, ushering in a period of deeper Greek influence.[36] Under both Ptolemaic and Seleucid rule, Phoenicia experienced accelerated Hellenization, evidenced by the introduction of Greek coinage, adoption of Hellenic names among elites, and construction of gymnasia and theaters in cities like Sidon and Tyre, though Semitic languages and worship of deities such as Melqart (syncretized with Heracles) persisted alongside trade in purple dye and glass.[36] Seleucid rulers like Antiochus IV Epiphanes further promoted Greek settlement and administrative reforms, founding or refounding ports such as Ptolemais (Acre), but local Phoenician autonomy in commerce endured, contributing to the region's economic prosperity until Roman intervention.[36]

Roman Annexation and Provincial Governance

In 64 BC, during the Third Mithridatic War, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (Pompey) annexed the remnants of the Seleucid Empire, deposing the pretender king Antiochus XIII Asiaticus and incorporating the territory of Syria—including the Phoenician coastal strip encompassing modern Lebanon's littoral cities of Berytus (Beirut), Byblos, Sidon, and Tyre—into the Roman Republic as the province of Syria.[37][38] This annexation followed Pompey's campaigns against Armenian and Seleucid forces, which had destabilized the region after the Seleucids' earlier losses to the Parthians and internal strife; the move secured Roman control over eastern Mediterranean trade routes and eliminated a buffer against Parthian expansion.[39] The inland areas of what is now Lebanon, including the Bekaa Valley and Mount Lebanon, fell under provincial oversight, though mountainous terrains retained semi-autonomous tribal structures due to logistical challenges in full Roman pacification.[40] Provincial administration centered on the legate of Syria, a high-ranking Roman official (initially a proconsul with imperium, later a legatus Augusti pro praetore under the Empire), who resided primarily in Antioch and exercised both military command over legions stationed in the province and civil jurisdiction over taxation, justice, and infrastructure.[37] The Syrian governor's authority extended to the Phoenician cities, where Roman oversight integrated local Phoenician-Punic institutions with imperial structures; cities like Tyre and Sidon, as "free cities" (civitates liberae), preserved municipal autonomy under their native councils (bouleutai) and magistrates, handling internal affairs such as market regulations and temple upkeep while paying tribute to Rome and aligning foreign policy with provincial directives.[41] Berytus, previously a minor port, was elevated by Augustus around 14 BC into the Colonia Julia Felix Augusta Berytus, a veteran colony granting full Roman citizenship to settlers and emphasizing loyalty to the imperial cult; this status fostered urban development, including forums, aqueducts, and a hippodrome, positioning it as a key administrative and cultural hub in the province.[42][43] Under imperial rule, governance emphasized fiscal efficiency and Romanization, with the province yielding revenues from coastal trade in purple dye, timber, and glass, alongside Bekaa grain production; censuses and land surveys, such as those conducted post-annexation, standardized taxation at rates around 1-2% of agricultural yields, though corruption among publicani (tax farmers) occasionally provoked local unrest.[44] Military presence, including cohorts at Tyre and Berytus, maintained order against banditry in the mountains and Parthian border threats, while legal appeals escalated to the Syrian governor or, in capital cases, to the emperor.[37] Phoenician elites adapted by adopting Roman nomenclature and patron-client networks, facilitating a hybrid governance where local priesthoods coexisted with imperial priesthoods (flamines), though periodic revolts—such as Jewish uprisings spilling into Phoenicia—tested provincial cohesion until Vespasian's reforms in 70 AD reinforced legionary garrisons.[40] By the 2nd century AD, under Trajan and Hadrian, the province's stability supported civic benefactions, including theaters and baths funded by decurions, underscoring effective decentralized administration within the overarching Syrian legateship.[44]

Byzantine Continuation and Christianization

The Byzantine Empire, as the continuation of the Eastern Roman Empire following its division in 395 AD, maintained administrative control over the region encompassing modern Lebanon, integrating it into provinces such as Phoenice Maritima and parts of Syria Coele.[45] Cities like Beirut, Tyre, and Sidon sustained economic prosperity through maritime trade and intellectual pursuits, with Beirut's law school attracting scholars until its destruction in the 551 AD earthquake, after which Emperor Justinian I oversaw partial reconstruction.[46] This period saw relative stability interspersed with challenges, including temporary Sassanid Persian occupation from 611 to 628 AD, during which Byzantine Emperor Heraclius reconquered the area, restoring imperial authority.[47] Christianization accelerated under Byzantine rule after Emperor Constantine's Edict of Milan in 313 AD legalized the faith, culminating in Theodosius I's decrees from 380 to 392 AD establishing Nicene Christianity as the state religion and prohibiting pagan practices. In Lebanon, this led to the conversion or abandonment of Hellenistic and Roman temples, with archaeological evidence of pagan sites repurposed for Christian use, such as the incorporation of ancient blocks bearing crosses into new structures during the 5th to 6th centuries.[48] Coastal and inland communities increasingly adopted Christianity, supported by imperial patronage of churches and the suppression of polytheistic cults, though pockets of paganism, Judaism, and other sects persisted amid theological disputes like those between Chalcedonians and Monophysites.[49] Monasticism emerged as a cornerstone of Christian consolidation, with early foundations like the Monastery of Saint Maron established in 452 AD on the Orontes River under Emperor Marcian's auspices, drawing followers of the 4th-century hermit St. Maron who emphasized ascetic dyophysite theology aligned with the Council of Chalcedon (451 AD).[50] Persecuted by Monophysite factions and later Byzantine emperors enforcing Monothelitism, Maronite communities migrated to Lebanon's rugged Mount Lebanon valleys, such as the Qadisha Valley, establishing hermitage networks by the 6th century that preserved Chalcedonian orthodoxy amid imperial religious policies.[51] These refuges fostered a distinct Syriac-influenced Christian identity, contributing to the region's demographic shift toward a Christian majority by the eve of the Arab conquests in 636 AD.[52]

Early Islamic and Medieval Periods

Arab Conquest and Caliphal Administration

The Muslim conquest of the Levant, including the territory of modern Lebanon, unfolded between 634 and 638 CE under the Rashidun Caliphs Abu Bakr and Umar, following the decisive Byzantine defeat at the Battle of Yarmouk in August 636 CE. Initial advances by Arab forces under Yazid ibn Abi Sufyan targeted inland strongholds like Baalbek before reaching the coast, where Byzantine naval superiority initially preserved some ports. However, local populations, weary of Byzantine religious persecutions—particularly against Monophysites—and heavy taxation, often offered minimal resistance, enabling relatively swift submissions.[53] Beirut capitulated without battle in mid-635 CE after negotiations with Abu Ubaydah ibn al-Jarrah, allowing residents to retain their properties under terms of surrender that imposed jizya poll tax on non-Muslims in exchange for protection. Sidon fell in 636 CE, with its inhabitants agreeing to tribute, while Tyre submitted shortly thereafter under similar dhimmi protections, though it briefly resisted due to its fortifications. Tripoli was secured around 637 CE, completing the conquest of northern coastal Lebanon, as Arab armies consolidated control amid the broader collapse of Byzantine authority in Bilad al-Sham.[54][55] These pacts reflected pragmatic governance, prioritizing revenue from existing Christian and Jewish majorities over forced conversions, though Arab tribal garrisons—such as from the Judham and Lakhm clans—were settled in fertile valleys like the Bekaa to secure loyalty and agriculture.[53] Post-conquest administration integrated the Lebanese littoral and mountains into Bilad al-Sham, the caliphal province of Syria, subdivided into military districts (ajnad) under Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan's oversight as governor from 639 CE. Primarily falling within Jund Dimashq (with its capital at Damascus), the region encompassed Beirut, Tripoli, and the interior highlands, while southern Tyre aligned with Jund Filastin; governance emphasized fiscal extraction via land taxes (kharaj) and military requisitions, with Arab elites dominating urban centers but leaving rural Christian communities, including Maronites in Mount Lebanon, largely autonomous as long as tributes flowed.[56] Under the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750 CE), with Damascus as imperial capital under Muawiya I and successors, Lebanon benefited from centralized stability, including road networks and mosque constructions that facilitated trade, though Arabization advanced unevenly—Syriac and Aramaic persisted alongside emerging Arabic usage, and Islam remained a minority faith amid enduring dhimmis.[55][57] The Abbasid Revolution of 750 CE relocated the caliphal center to Baghdad, rendering Bilad al-Sham—and by extension Lebanon—a frontier province prone to neglect and exploitation by Turkish governors, who imposed harsher corvées and suppressed revolts, such as those by local Arab tribes in the 8th century. Demographic shifts accelerated modestly, with Arab settlers intermarrying and some Christians converting to evade jizya amid economic pressures, yet mountain refuges preserved Christian majorities, fostering sectarian pluralism that caliphal policies tolerated for revenue stability rather than ideological uniformity.[58][55] This era entrenched fiscal administration over direct rule, with Lebanon's ports serving Mediterranean commerce while inland areas supplied grain and timber, underscoring the caliphates' reliance on pre-existing Byzantine infrastructures adapted to Islamic legal frameworks like the diwan for taxation.[56]

Crusader Invasions and Frankish States

The consolidation of Crusader control over the Lebanese coast followed the First Crusade's capture of Jerusalem in 1099, as Frankish leaders sought to secure maritime supply lines and expand territorial holdings. Raymond IV of Toulouse initiated the siege of Tripoli in 1102, establishing a fortified camp known as Mont Pèlerin, but his death in 1105 left the effort incomplete.[59] His son, Bertrand of Toulouse, resumed operations with Genoese naval support, culminating in the city's surrender on July 12, 1109, after a seven-year blockade that weakened the Banu Ammar dynasty's Shia Muslim rule.[60][61] This victory marked the foundation of the County of Tripoli, the northernmost Frankish state, which extended from the city of Tripoli southward to the Nahr Ibrahim river, encompassing much of modern northern Lebanon and serving as a vassal entity initially aligned with the Kingdom of Jerusalem.[62] Concurrently, Baldwin I of Jerusalem directed campaigns against other coastal strongholds, capturing Beirut in 1110 from Fatimid control through a brief siege that leveraged naval blockade and land assaults.[63] Further successes included the conquest of Sidon later in 1110 with Venetian aid and Tyre in 1124 after a five-year siege involving combined Frankish and Italian forces, integrating southern Lebanese ports into the Kingdom of Jerusalem's domain.[59] These acquisitions facilitated Italian merchant quarters and enhanced trade routes, though Frankish settlement remained limited, relying on local alliances for governance and defense.[64] In the mountainous interior of Mount Lebanon, Maronite Christians, who had maintained autonomy under prior Muslim administrations, generally welcomed the Franks as fellow Christians, forging military and ecclesiastical ties that bolstered Crusader positions against regional Muslim powers.[50][65] The Maronites provided auxiliary troops and refuge, particularly in areas like Kisrawan, which functioned as a frontier zone between Frankish territories and Muslim-held highlands, though full integration of the rugged terrain eluded sustained Frankish control.[64] The County of Tripoli, ruled by the Toulouse lineage until 1187 and later by the counts of Lusignan, developed feudal lordships around ports like Tortosa and Jubayl, erecting fortifications such as the Krak des Chevaliers to counter incursions from Aleppo and Damascus.[59][62] These Frankish states persisted as precarious enclaves amid fluctuating alliances and conflicts with Seljuk, Fatimid, and later Ayyubid forces, with local Christian communities contributing to their longevity through shared resistance to Islamic expansionism.[65] Demographic analyses indicate minor genetic contributions from European Crusaders to Lebanese populations, underscoring the rulers' status as a military elite rather than mass settlers.[66] By the mid-12th century, the states had stabilized trade and pilgrimage routes but faced chronic vulnerabilities due to their elongated coastal orientation and dependence on Western reinforcements.[59]

