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Arab citizens of Israel
Arab citizens of Israel
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The Arab citizens of Israel form the country's largest ethnic minority.[4][5] Their community mainly consists of former Mandatory Palestine citizens (and their descendants) who continued to inhabit the territory that was acknowledged as Israeli by the 1949 Armistice Agreements.[6] Notions of identity among Israel's Arab citizens are complex, encompassing civic, religious, and ethnic components.[7] Some sources report that the majority of Arabs in Israel prefer to be identified as Palestinian citizens of Israel.[8][4][9][10][11]

Key Information

In the wake of the 1948 Palestine war, the Israeli government conferred Israeli citizenship upon all Palestinians who had remained or were not expelled. However, they were subject to discrimination by being placed under martial law until 1966, while other Israeli citizens were not. In the early 1980s, Israel granted citizenship eligibility to the Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the Syrian citizens of the Golan Heights by annexing both areas, though they remain internationally recognized as part of the Israeli-occupied territories, which came into being after the Six-Day War of 1967.[12] Acquisition of Israeli citizenship in East Jerusalem has been scarce, as only 5% of Palestinians in East Jerusalem were Israeli citizens in 2022, largely due to Palestinian society's disapproval of naturalization as complicity with the occupation. Israel has made the process more difficult, approving only 38% of new Palestinian applications from 2002 to 2022.[13]

According to the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, the Israeli Arab population stood at 2.1 million people in 2023, accounting for 21% of Israel's total population.[1] The majority of these Arab citizens identify themselves as Arab or Palestinian by nationality and as Israeli by citizenship.[14][15][16] They mostly live in Arab-majority towns and cities, some of which are among the poorest in the country, and generally attend schools that are separated to some degree from those attended by Jewish Israelis.[17] Arab political parties traditionally did not join governing coalitions until 2021, when the United Arab List became the first to do so.[18] The Druze and the Bedouin in the Negev and the Galilee have historically expressed the strongest non-Jewish affinity to Israel and are more likely to identify as Israelis than other Arab citizens.[19][20][21][22]

Speakers of both Arabic and Hebrew, their traditional vernacular is mostly Levantine Arabic, including Lebanese Arabic in northern Israel, Palestinian Arabic in central Israel, and Bedouin Arabic across the Negev. Because the modern Arabic dialects of Israel's Arabs have absorbed multiple Hebrew loanwords and phrases, it is sometimes called the Israeli Arabic dialect.[23] By religious affiliation, the majority of Arab Israelis are Muslims, but there are significant Christian and Druze minorities, among others.[24] Arab citizens of Israel have a wide variety of self-identification: as Israeli or "in Israel"; as Arabs, Palestinians, or Israelis; and as Muslims, Christians or Druze.[25]

Terminology and identity

[edit]
Arabs in Israel, by natural region (2018).

The choice of terms to refer to Arab citizens of Israel is a highly politicized issue, and there is a broad range of labels that members of this community use to self-identity.[26][27] Generally speaking, supporters of Israel tend to use Israeli Arab or Arab Israeli to refer to this population without mentioning Palestine, while critics of Israel (or supporters of Palestinians) tend to use Palestinian or Palestinian Arab without referencing Israel.[28] According to The New York Times, most preferred to identify themselves as Palestinian citizens of Israel rather than as Israeli Arabs, as of 2012.[29][30] The New York Times uses both 'Palestinian Israelis'[31] and 'Israeli Arabs' to refer to the same population.

Israeli Arabs at a Land Day rally in Sakhnin, 30 March 2010

The relationship of Arab citizens to the State of Israel is often fraught with tension and can be regarded in the context of relations between minority populations and state authorities elsewhere in the world.[32] Arab citizens consider themselves to be an indigenous people.[33]

List of demonyms

[edit]

Arab/Palestinian citizens of Israel may refer to themselves by a wide range of terms. Each of these names, while referring to the same group of people, connotes a different balance in what is often a multilayered identity assigning varying levels of priority or emphasis to the various dimensions which may be historic-geographic ("Palestine (region)"), "national" or ethnoreligious (Palestinian, Arab, Israeli, Druze, Circassian), linguistic (Arabic-speaking), civic (feeling "Israeli" or not), etc.:[34]

Two appellations, among others listed above, are not applied to the East Jerusalem Arab population or the Druze in the Golan Heights, as these territories were occupied by Israel in 1967:

  • the Arabs inside the Green Line[14][37][38]
  • the Arabs within (Arabic: عرب الداخل, romanized: ‘Arab al-Dākhil).[14][37][38]

Demonym preferences

[edit]

According to The New York Times, as of 2012, most Israeli Arabs preferred to identify themselves as Palestinian citizens of Israel rather than as Israeli Arabs.[8] The Council on Foreign Relations also states that most members of the Israeli Arab community prefer this term.[4] The Washington Post asserted in 2021 that "surveys showed" that Israeli Arabs preferred the term "Palestinian citizen of Israel" and that "for people who often feel caught between two worlds, however, the contours of what it means to be a Palestinian citizen of Israel remain a work in progress."[10] However, these findings conflict with a 2017 Tel Aviv University poll which showed most Israelis self-identify as either Arab-Israeli or simply Israeli.[40]

Similar terms that Israeli Arabs, media and other organizations may use are Palestinian Arabs in Israel and Israeli Palestinian Arabs. Amnesty reports that "Arab citizens of Israel" is "an inclusive term used by Israel that describes a number of different and primarily Arabic-speaking groups, including Muslim Arabs", Christian Arabs, Druze and Circassians. They further stated that "considering the number of those defined as Muslim Arabs and Christian Arabs together, the population of Palestinian citizens of Israel amounted to around 1.8 million" in 2019.[41]

There are at least two terms which specifically exclude the East Jerusalem Arab population and the Druze and other Arabs in the Golan Heights: the Arabs inside the Green Line, and the Arabs within (Arabic: عرب الداخل, romanized: ‘Arab al-Dākhil).[14][37][38] These terms clarify that

Identification as Palestinian

[edit]

While known officially by the Israeli government only as "Israeli Arabs" or "Arab Israelis", the development of Palestinian nationalism and identity in the 20th and 21st centuries has been met by a marked evolution in self-identification, reflecting a rising identification with Palestinian identity alongside Arab and Israeli signifiers.[42][14][16] A number of Palestinian citizens of Israel have family ties to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as to Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.[6]

Between 1948 and 1967, few Arab citizens of Israel identified openly as "Palestinian", and an "Israeli-Arab" identity, the preferred phrase of the Israeli establishment and public, was predominant.[28] Public expressions of Palestinian identity, such as displays of the Palestinian flag or the singing and reciting of nationalist songs or poetry were illegal.[43] With the end of military administrative rule in 1966 and following the 1967 war, national consciousness and its expression among Israel's Arab citizens spread.[28][43] A majority then self-identified as Palestinian, preferring this descriptor to Israeli Arab in numerous surveys over the years.[28][44][43] In a 2017 telephone poll, 40% of Arab citizens of Israel identified as "Arab in Israel / Arab citizen of Israel", 15% identified as "Palestinian", 8.9% as "Palestinian in Israel / Palestinian citizen of Israel", and 8.7% as "Arab";[40][45] the focus groups associated with the poll provided a different outcome, in which "there was consensus that Palestinian identity occupies a central place in their consciousness".[40] A November 2023 poll asked respondents from this demographic what the most important "component in their personal identity" was to them; 33 percent answered "Israeli citizenship", 32 percent "Arab identity", 23 percent "religious affiliation", and 8 percent "Palestinian identity".[46][47][48]

University of Haifa professor Sammy Smooha commented in 2019, "The largest now and the most growing identity is a hybrid identity, which is 'Palestinian in Israel' or a similar combination. I think that’s what’s going to take over."[49]

Distinction of Druze and Circassian citizens
[edit]

In the Amnesty International 2022 report "Israel's Apartheid against Palestinians: Cruel System of Domination and Crime against Humanity", the organization excludes the Israeli Arab Druze and non-Arab Circassians from the term Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel:

  • The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially classifies the roughly 2.1 million Palestinian citizens of Israel as "Arab citizens of Israel", reflecting their attributing a racialized non-Jewish, Arab status to all of them
  • The term "Arab citizens of Israel" includes Muslim Arabs including Bedouins, Christian Arabs, the 20–25,000 Druze, and even the 4–5,000 Circassians, whose origins are in the Caucasus but are mostly Muslim.
  • According to Amnesty, the Israeli state views and treats Palestinian citizens of Israel differently from the Druze and Circassians, who must for example serve in the army while Palestinian citizens need not serve.
  • Nonetheless, Israeli authorities and media refer to those who self-identify as Palestinians – as "Israeli Arabs".

The Washington Post included the Druze among the Palestinians.[10][50] The Council of Foreign Relations stated:"The majority of Arab citizens are Sunni Muslims, though there are many Christians and also Druze, who more often embrace Israeli identity."[4]

Identification as Arab Israeli

[edit]

The question of Palestinian identity extends to representation in the Israeli Knesset. Journalist Ruth Margalit says of Mansour Abbas of the United Arab List, a member of the governing coalition, "The traditional term for this group, Arab Israelis, is increasingly controversial, but it's the one that Abbas prefers."[51] Abbas gave an interview to Israeli media in November 2021 and said "My rights don't just come from my citizenship. My rights also come from being a member of the Palestinian people, a son of this Palestinian homeland. And whether we like it or not, the State of Israel, with its identity, was established inside the Palestinian homeland."[52] Sami Abu Shehadeh of Balad is "an outspoken advocate of Palestinian identity".[10][53] He says, referring to the 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis, "... If the past weeks provided lessons for the international community, then a main one is that they cannot continue to ignore the Palestinian citizens of Israel. Any solution should include full equality for all citizens as well as the respect and recognition of our rights as a national minority."[54]

Some media using the term "Palestinian citizens of Israel" or "Palestinians in Israel" have treated the terms as interchangeable with "Arab citizens of Israel" or "Israeli Arabs", and have not discussed whether Druze and Circassians are exceptions.[36] such as the New York Times.[55][29]

Israeli surveys

[edit]

Surveys of Arab-Israeli self-identification are diverse, and have often presented differing if not contradictory results. In 2017 the Konrad Adenauer Foundation's Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University conducted a telephone poll, in which the results were:[40][45]

  • National identity with Israeli civil component 49.7%, of which
    • Palestinian (citizen) of Israel 8.9%
    • Arab (citizen) of Israel 40.8%
  • Pure national identity 24.1%, of which
    • Palestinian 15.4%
    • Arab 8.7%
  • Civil identity: Israeli 11.4%
  • Religious identity 9.5%
  • Other / Don't know 5.3%

The focus groups associated with the poll provided a different outcome, in which "there was consensus that Palestinian identity occupies a central place in their consciousness". reflecting "the strength of Palestinian-Arab identity", and that they do not see a contradiction between that and Israeli civic identity. The focus group revealed strong opposition to the term "Israeli-Arab" and to the concept of Israel's "Independence Day". The study concluded that the focus group findings of strong Palestinian national identity, not conflicting with Israeli civic identity, match those seen in the public sphere.[40]

According to a 2019 survey by University of Haifa professor Sammy Smooha, conducted in Arabic among 718 Arab adults, 47% of the Arab population chose Palestinian identities with an Israeli component ("Israeli Palestinian", "Palestinian in Israel", "Palestinian Arab in Israel"), 36% prefers Israeli Arab identities without a Palestinian component ("Israeli", "Arab", "Arab in Israel", "Israeli Arab"), and 15% chose Palestinian identities without an Israeli component ("Palestinian", "Palestinian Arab"). When these two components are presented as competitors, 69% chose exclusive or primary Palestinian identity, compared with 30% who chose exclusive or primary Israeli Arab identity. 66% of the Arab population agreed that "the identity of 'Palestinian Arab in Israel' is appropriate to most Arabs in Israel."[56]

According to a 2020 survey by Camil Fuchs of Tel-Aviv University, 51% of Arabs identify as Arab-Israeli, 7% identify as Palestinian, 23% identify as Israeli, 15% identify as Arab, and 4% identify as "other." This significantly differs from their 2019 survey, in which 49% identified as Arab-Israeli, 18% as Palestinian, 27% as Arab, and 5% as Israeli.[57]

Academic practice

[edit]

Common practice in contemporary academic literature is to identify this community as Palestinian as it is how the majority self-identify (See Self-Identification for more).[44] Terms preferred by most Arab citizens to identify themselves include Palestinians, Palestinians in Israel, Israeli Palestinians, the Palestinians of 1948, Palestinian Arabs, Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel or Palestinian citizens of Israel.[14][26][27][37][43][58] There are, however, individuals from among the Arab citizenry who reject the term Palestinian altogether.[26] A minority of Israel's Arab citizens include "Israeli" in some way in their self-identifying label; the majority identify as Palestinian by nationality and Israeli by citizenship.[15][27]

Israeli establishment

[edit]

The Israeli establishment prefers Israeli Arabs or Arabs in Israel, and also uses the terms the minorities, the Arab sector, Arabs of Israel and Arab citizens of Israel.[14][37][43][38][59] These labels have been criticized for denying this population a political or national identification, obscuring their Palestinian identity and connection to Palestine.[43][38][59] The term Israeli Arabs in particular is viewed as a construct of the Israeli authorities.[43][38][59][60] It is nonetheless used by a significant minority of the Arab population, "reflecting its dominance in Israeli social discourse."[27]

Historical

[edit]

Between 1920 and 1948, in what was then Mandatory Palestine, all citizens were known as Palestinians, and the two primary communities were referred to by the British authorities as "Arabs" and "Jews". Between 1948 and 1967, few citizens of Israel identified openly as "Palestinian". An "Israeli-Arab" identity, the preferred phrase of the Israeli establishment and public, was predominant.[28] Public expressions of Palestinian identity, such as displays of the Palestinian flag or the singing and reciting of nationalist songs or poetry were illegal.[43] Ever since the 1948 Nakba, the Palestinians that have remained within the 1949 Armistice borders have been colloquially known as "48 Arabs" (Arabic: عرب ٤٨, romanized: ʿArab Thamāniya wa-ʾArbaʿīn).[10][53] With the end of military administrative rule in 1966 and following the 1967 war, national consciousness and its expression among Israel's Arab citizens spread.[28][43] A majority then self-identified as Palestinian, preferring this descriptor to Israeli Arab in numerous surveys over the years.[28][44][43]

East Jerusalem and Golan Heights

[edit]

Arabs in East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights (Syrian Golan) are special cases regarding citizenship and identity.

Arabs living in East Jerusalem, occupied and administered by Israel since the Six-Day War of 1967 hold Israeli ID cards, but most are non-citizen permanent residents since few accepted Israel's offer of citizenship after the war's end, refusing to recognize its sovereignty, and most maintain close ties with the West Bank.[61] As permanent residents, they are eligible to vote in Jerusalem's municipal elections, although only a small percentage takes advantage of this right.

The Golan Heights was not part of Mandatory Palestine or the Ottoman political units which preceded it, but rather was part of Syria, and the UN still recognizes it as such, and calls it the Syrian Golan.[62] The remaining Druze population of the Golan Heights, occupied and administered by Israel in 1967, are considered permanent residents under Israel's Golan Heights Law of 1981. As of mid-2022, 4,303 Druze citizens of Syria have been granted Israeli citizenship, or, 20% of the total Druze residents in the Golan Heights.[63] In 2024, Rami Zeedan estimated that approximately 25% have Israeli citizenship.[64]

History

[edit]

1948 Arab–Israeli War

[edit]

Most Jewish Israelis refer to the 1948 Arab–Israeli War as the War of Independence, while most Arab citizens refer to it as al-Nakba (the catastrophe), a reflection of differences in perception of the purpose and outcomes of the war.[65][66]

In the aftermath of the 1947–49 war, the territory previously administered by the British Empire as Mandatory Palestine was de facto divided into three parts: the State of Israel, the Jordanian-held West Bank, and the Egyptian-held Gaza Strip. Of the estimated 950,000 Arabs that lived in the territory that became Israel before the war,[67] over 80% fled or were expelled. The other 20%, some 156,000, remained.[68] Some of them supported Israel from the beginning.[69] Arab citizens of Israel today are largely composed of the people who remained and their descendants. Others include some from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank who procured Israeli citizenship under family-unification provisions made significantly more stringent in the aftermath of the Second Intifada.[70]

Arabs who left their homes during the period of armed conflict, but remained in what had become Israeli territory, were considered to be "present absentees". In some cases, they were refused permission to return to their homes, which were expropriated and turned over to state ownership, as was the property of other Palestinian refugees.[71][72] Some 274,000, or 1 of every 4 Arab citizens of Israel are "present absentees" or internally displaced Palestinians.[73][74] Notable cases of "present absentees" include the residents of Saffuriyya and the Galilee villages of Kafr Bir'im and Iqrit.[75]

1949–1966

[edit]
Seif el-Din el-Zubi, member of the first Knesset

Between Israel's declaration of independence on 14 May 1948 and the Israeli Nationality Law of 14 July 1952, there technically were no Israeli citizens.[76]

While most Arabs remaining in Israel were granted citizenship, they were subject to martial law in the early years of the state.[77][78] Zionism had given little serious thought as to how to integrate Arabs, and according to Ian Lustick subsequent policies were 'implemented by a rigorous regime of military rule that dominated what remained of the Arab population in territory ruled by Israel, enabling the state to expropriate most Arab-owned land, severely limit its access to investment capital and employment opportunity, and eliminate virtually all opportunities to use citizenship as a vehicle for gaining political influence'.[79] A variety of Israeli legislative measures facilitated the transfer of land abandoned by Arabs to state ownership. These included the Absentee Property Law of 1950 which allowed the state to expropriate the property of Palestinians who fled or were expelled to other countries, and the Land Acquisition Law of 1953 which authorized the Ministry of Finance to transfer expropriated land to the state. Other common legal expedients included the use of emergency regulations to declare land belonging to Arab citizens a closed military zone, followed by the use of Ottoman legislation on abandoned land to take control of the land.[80] Travel permits, curfews, administrative detentions, and expulsions were part of life until 1966.[citation needed]

Arabs who held Israeli citizenship were entitled to vote for the Israeli Knesset. Arab Knesset members have served in office since the First Knesset in 1949. The first Arab Knesset members were Amin-Salim Jarjora and Seif el-Din el-Zoubi who were members of the Democratic List of Nazareth party and Tawfik Toubi, member of the Maki party.

In 1965 a radical independent Arab group called al-Ard forming the Arab Socialist List tried to run for Knesset elections. The list was banned by the Israeli Central Elections Committee.[81]

In 1966, martial law was lifted completely, and the government set about dismantling most of the discriminatory laws, while Arab citizens were granted the same rights as Jewish citizens under law.[82]

1967–2000

[edit]
A monument to residents of Arraba killed in the Arab–Israeli conflict

After the 1967 Six-Day War, Arab citizens were able to contact Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for the first time since the establishment of the state. This, along with the lifting of military rule, led to increased political activism among Arab citizens.[83][84]

In 1974, a committee of Arab mayors and municipal councilmen was established which played an important role in representing the community and pressuring the Israeli government.[85] This was followed in 1975 by the formation of the Committee for the Defense of the Land, which sought to prevent continuing land expropriations.[86] That same year, a political breakthrough took place with the election of Arab poet Tawfiq Ziad, a Maki member, as mayor of Nazareth, accompanied by a strong communist presence in the town council.[87] In 1976, six Arab citizens of Israel were killed by Israeli security forces at a protest against land expropriations and house demolitions. The date of the protest, 30 March, has since been commemorated annually as Land Day.

The 1980s saw the birth of the Islamic Movement. As part of a larger trend in the Arab World, the movement emphasized moving Islam into the political realm. They built schools, provided other essential social services, constructed mosques, and encouraged prayer and conservative Islamic dress. The Islamic Movement began to affect electoral politics particularly at the local level.[88]

Many Arab citizens supported the First Intifada and assisted Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, providing them with money, food, and clothes. A number of strikes were also held by Arab citizens in solidarity with Palestinians in the occupied territories.[88]

The years leading up to the Oslo Accords were a time of optimism for Arab citizens. During the administration of Yitzhak Rabin, Arab parties played an important role in the formation of a governing coalition. Increased participation of Arab citizens was also seen at the civil society level. However, tension continued to exist with multiple Arabs calling for Israel to become a "state of all its citizens", thereby challenging the state's Jewish identity. In the 1999 elections for prime minister, 94% of the Arab electorate voted for Ehud Barak. However, Barak formed a broad left-right-center government without consulting the Arab parties, disappointing the Arab community.[83]

2000–present

[edit]
Arab Israelis from Shefa-'Amr demonstrating in front of the Haifa court building with Palestinian flags

Tensions between Arabs and the state rose in October 2000 when 12 Arab citizens and one man from Gaza were killed while protesting the government's response to the Second Intifada. In response to this incident, the government established the Or Commission. The events of October 2000 caused multiple Arabs to question the nature of their Israeli citizenship. To a large extent, they boycotted the 2001 Israeli Elections as a means of protest.[83] This boycott helped Ariel Sharon defeat Ehud Barak; as aforementioned, in the 1999 elections, 94 percent of Israel's Arab minority had voted for Ehud Barak.[89] IDF enlistment by Bedouin citizens of Israel dropped significantly.[90]

During the 2006 Lebanon War, Arab advocacy organizations complained that the Israeli government had invested time and effort to protect Jewish citizens from Hezbollah attacks, but had neglected Arab citizens. They pointed to a dearth of bomb shelters in Arab towns and villages and a lack of basic emergency information in Arabic.[91] Multiple Israeli Jews viewed the Arab opposition to government policy and sympathy with the Lebanese as a sign of disloyalty.[92]

In October 2006, tensions rose when Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert invited a right-wing political party Yisrael Beiteinu, to join his coalition government. The party leader, Avigdor Lieberman, advocated an ethnicity-based territory exchange, the Lieberman Plan, by transferring heavily populated Arab areas (mainly the Triangle), to Palestinian Authority control and annexing major Jewish Israeli settlement blocs in the West Bank close to the green line as part of a peace proposal.[93] Arabs who would prefer to remain in Israel instead of becoming citizens of a Palestinian state would be able to move to Israel. All citizens of Israel, whether Jews or Arabs, would be required to pledge an oath of allegiance to retain citizenship. Those who refuse could remain in Israel as permanent residents.[94]

In January 2007 the first non-Druze Arab minister in Israel's history, Raleb Majadele, was appointed minister without portfolio (Salah Tarif, a Druze, had been appointed a minister without portfolio in 2001). The appointment was criticized by the left, which felt it was an attempt to cover up the Labor Party's decision to sit with Yisrael Beiteinu in the government, and by the right, who saw it as a threat to Israel's status as a Jewish state.[95][96] In 2021, Mansour Abbas, the leader of the United Arab List, made history by becoming the first Israeli Arab political leader to join an Israeli governing coalition.[97][98]

During the 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis widespread protests and riots intensified across Israel, particularly in cities with large Arab populations. In Lod, rocks were thrown at Jewish apartments and some Jewish residents were evacuated from their homes by the police. Synagogues and a Muslim cemetery were vandalized.[99] Communal violence including "riots, stabbings, arson, attempted home invasions and shootings" was reported from Beersheba, Rahat, Ramla, Lod, Nasiriyah, Tiberias, Jerusalem, Haifa and Acre.[100]

A protest against the killings in the Arab community in Tel Aviv

The Arab community in Israel has seen a significant increase in violence and organized crime, including a rise in gang-related murders in recent years.[101][102] A report by the Abraham Initiative highlighted that 244 Arab community members were killed in Israel in 2023, more than double the previous year's count.[103][104] The report attributed this surge in homicides directly to National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, who campaigned on a platform promising to improve personal security and oversees law enforcement.[103] Prominent organized crime families among Israeli Arabs include Al-Hariri, Bakri, Jarushis, and the Druze Abu Latifs.[105][106][107]

Since the outbreak of the Gaza war, Israel has carried out mass arrests and detentions of Palestinian workers and Arab citizens of Israel.[108][109] On 5 November 2023, CNN reported that "dozens" of Palestinian residents and Arab Israelis were arrested in Israel for expressions of solidarity with the civilian population of Gaza, sharing Quran verses, or expressing "any support for the Palestinian people".[110] Haaretz described the widespread targeting of Arab Israelis by Israeli security forces.[111] Referring to "hundreds" of interrogations, El País reported on 11 November that Israel increasingly treats its Arab minority as a "potential fifth column".[112] At the same time, the conflict saw an increased self-identification with Israel among Arab citizens[113] and continued cooperation with their Jewish counterparts in various areas, including healthcare, military service, education and sports.[114] According to different polls, a majority of Israeli Arabs condemned the 7 October massacre, but also opposed the mass bombardment of Gaza. Multiple Israeli Arabs expressed a general resentment over the war, as other Palestinians regarded them as supporters of Israel, whereas Israeli Jews saw them as potential Hamas supporters.[115][116]

Sectarian and religious groupings

[edit]
Religions adhered to by Arab citizens of Israel
Muslim
82%
Christian
9%
Druze
9%

In 2006, the official number of Arab residents in Israel – including East Jerusalem and Golan Heights permanent residents some of whom are not citizens – was 1,413,500 people, about 20% of Israel's population.[117] The Arab population in 2023 was estimated at 2,065,000, representing 21% of the country's population.[1][2] According to the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (May 2003), Muslims, including Bedouins, make up 82% of the entire Arab population in Israel, along with around 9% Druze, and 9% Christians.[118] Projections based on 2010 data, predicted that Arab Israelis would constitute 25% of Israel's population by 2025.[119]

The national language and mother tongue of Arab citizens, including the Druze, is Arabic and the colloquial spoken language is of the Palestinian Arabic dialect. Knowledge and command of Modern Standard Arabic varies.[120]

Muslims

[edit]
Muslim performs prayers in El-Jazzar Mosque.

Muslims comprise 17.9% of the Israeli population in 2019.[121] The majority of Muslims in Israel are Sunni Arabs,[122] with an Ahmadiyya minority.[123] There are around 4,000 Alawites in Israel and the majority of them live in Ghajar village in the occupied Golan Heights near the border with Lebanon. The Bedouin in Israel are also Arab Muslims, with some Bedouin clans participating in the Israeli army. The small Circassian community is composed of Sunni Muslims uprooted from the North Caucasus in the late 19th century. In addition, smaller populations of Kurdish, Romani and Turkish Muslims also live in Israel.

