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Denmark in World War II
Denmark in World War II
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Headquarters of the Schalburg Corps, a Danish SS unit, after 1943. The occupied building is the lodge of the Danish Order of Freemasons located on Blegdamsvej, Copenhagen

At the outset of World War II in September 1939, Denmark declared itself neutral, but that neutrality did not prevent Nazi Germany from occupying the country soon after the outbreak of war; the occupation lasted until Germany's defeat. The decision to occupy Denmark was taken in Berlin on 17 December 1939.[1] On 9 April 1940, Germany occupied Denmark in Operation Weserübung. The Danish government and king functioned in a relatively normal manner until 29 August 1943, when Germany placed Denmark under direct military occupation, which lasted until the Allied victory on 5 May 1945. Contrary to the situation in other countries under German occupation, most Danish institutions continued to function relatively normally until 1945. Both the Danish government and king remained in the country in an uneasy relationship between a democratic and a totalitarian system until 1943 when the Danish government stepped down in protest against German demands that included instituting the death penalty for sabotage.

Just over 3,105 Danes died as a direct result of the occupation.[2] A further 2,000 volunteers of Free Corps Denmark and Waffen-SS, most of whom originated from the German minority of southern Denmark, died fighting on the Eastern Front[3], while 1,072 merchant sailors died in Allied service.[4] Overall, this represents a very low mortality rate compared to other occupied countries and most belligerent countries. In addition to the volunteers of Free Corps Denmark and Waffen-SS, some Danes chose to collaborate during the occupation by joining the National Socialist Workers' Party of Denmark, Schalburg Corps, HIPO Corps and Peter Group (often with considerable overlap between the participants of the different groups). The National Socialist Workers' Party of Denmark participated in the 1943 Danish Folketing election, but despite significant support from Germany it only received 2.1% of the votes.[5] In Denmark, the occupation period is known as Besættelsen (Danish for "the Occupation").[6]

A resistance movement developed over the course of the war, and the vast majority of Danish Jews were rescued and sent to neutral Sweden in 1943 when German authorities ordered their internment as part of the Holocaust.[7]

Invasion

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Danish soldiers man an anti-aircraft gun, 1940. All wear the distinctive Danish helmet.

The occupation of Denmark was initially not an important objective for the German government. The decision to occupy its small northern neighbour was taken to facilitate a planned invasion of the strategically more important Norway, and as a precaution against the expected Allied response. German military planners believed that a base in the northern part of Jutland, specifically the airfield of Aalborg, would be essential to operations in Norway, and they began planning the occupation of parts of Denmark. However, as late as February 1940 no firm decision to occupy Denmark had been made.[8] The issue was finally settled when Adolf Hitler personally crossed out the words die Nordspitze Jütlands ("the Northern tip of Jutland") and replaced them with , a German abbreviation for Denmark.

Although the Danish territory of South Jutland was home to a significant German minority, and the province had been regained from Germany as a result of a plebiscite resulting from the Versailles Treaty, Germany was in no apparent hurry to reclaim it. In a much more vague and longer-term way, some Nazis hoped to incorporate Denmark into a greater "Nordic Union" at some stage, but these plans never materialized. Officially, Germany claimed to be protecting Denmark from Anglo-French attacks.[9]

At 4:15 on the morning of 9 April 1940, German forces crossed the border into neutral Denmark. In a coordinated operation, German ships began disembarking troops at the docks in Copenhagen. Although outnumbered and poorly equipped, Danish soldiers in several parts of the country put up resistance, most notably the Royal Guard in Copenhagen and units in South Jutland. As the invasion began, German planes dropped the notorious OPROP! leaflets over Copenhagen calling on Danes to accept the German occupation peacefully, and claiming that Germany had occupied Denmark in order to protect it against Anglo-French attacks. Colonel Lunding from the Royal Danish Army's intelligence office later confirmed that Danish intelligence knew the attack would be coming on either 8 or 9 April and had warned the government accordingly. The Danish ambassador to Germany, Herluf Zahle, issued a similar warning which was also ignored.

As a result of the rapid turn of events, the Danish government did not have enough time to officially declare war on Germany. Denmark was in an untenable position in any event, however. Its territory and population were too small to hold out against Germany for any sustained period. Its flat land would have resulted in it being easily overrun by German panzers; Jutland, for instance, was immediately adjacent to Schleswig-Holstein to the south and was thus wide open to a panzer attack from there. Unlike Norway, Denmark had no mountain ranges from which drawn-out resistance could be conducted.[10]

Danish Prime Minister Thorvald Stauning addresses the Rigsdagen in Christiansborg Palace on the day of the invasion.

Sixteen Danish soldiers died in the invasion,[citation needed] but after less than six hours the Danish government surrendered, believing that resistance was futile and hoping to work out an advantageous agreement with Germany. Not only was the flat Jutland territory a perfect area for the German army to operate in, the surprise attack on Copenhagen had made any attempt to defend Zealand impossible. The Germans had also been quick to establish control over the bridge across the Little Belt, thus gaining access to the island of Funen. Believing that further resistance would only result in the futile loss of more Danish lives, the Danish cabinet ultimately decided to bow to the German pressure "under protest".[8] The German forces were technologically sophisticated and numerous; the Danish forces comparatively tiny and using obsolete equipment; partially a result of a pre-war policy of trying to avoid antagonizing Germany by not supplying the army with modern equipment.[citation needed] Even stiff resistance from the Danes would not have lasted long. Questions have been raised around the apparent fact that the German forces did not seem to expect any resistance, invading with unarmored ships and vehicles.[11]

Other territories within the Kingdom of Denmark

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Faroe Islands

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After the occupation of Denmark, British forces from 12 April 1940 made a pre-emptive bloodless invasion of the Faroe Islands to prevent their occupation by German troops. Britain took over the areas where Denmark previously had given support, and the islands now became dependent on the United Kingdom, which began to participate in fishing production and supplied the islands with important goods.

The British fortified positions in strategically important locations in the Faroe Islands. Sounds and fjords were mined, and at the island of Vágar, British engineers built a military aviation base. Up to 8,000 British servicemembers were stationed in the islands, which at that time had 30,000 inhabitants.

The Faroe Islands were repeatedly attacked by German aircraft, suffering minimal damage. That said, 25 Faroese ships were lost and 132 sailors died.

Iceland

[edit]

From 1918 until 1944, Iceland was in a Personal Union with the Danish king (King Christian X) being the head of state of both Denmark and Iceland. The United Kingdom occupied Iceland on 10 May 1940 to preempt German occupation, turning it over to the then-neutral United States in July 1941, before the latter's entry into the war in December 1941. Officially remaining neutral throughout World War II, Iceland became an independent republic on 17 June 1944.

Greenland

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On 9 April 1941, the Danish envoy to the United States, Henrik Kauffmann, signed a treaty with the United States, authorizing it to defend Greenland and construct military stations there. Kauffmann was supported in this decision by the Danish diplomats in the United States and the local authorities in Greenland. Signing this treaty "in the name of the King" was a clear violation of his diplomatic powers, but Kauffmann argued that he would not receive orders from an occupied Copenhagen.

Protectorate government (1940–43)

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DNSAP's parade at Rådhuspladsen 17 November 1940. The parade was held in connection with DNSAP's attempt to seize power.
DNSAP's district office on Gammel Kongevej in Copenhagen Between 1940 and 1942 Frederiksberg.
Members of Free Corps Denmark leaving for the Eastern Front from Hellerup railway station in Copenhagen.