Mamluk Consolidation and Suppression

Following the Mamluk conquest of the remaining Crusader strongholds, including the fall of Acre in 1291 and Tripoli in 1289, the sultanate asserted direct control over Lebanese territories as part of the broader Syrian province under the viceroy in Damascus.[67] This consolidation integrated coastal cities like Beirut and Sidon into Mamluk administrative divisions, with local tax farming (iqta') systems imposed to extract revenue from agriculture and trade routes through Mount Lebanon.[68] Resistance from semi-autonomous mountain communities, who disrupted communications by blocking passes between Tripoli and Beirut, prompted retaliatory campaigns to enforce submission and eliminate potential alliances with lingering Mongol or Crusader remnants.[69] The primary focus of suppression was Kisrawan, a northern district of Mount Lebanon dominated by Shia Muslim tribes, Ismailis, and Alawites who had historically evaded central authority.[70] In 1292, Sultan al-Ashraf Khalil dispatched the first expedition under amir Sunqur al-Ashqar to punish road blockages and raids, resulting in initial punitive raids but incomplete pacification.[71] A second campaign in 1300, led by Baybars al-Jashnagir, intensified operations, while the decisive 1305 effort under sultan al-Nasir Muhammad involved widespread devastation, including the felling of trees to deny cover and mass killings that depopulated resistant villages.[72] These actions, estimated to have displaced thousands, drove Shia populations southward to Jabal Amil, reshaping sectarian demographics and allowing later Maronite Christian resettlement in Kisrawan under Mamluk oversight.[70][67] Shiite and Druze groups in southern districts like the Gharb and Shuf also faced crackdowns for similar rebellions around 1305–1309, coinciding with Mamluk distractions from Mongol threats, though these were less intense than in Kisrawan.[67] The sultanate installed Sunni tribal leaders, such as the Assaf family in 1306, as multazims (tax collectors) to govern subdued areas, curtailing the power of local emirs who previously operated with de facto independence.[73] Druze chieftains in the Shuf submitted tribute but retained limited feudal rights, reflecting pragmatic Mamluk tolerance for productive mountain economies in exchange for loyalty, though periodic revolts were quashed to prevent broader unrest.[74] By the mid-14th century, Mamluk authority stabilized through fortified garrisons in key towns and a network of spies monitoring emirs, reducing Mount Lebanon to a peripheral but tribute-yielding appendage of Damascus.[69] This era of suppression entrenched Sunni administrative dominance while fostering latent sectarian resentments, as heterodox communities adapted by migration or nominal assimilation, setting precedents for future Ottoman governance.[72]

Ottoman Era (1516–1918)

Druze Ascendancy and Ma'an Dynasty

The Ma'an dynasty, a Druze family of Arab origin based in the Chouf region of southern Mount Lebanon, ascended to prominence under Ottoman rule following the empire's conquest of Syria in 1516.[75] The dynasty's founder, Fakhr al-Din bin Uthman (r. 1516–1544), secured appointment as multazim (tax farmer) of the Shouf and later as emir of the Sidon-Beirut and Safad sanjaks, leveraging the Ottoman iqta' system to consolidate local authority amid the Druze's martial traditions and control over mountainous terrain.[76] This positioned the Druze as key intermediaries in Ottoman fiscal administration, enabling their dominance in the muqata'ji (tax-farming district) framework that governed Mount Lebanon from the 16th century.[76] The dynasty's peak occurred under Fakhr al-Din II (1572–1635), who assumed effective control in 1590 at age 18 after his father Qurqmaz's execution by Ottoman forces in 1585.[75] [76] Expanding beyond the Shouf, he secured governorships over Sidon, Beirut, and Jubayl by 1618, while extending influence across Galilee, the Biqa Valley, Hawran, and parts of Palestine through military victories, including the Battle of Anjar in 1623 against Ottoman-backed forces.[75] [76] Fakhr al-Din II fostered economic growth by introducing silk cultivation, enlarging Beirut's port for European trade, and constructing fortifications such as the Beirut citadel (later the Serail) and palaces in Deir al-Qamar.[75] [76] To counter Ottoman oversight, he forged alliances with European powers, notably signing a 1608 treaty with Tuscany's Grand Duke Ferdinando I for military aid and commercial privileges, followed by a self-imposed exile in Tuscany from 1613 to 1618 after defeating Janissaries at Muzayrib in 1613.[75] These pacts, alongside tolerance toward Maronites, Sunnis, and Jews, enhanced his semi-autonomous rule, promoting intercommunal cooperation and cultural exchanges that presaged Lebanon's later confessional dynamics.[75] However, his de facto independence provoked Ottoman retaliation; in 1633, imperial armies under Sultan Murad IV invaded, defeating Ma'an forces and capturing Fakhr al-Din, who was executed in Istanbul on April 13, 1635.[75] [76] Post-execution, the dynasty persisted under nephew Mulhim Ma'n (r. 1635–1658) and later Ahmad Ma'n (r. 1658–1697), but internal divisions and renewed Ottoman centralization eroded Druze ascendancy.[76] Ahmad's death without heirs in 1697 marked the Ma'an line's end, paving the way for the Shihab dynasty's rise, though the Druze retained influence in southern Mount Lebanon through feudal networks until the 19th-century upheavals.[76] The Ma'an era thus represented the zenith of Druze political and economic agency, rooted in strategic adaptation to Ottoman decentralization rather than outright separatism.[75]

Shihab Emirate and Internal Reforms

The Shihab Emirate, established in Mount Lebanon around 1697 following the Ma'an dynasty's decline, saw the Shihab family—originally Sunni Arabs with Druze marital ties—assume the paramount amirship under Ottoman suzerainty as tax farmers (multazims).[76] Early rulers like Bashir I (1697–1707) extended influence into Jabal Amil and Palestine, while Haydar Shihab (1707–1733) defeated Yamani faction rivals at the Battle of Ain Dara in 1711, solidifying Qaysi dominance and stabilizing governance amid factional strife.[76] [3] Bashir II Shihab (r. 1788–1840), ascending with support from the Pasha of Acre Ahmad Pasha Jazzar, centralized authority by systematically eliminating autonomous local lords (muqata'aji), culminating in the execution of Druze rival Bashir Jumblatt II and his kin in 1825 after the Battle of Ain Dara.[77] [76] This consolidation reduced feudal fragmentation, enabling direct tax collection and appointment of loyal sub-governors (kaymakams), though it provoked peasant revolts like the 1821 Antiliyas-Lihfid uprising against oppressive fiscal exactions.[78] [76] Administrative reforms under Bashir II emphasized personal rule over collegiate feudal councils, fostering a nascent bureaucracy with secretaries like Nasif al-Yazigi handling correspondence and diplomacy.[76] He developed a conscripted standing army of several thousand, equipped with European firearms acquired via Acre's ports, enhancing internal security and enabling expansionist campaigns.[79] Economically, the emirate transitioned from subsistence feudalism to cash-crop monoculture, with silk production surging through peasant cultivation incentives and factory reeling; by the 1830s, silk exports to Europe via Beirut generated revenues funding infrastructure like the Beiteddine Palace complex (initiated 1818).[80] [76] These reforms, while boosting fiscal centralization and trade—Beirut's commerce grew amid Ottoman-European treaties—exacerbated sectarian tensions by favoring Maronite Christians in alliances and land redistribution, alienating Druze elites and setting the stage for 1840s violence after Bashir II's alliance with Egyptian forces under Ibrahim Pasha led to his deposition.[79] [76] The emirate's end in 1841 marked the Ottoman imposition of the Qa'im Maqamiya dual governorship, fragmenting Mount Lebanon into northern Christian and southern Druze zones to curb Shihab-style autocracy.[76]

19th-Century Sectarian Violence and European Involvement

In the mid-19th century, sectarian tensions in Mount Lebanon intensified under Ottoman suzerainty following the decline of the Shihab emirate, exacerbated by demographic shifts favoring the Maronite Christian population and disputes over land tenure and local authority. Maronites, whose numbers had grown significantly due to relative prosperity and missionary influences, increasingly challenged Druze feudal elites in mixed districts like the Shuf and Matn, leading to sporadic clashes in the 1840s that aligned along Qaysi-Yamani factional lines but increasingly took on religious dimensions. By 1858, administrative divisions into separate Christian and Druze qa'imaqamates failed to contain rivalries, as Maronite peasants resisted Druze notables' claims to muqata'aji lands.[81] The violence erupted in April 1860 in the mixed areas of Zahle and Dayr al-Qamar, where local disputes over taxation and autonomy escalated into coordinated Druze attacks on Maronite communities. Druze militias, led by figures such as Said Bey Jumblatt, systematically targeted Maronite villages, destroying over 380 settlements and 560 churches while killing between 11,000 and 20,000 Christians, primarily civilians. Maronite forces offered resistance but suffered disproportionate losses due to the Druze's military preparedness and the element of surprise; Druze casualties numbered in the hundreds, reflecting the one-sided nature of the assaults driven by fears of Maronite political ascendancy. The conflict spilled into Damascus in July 1860, where Muslim mobs killed around 5,000-6,000 Christians, prompting Ottoman reprisals under Fuad Pasha, who executed over 100 perpetrators to restore order.[82][83] European powers, alerted by consular reports and missionary accounts, viewed the massacres as a humanitarian crisis and opportunity for influence, with France positioning itself as protector of Eastern Christians under longstanding capitulatory rights. In August 1860, a French expeditionary force of 6,000-7,000 troops landed in Beirut to safeguard Maronite refugees and pressure the Ottoman Porte, while Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia issued a joint note demanding reforms; British policy favored Druze interests to counter French expansion. Fuad Pasha's Ottoman commission, arriving in July, suppressed remaining violence and initiated indemnities, but the European intervention culminated in an international conference in Istanbul.[83][84] The 1860-1861 crisis led to the Règlement organique of June 9, 1861, establishing the Mutasarrifate of Mount Lebanon as an autonomous Ottoman province under a non-Lebanese Christian governor (mutasarrif), initially Daher al-Qurini, appointed by the Sultan but approved by the powers, with an administrative council proportional to sectarian demographics—Maronites holding the plurality. This arrangement, guaranteed by the six great powers, demilitarized factions, centralized taxation, and promoted infrastructure, reducing feudal privileges and fostering relative stability until World War I, though underlying sectarian mistrust persisted. France's role underscored great power rivalries, with Ottoman concessions averting broader territorial losses.[81][83]