In 2020, Jerusalem hosted the largest Muslim population in Israel, numbering 346,000 residents, constituting 21.1% of Israel's Muslim population and about 36.9% of the city's total residents. Rahat followed with the second-largest Muslim population at 71,300 residents, while Umm Al-Fahm and Nazareth had approximately 56,000 and 55,600 residents, respectively.[121] The eleven towns of the Triangle area are home to approximately 250,000 Israeli Muslims.[124]

Regarding regional distribution in 2020, approximately 35.2% of Israeli Muslims resided in the Northern District, 21.9% in the Jerusalem District, 17.1% in the Central District, 13.7% in the Haifa District, 10.9% in the Southern District, and 1.2% in the Tel Aviv District.[121] The Israeli Muslim population is notably youthful: about 33.4% are aged 14 and under, while those aged 65 and older account for only 4.3%. Furthermore, the Muslim community in Israel boasts the highest fertility rate among religious groups, standing at 3.16 children per woman.[121]

Worshipers in one of the mosques in Umm al-Fahm

According to study published by Pew Research Center in 2016, while Muslims living in Israel, overall, are more religious than Israeli Jews, they are less religious than Muslims living in other countries in the Middle East. Muslim women are more likely to say that religion has high importance in their lives, and younger Muslims are generally less observant than their elders.[122] According to the Israel Democracy Institute survey conducted in 2015, 47% of Israeli Muslims identified as traditional, 32% identified as religious, 17% identified as not religious at all, 3% identified as very religious.[125]

Settled

[edit]

Traditionally settled communities of Muslim Arabs comprise about 70% of the Arab population in Israel. In 2010, the average number of children per mother was 3.84, dropping from 3.97 in 2008. The Muslim population is mostly young: 42% of Muslims are under the age of 15. The median age of Muslim Israelis is 18, while the median age of Jewish Israelis is 30. The percentage of people over 65 is less than 3% for Muslims, compared with 12% for the Jewish population.[118]

Bedouin

[edit]
Rahat, the largest Bedouin city in the Negev

According to the Foreign Affairs Minister of Israel, 110,000 Bedouins live in the Negev, 50,000 in the Galilee, and 10,000 in the central region of Israel.[126]

Prior to the establishment of Israel in 1948, there were an estimated 65,000–90,000 Bedouin living in the Negev.[126] The 11,000 who remained were relocated by the Israeli government in the 1950s and 1960s to an area in the northeastern Negev comprising 10% of the Negev desert.[126] The Israeli government built seven development towns for the Bedouin between 1979 and 1982. Around half the Bedouin population live in these towns, the largest of which is the city of Rahat, others being Ar'arat an-Naqab (Ar'ara BaNegev), Bir Hadaj, Hura, Kuseife, Lakiya, Shaqib al-Salam (Segev Shalom) and Tel as-Sabi (Tel Sheva). In 2005, Bedouin were estimated to amount to 10% of the Arab citizens of Israel.[127] Approximately 40–50% of Bedouin citizens of Israel live in 39–45 unrecognized villages that are not connected to the electrical grid and water mains.[128][129] A study published by the Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in 2017 found that Bedouins have the lowest achievements in the Arab sector on all indices: bagrut scores, rates of college graduates, and fields of employment. As they tend to be the least educated.[130]: 42 

Druze

[edit]
Druze dignitaries celebrating the Ziyarat al-Nabi Shu'ayb festival at the tomb of the prophet in Hittin

Most Israeli Druze reside in the northern part of the country and are officially recognized as a separate religious community with their own courts.[131] They maintain Arabic language and culture as integral parts of their identity, and Arabic is their primary language.[132] The Galilean Druze and Druze of the Haifa region received Israeli citizenship automatically in 1948. After Israel captured the Golan Heights from Syria in 1967 and annexed it to Israel in 1981, the Druze of the Golan Heights were offered full Israeli citizenship under the Golan Heights Law. Most declined Israeli citizenship and retain Syrian citizenship and identity and are treated as permanent residents of Israel.[133] As of 2011, fewer than 10% of the Druze population in the Golan Heights had accepted Israeli citizenship.[134]

At the end of 2019, approximately 81% of the Israeli Druze population lived in the Northern District and 19% lived in the Haifa District, and the largest population of Druze were Daliyat al-Karmel and Yirka. Israeli Druze live in 19 towns and villages, either singly or mixed with Christians and Muslims, all located on the tops of the mountains in northern Israel (Upper and Lower Galilee and Mount Carmel), including Abu Snan, Beit Jann, Daliyat al-Karmel, Ein al-Asad, Hurfeish, Isfiya, Julis, Kafr Yasif, Kisra-Sumei, Maghar, Peki'in, Rameh, Sajur, Shefa-Amr, Yanuh-Jat, and Yarka.[135] There are four remaining Druze villages in the Israeli-annexed portion of the Golan HeightsMajdal Shams, Mas'ade, Buq'ata, and Ein Qiniyye—in which 23,000 Druze live.[136][137][138]

During the British Mandate for Palestine, the Druze did not embrace the rising Arab nationalism of the time or participate in violent confrontations. In 1948, multiple Druze volunteered for the Israeli army and no Druze villages were destroyed or permanently abandoned.[74] Since the establishment of the state, the Druze have demonstrated solidarity with Israel and distanced themselves from Arab and Islamic radicalism.[139] Male Druze citizens serve in the Israel Defense Forces.[140]

From 1957, the Israeli government formally recognized the Druze as a separate religious community,[141][142][143] and are defined as a distinct ethnic group in the Israeli Ministry of Interior's census registration. On the other hand, the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics categorizes Druze as Arabs in their census.[144] While the Israeli education system is basically divided into Hebrew and Arabic speaking schools, the Druze have autonomy within the Arabic speaking branch.[141] Israeli Druze are Arabic in language and culture,[132] and their mother tongue is the Arabic Language.

Some scholars maintain that Israel has tried to separate the Druze from other Arab communities, and that the effort has influenced the way Israel's Druze perceive their modern identity.[145][146] Survey data suggests that Israeli Druze prioritize their identity first as Druze (religiously), second as Arabs (culturally and ethnically), and third as Israelis (citizenship-wise).[147] A small minority of them identify as Palestinians, distinguishing them from the majority of other Arab citizens of Israel, who predominantly identify as Palestinians.[147]

In a survey conducted in 2008 by Dr. Yusuf Hassan of Tel Aviv University 94% of Druze respondents identified as "Druze-Israelis" in the religious and national context,[148][149] while a 2017 Pew Research Center poll reported that while 99% of Muslims and 96% of Christians identified as ethnically Arab, a smaller share of Druze, 71%, identified likewise.[150] Compared to other Christians and Muslims, Druze place less emphasis on their Arab identity and self-identify more as Israeli. Most do not identify as Palestinians.[151] However, they were less ready for personal relationships with Jews compared to Israeli Muslims and Christians.[125] Scholars attribute this trend to cultural differences between Jews and Druze.[152] Druze politicians in Israel include Ayoob Kara, who represented Likud in the Knesset; Majalli Wahabi of Kadima, the Deputy Speaker of the Knesset; and Said Nafa of the Arab party Balad.[153]

Christians

[edit]
Catholic Mass in the Basilica of the Annunciation in Nazareth, Christian Arabs are one of the most educated ethnoreligious groups in Israel.[154]

Christian Arabs comprise about 9% of the Arab population in Israel. At the end of 2019, approximately 70.6% reside in the Northern District, 13.3% in the Haifa District, 9.5% in the Jerusalem District, 3.4% in the Central District, 2.7% in the Tel Aviv District and 0.5% in the Southern District.[155] There are 135,000 or more Christian Arabs in Israel (and more than 39,000 non-Arab Christians).[155][156] As of 2014 the Melkite Greek Catholic Church was the largest Christian community in Israel, where about 60% of Israeli Christians belonged to the Melkite Greek Catholic Church,[157] while around 30% of Israeli Christians belonged to the Greek Orthodox Church of Jerusalem.[157] The Christian communities in Israel run numerous schools, colleges, hospitals, clinics, orphanages, homes for the elderly, dormitories, family and youth centers, hotels, and guesthouses.[158]

Nazareth has the largest Christian Arab population, followed by Haifa.[155] The majority of Haifa's Arab minority is Christian as well.[159] The Christian Arab communities in Nazareth and Haifa tend to be wealthier and better educated compare to other Arabs elsewhere in Israel.[160][161] Arab Christians also live in a number of other localities in the Galilee; such as Abu Snan, Arraba, Bi'ina, Deir Hanna, I'billin, Jadeidi-Makr, Kafr Kanna, Mazra'a, Muqeible, Ras al-Ein, Reineh, Sakhnin, Shefa-Amr, Tur'an and Yafa an-Naseriyye.[162] localities such as Eilabun, Jish, Kafr Yasif and Rameh are predominantly Christians.[163] Nearly all the population of Fassuta and Mi'ilya are Melkite Christians.[164] Some Druze villages, such as Daliyat al-Karmel,[165] Ein Qiniyye, Hurfeish, Isfiya, Kisra-Sumei, Maghar, Majdal Shams and Peki'in have small Christian Arab populations.[118] Mixed cities such as Acre, Jerusalem, Lod, Ma'alot-Tarshiha, Nof HaGalil, Ramla and Tel Aviv-Jaffa have significant Christian Arab populations.[118]

Many Christian Arabs have been prominent in Arab political parties in Israel, and leaders have included Archbishop George Hakim, Emile Toma, Tawfik Toubi, Emile Habibi, and Azmi Bishara. Notable Christian religious figures include the Melkite Archbishops of the Galilee Elias Chacour and Boutros Mouallem, the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem Michel Sabbah, and Bishop Munib Younan of the Lutheran Church of Jordan and the Holy Land. Israeli Supreme Court judges Salim Joubran and George Karra are Christian Arab.[166][167] Notable Christian figures in science and high tech include Hossam Haick[168] who has a number of contributions in multidisciplinary fields such as nanotechnology, nanosensors and molecular electronics,[169] and Johny Srouji who is Apple's senior vice president of hardware technologies.[170][171][172]

Among Arab Christians in Israel, some emphasize pan-Arabism, whilst a small minority enlists in the Israel Defense Forces.[173][174] Since September 2014 Christian families or clans who have either Aramaic/Assyrian or Maronite cultural heritage are considered an ethnicity separate from Israeli Arabs and can register themselves as Arameans. This recognition comes after about seven years of activity by the Aramean Christian Foundation in Israel, which rather than sticking to an Arab identity, wishes to assimilate into an Israeli lifestyle. Aram is led by IDF Major Shadi Khalloul Risho and the Israeli Christian Recruitment Forum, headed by Father Gabriel Naddaf of the Greek-Orthodox Church and Major Ihab Shlayan.[175][176][177] The move was condemned by the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, which described it as an attempt to divide the Palestinian minority in Israel.[178] Other pro-Zionist advocates supporting similar ideas received extensive coverage in Israeli state sponsored media and Jewish news outlets to severe criticisms from their co-religionists (see Yoseph Haddad).

Christian Arabs are one of the most educated groups in Israel.[179] Statistically, Christian Arabs in Israel have the highest rates of educational attainment among all religious communities, according to a data by Israel Central Bureau of Statistics in 2010, 63% of Israeli Christian Arabs have had college or postgraduate education, the highest of any religious and ethno-religious group.[180] Despite the fact that Arab Christians only represent 2% of the total Israeli population, in 2014 they accounted for 17% of the country's university students, and for 14% of its college students.[181] There are more Christians who have attained a bachelor's degree or higher academic degrees than the median Israeli population.[154] The rate of students studying in the field of medicine was higher among Christian Arab students than that of all other sectors,[182] and the percentage of Arab Christian women who are receiving higher education is also higher than that of other groups.[183]

Catholic school in Haifa: High level Christian schools are among Israel's best performing educational institutions.[184]

The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics noted that when taking into account the data recorded over the years, Israeli Christian Arabs fared the best in terms of education in comparison to any other group receiving an education in Israel.[154][185] In 2012 Christian Arabs had the highest rates of success at matriculation examinations,[186] In 2016, Arab Christians had the highest rates of success at matriculation examinations, namely 73.9%, both in comparison to Muslim and Druze Israelis (41% and 51.9% respectively), and to the students from the different branches of the Hebrew (majority Jewish) education system considered as one group (55.1%).[187]

In terms of their socio-economic situation, Arab Christians are more similar to the Jewish population than to the Muslim Arab population.[188] They have the lowest incidence of poverty and the lowest percentage of unemployment, at 4.9%, compared to 6.5% among Jewish men and women.[189] They have also the highest median household income among Arab citizens of Israel and second highest median household income among the Israeli ethno-religious groups.[190] Also Arab Christians have a high presentation in science and in the white collar professions.[191] In Israel Arab Christians are portrayed as a hard working and upper middle class educated ethno-religious minority. According to study the majority of Christians in Israel (68.2 per cent) are employed in the service sector, i.e. banks, insurance companies, schools, tourism, hospitals etc.[158]

According to the study "Are Christian Arabs the New Israeli Jews? Reflections on the Educational Level of Arab Christians in Israel" by Hanna David from the University of Tel Aviv, one of the factors why Israeli Arab Christians are the most educated segment of Israel's population is the high level of the Christian educational institutions. Christian schools in Israel are among the best schools in the country, and while those schools represent only 4% of the Arab schooling sector, about 34% of Arab university students come from Christian schools,[192] and about 87% of the Israeli Arabs in the high tech sector have been educated in Christian schools.[193][184] A 2011 Maariv article described the Christian Arab sector as "the most successful in the education system",[183] an opinion supported by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics and others who point out that Christian Arabs fared best in terms of education in comparison to any other group receiving an education in Israel.[154]

Lebanese people

[edit]

There are 3,500 Lebanese people in Israel,[194] most of them are former members of the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and their families. The SLA was a Christian-dominated militia allied with the Israel Defense Forces during the South Lebanon conflict until Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 that ended the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon.[194] The majority are Maronites but there are also Muslims, Druze and Christians of other denominations among them.[195] They are registered by the Ministry of Interior as "Lebanese" and hold Israeli citizenship.[194] They are located across the country, mainly in the Northern District, in cities such as Nahariya, Kiryat Shmona, Tiberias, and Haifa.[195]

The native language of former SLA members is Lebanese Arabic. However, the language is only partially transmitted from one generation to another. The majority of the second generation understand and speak Lebanese Arabic but are unable to read and write it. Young Lebanese Israeli mainly text in Hebrew or, more rarely, in Lebanese Arabic written in the Hebrew alphabet. Religious books for children and youths are similarly written in Classical Arabic (or in Lebanese Arabic for some songs) in Hebrew letters.[195]

Population

[edit]
Arabs in Israel population pyramid in 2021
The lower town of Haifa, an area where Arabs, both Christians and Muslims, comprise around 70% of the residents.[196]

In 2006, the official number of Arab residents in Israel was 1,413,500 people, about 20% of Israel's population. This figure includes 209,000 Arabs (14% of the Israeli Arab population) in East Jerusalem, also counted in the Palestinian statistics, although 98% of East Jerusalem Palestinians have either Israeli residency or Israeli citizenship.[197] In 2012, the official number of Arab residents in Israel increased to 1,617,000 people, about 21% of Israel's population.[198] The Arab population in 2023 was estimated at 2,065,000 people, representing 21% of the country's population.[1]

According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics census in 2010, "the Arab population lives in 134 towns and villages. About 44 percent of them live in towns (compared to 81 percent of the Jewish population); 48 percent live in villages with local councils (compared to 9 percent of the Jewish population). Four percent of the Arab citizens live in small villages with regional councils, while the rest live in unrecognized villages (the proportion is much higher, 31 percent in the Negev)".[199] The Arab population in Israel is located in five main areas: Galilee (54.6% of total Israeli Arabs), Triangle (23.5% of total Israeli Arabs), Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, and Northern Negev (13.5% of total Israeli Arabs).[199] Around 8.4% (approximately 102,000 inhabitants) of Israeli Arabs live in officially mixed Jewish-Arab cities (excluding Arab residents in East Jerusalem), including Haifa, Lod, Ramle, Jaffa-Tel Aviv, Acre, Nof HaGalil, and Ma'alot Tarshiha.[200]

Jaffa, which currently has 16,000 Arab residents, mixed of Muslims and Christians.[201]
Old City of Acre, an area where Arabs make up 95% of the residents.[196]

In Israel's Northern District[3] Arab citizens of Israel form a majority of the population (52%) and about 50% of the Arab population lives in 114 different localities throughout Israel.[202] In total there are 122 primarily if not entirely Arab localities in Israel, 89 of them having populations over two thousand.[118] The seven townships as well as the Abu Basma Regional Council that have been constructed by the government for the Bedouin population of the Negev,[203][better source needed] are the only Arab localities to have been established since 1948, with the aim of relocating the Arab Bedouin citizens (see preceding section on Bedouin[broken anchor]).[citation needed]

46% of the country's Arabs (622,400 people) live in predominantly Arab communities in the north.[3] In 2023 Nazareth was the largest Arab city, with a population of 77,208,[204] roughly 40,000 of whom are Muslim. Shefa-'Amr has a population of approximately 43,408 and the city is mixed with sizable populations of Muslims, Christians, and Druze.

Jerusalem, a mixed city, has the largest overall Arab population. Jerusalem housed 332,600 Arabs in 2016 (37.7% of the city's residents)[205] and together with the local council of Abu Ghosh, some 19% of the country's entire Arab population.

14% of Arab citizens live in the Haifa District predominantly in the Wadi Ara region. Here is the largest Muslim city, Umm al-Fahm, with a population of 59,319. Baqa-Jatt is the second largest Arab population center in the district. The city of Haifa has an Arab population of 10%, much of it in the Wadi Nisnas, Abbas and Halissa neighborhoods.[206] Wadi Nisnas and Abbas neighborhoods, are largely Christian,[207][208] Halisa and Kababir are largely Muslim.[208]

10% of the country's Arab population resides in the Central District of Israel, primarily the cities of Tayibe, Tira, and Qalansawe as well as the mixed cities of Lod and Ramla which have mainly Jewish populations.[118]

Of the remaining 11%, 10% live in Bedouin communities in the northwestern Negev. The Bedouin city of Rahat is the only Arab city in the Southern District and it is the third largest Arab city in Israel.

The remaining 1% of the country's Arab population lives in cities that are almost entirely Jewish, such as Nazareth Illit with an Arab population of 22%[209] and Tel Aviv-Yafo, 4%.[118][202]

In February 2008, the government announced that the first new Arab city would be constructed in Israel. According to Haaretz, "[s]ince the establishment of the State of Israel, not a single new Arab settlement has been established, with the exception of permanent housing projects for Bedouins in the Negev".[210] The city, Givat Tantur, was never constructed even after 10 years.[211]

Major Arab localities

[edit]
Nazareth, which is a mixed ancient city of Muslims and Christians, is the largest Arab city in Israel.[212]
Umm al-Fahm is the third largest Arab city in Israel.
Baqa al-Gharbiyye is the eighth largest Arab city in Israel.

Arabs make up the majority of the population of the "heart of the Galilee" and of the areas along the Green Line including the Wadi Ara region. Bedouin Arabs make up the majority of the northeastern section of the Negev.

Significant population centers (2014)
Locality Population District
Nazareth 74,600 North
Rahat 60,400 South
Umm al-Fahm 51,400 Haifa
Tayibe 40,200 Center
Shefa-'Amr 39,200 North
Tamra 31,700 North
Sakhnin 28,600 North
Baqa al-Gharbiyye 27,500 Haifa
Tira 24,400 Center
Ar'ara 23,600 Haifa
Arraba 23,500 North
Kafr Qasim 21,400 Center
Maghar 21,300 North
Qalansawe 21,000 Center
Kafr Kanna 20,800 North
Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics

Perceived demographic threat

[edit]

The phrase demographic threat (or demographic bomb) is used within the Israeli political sphere to describe the growth of Israel's Arab citizenry as constituting a threat to its maintenance of its status as a Jewish state with a Jewish demographic majority. In the northern part of Israel the percentage of the population that is Jewish is declining.[213] The increasing population of Arabs within Israel, and the majority status they hold in two major geographic regions – the Galilee and the Triangle – has become a growing point of open political contention in recent years. Among Arabs, Muslims have the highest birth rate, followed by Druze, and then Christians.[citation needed] Israeli historian Benny Morris stated in 2004 that, while he strongly opposes expulsion of Israeli Arabs, in case of an "apocalyptic" scenario where Israel comes under total attack with non-conventional weapons and comes under existential threat, an expulsion might be the only option. He compared the Israeli Arabs to a "time bomb" and "a potential fifth column" in both demographic and security terms and said they are liable to undermine the state in time of war.[214]

Several politicians[215][216] have viewed the Arabs in Israel as a security and demographic threat.[217][218][219]

The phrase "demographic bomb" was famously used by Benjamin Netanyahu in 2003[220] when he noted that, if the percentage of Arab citizens rises above its current level of about 20 percent, Israel will not be able to maintain a Jewish demographic majority. Netanyahu's comments were criticized as racist by Arab Knesset members and a range of civil rights and human rights organizations, such as the Association for Civil Rights in Israel.[221] Even earlier allusions to the "demographic threat" can be found in an internal Israeli government document drafted in 1976 known as the Koenig Memorandum, which laid out a plan for reducing the number and influence of Arab citizens of Israel in the Galilee region.

In 2003, the Israeli daily Ma'ariv published an article entitled "Special Report: Polygamy is a Security Threat", detailing a report put forth by the Director of the Population Administration at the time, Herzl Gedj; the report described polygamy in the Bedouin sector a "security threat" and advocated means of reducing the birth rate in the Arab sector.[222] The Population Administration is a department of the Demographic Council, whose purpose, according to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, is: "...to increase the Jewish birthrate by encouraging women to have more children using government grants, housing benefits, and other incentives".[223] In 2008 the minister of the interior appointed Yaakov Ganot as new head of the Population Administration, which according to Haaretz is "probably the most important appointment an interior minister can make".[224]

A January 2006 study rejects the "demographic time bomb" threat based on statistical data that shows Jewish births have increased while Arab births have begun to drop.[225] The study noted shortcomings in earlier demographic predictions (for example, in the 1960s, predictions suggested that Arabs would be the majority in 1990). The study also demonstrated that Christian Arab and Druze birth rates were actually below those of Jewish birth rates in Israel. The study used data from a Gallup poll to demonstrate that the desired family size for Arabs in Israel and Jewish Israelis were the same. The study's population forecast for 2025 predicted that Arabs would comprise only 25% of the Israeli population. Nevertheless, the Bedouin population, with its high birth rates, continues to be perceived as a threat to a Jewish demographic majority in the south, and a number of development plans, such as the Blueprint Negev, address this concern.[226]

A study showed that in 2010, Jewish birthrates rose by 31% and 19,000 diaspora Jews immigrated to Israel, while the Arab birthrate fell by 2%.[227]

Land and population exchange

[edit]
Survey among residents of Um Al-Fahm
Prefer joining Palestinian State
11%
Prefer continued Israeli jurisdiction
83%
No opinion
6%
Source: Kul Al-Arab, 2000[228]
Respondents opposed joining future Palestinian State
Prefer to remain in democratic regime with high living standards
54%
Satisfied with present situation
18%
Not willing to make sacrifices for creation of Palestinian state
14%
No stated reason
11%
Source: Kul Al-Arab, 2000[228]

Some Israeli politicians advocate land-swap proposals in order to assure a continued Jewish majority within Israel. A specific proposal is that Israel transfer sovereignty of part of the Arab-populated Wadi Ara area (west of the Green Line) to a future Palestinian state, in return for formal sovereignty over the major Jewish settlement "blocks" that lie inside the West Bank east of the Green Line.[229]

Avigdor Lieberman of Yisrael Beiteinu, the fourth largest faction in the 17th Knesset, is one of the foremost advocates of the transfer of large Arab towns located just inside Israel near the border with the West Bank (e.g. Tayibe, Umm al-Fahm, Baqa al-Gharbiyye), to the jurisdiction of the Palestinian National Authority in exchange for Israeli settlements located inside the West Bank.[230][231][232][233][234][235][236]

In October 2006, Yisrael Beiteinu formally joined in the ruling government's parliamentary coalition, headed by Kadima. After the Israeli Cabinet confirmed Avigdor Lieberman's appointment to the position of "minister for strategic threats", Labour Party representative and science, sport and culture minister Ophir Pines-Paz resigned his post.[93][237] In his resignation letter to Ehud Olmert, Pines-Paz wrote: "I couldn't sit in a government with a minister who preaches racism."[238]

The Lieberman Plan caused a stir among Arab citizens of Israel. Various polls show that Arabs in Israel do not wish to move to the West Bank or Gaza if a Palestinian state is created there.[234] In a survey conducted by Kul Al-Arab among 1,000 residents of Um Al-Fahm, 83 percent of respondents opposed the idea of transferring their city to Palestinian jurisdiction, while 11 percent supported the proposal and 6 percent did not express their position.[228]

Of those opposed to the idea, 54% said that they were against becoming part of a Palestinian state because they wanted to continue living under a democratic regime and enjoying a good standard of living. Of these opponents, 18% said that they were satisfied with their present situation, that they were born in Israel and that they were not interested in moving to any other state. Another 14% of this same group said that they were not prepared to make sacrifices for the sake of the creation of a Palestinian state. Another 11 percent cited no reason for their opposition.[228]

Politics

[edit]
Israeli-Arab voter turnout in Knesset elections[239]

Arab Voting

[edit]

The table below shows the votes of Arab-Israelis for Arab-led political parties, Jewish-led political parties and the satellite lists:[240]

Year Arab parties/Maki Arab satellite lists Jewish parties
1949 22% 52% 26%
1951 16% 55% 29%
1955 16% 58% 27%
1959 11% 59% 30%
1961 23% 46% 32%
1965 24% 44% 33%
1969 30% 41% 29%
1973 37% 36% 27%
1977 52% 21% 27%
1981 39% 12% 49%
1984 50% 50%
1988 58% 42%
1992 48% 52%
1996 62% 38%
1999 69% 31%
2003 69% 31%
2006 72% 28%
2009 82% 18%
2013 77% 23%
2015 83% 17%
April 2019 72% 28%
September 2019 82% 18%
2020 88% 12%
2021 80% 20%
2022[239] 86% 14%

Arab political parties

[edit]

There are three mainstream Arab parties in Israel: Hadash (a joint Arab-Jewish party with a large Arab presence), Balad, and the United Arab List, which is a coalition of several different political organizations including the Islamic Movement in Israel. In addition to these, there is Ta'al, which currently run with Hadash. All of these parties primarily represent Arab-Israeli and Palestinian interests, and the Islamic Movement is an Islamist organization with two factions: one that opposes Israel's existence, and another that opposes its existence as a Jewish state. Two Arab parties ran in Israel's first election in 1949, with one, the Democratic List of Nazareth, winning two seats. Until the 1960s all Arab parties in the Knesset were aligned with Mapai, the ruling party.

A minority of Arabs join and vote for Zionist parties; in the 2006 elections 30% of the Arab vote went to such parties, up from 25% in 2003,[241] though down on the 1999 (31%) and 1996 elections (33%).[242] Left-wing parties (i.e. Labor Party and Meretz-Yachad, and previously One Nation) are the most popular parties amongst Arabs, though some Druze have also voted for right-wing parties such as Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu, as well as the centrist Kadima.[243][244]

Arab-dominated parties typically do not join governing coalitions. However, historically these parties have formed alliances with dovish Jewish parties and promoted the formation of their governments by voting with them from the opposition. Arab parties are credited with keeping Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in power, and they have suggested they would do the same for a government led by Labor leader Isaac Herzog and peace negotiator Tzipi Livni.[245][246] A 2015 Haaretz poll found that a majority of Israeli Arabs would like their parties, then running on a joint list, to join the governing coalition.[247]

Representation in the Knesset

[edit]
Ahmad Tibi, leader of the Arab party Ta'al, currently serves as Deputy Speaker of the Knesset.