Historically, Denmark had a large amount of interaction with Germany. In 1920 the country regained possession of the northern part of Schleswig after losing the provinces during the Second Schleswig War in 1864. The Danish people were divided about what the best policy toward Germany might be. Few were ardent Nazis; some explored the economic possibilities of providing the German occupiers with supplies and goods; others eventually formed resistance groups towards the latter part of the war.[citation needed] The majority of Danes were unwillingly compliant towards the Germans.[citation needed] Due to the relative ease of the occupation and copious amount of dairy products, Denmark earned the nickname the Cream Front (German: Sahnefront).[12]

As a result of the cooperative attitude of the Danish authorities, German officials claimed that they would "respect Danish sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as neutrality."[9] The German authorities were inclined towards lenient terms with Denmark for several reasons: their only strong interest in Denmark, that of surplus agricultural products, could be supplied by price policy on food rather than by control and restriction (some German records indicate that the German administration had not fully realized this potential before the occupation took place, which can be doubted);[13] there was serious concern that the Danish economy was so dependent upon trade with Britain that the occupation would create an economic collapse, and Danish officials capitalized on that fear to get early concessions for a reasonable form of cooperation;[14] they also hoped to score propaganda points by making Denmark, in Hitler's words, "a model protectorate";[15] on top of these more practical goals, Nazi race ideology held that Danes were "fellow Nordic Aryans," and could therefore to some extent be trusted to handle their domestic affairs.[citation needed]

These factors combined to allow Denmark a very favourable relationship with Nazi Germany. The government remained somewhat intact, and the parliament continued to function more or less as it had before. They were able to maintain much of their former control over domestic policy.[16] The police and judicial system remained in Danish hands, and unlike most occupied countries, King Christian X remained in the country as Danish head of state. The German Reich was formally represented by a Reichsbevollmächtigter ('Reich Plenipotentiary'), i.e. a diplomat accredited to the sovereign, a post awarded to Cecil von Renthe-Fink, the German ambassador, and then in November 1942 to the lawyer and SS general Werner Best.

Danish public opinion generally backed the new government, particularly after the fall of France in June 1940.[17] There was a general feeling that the unpleasant reality of German occupation must be confronted in the most realistic way possible, given the international situation. Politicians realized that they would have to try hard to maintain Denmark's privileged position by presenting a united front to the German authorities, so all of the mainstream democratic parties formed a new government together. Parliament and the government agreed to work closely together.[8] Though the effect of this was close to the creation of a one-party state, it remained a representative government.

The Danish government was dominated by Social Democrats, including the pre-war prime minister Thorvald Stauning, who had been strongly opposed to the Nazi party.[citation needed] Stauning himself was deeply depressed by the prospects for Europe under Nazism.[citation needed] Nonetheless, his party pursued a strategy of cooperation, hoping to maintain democracy and Danish control in Denmark for as long as possible. There were many issues that they had to work out with Germany in the months after the occupation. In an effort to keep the Germans satisfied, they compromised Danish democracy and society in several fundamental ways:

  • Newspaper articles and news reports "which might jeopardize German-Danish relations" were outlawed, in violation of the Danish constitutional prohibition against censorship.[18]
  • On the 22nd of June 1941, when Germany commenced its attack on the Soviet Union, the German authorities in Denmark demanded that Danish Communists should be arrested. The Danish government complied and using secret registers, the Danish police in the following days arrested 339 Communists. Of these 246, including the three Communist members of the Danish parliament, were imprisoned in the Horserød camp, in violation of the Danish constitution. On 22 August 1941, the Danish parliament passed the Communist Law, outlawing the Communist Party and Communist activities, in another violation of the Danish constitution. In 1943, about half of the Communists were transferred to Stutthof concentration camp, where 22 of them died.
  • Following Germany's assault on the Soviet Union, Denmark joined the Anti-Comintern Pact, together with the fellow Nordic state of Finland. As a result, many Communists were found among the first members of the Danish resistance movement.
  • Industrial production and trade was, partly due to geopolitical reality and economic necessity, redirected toward Germany. An overriding concern was a German fear of creating a burden if the Danish economy collapsed as it did after World War I. This sensitivity to Denmark's heavy reliance on foreign trade informed the German decision before the occupation to allow the Danes passage through their blockade.[19] Denmark had traditionally been a major trading partner of both Britain and Germany. Many government officials saw expanded trade with Germany as vital to maintaining social order in Denmark.[18] Increased unemployment and poverty were feared to lead to more of open revolt within the country, since Danes tended to blame all negative developments on the Germans. It was feared that any revolt would result in a crackdown by the German authorities.[17]
  • The Danish army was largely demobilized, although some units remained until August 1943. The army was allowed to maintain 2,200 men, as well as 1,100 auxiliary troops.[20] Much of the fleet remained in port, but in Danish hands. In at least two towns, the army created secret weapons caches on 10 April 1940.[21] On 23 April 1940,[22] members of the Danish military intelligence established contacts with their British counterparts through the British diplomatic mission in Stockholm. They began dispatching intelligence reports to Britain by Autumn 1940. This traffic became regular and continued until the Germans dissolved the Danish army in 1943.[22] Following the liberation of Denmark, Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery described the intelligence gathered in Denmark as "second to none".[23]

In return for these concessions, the Danish cabinet rejected German demands for legislation discriminating against Denmark's Jewish minority. Demands to introduce the death penalty were likewise rebuffed, and so were German demands to allow German military courts jurisdiction over Danish citizens. Denmark also rejected demands for the transfer of Danish army units to German military use.

A member of Danmarks Nationalsocialistiske Ungdom (Danish Nazi youth movement) in 1941

Stauning remained prime minister until his death in 1942, as head of a coalition cabinet encompassing all major political parties (the exceptions being the tiny Nazi party, and the Communist Party, which was outlawed in 1941). Vilhelm Buhl replaced him briefly, only to be replaced by foreign minister Erik Scavenius, who had been the main link to the Nazi authorities throughout the war. Scavenius was a diplomat, not an elected politician, and had an elitist approach to government.[18] He was afraid that emotional public opinion would destabilize his attempts to build a compromise between Danish sovereignty and the realities of German occupation. Scavenius felt strongly that he was Denmark's most ardent defender. After the war there was much recrimination over his stance, particularly from members of the active resistance, who felt that he had hindered the cause of resistance and threatened Denmark's national honour. He felt that these people were vain, seeking to build their own reputations or political careers through emotionalism.

The Danish authorities were able to use their more cooperative stance to win important concessions for the country. They continually refused to enter a customs and currency union with Germany. Danes were concerned both about the negative economic effects of the German proposals, as well as the political ones. German officials did not want to risk their special relationship with Denmark by forcing an agreement on them, as they had done in other countries. The Danish government was also able to stall negotiations over the return of South Jutland to Germany, ban "closed-rank uniformed marches" that would have made nationalist German or Danish Nazi agitation more possible, keep National Socialists out of the government, and hold a relatively free election, with decidedly anti-Nazi results, in the middle of the war.[18] Danish military officials also had access to sensitive German information, which they delivered to the Allies under government cover.[24] The economic consequences of the occupation were also mitigated by German-Danish cooperation. Inflation rose sharply in the first year of the war, as the German Army spent a large amount of German military currency in Denmark, most importantly on military installations and troop deployments. Due to the Occupation, the National Bank of Denmark was compelled to exchange German currency for Danish notes, effectively granting the Germans a gigantic unsecured loan with only vague promises that the money would eventually be paid, something which never happened. The Danish government was later able to renegotiate the Germans' arbitrary exchange rate between the German military currency and the Danish krone to reduce this problem.[16]

The success most often alluded to in regard to the Danish policy toward Germany is the protection of the Jewish minority in Denmark. Throughout its years in power, the government consistently refused to accept German demands regarding the Jews.[25] The authorities would not enact special laws concerning Jews, and their civil rights remained equal with those of the rest of the population. German authorities became increasingly exasperated with this position but concluded that any attempt to remove or mistreat Jews would be "politically unacceptable."[26] Even the Gestapo officer Werner Best, plenipotentiary in Denmark from November 1942, believed that any attempt to remove the Jews would be enormously disruptive to the relationship between the two governments and recommended against any action concerning the Jews of Denmark.

Christian X remained in Denmark throughout the war, a symbol of courage much appreciated by his subjects.