World War I Famine and Collapse of Ottoman Control

The entry of the Ottoman Empire into World War I on the side of the Central Powers in October 1914 initiated a period of severe hardship in Mount Lebanon, an autonomous mutasarrifate within the empire that encompassed much of modern Lebanon's core territory.[85] The region, with a pre-war population of approximately 450,000, experienced the Great Famine from 1915 to 1918, resulting in an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 deaths from starvation and associated diseases such as typhus and dysentery, representing a mortality rate exceeding one-third of the populace.[86] [87] This catastrophe decimated the primarily Maronite Christian population, altering demographic balances and exacerbating sectarian vulnerabilities that persisted into the postwar era.[88] Mount Lebanon's vulnerability stemmed from its heavy reliance on food imports—up to 80 percent of grain and staples from Syria and international trade—coupled with limited local arable land suited for subsistence agriculture.[89] The Allied naval blockade, enforced primarily by French forces on ports like Beirut starting in late 1914, severed these supply lines as a wartime measure against Ottoman logistics, while Ottoman authorities prioritized requisitioning available foodstuffs for the military, confiscating livestock and harvests across the vilayets of Syria and Beirut.[85] [90] Compounding these policy-driven shortages were environmental factors, including a 1915 locust plague that destroyed crops in the Beqaa Valley and drought-reduced yields, which Ottoman grain export bans failed to mitigate effectively due to administrative corruption and black-market profiteering.[91] Relief efforts, such as remittances from the Lebanese diaspora and sporadic aid from American missionaries, provided marginal sustenance but were hampered by Ottoman restrictions on distribution and smuggling.[92] Ahmet Cemal Pasha, appointed commander of the Ottoman Fourth Army and de facto governor of Syria (including Mount Lebanon) in 1914, implemented draconian measures to enforce food controls and suppress perceived disloyalty amid Arab nationalist stirrings.[93] His administration closed borders to trade, executed 21 prominent Lebanese and Syrian figures—predominantly Christians and Muslims advocating autonomy—on May 6, 1916 (commemorated as Martyrs' Day), and diverted resources to frontline needs, actions that some contemporary observers and later analysts attributed to intentional pressure on Christian communities suspected of francophile sympathies.[88] [89] However, the famine's roots lay more in the empire's wartime prioritization of military sustenance over civilian welfare and the blockade's disruption of pre-war commercial networks than in singular genocidal intent, though Cemal's harsh governance amplified mortality through disease outbreaks in overcrowded, underfed quarters.[94] By 1917, reports documented widespread cannibalism, grass consumption ("martyrs of the grass"), and mass emigration or exodus to Damascus and beyond, hollowing out villages and urban centers like Beirut.[95] The famine eroded Ottoman administrative capacity in Mount Lebanon, fostering resentment and passive resistance that undermined recruitment and taxation efforts, while disease and malnutrition depleted labor for war production.[96] This internal collapse paralleled military reversals: British forces under General Edmund Allenby captured Palestine in 1917–1918, and the Arab Revolt diverted Ottoman troops, culminating in the fall of Damascus on October 1, 1918, to Allied and Sherifian armies.[97] Emir Faisal's forces entered Beirut on October 5, 1918, prompting Ottoman evacuation, followed by the Armistice of Mudros on October 30, 1918, which mandated Ottoman demobilization and Allied occupation of strategic points.[98] By November 1918, Ottoman authority in Lebanon had dissolved, yielding to interim Arab civil administration under Faisal, though French forces soon asserted mandate claims per pre-war Sykes-Picot arrangements, exploiting the power vacuum and famine-induced instability to justify intervention.[86] The catastrophe thus not only inflicted demographic ruin but accelerated the empire's disintegration in the region, paving the way for colonial reconfiguration.[94]

French Mandate and Path to Independence (1920–1946)

Creation of Greater Lebanon

The State of Greater Lebanon was proclaimed on September 1, 1920, by French General Henri Gouraud, the High Commissioner for the French Mandate in Syria and Lebanon, during a ceremony at the Residence des Pins in Beirut attended by representatives from across the new territory.[99] This act followed France's military occupation of Damascus after the Battle of Maysalun on July 24, 1920, which ended Arab attempts under Emir Faisal to establish an independent Kingdom of Syria encompassing Ottoman Syrian provinces.[100] The proclamation detached territories from the former Ottoman vilayets of Beirut and Damascus, expanding beyond the autonomous Mutasarrifate of Mount Lebanon (established in 1861) to include the port cities of Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, and Tyre; the Bekaa Valley; the southern districts up to the Litani River; and the northern Akkar plain, forming a contiguous state of approximately 5,442 square kilometers with direct Mediterranean access.[101] The configuration of Greater Lebanon was largely shaped by proposals from Robert de Caix, a French colonial advisor and secretary to Gouraud, who in July 1920 advocated for a enlarged Lebanese entity to ensure economic viability through coastal integration and to bolster French strategic interests by creating a pro-French Christian-dominated polity in the Levant.[102] De Caix's vision emphasized uniting the Maronite Christian core of Mount Lebanon—where Christians held a demographic plurality—with peripheral regions, despite these areas having Muslim majorities, particularly Sunnis in the north and Shiites in the south and Bekaa, to prevent their absorption into a pan-Syrian state hostile to French influence.[103] The Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon, a body of local notables dominated by Maronites, actively lobbied for this expansion, viewing it as essential for state survival amid post-World War I fragmentation.[101] While Maronite leaders and some Druze elites welcomed the creation as a safeguard against Sunni Arab dominance, it provoked opposition from Muslim communities in the annexed districts, who protested the territorial amputation from historical Syria and demanded unification with Damascus, leading to petitions and unrest that highlighted emerging sectarian fissures.[104] The French justified the move as fulfilling League of Nations principles for mandates by fostering self-governing institutions, though critics later argued it prioritized colonial divide-and-rule tactics over organic national cohesion, sowing seeds for Lebanon's confessional imbalances where Christians comprised about 51% of the population against 49% Muslims in the 1932 census.[105] Formalized by the League of Nations in 1923 as part of the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon, Greater Lebanon's borders have endured, defining the modern republic despite ongoing debates over their artificiality.[103]

Mandate Policies and Nationalist Resistance

The French Mandate administration in Lebanon, formalized under the League of Nations in 1923 but operational from 1920, was headed by a High Commissioner appointed by France, who wielded executive authority over legislative councils with limited powers. Key policies emphasized infrastructure development, including the expansion of Beirut's port and road networks connecting Mount Lebanon to coastal and Bekaa regions, alongside agricultural reforms that transitioned silk production from Ottoman-era monopolies to export-oriented markets tied to French interests.[106] Educational initiatives prioritized French-language instruction and institutions, with over 200 French-operated schools by the 1930s enrolling a disproportionate share of Christian students, fostering cultural assimilation while restricting Arabic-medium higher education to curb pan-Arab influences.[106] To maintain control amid diverse sects, French authorities institutionalized a confessional political framework in the 1926 constitution, apportioning parliamentary seats and public offices by religious affiliation based on a 1921 estimate—6:5 Christian-to-Muslim ratio—favoring Maronites with the presidency and Greek Orthodox key administrative roles, while Sunnis received the premiership.[107] This system, rooted in pre-mandate Ottoman millet structures but rigidified under French oversight, aimed to fragment potential unified opposition by amplifying sectarian identities over Arab nationalism, with policies like selective land reforms benefiting Christian landowners in Mount Lebanon at the expense of Muslim-majority peripheral areas.[108] Economic privileges, such as tax exemptions for French-linked enterprises, further entrenched dependencies, as Lebanon's budget relied on 40% French subsidies by the mid-1920s, limiting fiscal autonomy.[106] Nationalist resistance emerged from grievances over territorial expansion into Muslim-majority regions like Tripoli and the Bekaa, which diluted Christian dominance and fueled demands for reintegration with Syria.[109] Sunni and Shiite leaders, viewing Greater Lebanon as an artificial construct, organized petitions and petitions in the early 1920s advocating Syrian unity, while even some Greek Orthodox clergy opposed the mandate's separation from Damascus.[110] By the 1930s, cross-sectarian agitation intensified through strikes and boycotts in Beirut and Sidon, protesting censorship and forced labor; a 1933 general strike paralyzed commerce, prompting French concessions like advisory councils but no sovereignty transfer.[111] The 1936 Franco-Lebanese treaty, negotiated amid Syrian revolts spilling into northern Lebanon, promised independence within three years and mutual defense pacts but was shelved by France's parliament due to geopolitical shifts, igniting widespread riots and the formation of paramilitary groups.[109][103] The Phalange (Kataeb), founded in 1936 by Pierre Gemayel as a Christian youth organization inspired by fascist models, mobilized against French cultural dominance through marches and scouting networks, amassing 10,000 members by 1937.[112] Paralleling this, the Muslim Najjadeh militia, established in 1937, rallied Sunni nationalists for anti-mandate demonstrations, clashing with French forces in Beirut suburbs.[102] These movements, though suppressed via arrests and martial law—resulting in over 200 deaths in 1937-1938 skirmishes—eroded French legitimacy, setting the stage for wartime declarations of autonomy.[111]

World War II Impacts and Sovereign Independence

Following the fall of France to Nazi Germany on June 22, 1940, the Vichy French regime assumed control over the French Mandate territories of Syria and Lebanon, raising Allied concerns about potential Axis exploitation as a staging ground for operations against British positions in the Middle East.[113] In response, British-led Allied forces, including troops from Australia, India, and Free French units under General Charles de Gaulle, launched Operation Exporter on June 8, 1941, invading from Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq to neutralize Vichy threats.[114] [113] The campaign encountered stiff Vichy resistance, involving approximately 40,000 Vichy troops equipped with modern aircraft and tanks, resulting in over 5,000 Allied casualties before the Vichy surrender on July 14, 1941, after Allied forces captured key sites including Damascus on June 21 and Beirut on July 12.[115] [116] This military action not only secured the region against immediate Axis threats but also diminished French mandatory authority, as British influence grew and Free French assurances of eventual independence for Lebanon and Syria were extended, though wartime exigencies delayed full implementation.[117] The invasion's success prevented potential German airborne operations into the Levant, as evidenced by intercepted intelligence on Vichy-German contacts, while imposing economic strains through requisitioning and disrupted trade under both Vichy and subsequent administrations.[118] [106] Post-invasion, Lebanese nationalists capitalized on weakened French control to advance self-governance. In the August-September 1943 parliamentary elections, Bechara el-Khoury, a Maronite Christian, was elected president, and Riad el-Solh, a Sunni Muslim, became prime minister, forging the unwritten National Pact that balanced confessional interests by reserving the presidency for Maronites, the premiership for Sunnis, the speakership for Shiites, and maintaining a 6:5 Christian-to-Muslim ratio in parliament based on the 1932 census, while committing Christians to Lebanon's Arab character and Muslims to its independence from Syrian unification.[119] [120] This pact, negotiated amid wartime transitions, rejected pan-Arab irredentism and entrenched proportional sectarian representation as a pragmatic compromise to avert civil strife, though it perpetuated demographic imbalances favoring Christians despite Muslim population growth.[119] French High Commissioner Henri Eyguénotz challenged the new government's authority by dissolving parliament and arresting el-Khoury and el-Solh on November 11, 1943, prompting a two-day general strike and protests that compelled their release on November 22, after which France conceded to Lebanese constitutional reforms.[117] Lebanon declared independence on November 26, 1943, joining the Arab League in 1945 and the United Nations later that year, yet French troops numbering around 5,000 remained until international pressure, including from Britain and the U.S., enforced their complete withdrawal by December 31, 1946, marking sovereign independence.[117] [121] This endpoint resolved lingering mandate-era tensions, allowing the confessional framework to underpin the early republic's stability.[122]