Palestinian Arabs sat in the state's first parliamentary assembly in 1949. In 2011, 13 of the 120 members of the Israeli Parliament are Arab citizens, most representing Arab political parties, and one of Israel's Supreme Court judges is a Palestinian Arab.[248]

The 2015 elections included 18 Arab members of Knesset. Along with 13 members of the Joint List, there were five Arab parliamentarians representing Zionist parties, which is more than double their number in the previous Knesset.[249][250]

Some Arab Members of the Knesset, past and present, are under police investigation for their visits to countries designated as enemy countries by Israeli law. This law was amended following MK Mohammad Barakeh's trip to Syria in 2001, such that MKs must explicitly request permission to visit these countries from the Minister of the Interior. In August 2006, Balad MKs Azmi Bishara, Jamal Zahalka, and Wasil Taha visited Syria without requesting nor receiving such permission, and a criminal investigation of their actions was launched. Former Arab Member of Knesset Mohammed Miari was questioned 18 September 2006 by police on suspicion of having entered a designated enemy country without official permission. He was questioned "under caution" for 2.5 hours in the Petah Tikva station about his recent visit to Syria. Another former Arab Member of Knesset, Muhammad Kanaan, was also summoned for police questioning regarding the same trip.[251] In 2010, six Arab MKs visited Libya, an anti-Zionist Arab state, and met with Muammar al-Gaddafi and various senior government officials. Gaddafi urged them to seek a one-state solution, and for Arabs to "multiply" in order to counter any "plots" to expel them.[252]

According to a study commissioned by the Arab Association of Human Rights entitled "Silencing Dissent", over the period 1999–2002, eight of nine of the then Arab Knesset members were beaten by Israeli forces during demonstrations.[253]: 8  Most recently according to the report, legislation has been passed, including three election laws [e.g., banning political parties], and two Knesset related laws aimed to "significantly curb the minority [Arab population] right to choose a public representative and for those representatives to develop independent political platforms and carry out their duties".[253]

United Arab List leader Mansour Abbas, Israeli President Herzog and young Bedouins in the city of Rahat, 15 February 2022

The Knesset Ethics Committee has on several occasions banned Arab MKs that the committee felt were acting outside acceptable norms. In 2016, Hanin Zoabi and Jamal Zahalka were banned from plenary sessions for four months and Basel Ghattas for two months after they had visited families of Palestinian attackers killed by Israeli security forces.[254] Ghattas was again banned for six months in 2017 over charges of having smuggled cell phones to Palestinian prisoners[255] and Zoabi was banned for a week for having called IDF soldiers "murderers."[256]

In 2016, the Knesset passed a controversial law that would allow it to impeach any MK who incites racism or supports armed struggle against Israel. Critics said that the law was undemocratic and would mainly be used to silence Arab MKs.[257] As of 2020, no MK has been impeached by the law.[citation needed] In 2018, the Israeli supreme court of justice rejected arguments that the law would harm specific political parties and ruled that checks and balances within the law serve as sufficient protection against abuse of rights. For example, the law requires 70 Knesset members, 10 of whom must be from the opposition, to petition to the Knesset House Committee, and could only be finalized with a vote of 90 out of 120 MKs in favor of the impeachment.[258]

Representation in the civil service sphere

[edit]

In the public employment sphere, by the end of 2002, 6% of 56,362 Israeli civil servants were Arab.[259] In January 2004, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon declared that every state-run company must have at least one Arab citizen of Israel on its board of directors.[260]

Representation in political, judicial and military positions

[edit]
Raleb Majadele, the first non-Druze Arab minister in Israel's history

Knesset: Arab citizens of Israel have been elected to every Knesset, and as of 2015 held 17 of its 120 seats. The first female Arab MP was Hussniya Jabara, a Muslim Arab from central Israel, who was elected in 1999.[261]

Government: Until 2001, no Arab had been included Israel's cabinet. In 2001, this changed, when Salah Tarif, a Druze Arab citizen of Israel, was appointed a member of Ariel Sharon's cabinet without a portfolio. Tarif was later ejected after being convicted of corruption.[262] The first non-Druze Arab minister in Israel's history was Raleb Majadele, who in 2007 was appointed a minister without portfolio, and a month later appointed minister for Science, Culture and Sport.[95][263] Following this precedent, additional Muslim Arabs served as ministers or deputy ministers, including Issawi Frej, Abd el-Aziz el-Zoubi and Nawaf Massalha[264]

The appointment of Majadele was criticized by far-right Israelis, some of whom are also within the Cabinet, but this drew condemnation across the mainstream Israeli political spectrum.[96][265] Meanwhile, Arab lawmakers called the appointment an attempt to "whitewash Israel's discriminatory policies against its Arab minority".[266][267]

Supreme Court: Abdel Rahman Zuabi, a Muslim from northern Israel, was the first Arab on the Israeli Supreme Court, serving a 9-month term in 1999. In 2004, Salim Joubran, a Christian Arab from Haifa descended from Lebanese Maronites, became the first Arab to hold a permanent appointment on the Court. Joubran's expertise lies in the field of criminal law.[268][better source needed] George Karra, a Christian Arab from Jaffa has served as a Tel Aviv District Court judge since 2000. He was the presiding judge in the trial of Moshe Katsav. In 2011, he was nominated as a candidate for the Israeli Supreme Court.[269]

Foreign Service: Ali Yahya, an Arab Muslim, became the first Arab ambassador for Israel in 1995 when he was appointed ambassador to Finland. He served until 1999, and in 2006 was appointed ambassador to Greece. Other Arab ambassadors include Walid Mansour, a Druze, appointed ambassador to Vietnam in 1999, and Reda Mansour, also a Druze, a former ambassador to Ecuador. Mohammed Masarwa, an Arab Muslim, was Consul-General in Atlanta. In 2006, Ishmael Khaldi was appointed Israeli consul in San Francisco, becoming the first Bedouin consul of the State of Israel.[270]

Israel Defense Forces: Arab Generals in the IDF include Major General Hussain Fares, commander of Israel's border police, and Major General Yosef Mishlav, head of the Home Front Command and current Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories.[citation needed] Both are members of the Druze community. Other high-ranking officers in the IDF include Lieutenant Colonel Amos Yarkoni (born Abd el-Majid Haydar/ عبد الماجد حيدر) from the Bedouin community, a legendary officer in the Israel Defense Forces and one of six Israeli Arabs to have received the IDF's third highest decoration, the Medal of Distinguished Service.

Israeli Police: In 2011, Jamal Hakroush became the first Muslim Arab deputy Inspector-General in the Israeli Police. He has previously served as district commander of two districts.[271]

Jewish National Fund: In 2007, Ra'adi Sfori became the first Arab citizen of Israel to be elected as a JNF director, over a petition against his appointment. The court upheld the JNF's appointment, explaining, "As this is one director among a large number, there is no chance he will have the opportunity to cancel the organization's goals."[272]

Other political organizations and movements

[edit]
Abna el-Balad

Abnaa el-Balad[273] is a political movement that grew out of organizing by Arab university youth, beginning in 1969.[274][275] It is not affiliated with the Arab Knesset party Balad. While participating in municipal elections, Abnaa al-Balad firmly reject any participation in the Israeli Knesset. Political demands include "the return of all Palestinian refugees to their homes and lands, [an] end [to] the Israeli occupation and Zionist apartheid and the establishment [of] a democratic secular state in Palestine as the ultimate solution to the Arab-Zionist conflict."[273]

High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel

The High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel is an extra-parliamentary umbrella organization that represents Arab citizens of Israel at the national level.[276] It is "the top representative body deliberating matters of general concern to the entire Arab community and making binding decisions."[277] While it enjoys de facto recognition from the State of Israel, it lacks official or de jure recognition from the state for its activities in this capacity.[276]

Ta'ayush

Ta'ayush is "a grassroots movement of Arabs and Jews working to break down the walls of racism and segregation by constructing a true Arab-Jewish partnership."[278]

Regional Council of Unrecognized Villages

The Regional Council of Unrecognized Villages is a body of unofficial representatives of the unrecognized villages throughout the Negev region in the south.

Attempts to ban Arab political parties

[edit]

Amendment 9 to the 'Basic Law: The Knesset and the Law of Political Parties' states that a political party "may not participate in the elections if there is in its goals or actions a denial of the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people, a denial of the democratic nature of the state, or incitement to racism."[279][280] There have been a number of attempts to disqualify Arab parties based on this rule, however as of 2010, all such attempts were either rejected by the Israeli Central Elections Committee or overturned by the Israeli Supreme Court.

Progressive List for Peace

[edit]

An Israeli Central Elections Committee ruling which allowed the Progressive List for Peace to run for the Knesset in 1988 was challenged based on this amendment, but the committee's decision was upheld by the Israeli Supreme Court, which ruled that the PLP's platform calling for Israel to become "a state of all its citizens" does not violate the ideology of Israel as the State of the Jewish people, and thus section 7(a) does not apply.[281]

Balad

[edit]

In December 2002, Azmi Bishara and his party, Balad, which calls for Israel to become "a state of all its citizens", were banned by the Israeli Central Elections Committee, on the grounds of refusing to recognize Israel as a "Jewish and democratic state"[282] and making statements promoting armed struggle against it. The Supreme Court overruled the decision in January 2003.[283] Bishara served as a Knesset member from 1996 to 2007. He reportedly told an audience in Lebanon in December 2005 that Arab citizens "... are like all Arabs, only with Israeli citizenship forced upon them ... Return Palestine to us and take your democracy with you. We Arabs are not interested in it".[284] Bishara resigned his Knesset office and left the country in 2007 amidst news that criminal charges were being laid against him. He has been charged with espionage and money laundering, stemming from allegations that he gave Hizbullah information on strategic targets that should be attacked with rockets during the 2006 Lebanon War, in exchange for large amounts of money.[285]

In 2022, Balad was barred by the Israeli Central Elections Committee for undermining Israel as a "Jewish and democratic state".[286] The High Court unanimously overturned the ruling.[287]

United Arab List – Ta'al and Balad

[edit]

In 2009, United Arab List – Ta'al and Balad were disqualified, on grounds that they do not recognize the State of Israel and call for armed conflict against it.[288] The Supreme Court overturned the committee's decision by a majority of eight to one.[289]

[edit]

Israel's Declaration of Independence called for the establishment of a Jewish state with equality of social and political rights, irrespective of religion, race, or sex.[290]

The rights of citizens are guaranteed by a set of basic laws (Israel does not have a written constitution).[291] Although this set of laws does not explicitly include the term "right to equality", the Israeli Supreme Court has consistently interpreted "Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty"[292] and "Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (1994)"[293] as guaranteeing equal rights for all Israeli citizens.[294]

The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that "Arab Israelis are citizens of Israel with equal rights" and states that "The only legal distinction between Arab and Jewish citizens is not one of rights, but rather of civic duty. Since Israel's establishment, Arab citizens have been exempted from compulsory service in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)."[295] Druze and Circassians are drafted into the Israeli army, while other Arabs may serve voluntarily; however, only a small number of Arabs choose to volunteer for the Israeli army.[296]

Many Arab citizens feel that the state, as well as society at large, not only actively limits them to second-class citizenship, but treats them as enemies, affecting their perception of the de jure versus de facto quality of their citizenship.[297] The joint document The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, asserts: "Defining the Israeli State as a Jewish State and exploiting democracy in the service of its Jewishness excludes us, and creates tension between us and the nature and essence of the State." The document explains that by definition the "Jewish State" concept is based on ethnically preferential treatment towards Jews enshrined in immigration (the Law of Return) and land policy (the Jewish National Fund), and calls for the establishment of minority rights protections enforced by an independent anti-discrimination commission.[298]

A 2004 report by Mossawa, an advocacy center for Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel, states that since the events of October 2000, 16 Arabs had been killed by security forces, bringing the total to 29 victims of "institutional violence" in four years.[299] Ahmed Sa'adi, in his article on The Concept of Protest and its Representation by the Or Commission, states that since 1948 the only protestors to be killed by the police have been Arabs.[300]

Yousef Munayyer, an Israeli citizen and the executive director of The Jerusalem Fund, wrote that Palestinians only have varying degrees of limited rights in Israel. He states that although Palestinians make up about 20% of Israel's population, less than 7% of the budget is allocated to Palestinian citizens. He describes the 1.5 million Arab citizens of Israel as second-class citizens while four million more are not citizens at all. He states that a Jew from any country can move to Israel but a Palestinian refugee, with a valid claim to property in Israel, cannot. Munayyer also described the difficulties he and his wife faced when visiting the country.[301]

Arabic and Hebrew as official languages

[edit]
Israeli road signs in Arabic, Hebrew and English

Arabic was until July 2018 one of Israel's official languages.[302] The use of Arabic increased significantly following Supreme Court rulings in the 1990s. Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People defines Hebrew as the official language of the State and gives the Arabic language a special status.

Government ministries publish all material intended for the public in Hebrew, with selected material translated into Arabic, English, Russian, and other languages spoken in Israel. There are laws that secure the Arab population's right to receive information in Arabic. Some examples include a portion of the public television channels' productions must be in Arabic or translated into Arabic, safety regulations in working places must be published in Arabic if a significant number of the workers are Arabs, information about medicines or dangerous chemicals must be provided in Arabic, and information regarding elections must be provided in Arabic. The country's laws are published in Hebrew, and eventually English and Arabic translations are published.[120] Publishing the law in Hebrew in the official gazette (Reshumot) is enough to make it valid. Unavailability of an Arabic translation can be regarded as a legal defense only if the defendant proves he could not understand the meaning of the law in any conceivable way. Following appeals to the Israeli Supreme Court, the use of Arabic on street signs and labels increased dramatically. In response to one of the appeals presented by Arab Israeli organizations,[which?] the Supreme Court ruled that although second to Hebrew, Arabic is an official language of the State of Israel, and should be used extensively. Today most highway signage is trilingual (Hebrew, Arabic, and English).

Many Arab villages lack street signs of any kind and the Hebrew name is often used.[303][304] The state's schools in Arab communities teach in Arabic according to a specially adapted curriculum. This curriculum includes mandatory lessons of Hebrew as foreign language from the 3rd grade onwards. Arabic is taught in Hebrew-speaking schools, but only the basic level is mandatory. In the summer of 2008, there was an unsuccessful attempt of right-wing lawmakers to strip Arabic of its status alongside Hebrew as an official language of the state.[305]

Israeli national symbols

[edit]
The flag of Israel, based on the Star of David

Some Arab politicians have requested a reevaluation of the Israeli flag and national anthem, arguing that the Star of David at the flag's center is an exclusively Jewish symbol, and Hatikvah does not represent Arab citizens, since it speaks of the Jewish people's desire to return to their homeland. The High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel and the National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel stated in 2006,[306]

The Israeli legal system includes a number of core laws that produce and reinforce inequality between the Arabs and the Jews in Israel. ... The official bias is not restricted to symbols such as the Israeli flag, but also to deeper legal issues concerning all Palestinian Arabs ... [t]he official definition of Israel as a Jewish state created a fortified ideological barrier in the face of obtaining full equality for the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel ... We, the Palestinians in Israel, are an integral part of this place ... Israel has tried over the past decades to disengage us from this place, not through physical transfer but through intellectual emotional transfer. Israel has tried to create a new identity on the basis of 'loyalty to the state' ... The State has not determined a position acceptable to us yet in terms of nurturing our Arab culture.

Michael Oren, the former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, has argued that since the Seal of Solomon (Star of David) is also considered to be an Islamic symbol, Arab citizens of Israel should be able to feel the same sense of loyalty to the flag as Jewish citizens do.[307]

Independence Day

[edit]

In Israel, Independence Day takes place on 5 Iyar according to the Hebrew calendar, which means it falls on different dates every year under the Gregorian calendar. Arab citizens of Israel generally mark al-Nakba both on this day, and on 15 May, as do other Palestinians.[308] Druze soldiers, however, were present at Israel's first Independence Day Parade in 1949,[309] and there have since been parades for Druze and Circassians, as well as special events for Bedouins, on Independence Day.[310]

In January 2008, the mayor of Shefa-'Amr, Ursan Yassin, met with officials of the Israeli state committee on the celebrations for the 60th anniversary of independence and announced that Shefa-'Amr intended to take part in the celebrations. He stated: "This is our country and we completely disapprove of the statements made by the Higher Monitoring Committee. I want to hold a central ceremony in Shefa-'Amr, raise all the flags and have a huge feast. The 40,000 residents of Shefa-'Amr feel that they are a part of the State of Israel...The desire to participate in the festivities is shared by most of the residents. We will not raise our children to hate the country. This is our country and we want to live in coexistence with its Jewish residents."[311]

Citizenship

[edit]

Citizenship status confers many rights and privileges; voting in Israeli legislative elections; traveling abroad without requiring a laissez passer, the availability of a greater number of jobs, and Israel cannot at any time revoke residency status, whereby health insurance, the right to enter the place of residency, and thus usually also one's source of income are lost.[13]

Barriers for East Jerusalem Palestinians

[edit]

As of 2022, only 5% of East Jerusalem Palestinians had Israeli citizenship, despite Israel's having unilaterally annexed the area in 1967. From 1967 to 1974 hundreds per year became Israeli, which the Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research attributes to then-lax Israeli policy, also noting that by the mid-1970s, Palestinian society started to disapprove of becoming Israeli, seeing it as complicit with or collaborating with Israeli occupation. Since 2005, the Israeli West Bank barrier that separates them from Palestinians in the West Bank has changed education and employment markets, and the taboo has weakened — (Israeli citizenship no longer seen as detracting from being Palestinian). However, since 2002, Israel's Population and Immigration Authority has made the process more difficult. From 2002 to 2021, only 34% of naturalization applications were approved, and the process may take years. Israel may justify the rejection for any of a wide variety of reasons such as a family member owning land or having a utility bill in the West Bank, posting the Palestinian flag or mentioning the Nakba on social media, a past failed Hebrew proficiency test, refusal to renounce Jordanian citizenship, minor criminal charges, or "security impediments".[13]

2003 Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law

[edit]

On 31 July 2003, Israel enacted the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Provision), 5763–2003, a one-year amendment to Israel's Citizenship Law denying citizenship and Israeli residence to Palestinians who reside in the West Bank or Gaza Strip and who marry Israelis;[312] the rule has been waived for any Palestinian "who identifies with the State of Israel and its goals, when he or a member of his family has taken concrete action to advance the security, economy or any other matter important to the State". Defenders of the Citizenship and Entry Law say it is aimed at preventing terrorist attacks and preserving the "Jewish character" of Israel by restricting Arab immigration.[313] The new bill was formulated in accordance with Shin Bet statistics showing that involvement in terror attacks declines with age. This newest amendment, in practice, removes restrictions from half of the Palestinian population requesting legal status through marriage in Israel. This law was upheld by a High Court decision in 2006.[313]

Discriminatory/racist character
[edit]

Although this law theoretically applies to all Israelis, it has disproportionately affected Arab citizens of Israel;[314] Arabs are far more likely to have Palestinian spouses than other Israelis.[315] Thus the law has been widely considered discriminatory[316] and the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has unanimously approved a resolution saying that the Israeli law violated an international human rights treaty against racism.[317]

Extensions and current status quo
[edit]

Upon expiration the law was extended for six months in August 2004, and again for four months in February 2005.[318][better source needed] On 8 May 2005, the Israeli ministerial committee for issues of legislation once again amended the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, to restrict citizenship and residence in Israel only to Palestinian men over the age of 35, and Palestinian women over the age of 25.

The law expired in 2021[319][312] and about 12,700 Palestinians married to Israeli Arab citizens are able to apply for citizenship[320] but Israel has delayed all family reunification requests, maintaining the status quo.[321]

Civil rights

[edit]

The Israeli Declaration of Independence stated that the State of Israel would ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex, and guaranteed freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture. While formally equal according to Israeli law, a number of official sources acknowledge that Arab citizens of Israel experience discrimination in multiple aspects of life. Israeli High Court Justice (Ret.) Theodor Or wrote in The Report by the State Commission of Inquiry into the Events of October 2000:[322]

The Arab citizens of Israel live in a reality in which they experience discrimination as Arabs. This inequality has been documented in a large number of professional surveys and studies, has been confirmed in court judgments and government resolutions, and has also found expression in reports by the state comptroller and in other official documents. Although the Jewish majority's awareness of this discrimination is often quite low, it plays a central role in the sensibilities and attitudes of Arab citizens. This discrimination is widely accepted, both within the Arab sector and outside it, and by official assessments, as a chief cause of agitation.

The Or Commission report also states that activities by Islamic organizations may be using religious pretenses to further political aims. The commission describes such actions as a factor in 'inflaming' the Muslim population in Israel against the authorities, and cites the al-Sarafand mosque episode, with Muslims' attempts to restore the mosque and Jewish attempts to stop them, as an example of the 'shifting of dynamics' of the relationship between Muslims and the Israeli authorities.

According to the 2004 U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Israel and the Occupied Territories, the Israeli government had done "little to reduce institutional, legal, and societal discrimination against the country's Arab citizens".[323]

The 2004 U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices[323] notes that:

  • "Israeli-Arab advocacy organizations have challenged the Government's policy of demolishing illegal buildings in the Arab sector, and claimed that the Government was more restrictive in issuing building permits in Arab communities than in Jewish communities, thereby not accommodating natural growth."
  • "In June, the Supreme Court ruled that omitting Arab towns from specific government social and economic plans is discriminatory. This judgment builds on previous assessments of disadvantages suffered by Arab Israelis."
  • "Israeli-Arab organizations have challenged as discriminatory the 1996 "Master Plan for the Northern Areas of Israel," which listed as priority goals increasing the Galilee's Jewish population and blocking the territorial contiguity of Arab towns."
  • "Israeli Arabs were not required to perform mandatory military service and, in practice, only a small percentage of Israeli Arabs served in the military. Those who did not serve in the army had less access than other citizens to social and economic benefits for which military service was a prerequisite or an advantage, such as housing, new-household subsidies, and employment, especially government or security-related industrial employment. The Ivri Committee on National Service has issued official recommendations to the Government that Israel Arabs not be compelled to perform national or 'civic' service, but be afforded an opportunity to perform such service."
  • "According to a 2003 University of Haifa study, a tendency existed to impose heavier prison terms to Arab citizens than to Jewish citizens. Human rights advocates claimed that Arab citizens were more likely to be convicted of murder and to have been denied bail."
  • "The Orr Commission of Inquiry's report ... stated that the 'Government handling of the Arab sector has been primarily neglectful and discriminatory,' that the Government 'did not show sufficient sensitivity to the needs of the Arab population, and did not take enough action to allocate state resources in an equal manner.' As a result, 'serious distress prevailed in the Arab sector in various areas. Evidence of distress included poverty, unemployment, a shortage of land, serious problems in the education system, and substantially defective infrastructure.'"

The 2007 U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices[324] notes that:

  • "According to a 2005 study at Hebrew University, three times more money was invested in education of Jewish children as in Arab children."

Human Rights Watch has charged that cuts in veteran benefits and child allowances based on parents' military service discriminate against Arab children: "The cuts will also affect the children of Jewish ultra-orthodox parents who do not serve in the military, but they are eligible for extra subsidies, including educational supplements, not available to Palestinian Arab children."[325]

According to the Guardian, in 2006 just 5% of civil servants were Arabs, a number of them hired to deal with other Arabs, despite the fact that Arab citizens of Israel comprise 20% of the population.[326]

Although the Bedouin infant mortality rate is still the highest in Israel, and one of the highest in the developed world, The Guardian reports that in the 2002 budget, Israel's health ministry allocated Arab communities less than 1% of its budget for healthcare facility development.[326]

In March 2010, a report released by several Israeli civil rights groups stated that the current Knesset was "the most racist in Israeli history" with 21 bills proposed in 2008 and 2009 that would discriminate against the country's Arab minority.[327]

A preliminary report commissioned by Israel's Courts Administration and the Israel Bar Association found in 2011 that Israeli Arabs are more likely than Israeli Jews to be convicted of crimes after being charged, more likely to be given custodial sentences, and were given longer sentences. It did not account for "mitigating or aggravating circumstances, prior criminal record and the convict's gender".[328]

Property ownership and housing

[edit]
JNF collection boxes were used in Jewish communities around the world to collect donations for buying lands, planting forests and settling Jews in Israel.

The Jewish National Fund (JNF) is a private organization established in 1901 to buy and develop land in the Land of Israel for Jewish settlement; land purchases were funded by donations from world Jewry exclusively for that purpose.[329] The JNF currently owns 13% of land in Israel,[330][331] while 80% is owned by the government, and the rest, around 7%, is evenly divided between private Arab and Jewish owners.[332] Thus, the Israel Land Administration (ILA) administers 94% of the land in Israel.[332] A significant portion of JNF lands were originally properties left behind by Palestinian "absentees" and as a result the legitimacy of some JNF land ownership has been a matter of dispute.[329][333][334][335] The JNF purchased these lands from the State of Israel between 1949 and 1953, after the state took control of them according to the Absentee Properties Law.[206][336] While the JNF charter specifies the land is for the use of the Jewish People, land has been leased to Bedouin herders.[337] Nevertheless, JNF land policy has been criticized as discrimination.[206] When the ILA leased JNF land to Arabs, it took control of the land in question and compensated the JNF with an equivalent amount of land in areas not designated for development (generally in the Galilee and the Negev), thus ensuring that the total amount of land owned by the JNF remains the same.[336][338] This was a complicated and controversial mechanism, and in 2004 use of it was suspended. After Supreme Court discussions and a directive by the Attorney General instructing the ILA to lease JNF land to Arabs and Jews alike, in September 2007 the JNF suggested reinstating the land-exchange mechanism.[336][339]

While the JNF and the ILA view an exchange of lands as a long-term solution, opponents say that such maneuvers privatize municipal lands and preserve a situation in which significant lands in Israel are not available for use by all of its citizens.[331] As of 2007, the High Court delayed ruling on JNF policy regarding leasing lands to non-Jews,[331] and changes to the ILA-JNF relationship were up in the air.[336] Adalah and other organizations furthermore express concern that proposed severance of the relation between the ILA and JNF, as suggested by Ami Ayalon, would leave the JNF free to retain the same proportion of lands for Jewish uses as it seeks to settle hundreds of thousands of Jews in areas with a tenuous Jewish demographic majority (in particular, 100,000 Jews in existing Galilee communities[206] and 250,000 Jews in new Negev communities via the Blueprint Negev).[340]

The Israel Land Administration, which administers 93% of the land in Israel (including the land owned by the Jewish National Fund), refuses to lease land to non-Jewish foreign nationals, who include Palestinian residents of Jerusalem who have identity cards but are not citizens of Israel. When ILA land is "bought" in Israel it is actually leased to the "owner" for a period of 49 years. According to article 19 of the ILA lease, foreign nationals are excluded from leasing ILA land, and in practice foreigners may just show that they qualify as Jewish under the Law of Return.[341]

Bedouins protesting in Tel Aviv in demand to return to their village, Al-Araqeeb, 12 May 2010

Israeli law also discriminates between Jewish and Arab residents of Jerusalem regarding rights to recover property owned before the dislocations created by the 1948 Arab–Israeli War.[342] The 1950 Absentees Property Law said that any property within post-war Israel which was owned by an Arab who had left the country between 29 November 1947 and 19 May 1948, or by a Palestinian who had merely been abroad or in area of Palestine held by hostile forces up to 1 September 1948, lost all rights to that property. Palestinians who fled or were expelled from their homes by Jewish or Israeli forces, before and during the 1948 Arab–Israeli war, but remained within the borders of what would become Israel, that is, those currently known as Arab citizens of Israel, are deemed present absentees by the legislation. Present absentees are regarded as absent by the Israeli government because they left their homes, even if they did not intend to leave them for more than a few days, and even if they did so involuntarily.[343]

Following the 1967 Six-Day War in which Israel occupied the West Bank, from where it annexed East Jerusalem, Israel then passed in 1970 the Law and Administration Arrangements Law allowing for Jews who had lost property in East Jerusalem and the West Bank during the 1948 war to reclaim it.[342] Palestinian residents of Jerusalem (absentees) in the same positions, and Arab Israelis (present absentees), who owned property in West Jerusalem or other areas within the state of Israel, and lost it as a result of the 1948 war, cannot recover their properties. Israeli legislation, therefore, allows Jews to recover their land, but not Arabs.[342]

In the early 2000s, several community settlements in the Negev and the Galilee were accused of barring Arab applicants from moving in. In 2010, the Knesset passed legislation that allowed admissions committees to function in smaller communities in the Galilee and the Negev, while explicitly forbidding committees to bar applicants based on the basis of race, religion, sex, ethnicity, disability, personal status, age, parenthood, sexual orientation, country of origin, political views, or political affiliation.[344][345] Critics, however, say the law gives the privately run admissions committees a wide latitude over public lands, and believe it will worsen discrimination against the Arab minority.[346]

Contesting allegations of discrimination

[edit]

While groups are not separated by official policy, Israel has a number of different sectors within the society that maintain their strong cultural, religious, ideological, and/or ethnic identity. The Israeli foreign ministry maintains that in spite of the existing social cleavages and economic disparities, the political systems and the courts represent strict legal and civic equality. The Israeli foreign ministry in 2006 described the country as: "Not a melting-pot society, but rather more of a mosaic made up of different population groups coexisting in the framework of a democratic state".[347]

According to Ishmael Khaldi, an Arab citizen of Israel and the nation's first high-ranking Muslim in the Israeli foreign service, while Israeli society is far from perfect, minorities in Israel fare far better than any other country in the Middle East. He wrote:

I am a proud Israeli – along with many other non-Jewish Israelis such as Druze, Bahai, Bedouin, Christians and Muslims, who live in one of the most culturally diversified societies and the only true democracy in the Middle East. Like America, Israeli society is far from perfect, but let us deal honestly. By any yardstick you choose – educational opportunity, economic development, women and gay's rights, freedom of speech and assembly, legislative representation – Israel's minorities fare far better than any other country in the Middle East.