Collaborators

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Footage from a Waffen-SS memorial service held near Birkerød in 1944. Among the attendees were Dr. Werner Best and the Free Corps Denmark commander and Schalburg Corps founder, Knud Børge Martinsen.

Free Corps Denmark

[edit]

On 29 June 1941, days after the invasion of the USSR, Free Corps Denmark (Danish: Frikorps Danmark) was founded as a corps of Danish volunteers to fight against the Soviet Union. Free Corps Denmark was set up at the initiative of the SS and DNSAP who approached Lieutenant-Colonel C.P. Kryssing of the Danish army shortly after the invasion of the USSR had begun. The Nazi paper Fædrelandet [da] proclaimed the creation of the corps on 29 June 1941.[27]

According to Danish law, it was not illegal to join a foreign army, but active recruiting on Danish soil was illegal. The SS disregarded this law and began recruitment, predominantly recruiting Danish Nazis and members of the German-speaking minority.[27] The Danish government discovered this and decided to concentrate on persuading the Germans not to recruit underage boys. General Prior wanted to remove Kryssing and his designated second-in-command, but decided to consult the cabinet. It agreed that Kryssing should be removed in its meeting on 2 July 1941, but this decision was later withdrawn when Erik Scavenius—who had not attended the original meeting—returned from negotiations and announced that he had reached an agreement with Renthe-Fink that soldiers wishing to join this corps could be given leave until further notice. The government issued an announcement stating that "Lieut. Colonel C. P. Kryssing, Chief of the 5th Artillery reg., Holbæk, has with the consent of the Royal Danish Government assumed command over 'Free Corps Denmark'". The Danish text only explicitly said that the government recognized that Kryssing had been given a new command; it did not sanction the creation of the corps, which had already happened without its creators asking the government's consent.[27] In July 1941 Heinrich Himmler complained that Denmark was unofficially trying to stop recruitment since the word ran in the army that anyone joining would be committing treason. The government later instructed the army and navy not to obstruct applications from soldiers wishing to leave active duty and join the corps.

A 1998 study showed that the average recruit to Free Corps Denmark was a Nazi, a member of the German minority in Denmark, or both, and that recruitment was very broad socially.[27] Historian Bo Lidegaard notes: "The relationship between the population and the corps was freezing cold, and legionnaires on leave time and again came into fights, with civilians meeting the corps' volunteers with massive contempt." Lidegaard gives the following figures for 1941: 6,000 Danish citizens had signed up to German army duty; 1,500 of these belonged to the German minority in Denmark.[27]

Anti-Comintern Pact

[edit]
Administrative map of the Kingdom of Denmark during the German occupation.
King Christian X, seen here on the occasion of his birthday in 1940, served as a powerful symbol of national sovereignty during the occupation. At the time, many Danes wore an emblem showing his cypher as a symbol of patriotism and silent resistance against the Germans.[28]

On 20 November 1941, five months after the invasion of the USSR, the Danish government received a German "invitation" to join the Anti-Comintern Pact. Finland accepted reluctantly on 25 November and stated that it presumed that Denmark would also attend the ceremony (effectively conditioning its own attendance). Erik Scavenius argued that Denmark should sign the pact but the Cabinet ministers refused, stating that this would violate the policy of neutrality.[29] Scavenius reported this decision to Renthe-Fink. Fink replied on 21 November that "Germany would be unable to comprehend" a Danish rejection and demanded this decision be reversed before the end of the day. He assured Scavenius that the pact contained neither "political or other obligations" (i.e., going to war with the USSR). At a cabinet meeting the same day, it was suggested to seek written confirmation of this promise in an addendum to the protocol. Stauning agreed on these terms since it would effectively make the signing meaningless. The Danish foreign office drew up a list of four terms that stated that Denmark only committed itself to "police action" in Denmark and that the nation remained neutral. The German foreign ministry agreed to the terms, provided that the protocol was not made public, which was the intent of the Danish foreign ministry.

As Berlin grew tired of waiting, Joachim von Ribbentrop called Copenhagen on 23 November threatening to "cancel the peaceful occupation" unless Denmark complied. On 23 November, the Wehrmacht in Denmark was put on alert, and Renthe-Fink met Stauning and Foreign Minister Munch at 10 AM stating that there would be no room for "parliamentary excuses". If the German demands were not met Germany "would no longer be committed by the promises given on 9 April 1940" (the threat of a state of war, a Nazi government, and territorial dismemberment). In a Cabinet meeting at 2 PM that day, Stauning, Scavenius, Munch and two additional ministers advocated accession; seven ministers opposed. In a meeting the same day in the Nine Man committee, three more ministers caved in, most notably Vilhelm Buhl, stating "Cooperation is the last shred of our defence". Prime Minister Stauning's notes from the day stated: The objective is a political positioning. But this was established by the occupation. The danger of saying no—I would not like to see a Terboven here. Sign with addendum—that modifies the pact.[29]

Scavenius boarded a train and headed for Berlin, where he arrived on Monday 24 November. The next crisis came when he was met by Renthe-Fink, who informed him that Ribbentrop had informed Fink that there had been a "misunderstanding" regarding the four clauses and that clause 2 would be deleted. This had specified that Denmark only had police-like obligations. Scavenius had a strict mandate not to change a sentence and stated that he would be unable to return to Copenhagen with a different content from the one agreed upon, but that he was willing to reopen negotiations to clarify the matter further. This reply enraged Ribbentrop (and rumours claim that he was considering ordering the SS to arrest Scavenius). The task fell to German diplomat Ernst von Weizsäcker to patch up a compromise. He watered down the wording but left the content pretty intact. Nonetheless, for Scavenius it was a strong setback that the four clauses would now only get the status of a unilateral Danish declaration (Aktennotitz) with a comment on it by Fink that its content "no doubt" was in compliance with the pact. Furthermore, he was instructed to give a public speech while abstaining from mentioning the four clauses but only making general statements about Denmark's status as a neutral nation. Scavenius signed the pact. At the following reception, the Italian ambassador described Scavenius as "a fish dragged on land ... a small old gentleman in a suit asking himself how on earth he got to this place". Lidegaard comments that the old man remained defiant: during a conversation with Ribbentrop in which the latter complained about the "barbarous cannibalism" of Russian POWs, Scavenius rhetorically asked if that statement meant that Germany didn't feed her prisoners.[29]

When news of the signing reached Denmark, it left the population outraged, and rumours immediately spread about what Denmark had now committed itself to. The cabinet sent a car to pick up Scavenius at the ferry, to keep him from needing to ride the train alone to Copenhagen. At the same time a large demonstration gathered outside of Parliament, which led the Minister of Justice, Eigil Thune Jacobsen [da] to remark that he did not like to see Danish police beating up students singing patriotic songs. When Scavenius had returned to Copenhagen, he asked the cabinet to debate once and for all where the red lines existed in Danish relations with Germany. This debate concluded that three red lines existed:

  1. No legislation discriminating against Jews,
  2. Denmark should never join the Axis Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan,
  3. No unit of the Danish army should ever fight against foreign forces.

To the surprise of many, Scavenius accepted these instructions without hesitation.[29]

The 1942 telegram crisis

[edit]

In October 1942, Hitler transmitted a long, flattering birthday telegram to King Christian. The King replied with a simple "Spreche Meinen besten Dank aus. Chr. Rex" ("Giving my best thanks. King Christian") sending the Führer into a state of rage at this deliberate slight, and seriously damaging Danish relations with Germany. Hitler immediately recalled his ambassador and expelled the Danish ambassador from Germany. The plenipotentiary, Renthe-Fink, was replaced by Werner Best and orders to crack down in Denmark were issued. Hitler also demanded that Erik Scavenius become prime minister, and all remaining Danish troops were ordered out of Jutland.

Increasing resistance after the August 1943 crisis

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Denmark Fights for Freedom, film about the Danish resistance movement from 1944.