Early Independent Republic (1946–1975)

Confessional Democracy and Initial Stability

The National Pact of 1943, an unwritten agreement between Maronite Christian leader Bechara El Khoury and Sunni Muslim politician Riad El Solh, established Lebanon's confessional democracy by codifying sectarian power-sharing in the post-independence government.[123][124] This arrangement allocated the presidency to Maronite Christians, the premiership to Sunni Muslims, and the speakership of parliament to Shia Muslims, while extending proportional representation to other sects based on the 1932 French census, which recorded Christians at approximately 51% of the population.[125][119] The Pact also committed Lebanon to independence from both Western domination and pan-Arab unification with Syria, preserving a multi-sectarian framework over a secular or unitary state.[125] Building on the 1926 constitution's provisions for religious community representation in parliament—requiring seats to be divided proportionally among sects without mandating exact quotas—the National Pact reinforced confessionalism as the basis for executive and legislative stability.[126] El Khoury's election as president in 1943 and Solh's appointment as prime minister facilitated the 1946 withdrawal of French mandate forces, marking full sovereignty without immediate internal upheaval.[127] Governments rotated frequently through coalition cabinets, accommodating diverse sectarian interests via consensus rather than majoritarian rule, which mitigated overt power struggles in the initial decade.[128] This system fostered political equilibrium amid Lebanon's demographic mosaic, where no single sect held an absolute majority, enabling relative stability from 1946 to the mid-1950s despite underlying demographic shifts from rural Muslim migration to urban areas.[119] Parliamentary elections in 1947 and 1951 proceeded under universal male suffrage, producing assemblies reflective of confessional balances, though influenced by notable families (zu'ama) who bridged sectarian and clientelist networks.[129] The absence of a new census—politically sensitive due to potential Muslim majorities—locked in 1932 ratios, preserving Christian privileges while averting immediate reform demands.[125] Initial stability derived from the Pact's pragmatic accommodation of sectarian veto powers, allowing policy continuity on foreign neutrality and economic openness, though it institutionalized divisions that later amplified tensions during regional upheavals like the 1956 Suez Crisis and 1958 pan-Arabist pressures.[128] By prioritizing elite pacts over popular sovereignty, confessional democracy sustained governance without civil strife until external influences and internal dissent eroded its foundations in 1958.[130]

Economic Liberalization and Golden Age

Following independence in 1946, Lebanon pursued a laissez-faire economic model characterized by minimal government intervention, low taxation, and free trade policies, which fostered rapid growth in the services sector.[131] This approach, rooted in the country's confessional political system that balanced sectarian interests through economic prosperity rather than redistribution, positioned Lebanon as a regional outlier with the highest per capita income in the Arab world by the 1950s.[132] The economy expanded through commerce, tourism, and finance, with Beirut emerging as a cosmopolitan hub often dubbed the "Paris of the Middle East" due to its vibrant nightlife, international banking, and influx of foreign capital.[133] A pivotal reform was the enactment of the Banking Secrecy Law in 1956, which prohibited banks from disclosing client information without judicial authorization, mirroring Swiss standards and shielding depositors from political risks prevalent elsewhere in the region.[134] This legislation, promulgated on September 3, 1956, bound bank managers and employees to absolute secrecy, attracting substantial Arab petrodollars and flight capital, particularly after regional upheavals like the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.[135] The banking sector thrived as a result, with deposits growing exponentially and Beirut solidifying its role as a principal financial center; by the 1960s, new company registrations increased at an average annual rate of 15 percent, underscoring the era's entrepreneurial dynamism.[136] Lebanon's per capita income surpassed that of neighboring states, driven by service exports and remittances, though this growth masked underlying vulnerabilities such as limited industrialization and heavy reliance on external capital flows.[137] The 1960s and early 1970s marked the zenith of this "Golden Age," with sustained economic expansion fueled by infrastructure investments, including port expansions and hotel constructions that boosted tourism revenues.[138] Real GDP growth averaged around 6-7 percent annually during peak years, supported by a stable Lebanese pound pegged to the U.S. dollar and favorable trade balances in invisibles like banking services.[139] However, critics note that while empirical data confirms prosperity—evidenced by Beirut's skyline transformation and population influx—the model's causal foundation rested on geopolitical stability and confessional consensus, both of which eroded by the mid-1970s; mainstream narratives often overlook how institutional biases in post-colonial historiography underemphasize these endogenous drivers in favor of exogenous factors.[132] This period's legacy endures as a testament to market-oriented policies enabling Lebanon to achieve relative affluence amid regional turmoil.[140]

Influx of Palestinian Refugees and Sectarian Tensions

Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, approximately 90,000 to 104,000 Palestinian refugees, predominantly Sunni Muslims, fled to Lebanon, settling primarily in coastal camps near Beirut, Tyre, and Sidon such as Sabra, Chatila, and Ein el-Hilweh.[141][142] Lebanon's government, wary of upsetting the fragile confessional balance established by the 1943 National Pact—which allocated political power based on a 1932 census showing Christian numerical superiority—denied most refugees citizenship and restricted their employment and property rights to prevent a shift toward Muslim demographic dominance.[143] By the 1970s, the Palestinian population, including descendants, had grown to an estimated 300,000, concentrated in urban and southern areas, exacerbating fears among Maronite Christians and other groups that permanent settlement would demand revisions to power-sharing formulas favoring Muslims.[144] The 1967 Six-Day War brought additional refugees, numbering around 15,000, further straining resources, but the pivotal escalation occurred with the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) militarization. After its founding in 1964, the PLO increasingly used Lebanon as a base for fedayeen guerrilla operations against Israel, prompting clashes with the Lebanese army in 1968-1969 over border control.[145] The 1969 Cairo Agreement, mediated by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser following deadly confrontations that killed over 30 Lebanese soldiers, granted the PLO autonomy in refugee camps and the right to conduct cross-border raids, effectively creating a state-within-a-state while nominally subordinating it to Lebanese authority.[146] This accord undermined the government's monopoly on force, as PLO factions armed and trained openly, allying with Lebanon's Sunni Muslims and leftist parties against conservative Christian factions like the Phalange, who viewed the arrangement as an existential threat to sovereignty and sectarian equilibrium.[147] The 1970 Black September conflict in Jordan expelled thousands of PLO fighters—estimates suggest up to 10,000-20,000 relocated to Lebanon, bolstering the organization's arsenal and presence in southern border areas.[148] From these bases, fedayeen launched frequent attacks on northern Israel starting in the early 1970s, with over 1,000 raids recorded by 1975, drawing heavy Israeli retaliatory strikes that devastated Lebanese villages, infrastructure, and agriculture in the south, displacing tens of thousands and fostering resentment toward both the PLO and the central government for failing to curb the activities. Israel's responses, including artillery barrages and aerial bombings—such as the 1973 Operation Spring of Youth raid on Beirut killing PLO leaders—highlighted Lebanon's vulnerability, as the PLO's unchecked operations invited external aggression without commensurate defense capabilities.[149] These dynamics intensified sectarian divides: the PLO's alignment with the National Movement (a Muslim-leftist coalition demanding secular reforms and greater Muslim representation) clashed with Christian militias arming in self-defense, perceiving the Palestinians as catalysts for demographic dilution and civil disorder.[150] Clashes escalated in 1973 when the Lebanese army besieged Palestinian camps after Israeli reprisals, killing hundreds and exposing the state's weakness, while PLO recruitment among Lebanon's underclass blurred lines between refugee militancy and internal radicalism.[151] By 1975, the influx and PLO entrenchment had transformed refugee presence from a humanitarian issue into a security crisis, eroding confessional consensus and priming the multi-factional alliances that ignited the civil war.[152]

Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990)