— [348]

Opposition to intermarriage

[edit]

Intermarriage is prohibited by the Jewish Halakha.[349] In the case of mixed Arab-Jewish marriages, emotions run especially high.[citation needed] A 2007 poll found that more than half of Israeli Jews believed intermarriage was equivalent to national treason.[350][better source needed] Around 2009 a group of Jewish men in the Jerusalem neighborhood of Pisgat Ze'ev started patrolling the neighborhood to stop Jewish women from dating Arab men.[351] In 2008 the municipality of Petah Tikva had a telephone hotline for friends and family to report Jewish girls who date Arab men as well as psychologists to provide counselling.[350] The city of Kiryat Gat launched a campaign in schools to warn Jewish girls against dating local Bedouin men.[350]

A 2015 survey found that 82% of Israeli Muslims, 87% of Israeli Druze, and 88% of Israeli Christians would be uncomfortable with a child of theirs marrying a Jew. 97% of Israeli Jews would be uncomfortable if a child of theirs married a Muslim and 89% would be uncomfortable if a child of theirs married a Christian.[352]

In 2018, Arab-Israeli journalist Lucy Aharish married Jewish-Israeli actor Tzachi HaLevy,[353][354] triggering a public controversy. A number of Israeli right-wing politicians, such as Oren Hazan, criticized HaLevy's marriage to an Arab Muslim woman as "assimilation" while multiple members of the Knesset, including other government officials, congratulated the couple and dismissed their colleagues as racist.[355][356][357]

Knesset

[edit]

The Mossawa Center – an advocacy organization for Arabs in Israel – blames the Knesset of discrimination against Arabs, citing a 75% increase in discriminatory and racist bills submitted to the Knesset in the year 2009. According to the report, 11 bills deemed by the center to be "discriminatory and racist" were placed on the legislature's table in 2007, while 12 such bills were initiated in 2008. However, in 2009 a full 21 bills deemed discriminatory by the Mossawa Center were discussed in the Knesset.[358]

The reports categorizes as "racist" proposals such as giving academic scholarships to soldiers who served in combat units, and a bill to revoke government funding from organizations acting "against the principles of the State".[358] The Coalition Against Racism and the Mossawa Center said that the proposed legislation seeks to de-legitimize Israel's Arab citizens by decreasing their civil rights.[327]

Economic status

[edit]
Nazareth Hi-Tech Park; the city has been called the "Silicon Valley of the Arab community".[359]

Poverty, unemployment, and government assistance: from Israel’s founding to the 2000s

[edit]

Inequality in the allocation of public funding for Jewish and Arab needs, and widespread employment discrimination, present significant economic hurdles for Arab citizens of Israel.[360] On the other hand, the Minorities at Risk (MAR) group states that "despite obvious discrimination, Israeli Arabs are relatively much better off economically than neighboring Arabs."[361]

The predominant feature of the Arab community's economic development after 1949 was its transformation from a predominantly peasant farming population to a proletarian industrial workforce. It has been suggested that the economic development of the community was marked by distinct stages. The first period, until 1967, was characterised by this process of proletarianisation. From 1967 on, economic development of the population was encouraged and an Arab bourgeoisie began to develop on the margin of the Jewish bourgeoisie. From the 1980s on, the community developed its economic and, in particular, industrial potential.[362]

In July 2006, the Government categorized all Arab communities in the country as 'class A' development areas, thus making them eligible for tax benefits. This decision aims to encourage investments in the Arab sector.[363]

Raanan Dinur, director-general of Prime Minister office, said in December 2006 that Israel had finalized plans to set up a NIS 160 million private equity fund to help develop the businesses of the country's Arab community over the next decade. According to Dinur, companies owned by Arab citizens of Israel will be eligible to apply to the fund for as much as NIS 4 million (US$952,000), enabling as many as 80 enterprises to receive money over the next 10 years. The Israeli government will, according to Dinur, solicit bids to operate the fund from various financial institutes and private firms, which must pledge to raise at least NIS 80 million (about US$19 million) from private investors.[364]

In February 2007, The New York Times reported that 53 percent of the impoverished families in Israel were Arabs.[365] Since the majority of Arabs in Israel do not serve in the army, they are ineligible for multiple financial benefits such as scholarships and housing loans.[366]

Arab towns in Israel are reluctant to collect city taxes from their residents.[367] Sikkuy, a prominent Arab-Jewish NGO, found that Arabs as a group have the highest home ownership in Israel: 93% compared to 70% among Jews.[368]

While per capita income is lower in the Arab community, these figures do not take into account age (the average age in the Arab community is lower and young people earn less), the low percentage of women who join the workforce, and the large size of Arab families.[369]

In 2005, of the 40 towns in Israel with the highest unemployment rates, 36 were Arab towns.[370] According to the Central Bank of Israel statistics for 2003, salary averages for Arab workers were 29% lower than for Jewish workers.[370] Difficulties in procuring employment have been attributed to a comparatively low level of education vis-a-vis their Jewish counterparts, insufficient employment opportunities in the vicinity of their towns, discrimination by Jewish employers, and competition with foreign workers in fields, such as construction and agriculture.[370] Arab women have a higher unemployment rate in the work force relative to both religious and secular Jewish women. While among Arab men the employment was found to be on par with Jewish men, 17% of Arab women were found to be employed. This puts the Arab employment at 68% of the Israeli average. The Druze and Christian Arabs have higher employment than Muslims.[371]

Socio-economic advancements: from 2010s onward

[edit]

In March 2010, the government approved a $216 million, five-year development plan for the Israeli Arab sector with the goal of increasing job accessibility, particularly for women and academics. Under this program, some 15,000 new employees will be added to the work roster by 2014.[372]

By the 2010s, the Israeli-Arab standard of living was found to be improving, with the number of middle class Arabs growing. In 2017, Haaretz, which termed Arabs as Israel's "new yuppies", reported that Arabs, especially women, were pursuing higher education in increasing numbers, and increasingly seeking white-collar jobs. According to Professor Aziz Haidar of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, in 2017 about 27% of Arabs were middle class (as opposed to 17% two decades before) and 3% were wealthy, and although most Arabs were still in lower-income brackets, the Arab middle class is expanding dramatically.[373]

Across all groups, Arab Christians tend to be the most educated,[130] and most of them are middle and upper middle class, and they have the lowest incidence of poverty and the lowest percentage of unemployment;[130] a study published by the Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in 2017 found that "Christian population has the highest achievements in the Arab sector on all indices: bagrut scores, rates of college graduates, and fields of employment".[130] The study found also that the achievements of the Druze are mixed, and they have the second highest achievements in the Arab sector on all indices.[130] While Bedouins has the lowest achievements in the Arab sector on all indices, as they tend to be the least educated.[130]

High-tech sector

[edit]

In 2011, Nazareth had over 15 Arab-owned high-tech companies, mostly in the field of software development. According to the Haaretz newspaper the city has been called the "Silicon Valley of the Arab community" in view of its potential in this sphere.[359]

Sakhnin industrial area

Imad Telhami, founder and CEO of Babcom, a call center in the Tefen Industrial Park with 300 employees, is committed to developing career opportunities for Arab workers in Israel. Telhami, a Christian Arab, was a senior executive at the Delta Galil Industries textile plant before establishing Babcom. He hopes to employ 5,000 workers within five years: "Israeli companies have been exporting thousands of jobs to India, Eastern Europe and other spots around the globe. I want to bring the jobs here. There are terrific engineers in the Arab sector, and the potential is huge.[374]

Health

[edit]
The Italian Nazareth Hospital

Health issues

[edit]

The most common health-related causes of death are heart disease and cancer. Roughly 14% were diagnosed with diabetes in 2000.[375] Around half of all Arab men smoke.[375] Life expectancy has increased 27 years since 1948. Further, due largely to improvements in health care, the Arab infant mortality rate dropped from 32 deaths per thousand births in 1970 to 8.6 per thousand in 2000.[375][better source needed] However, the Bedouin infant mortality rate is still[when?] the highest in Israel, and one of the highest in the developed world.

The Italian Hospital in Haifa

In 2003, the infant mortality rate among Arab citizens overall was 8.4 per thousand, more than twice as high as the rate 3.6 per thousand among the Jewish population.[376] In the 2002 budget, Israel's health ministry allocated Arab communities less than 1% of its 277 m-shekel (£35m) budget (1.6 m shekels {£200,000}) to develop healthcare facilities.[326]

Presence in the Israeli healthcare system

[edit]

Nazareth have three private hospitals serving its districts: The Nazareth Hospital (also called the English Hospital), French Nazareth Hospital, and the Italian Nazareth Hospital. All of these hospitals run by the Christian community of Nazareth.[377] The Christian Arab community run also the Italian Hospital in Haifa.[378]

Despite the fact that Arab represent 20% of the total Israeli population, in 2015 they accounted 35% of all doctors in Israel, and according to a study by the Tel Aviv University Arabs account about 35% of all pharmacists in Israel.[379] A 2025 research article published in an Israeli journal estimated that, as of 2023, Arabs comprised 21% of Israel's population but accounted for 25% of its physicians, 27% of both nurses and dentists, and 49% of pharmacists. This represents a significant rise since 2010, particularly among physicians, whose share increased from 8% to 25%.[380] The Arabic local council Arraba has one of the highest numbers of doctors per capita in the world.[379]

Education

[edit]
Sign in front of the Galil school, a joint Arab-Jewish primary school in Israel
Mar Elias, a kindergarten, elementary, junior high, and high school, and college in Ibillin, an Arab village in northern Israel.

The Israeli government regulates and finances most of the schools operating in the country, including the majority of those run by private organizations. The school system has two branches, Hebrew-speaking and Arabic-speaking. The curricula for the two systems are almost identical in mathematics, sciences, and English. It is different in humanities (history, literature, etc.). Hebrew is taught in Arabic schools from third grade and obligatory for Arabic-speaking school's matriculation exams, a basic knowledge of Arabic is taught in Hebrew schools, usually from the 7th to the 9th grade. Arabic is not obligatory for Hebrew speaking school's matriculation exams. The schooling language split operates from preschool to the end of high school. At the university level, they merge into a single system, which operates mostly in Hebrew and in English.[381]

In 2001, Human Rights Watch described government-run Arab schools as "a world apart from government-run Jewish schools."[382] The report found striking differences in virtually every aspect of the education system.[383][needs update]

In 2005, the Follow-Up Committee for Arab Education said that the Israeli government spent an average of $192 a year on Arab students compared to $1,100 for Jewish students. The drop-out rate for Arabs was twice as high as for Jews (12% versus 6%). There was a 5,000-classroom shortage in the Arab sector.[384]

According to the 2004 U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Israel and the occupied territories, "Israeli Arabs were underrepresented in the student bodies and faculties of most universities and in higher professional and business ranks. Well educated Arabs often were unable to find jobs commensurate with their level of education. According to Sikkuy, Arab citizens held approximately 60 to 70 of the country's 5,000 university faculty positions."[323]

Arab educators have long voiced concerns over institutionalized budgetary discrimination. An August 2009 study published by the Hebrew University's School of Education claimed that Israel's Education Ministry discriminated against Arabs in its allocations of special assistance for students from low socioeconomic backgrounds and the average per-student allocation at Arab junior high schools was one-fifth the average at Jewish ones. This was due to the allocation method: funds were first divided between Arab and Jewish school systems according to the number of students in each, and then allocated to needy students; however, due to the large proportion of such students in the Arab sector, they receive less funds, per student, than Jewish students. The Ministry of Education said it was discontinuing this method in favor of a uniform index.[385] Ministry data on the percentage of high school students who passed their matriculation exams showed that Arab towns were ranked lowest except for Fureidis, which had the third highest pass rate (76%) in Israel.[385]

According to the study by Hanna David from the University of Tel Aviv, Arab Christian schools in Israel are among the best schools in the country, and while those schools represent only 4% of the Arab schooling sector, about 34% of Arab university students come from Christian schools,[192] and about 87% of the Israeli Arabs in the high tech sector have been educated in Arab Christian schools.[193][184] These 47 Arab Christian schools accommodate 33,000 Christian students, Muslims, Druze and some Jews from across the country.[386]

Higher education

[edit]
The percentage of Arab students at the University of Haifa is around 41%.[387][388]

Nearly half of Arab students who passed their matriculation exams failed to win a place in higher education because they performed poorly in the Psychometric Entrance Test, compared to 20% of Jewish applicants. Khaled Arar, a professor at Beit Berl College, believes the psychometric test is culturally biased: "The gap in psychometric scores between Jewish and Arab students has remained steady – at more than 100 points out of a total of 800 – since 1982. That alone should have raised suspicions."[389]

However, a 1986 research found negligible differences in construct or predictive test validity across varying cultural groups and the findings appeared to be more consistent with the psychometric than with the cultural bias position.[390]

According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics census in 2020, 83.6% of Christians were entitled to a matriculation certificate, followed by Druze (79.9%), and Muslims (60.3%). While 80.2% of the Israeli Jews were entitled to a matriculation certificate.[121]

Statistically, Christian Arabs in Israel have the highest rates of educational attainment among all religious communities, according to a data by Israel Central Bureau of Statistics in 2010, 63% of Israeli Christian Arabs have had college or postgraduate education, the highest of any religious and ethno-religious group.[180] According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics census in 2020, 70.9% of Christians in Israel have a college degree,[391] followed by Druze (15.3%),[135] and Muslims (10%).[121]

Among Israeli higher education institutions the University of Haifa has the largest percentage (41%) of Arab-Israeli students.[392] The Technion Israel Institute of Technology has the second largest percentage (22.2%) of Arab-Israeli students.[387][388]

Military conscription

[edit]
Bedouin IDF soldiers of Rumat al-Heib (عرب الهيب) during a military parade in Tel-Aviv in June 1949

Unlike their Jewish counterparts, Arab citizens are not required to serve in the Israeli military, and, outside the Bedouin community, few (around 120 a year) volunteer.[118] Until 2000, each year between 5–10% of the Bedouin population of draft age volunteered for the Israeli army, and Bedouin were well known for their unique status as volunteers. The legendary Israeli soldier, Amos Yarkoni, first commander of the Shaked Reconnaissance Battalion in the Givati Brigade, was a Bedouin (born Abd el-Majid Hidr). Bedouin soldiers dominate the elite human tracking units that guard Israel's northern and southern border.[393] Lieutenant Colonel Magdi Mazarib, a Bedouin, who is the Israeli army's highest-ranking tracking commander, told the AFP that he believes that "the state of Bedouin in Israel is better, as far as the respect we get, our progress, education".[393] In 2004 the number of Bedouin in the army may have been be less than 1%.[394] A 2003 report stated that willingness among Bedouin to serve in the army had drastically dropped in recent years, as the Israeli government has failed to fulfill promises of equal service provision to Bedouin citizens.[395] However, a 2009 article in Haaretz stated that volunteer recruitment for a crack elite Bedouin army unit rose threefold.[396]

IDF figures indicate that, in 2002 and 2003, Christians represented 0.1 percent of all recruits. In 2004, the number of recruits had doubled. Altogether, in 2003, the percentage of Christians serving had grown by 16 percent over the year 2000. The IDF does not publish figures on the exact number of recruits by religious denomination, and in 2005 it was estimated that a few dozen Christians currently served in the IDF.[140]

Druze commander of the IDF Herev battalion

The Druze are required to serve in the IDF in accordance with an agreement between their local religious leaders and the Israeli government in 1956. Opposition to the decision among the Druze populace was evident immediately, but was unsuccessful in reversing the decision.[397] Multiple Druze in the IDF become officers[398][better source needed] and some rising to general officer rank.[399] In recent years, a growing minority from within the Druze community have denounced this mandatory enrollment, and refused to serve.[400][401] In 2001, Said Nafa, who identifies as a Palestinian Druze and serves as the head of the Balad party's national council, founded the "Pact of Free Druze", an organization that aims "to stop the conscription of the Druze and claims the community is an inalienable part of the Arabs in Israel and the Palestinian nation at large".[402]

National service

[edit]

Rather than perform army service, Israeli Arab youths have the option to volunteer to national service and receive benefits similar to those received by discharged soldiers. The volunteers are generally allocated to Arab populations, where they assist with social and community matters. As of 2010 there are 1,473 Arabs volunteering for national service. According to sources in the national service administration, Arab leaders are counseling youths to refrain from performing services to the state. According to a National Service official: "For years the Arab leadership has demanded, justifiably, benefits for Arab youths similar to those received by discharged soldiers. Now, when this opportunity is available, it is precisely these leaders who reject the state's call to come and do the service, and receive these benefits."[296]

Intercommunal relations

[edit]

Surveys and polls

[edit]

In a 2004 survey by Sammy Smooha of the University of Haifa Jewish-Arab Center, 85% of Israeli Arabs stated that Israel has a right to exist as an independent state, and 70% that it has a right to exist as a democratic, Jewish state.[403][404] A Truman Institute survey from 2005 found that 63% of the Arab citizens accepted the principle that Israel is the state of the Jewish people.[370][405]

A 2006 poll by the Arab advocacy group the Center Against Racism showed negative attitudes towards Arabs. The poll found that 63% of Jews believe Arabs are a security threat; 68% would refuse to live in the same building as an Arab; 34% believe that Arab culture is inferior to Israeli culture. Support for segregation between Jewish and Arab citizens was higher among Jews of Middle Eastern origin.[406]

Israeli patriotism among Israeli Arabs, 2006
Very patriotic
17%
Patriotic
7%
Somewhat patriotic
35%
Not especially patriotic
41%
Herzliya patriotism survey[407]

In a 2006 patriotism survey, 56% of Israeli Arabs were not proud of their citizenship and 73% were not ready to fight to defend the state, but 77% said that Israel was better than most other countries and 53% were proud of the country's welfare system. Eighty-two percent said they would rather be a citizen of Israel than of any other country in the world.[407]

An Israeli Democracy Institute (IDI) poll in 2007 showed that 75% of "Israeli Arabs would support a constitution that maintained Israel's status as a Jewish and democratic state while guaranteeing equal rights for minorities, while 23% said they would oppose such a definition".[408] Another survey that year showed that 62% of Israel's Arabs would prefer to remain Israeli citizens rather than become citizens of a future Palestinian state.[409] A separate 2008 poll found that 77% would rather live in Israel than in any other country in the world.[410][411] Another 2007 poll by Sammy Smooha found that 63% of Jewish Israelis avoided entering Arab towns and cities; 68% feared the possibility of widespread civil unrest among Israeli Arabs; 50% of Israeli Arabs justified Hezbollah's capture of IDF reservists Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev in a cross-border raid; 19% thought Israel was justified in going to war following the kidnapping; 48% justified Hezbollah rocket attacks on northern Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War; 89% of Israeli Arabs saw the IDF bombing of Lebanon as a war crime, while 44% of Israeli Arabs viewed Hezbollah's bombing of Israel as a war crime; 62% of Israeli Arabs worried that Israel could transfer their communities to the jurisdiction of a future Palestinian state, and 60% said they were concerned about a possible mass expulsion; 76% of Israeli Arabs described Zionism as racist; 68% of Israeli Arabs would be content to live in the Jewish state alongside a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; 41% of Israeli Arab citizens denied the Holocaust ever happened.[412]

In 2007, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel reported a "dramatic increase" in racism against Arab citizens, including a 26 percent rise in anti-Arab incidents. ACRI president Sami Michael said that "Israeli society is reaching new heights of racism that damages freedom of expression and privacy".[413]

A 2008 poll on intercommunal relations by Harvard Kennedy School found that Arabs and Jews in Israel underestimated the extent to which their communities "liked" one another. 68% of the Jews supported teaching Arabic in Jewish schools.[414]

A 2008 poll by the Center Against Racism found that 75% of Israeli Jews would not live in a building with Arabs; over 60% would not invite Arabs to their homes; 40% believed that Arabs should be stripped of the right to vote; over 50% agreed that the state should encourage emigration of Arab citizens to other countries; 59% considered Arab culture primitive. Asked "What do you feel when you hear people speaking Arabic?" 31% said hate and 50% said fear. Only 19% reported positive or neutral feelings.[415]

Surveys in 2009 found a radicalization in the positions of Israeli Arabs towards the State of Israel, with 41% of Israeli Arabs recognizing Israel's right to exist as a Jewish and democratic state (down from 66% in 2003), and 54% believing Israel has a right to exist as an independent country (down from 81% in 2003). Polls also showed that 40% of Arab citizens engaged in Holocaust denial.[412]

A 2010 poll of Israeli high school students found that 50% did not think Israeli Arabs were entitled to the same rights as Jews in Israel, and 56% thought Arabs should not be elected to the Knesset.[416] The figures rose among religious students.[417]

A 2010 Arab Jewish Relations Survey, compiled by Prof. Sami Smoocha in collaboration with the Jewish-Arab Center at the University of Haifa shows that 71% Arab citizens of Israel said they blamed Jews for the hardships suffered by Palestinians during and after the "Nakba" in 1948. 38% denied the Holocaust. The percentage supporting the use of violence to advance Arab causes climbed from 6% in 1995 to 12% in 2010. 66% say they reject Israel as a Jewish and Zionist state, while 30% opposed its existence under any terms. 63% saw the Jews as "foreign settlers who do not fit into the region and will eventually leave, when the land will return to the Palestinians".[418]

A 2010 University of Maryland / Zogby International poll of 600 Arab Israelis compiled by Shibley Telhami found that 36 percent considered their Arab identity to be "most important", while 22% answered "Palestinian", 19% Muslim, and 12% Israeli.[419]

Amongst other things, a 2012 survey by Mada al-Carmel, the Arab Center for Applied Social Research, asked Arab students what obstacles they felt they faced in getting into university: 71% said the psychometric exam was the primary obstacle, while 40% cited "Jewish racism".[420] The survey also found that 45 percent of those questioned felt no pride in Israeli achievements in whatever field, with another 13% reporting negative feelings about them.[420]

A Pew Research poll released in March 2016 showed that close to half of all Israeli Jews are in favor of "transferring or expelling" Israel's Arab population. 48% of Israeli Jews strongly agree or agree with the idea, and 46% strongly disagree or disagree. The in-person polling was conducted in a relatively "calm" from late 2014 through early 2015.[421]

In December 2022, support for a two-state solution was 33% among Palestinians, 34% among Israeli Jews, and 60% among Israeli Arabs.[422] At the end of October 2023, after the Hamas-led attack on Israel, the two-state solution had the support of 71.9% of Israeli Arabs and 28.6% of Israeli Jews.[423] According to a poll published by the Israel Democracy Institute, only 24% of Israeli Arabs believe that the IDF is trying to uphold international law in the war between Israel and Hamas.[424]

In December 2023, during the Israel-Hamas war, the Druze were the Israeli Arab minority which most identified with the state of Israel (80%), followed by Christians (73%) and Muslims (62%). For residents of the Negev, most of whom are Bedouin, the figure was 73%.[425]

Violence against Arab citizens in Israel

[edit]

Alexander Yakobson of Jerusalem's Hebrew University has said "There is very little actual violence between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs. Given the length and the intensity of the conflict, that is both surprising and encouraging."[426]

In the 1956 Kafr Qasim massacre, 48 unarmed Arab citizens, returning to their village, were gunned down by an Israel Border Police platoon; a curfew had been imposed, but the villagers were not informed of it. Arab citizens have also been killed by Israeli security forces in the wake of violent demonstrations and riots, such as the March 1976 Land Day demonstrations, which left 6 dead, and the October 2000 events in which 12 Israeli Arabs and one Palestinian from Gaza were killed.

In 2005 an AWOL IDF soldier, Eden Natan-Zada opened fire in a bus in Shefa-Amr in northern Israel, murdering four Arabs and wounding twenty-two others. No group had taken credit for the terrorist attack and an official in the settler movement denounced it.[427]

Arab activists have complained about the police abandoning Arab towns to intra communal violence at the hands of common criminals and murderers, calling for cooperation with Israeli police and internal security services under the slogan of "Arab Lives Matter".[428]

Arab victims of terrorism

[edit]
Israeli President Isaac Herzog in the city of Rahat with heads of the Bedouin community and families of kidnapped and murdered Bedouins during the Hamas-led attack on Israel on 7 October 2023

Arab citizens have also been victims of Palestinian, Arab, or Islamist attacks on Israel and Israelis. For example, on 12 September 1956, three Druze guards were killed in an attack on Ein Ofarim, in the Arabah region.[429][better source needed] Two Arab citizens were killed in the Ma'alot massacre carried out by the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine on 15 May 1974. In March 2002, a resident of the Arab town of Tur'an was killed in an attack on a Haifa restaurant.[430] Two months later, a woman from Jaffa was killed in a Hamas suicide bombing in Rishon LeZion.[430] On 18 June 2002, a woman from the Arab border town of Barta'a was one of 19 killed by Hamas in the Pat Junction Bus Bombing in Jerusalem.[430] In August 2002, a man from the Arab town of Mghar and woman from the Druze village of Sajur were killed in a suicide bombing at Meron junction.[430] On 21 October 2002, an Isfiya man and a Tayibe woman were among 14 killed by Islamic Jihad in the Egged bus 841 massacre.[430] On 5 March 2003, a 13-year-old girl from the Druze town of Daliyat al-Karmel was one of 17 killed in the Haifa bus 37 suicide bombing.[430] In May 2003, a Jisr az-Zarqa man was killed in an Afula mall suicide bombing.[430] On 19 March 2004, Fatah al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades gunmen killed George Khoury, a Hebrew University student.[431] On 12 December 2004, five Arab IDF soldiers were killed in an explosion and shooting at the border with Egypt for which the Fatah Hawks claimed responsibility.[432] On 4 October 2003, four Arab citizens of Israel were among the 21 killed by Hanadi Jaradat in the Maxim restaurant suicide bombing. In July 2006, 19 Arab citizens were killed due to Hezbollah rocket fire in the course of the 2006 Lebanon War.