As the war dragged on, the Danish population became increasingly hostile to the Germans. Soldiers stationed in Denmark had found most of the population cold and distant from the beginning of the occupation, but their willingness to cooperate had made the relationship workable. The government had attempted to discourage sabotage and violent resistance to the occupation, but by the autumn of 1942 the numbers of violent acts of resistance were increasing steadily to the point that Germany declared Denmark "enemy territory" for the first time.[18] After the battles of Stalingrad and El-Alamein the incidents of resistance, violent and symbolic, increased rapidly.

In March 1943 the Germans allowed a general election to be held. The voter turnout was 89.5%, the highest in any Danish parliamentary election, and 94% cast their ballots for one of the democratic parties behind the cooperation policy while 2.2% voted for the anti-cooperation Dansk Samling.[30] 2.1% voted for the National Socialist Workers' Party of Denmark, almost corresponding to the 1.8% the party had received in the 1939 elections. The election, discontent, and a growing feeling of optimism that Germany would be defeated led to widespread strikes and civil disturbances in the summer of 1943. The Danish government refused to deal with the situation to the satisfaction of the Germans, who gave an ultimatum to the government, including the following demands, on 28 August 1943:

  • A ban on people assembling in public,
  • outlawing strikes, the introduction of a curfew,
  • censorship conducted with German assistance,
  • special (German military) courts should be introduced, and
  • death penalty in cases of sabotage.

In addition, the city of Odense was ordered to pay a fine of 1 million kroner for the death of a German soldier killed in that city and hostages were to be held as security.[31]

The Danish government refused, so on 29 August 1943 the Germans officially dissolved the Danish government and instituted martial law. The Danish cabinet handed in its resignation, but since King Christian never officially accepted it, the government remained functioning de jure until the end of the war. In reality—largely due to the initiative of the permanent secretary of foreign affairs Nils Svenningsen[32]—all day-to-day business was handed over to Permanent Secretaries, who each effectively ran his own ministry. The Germans administered the rest of the country, and the Danish Parliament did not convene for the remainder of the occupation. As the ministry of foreign affairs responsible for all negotiations with the Germans, Nils Svenningsen had a leading position in the government.[33]

Barricades erected during a general strike, Nørrebro, Copenhagen, July 1944.

In anticipation of Operation Safari, the Royal Danish Navy had instructed its captains to resist any German attempts to assume control over their vessels. The navy managed to scuttle 32 of its larger ships, while Germany succeeded in seizing 14 of the larger and 50 of the smaller vessels (patruljekuttere or "patrol cutters"). The Germans later succeeded in raising and refitting 15 of the sunken ships. During the scuttling of the Danish fleet, a number of vessels were ordered to attempt an escape to Swedish waters, and 13 vessels succeeded in this attempt, including four larger ships; two other larger vessels remained at safe harbour in Greenland.[34][35] The coastal defence ship HDMS Niels Juel attempted to break out of the Isefjord, but was attacked by Stukas and forced to run aground. By the autumn of 1944, the ships in Sweden officially formed a Danish naval flotilla in exile.[36] In 1943, Swedish authorities allowed 500 Danish soldiers in Sweden to train themselves as "police troops". By the autumn of 1944, Sweden increased this number to 4,800 and recognized the entire unit as a Danish brigade in exile.[37] Danish collaboration continued on the administrative level, with Danish bureaucracy functioning under German command.

In September 1943, a variety of resistance groups grouped together into the Danish Freedom Council, which coordinated resistance activities. A high-profile resister was former government minister John Christmas Møller, who had fled to England in 1942 and became a widely popular commentator because of his broadcasts to the nation on BBC radio.

After the fall of the government, Denmark was exposed to the full extent of occupational rule. In October the Germans decided to remove all Jews from Denmark. German diplomat Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz leaked Nazi plans, and swift action by Danish civilians transported the vast majority of Danish Jews to safety in neutral Sweden in fishing vessels and motorboats. The entire evacuation lasted two months; one man helped ferry more than 1,400 Jews to safety.[38] Unencumbered by government opposition, sabotage increased greatly in frequency and severity, though it was rarely of very serious concern to the Germans. Nonetheless, the Danish resistance movement had some successes, such as on D-Day when the train network in Denmark was disrupted for days, delaying the arrival of German reinforcements in Normandy. An underground government was established, and the illegal press flourished. Allied governments, which had been sceptical about the country's commitment to fight Germany, began recognizing Denmark as a full ally.[18]

Returning prisoners from the Stutthof concentration camp, Copenhagen, June 1945.

The permanent secretary of the ministry of foreign affairs, Nils Svenningsen, in January 1944 suggested establishing a Danish camp, to avoid deportations to Germany.[39] Werner Best accepted this suggestion, but on condition that this camp was built close to the German border; Frøslev Prison Camp was set up in August 1944, solely to keep Danish Jews and other prisoners within Denmark's borders.[40]

The Gestapo had limited trust in the Danish police force, which had 10,000 members;[41] 1,960 of them were arrested and deported to Germany on 19 September 1944.

Economy

[edit]

Denmark faced some serious economic problems during the war. The Danish economy was fundamentally hurt by the rising cost of raw material imports such as coal and oil. Furthermore, Denmark lost its main trading partner at that point, the UK. During years of occupation the Danish economy was more and more aligned on meeting German demands, which mainly meant agrarian products. The Danish authorities took an active part in the development and even initiated negotiations on a customs union. Those negotiations failed on the question whether the Danish krone should be abolished.[42]

The blockade against Germany affected Denmark too with unfortunate results. Since the country has virtually no natural resources of its own it was very vulnerable to these price shocks and shortages. The government had foreseen the possibility of coal and oil shortages and had stockpiled some before the war, which, combined with rationing, prevented some of the worst potential problems from coming to the country. The disruptions to the European trading network were also damaging to the economy, but all things considered, Denmark did quite well compared to other countries during the war.

The country, at least certain sections of it, did so well that it has been open to the accusation of profiteering from the war. After the war there was some effort to find and punish profiteers, but the consequences and scope of these trials were far less severe than in many other countries, largely a reflection of the general acceptance of the realistic need for cooperation with Germany. On the whole, though the country fared relatively well, this is only a relative measure. Phil Giltner has worked out that Germany had a "debt" of roughly 6.9 billion kroner to Denmark as a whole.[16] This means that they had taken far more out of the Danish economy than they had put in, aside from the negative side effects of the war on trade. The German debt had accumulated due to an arrangement with the Danish central bank, in which the German occupation forces could draw on a special account there to pay their bills from Danish suppliers. Exports to Germany were also largely settled this way. The arrangement was agreed to for fear of German soldiers helping themselves without paying, and the conflicts that might follow. It also meant that the Danish central bank was picking up a large part of the tab for the German occupation, and that the money supply rose drastically as a result.[43]

Post-war currency reform

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The Danish National Bank estimates that the occupation had resulted in the printing press increasing the currency supply from the pre-war figure of 400 million kroner to 1,600 million, much of which ended up in the hands of war profiteers. In July 1945, two months after the liberation of Denmark, the Danish Parliament passed an emergency law initiating a currency reform, making all old banknotes void. A small number of employees at the National Bank had clandestinely begun the production of new banknotes in late 1943. The production of new notes happened without the knowledge of the German forces located at the bank, and by the spring of 1945 the bank's stock of notes was sufficient to initiate the exchange.[44] The law required was passed hastily on Friday 20 July and published the same day; it also closed all shops for the weekend. By Monday 23 July, all old notes were officially outlawed as legal tender and any note not declared in a bank by 30 July would lose its value. This law allowed any Dane to exchange a total of 100 kroner to new notes, no questions asked. An amount up to 500 kroner could be exchanged, provided the owner signed a written statement explaining its origins. Any amount above this level would be deposited in an escrow account and only released or exchanged following scrutiny by tax officials examining the validity of the person's statement about the origins of this wealth. All existing bank accounts were also scrutinized. Multiple exchanges of cash by the same person were avoided by the requirement that currency would only be exchanged to anybody also handing in a specified ration stamp, previously issued in a different context, which had not yet been authorized for use.[45] The exchange resulted in a significant drop in the currency supply, and around 20% of the 3,000 million kroner property declared had not previously been registered by the tax authorities.[44] Estimates vary for the amounts of currency simply destroyed by its owners. All banknotes issued since the changeover date remain valid indefinitely; earlier ones are not valid.