Triggers and Factional Alliances

The influx of Palestinian refugees following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War (approximately 100,000) and the 1967 Six-Day War (an additional 15,000–20,000) significantly altered Lebanon's demographic balance, with the total Palestinian population reaching an estimated 300,000–400,000 by 1975, many concentrated in refugee camps and increasingly militarized under the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).[144] [141] This group, predominantly Sunni Muslim and aligned with pan-Arabist ideologies, exacerbated sectarian strains within Lebanon's confessional power-sharing system, which was fixed by the 1932 census granting Christians a slim parliamentary majority despite higher Muslim birth rates and urban migration; Christians, particularly Maronites, perceived the Palestinians as tipping the scales toward a Muslim majority and undermining the state's monopoly on force.[5] The 1969 Cairo Agreement formalized PLO autonomy in Palestinian camps and southern Lebanon, allowing fedayeen guerrilla operations against Israel from Lebanese territory, which provoked Israeli reprisals (including artillery bombardments and raids killing hundreds of civilians) and internal clashes with the Lebanese army, fostering a parallel armed authority that Phalangist leaders viewed as an existential threat to Lebanese sovereignty.[153] The immediate trigger occurred on April 13, 1975, in Beirut's Ain el-Rummaneh district, when gunmen—later identified as Phalangist militiamen—opened fire on a church during a service, followed by an attack on a bus carrying approximately 50 armed Palestinians returning from a rally in Chiyah, killing 22–27 passengers and wounding others in what became known as the "Bus Massacre."[154] [155] This incident ignited retaliatory violence, including "Black Saturday" on April 14, when PLO and leftist fighters killed around 200–300 civilians in Christian areas of Beirut, escalating sporadic clashes into widespread fighting that engulfed the capital by mid-1975.[154] Underlying economic grievances—such as disparities between prosperous Christian Beirut suburbs and impoverished Muslim and Palestinian peripheries—fueled leftist mobilization, but the core dynamic was sectarian: Maronite Christians defending the status quo against a perceived Muslim-Palestinian coalition seeking power redistribution.[156] [5] Factional alliances crystallized along sectarian and ideological lines, with Christian groups forming the Lebanese Front in 1976 as a loose coalition primarily comprising the Phalange Party (Kataeb, led by Pierre Gemayel, with 10,000–15,000 fighters emphasizing Maronite autonomy and anti-PLO stance), the Tigers militia of the National Liberal Party (under Camille Chamoun, around 5,000 fighters), the Ahrar Party, and smaller outfits like the Guardians of the Cedars (nationalist, anti-Palestinian, 2,000–3,000 members).[153] Opposing them was the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), a leftist alliance founded in 1973 by Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party, incorporating Nasserists, communists, Baathists, and Arab nationalists, which partnered with the PLO (under Yasser Arafat, commanding 15,000–20,000 fighters) to advocate secularism, Palestinian integration, and constitutional reform favoring Muslims.[153] [6] The Shia Amal Movement (formed 1975 under Musa al-Sadr, with growing ranks of 5,000+ by late 1970s) initially aligned with the LNM-PLO bloc to represent southern Shia interests against Israeli incursions but later diverged due to Palestinian dominance in mixed areas.[153] External patrons shaped these blocs: Syria under Hafez al-Assad initially armed the LNM-PLO to counterbalance Christian militias and extend influence (supplying weapons and advisors), while Israel provided covert support to the Lebanese Front, including arms and training, viewing it as a buffer against PLO attacks.[157] [6] Efraim Inbar discusses foreign roles, noting Israeli actions as defensive against border threats amplified by Syrian occupation, countering simplifications of Israeli intervention as primary destabilizer. Itamar Rabinovich emphasizes multifaceted external interferences, including Iranian backing of militias.[158] [159]
Major Factional BlocKey ComponentsEstimated Fighters (1975–76)Primary External Backer
Lebanese Front (Christian-rightist)Phalange, Tigers, Guardians of the Cedars20,000–25,000Israel
Lebanese National Movement + PLO (Muslim-leftist/Palestinian)Progressive Socialists, communists, PLO factions25,000–30,000Syria (initially), Arab states
Amal (Shia)Movement of the Deprived militia3,000–5,000Syria
This table summarizes early war alignments, which fluidly shifted with betrayals and interventions; totals exclude irregulars and fluctuated amid desertions.[153][5]

Syrian and Israeli Interventions

Syria initiated its military intervention in the Lebanese Civil War on May 31, 1976, deploying several thousand troops to halt the advance of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) forces allied with leftist Lebanese militias, which had gained the upper hand against Christian-led factions in the Battle of Zahle and surrounding areas.[160] Initially framed as support for the Maronite Christian side to preserve Lebanon's confessional balance and prevent a PLO-dominated state that could undermine Syrian regional ambitions, the intervention involved up to 40,000 Syrian soldiers by mid-1976, who occupied key positions in the Bekaa Valley and eastern Lebanon.[161] This shift marked a turning point, as Syria's entry, tacitly approved by Arab League resolutions, contained the fighting but also established Damascus as a de facto arbiter, enforcing a "Red Line" demarcation around Beirut to limit further escalation while extracting concessions from all factions.[162] Israel's first major intervention came with Operation Litani on March 14, 1978, launched in response to the PLO's Coastal Road massacre on March 11, which killed 38 Israeli civilians and wounded over 70 in a bus hijacking and shooting attack originating from Lebanon.[163] Involving 20,000 to 25,000 Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) troops, the operation aimed to dismantle PLO bases within 10-15 kilometers of the border and push fighters north of the Litani River, resulting in the occupation of approximately 500 square kilometers of southern Lebanon over seven days of ground, air, and naval assaults.[163] Casualties included around 1,100 Lebanese and Palestinian fighters and civilians killed, alongside 18 IDF soldiers, with the incursion displacing up to 250,000 people; Israel withdrew by June 1978 under UN Security Council Resolution 425, but maintained a security zone patrolled by the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army militia.[164] The most extensive Israeli operation, codenamed Peace for Galilee, began on June 6, 1982, following the attempted assassination of Israel's ambassador to the UK on June 4 by a splinter PLO faction, amid escalating rocket attacks from southern Lebanon that had killed 11 Israeli civilians earlier that year.[165] With 60,000 IDF troops advancing up to 40 kilometers inland—exceeding initial plans—the invasion targeted PLO infrastructure, besieging Beirut by mid-June and engaging Syrian forces deployed since 1976, destroying 19 Syrian surface-to-air missile batteries in the Bekaa Valley on June 9-10 to secure air superiority in battles that inflicted heavy losses on Damascus's Soviet-supplied equipment.[166] Syrian-Israeli clashes peaked with Israeli ground advances repelling Syrian armored units near Jezzine, leading to a U.S.-brokered ceasefire on June 11; the PLO, facing artillery bombardment and urban fighting, agreed to evacuate 14,000 fighters from Beirut in August under international supervision, evacuating to Tunisia and other Arab states.[166][165] Israel's occupation facilitated the election of Bashir Gemayel as president on August 23, 1982, but his assassination on September 14 triggered Phalangist militia reprisals in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps on September 16-18, killing 700-3,500 Palestinian civilians in an event condemned internationally, though an Israeli commission later attributed indirect responsibility to IDF oversight failures without direct orders.[167] Syrian forces, weakened but regrouping, re-entered Beirut post-1982, clashing intermittently with Israeli positions in the Shouf Mountains during the 1983-1984 Mountain War alongside Druze militias, which forced an IDF withdrawal from most areas by 1985, leaving a southern buffer zone until 2000.[162] These interventions prolonged the civil war, with Syria consolidating control over central and eastern Lebanon by the late 1980s, while Israel's actions diminished PLO military capacity but empowered emerging Shiite groups like Hezbollah.[168]

War Economy, Atrocities, and Taif Accord

The Lebanese Civil War fostered a militia-dominated economy where armed groups controlled territories, ports, and trade routes, extracting revenues through smuggling, extortion, and black markets. Militias imposed checkpoints and tariffs on imports and exports, with groups like the Amal Movement and Hezbollah managing southern ports for fuel and goods smuggling into Syria, while Christian factions handled Beirut's eastern sectors. This system, emerging prominently after 1982, generated income via narcotics production in the Bekaa Valley, where hashish cultivation expanded under militia protection, supplying global markets and funding operations. Cross-sectarian networks facilitated cooperation in trafficking, dividing labor for arms, drugs, and consumer goods, sustaining fighters amid central government collapse.[169][170][171] Economic resilience persisted initially through prewar liberal structures, but by the mid-1980s, hyperinflation eroded the Lebanese pound, with GDP contracting approximately 50% over the war and per capita income halving from 1974 levels by 1993. Militias profited from subsidized imports smuggled abroad or hoarded for resale at premiums, exacerbating shortages and fostering corruption that undermined state authority. Foreign patronage from Syria, Iran, and Gulf states further propped up factional finances, turning Lebanon into a hub for illicit trade while formal sectors like banking and tourism collapsed.[172][173][174] The war's atrocities, committed by multiple factions, underscored its sectarian brutality, with massacres targeting civilians across religious lines. In January 1976, Christian Phalangist and Tigers militias overran the Karantina Palestinian camp in Beirut, killing 1,000 to 1,500 residents, mostly Palestinians and poor Muslims, in reprisal for earlier attacks. Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) forces and leftist allies responded in January 1976 by massacring 150 to 582 Christian civilians in Damour, south of Beirut, destroying the town and prompting Maronite displacement. Further escalations included the Christian siege of Tel al-Zaatar camp in 1976, resulting in 1,500 to 3,000 Palestinian deaths from starvation and assault.[6] Prominent among later horrors was the September 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre, where Phalangist militias, allied with Israel post-PLO evacuation, entered the Beirut refugee camps and killed 700 to 3,500 Palestinian and Lebanese Muslim civilians over three days, using knives and guns amid reports of rape and mutilation. This followed the assassination of Phalangist leader Bashir Gemayel and occurred under Israeli Defense Forces' perimeter oversight, though direct Israeli involvement in killings remains disputed. Atrocities persisted on all sides, including Hezbollah and Amal abductions and executions of opponents, with total civilian deaths exceeding 100,000 amid indiscriminate shelling and reprisals that fueled cycles of vengeance.[175][176][177] Exhaustion from prolonged fighting and external pressures culminated in the Taif Accord, signed on October 22, 1989, in Taif, Saudi Arabia, by Lebanese parliamentarians under Arab League mediation. The agreement revised the 1943 National Pact by equalizing Christian-Muslim parliamentary seats in an expanded 108-member assembly, reducing Maronite presidential powers while strengthening the Sunni prime minister and Shiite speaker roles, aiming to reflect demographic shifts toward Muslim majorities. It mandated militia disarmament, Syrian troop redeployment to the Bekaa within two years (delayed in practice), and eventual full withdrawal, alongside constitutional reforms for a stronger central state.[178][179][180] Implemented after Michel Aoun's ouster in October 1990, Taif formally ended the war but entrenched Syrian influence until 2005, as Damascus controlled enforcement and militia dissolution selectively spared Hezbollah. While restoring nominal unity, it perpetuated confessionalism without abolishing it, sowing seeds for future instability by prioritizing power-sharing over merit-based governance.[181][182][183]

Reconstruction and Syrian Hegemony (1990–2005)

Hariri's Beirut Rebuilding Efforts

Following the Taif Accord's ratification in 1990, which ended the Lebanese Civil War, Rafic Hariri, a billionaire Saudi-based businessman of Lebanese origin, was elected prime minister in October 1992, initiating a major reconstruction drive centered on Beirut.[184] Hariri's vision emphasized restoring Beirut's pre-war status as a regional financial and commercial hub, often likened to the "Singapore of the Middle East," through infrastructure investments funded by foreign aid, loans, and private capital.[185] His administration launched a $10 billion program targeting war-damaged roads, ports, airports, and utilities, with a focus on the capital's central district devastated by factional fighting.[186] The cornerstone of Hariri's efforts was the establishment of Société Libanaise de Reconstruction et de Développement (Solidere) on May 5, 1994, a joint-stock company authorized by the Council for Development and Reconstruction to redevelop Beirut's 6.2 square kilometer Central District (BCD).[187] As Solidere's largest shareholder through his Oger Group, Hariri oversaw the expropriation of over 500 properties at below-market rates, compensated via shares or bonds, enabling large-scale demolition and reconstruction of Ottoman-era buildings, hotels, and commercial spaces.[188] By the early 2000s, the project had transformed the BCD into a modern zone with luxury apartments, shopping malls, and offices, attracting $1.5 billion in investments and boosting tourism and banking sectors.[189] Hariri's initiatives spurred GDP growth averaging 4-6% annually in the 1990s, with Beirut's port handling increased trade and real estate values in the BCD rising over 300% by 2000.[190] However, the financing relied heavily on borrowing, elevating Lebanon's public debt from 30% of GDP in 1990 to over 150% by 2004, much of it serviceable only through remittances and Gulf aid.[191] Critics, including urban planners and displaced residents, argued that Solidere's model prioritized elite commercial interests over affordable housing, displacing thousands of lower-income families and small businesses without adequate relocation support.[192] Allegations of corruption plagued the process, with Hariri accused of conflating personal wealth—estimated at $4.3 billion by 2004—with state projects, including opaque property deals and kickbacks to secure approvals under Syrian oversight.[188] [193] Independent analyses noted systemic graft in contract awards, contributing to unequal development that favored Beirut's core while peripheral areas languished, exacerbating sectarian and class divides.[194] Hariri's second term (2000-2004) saw continued borrowing despite these issues, setting the stage for fiscal unsustainability, though supporters credit him with averting total economic collapse post-war.[195]