On 22 August 2006, 11 Arab tourists from Israel were killed when their bus overturned in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. Israel sent Magen David Adom, but the ambulances waited for hours at the border before receiving Egyptian permission to enter and treat the wounded, responsible for at least one of the deaths. The victims say that the driver acted as part of a planned terrorist attack, and are attempting to receive compensation from the government.[433][434]

Relations with other Palestinians

[edit]

During the 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis, according to Al Arabiya, Fatah backed a call for a general strike on 18 May 2021 in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and Palestinians in Israel were asked to take part.[435] In an unusual display of unity by "Palestinian citizens of Israel, who make up 20% of its population, and those in the territories Israel seized in 1967"[d][437] the strike went ahead and "shops were shuttered across cities in Gaza, the occupied West Bank and in villages and towns inside Israel".[438]

Culture

[edit]
Al-Midan Theater in Haifa

Many Arab citizens of Israel share in the culture of the Palestinian people and wider Arab region of which a number of them form a part. There are still some women who produce Palestinian cultural products such as Palestinian embroidery,[439][440] and costume. The Palestinian folk dance, known as the dabke, continues to be taught to youth in cultural groups, and is often danced at weddings and other parties.

Cultural centers

[edit]
The house of culture and art in Nazareth

As the largest Arab city in Israel, Nazareth is a cultural, political, economic and commercial center of the Arab citizens of Israel, and became also a center of Arab and Palestinian nationalism.[441] Haifa, however, is the center of liberal Arabic-speaking culture, as it was under British colonial rule. Arabs in Haifa (mostly Christians and Muslims) tend to be wealthier and better educated compared to Arabs elsewhere in Israel.[159] An active Arab cultural life has developed in the 21st century.[159] Haifa is center of a number of Arab-owned businesses such as theaters, bars, cafes, restaurants and nightclubs which host also a different cultural discussions and art exhibitions.[159]

Other centers of Arab and Palestinian cultures includes Kafr Yasif and Rameh. According to the historian Atallah Mansour, Kafr Yasif is the "most academic Arab town in Israel",[442] while journalist Sylvia Smith calls it "the preeminent [Arab] cultural town".[443] With the near total depopulation of the Palestinian Arabs in the major cities of Haifa and Jaffa as a result of the 1948 war, Kafr Yasif and Rameh became one of a few villages in the newly established state of Israel to emerge as a central space for Arab culture and politics.[444] Its schools, proximity and location between major cities and other Arab villages, the relatively equal distribution of land ownership among its households and the diversity brought about by the influx of internally displaced Palestinians all contributed to its local importance.[444]

In 1948, it was the only Arab locality in the Galilee to contain a high school outside of the cities of Nazareth, Shefa-Amr and Haifa.[444] Following the war, the high school enrolled students from over fifty Arab villages.[444] Several students, including Mahmoud Darwish, became well-known poets, and the village hosted weekly poetry recitals.[444] As of the 1960s, the people of Rameh have been noted for their high levels of education and standards of living.

Language

[edit]
A wedding groom and his horse, Jisr az-Zarka, 2009

Linguistically speaking, the majority of Arabic citizens of Israel are fluently bilingual, speaking both a Palestinian Arabic dialect and Hebrew. In Arab homes and towns, the primary language spoken is Arabic. Some Hebrew words have entered the colloquial Arabic dialect. For example, Arabs often use the word beseder (equivalent of "Okay") while speaking Arabic. Other Hebrew words that are regularly interspersed are ramzor (stoplight), mazgan (air conditioner), and mahshev (computer). The resulting dialect is usually referred to as 'Israeli Arabic'.

Such borrowings are often "Arabized" to reflect not only Arabic phonology but the phonology of Hebrew as spoken by Arabs. For example, the second consonant of מעונות (me'onot, "dormitory") would be pronounced as a voiced pharyngeal fricative rather than the glottal stop traditionally used by the vast majority of Israeli Jews. A survey by the Central Bureau of Statistics released in 2013 found that 60% of Israeli Arabs were proficient or highly proficient in Hebrew, while 17% could not read it and 12% could not speak it.[445]

There are different local colloquial dialects among Arabs in different regions and localities. For example, the Little Triangle residents of Umm al-Fahm are known for pronouncing the kaph sound with a "ch" (as-in-cheese) rather than "k" (as-in-kite). Some Arabic words or phrases are used only in their respective localities, such as the Nazareth word for "now" which is issa, and silema a local modification of the English word "cinema".[446][447] The Druze Arabic dialect, especially in the villages, is often different from the other regional Israeli Arabic dialects. Druze Arabic dialect is distinguished from others by retention of the phoneme /qāf/.[448] They often use Hebrew characters to write their Arabic dialect online.[449]

Arab citizens of Israel tend to watch both the Arab satellite news stations and Israeli cable stations and read both Arabic and Hebrew newspapers, comparing the information against one another.[450]

Music and art

[edit]
DAM band

The Palestinian art scene in general has been supported by the contributions of Arab citizens of Israel.[451] In addition to the contribution of artists such as singer Rim Banna (from Nazareth) and Amal Murkus (from Kafr Yasif) to evolving traditional Palestinian and Arabic music styles, a new generation of Arab youth in Israel has also begun asserting a Palestinian identity in new musical forms. For instance of the Palestinian hip hop group DAM, from Lod, has spurred the emergence of other hip hop groups from Akka, to Bethlehem, to Ramallah, to Gaza City. DAM is the first Palestinian hip hop group.[452]

Singer-songwriter such as Nasrin Kadri, Mira Awad, Lina Makhul, Luay Ali, Sharif "the druze boy" have put Arab citizens of Israel on the musical map.[453]

In the art scene, the Palestinian minority in Israel has asserted its identity according to Ben Zvi, who suggests that this group of artists who are identified "on the one hand, as part of a broad Palestinian cultural system, and on the other — in a differentiated manner — as the Palestinian minority in Israel."[451] The issue of identity becomes particularly clear in an artwork of the Palestinian artist Raafat Hattab from Jaffa. The video performance "untitled" was part of the exhibition "Men in the Sun" in the Herzliya Museum of Contemporary Art in 2009. In the work, Raafat Hattab is seen as he pours water into a bucket in order to lengthily water an olive tree which is a sign for the lost paradise before 1948. The scene is primed by the song Hob (Love) by the Lebanese Ahmad Kaabour which expresses the need for Palestinian solidarity. The chorus repeats the phrase "I left a place" and it seems as if the video is dealing with memory. But as the camera zooms out, the spectator realizes that Hattab and the olive tree both actually stand in the middle of the Rabin Square, a main place in Tel Aviv, and the water used for watering the tree comes from the nearby fountain. "In my installations I appear in different identities that combined are my identity — a Palestinian minority in Israel and a queer minority in the Palestinian culture", explains Rafaat Hattab in an interview with the Tel Avivian City Mouse Magazine.[454] Asim Abu Shaqra's focus of the sabra plant (prickly pear cactus) in his paintings is another example of the centrality of identity, especially vis-a-vie the Palestinian subject's Israeli counterpart, in Palestinian art. Tal Ben Zvi writes that Abu Shaqra is one of the few Palestinian artists, who have succeeded in entering the canon of Israeli art.[455]: 115  Abu Shaqra painted various paintings featuring the sabra, both a symbol for the Palestinian Nakba and a symbol for the new Israeli and his work stirred up a debate in the Israeli art discourse over the image of the sabra in Israeli culture and over questions of cultural appropriation and ownership of this image.[455]: 118 

Cuisine

[edit]
"Doniana" is a popular Arab seafood restaurant in Acre

Arab cuisine in Israel is similar to other Levantine cuisines and is rich in grains, meat, potato, cheese, bread, whole grains, fruits, vegetables, fresh fish and tomatoes. Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of Israeli Arab and Levantine cuisine is meze including tabbouleh, hummus and baba ghanoush, kibbeh nayyeh is also a popular mezze among Israeli Arabs. Other famous foods among Israeli Arab include falafel, sfiha, shawarma, dolma, kibbeh, kusa mahshi, shishbarak, muhammara, and mujaddara.[456] Druze pita is a Druze-styled pita filled with labneh (thick yoghurt) and topped with olive oil and za'atar,[457] and a popular bread in Israel.[458]

Arabic restaurants are popular in Israel and relatively inexpensive establishments often offer a selection of meze salads followed by grilled meat with a side of "chips" (french fries, from British English) and a simple dessert such as chocolate mousse for dessert.[459] "The Old Man and the Sea" is a popular Arab seafood restaurant in the southern part of Ajami, Jaffa.[460][461] Abu Hassan is a small hummus restaurant located at the northern tip of Ajami. It was opened in 1959 by Ali Karawan and now has two additional branches in Jaffa.[462] It has been rated as the best hummus restaurant in Israel in a number of lists. The restaurant is famous for its loyal clientele of Arabs and Jews.

Falafel HaZkenim (Hebrew: "the elders") is an Arab Israeli restaurant and falafel stand, located in Wadi Nisnas, Haifa. Since its foundation, guests are greeted with a free falafel ball dipped in tahini. Foodies consider HaZkenim's falafel among the best in Israel.[463][464][465][466] It was founded in 1950 by George and Najala Afara.[467] The falafel stand initially had no signage. Jewish customers often said that they would go to "hazkenim" (the old folks) for falafel, while Arab customers identified the place with the female co-owner. When the owners did put up a sign, it contained both names.

Sport

[edit]
Mu'nas Dabbur, professional footballer who plays as a striker for Bundesliga club 1899 Hoffenheim and the Israel national team

Arab citizens of Israel have been prominent in the field of sport, as seen specifically by their contributions to Israeli football.[468] Players such as Abbas Suan have had illustrious careers playing not only professional football, but also most notably for the Israel national football team.[469] These players have been argued to represent symbols of political movement and civil justice for the Arab citizens of Israel, considering alleged discriminatory sentiments against the Arab population.[470] Specifically in a 2005 World Cup Qualifying match, Suan and his Arab teammates played significant roles for the Israeli National Team, where Suan scored an equalising goal against the Republic of Ireland national football team.[471] Following this match, Arab citizens of Israel received unprecedented media attention from Israeli TV stations. Even without the publicity, the Arab citizens of Israel have been said to look up to these players in hopes that they speak up for them as their political voice within Israel.[472] In the following months, Suan and other players were criticised by the Hebrew media for their involvement with political issues.[473] This was due to their answers to questions regarding their partaking in the singing of the Hatikvah, the national anthem of Israel.[474]

Overall, Israel-Palestinian soccer players are looked up to greatly by the Arab citizens of Israel, yet are allegedly criticised and silenced when it comes to their attempts to involve themselves in political issues surrounding equality for Arab citizens in Israel.[475]

Cinema and theater

[edit]

Arab citizens of Israel have made significant contributions in both Hebrew and Arabic cinema and theater. Mohammad Bakri,[476] Hiam Abbass,[477] and Juliano Mer-Khamis have starred in Israeli film and television. Directors such as Mohammad Bakri, Elia Suleiman, Hany Abu-Assad, Michel Khleifi, and Maysaloun Hamoud have put Arab citizens of Israel on the cinematic map.

Avoda Aravit (2007), or in English, Arab Labor, is a satirical sitcom written by Kashua and aired on Israel's Channel 2. A large part of the dialogue is in Arabic with Hebrew subtitles. The show holds a mirror up to the racism and ignorance on both sides of the ethnic divide and has been compared with All in the Family. The show received overwhelmingly positive reviews, winning awards for Best Comedy, Best Lead Actor in a Comedy, Best Lead Actress in a Comedy, Best Director, and Best Screenplay at the 2013 Israeli Academy of Film and Television awards.[478]

Literature

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Acclaimed Israeli-Arab authors include Emil Habibi, Anton Shammas, and Sayed Kashua.

See also

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Notes

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References

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Bibliography

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Further reading

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from Grokipedia
Arab citizens of Israel are the descendants of Palestinian Arabs who remained in the territory that became after the Arab-Israeli War, constituting about 21.1% of the total population, or roughly 2.09 million people as of 2024. This group primarily includes , who form the majority, along with smaller numbers of , and is distinct from the and Circassian minorities, who are also non-Jewish citizens but often categorized separately due to their mandatory obligations. They possess full Israeli citizenship, including the right to vote in elections since the state's founding, with Arab parties securing seats in every parliament and achieving up to 15 mandates in recent assemblies. Despite equal legal standing, Arab citizens experience persistent socioeconomic disparities compared to Jewish , including lower household , higher rates, reduced labor force participation (60.6% for Arab men versus 67.7% for Jewish men in 2022), and shorter . These gaps stem from factors such as concentrated residence in underinvested localities, cultural norms favoring larger families, and limited integration into sectors like high-tech or military-related , though has improved markedly in recent decades. Politically, while represented in the legislature and occasionally in coalitions—as with the United Arab List's participation in the 2021 government—debates persist over national loyalty, with some Arab citizens identifying primarily as Palestinian and lower reflecting disillusionment. Internal challenges, including elevated rates in Arab communities, further underscore integration hurdles, prompting calls for enhanced and .

Terminology and Identity

Definitions and Preferred Demonyms

Arab citizens of Israel are defined as individuals of Arab ethnicity who acquired Israeli citizenship, primarily those who remained within the territory controlled by after the Arab-Israeli War and subsequent agreements. This group, numbering approximately 2.1 million as of 2023, constitutes about 21% of 's total population and includes Muslims (the majority), Christians, and smaller numbers of other religious minorities, excluding who are often categorized separately due to their distinct communal status and obligations. Legally, their status derives from the 1952 Citizenship Law, which granted automatic citizenship to residents present at 's establishment and their descendants, provided they did not flee during the war or formally renounce ties. In Israeli official and statistical contexts, such as those from the Central Bureau of Statistics, the population is classified broadly as "" or "non-Jewish ," encompassing those identifying by language, , and patrilineal descent, with data aggregated under demographic categories like "Arab locality residents" for socioeconomic tracking. Media and government documents frequently employ "Israeli " to denote this citizen group, emphasizing civic integration within the state's framework while acknowledging ethnic distinction from the Jewish majority. This terminology aligns with Israel's self-definition as a , where Arab citizens enjoy equal legal but face disparities in areas like municipal and allocation, as documented in governmental reports. Preferred demonyms among Arab citizens vary, reflecting layered identities shaped by historical, national, and religious factors, as revealed in empirical surveys. A 2024 Tel Aviv University poll found that 33.9% prioritize Israeli citizenship in their self-identification, 29.2% emphasize religious affiliation (e.g., Muslim or Christian), 25.5% highlight ethnicity, and only 9% stress , indicating a post-October 7, 2023, shift toward pragmatic civic ties amid heightened security concerns. Similarly, a 2020 Israel Democracy Institute survey reported that just 7% primarily self-identify as "Palestinian," down from 18% the prior year, with over half opting for "" or religious labels like "Muslim." A 2025 Central Bureau of Statistics finding corroborated this, with 56% defining primarily as "" and 25% as "Muslim," underscoring that while terms like "Palestinian citizens of Israel" appear in advocacy contexts to assert indigeneity, they do not predominate in self-reported preferences per representative polling data. These patterns suggest identity fluidity, influenced by integration levels and external events, rather than uniform adoption of separationist framing promoted in some academic or activist sources.

Self-Identification in Surveys and Polls

A 2024 survey by identified the dominant elements of personal identity among Arab citizens of Israel as Israeli (33.9%), religious affiliation (29.2%), (26.9%), and (9%), noting that a significant segment prioritizes Israeli over amid ongoing conflict. A May 2025 poll by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics revealed that 56% of respondents self-identified primarily as Arab, 25% as Muslim, 3% as Palestinian, and 3% as Israeli citizens first, with 27% citing Israeli as a secondary identity and overall 70% excluding it from primary or secondary roles. Sociologist Sammy Smooha's analyses of opinion polls indicate a consistent among Arab citizens, with rated highest (34%), followed by Muslim identity (27%) and (24%), reflecting layered ethnic and religious self-perceptions alongside civic ties. A 2019 report found that only 13% of Arab respondents identified explicitly as Palestinian, underscoring limited primacy of that label in structured self-assessments despite its cultural resonance in some contexts. Post-October 7, 2023, surveys have documented shifts toward greater emphasis on shared Israeli belonging, with the study attributing this to instrumental value of citizenship amid war, though primary ethnic and religious identifiers persist.

Usage in Official, Academic, and Historical Contexts

In official contexts, the Israeli government and its institutions, such as the , consistently employ terms like "Arab Israelis" or "Arab citizens of Israel" to describe this population, emphasizing their legal status as full citizens with rights and obligations under . The Central Bureau of Statistics (), responsible for national demographic data, classifies them as the "Arab population" in reports, avoiding ethnic or national qualifiers that imply divided loyalties, with 2022 figures listing 2.04 million individuals comprising 21.1% of Israel's total population under this rubric. During the military administration period (1949-1966), official designations often grouped them under "minorities" to denote non-Jewish communities subject to administrative oversight, a practice reflected in security and governance documents from the era. Academic usage in peer-reviewed studies and policy analyses typically favors "Arab citizens of Israel" or "Israeli Arabs," terms that highlight civic integration while acknowledging ethnic distinction, as seen in research on socioeconomic gaps and educational outcomes. For instance, analyses of labor market participation or school segregation employ "Arab Israelis" to frame comparative data with Jewish Israelis, drawing on metrics without endorsing self-identifications like "Palestinian citizens," which some scholars note carry nationalist connotations potentially at odds with state sovereignty. This terminological choice in academia often stems from methodological needs for neutrality, though critiques highlight occasional bias in Western outlets toward "Palestinian" framing, which can obscure the empirical reality of citizenship and institutional ties. Historically, post-1948 Israeli state records and refer to this group as " who remained in " or evolving to "Israeli " by the , distinguishing survivors of the war who accepted citizenship from refugees or those in and , with early debates using " residents" in land and security policies. Pre-1948, under the British Mandate, inhabitants were designated " " in administrative censuses, but the broader "" label encompassed both and Jewish populations until 's shifted its exclusive association with . In Israeli historical narratives, such as those documenting the 1948 war, the term avoids "" for citizens to prevent conflation with the or post-war irredentist claims, prioritizing causal distinctions between those integrated via armistice agreements and those displaced.

Demographics and Population

Current Size, Growth Rates, and Projections

As of the end of 2022, the population of , comprising Israeli citizens identified as (primarily , , and ), numbered approximately 2.04 million, accounting for 21.1% of the country's total of 9.66 million. By September 2025, this figure had risen to about 2.13 million , representing 21.5% of 's population exceeding 9.9 million. These estimates from Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics () exclude non-citizen residents of and the , focusing on citizens within the pre-1967 borders. The Arab population has exhibited higher growth rates than the Jewish population historically, primarily due to natural increase rather than immigration, with 92% of annual growth in 2022-2023 attributed to births exceeding deaths. Annual growth for Arabs averaged around 2% in the early 2020s, compared to 1.6-1.8% for Jews, though this differential has narrowed as Arab fertility rates decline. Key drivers include a total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.75 live births per Arab woman in 2022—down from higher levels in prior decades—versus 3.03 for Jewish women, with Muslim Arab TFR at approximately 2.9 and lower rates among Druze (around 1.8) and Christians (1.6). This convergence reflects socioeconomic modernization, urbanization, and increased female education and workforce participation among Arabs, reducing family sizes, while Jewish TFR remains elevated due to cultural and religious factors. Projections from CBS indicate continued Arab population expansion, with estimates from 2017 forecasting growth to about 3 million by 2045 under medium-variant assumptions, implying an average annual increase of 1.5-2% if stabilizes near replacement levels (2.1). Updated analyses accounting for recent trends suggest the Arab share may stabilize at 21-23% through 2050, rather than rising sharply, as Jewish natural growth—bolstered by higher TFR and —offsets relative Arab gains. Long-term forecasts to 2065 project Arabs comprising up to 25% of the total population under sustained higher natural increase, but these assume no further convergence or policy shifts affecting migration or family incentives. Uncertainties include potential emigration, intermarriage rates (low at under 2%), and external factors like regional stability influencing birth trends.

Geographic Distribution and Major Localities

Approximately half of Israel's citizens, excluding those in , reside in the northern regions, particularly the and parts of the including , while the remainder are distributed between the central "Little Triangle" area and the Southern District in the . This concentration in the country's periphery stems from historical factors, including post-1948 population movements and limited urban integration. The Northern District hosts the highest proportion of among Israel's administrative , with comprising over 50% of its according to Central Bureau of Statistics data. Arab citizens predominantly inhabit 163 exclusively Arab localities, comprising 13 cities and 68 local councils, where they form the overwhelming majority. The largest of these are in the , home to about 79,000 residents mainly from communities, and in the , with roughly 78,000 inhabitants. Other prominent northern localities include in and in the , while in the central Triangle, Tayibe and Tira stand out. In the south, beyond , unrecognized villages cluster near . About 10% of Arab citizens live in seven , including (with around 30,000 Arabs), Acre, , and , where populations intermix but segregation often persists in neighborhoods.

Inclusion of East Jerusalem and Golan Heights Residents

The residents of , numbering approximately 362,000 as of recent estimates, hold status rather than full , despite Israel's 1967 annexation of the area and offers of to eligible individuals. Most have declined for political and identity reasons, preferring to maintain ties to Palestinian national aspirations, which results in their exclusion from official counts of Israel's citizen , typically limited to those within pre-1967 borders holding . provides access to , work, and residency rights but lacks voting rights in national elections and exposes residents to potential , with nearly 10,000 cases since 2000 linked to prolonged absences or security concerns. In demographic analyses of citizens—estimated at around 2.04 million at the end of 2022—these residents are often noted separately to distinguish citizen rights and obligations, though broader discussions of Israel's may aggregate them for contextual totals exceeding 2.4 million. In the , annexed by in 1981 following its 1967 capture from , the Arab population—primarily numbering about 24,000 to 25,000—predominantly retains or , with only around 20% having acquired Israeli citizenship as of mid-2025 amid shifting regional dynamics like the . This group, concentrated in four main villages including , is excluded from core statistics on Arab citizens of Israel due to their non-citizen status and historical allegiance to , though some analyses of Arab society incorporate them alongside residents for comprehensive population overviews. uptake remains low, reflecting resistance to perceived erasure of Syrian identity, despite benefits like improved travel and services; Israeli policy applies the laws of the state but faces international non-recognition of the . These residents' demographic separation underscores distinctions in legal integration, with Golan often treated akin to Arabs in policy but distinct from the roughly 143,000 citizens within 's pre-1967 territory.

Historical Development

Origins and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War

The Arab citizens of Israel originated from the Palestinian Arabs who remained in the territory controlled by the nascent Jewish state at the conclusion of the 1947–1949 Palestine war, numbering approximately 156,000 individuals according to Israel's first population registration in late 1948. These residents, primarily from rural villages and urban enclaves in areas such as the Galilee, coastal plain, and Negev, had been subjects of the Ottoman Empire until 1918 and then of the British Mandate for Palestine until 1948. Prior to the war, Arabs formed the demographic majority in Mandatory Palestine, comprising about 1.3 million people compared to roughly 600,000 Jews as of 1947, though the United Nations Partition Plan (Resolution 181) of November 29, 1947, proposed separate Jewish and Arab states, allocating 56% of the land to the Jewish state despite Jews owning only 7% of the land and comprising one-third of the population. The war's immediate prelude was the Arab rejection of the partition plan, which Palestinian Arab leaders and surrounding Arab states viewed as unjust, leading to outbreaks of civil violence from late 1947 as Arab militias attacked Jewish communities and road networks. This escalated into full-scale interstate conflict following Israel's on May 14, 1948, when armies from , (Transjordan), , , and invaded the former Mandate territory the next day with the explicit aim of preventing the establishment of a . The ensuing battles, characterized by , sieges, and conventional engagements, resulted in Israel securing lines in early 1949 that encompassed about 78% of , including areas beyond the UN-proposed Jewish allocation. During this period, an estimated 700,000 to 750,000 Palestinian —roughly half the pre-war Arab population in the contested areas—fled or were expelled from zones falling under Israeli control. Factors contributing to the mass displacement included direct military expulsions by Jewish forces in specific locales (such as the towns of Lydda and Ramle in July 1948, affecting 50,000–70,000 people), generalized fear and panic amid collapsing Arab defenses, the breakdown of local economies and services, and explicit evacuation directives issued by Arab leaders in certain cases, such as radio broadcasts urging temporary departure from cities like and to facilitate military operations. Empirical analyses of village archives and contemporary accounts indicate that while expulsions occurred in about 6% of cases, the majority of flights stemmed from the chaos of combat and anticipation of violence rather than systematic across all fronts, with orders playing a role in urban evacuations. Those Arabs who stayed often did so by remaining in less contested regions, surrendering to Israeli forces, or benefiting from local truces, particularly among communities who negotiated alliances. The legal foundation for their citizenship was formalized retroactively through Israel's Nationality Law of 1952, which granted automatic citizenship to non-Jews who were legal residents of on the eve of (May 14, 1948), had not voluntarily left to join enemy forces, and either remained in the country or registered their intent to reside there by the law's effective date. Approximately 150,000–160,000 qualified under these provisions, receiving equal civil rights in principle, including voting and representation in the from the state's first elections in January 1949, though their practical freedoms were curtailed by the concurrent imposition of over Arab-populated areas from 1949 to 1966. This cohort formed the foundational population of Arab Israelis, distinct from the larger populations hosted in neighboring states, and their descendants now constitute over 2 million citizens amid high natural growth rates.

Military Administration Era (1949-1966)

The over Arab citizens of Israel was imposed in December 1948, shortly after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, applying to approximately 156,000 who remained within Israel's lines, primarily in regions vulnerable to infiltration from neighboring Arab states. These areas encompassed about 20% of Israel's territory, divided into three commands: Northern ( and surrounding villages), Central ( or "Little Triangle"), and Southern ([Negev Bedouin](/page/Negev Bedouin) regions), where military governors enforced British Mandate-era Defense Regulations to regulate movement, assembly, and land use. The primary rationale was security, amid ongoing cross-border raids by and armies from , , and , which resulted in over 1,000 Israeli deaths from infiltration between 1949 and 1956; the administration curbed such threats by requiring permits for Arabs to leave villages, designating closed military zones under Regulation 125, and conducting searches for weapons and saboteurs. Under the regime, Arab residents faced daily restrictions, including curfews, checkpoints, and travel permits needed even for inter-village movement or work in Jewish areas, enforced via identity cards and military tribunals rather than civilian courts, which processed thousands of administrative detentions and expulsions annually in the early . These measures, rooted in emergency laws inherited from the Mandate period, also facilitated land requisitions for security buffers and state development, affecting tens of thousands of dunams, though absentee property laws from 1950 separately handled claims by Arabs who had fled during the war. Political activity was monitored, with communist-led groups facing scrutiny for alleged ties to hostile states, while select Arab leaders collaborated via satellite lists aligned with (Labor) for limited influence. Incidents like the 1956 massacre, where 49 villagers were killed by border police enforcing an unpublicized curfew during the Sinai Campaign, highlighted enforcement excesses, leading to convictions but underscoring the regime's reliance on military discretion. The administration's efficacy in reducing infiltrations—from peaks of 10,000 annual crossings in to near elimination by the mid-1950s via barriers and reprisals—diminished its necessity as borders stabilized post-Armistice Agreements and violations declined. Internal debates grew in the 1960s, with critics like party members arguing it hindered integration and fueled resentment, while proponents cited persistent risks from Syrian shelling in the north. Prime Minister , succeeding in 1963, pledged its phase-out; on November 30, 1966, the cabinet abolished it effective December 1, transferring oversight to civilian police and interior ministry, a move Eshkol framed as advancing equality amid improved , though some closed zones persisted informally. This ended 18 years of rule, affecting an population that had grown to about 300,000 by 1966, marking a shift toward fuller civic incorporation despite ongoing socioeconomic disparities.