Hardship and the end of the war

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Closed due to happiness. Two Danish resistance fighters are guarding a shop while the owner is celebrating the liberation of Denmark on 5 May 1945. The man on the left is wearing a captured German Stahlhelm, the one on the right is holding a Sten gun.

Most of Denmark was liberated from German rule in May 1945 by British forces commanded by Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery; the easternmost island of Bornholm was liberated by Soviet forces, who remained there for almost a year. On 5 April 1946 the last Soviets left Bornholm. The end of German rule is in Denmark known as Befrielsen (the Liberation).[46][47]

Although Denmark was spared many of the difficulties other areas of Europe suffered, its population still experienced hardships, particularly after the Germans took charge in 1943. Yet on the whole, Denmark can be said to have suffered the least of all the European combatants from the war.[16] Many were killed and imprisoned because of their work resisting the German authorities. There were small bombing raids on select targets in the country, but nothing comparable to that suffered by, for instance, neighbouring Norway or the Netherlands. One area that was badly damaged was the island of Bornholm, largely due to Soviet bombardment of the German garrison there in the very last days of the war.

About 380 members of the resistance were killed during the war: they are commemorated in Ryvangen Memorial Park. Roughly 900 Danish civilians were killed in a variety of ways: either by being caught in air raids, killed during civil disturbances, or in reprisal killings, the so-called "clearing" murders. Thirty-nine Danish soldiers were killed or injured during the invasion, and four were killed on 29 August 1943 when the Germans dissolved the Danish government. Some sources estimate that about 360 Danes died in concentration camps. The largest groups of fatalities were amongst Danish merchant sailors, who continued to operate throughout the war, most falling victim to submarines. Some 1,850 sailors died. Just over 100 soldiers died as part of Allied forces.[citation needed]

People celebrating the liberation of Denmark at Strøget in Copenhagen, 5 May 1945. Germany surrendered two days later.

Approximately 6,000 Danes were sent to concentration camps during World War II,[48] of whom about 600 (10%) died. In comparison with other countries this is a relatively low mortality rate in the concentration camps.

After the war, 40,000 people were arrested on suspicion of collaboration. Of these, 13,500 were punished in some way. 78 received death sentences, of which 46 were carried out. Most received prison sentences of under four years. Many people criticized the process for victimizing "small" people disproportionately, while many politicians and businesses were left untouched. One difficult issue was deciding what to do with collaborators who were essentially "following orders" that their own government had given them, such as business executives who had been encouraged to work with the Germans.

Although some members of the resistance tried to organize new political parties after the war to reshape the political order in Denmark, they were unable to do so. The only party that appeared to receive a significant boost from resistance was the Communist Party. The Communists received about one-eighth of the popular vote in the October 1945 elections.

On 5 May 1945, Denmark was officially free of German control. Citizens all over the country took down the black shades that had been used to cover their windows during bombing raids and made bonfires of them in the streets. Allied troops (mostly Soviet soldiers) were released from prisons all over the country and paraded down streets in Copenhagen, Aarhus, and other cities.

After the end of hostilities, over two thousand German prisoners of war were made to clear the vast minefields that had been laid on the west coast of Jutland, nearly half of them being either killed or wounded in the process. As part of a controversial agreement reached by the German Commander General Georg Lindemann, the Danish Government and the British Armed Forces, German soldiers with experience in defusing mines were in charge of clearing the mine fields.[49][50][better source needed]

Women in Denmark during and after the war

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During the German occupation of Denmark (1940–1945) and in the immediate post-war period, women experienced a range of wartime and post-liberation hardships that have been the subject of historical study.[51][52][53] Scholars have documented increased instances of sexual violence and reported cases of public reprisals directed at women both during the occupation and after liberation, and several historians argue that women’s experiences have been underrepresented in public memory and historiography.[54][52][53] Some historians interpret wartime discourses about sexual conduct as being framed in national terms, where female sexuality was described as having symbolic value for public honor and cohesion, linking female behavior to the honor and fate of the nation.[51][55][53] Anette Warring, in her chapter “Intimate and Sexual Relations” in the book “Surviving Hitler and Mussolini,” argues that the female body literally represented a "combat zone" between the occupiers and the occupied, and internally, between collaborators and resistance fighters.[53]

Contemporary research, historical reviews, and archival research report an increase in recorded convictions for sexual offenses, such as rape, attempted rape, or forcible oral sex, by approximately 50%  during the occupation compared with the pre-war period.[54][56] Scholars have suggested multiple contributing factors, including social disruption, shortages and rationing, and periods of armed conflict between the occupiers and resistance forces, which may have affected crime patterns and social norms, with sexual violence disproportionately affecting women.[54][57]

Both before and after the liberation, women who had intimate relationships with German soldiers, often referred to as “tyskerpiger” ("pro-German girls") or "field-mattresses," were subjected in many cases to extrajudicial punishments and public humiliation, primarily carried out by young men, (for example, public head-shaving, forced public parading, and drawing swastikas with black enamel paint on the women's exposed backs and breasts [51][55][53]) though they became even more frequent and brutal after the liberation.[51][55][53] Fraternization itself was not a criminal act under the retroactive penal laws passed after the war; however, some actions connected with collaboration (such as informing) were prosecuted under post-liberation legal measures.[51][53] Secondary sources find that between 300 and 400 women who had relationships with German soldiers were convicted of informing after the liberation under these post-liberation legal measures.[51][53] Estimates of the number of Danish women who had relationships with German soldiers vary between studies. However, drawing from historical reviews, the registration of 5,500 children as Danish–German during the occupation, and other sources, contemporary historians estimate that there were at least 50,000 “pro-German girls” during the occupation.[51][53] Some historians, such as Anette Warring and Holbraad, link this phenomenon to the way sexuality became perceived as a national property, where female fraternization is then viewed as a double betrayal.[51][55][53]

Women also took part in resistance and rescue activities, including relief work and efforts to assist Jews and others targeted by the occupiers; according to secondary sources and historical reviews, female participation was often less formal and involved the double risk of secret activities combined with ongoing family responsibilities.[51][52] For example, Thora Daugaard, leader of Danske Kvinders Fredskæde (the Danish branch of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom), was involved in rescue and relief work and is credited in biographical sources with helping to save Jewish children during the Nazi period.[58][59] Secondary sources present that Daugaard argued that Denmark should take at least 1,000 children, but ultimately secured entry for 320–350 children.[58][59] According to historical reviews, Daugaard's actions in resisting the German occupation ultimately led her to flee to Sweden herself in 1943 during the Jewish raids.[59][58]

German refugees

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In the final weeks of the war, between 9 February and 9 May, several hundred thousand German refugees fled across the Baltic Sea, fleeing the advancing Soviet Army. For the most part, the refugees were from East Prussia and Pomerania. Many of the refugees were women, children, or elderly. Many were malnourished, exhausted, or seriously ill. A third of the refugees were younger than 15 years old.

The German authorities gave the refugees a privileged status, seizing Danish schools, church houses, hotels, factories, and sports facilities for refugee housing. At the same time, thousands of Danes were deported to German prisons and concentration camps. German terror against Danish resistance fighters and civilians increased in these final months. The general sentiment among Danes saw the arrival of refugees as a new, violent German occupation.