Hezbollah's Rise and Iranian Proxy Role

Following the Taif Accord's implementation in 1990, which sought to disarm most Lebanese militias, Hezbollah was uniquely permitted to retain its arsenal under the rationale of continuing "resistance" against Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon, a concession tacitly endorsed by Syrian authorities dominating Lebanon's political landscape at the time.[196] This exemption allowed Hezbollah to consolidate its military capabilities, including guerrilla operations involving ambushes, rocket attacks, and soldier kidnappings, which inflicted steady casualties on Israeli forces and their South Lebanon Army allies throughout the 1990s.[197] By 1996, Hezbollah's forces numbered approximately 5,000 fighters, equipped with Iranian-supplied weaponry such as Katyusha rockets and anti-tank missiles, enabling sustained low-intensity conflict that eroded Israeli resolve without provoking full-scale retaliation.[198] Hezbollah's ascent intertwined military prowess with political maneuvering, as the group entered Lebanon's parliamentary arena in the 1992 elections—the first post-civil war vote—securing 12 seats through its Loyalty to the Resistance bloc, thereby gaining formal legislative influence while preserving its armed autonomy.[199] Under Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, who assumed leadership in 1992 following the assassination of Abbas al-Musawi, Hezbollah pursued a dual-track strategy: ideological commitment to Iran's wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurist) doctrine alongside pragmatic alliances with Syrian-backed factions, which shielded it from disarmament pressures.[200] Parallel to this, Hezbollah expanded a vast social welfare apparatus, funding clinics, schools, and reconstruction projects in Shia-dominated areas like the Bekaa Valley and southern suburbs of Beirut, which served over 200,000 beneficiaries by the mid-1990s and entrenched grassroots loyalty among underserved communities neglected by the central government.[201] Central to Hezbollah's empowerment was its role as Iran's primary regional proxy, with Tehran providing an estimated $100–200 million annually in funding by the early 2000s, alongside training from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that professionalized its tactics, including asymmetric warfare doctrines adapted from the 1979 Iranian Revolution.[198] This support, channeled through IRGC-Quds Force operatives embedded in Lebanon since 1982, transformed Hezbollah from a nascent militia into a hybrid entity blending political party, social provider, and paramilitary force, often operating independently of Lebanese state control and exporting expertise to Iranian-backed groups in Iraq and Yemen.[202] Iran's investment yielded strategic depth, positioning Hezbollah as a deterrent against Israeli actions and a conduit for Tehran's influence in the Levant, though this reliance exposed the group to accusations of prioritizing foreign agendas over Lebanese sovereignty.[203] The culmination of Hezbollah's 1990s resistance came with Israel's unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon on May 24, 2000, which the group hailed as a triumph of its attrition strategy—claiming over 1,000 Israeli casualties since 1985—bolstering its domestic prestige and recruitment, with membership swelling to around 10,000 by 2005.[204] Yet, this victory entrenched Hezbollah's exceptionalism, as the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 later demanded its disarmament in 2004, a call ignored amid Syrian occupation and Iranian backing, setting the stage for escalating tensions.[205] During this era, Hezbollah's operations, including cross-border raids, drew international condemnation, with the U.S. designating it a foreign terrorist organization in 1997 for prior attacks like the 1992 Israeli embassy bombing in Buenos Aires, underscoring its dual identity as both Lebanese actor and Iranian instrument.[198]

Cedar Revolution Against Syrian Occupation

The assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on February 14, 2005, by a massive car bomb in Beirut, which killed 22 others, ignited widespread public fury directed at Syria's longstanding military presence in Lebanon. Hariri, a prominent critic of Syrian influence, had opposed extensions of President Émile Lahoud's term, seen as propped up by Damascus; the blast was immediately suspected by many Lebanese and international observers to involve Syrian intelligence, given Syria's control over Lebanese security apparatus and Hariri's opposition to it.[206][207] Although a UN-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon later convicted a Hezbollah operative in absentia in 2020 while finding no direct evidence linking Syrian leadership or Hezbollah's top command, the perception of Syrian orchestration fueled demands for accountability and an end to the occupation that had begun in 1976 with approximately 30,000 Syrian troops deployed under the pretext of quelling the Lebanese Civil War.[208][209] This outrage coalesced into the Cedar Revolution, named for the Lebanese cedar tree emblem on national flags waved by protesters, marking Lebanon's largest demonstration ever on March 14, 2005, when over one million people—roughly a quarter of the population—gathered in Beirut's Martyrs' Square to demand Syrian withdrawal, the resignation of the pro-Syria government, and free elections. The movement united diverse factions, including Sunni Muslims led by Hariri's son Saad, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, and Christian figures like Samir Geagea, transcending sectarian lines in a rare display of national consensus against foreign domination; it built on UN Security Council Resolution 1559 from September 2, 2004, which explicitly called for Syrian forces to vacate Lebanon, the disbanding of militias, and extension of Lebanese government control over its territory.[210][211][212] Counter-demonstrations on March 8, organized by Hezbollah and pro-Syria groups like Amal, drew hundreds of thousands but emphasized "unity" under continued Syrian ties rather than outright opposition to the occupation. Sustained pressure, amplified by U.S. and French diplomatic isolation of Syria, prompted Prime Minister Omar Karami's resignation on March 13 and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's announcement of a phased pullout. By April 26, 2005, the last Syrian troops crossed the border at Masnaa, completing a withdrawal of forces that had peaked at around 40,000 during the 1980s, verified by UN observers as required under international agreements.[213][214] This ended nearly 29 years of direct military occupation, formalized under the 1989 Ta'if Accord which had mandated withdrawal within two years but was never enforced. The revolution paved the way for parliamentary elections in May-June 2005, yielding an anti-Syria majority alliance that formed a new government under Fouad Siniora; however, it did not dismantle parallel power structures, as Syrian-aligned groups like Hezbollah retained arms and influence, underscoring the limits of the uprising in achieving full sovereignty amid entrenched proxy dynamics.[215][216]

Post-2005 Instability and Crises (2005–2019)

2006 Hezbollah-Israel War and Aftermath

The 2006 Lebanon War, also known as the Second Lebanon War, erupted on July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah militants conducted a cross-border raid into northern Israel, killing eight Israeli soldiers and capturing two others.[217] Israel responded with extensive airstrikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure across Lebanon, including Beirut's southern suburbs and southern Lebanon, while mobilizing ground forces for a limited invasion to dismantle Hezbollah's rocket-launching capabilities and secure the release of the captives.[217] Hezbollah countered with over 4,000 rocket attacks on northern Israeli communities, displacing approximately 300,000 Israelis and causing 44 civilian deaths alongside 121 military fatalities.[218] On the Lebanese side, the conflict resulted in 1,191 deaths and 4,409 injuries, predominantly among civilians due to Hezbollah's embedding of military assets in populated areas, with over 900,000 Lebanese displaced and extensive infrastructure damage estimated at $3.6 billion.[219] Israeli operations aimed to degrade Hezbollah's military arsenal, enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559's call for militia disarmament, and pressure Lebanon to control its border, but faced challenges from Hezbollah's fortified tunnel networks and decentralized guerrilla tactics, which inflicted significant casualties on advancing IDF units.[220] Hezbollah's strategy emphasized attrition through short-range rocket fire and ambushes, avoiding decisive engagements while portraying resilience against a superior force, thereby sustaining domestic support despite Lebanon's disproportionate suffering.[221] The ground phase intensified in late July, with Israeli forces advancing up to the Litani River, but failed to fully neutralize Hezbollah's command structure or rocket stockpiles, leading to domestic criticism in Israel over strategic shortcomings.[218] The war concluded on August 14, 2006, following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which mandated an immediate ceasefire, Israeli withdrawal south of the Blue Line, deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces and an enhanced UNIFIL peacekeeping force south of the Litani River, and Hezbollah's withdrawal from the area to enable the group's disarmament by the Lebanese government.[222] However, implementation faltered as Hezbollah retained operational presence in southern Lebanon, rapidly rearming with Iranian-supplied precision-guided missiles and advanced weaponry, violating the resolution's intent.[223] The captives' bodies were returned to Israel in July 2008 via German mediation, but Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah declared a "divine victory," framing the survival of his organization as a strategic success against Israeli objectives.[224] In the immediate aftermath, Hezbollah mobilized Iranian funding exceeding $100 million for reconstruction in Shia-dominated areas, distributing aid and rebuilding homes faster than the central government, which bolstered its domestic popularity and entrenched its role as a state-within-a-state.[225] This strengthened Hezbollah's political leverage within Lebanon's confessional system, enabling veto power over government decisions and exacerbating sectarian divides, as Sunni, Christian, and Druze factions in the March 14 Alliance accused it of prioritizing militia interests over national sovereignty.[196] Economic recovery stalled amid $2.8 billion in direct damages to agriculture and industry, with southern Lebanon remaining vulnerable to Hezbollah's militarization, setting the stage for prolonged instability.[219] International efforts to enforce Resolution 1701 yielded limited results, as UNIFIL's 13,000 troops focused on monitoring rather than active disarmament, allowing Hezbollah's arsenal to expand to an estimated 150,000 rockets by 2023.[226]