Integration Efforts and Conflicts (1967-2000)

Following the in June 1967, Arab citizens of Israel, freed from military rule since August 1966, experienced expanded mobility and access to the Israeli labor market, facilitating gradual economic incorporation despite persistent disparities. Many entered low-skilled jobs in , , and services within Jewish-majority areas, contributing to household income growth amid Israel's overall economic expansion, though average Arab wages remained 30-50% lower than Jewish counterparts by the 1980s due to limited industrial investment in Arab localities. Educational opportunities advanced as Arab enrollment in Israeli universities rose from approximately 2.9% of total students in the to 6.7% by the mid-1980s, driven by state-funded secondary schooling and affirmative access policies, though Arab schools received per-pupil funding 20-30% below Jewish ones, perpetuating skill gaps. By 1990, thousands of Arab students pursued degrees, fostering a nascent professional class in , , and , yet infrastructure deficits in Arab towns—such as overcrowded classrooms and fewer advanced tracks—hindered parity. Tensions erupted in major conflicts over land expropriation, exemplified by on March 30, 1976, when a and demonstrations against the planned seizure of 20,000 dunams in the for Jewish development led to clashes with security forces, resulting in six Arab deaths and over 90 injuries. The event, organized by the Committee for the Defense of Arab Land, marked a surge in collective Arab activism, highlighting grievances over state land policies that prioritized Jewish settlement, with Arab-owned land shrinking from 7% of Israel's total in 1948 to under 3% by the 1970s. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, integration coexisted with friction, as the (1987-1993) spurred solidarity protests among Arab citizens without widespread violence, while post-1985 inflation crisis boosted Arab workforce participation to around 65% for men by 2000, albeit with rates double those of Jews (12% vs. 7.6%). (1993) intensified identity divides, with many Arabs viewing themselves as a national minority amid stalled domestic reforms, culminating in heightened rhetoric but contained unrest until 2000. Disparities in municipal budgets—Arab localities receiving 30% less per capita—fueled perceptions of systemic neglect, though empirical gains in (from 70% in 1960s to over 90% by 1990s) underscored uneven progress.

Recent History (2000-Present, Including Post-October 7, 2023)

In October 2000, Ariel Sharon's visit to the / al-Sharif triggered widespread s among citizens, escalating into riots across northern and other areas, resulting in the deaths of 13 Israelis killed by police and one illegal border crosser shot by IDF forces. The Or Commission of Inquiry, established in 2001, attributed the violence to long-standing grievances over , land expropriations, and unequal resource allocation, while criticizing police for excessive force and inadequate preparation, though it rejected claims of systemic in . These events deepened mutual distrust, leading to temporary election boycotts and heightened political mobilization within society. Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, Arab political parties—primarily (communist-Jewish-), Balad (nationalist), , and the (Ra'am, Islamist)—secured consistent representation, typically 10-13 seats combined, amid fragmented alliances. among Arab citizens hovered around 40-50% in early elections, rising with the 2015 formation of the to counter the raised , which garnered 13 seats in 2015 and 10 in 2019. In a historic shift during the 2021 election cycle, Ra'am, under , abstained from traditional anti-Zionist stances to support the Bennett-Lapid coalition, enabling the first Arab party involvement in government and securing over 30 billion shekels in funding for Arab , , and reduction. This pragmatic approach contrasted with boycotts by other Arab factions, reflecting intra-sectoral debates over integration versus opposition. Socioeconomic gaps persisted, with Arab poverty rates at 34.9% in 2021 versus 13.7% for , driven by lower labor force participation (around 60% for Arab women in recent years) and educational disparities, though high school completion rates improved from 60% in 2000 to over 80% by 2020. Crime rates in Arab communities surged, with annual homicides climbing from fewer than 40 in the early 2000s to 109 in 2022 and a peak of 244 in 2023, attributed to clan conflicts, arms proliferation, and under-policing rather than broader societal alone. The 2018 Nation-State Law, affirming Israel's Jewish character, Hebrew as the , and Jewish settlement as a national value, provoked Arab protests and Knesset walkouts, with critics arguing it formalized second-class status despite equal civil rights under other Basic Laws. Supporters maintained it clarified Israel's without revoking individual rights. The , 2023, attack, killing 1,200 Israelis and taking 251 hostages (including Arab citizens), elicited varied responses: 56% of Arab Israelis stated the assault did not reflect Arab society, Palestinian people, or Islamic values, per surveys, while a minority expressed sympathy for Palestinian grievances amid the Gaza war. trackers and civilians played key roles in rescue efforts on , earning praise despite historically low enlistment (under 1% serve in IDF combat roles). Post-attack polls showed increased identification with concerns and a "shared destiny" with , boosting volunteerism in , though communal violence persisted at high levels—220 homicides in —exacerbated by wartime resource strains. In 2022 elections, Arab parties split into three lists winning 10 seats total, with Ra'am's integrationist gains sustained but no repeat government role under the Netanyahu coalition.

Religious and Sectarian Composition

Muslim Majority (Settled and Bedouin)

Muslims constitute the predominant religious affiliation among Arab citizens of Israel, accounting for 83.2% of the Arab population in 2023, or approximately 1.7 million individuals out of the total Arab citizenry of around 2.1 million. Predominantly Sunni, this group practices under a framework that includes state-recognized courts handling personal status matters such as , , and , while enjoying freedom of worship including the maintenance of over 400 mosques. Religious observance remains relatively high, with surveys indicating that report daily rates exceeding those of Jewish Israelis and 83% participation in fasting, though lower than global Muslim averages. Settled Muslim Arabs, forming the bulk of this demographic, inhabit established urban and rural localities primarily in northern Israel, including cities like (population over 55,000 as of recent estimates) and villages in the region. These communities have largely adopted sedentary lifestyles post-1948, integrating Islamic traditions—such as communal prayers and adherence to dietary laws—with participation in Israel's civic and economic systems, albeit amid persistent disparities in infrastructure and education access compared to Jewish-majority areas. Cultural expressions of faith often emphasize family-centric religious education through local madrasas, though secular influences and internal debates over Islamist movements like the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement, banned in 2015 for alleged ties, shape community dynamics. Bedouin Muslims, estimated at 300,000 to 305,000 individuals concentrated in the , differ from settled Muslims through their historical semi-nomadic , tribal governance structures, and ongoing transition to . About half reside in seven government-planned towns such as (population approximately 80,000), while 80,000 to 90,000 live in 35 unrecognized villages vulnerable to demolitions due to land tenure disputes originating from pre-state Ottoman-era claims. Religious life among incorporates with customary tribal law (), influencing and social norms, and features voluntary military service rates higher than among other Arab groups, with thousands enlisting in IDF tracking units since the 1950s. Socioeconomic indicators reflect greater marginalization, including elevated and , yet communities maintain distinct cultural practices like traditional weddings blending Islamic rites with . Despite shared Sunni adherence, tensions exist between settled and Bedouin subgroups over resource allocation and political representation, with often advocating for recognition of ancestral lands amid government urbanization initiatives like the 2013 Prawer Plan, which proposed relocating residents from unrecognized sites but faced protests and partial revision. Overall, the Muslim majority's religious composition underscores a demographic projected to grow faster than Israel's Jewish population due to higher fertility rates—around 2.9 children per woman for Muslim Arabs versus 3.0 nationally in recent data—potentially influencing future sectarian balances.

Druze Community

The Druze constitute a distinct ethnoreligious minority among Israel's Arab citizens, comprising about 1.6% of the country's total population, or approximately 152,000 individuals as of April 2024. Originating as an 11th-century offshoot of Ismaili Shi'ism, the Druze faith emphasizes , , and secrecy of scriptures, with adherents divided into knowledgeable initiates (uqqal) and uninitiated followers (juhhal). In Israel, the community is officially recognized as a separate religious entity, distinct from , granting it autonomous religious courts with jurisdiction over personal status matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance, under the framework of Israel's religious court system. This status stems from a post-1948 agreement affirming Druze loyalty to the state in exchange for legal and communal autonomy. Geographically, Israel's are concentrated in 18 villages across the Northern District, primarily in the and regions, including major localities like (population ~20,000), Yarka (~15,000), and Beit Jan (~10,000), with smaller communities in the where citizenship is often declined. This distribution reflects historical settlement patterns predating modern Israel, with the community maintaining tight-knit, village-based social structures that prioritize and communal solidarity. Demographically, the Druze exhibit high fertility rates—around 2.5 children per woman in recent years—contributing to steady growth, though urbanization and intermarriage pressures are emerging. A defining feature of Druze integration is mandatory military conscription for men since 1956, following negotiations between community leaders, including Sheikh Amin Tarif, and Israeli authorities, which positioned the Druze as allies during the state's formative years. Unlike Muslim and Christian , who are exempt, Druze males serve from age 18 for 32 months, often in combat roles, elite units like the , and intelligence services, with enlistment rates exceeding 80% and over 500 fatalities recorded in defense of since 1948. This service has fostered socioeconomic mobility, with veterans accessing benefits like subsidized housing and higher education, resulting in Druze achievement levels second only to in metrics such as high school completion (over 90%) and university attendance. However, disparities persist, including lower average incomes (~70% of Jewish levels) and deficits in villages, attributed to historical underinvestment despite military contributions. Politically, the Druze demonstrate pragmatic loyalty, with voting patterns favoring centrist and right-leaning Zionist parties—over 60% supported or allies in recent elections—rather than Arab lists, yielding representation through alliances and ministerial roles, such as in and welfare. Tensions arose with the 2018 Nation-State , which some Druze leaders criticized for downgrading Arabic's status and emphasizing Jewish without reciprocal mention of Druze sacrifices, prompting protests but not fracturing the overall covenant of mutual obligation. Post-October 7, 2023, amid the attack and ensuing war, Druze solidarity intensified, with thousands volunteering for reserve duty, community-led fundraising for evacuees, and public affirmations of shared fate with Jewish , underscoring causal links between historical pacts and contemporary resilience against external threats. Despite such integration, challenges like land expropriations for security needs and youth disillusionment over perceived inequalities highlight ongoing negotiations within the community's adaptive realism.

Christian Minorities

Arab Christians form a small but distinct minority within Israel's Arab citizenry, comprising approximately 7% of the Arab population, or roughly 140,000 individuals as of 2023. They constitute the majority of Israel's overall , which numbered 180,300 in 2024 and accounted for 1.8% of the total population. This group has experienced modest growth, with a 0.6% increase in 2023, driven more by and conversion than high birth rates. The predominant denominations among Arab Christians are Eastern Orthodox and Greek Catholic (Melkite), which together represent about 90% of the community; smaller groups include Maronites, Roman Catholics, and Protestants. Geographically, they are concentrated in northern , particularly —the largest Arab Christian locality with a population exceeding 20,000 Christians—along with , , and villages like and . Urban residence and historical ties to these areas, including pre-state Christian institutions, have fostered relative socioeconomic advancement compared to Muslim . Arab Christians exhibit higher educational attainment and income levels than their Muslim and Druze counterparts, with greater participation in higher education and professional sectors; for instance, they often outperform other Arab subgroups in rates and enrollment. This disparity stems from cultural emphasis on , smaller family sizes enabling resource investment, and less geographic isolation than Bedouin communities. Politically, while most Arab citizens are exempt from mandatory , a subset of volunteers for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), viewing enlistment as a path to integration and distinguishing themselves from broader Arab nationalist sentiments. Efforts to promote IDF service among Christians, including self-identification as rather than , reflect tensions between communal loyalty and state allegiance. Despite these advantages, Arab Christians face challenges such as declining birth rates—contributing to emigration pressures—and occasional intercommunal frictions with Muslim majorities in mixed localities. Their community maintains active religious institutions, including churches and schools, which reinforce identity amid Israel's pluralistic framework. Overall, Arab Christians demonstrate higher rates of and , positioning them as a relatively integrated minority within the Arab sector.

Other Groups (e.g., )

The form a small, non-Arab Muslim minority in , numbering approximately 5,000 as of recent estimates. They reside mainly in two villages—Kfar and —established in the late after their ancestors fled Russian imperial conquests in the during the 1860s and 1870s, initially settling under Ottoman rule. Adhering to , preserve their , tribal customs, and cultural heritage, while integrating Hebrew and achieving high educational and socioeconomic outcomes comparable to Jewish averages. Unlike most non-Druze Arab citizens, face mandatory conscription into the Israel Defense Forces, with near-universal male enlistment rates and notable representation in specialized units, underscoring their historical loyalty to the state since Israel's founding. This integration stems from pragmatic adaptation post-1948, including exemption from certain Arab-specific policies, though they remain classified by the Central Bureau of Statistics as part of the "other" category rather than . Smaller non-Arab groups include , estimated at 2,000–3,000, primarily Orthodox Christians concentrated in Jerusalem's , who maintain Apostolic traditions dating to Byzantine times and operate independent schools and churches. , an ancient ethno-religious community of about 400 Israeli citizens in (with kin under Palestinian Authority in ), follow a distinct Torah-based , practicing strict and to sustain their amid high risks. These groups, totaling under 1% of Israel's , generally exhibit low political but stable civic participation, often prioritizing cultural preservation over collective advocacy.

Political Engagement

Voting Patterns and Electoral Participation

Arab citizens of Israel have historically exhibited lower rates compared to Jewish citizens, with participation fluctuating due to factors such as political alienation, calls for boycotts by some factions, and varying degrees of perceived electoral efficacy. In the elections for the 25th on November 1, 2022, turnout among eligible Arab voters reached 53.2%, an increase from 44.6% in the March elections but below the decade-long average of 55.9%. This uptick reflected greater engagement following the pragmatic approach of parties like Ra'am, which prioritized domestic issues such as and over ideological opposition to the state. Overall Israeli turnout in 2022 was 70.6%, highlighting the persistent gap. Voting patterns predominantly favor Arab-led lists, though a minority supports Zionist parties, particularly in or among communities integrated into state institutions. In 2022, Arab parties collectively received the strongest support in a decade, capturing about 85.7% of votes cast in Arab localities, equivalent to 44.9% of eligible voters. Ra'am garnered 35.2% (173,783 votes, securing 5 seats), Hadash-Ta'al 28.8% (5 seats), and Balad 21.7% (which failed the at 2.9% nationally). Votes for Zionist parties totaled 14.3%, including 3.2% for National Unity and 2.7% for , often driven by tactical considerations in local contests. By contrast, in 2019 elections, Zionist parties received up to 28.4% of Arab votes amid fragmented Arab lists. Electoral participation has shown volatility, with turnout dipping in periods of heightened tension—such as post-2000 disillusionment—but rising when Arab parties demonstrate influence, as in Ra'am's 2021 coalition entry, which encouraged pragmatic voting over abstention. Druze Arabs, comprising about 10% of the Arab citizenry, consistently exhibit higher turnout and stronger support for Zionist parties due to mandatory and communal ties to the state, diverging from Muslim and Christian patterns. Despite these trends, systemic underrepresentation persists, as Arab lists rarely exceed 10-15 seats in the 120-member , limiting broader policy impact.

Arab Political Parties and Alliances

Arab political parties in Israel emerged in the state's early years, initially as affiliates of mainstream Zionist parties or independent communist fronts, but evolved into distinct entities advocating for Arab minority rights, socioeconomic improvements, and Palestinian national aspirations. These parties operate within Israel's system, where a 3.25% necessitates alliances to secure seats. Major parties include , a left-wing, binational (Arab-Jewish) group rooted in the Maki and emphasizing civil equality and opposition to occupation; Balad, a secular Palestinian nationalist party focused on transforming Israel into a "state of all its citizens" with binational characteristics; , an Arab nationalist party led by , prioritizing Palestinian issues and Arab representation; and Ra'am (), an Islamist party representing the southern branch of the Islamic Movement, which prioritizes conservative religious values, community welfare, and pragmatic engagement with the state over ideological rejectionism. To overcome fragmentation and the —raised from 1% to 2% in 1992 and to 3.25% in 2014—Arab parties frequently form temporary alliances. The most significant was the , created before the March 2015 election by merging , Balad, , and Ra'am, which garnered 13 seats (10.6% of the vote) despite low Arab turnout of 48.7%. This alliance peaked in the March 2020 election with 15 seats (12.9% of the vote), becoming the Knesset's third-largest bloc and enabling figures like of to lead opposition efforts against . The 's platform combined leftist socioeconomic demands with critiques of Israeli policies toward , though internal ideological tensions—particularly between Ra'am's and Balad's secular nationalism—persisted. The alliance fractured ahead of the 2021 election due to disputes over Ra'am leader Mansour Abbas's willingness to negotiate with Zionist parties. Ra'am ran independently, securing 4 seats (4.0% of the vote), while the remaining parties took 6 seats (5.2%). Ra'am's subsequent support for the anti-Netanyahu under and —from June 2021 to June 2022—represented a historic shift, as Abbas prioritized community funding (e.g., for reduction and ) over boycottism, extracting concessions like 30 billion shekels in budget allocations for localities despite abstaining on some security votes. This pragmatism contrasted with Balad's rejection of coalitions and Hadash-Ta'al's opposition stance, highlighting divisions between integrationist and separatist approaches within politics. In the November 2022 election, further splintering occurred: Hadash-Ta'al alliance won 5 seats (3.7% of the vote), Ra'am secured 5 seats (3.8%), and Balad, running alone, failed to cross the threshold with 2.9% amid boycott calls and internal controversies, resulting in no Balad representation. Arab voter turnout rose slightly to 44.6%, but overall seats dropped to 10, reflecting disillusionment and competition from non-Arab parties. Balad faced repeated Central Elections Committee disqualifications attempts for alleged support of armed struggle, though courts overturned them; similarly, Ra'am has navigated scrutiny over ties to Islamist networks. By August 2025, amid ongoing challenges like rising Arab and post-October 7, 2023 tensions, party leaders including Tibi announced efforts to revive a unified for future elections to boost turnout and bargaining power.

Representation in Knesset and Government

Arab citizens of Israel have held seats in the Knesset since the body's establishment in 1949, with initial representation through mixed Arab-Jewish parties like the Communist Party, and over 100 individual Arab members having served to date. Over subsequent decades, dedicated Arab lists emerged, securing between 8 and 13 seats in most elections out of the Knesset's 120 total, though this falls short of their 21% share of the population due to consistently lower voter turnout rates of 40-50% compared to over 70% among Jewish voters. In the 25th Knesset, elected in November 2022, Arab representation reached a two-decade low of 10 members, all from Arab parties, with none serving in Jewish-led Zionist parties. These members are primarily elected via parties such as Hadash-Ta'al alliance (Marxist-Jewish and Arab nationalist), Balad (pan-Arabist), and the Islamist United Arab List (Ra'am), which together hold the bloc's seats. Arab parties have traditionally adopted an oppositional stance, rejecting participation in governing coalitions on ideological grounds tied to solidarity with Palestinians and criticism of Israel's Jewish character, limiting their direct policy influence. A notable exception occurred in June 2021, when Ra'am, under leader Mansour Abbas, broke from this norm by supporting the Bennett-Lapid coalition—the first time an independent Arab party joined an Israeli government—prioritizing pragmatic gains like funding for Arab communities over boycott. Ra'am secured commitments for infrastructure and crime reduction in Arab areas but exited support amid tensions, including post-October 7, 2023, events. Entry into executive government roles has been rarer still, reflecting the parties' reluctance to align with Zionist-led administrations. The first non-Jewish cabinet minister was Druze politician Salah Tarif in 2001, followed by Raleb Majadele, the first Muslim Arab, who served as Minister of Science and Technology from 2007 to 2009 under a Labor-led . No Arab party has held ministerial portfolios in recent coalitions, including the current Netanyahu formed in late 2022, where Ra'am remains in opposition despite occasional issue-based cooperation. This pattern underscores a tension between ideological maximalism—evident in platforms rejecting Israel's legitimacy—and occasional pragmatic engagement, with the latter yielding tangible benefits like budget allocations but facing internal backlash for compromising on issues.

Roles in Judiciary, Civil Service, and Local Governance

Arab citizens hold limited positions in Israel's relative to their share of the , which stands at approximately 21%. In 2022, the Judicial Appointments Committee selected 56 new judges, of whom only six were Arab, representing about 10.7% of appointments. This underrepresentation persists despite legal equality, with Arab judges more commonly serving in lower courts rather than higher ones; no Arab has sat on the since Salim Joubran's retirement in 2017. Studies indicate that panels including Arab judges tend to issue more lenient outcomes for Arab defendants, such as 14-20% reductions in incarceration rates, suggesting descriptive representation influences judicial decisions in multiethnic settings. In the civil service, Arab employment has grown but remains below population parity. As of recent reports, Arabs constitute 12.2% of civil service employees across Israel's 95 departments employing 78,594 personnel. Historical data shows progression from 4.8% in 2000 to 7.5% in 2010 and further increases by 2020, though breakdowns reveal disparities: in 2019, Arabs held 8.6% of positions, 15.5% of entry-level roles, and lower shares in senior positions. Underrepresentation is attributed in part to barriers like nationality-based hiring preferences in Jewish-majority organizations, despite affirmative efforts by the . Local governance sees greater Arab involvement, particularly in the 90 Arab-majority municipalities where residents elect Arab mayors and council members through direct votes every five years. In the 2024 municipal elections, Arab lists secured seats across 950 council positions in these authorities, maintaining community control over local services, planning, and budgets. However, Arab mayors face unique challenges, including threats from criminal elements seeking influence via extortion and institutional hurdles under national governments perceived as unsympathetic, compounded by low socioeconomic rankings in over 90% of Arab towns. Despite this, Arab officials manage daily in localities housing 70% of the Arab population, with direct elections since 1978 enabling localized political expression.

Challenges to Arab Parties and Movements

Arab political parties in Israel face persistent fragmentation, with ideological and strategic divisions leading to repeated splits and weakened electoral performance. The Joint List, formed in 2015 as a unified electoral alliance of four Arab-majority parties, collapsed in 2021 due to disagreements over participation in coalition governments, resulting in separate runs by Hadash-Ta'al, Balad, and Ra'am in subsequent elections. This fragmentation culminated in Balad's departure from Hadash-Ta'al ahead of the 2022 elections, reducing the collective Arab representation in the Knesset from 13 seats in 2020 to 10 seats in 2022, despite Arabs comprising about 21% of Israel's population. Such divisions stem from tensions between Islamist, nationalist, and communist factions, as well as debates over pragmatic engagement with Jewish-led coalitions versus ideological opposition to the state. Low among Arab citizens exacerbates these challenges, reflecting disillusionment with political institutions and internal societal issues like . In the 2022 elections for the 25th , turnout among eligible Arab voters was approximately 55%, down from higher rates in unified list eras, contributing to Ra'am's relative success with 5 seats while Balad failed to cross the . Factors include perceptions of inefficacy—evidenced by parties' limited influence on national policy—and rising violence within Arab communities, which claimed over 200 lives in 2022 and diverted focus from political mobilization. Surveys indicate that while two-thirds of Arab citizens support potential partnerships, persistent low participation stems from distrust in parties' ability to address socioeconomic disparities or security concerns. Legal barriers under Israel's Basic Law: The Knesset further constrain Arab parties, allowing disqualification for denying the state's Jewish and democratic character, inciting racism, or supporting armed struggle against Israel. Article 7A has been invoked against parties like Balad, which faced repeated Central Elections Committee bans—upheld or overturned by the Supreme Court—for statements perceived as endorsing terrorism or rejecting Israel's legitimacy, such as glorifying historical figures involved in attacks on civilians. Recent legislative efforts, including a 2024 bill advancing in the Knesset, aim to broaden disqualification criteria to include explicit support for enemy states or terrorist groups, potentially targeting MKs with pro-Palestinian rhetoric amid post-October 7, 2023, heightened scrutiny. While these measures are defended as safeguarding democracy against existential threats, critics argue they disproportionately affect Arab representation, though empirical data shows no outright bans since 1980s-era socialist lists, with courts often mitigating politically motivated petitions. Ideological positions prioritizing over Israeli civic integration limit coalition-building, isolating most Arab parties from governing majorities. Prior to 2021, an unwritten taboo excluded them from coalitions; Ra'am's brief participation in the Bennett-Lapid government marked a pragmatic shift, securing funding but drawing backlash from other Arab factions for compromising on core issues like the Nation-State Law. Many parties, including and Balad, maintain platforms critical of Israel's security policies and supportive of , which Jewish parties cite as incompatible with Zionist governance—evidenced by rhetoric from leaders like those in labeling Arab MKs as security risks. This dynamic, compounded by Arab parties' occasional endorsement of narratives aligning with hostile actors, perpetuates marginalization, though Ra'am's model suggests potential for issue-based alliances focused on domestic welfare over irredentist goals. Arab citizens of Israel primarily acquired through residency and registration following the state's establishment on May 14, 1948. Approximately 156,000 remained within Israel's borders after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, out of a pre-war population of around 1.2 million in the area that became ; these individuals were eligible for automatic if they were present on the day of independence and registered with authorities by a specified deadline, typically involving proof of residence and loyalty oaths in some cases. The process was formalized under the of 1952, which granted to Ottoman or British subjects (including ) who were residents on or before July 14, 1952, provided they did not voluntarily leave during the war or receive enemy citizenship; this law also allowed for for those meeting residency requirements of three to five years, without mandating renunciation of prior nationality except in specific cases. Subsequent acquisitions occur through birth to at least one Israeli citizen parent, regardless of ethnicity, or via , which requires continuous residency, proficiency, and renunciation of foreign allegiances in practice, though dual is permitted for most. Children born in Israel to non-citizen parents do not automatically gain , aligning with principles favoring descent over birthplace, a policy applied uniformly but contrasting with the Law of Return's preferential immigration for . By 2023, citizens numbered about 2.1 million, comprising roughly 21% of Israel's , with growth driven by higher birth rates and natural increase rather than , as immigration post-1948 has been limited compared to Jewish . Legally, Arab citizens hold equal standing with Jewish citizens under , entitled to the full spectrum of civil including voting from age 18, freedom of expression, property ownership, and access to courts without ethnic distinctions in adjudication. The : Human Dignity and Liberty (1992) enshrines protections against arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty, or property, interpreted by the to include equality principles, enabling Arab citizens to challenge discriminatory practices through , as seen in cases striking down certain administrative biases. However, exemptions from compulsory military service—mandatory for Jewish and citizens but voluntary for most since 1949—affect eligibility for certain benefits like subsidies or tax credits, creating practical disparities not rooted in legal inequality but in service obligations tied to perceived security risks during the state's formative years. The 2018 Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People affirms Hebrew as the sole state language (downgrading Arabic to "special status") and prioritizes Jewish settlement, but does not alter individual citizenship rights or impose ethnic hierarchies in legal protections; critics, including some Arab MKs, argue it signals symbolic inferiority, yet courts have upheld equal application of laws absent explicit discrimination. Specific restrictions, such as the 2003 Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (temporarily barring Palestinian spouses from the West Bank or Gaza from gaining residency or citizenship, renewed periodically for security reasons), disproportionately impact Arab citizens due to marriage patterns but apply to all Israelis and have been partially mitigated by court rulings allowing case-by-case approvals. Overall, while de facto socioeconomic gaps persist, formal legal equality enables Arab participation in governance, with 10 Arab MKs serving in the 25th Knesset as of 2023, underscoring citizenship's practical efficacy despite ongoing debates over national identity.