At the time of the German capitulation there were about 250,000 German refugees in Denmark. Already at the end of April, the German military authorities seemed to have lost control of the situation; many refugees had no food, the sick were not treated, mortality was high, and unburied dead bodies were stored in warehouses and cellars—although this was the result of different priorities in negotiations on aid between German and Danish authorities. The Danish negotiators, led by secretary of state Nils Svenningsen, would only agree provided that approximately 4,000 Danish citizens, mainly policemen, who were being detained in German concentration camps, were liberated. German authorities, on the other hand, would only agree if those policemen would take an active part in defeating the Danish resistance.[60]

At the capitulation, the refugee administration was handed over to Danish authorities. Refugees were gradually moved from over 1,000 smaller locations to new-built camps or previous German military barracks, some of which held over 20,000 refugees. The largest of the camps, Oksbøl Refugee Camp, in Oksbøl on the west coast of Jutland, held 37,000 refugees. Camps were placed behind barbed wire and guarded by military personnel to avoid contact with the Danish population.

In some of the camps, food rations were scarce and medical care was inadequate. In 1945 alone, more than 13,000 people died, among them some 7,000 children under the age of five.[61] The situation was worst in the months right before and after the capitulation when Danish hospitals and doctors were reluctant to treat German refugees. The reason for this was not only anti-German resentment, but also lack of resources, the time needed to rebuild administrative structures, and the fear of epidemic diseases which were highly prevalent among the refugees. Instead, Danish authorities established a camp-internal medical system with German medical personnel which took some time to work adequately. In the camps, there was school education for children up to the upper secondary level, work duty for adults, study circles, theatre, music, and self-issued German newspapers. After initial inadequacy, food rations became more sufficient.

On 24 July 1945, the British occupation force, contrary to Danish expectations, decided that the refugees must stay in Denmark until the situation in Germany had stabilized. The first refugees were returned to Germany in November 1946 and the last ones in February 1949. Very few stayed in Denmark for good.[62]

Legacy

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The policy of the government, called samarbejdspolitikken (cooperation policy) is one of the most controversial issues in Danish history.[63] Some historians argue that the relatively accommodating policy which did not actively resist the occupation was the only realistic way of safeguarding Danish democracy and people.[64] However, others argue that accommodation was taken too far, was uniquely compliant when compared to other democratic governments in Europe, and cannot be seen as part of a coherent long-term strategy to protect democracy in Denmark or Europe.[63] In 2003 Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen characterized the cooperation as "morally unjustifiable," the only time a Danish leader had condemned the war-era leadership,[65] even though Anders Fogh Rasmussen's is seen using it as a justification for his own ambitions, in connection with the invasion of Iraq in 2003.[66][67]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Denmark in World War II encompassed the Nazi German occupation from the on 9 April 1940, which overcame minimal Danish military resistance within hours, until liberation on 5 May 1945 by British forces without significant combat on Danish soil. The period was defined by an initial Danish strategy of pragmatic cooperation with the occupiers—preserving parliamentary functions, , and economic operations to avert harsher and widespread destruction—which allowed nominal until escalating and strikes prompted the on 29 August 1943, shifting to German military administration and intensifying clandestine resistance activities such as industrial disruption, intelligence relays to the Allies, and the coordinated evacuation of over 7,200 of Denmark's approximately 7,800 to neutral in after advance warnings of plans. This dual dynamic of accommodation and defiance coexisted with collaborationist factions, including the Danish Nazi Party (DNSAP) and roughly 5,500 volunteers who joined units fighting on the Eastern Front, reflecting ideological alignment with German expansionism among a minority. King Christian X's symbolic daily horseback rides through Copenhagen underscored passive national continuity amid exploitation of Danish agriculture and industry for the German war effort, while resistance groups executed over 1,000 sabotage operations by 1945, disrupting rail and ship repairs critical to Axis logistics. The occupation's end brought repatriation of forced laborers and prisoners, though it left a legacy of internal reckoning over collaboration's costs versus resistance's gains, with post-war trials addressing both Nazi sympathizers and resisters' excesses.

Pre-War Context

Neutrality Policy and Military Limitations

Denmark maintained a longstanding policy of armed neutrality during the , formalized through declarations of impartiality and non-alignment with major powers, as it had successfully done to evade entanglement in . This stance was shaped by Denmark's economic reliance on for exports and imports, comprising over half of its trade volume, which incentivized avoidance of any actions perceived as provocative by . The policy emphasized diplomatic passivity, adherence to principles, and minimal military posturing, with the government rejecting defensive alliances or joint Scandinavian military coordination despite occasional discussions. Under Thorvald Stauning's Social Democratic administration from 1929, defense priorities yielded to expansive welfare reforms and , limiting military budgets to about 1.5-2% of GDP in amid widespread and disarmament optimism post-Versailles. Successive defense commissions in 1922, 1932, and 1937 codified reductions in force structure, prioritizing static coastal fortifications—particularly around , which absorbed roughly half of defense spending—over expeditionary or mobile capabilities, rendering the military suitable only for short-term border delays rather than sustained resistance. The Danish Army's peacetime strength stood at approximately 6,600 active personnel by late 1939, expandable to 55,000 via reserves but hampered by obsolete equipment, including World War I-vintage rifles, limited machine guns, and no tanks or modern artillery beyond horse-drawn field pieces. The maintained a modest fleet of 104 vessels, predominantly small patrol craft, torpedo boats (totaling 21 at 4,704 tonnes), two submarines, and no aircraft carriers, focused on denial rather than blue-water projection. An independent Air Force, formed in 1933, operated fewer than 50 aircraft, mostly obsolete biplanes unsuitable for contemporary . These constraints stemmed from deliberate strategic choices: geographic vulnerability as a flat, peninsular nation with porous borders encouraged reliance on over , while domestic favored demilitarization proposals, such as 1924 suggestions to replace the with a and state navy. Late-1930s rearmament, prompted by the in 1938, added some anti-aircraft guns and mobilized reservists to reach 14,000-28,000 troops by early 1940, but equipment shortages and training deficiencies persisted, underscoring the policy's causal realism deficit in underestimating German expansionism.

Diplomatic Relations and Scandinavian Dynamics

Denmark maintained a policy of armed neutrality throughout the , emphasizing non-alignment and minimal military preparedness to deter aggression while relying on and diplomatic assurances for security. This approach was formalized in a series of declarations, including the renewal of neutrality commitments in and a explicit proclamation of neutrality on , immediately following the German . Danish diplomats pursued bilateral agreements to safeguard , such as the Treaty of Non-Aggression signed with on May 31, 1939, which pledged mutual respect for amid rising European tensions. Relations with in were characterized by pragmatic accommodation rather than ideological affinity, driven by economic interdependence— was a major trading partner for Danish agricultural exports—and a desire to avoid provoking Berlin's expansionist ambitions. Danish shifted toward after the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, including concessions on trade imbalances and restrained criticism of , though Prime Minister Thorvald Stauning's government rejected any formal alignment. Concurrently, Denmark balanced this with ties to Britain and the League of Nations, but its demilitarized stance and small armed forces—limited to about 15,000 troops by 1939—left it vulnerable to unilateral action. Scandinavian dynamics featured cultural and rhetorical solidarity but lacked binding military cooperation, as Denmark, Norway, and Sweden prioritized individual neutrality over collective defense amid divergent threat perceptions. The Nordic states coordinated a joint on , 1939, by their prime ministers, affirming non-belligerence and intent to uphold international norms collectively. Efforts at a Scandinavian defense union in the late 1930s faltered; Denmark advocated for Nordic mutual aid tied to League guarantees, but Sweden insisted on strict excluding great-power entanglements, while Norway leaned toward British assurances, preventing any pact before the 1940 invasions. This fragmentation reflected broader realism: Denmark's geographic exposure to Germany undermined prospects for regional deterrence without external alliances.