Doha Agreement and Power-Sharing Stalemates

In May 2008, escalating clashes between Hezbollah-led opposition forces and pro-government militias culminated in the opposition seizing control of predominantly Sunni and Christian neighborhoods in West Beirut, marking the most intense intra-Lebanese violence since the civil war.[227] This followed government decisions perceived as undermining Hezbollah's communications network, prompting a swift military response from the group and its allies.[228] Qatari mediation, under Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, convened rival leaders in Doha, resulting in the agreement signed on May 21, 2008, which halted the fighting that had claimed over 80 lives.[229] [227] The Doha Agreement established a national unity government allocating 11 of 30 cabinet seats to the opposition (March 8 Alliance, including Hezbollah), granting them a blocking minority veto requiring a two-thirds majority for decisions, thus empowering them to obstruct policies misaligned with their interests.[230] It also reinstated the 1960 electoral law for parliamentary elections, reversing a 2005 gerrymandered version favored by the March 14 coalition, and facilitated the election of army commander Michel Sleiman as president on May 25, 2008.[228] [231] While temporarily stabilizing the country ahead of the June 2009 elections—where March 14 retained a slim majority—the accord shifted effective power dynamics, institutionalizing Hezbollah's influence and fostering a "state within a state" by ceding veto authority over central government actions.[232] [233] Post-Doha power-sharing entrenched sectarian confessionalism, where cabinet formation hinged on rigid quotas (e.g., Maronite president, Sunni prime minister, Shiite speaker), compounded by the opposition's veto, leading to protracted negotiations and governmental paralysis.[234] In January 2011, Hezbollah and allies resigned from the cabinet, toppling Prime Minister Saad Hariri's government after it refused to drop charges against the group in the Hariri assassination tribunal, forcing 10 months of caretaker rule before Najib Mikati formed a Hezbollah-aligned unity cabinet in June.[235] Similar deadlocks recurred: from 2013 to 2014, Lebanon operated under caretaker governance amid disputes over ministerial portfolios, delaying responses to security threats.[236] Presidential vacancies exemplified the stalemates, with the post empty from May 2014 to October 2016 due to irreconcilable sectarian demands, during which parliament failed to convene effectively and extended its own term twice.[236] Michel Aoun's election in 2016 and Hariri's subsequent government in November restored formal institutions but perpetuated veto-induced gridlock, as blocking minorities stalled reforms on corruption, electoral law changes, and economic policy through 2019.[237] This structure prioritized elite bargaining over governance, rendering cabinets ineffective against accumulating crises like fiscal deficits and Hezbollah's parallel military apparatus.[232] [234]

Syrian Civil War Spillover and Refugee Burden

The Syrian Civil War, erupting in March 2011, rapidly spilled over into Lebanon through sectarian clashes and cross-border violence, exacerbating the country's fragile confessional balance. Initial incidents included deadly fighting in Tripoli starting in mid-2011, where pro-Syrian Alawite neighborhoods clashed with anti-Syrian Sunni areas, resulting in over 50 deaths by August 2012 amid sniper attacks and street battles that mirrored Syria's Alawite-Shia versus Sunni divides.[238] The October 19, 2012, car bombing that assassinated Internal Security Forces intelligence chief Wissam al-Hassan in Beirut, killing eight others, was widely attributed to Syrian intelligence in retaliation for Lebanese opposition to the Assad regime, heightening fears of renewed political assassinations akin to those preceding the 2005 Cedar Revolution.[239] These events strained Lebanon's security forces, with the army deployed repeatedly to contain spillover, as divisions within Lebanese factions aligned proxies with Syrian belligerents. Hezbollah's deepening military intervention in Syria from mid-2013, deploying thousands of fighters to bolster Assad and secure Lebanon's border, provoked retaliatory attacks by Sunni jihadist groups like ISIS and al-Nusra Front. A July 9, 2013, car bomb in Beirut's Hezbollah stronghold of Bir al-Abed injured over 50, claimed by Syrian rebels as payback for the group's Syrian role.[240] The most severe escalation occurred in August 2014, when ISIS and Nusra forces overran the northeastern border town of Arsal, clashing with the Lebanese army in battles that killed dozens of soldiers and displaced thousands, marking the first direct incursion by Syrian jihadists into Lebanon proper.[241] Cross-border shelling from Syria into northern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley in 2014 alone killed at least 10 civilians and wounded 19, while ISIS-claimed suicide bombings, such as the November 12, 2015, attacks in Beirut's Bourj el-Barajneh suburb that killed 43 and injured over 200, targeted Shia areas in reprisal.[242] By 2016, Lebanese security operations had dismantled hundreds of jihadist cells, but the spillover contributed to over 500 militant deaths and persistent border instability through 2019.[239] Concurrently, the refugee influx imposed an unprecedented demographic and resource burden on Lebanon, which hosted no formal camps and absorbed arrivals into urban and rural areas. UNHCR registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon rose from about 36,000 in August 2012 to over 463,000 by May 2013, peaking at around 1 million registered by 2014-2015, with government estimates placing the total—including unregistered—at 1.5 million, equivalent to roughly 25% of Lebanon's native population.[243] This per-capita hosting ratio, the world's highest, overwhelmed infrastructure: public schools absorbed 200,000 extra students by 2014, hospitals faced doubled demand straining already limited services, and water/electricity systems buckled under urban density, fostering resentment amid Lebanon's confessional quotas that amplified fears of Sunni demographic shifts. Economically, the crisis shaved an estimated 2.9 percentage points off Lebanon's annual GDP growth through reduced trade, tourism collapse near the border, and fiscal pressures from uncompensated service provision, pushing 170,000 additional Lebanese into poverty by 2014. While refugees filled low-wage informal labor gaps in agriculture and construction—boosting output in those sectors by providing cheap manpower—the influx depressed unskilled wages by up to 20% in affected areas and heightened job competition, exacerbating unemployment among Lebanese youth and fueling social tensions, including sporadic anti-refugee violence and calls for repatriation.[244] Lebanon's 2015 policy halting new UNHCR registrations and imposing residency fees aimed to curb numbers but entrenched informal economies, with 88% of refugees destitute by late 2010s, reliant on aid that international donors increasingly withheld, compounding Lebanon's pre-existing governance frailties without formal integration pathways.[245]

Economic Collapse and Governance Failure (2019–2023)

October Revolution Against Corruption

The October Revolution, also known as the 17 October Revolution or thawra, erupted on October 17, 2019, as mass protests against entrenched government corruption and economic mismanagement that had precipitated Lebanon's financial collapse. Triggered by the government's proposal to impose a $0.20 daily tax on voice-over-IP calls via apps like WhatsApp—alongside hikes in fees for gasoline and tobacco—the demonstrations rapidly transcended the immediate fiscal trigger, channeling public outrage over decades of elite embezzlement, sectarian patronage networks, and fiscal profligacy that ballooned public debt to over 150% of GDP by mid-2019.[246][247] Protesters, drawing from diverse religious and regional backgrounds, blockaded major roads with burning tires and barricades, paralyzing Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, and even Hezbollah strongholds like Nabatieh, in a rare display of cross-sectarian unity unprecedented since the 1975-1990 civil war.[248] The uprising's core demands centered on dismantling the muhasasa sectarian power-sharing system, which allocates government posts by religious quota and enables a ruling oligarchy—often termed the zouama—to siphon state resources through monopolies, rigged contracts, and central bank malfeasance under Governor Riad Salameh. Demonstrators called for the resignation of the entire political class, independent judicial probes into corruption, electoral reform to end vote-buying, and economic policies prioritizing transparency over austerity that burdened the impoverished while shielding elites' offshore wealth. Participation swelled to an estimated 1-2 million people—roughly one-quarter of Lebanon's population—at peak moments, with women prominently leading roadblocks and cultural expressions like satirical songs and chants of "all means all" amplifying the anti-elite fervor.[249][250] Security forces responded with tear gas, rubber bullets, and water cannons, injuring hundreds and killing at least seven protesters by early 2020, though the military largely refrained from live fire to avoid escalating sectarian tensions.[251] Prime Minister Saad Hariri's cabinet initially suspended the WhatsApp tax on October 17 but failed to quell the unrest; on October 29, Hariri resigned in a televised address, admitting a "dead end" and dissolving the government, marking a tactical concession to protesters' pressure without addressing systemic graft.[252][253] Protests persisted into 2020, with renewed mobilizations against the formation of a caretaker government dominated by the same factions, including Hezbollah, which accused demonstrators of abetting economic sabotage amid currency devaluation and bank withdrawals exceeding $3 billion monthly. Clashes intensified, including alleged Hezbollah-orchestrated attacks on encampments, eroding turnout as COVID-19 lockdowns and targeted violence fragmented the movement.[247][254] Despite exposing the causal links between political cartels' rent-seeking and the ensuing hyperinflation—where the Lebanese pound lost over 90% of its value against the dollar by 2021—the revolution yielded no structural reforms, as veto-wielding groups like Hezbollah prioritized militia funding over accountability, perpetuating governance paralysis.[255][256] Grassroots initiatives fostered civic networks and heightened awareness of elite impunity, but the failure to prosecute high-level corruption—evident in stalled investigations into scandals like the $11 billion Central Bank losses—underscored the entrenched power imbalances that thwarted the uprising's transformative potential.[257]

Beirut Port Explosion and Institutional Neglect

The Beirut Port explosion occurred on August 4, 2020, when approximately 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate, stored in warehouse 12 since its confiscation from the MV Rhosus ship in 2013, detonated following a fire, producing a blast equivalent to 1.1 kilotons of TNT—the largest non-nuclear explosion in history.[258][259] The ammonium nitrate had been offloaded after the unseaworthy vessel was impounded, with initial plans for auction or export abandoned amid bureaucratic delays and ownership disputes involving Russian and Ukrainian parties.[258][260] Lebanese authorities received at least 10 formal warnings between July 2014 and July 2020 from port officials, customs directors, and security agencies about the explosive risks posed by the improperly stored chemicals, including requests to remove, relocate, or neutralize the material; these were repeatedly escalated to top political figures, including the president, prime minister, and ministers of finance, justice, and public works, yet no decisive action was taken due to inter-ministerial disputes and inaction.[258][260] The negligence stemmed from a confluence of factors: the port's role as a patronage hub under elite control, where customs revenues funded sectarian networks; fragmented authority across confessional lines, paralyzing cross-sect decisions; and entrenched corruption, as evidenced by prior scandals like the 2019-2020 fuel subsidy thefts at the same facility.[258][261] The explosion killed 218 people, including foreign nationals from at least nine countries, injured about 7,000, and displaced over 300,000 residents, while destroying or damaging 77,000 apartments across 10,000 buildings within a 6.7-kilometer radius and crippling the port's grain silos, which held 85% of Lebanon's reserves amid an ongoing economic crisis.[258][262] Economic losses exceeded $15 billion, exacerbating hyperinflation and food insecurity in a nation already facing de facto bankruptcy declared in March 2020.[263][261] This catastrophe underscored Lebanon's institutional decay, where a consociational system allocating power by sect—predominantly among Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shiites—prioritizes elite consensus over public safety, enabling hazards like unsecured chemicals to persist for seven years despite evident risks comparable to known industrial disasters such as Tianjin 2015.[258][264] Post-blast probes, led sequentially by Judges Fadi Sawan and Tarek Bitar, implicated 25 officials including former Prime Minister Hassan Diab and ministers in negligence and homicide but stalled repeatedly via political appeals, judicial recusals, and immunity claims, with no trials or convictions as of 2025.[262][263][264] International calls for an independent UN-led inquiry, supported by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have been rejected by Lebanese leaders citing sovereignty, perpetuating impunity that erodes state legitimacy.[262][263]