Language Policy, National Symbols, and Holidays

Israel's designates Hebrew as the sole official state language, while holds a special status, as enshrined in the 2018 : Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People. This legislation, passed by the on July 19, 2018, with a vote of 62-55, explicitly states that "Hebrew is the State language" and provides for "arrangements" regarding 's special status, effectively downgrading it from its prior official standing since 's founding in 1948. In practice, continues to be used extensively in Arab-majority localities, primary and for Arab students (where it serves as the language of instruction), signage in Arabic-speaking areas, and legal proceedings involving Arabic speakers, though Hebrew predominates in national institutions, media, and public administration. Road signs and official documents often feature alongside Hebrew and English to accommodate the population. National symbols of Israel, including the flag featuring two blue horizontal stripes and a blue Star of David on a white field, and the anthem "Hatikvah" ("The Hope"), which references Jewish historical longing for return to the homeland, reflect the state's Jewish character and are mandated for official use. Arab citizens, comprising about 21% of Israel's population as of 2023, frequently express disconnection from these symbols due to their Zionist and Jewish-centric themes; surveys and statements from Arab leaders indicate that many view the anthem as exclusionary, with some advocating for revisions or supplementary symbols to foster inclusivity. Despite this, Arab citizens are expected to respect state symbols in public settings, such as schools and ceremonies, though compliance varies, with isolated incidents of protest or non-participation reported. Holidays in Israel primarily follow the Jewish calendar, with national observances for events like (May 14, adjusted to ), , and resulting in widespread closures of schools, businesses, and government offices. citizens, predominantly Muslim with Christian and minorities, receive legal accommodations for their religious holidays; permits employees to take paid or unpaid time off for up to nine religious holidays annually, tailored by faith, including and for Muslims, and and for , without penalty. These days are not national holidays but are recognized in communities, where local businesses and schools often close, enabling participation in prayers, family gatherings, and traditions; for instance, in 2023, fell around April 21, aligning with school holidays for students.

Property Rights, Housing, and Land Issues

Arab citizens of Israel possess equal legal rights to property ownership under , including the : Human Dignity and Liberty, which protects property from arbitrary deprivation. However, the majority of land in —approximately 93%—is state-owned or controlled by quasi-public entities like the Israel Land Authority, with usage rights allocated via long-term leases to citizens irrespective of ethnicity. Private land ownership among Arabs is concentrated in designated Arab localities, comprising a smaller share compared to Jewish citizens due to historical factors such as the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, which displaced populations and led to the application of laws like the 1950 Absentee Property Law, transferring abandoned or enemy-held properties to state custodianship; estimates indicate this affected up to 1.2-1.3 million dunams formerly under Arab control. These transfers were legally enacted amid wartime conditions but have been criticized by advocacy groups as contributing to reduced Arab land holdings, though defenders argue they aligned with international norms for handling absentee assets post-conflict and that subsequent state policies prioritize development over ethnic allocation. Housing challenges in Arab localities stem primarily from rapid demographic growth—Arab population increase averaged 2.5% annually from 2010-2020, outpacing the Jewish rate of 1.6%—coupled with insufficient , resulting in and a prevalence of unauthorized construction estimated at 15-20% of homes in Arab towns and villages. Larger sizes, with over 26% of Muslim families comprising six or more members versus 9% of Jewish families, exacerbate issues, often leading to multi-generational dwellings that strain limited zoned areas. Local factors, including clan-based (hamula) influence on municipal , resistance to densification in favor of low-rise sprawl, and delays in updating master plans—many unchanged since the —contribute to permit bottlenecks, as Arab authorities advance fewer development proposals than Jewish ones. While claims of discriminatory permit denials persist— reports allege lower approval rates in Arab areas due to underinvestment—empirical points to mutual causation: governmental neglect in allocating planning resources to Arab sectors post-independence, combined with internal inefficiencies like and politicized , perpetuates a cycle where illegal builds precede formal , inviting demolitions. Demolition orders target unpermitted structures across ethnic lines, but in Arab contexts, they often affect expansions in unrecognized or peripheral villages; for instance, self-demolitions occur to evade enforcement costs, and annual demolitions in proper number in the hundreds, far below West Bank figures often conflated in critiques. Government responses since 2015 include multi-year economic plans for the sector, such as the 2016-2020 initiative under Resolution 922, which earmarked NIS 15 billion overall, with portions for infrastructure, commercial zoning, and master plan updates to enable thousands of new units; subsequent plans through 2025 extended investments, though implementation lags due to local absorption capacity and fiscal constraints amid the 2023-2025 cuts. These efforts aim to address root causes like scarcity for expansion—Arab localities control under 3% of municipal despite 21% of the —by promoting regulated development, yet disparities persist, with Arab homeownership at 62% similar to national averages but quality and affordability lower due to persistent illegal builds evading utilities.

Family Reunification, Intermarriage, and Specific Legislation

The Citizenship and Entry into Israel (Temporary Order) Law, 5763-2003, enacted by the on July 31, 2003, prohibits the automatic granting of Israeli , , or long-term temporary residency to residents of the , , or "areas in and " who marry Israeli citizens, a measure that predominantly impacts Arab Israeli spouses due to higher rates of such unions with . The law allows limited exceptions, such as short-term visitor permits subject to security vetting or residency for spouses over age 35 (men) or 25 (women) from certain areas, but these are rarely granted and do not lead to . Enacted during the Second , the legislation addressed security risks, as Israeli authorities documented cases where family unification permits enabled entry for individuals later involved in terrorist activities, including suicide bombings that killed dozens of Israelis. A 2022 study reaffirmed these concerns, finding statistically significant correlations between approved reunifications and subsequent involvement in violence by some beneficiaries or their relatives. The law, initially temporary, has been extended repeatedly by the , most recently in March 2022 for an additional year, amid ongoing threats from Palestinian territories, though critics argue it constitutes demographic control by preventing a potential influx that could alter Israel's Jewish majority. Israel's has rejected multiple challenges to its constitutionality, including in 2006 (upholding it 6-5 as proportionate to security needs) and 2012 (confirming it does not violate basic rights unduly, given alternatives like relocation abroad), emphasizing that family life rights are not absolute in contexts of . Petitions from groups like Adalah, which represent Arab interests, have highlighted humanitarian impacts, such as family separations affecting thousands of applications annually, but courts have prioritized empirical security data over equality claims. Intermarriage between Arab citizens of Israel and Jewish citizens occurs at very low rates, reflecting deep cultural, religious, and social divides rather than outright legal prohibition. Data from Israel's 2008 census indicate that only 2.1% of married Jewish men were wed to Palestinian women, with even lower figures for Jewish women and Arab men due to patriarchal norms and familial opposition in Arab communities. Broader surveys show religious intermarriage among Jews at around 2%, predominantly with non-Arabs like immigrants from the former Soviet Union classified as "without religion," underscoring the rarity of Arab-Jewish unions. Israel's marriage system, governed exclusively by religious authorities (rabbinical courts for Jews, sharia or ecclesiastical courts for Muslims and Christians), does not recognize interfaith marriages performed domestically, though civil marriages abroad are registered for residency purposes; this framework indirectly discourages such pairings without banning them. Specific legislation reinforces these dynamics while addressing citizenship transmission. Under the 1952 Citizenship Law, children of Israeli citizens born abroad to intermarried couples may claim if one is Israeli, but this does not extend to non-citizen spouses from restricted areas under the 2003 law. No dedicated statute bars Arab-Jewish intermarriage per se, but the absence of options—unique among democracies—exacerbates barriers, as religious laws prohibit mixed unions, leading couples to seek foreign ceremonies. For Arab citizens, courts permit in limited cases but enforce strict norms, contributing to rates exceeding 40% in some communities, far higher than among . These provisions, upheld as preserving religious autonomy, align with Israel's nation-state framework but have drawn criticism for perpetuating segregation, though empirical low intermarriage rates suggest voluntary preferences play a primary causal role. Arab citizens of Israel hold full citizenship with equal legal rights to Jewish citizens, including established since the state's founding in 1948, the ability to form , and access to the without ethnic-based restrictions. Israel's : Human Dignity and Liberty (1992), interpreted by the as incorporating equal protection principles, applies uniformly to all citizens regardless of . Critics frequently allege legal subordination through the : Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People (2018), which declares Hebrew the state language and prioritizes Jewish settlement as a national value; however, the law contains no provisions revoking individual or , and the upheld it on January 31, 2021, affirming it does not override democratic tenets or entrenched Basic Laws protecting personal liberties. The Court's 10-3 majority emphasized that declarative does not authorize , distinguishing Israel's framework from systems of . Assertions of systemic legal apartheid, as advanced by organizations like and , conflate citizen with policies toward non-citizens in the territories or historical security measures, such as the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (2003, amended), which temporarily restricts from certain areas for demographic and security reasons but has been partially softened by court oversight and does not apply retroactively to existing citizens. These claims fail under definitions of apartheid, which require intent for racial domination and inhumane acts of segregation; Arab Israelis, comprising 21% of the population as of 2023, vote, serve as judges (including on the since 1999), and hold ministerial positions without legal barriers, evidencing no such systematic denial of . Judicial precedents further refute blanket discrimination claims: In Ka'adan v. Israel Land Administration (2000), the ruled against ethnic exclusion in state-subsidized housing, mandating equal access to land allocated by the Jewish Agency. Similarly, in Adalah v. Minister of Interior (2006), the Court struck down aspects of citizenship revocation for dual nationals aiding enemy states, narrowing application to extreme security threats and preserving equality for non-combatant citizens. Lists of "discriminatory laws" compiled by advocacy groups like Adalah, which document over 65 statutes since , often interpret neutral security or policies—such as the Absentee Property Law (1950), targeting properties abandoned during wartime by non-residents—as targeting citizens, despite rulings limiting their scope to non-citizens or proven disloyalty cases. Such compilations, while highlighting policy debates, reflect advocacy agendas rather than wholesale legal inequality, as evidenced by Arab Israelis' consistent electoral participation (e.g., 44% turnout in 2021 Knesset elections) and representation (10 Arab MKs in the 2022 coalition). Empirical legal equality persists despite socioeconomic gaps, which stem more from cultural, educational, and intra-community factors than statutes denying civic parity; for instance, localities receive equivalent per-capita municipal since 2015 reforms, with disparities arising from lower tax bases and non-compliance rather than discriminatory edicts. International bodies critiquing , including those echoing apartheid rhetoric, exhibit selective application—rarely addressing comparable ethnic preferences in constitutions like Jordan's (Article 2, state) or Germany's (Article 116, favoring ethnic Germans)—undermining their neutrality on .

Socioeconomic Status

Historical Poverty, Unemployment, and Welfare Dependency

Throughout the post-independence period, Arab citizens of Israel have exhibited markedly higher rates than the Jewish majority, with family rates often exceeding 40 percent. Data from Israel's Institute and analytical reports indicate that in 1995, the after-transfer rate among Arab families stood at approximately 53 percent, declining modestly to around 48 percent by 2005 before stabilizing near 45 percent through the early 2010s. In contrast, Jewish family rates during the same era ranged from 12 to 15 percent, highlighting persistent disparities driven by lower market incomes, with Arab rates on market income rising from 47 percent in 1992 to 57 percent by 2011. Child among Arabs was even more acute, affecting over 55 percent in the due to higher rates averaging 3-4 children per woman compared to 2-3 for . Unemployment among Arab Israelis has historically outpaced national averages, particularly during economic downturns. In the second half of the , unemployment rates for Arabs surged more than for , reaching peaks of 12-15 percent for Arab men by the early amid national rates of 8-10 percent. Employment rates for Arab men aged 25-64 fell sharply from mid- levels through 2003, recovering only gradually to pre-1995 figures by the late , while Arab women faced participation rates below 20 percent in the - due to limited and cultural norms. These trends were exacerbated by geographic concentration in peripheral localities with fewer industrial opportunities and lower skill levels, as Arab workers were overrepresented in low-wage sectors like and . Welfare dependency has correspondingly been elevated, with Arab citizens relying more heavily on state transfers such as support, child allowances, and to mitigate . By the mid-2000s, , comprising about 18-20 percent of the , accounted for roughly 30-35 percent of welfare expenditure recipients, reflecting both higher eligibility from and larger household sizes. National Insurance Institute data show that transfers reduced Arab by 10-15 percentage points in the 1990s-2000s but left a residual gap, as benefits were insufficient to fully offset shortfalls from and . This dependency was further underscored by the fact that over 40 percent of poor individuals in aggregated assessments through 2010 were , despite their demographic share.

Economic Progress Since the 2010s

Since the early , rates among Arab citizens of Israel have risen markedly, driven by increased labor force participation, particularly among women, and supported by targeted investments. The rate for Arab women climbed from 21% in 2010 to 43.4% by the end of 2022, nearly doubling and reflecting broader shifts toward workforce integration. For Arab men, the rate reached 77.7% in the lead-up to October 2023, though it dipped temporarily amid the ensuing conflict. These gains contributed to higher overall labor force participation, with Arab men at 60.6% in 2022 compared to 67.7% for Jewish men, narrowing some disparities through expanded opportunities in sectors like healthcare, where Arab representation among physicians surged from 8% in 2010 to 25% in 2023. A pivotal factor was the government's 2015 five-year plan (Resolution 922), which allocated approximately 15 billion shekels (about $4.3 billion at the time) to the sector for , , programs, and industrial zones, marking the largest such initiative to date. This was followed by a second plan in 2021 (Resolution 550), committing 30 billion shekels ($9 billion) over five years to further advance , innovation, and housing. Evaluations indicate these efforts boosted by fostering job creation and skill development, with women's rate stabilizing around 40% post-stagnation, aiding Israel's broader productivity growth. Despite persistent income gaps—where average Jewish incomes exceeded Arab ones by 40-60% through the late , with trends continuing into the —rising has correlated with improved household earnings in the Arab sector, though rates remained elevated at around 45% for Arab families in 2021 after transfers. Progress in high-tech and fields, alongside urban development in Arab localities, has helped mitigate some structural barriers, though challenges like and underinvestment in earlier decades tempered absolute gains.

Factors Explaining Disparities (Cultural, Educational, and Criminal Influences)

Cultural factors, including larger average family sizes and traditional gender roles, contribute significantly to persistent socioeconomic disparities. Arab-Israeli households tend to have higher dependency ratios due to historically elevated rates, which, even as they converge with rates (2.98 children per woman for versus 3.00 for in recent data), result in a disproportionate share of young children in —Arab families accounted for % of households with children under five below the poverty line despite comprising only 16% of all households. This strains and welfare resources, as larger families dilute earnings and increase reliance on child allowances, which studies link to sustained high-order births in communities, perpetuating cycles of low income. Consanguineous marriages, prevalent in some subgroups at rates up to 40-50%, further exacerbate health issues like genetic disorders, indirectly hindering educational and economic productivity. Norms prioritizing clan loyalty and over broader limit women's workforce integration and entrepreneurial activity. Female labor participation among Arab Israelis lags at approximately 40%, compared to over 75% for Jewish women, rooted in cultural expectations of early and , which reduce household income and accumulation. These patterns foster dependence on employment and remittances, rather than private sector , widening income gaps independent of legal barriers. Educational influences amplify these disparities through lower attainment and field choices misaligned with high-value labor markets. While access to schooling is universal, Arab students' socioeconomic backgrounds—intertwined with cultural emphases on family obligations over individual academic rigor—correlate with achievement gaps; for instance, Arab pupils score lower on standardized tests even after controlling for some inputs, reflecting priorities toward and over STEM and technical fields that command higher wages. Cultural shifts, such as delayed marriage for educated women amid a "youth bulge," create mismatches in the marriage market and reinforce educational stagnation for males in underachieving communities. This results in underemployment, as Arab graduates cluster in lower-paying public roles, sustaining rates double those of . Criminal influences, particularly intra-communal violence, undermine by eroding trust, deterring investment, and disrupting daily life. In 2023, Arab society recorded 233 —over 80% of Israel's total—primarily from feuds and , yielding a murder rate more than ten times that of Jewish communities and ranking among the highest in developed nations. This pervasive insecurity correlates with business closures, school absenteeism, and from Arab localities, perpetuating poverty traps; for example, the and regions, Arab-majority areas, see homicide concentrations that halve local growth potential compared to safer Jewish peripheries. Weak state authority in -dominated structures exacerbates enforcement failures, with only 15% of cases solved, fostering a parallel economy of protection rackets over legitimate enterprise.

Education and Human Capital

Primary and Secondary Education Outcomes

Arab students in Israel's primary and middle schools have achieved near-universal enrollment, rising from 63% in 1990 to 93% in 2015, closely approaching the Hebrew sector's rates of 90% to 97% over the same period. This progress reflects policy expansions in and infrastructure investment, though per-student spending in Arab schools remains lower, at about 70-80% of Hebrew sector levels in recent years. Standardized test performance reveals persistent gaps. In national Meitsav assessments for grades 5 and 8 (2007-2016), Arab students trailed Jewish peers in and , with gaps narrowing over time—e.g., grade 5 math disparities reduced after socioeconomic adjustments—but remaining substantial in language subjects like English, where Arab pass rates lag far behind. International results for 15-year-olds underscore this: in 2015, Arab students scored 104 points lower on average than Jewish students across reading, , and , a gap persisting across socioeconomic quartiles (e.g., 67 points in the lowest group). Secondary education outcomes show convergence in completion metrics. Dropout rates have fallen sharply, reaching 2.9% for Arab boys and 1.5% for girls in the 2022-2023 transition to 10th grade, versus 2.8% and 1.0% for Jewish students; historical rates were higher among Arab males but have aligned amid overall declines. Matriculation (bagrut) eligibility within age cohorts has improved dramatically for Arabs, from 28.9% in 2000 to 50.3% in 2015 and 75.6% in 2021-2022, narrowing the gap to Jewish rates of 45.6%, 62.4%, and 77.2% respectively.
YearArab Bagrut Eligibility (%)Jewish Bagrut Eligibility (%)
200028.945.6
201550.362.4
2021-2275.677.2
Subgroup variations persist, with rates at 91.6% and at 63.7% in 2021-2022, reflecting geographic and cultural differences in educational emphasis. While quantity metrics like enrollment and eligibility have equalized, quality indicators such as test scores indicate ongoing disparities, potentially linked to differences, , and home environments rather than access alone.

Access to and Achievements in Higher Education

Access to higher education for Arab citizens of Israel has expanded markedly since the 1990s, driven by rising matriculation eligibility rates and targeted affirmative action programs in select institutions, though overall enrollment remains below their 21% share of the population. In the 2021/2022 academic year, Arab students comprised 14.8% of total higher education enrollees, reflecting steady growth from 8.3% in 1999/2000 but persistent gaps linked to lower secondary school completion rates (63.4% matriculation eligibility for Arabs versus 80.2% for Jews in 2019). Enrollment in academic colleges has accelerated faster, with Arabs forming 24% of first-degree students in 2022/2023, up from 7% a decade prior, particularly among women who now outpace men in participation. Achievements are evident in graduation outputs and professional integration, especially in health-related fields where Arab students demonstrate high retention and specialization. By 2023, 25% of Arab women aged 30-34 held a or higher, a doubling from 2013 levels, contributing to overrepresentation in (70% of first-degree enrollees Arab in 2022/2023) and (33%). This has translated into Arabs comprising 49% of pharmacists, 27% of nurses and dentists, and 25% of physicians in recent workforce data, with newly licensed professionals showing even higher Arab shares in some categories (e.g., 46% of new pharmacists). In contrast, representation in and other STEM fields lags, though historical trends show increasing study abroad and domestic participation, with overall Arab degree attainment rising across subgroups like , , and . Challenges in broader achievements stem from socioeconomic factors and preparatory gaps, yet empirical progress underscores causal links to policy interventions like expanded college tracks and scholarships; for instance, enrollment doubled from 22,543 students in 2008 to over 45,000 by the mid-2010s, sustaining momentum into the . Peer-reviewed analyses confirm that while absolute gains are substantial—e.g., from negligible post-1948 levels to current professional outputs—relative disparities with Jewish peers endure due to uneven K-12 foundations rather than institutional barriers, as Israeli universities maintain based on standardized tests and eligibility.

Healthcare and Social Services

Health Disparities and Access to Services

Arab citizens of Israel experience notable health disparities compared to Jewish citizens, particularly in , , and chronic disease prevalence. at birth remains approximately four years lower for Arabs than for Jews, with Arab men showing particularly lower rates as reported in a 2025 Health Ministry analysis. rates among Arab infants are nearly double those among Jewish infants, at around 5 per 1,000 live births versus 2.7 for Jews, based on recent demographic data. General mortality rates also diverge, with 5.1 deaths per 1,000 among Arabs compared to 4.3 among Jews and others in 2023. These gaps persist despite universal healthcare coverage under Israel's Law, which mandates equal access to services for all citizens. Chronic conditions contribute significantly to these disparities, with Arabs exhibiting higher rates of (18.3% versus 17.5% among Jews) and (28.8% versus 22.5%). Elevated incidences of birth defects, road and work-related accidents, and overall chronic disease burdens are documented among Arab Israelis, often linked to and environmental factors rather than direct of care. Cardiovascular mortality risks are higher for Arabs, influenced by socioeconomic determinants, though specific causal pathways require further disaggregation beyond aggregate data. Mortality differentials have narrowed at younger ages (under 45) over decades but widened at older ages, reflecting shifts in demographic transitions and health behaviors. Access to healthcare services is facilitated by the national system, yet practical barriers persist, especially in peripheral and Arab-majority localities where lags. The 2025 Health Ministry Equity Report highlights disparities in service availability, with in remote areas facing longer travel times to specialists and hospitals compared to central Jewish populations. communities, a subset of Arab citizens, encounter additional systemic obstacles including unrecognized villages lacking formal clinics, compounded by low , , and high . Cultural factors, such as higher rates among Arab men and family-centered care preferences, influence utilization patterns, though these do not fully explain gaps when controlling for and residence. Representation of in healthcare professions has risen sharply, comprising 25% of physicians, 27% of nurses, and 49% of pharmacists by 2023, aiding culturally sensitive service delivery but not yet eliminating outcome differences. Socioeconomic and residential segregation underpin many disparities, as citizens predominantly reside in clustered localities with lower development indices, correlating with reduced preventive care uptake and higher emergency interventions. Peer-reviewed analyses attribute persistent inequalities to these structural elements over systemic in service provision, noting that equal legal entitlements have not uniformly translated to equitable outcomes due to behavioral and locational variances. initiatives, including targeted equity programs, aim to address periphery gaps, but 2025 reports indicate ongoing challenges in mortality and access metrics.

Role in National Healthcare System

Arab citizens of Israel, comprising approximately 21% of the country's , play a substantial role in the national healthcare workforce, particularly as physicians, nurses, dentists, and pharmacists. In 2023, Arabs accounted for 25% of physicians, 27% of nurses, 27% of dentists, and 49% of pharmacists, exceeding their population share in several categories and reflecting increased integration into the system. This representation has grown markedly since 2010, with Arab professionals filling critical gaps in service provision amid Israel's aging population and physician shortages. Among younger physicians (aged 67 and under), Arabs constituted 24% by the end of 2021, while 43% of new physician licenses that year were awarded to and doctors combined, indicating accelerating entry into the profession. also represent about 15% of medical students, a 400% increase since 1990, supporting long-term sustainability of the workforce. In healthcare organizations serving mixed Jewish- populations, staff often comprise 20-25% of employees, collaborating with Jewish colleagues to deliver care across ethnic lines. This participation extends to essential functions in hospitals and clinics, including in northern regions with higher Arab concentrations, where their employment rates surpass population proportions. pharmacists, in particular, dominate the field at nearly half of all practitioners, contributing to medication distribution and initiatives nationwide. During national emergencies, such as the and the 2023-2024 conflicts, healthcare workers have maintained operations, underscoring their integral position in Israel's universal coverage model administered through health maintenance organizations like Clalit and Maccabi.

National Service and Security Contributions

Conscription Exemptions and Voluntary Participation

Arab citizens of Israel who are not Druze or Circassians—primarily Muslims and Christians—are exempt from mandatory conscription into the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), a policy in effect since the state's founding in 1948 despite lacking explicit statutory codification. This exemption stems from practical considerations, including historical security concerns over divided loyalties in potential conflicts with Arab states or Palestinian groups, rather than a formal legal deferral like those for ultra-Orthodox Jews. In practice, the IDF issues no draft orders to these Arab citizens, who constitute about 21% of Israel's population, though exemptions can be revoked administratively if deemed necessary for national security. Voluntary enlistment by non-Druze Arab citizens remains available and has shown gradual increases, particularly among Muslim volunteers, driven by incentives such as enhanced employment prospects, , and access to IDF training programs. In 2018, 436 Muslim Arabs enlisted voluntarily; this rose to 489 in 2019 and 606 in 2020, with more than half assigned to roles. Dropout rates among these volunteers improved from 30% in 2019 to 23% in 2020, reflecting targeted IDF retention efforts, though challenges persist due to cultural resistance and family pressures within Arab communities. Enlistment rates among Arab citizens overall hover below 1% of their eligible cohort, far lower than the near-universal service among Jewish , but post-2020 trends indicate acceleration amid economic motivations and the era's emphasis on IDF reliability. A 2025 survey of found 41% opposing any IDF service, 45% supporting non-combat roles, and only 7% favoring combat enlistment, underscoring persistent debates over participation's implications for communal identity. Volunteers often cite personal agency and benefits like priority in hiring, yet face , including accusations of disloyalty from Palestinian nationalists.

Druze and Circassian Military Service

In Israel, male citizens from the and Circassian communities are subject to compulsory into the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), distinguishing them from the broader Arab Muslim and Christian populations who are exempt. This requirement stems from historical agreements reflecting their leaders' voluntary alignment with the state during its founding, positioning both groups as loyal minorities integrated into roles alongside Jewish citizens. and Circassian men typically serve 32 months of , with opportunities for officer training and service across various IDF units, including elite combat formations. Women from these communities are fully exempt from service. Druze conscription was formalized in 1956 following initial voluntary participation by many in the 1948 War of Independence, after community leaders petitioned for inclusion to affirm loyalty to the new state. Today, enlistment rates exceed 80 percent among eligible men, one of the highest in , leading to disproportionate representation in roles and command positions. Since the , 2023, attacks, soldiers have sustained significant casualties, with at least 13-14 killed in operations, underscoring their frontline involvement in defending Israeli . This service has fostered socioeconomic benefits, such as access to veterans' benefits and higher education subsidies, though it has not fully bridged disparities in civilian infrastructure for villages. Circassian males have faced mandatory service since , based on a community consensus to integrate militarily as Muslim exiles resettled in after the 19th-century Russian conquests. Comprising a small of approximately 5,000, serve across IDF branches, producing numerous officers and demonstrating high unit cohesion due to their martial traditions. Their contributions emphasize and roles, with no recorded exemptions or widespread , reflecting a cultural emphasis on state allegiance over pan-Islamic or ethnic ties. Both communities' participation reinforces 's policy of selective for non-Jewish minorities perceived as reliable, though debates persist over equal despite their security sacrifices.