Invasion and Surrender

Operation Weserübung

, the German codename for the coordinated invasions of and , commenced on April 9, 1940, with designated as the southern sector (Weserübung Süd) to facilitate rapid transit and air support for the . The primary strategic objectives included securing Scandinavian ports and airfields to protect Swedish iron ore shipments vital to the German , preempting potential Allied interventions, and establishing naval bases in the North Atlantic. 's invasion was planned as a secondary but essential element, leveraging its flat terrain and proximity to provide staging areas without the need for extensive amphibious operations, as German planners anticipated minimal resistance from Denmark's limited defenses. German forces under General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst's XXI Army Group, specifically XXXI Corps commanded by General , consisted of two infantry divisions (11th and 31st), the 170th Infantry Division, a motorized brigade, and supporting engineer and units totaling around 20,000 troops, supplemented by air superiority with over 500 aircraft. The assault began at approximately 4:15 a.m. with airborne landings at key airfields like , naval incursions into ports such as and , and ground advances across the Jutland border from . German paratroopers seized control of bridges and infrastructure to prevent Danish , while armored columns rapidly advanced toward , covering up to 200 kilometers in the first day. Denmark's military, numbering about 14,000 active personnel with obsolete equipment and no modern fortifications due to its longstanding neutrality policy, mounted sporadic resistance, including defensive actions at border crossings and the use of anti-tank guns against advancing panzers. Skirmishes occurred at locations like the , where Danish troops delayed German engineers, but coordinated counterattacks were hampered by the surprise element and overwhelming German air dominance, which neutralized Danish aircraft on the ground. By 7:20 a.m., German envoys presented an to the Danish government in , demanding capitulation to avoid bombardment; Prime Minister Thorvald Stauning's cabinet, after brief deliberation and reports of German troops nearing the capital, authorized Christian X to order a around 8:00 a.m., with formal surrender announced by noon on 9. The operation resulted in light German losses, with approximately 20 soldiers killed and fewer than 50 wounded, reflecting the brevity of engagements and Danish restraint in to minimize civilian harm. Danish military casualties totaled 16 killed and 20-23 wounded, alongside 13 civilian deaths from aerial and ground actions; captured Danish forces were generally paroled shortly after, allowing the retention of a semblance of national administration under occupation. This swift conquest, completed in under six hours, enabled German redirection of resources to while establishing as a transit corridor, though it exposed early logistical strains in the broader Weserübung due to weather delays and Allied naval responses elsewhere.

Danish Military Response and Capitulation

The German invasion of Denmark commenced in the early hours of April 9, 1940, as part of , with airborne assaults on key airfields such as and Værløse, naval landings near , and ground advances from southern borders. The Danish Army, numbering approximately 14,000 troops including recently mobilized reserves, was under the command of Lieutenant General , who had anticipated a potential German attack but faced severe limitations in equipment, training, and air support—Denmark's consisted of about 50 obsolete aircraft, and its had only two coastal defense vessels. Danish forces mobilized swiftly, with guards at Copenhagen's Citadel and other sites offering initial resistance, but the strategic disparity was evident: German units, supported by dominance and paratrooper drops, rapidly secured bridges like Masnedø and advanced toward the capital, threatening unfortified urban areas. Engagements were sporadic and localized, reflecting Denmark's defensive doctrine of minimal resistance to preserve national integrity rather than prolonged combat against a superior foe. Notable actions included skirmishes at Oxenholm Barracks near , where Danish troops repelled initial probes, and defensive stands in and at key crossings, but these were quickly overwhelmed by German and air cover. The Royal Guard delayed German entry into long enough for consultations, yet no coordinated counteroffensive materialized due to inadequate preparedness and the risk of devastating aerial bombardment on civilian centers. Total Danish military casualties amounted to 16 killed and around 20 wounded, underscoring the brevity and limited scale of the fighting, while German losses were minimal at fewer than 10. By approximately 6:00–7:00 a.m., German forces had encircled , prompting an ultimatum from General Leonhard Kaupisch demanding under threat of bombardment. King Christian X, Prime Minister , and General Prior convened urgently, concluding that continued resistance would result in disproportionate destruction and loss of life given the overwhelming German numerical and technological advantages—Denmark's forces were outnumbered and outmatched in every domain. Formal capitulation was announced at 7:20 a.m., with the king issuing a urging calm acceptance to mitigate further harm, effectively ending organized military opposition after roughly six hours from the onset of hostilities. This decision preserved the Danish government's nominal initially, avoiding the fate of more devastated nations, though it transitioned into occupation status.

Occupation Phases

Cooperation Government (1940–1943)

Following the German invasion on April 9, 1940, the Danish government under Prime Minister adopted a policy of cooperation with the occupiers, allowing the existing administration, (parliament), and King Christian X to retain significant autonomy. This approach, supported by major political parties, aimed to mitigate the impacts of occupation by preserving national institutions and minimizing disruptions to daily life, in contrast to harsher regimes in other occupied countries. Denmark was treated as a "model protectorate," with German interference limited initially to military and security matters. The cooperation entailed economic concessions, including the supply of agricultural produce and industrial output to Germany, alongside media censorship and the banning of the Communist Party of Denmark on June 22, 1941, after Operation Barbarossa. Foreign Minister Erik Scavenius signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in Berlin in November 1941, signaling alignment against the Soviet Union. The government also permitted expanded German troop deployments and expelled approximately 21 stateless Jewish refugees to Germany between 1940 and 1943. However, it rejected Nazi demands for anti-Jewish legislation in September 1942, maintaining that Danish Jews were citizens protected under national law. Stauning led until his death on September 3, 1942, after which Vilhelm Buhl briefly served before Scavenius assumed the premiership in November 1942, continuing the pragmatic accommodation to safeguard sovereignty. By mid-1943, shifting public sentiment fueled by Allied advances and German setbacks prompted widespread strikes, including major actions in and in August. On August 29, 1943, the government resigned rather than endorse German-proposed and for saboteurs, prompting the occupiers to declare a , dissolve the cabinet, and assume direct control over . This phase of cooperation, while enabling relative normalcy such as continued schooling and limited , facilitated German resource extraction and has been debated post-war for balancing against moral costs.

The 1943 Crisis and Shift to Direct Control

By mid-1943, the Danish policy of cooperation with German authorities faced mounting pressure from intensified resistance activities, including against infrastructure and production facilities vital to the German , as well as widespread strikes triggered by shortages and economic hardships. These disruptions, particularly in and other urban centers, escalated into street demonstrations and riots during August, undermining the Danish government's capacity to enforce order while adhering to its negotiated autonomy. The cumulative unrest reflected growing public disillusionment with the occupation, exacerbated by Allied bombing campaigns and reports of German defeats on other fronts. On August 28, 1943, , the German plenipotentiary in Denmark, issued an ultimatum to Wilhelm Buhl's government, demanding immediate measures to ban strikes, limit public assemblies to no more than five persons, and suppress resistance actions under threat of military intervention. The Danish cabinet, committed to preserving legal continuity and national sovereignty, rejected the demands, prompting Best to declare a that evening. This declaration effectively nullified the existing cooperation framework, as German forces moved to assert direct control. The following day, August 29, 1943, German troops executed , a coordinated operation to disarm and intern the Danish military, capturing approximately 6,000 soldiers and seizing armaments across the country with minimal resistance due to prior Danish demobilization orders. Simultaneously, the Germans dissolved the Danish government, dismissed civil servants, and imposed , transferring administrative authority to Best's office while banning and trade unions. King Christian X, who had symbolically maintained a degree of , saw his influence curtailed as German guards replaced the royal household's traditional mounted escort. This shift to direct control intensified German repressive measures, including the of over 2,000 Danish police officers in to curb their perceived leniency toward resisters, and the establishment of summary courts for rapid trials of saboteurs. Economic policies tightened, with forced requisitions and curfews becoming commonplace, though Best initially pursued a relatively restrained approach to avoid alienating the population entirely and sustain Danish productivity for the . The crisis thus catalyzed a transition from veiled occupation to overt , galvanizing broader resistance while exposing the fragility of the prior accommodation strategy.