Hyperinflation, Bank Failures, and Elite Resistance to Reform

Lebanon's economic crisis intensified with rampant hyperinflation following the liquidity shortfall that emerged in 2019, as the central bank's foreign reserves dwindled amid unsustainable fiscal deficits and Ponzi-like financial engineering. Annual inflation surged to over 200%, peaking at 264% by March 2023, driven by currency collapse and supply disruptions that eroded real incomes by more than 80% for many households.[265] The Lebanese pound, long pegged at 1,507.5 LBP per USD since 1997, saw its parallel market rate plummet to around 100,000 LBP per USD by March 2023, reflecting a de facto 98% loss in value against the dollar over the prior four years.[266] In February 2023, Banque du Liban formally devalued the official rate by 90% to 15,000 LBP per USD, acknowledging the peg's collapse but failing to stabilize the economy amid persistent dollar shortages.[267] The banking sector, once a cornerstone of Lebanon's rentier economy, entered systemic failure as informal capital controls imposed from October 2019 onward trapped approximately $100 billion in depositors' USD savings, rebranded as illiquid "lollars." Banks, holding over 70% of assets in government bonds and non-performing loans to politically connected borrowers, became insolvent, with losses estimated at $72 billion—equivalent to 120% of GDP—yet resisted recapitalization or restructuring to avoid "haircuts" on elite-held assets.[268] Withdrawals were limited to nominal LBP amounts or depreciated equivalents, sparking depositor protests and heists at branches, while the sector's opacity shielded insiders from accountability for decades of mismanagement tied to sectarian patronage networks.[269] Reform efforts, including protracted IMF negotiations launched in May 2020 for a $3 billion Extended Fund Facility, foundered on elite resistance from political factions, bankers, and business oligarchs who prioritized preserving banking secrecy, subsidies, and state guarantees over systemic overhaul.[270] These groups, embedded in confessional power-sharing, blocked key preconditions such as auditing central bank governor Riad Salameh's operations—later implicated in $7 billion of alleged embezzlement—and restructuring insolvent banks, fearing loss of control over financial flows that fund patronage and offshore wealth.[271] By 2023, despite a tentative staff-level agreement in April 2022, parliamentary inaction and vetoes from Hezbollah-aligned and traditional parties stalled implementation, prolonging the crisis as elites gamed dollarized black markets and awaited external aid without concessions.[272] This intransigence, rooted in causal incentives of short-term survival over long-term viability, exacerbated poverty affecting 80% of the population and deterred foreign investment.[273]

Recent Conflicts and Stagnation (2023–Present)

Hezbollah's Escalation in Israel-Hamas War Support

Following the Hamas-led attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, which killed approximately 1,200 people and initiated the Israel-Hamas war, Hezbollah began cross-border attacks the next day to support its Palestinian ally. On October 8, 2023, the group fired rockets and anti-tank guided missiles at Israeli military positions in northern Israel, including near the Shebaa Farms area, explicitly framing the actions as solidarity with Hamas's "Al-Aqsa Flood" operation. Hezbollah's deputy leader Naim Qassem stated that external pressures to restrain the group would have no effect, signaling intent to open a northern front regardless of diplomatic appeals.[274] Hezbollah's campaign rapidly escalated into near-daily barrages, with the group launching over 8,000 rockets, drones, and missiles toward Israel by September 2024, targeting both military sites and civilian areas in the north. These attacks, coordinated with Iran's "axis of resistance," aimed to divert Israeli resources from Gaza by compelling a multi-front response, as articulated in Hezbollah's doctrine of confronting Israel until Palestinian goals—ultimately the elimination of the Jewish state—are met. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, in his first public address on the war on November 3, 2023, justified the operations as having successfully "bogged down" Israeli forces on the northern border, preventing a full redeployment south, though he stopped short of committing to all-out war at that stage.[275][276] By early 2024, the intensity grew with Hezbollah employing advanced weaponry, including explosive drones and precision-guided missiles striking deeper into Israeli territory, such as the Golan Heights and even near Haifa. The group conducted over 1,900 cross-border attacks by September 2024, per conflict tracking data, often in salvos of dozens of unguided rockets that violated international humanitarian law due to their inaccuracy and indiscriminate nature when aimed at populated areas. Nasrallah met with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad leaders in October 2023 to align strategies for "victory," emphasizing sustained pressure to force Israeli concessions in Gaza. This escalation displaced over 70,000 Israelis from border communities and caused dozens of casualties, while Hezbollah claimed the actions compelled Israel to maintain significant troop deployments in the north—around 60,000 soldiers by mid-2024—substantiating the strategic diversion intent but at the cost of Lebanese border villages facing retaliatory Israeli strikes.[277][278]

2024 Israel-Hezbollah War and Territorial Devastation

The 2024 Israel-Hezbollah war escalated dramatically in September when Israel conducted targeted strikes against Hezbollah's command structure, including explosions of pagers and walkie-talkies used by militants on September 17 and 18, killing dozens and wounding thousands.[279] These operations disrupted Hezbollah's operational capabilities, followed by airstrikes on September 20 that eliminated senior commanders Ibrahim Aqil and Ahmed Wehbe, along with at least 29 others in Beirut.[280] The conflict intensified further on September 27, when Israeli forces struck an underground Hezbollah headquarters in Beirut's southern suburbs, killing longtime secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah, who had led the group since 1992 and directed its support for the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel.[281] [282] Nasrallah's death represented a severe blow to Hezbollah's leadership hierarchy, which Israel had systematically degraded through intelligence-driven precision strikes amid ongoing rocket fire from southern Lebanon that had displaced over 60,000 Israelis since October 2023.[283] In response to Hezbollah's continued barrages, Israel initiated a ground offensive into southern Lebanon on October 1, 2024, aiming to dismantle border infrastructure, tunnels, and rocket launch sites in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which mandates the area south of the Litani River be free of non-Lebanese armed forces.[284] Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) operations focused on villages like Aita al-Shaab, Kfarkela, and Maroun al-Ras, where ground troops uncovered extensive Hezbollah weapon caches and neutralized fighters in close-quarters combat.[280] Hezbollah retaliated with anti-tank missiles and drones targeting IDF positions, but sustained Israeli airstrikes—totaling over 8,400 munitions dropped by mid-November—severely hampered its ability to regroup, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 2,000-3,000 Hezbollah combatants according to Israeli assessments.[285] Lebanon's Ministry of Health reported over 3,800 total deaths since October 2023, predominantly in the south, though these figures do not distinguish between civilians and Hezbollah affiliates embedded in populated areas.[285] A U.S.- and France-brokered ceasefire took effect on November 27, 2024, for an initial 60 days, requiring Hezbollah to withdraw fighters and weapons north of the Litani River while Israel gradually pulled back troops, monitored by UNIFIL peacekeepers and Lebanese Armed Forces.[286] [287] The agreement held tenuously into 2025, with mutual violations including Israeli enforcement strikes on suspected Hezbollah re-infiltration and Lebanese reports of drone overflights, but it halted large-scale ground engagements.[288] Hezbollah's military degradation was evident in its leadership decapitation—beyond Nasrallah, key figures like Fuad Shukr (killed July 30, 2024) and Ali Karaki were eliminated—and loss of rocket stockpiles, reducing its capacity to threaten northern Israel.[280] On the Israeli side, 56 soldiers were killed during the invasion phase.[287] The war inflicted profound territorial devastation on southern Lebanon, where Israeli strikes demolished over 60,000 structures, including homes, schools, and agricultural land across 25-30 border villages, rendering much of the region uninhabitable and exacerbating Lebanon's pre-existing economic collapse.[287] Displacement affected over one million Lebanese, primarily from the south, with return hindered by unexploded ordnance and collapsed infrastructure; the World Bank estimated reconstruction costs at $8-10 billion, focused on water systems, roads, and electricity grids targeted due to Hezbollah's dual-use militarization.[285] Hezbollah initiated reconstruction efforts post-ceasefire, attempting to rebuild tunnels and positions despite IDF oversight, but its weakened state left a power vacuum, with the Lebanese government struggling to deploy forces effectively south of the Litani.[289] This devastation compounded Lebanon's crises, highlighting Hezbollah's role in provoking the conflict through its alignment with Iran-backed proxies, while Israel's operations prioritized neutralizing existential threats over minimal collateral, though humanitarian impacts drew international scrutiny from organizations like Amnesty International.[287]

Political Vacuum, Hezbollah Weakening, and Uncertain Recovery

Following the November 27, 2024, ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, which required the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to deploy south of the Litani River and dismantle Hezbollah's infrastructure while Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon, the country faced persistent political paralysis. Lebanon's parliament had been unable to elect a president since Michel Aoun's term ended on October 31, 2022, leaving Prime Minister Najib Mikati's caretaker government in charge amid stalled reforms and escalating sectarian tensions exacerbated by Hezbollah's wartime role. This vacuum hindered coordinated responses to reconstruction, with Hezbollah accused of obstructing LAF deployments in the south to protect its remnants.[290][291] The deadlock broke on January 9, 2025, when parliament elected LAF commander Joseph Aoun as president in the 13th voting session, securing 99 votes after U.S. and Saudi backing facilitated consensus among factions, including a weakened Hezbollah. Aoun, viewed as a consensus figure unaligned with traditional power blocs, pledged to prioritize state sovereignty, disarm non-state actors, and implement economic reforms, though his military background raised concerns among Hezbollah allies about prioritizing LAF dominance. Post-election, Mikati retained the premiership in a transitional cabinet, but forming a full government stalled over disputes on ministerial allocations and Hezbollah's influence, with the group rejecting disarmament timelines despite ceasefire stipulations.[292][293][291] Hezbollah emerged severely degraded from the 2024 conflict, suffering over 3,000 fighter deaths, the elimination of leader Hassan Nasrallah on September 27, 2024, and destruction of much of its southern command structure and rocket arsenal through Israeli operations, including pager detonations and ground incursions. Estimates indicate the group lost up to 80% of its precision-guided missiles and key leadership, rendering it militarily at its weakest since 1982, though its financial networks—bolstered by Iranian funding and diaspora remittances—enabled limited regrouping and reconstruction in Shia areas by mid-2025. The Lebanese government announced plans in August 2025 to disarm Hezbollah by year's end, positioning the LAF as the sole armed force, a move Hezbollah dismissed as unenforceable without broader consensus, amid ongoing Israeli airstrikes targeting residual assets.[294][295][296] Recovery remained precarious, with the World Bank estimating $11-14 billion in damages from the war atop a pre-existing crisis that saw GDP contract 38-40% since 2019, including a 6.6-7.1% drop in 2024 alone. Hyperinflation persisted, with the currency losing over 98% of its value, and banking sector insolvency blocking access to $100 billion in deposits; elite resistance to forensic audits delayed International Monetary Fund aid. Projected 5% GDP growth in 2025 hinged on reforms, tourism rebound, and foreign aid, but ceasefire violations—including Israeli strikes on Hezbollah sites and Hezbollah incursions—fueled fears of re-escalation, while 1.5 million Syrian refugees strained resources. Aoun's administration initiated donor conferences for southern reconstruction, yet Hezbollah's parallel aid efforts in devastated areas underscored divided authority, complicating unified state-led revival.[297][298][299]

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