National-Civil Service Alternatives and Debates

Arab citizens of Israel, exempt from mandatory conscription under the Defense Service Law, have access to voluntary national as an alternative form of contribution to society. This program, administered by the Authority for National , enables participants aged 18 to 21 to serve for 12 to 24 months in non- roles, primarily in healthcare, , welfare, and environmental sectors, typically working 30-40 hours per week. Participation is entirely optional and has seen steady growth, particularly among women; for instance, in 2015, approximately 4,157 Israelis were engaged in the service, comprising nearly all female volunteers. Completion grants benefits equivalent to those of discharges, including monthly stipends during service, priority admission to universities, and advantages in and public sector job placements, with reports indicating that about 85% of participants secure improved opportunities afterward. Proponents of expanded participation emphasize its role in promoting socioeconomic integration and mutual societal contributions, arguing that it equips Arab youth with professional skills, fosters exposure to diverse communities, and aligns with a shared civic burden without requiring involvement. initiatives have encouraged uptake through and incentives, viewing it as a pathway to reduce disparities in and rates between Arab and Jewish citizens. Studies on participants highlight motivations tied to and , with some reporting enhanced senses of belonging to Israeli society while navigating dual identities. Debates persist over the program's implications for national cohesion and identity. Advocates for mandatory civilian service, occasionally proposed amid broader discussions on exemptions (such as for ultra-Orthodox Jews), contend it could enhance trust and reciprocity without the sensitivities of armed service, potentially drafting into infrastructure or projects. Critics, including segments of and organizations like Baladna, argue that even voluntary involvement risks ostracism, reinforces perceptions of conditional citizenship, and diverts from addressing underlying inequalities or the Palestinian national narrative. Efforts to mandate service have been avoided to prevent escalation, with policymakers opting for voluntary expansion to balance integration goals against potential backlash.

Intercommunal Dynamics

Public Opinion Polls on Mutual Perceptions

A survey conducted by University's Center in December 2024 found that 57.8% of Arab Israelis believed the ongoing war in Gaza had fostered a sense of shared destiny between and in , up from 51.6% in a June 2024 poll by the same institution. In contrast, a 2025 survey by the Givat Haviva Institute revealed significant mutual distrust: 72% of Jewish Israelis reported not trusting most Arab citizens, while 43% of Arab Israelis reported not trusting most Jewish citizens; additionally, 50% of Jewish respondents perceived increased hostility from Arabs since the start of the Gaza war. A June 2024 Pew Research Center survey indicated that 58% of Arab Israelis and 61% of Jewish Israelis viewed relations between the two groups as characterized by strong conflicts, with both populations equally likely to identify intergroup tensions as a major societal issue. The same Pew survey highlighted divergent optimism about coexistence: only 16% of Jewish Israelis believed peaceful coexistence with a Palestinian state was possible, compared to 40% of Arab Israelis. An Israel Democracy Institute survey reported high overall attachment to the state, with 92.5% of Jewish Israelis and 77% of Arab Israelis expressing a sense of belonging to Israel and sharing in its challenges.
Poll SourceDateKey Finding on Arab Israelis' PerceptionsKey Finding on Jewish Israelis' Perceptions
Dec 202457.8% see shared destiny with Jews post-warNot assessed
Givat Haviva InstituteFeb 202543% distrust most 72% distrust most Arabs; 50% sense increased Arab hostility
Jun 202458% see strong conflicts with ; 40% optimistic on coexistence61% see strong conflicts with Arabs; 16% optimistic on coexistence
Recent (post-2023)77% feel part of 92.5% feel part of

Patterns of Violence, Crime, and Terrorism Involvement

Arab citizens of Israel face disproportionately high rates of intra-communal violence, primarily driven by families and clan-based feuds involving illegal firearms and . In 2023, 244 Arab citizens were killed in crime-related incidents, the highest annual figure recorded, representing over 80% of Israel's total homicides despite Arabs comprising about 21% of the . The rate among Arab Israelis more than doubled from prior years, reaching levels that place Israel third highest in murder rates among developed nations when accounting for the Arab sector's contribution. This trend persisted into 2024 with 220 homicides in the Arab , compared to 58 among . From June 2012 to June 2023, 856 Arab men and 143 Arab women were murdered, with many cases linked to unresolved family vendettas and low solve rates. Organized crime syndicates in Arab communities, often operating as mafia-style groups, dominate local economies through protection rackets, drug trafficking, and construction bid rigging, exacerbating violence amid proliferation of smuggled weapons and socioeconomic factors like youth unemployment exceeding 20% in some areas. Between 2018 and 2022, 70% of crime-related fatalities involved Arab victims and perpetrators, underscoring the self-perpetuating nature of these networks in under-policed localities. Efforts to combat this, including increased police operations under National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, have yielded arrests but faced criticism for insufficient long-term deterrence, with over 100 murders in the first half of 2024 alone. A smaller but notable pattern involves Arab citizens in terrorism against Israeli civilians and security forces, often inspired by Islamist ideologies or affiliations with groups like Hamas or ISIS. Since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack, at least 15 Jews have been killed by Arab citizens or legal residents of Israel, surpassing fatalities from Palestinian attacks in the West Bank during the same period. In 2015, 41 Arab Israelis joined ISIS, coinciding with 15 domestic terror attacks by Arab perpetrators. Israeli security agencies, including the Shin Bet, have dismantled multiple terror cells comprising Arab citizens plotting shootings, bombings, and stabbings, with incidents rising amid regional tensions. While such involvement remains a minority phenomenon—polls show broad Arab rejection of extremism—its persistence highlights vulnerabilities from radicalization networks operating within communities.

Impacts of October 7, 2023, and Subsequent Events

On October 7, 2023, Hamas's attack on southern resulted in the deaths of at least 20 Arab citizens, either directly by terrorists or from subsequent rocket fire. A of Arab , 56%, stated that the attack did not represent Arab society, the Palestinian people, or the broader Islamic nation, according to a December 2023 (IDI) survey. Public opinion among Arab citizens showed divisions regarding Israel's military response in Gaza, with 47% deeming it justified—primarily those justifying it as a reaction to attacks on IDF bases and border settlements—while 44% opposed it, per a survey from the same period. Approximately 70% of Arab reported feeling part of the state, though a majority also expressed heightened fears for their personal safety amid the ensuing , as indicated by IDI polling in 2023. These sentiments reflected a complex interplay of integration into Israeli society and lingering identification with Palestinian kin, without widespread endorsement of Hamas's actions. Intra-communal violence escalated significantly in the year following , with 244 Arab citizens killed in 219 incidents of crime and violence in 2023—more than double the previous year's figure—though only 10.5% of cases were resolved by authorities. Initial reports noted a temporary drop in killings immediately after the attack, attributed to community focus shifting toward the national crisis, but the overall surge highlighted persistent and clan disputes exacerbated by wartime instability. Voluntary military enlistment among non-Druze saw a post-October 7 uptick, with defense officials reporting heightened interest as societal taboos eroded, exemplified by the promotion of the first Muslim non-Bedouin in 2024. This trend, building on pre-war increases, signaled pragmatic integration motives amid security threats, though overall participation remained low compared to Jewish conscripts.

Relations with Broader Palestinian Identity

Palestinian Identification and National Aspirations

A significant portion of Arab citizens in Israel maintain a multifaceted sense of identity, often prioritizing ethnic Arab affiliation or religious ties over a singular Palestinian national identity, according to recent surveys. In a December 2024 poll conducted by Tel Aviv University, only 9% of respondents identified their Palestinian identity as the dominant component, while 33.9% highlighted Israeli citizenship as primary, reflecting a blend of civic, ethnic, and sectarian elements such as Muslim or Christian affiliation. Similarly, an Israel Central Bureau of Statistics survey from May 2025 found that a majority defined their primary identity as "Arab," with just 3% selecting "Palestinian" as foremost and 11% viewing it as secondary, underscoring that while historical and cultural ties to Palestinian nationalism persist, they do not overwhelmingly eclipse other self-conceptions. Post-October 7, 2023, events have correlated with shifts toward greater Israeli civic identification among Arab citizens, amid heightened internal security concerns and intercommunal solidarity. A November 2023 Israel Democracy Institute poll indicated that 70% of Arab respondents felt part of the country, a rise from 48% in June 2023, attributed in part to shared threats from attacks. This trend aligns with broader findings from the Institute for National Security Studies, which describe Arab identities as layered—encompassing alongside ethnic or religious dimensions—rather than uniformly Palestinian, with variations by subgroup such as (who emphasize loyalty to the state) versus Muslim Arabs. Regarding national aspirations, Arab citizens exhibit pragmatic support for Palestinian statehood alongside demands for enhanced civil equality within , though outright calls for territorial unification with the Palestinian Authority remain marginal. A December 2024 survey reported nearly half of respondents endorsing a , reflecting aspirations for a sovereign Palestinian entity in the and Gaza, yet tempered by preferences for socioeconomic integration into Israeli society rather than secession. This duality is evident in polling data showing 57.8% perceiving a "shared destiny" with Jewish post-war, suggesting that while cultural affinity with endures—fueled by and media exposure—strategic realism favors civic participation over irredentist goals that could jeopardize citizenship rights. Such aspirations are not monolithic, as evidenced by low endorsement of armed resistance groups like among Israeli , prioritizing instead policy reforms for and .

Interactions with Palestinian Authority and Gaza

Arab citizens of Israel maintain familial and social connections with Palestinians in the and , rooted in shared ethnic, cultural, and historical ties predating Israel's establishment. These links often involve extended family networks divided by the 1948 war and subsequent borders, facilitating occasional communication, remittances, or emotional solidarity. However, such interactions are constrained by Israeli security regulations; Israeli citizens, including Arabs, are generally prohibited from entering Palestinian Authority (PA)-controlled Area A in the without prior approval from military authorities, and access to Gaza has been limited to exceptional humanitarian cases since July 2015, following heightened security concerns over potential militant infiltration. Politically, the PA sustains influence over Israeli Arab communities through direct engagement with leaders, including meetings at its Ramallah headquarters (Muqata'a) attended by Arab members and civic figures. These interactions, ongoing since the PA's formation in the , involve discussions on Palestinian national issues and advocacy for Israeli Arab interests, though they have drawn Israeli scrutiny for potential incitement or . For instance, PA President has hosted delegations from Israeli Arab parties, reinforcing a of pan-Palestinian unity while Israeli authorities monitor such ties to prevent coordination with PA security apparatuses or rejectionist factions. Relations with Gaza, governed by Hamas since 2007, are marked by ambivalence: Israeli Arabs express empathy for Gazan civilians amid recurrent conflicts but overwhelmingly reject Hamas's Islamist governance and use of violence. Surveys by the indicate that the vast majority of Israeli Arabs criticize Hamas's practices, including its authoritarian rule and diversion of aid, and oppose its militant strategy toward Israel, preferring diplomatic resolutions over escalation. Economic ties remain minimal due to Israel's and border closures, with no significant formal ; informal channels, such as family transfers, exist but are curtailed by financial oversight to block funding to designated terror groups. The October 7, 2023, attack and ensuing Gaza war intensified scrutiny of these interactions, revealing both solidarity protests in towns and security incidents. Israeli police detained over 100 citizens in the war's initial weeks for social media posts glorifying the attack or expressing overt support for , interpreted as under anti-terrorism laws. Concurrently, polls post-attack showed 56% of Israeli attributing the assault not to broader Palestinian or Islamic values, alongside growing perceptions of shared destiny with Jewish Israelis amid the conflict's domestic fallout. Despite occasional public demonstrations calling for Gaza ceasefires, empirical data underscores limited appetite for -style militancy, with Israeli citing Gaza's —exacerbated by mismanagement—and preferring Israel's stability over PA or alternatives.

Accusations of Dual Loyalty and Security Implications

Accusations of against Arab citizens of Israel have arisen periodically, often tied to expressions of solidarity with in the territories or neighboring Arab states, as well as participation in anti-Israel activities. These claims intensified following violent events, such as the May 2021 riots during of the Walls, when Arab mobs in like and Acre attacked Jewish residents, torched synagogues, and caused widespread property damage, leading Israeli officials to question the loyalty of rioters who numbered in the thousands and included Israeli Arab citizens. The riots resulted in at least 19 deaths, over 1,500 arrests (many Arab Israelis), and billions in damages, with critics arguing that such intra-communal violence demonstrated prioritization of over Israeli citizenship. Security agencies have documented tangible threats stemming from segments of the Arab population, including involvement in terrorism and weapons proliferation. According to a 2023–2024 Institute for National Security Studies report, Israeli Arab citizens perpetrated 14 significant terror attacks within Israel proper, five by Bedouins from unrecognized villages, contributing to broader patterns of lone-wolf stabbings, shootings, and vehicular assaults. Shin Bet assessments highlight growing Arab Israeli ties to West Bank terror cells for smuggling arms and participating in attacks, with criminal organizations in Arab communities facilitating these networks amid a surge in illegal firearms—estimated at tens of thousands—that pose national security risks beyond intra-Arab violence. In 2024, Shin Bet thwarted numerous Iranian infiltration attempts, some leveraging Arab recruits, underscoring espionage vulnerabilities. Public opinion data reveals divided allegiances that fuel these concerns. A 2025 Central Bureau of Statistics survey found that 70% of Arab Israelis do not view "Israeli" as their primary or secondary identity, reflecting strong identification with despite formal citizenship. Support for among Arab Israelis rose from 8% to 28% in recent polls, correlating with security incidents like post-October 7, 2023, cases. While some surveys post-war showed 70% feeling "part of the country" (up from 48% pre-war) and 51.6% sensing a "shared destiny" with , critics contend these shifts are situational and do not mitigate empirical risks from radicalized subgroups. Israeli leaders, including security officials, have thus advocated measures like expanded authority in Arab areas to address crime-terror overlaps, viewing unchecked violence—claiming over 200 Arab lives annually—as a potential incubator for broader threats to state stability.

Cultural Expressions

Language, Media, and Cultural Institutions

Arabic remains the primary language of communication, education, and cultural expression for Israel's Arab citizens, who number approximately 2.1 million as of 2023. In the Arab school system, which serves over 500,000 students, Arabic is the language of instruction from kindergarten through high school, with curricula including classical and modern Arabic literature. The 2018 Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People established Hebrew as the sole state language while according Arabic "special status," preserving its use in official institutions, signage, and government services without altering practical implementation. Road signs, legal documents, and certain public notices continue to appear in Arabic alongside Hebrew and English, reflecting its entrenched role despite the legal downgrade. Arab media outlets operate within Israel, providing news and content tailored to the community, including daily newspapers such as Kul al-Arab and Panorama, which cover local issues, politics, and Palestinian affairs. Public broadcaster Kan offers Arabic-language radio and television programming, including news bulletins reaching hundreds of thousands of viewers. These outlets often reflect perspectives sympathetic to Palestinian nationalism, with content scrutinized for incitement under Israeli law, leading to occasional closures or restrictions by authorities. Digital platforms and social media supplement traditional media, though access to external Arab networks like Al Jazeera remains widespread among Arab Israelis. Cultural institutions for Arab citizens include theaters, museums, and community centers, though historically underdeveloped compared to Jewish-majority areas. In February 2022, the Israeli government allocated 400 million shekels (about $114 million) to bridge this gap, funding the establishment of a repertory theater, art museum, cinematheque, and arts schools in Arab localities. Examples include the Al-Midan Theater in , which produces Arabic-language plays, and cultural halls in Bedouin cities like , inaugurated to promote local arts and heritage. Higher education sees Arab students, comprising around 18% of undergraduates in 2023, primarily studying in Hebrew-medium institutions, with limited Arabic-language academic programs beyond basic offerings. These institutions foster preservation of Arab-Islamic traditions amid integration pressures, yet face challenges from funding disparities and political sensitivities.

Arts, Literature, Music, and Cinema

, born in 1975 in Tira to an Arab family, emerged as one of the most prominent authors among Arab citizens of Israel, writing primarily in Hebrew to depict the complexities of Arab-Israeli identity, family dynamics, and integration challenges. His debut novel Dancing Arabs (1998), later adapted into a 2014 film, portrays a young Arab boy's experiences in a Jewish-majority society, drawing from Kashua's own background and earning acclaim for its satirical insight into cultural tensions. Kashua's columns in further amplified Arab perspectives within mainstream Israeli discourse until his relocation to the in 2014. Visual artists among Arab citizens have contributed works exploring themes of displacement, identity, and daily life, often blending traditional motifs with contemporary techniques. Abed Abdi, born in 1946 in , produces prints, sculptures, and paintings that reflect the 1948 events and ongoing Arab experiences in , with exhibitions in galleries across and the since the 1970s. In 2023, artists Hannan Abu-Hussein and Maria Salah Mahameed from the same Arab town received the Israel's Ministry of Culture's prestigious Dizengoff Prize for their feminist explorations of Arab women's roles, marking a generational shift in recognition within 's art scene. In music, Arab citizens have fused traditional Arabic styles with modern genres, addressing social issues and gaining cross-cultural audiences. The hip-hop group DAM, formed in 1999 in Lod by and others, pioneered Palestinian rap in Israel, with their 2000 track "Who's the Terrorist?" critiquing violence and stereotypes in and Hebrew, influencing global hip-hop discussions on minority experiences. Singer , born in 1975 in , represented at the 2009 alongside Jewish singer Noa, performing "There Must Be Another Way" to promote coexistence, while her solo albums blend folk with pop elements. Nisreen Qadri has popularized Arabic-language songs within , achieving chart success with tracks like "Ana Esmi Lebnaniya" in 2013, appealing to both Arab and Jewish listeners through themes of heritage and unity. Cinema by Arab Israeli directors often examines intra-community struggles, gender dynamics, and societal integration. , born in 1953 in , has directed films like Since You Left (2005), documenting Arab family life post-1948, and starred in over 100 productions, earning international for bridging Arab narratives to Israeli audiences. Scandar Copti's co-direction of Ajami (2009), set in a mixed neighborhood, depicted cycles of crime and revenge among and , securing an Academy nomination for Best Foreign Language Film and highlighting urban Arab realities. Maysaloun Hamoud's (2016), focusing on three Arab women's independence in , premiered at the and won multiple , challenging conservative norms within Arab society while portraying urban professional life.

Sports, Cuisine, and Social Customs

Arab citizens of Israel participate prominently in football (soccer), where several Arab-majority clubs, such as Bnei Sakhnin and Maccabi Ahi Nazareth, compete in the top-tier Israeli Premier League, fostering community identity and occasional integration with Jewish teams. However, representation in elite non-football sports remains limited; for instance, despite comprising about 21% of Israel's population, no Arab citizen was selected for Israel's 90-member team at the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. Notable exceptions include surfer Anat Lelior, an Arab Israeli who in 2023 became the first from her community to win a silver medal at the World Surfing Games, highlighting rare breakthroughs amid broader underrepresentation. Overall, Arab participation in organized sports lags due to factors like underfunding in Arab localities and cultural barriers, particularly for women, as seen in initiatives to integrate Arab girls into basketball despite systemic resource shortages. Cuisine among Arab citizens retains strong Levantine and Palestinian influences, featuring dishes like —roasted chicken with sumac-seasoned onions and pine nuts served over taboon bread—and , a lentil-rice preparation topped with caramelized onions, often consumed during family gatherings or religious occasions. These staples emphasize , , and seasonal , reflecting agrarian traditions in northern and central Arab towns like and . While shared with broader Israeli society through markets and eateries, Arab households prioritize home-cooked versions tied to communal feasts, such as during , avoiding fusion trends prevalent in urban Jewish areas. Social customs prioritize extended family structures and hospitality, with large gatherings common for milestones like weddings, where traditions include elaborate feasts, dabke folk dancing, and gift exchanges reinforcing tribal ties, especially among Bedouin subgroups. Religious practices vary by sect—Muslims observe Ramadan with iftar meals, Christians celebrate Christmas with nativity processions in Nazareth, and Druze maintain endogamous marriages and unique pilgrimage sites—but all underscore collectivism, with high fertility rates (e.g., 3.1 children per woman in Arab sectors as of recent data) sustaining clan-based support networks. Gender roles traditionally assign women primary domestic duties, though urbanization has increased female workforce participation; public interactions emphasize modesty and respect for elders, contrasting with more individualistic Israeli Jewish norms.

Key Controversies

Allegations of Systemic Discrimination vs. Empirical Evidence

Arab citizens of Israel, comprising approximately 21% of the population, possess full legal citizenship rights equivalent to Jewish citizens, including voting in national elections since the state's founding in and eligibility for public office. Allegations of systemic , advanced by organizations such as and , assert that Israeli laws and policies enforce apartheid-like segregation and unequal resource distribution, citing disparities in municipal , access, and development. These claims, however, overlook the absence of racially codified laws prohibiting intermarriage, property ownership, or political participation, distinguishing Israel's framework from historical apartheid systems; legal scholars argue such comparisons fail under international definitions of apartheid, which require intent to maintain domination through prohibited . Empirical data reveal persistent socio-economic gaps, with 38.5% of individuals living below the line in 2023 compared to 11.1% among non-ultra-Orthodox , a rate comparable to the ultra-Orthodox Jewish sector at 38.5%, suggesting contributory factors beyond state policy, such as larger average family sizes (3.3 children per Arab woman versus 2.9 overall) and cultural norms prioritizing early over entry. among Arab families stood at 15.9% after transfers, twice the Jewish rate but halved from prior decades due to welfare expansions, indicating policy mitigation rather than entrenched exclusion. In , only 16.2% of Arabs held higher degrees in recent years versus 36.6% of Jews, with Arab high school achievement gaps persisting at around 10%, attributable in part to lower pre-primary enrollment and historical underinvestment now addressed through targeted programs. Government data show 95% of Arab localities ranked in the lowest five socio-economic clusters, correlating with lower municipal budgets per capita, yet recent initiatives, including a multi-billion-shekel five-year plan extended post-2020, have boosted infrastructure and employment training in Arab areas. Arab representation in senior civil service remains below 10%, prompting legal mandates for 10% hiring targets, while judicial roles hold about 8% Arabs despite population share, though Arab justices have served on the Supreme Court, such as Salim Joubran (Christian Arab, 2004–2017) and Abdel Rahman Zuabi (Muslim, 1999–2004). Elevated crime rates in Arab communities further exacerbate disparities, with 233 homicides in 2023—over 80% of national total—primarily from intra-communal criminal and family conflicts, yielding a murder rate per million exceeding many developed nations and hindering independently of alleged . These patterns, doubling from 109 in , reflect clan-based and weak local rather than state-imposed barriers, as evidenced by comparable welfare access and rising female labor participation among (from 20% in 2000 to over 40% recently). While gaps persist, empirical trends demonstrate legal equality enabling incremental progress, with disparities more causally linked to endogenous social structures than systemic state .

Loyalty, Incitement, and National Security Concerns

Arab citizens of Israel have historically exhibited low levels of identification with the state, with surveys indicating that a majority do not prioritize Israeli national identity. A June 2024 Central Bureau of Statistics poll found that only a minority of Arab respondents considered Israeli identity as their primary affiliation, reflecting persistent sentiments of alienation tied to perceptions of and with Palestinian kin. Arab have repeatedly rejected proposals for loyalty oaths recognizing as a , such as the 2010 cabinet-approved bill requiring non-Jewish immigrants to pledge allegiance to a ", which was criticized by Arab leaders as discriminatory and led to widespread protests. Following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, polls revealed mixed responses among Arab Israelis, with 56% stating that the assault did not reflect Arab societal values or the broader Islamic nation, yet a notable undercurrent of sympathy for Palestinian resistance persisted, complicating national cohesion. A December 2023 survey indicated that while a majority rejected Hamas's methods, identification with the Palestinian cause remained strong, with limited explicit condemnation of the group in public discourse. Instances of public celebration in some Arab localities on October 7 underscored security apprehensions, prompting heightened vigilance from Israeli authorities amid fears of internal destabilization. Incitement to violence has been a recurring issue, often manifesting through , sermons, and political rhetoric, leading to numerous arrests by the and police. In March 2024, 13 Arab Israelis were detained for allegedly plotting attacks on behalf of , including incitement and material support. Former member was arrested in September 2025 on suspicion of publicly identifying with a terrorist organization and inciting terrorism through statements praising armed resistance. Post-October 7, dozens of Arab citizens faced charges for online posts glorifying or calling for violence against Jews, with police citing risks of escalating unrest. These cases highlight systemic monitoring of platforms where extremist ideologies, including those from and , infiltrate communities, though critics argue enforcement disproportionately targets expressions of solidarity rather than imminent threats. National security concerns have intensified due to rising involvement of Arab Israelis in and , with reporting a surge in plots linked to external actors. Between 2023 and 2024, Israeli Arab participation in "lone wolf" attacks and riots increased, including three major incidents in the year prior to mid-2024, often fueled by Islamist . Hezbollah's efforts among Arab Israelis have escalated, blurring lines between and operational support, as evidenced by thwarted and operations. Iranian attempts to enlist insiders for , including targeting vulnerable Arab communities, further amplify risks, with 2024 seeing intensified counter-intelligence operations to prevent internal . These threats, compounded by demographic growth and parallel societal structures, raise long-term questions about state stability, prompting debates over enhanced integration measures versus .

Demographic Growth and Long-Term State Stability

The population of , constituting approximately 21% of the total as of 2023, has experienced higher natural increase rates compared to the Jewish population historically, driven primarily by elevated . However, recent data indicate a convergence in total fertility rates (TFR), with Jewish women averaging 3.03 births per woman in 2022, surpassing the Arab rate of 2.75, a reversal from prior decades when Arab TFR exceeded 4.0. This trend reflects declining Arab amid , gains, and delayed , dropping from 9.3 in 1960 to levels now approaching or below Jewish norms, while Jewish rates remain sustained by religious subgroups like Haredim (around 6-7 births per woman). Annual population growth for Arabs stood at 2.2% versus 1.8% for Jews in recent estimates, but overall Jewish numerical growth outpaces due to net migration (over 30,000 annually) and higher absolute births from a larger base of 7.2 million Jews compared to 1.9 million . Projections from Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics and independent analyses forecast the Jewish share stabilizing at 74-75% through 2050, with no erosion of majority status, as Arab growth moderates and Haredi expansion (projected to match Arab numbers by mid-2040s) bolsters Jewish demographics. Older alarms of an "Arab demographic time bomb" often conflated Israel proper with territories or relied on outdated UN models including West Bank/Gaza populations, which do not apply to citizen demographics.
YearJewish TFRArab/Muslim TFR
19952.64.6
20102.93.7
20223.032.75
This table illustrates the , sourced from longitudinal analyses. For long-term state stability, sustained Jewish majority enables preservation of Israel's character as a , mitigating risks of binational transformation that could arise from parity. Rapid Arab sectoral growth, concentrated in underinvested northern and locales, strains infrastructure and welfare systems—evident in rising and rates—but integration policies and economic convergence could foster cohesion. Conversely, persistent identification with among segments of the Arab population amplifies concerns over internal divisions during conflicts, though empirical demographic trends affirm resilience against existential shifts. Claims of impending majority inversion lack substantiation in current data, prioritizing instead policy focus on boosting Jewish vitality and Arab socioeconomic advancement to underpin stability.

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