Intensified Resistance (1943–1945)

Following the resignation of the Danish government on August 29, 1943, in response to German demands for the death penalty against saboteurs, the occupying authorities imposed direct control, declared a state of emergency, disarmed the Danish military, and attempted to seize the navy, resulting in the scuttling of 30 vessels to prevent capture. This shift ended the policy of cooperation and sparked widespread open defiance, including the August Uprising that had begun earlier in the summer with strikes at the Odense Steel Shipyard on July 30, 1943, triggered by the deployment of German sabotage guards. The unrest, fueled by news of German military setbacks such as the fall of Mussolini on July 24, spread nationwide with riots, demonstrations, and targeted sabotage against German-affiliated enterprises, leading to street battles between young Danes and German soldiers. In September 1943, the Danish Freedom Council was established to coordinate the fragmented resistance groups, unifying efforts in , intelligence gathering, and while serving as an unofficial from mid-1944 onward. Resistance activities intensified, with labor strikes and actions straining German logistics, particularly in the area during the summer of 1944, where operations disrupted industrial output and transportation vital to the Nazi war effort. These efforts included attacks on railways, factories, and supply lines, often coordinated with Allied intelligence networks, as the movement grew to encompass illegal publishing, weapons procurement, and the liquidation of informers collaborating with the . German reprisals escalated in tandem, with renewed states of emergency—such as on September 19, 1944—banning strikes and , imposing curfews, and arresting hundreds, yet failing to quell the unrest as public support for defiance solidified amid Allied advances. By early 1945, resistance had contributed to paralyzing key , paving the way for Denmark's liberation on May 5 without major ground fighting, as German forces capitulated following the in . The period marked a transition from passive non-cooperation to active , reflecting causal pressures from German overreach and exogenous Allied progress that eroded occupier control.

Collaboration and Pro-German Activities

Danish Nazi Parties and Movements

The Danmarks Nationalsocialistiske Arbejderparti (DNSAP), founded on 16 November 1930 by Cay Lembcke and led by from 1933, was the largest and most prominent in . Modeled after the German NSDAP, it employed the emblem and in its activities. In the October 1939 Folketing election, DNSAP garnered 31,000 votes, equating to 1.8% of the valid votes and securing three parliamentary seats; it replicated this marginal success in the March 1943 election with 43,000 votes (2.1%) and three seats. Membership expanded modestly from approximately 5,000 in 1939 to a wartime peak of around 21,000 in spring , before contracting to about 12,000 by amid growing public opposition. The party endorsed the German invasion of 9 April 1940 and pursued pro-German initiatives, including dissemination, recruitment for German military units, and provision of intelligence to occupation authorities, often with financial backing from the Germans. However, German officials, prioritizing a policy of indirect control through the existing Danish over a puppet Nazi regime, withheld full support from Clausen and DNSAP, precluding any Quisling-style takeover. Numerous smaller Nazi-oriented groups emerged between 1929 and 1945, many as DNSAP splinters or short-lived entities, but none attained parliamentary representation or significant influence. DNSAP maintained affiliated organizations, such as the National-Socialistisk Ungdom (NSU) , to propagate ideology among younger adherents. Overall, Danish Nazi movements commanded negligible public backing, widely perceived as traitorous amid pervasive national resistance to occupation excesses. Clausen retained leadership until late 1944, when a collective council assumed control; he subsequently volunteered for the .

Volunteers in German Forces

(Frikorps Danmark) was established on June 29, 1941, shortly after the German invasion of the , as a volunteer unit to combat on the Eastern Front. targeted Danish men aged 17 to 35, including active and recent veterans, with the Danish under the cooperation policy officially sanctioning the formation to align with the policy of limited collaboration with German authorities. Initial volunteers numbered around 480, who departed for training in on July 19, 1941, growing to approximately 1,164 by late 1941. The unit deployed to the Eastern Front in May 1942, attached to the 3rd SS Division under , participating in defensive operations around the south of Leningrad. Intense combat in swampy terrain and harsh winter conditions led to heavy losses; by September 1942, the corps had suffered 121 killed and returned to Denmark with only 299 combat-effective men from an original force of about 1,200. Commanders, including in June 1942 and subsequent replacements, were during these engagements. Disbanded in May 1943 amid shifting Danish-German relations, remnants were reorganized into the SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment 24 "Danmark" within the 11th SS Volunteer Panzergrenadier Division Nordland, comprising Danish and Norwegian volunteers. This regiment fought at the bridgehead in from to August 1944, incurring further casualties, with strength reduced to 1,386 by September 1944. Survivors participated in the final defense of in 1945. Overall, an estimated 5,500 to 6,000 volunteered for the , motivated primarily by anti-communist ideology, perceived defense of Western civilization against Soviet expansion, economic incentives, and in some cases sympathy for National Socialist goals. Casualties were severe, with approximately 2,000 to 4,000 Danish volunteers killed in German service, reflecting the brutal attrition of Eastern Front warfare. Post-war, many survivors faced legal repercussions in , including trials for , though executions were limited.

Industrial and Economic Cooperation

During the initial phase of German occupation from April 1940 to 1943, Denmark's government pursued a policy of pragmatic cooperation, which facilitated the redirection of its economy toward supporting the while preserving domestic institutions. Agricultural exports formed the cornerstone of this arrangement, with Denmark supplying critical foodstuffs to alleviate shortages in ; these exports accounted for 10 to 15 percent of the food consumption needs of the German civilian population throughout the war. Pork and constituted a primary , as Denmark's production reached 192,160 tonnes in 1941, of which 112,276 tonnes were exported, with receiving 99,281 tonnes. Deliveries peaked between 1943 and 1945, providing 14 percent of meat and pork consumed in major German cities and over 20 percent of the Wehrmacht's supply of these products, effectively sustaining the equivalent of 8.2 million German civilians through Danish farm outputs. Industrial cooperation was more limited, as Denmark lacked heavy armaments capacity, but German authorities placed orders totaling approximately 1 billion Danish kroner (DKK) across various sectors over the five-year occupation, focusing on components like machinery parts, ships, and textiles rather than direct weapons production. Butter output, a key export, declined from 180,000 tons annually pre-war to 110,000 tons by —a 40 percent drop—due to feed shortages and reallocation pressures, yet exports persisted under bilateral agreements managed by bodies like the German-Danish Government Committee. This , enforced through occupation controls and favorable pricing to maximize extraction, mitigated severe domestic compared to other occupied territories but tied Denmark's output to German needs, with inflation rising sharply in 1940 before stabilization via . German policy tolerated Danish autonomy partly because these supplies forestalled broader exploitation, though the net transfer favored , leaving Denmark with unpaid clearing account balances exceeding extraction value in some estimates. Post-1943, as resistance intensified and direct German control tightened, economic cooperation eroded amid targeting export infrastructure and factories fulfilling German contracts, reducing output reliability. Nonetheless, the prior collaboration had embedded Danish production within the Axis , contributing to German resilience against Allied bombing and effects until liberation in May 1945.

Resistance and Anti-German Efforts

Organizational Development and Tactics

The Danish resistance movement began as loosely organized, spontaneous efforts following the German invasion on , , initially emphasizing non-violent actions such as distributing illegal newspapers like De Frie Danske to counter German and report on occupation abuses. By , more structured groups emerged amid growing frustration with the cooperation policy, including the , a youth-led group in that conducted early arson and sabotage against German targets. These early cells lacked central coordination, operating independently with limited resources until British (SOE) supplies, including parachuted weapons and explosives, began aiding operations from 1943 onward. Holger Danske, formed in Copenhagen in 1942 by veterans of the Finnish Winter War against the , grew into Denmark's largest resistance organization with approximately 350 members by 1945, focusing primarily on urban sabotage and the liquidation of over 200 informers and collaborators to protect networks. The communist-led BOPA (Borgersamfundets Partisaner), centralized in early 1943 from prior KOPA cells, emphasized industrial disruption with around 150 members, executing high-profile daylight raids such as the June 6, 1944, bombing of the Sønderjylland Command ammunition depot. Other regional groups, like the rural Hvidsten network, specialized in weapons transport and partisan actions, receiving SOE-dropped arms for targeted strikes. Coordination advanced with the formation of the Danish Freedom Council on September 16, 1943, uniting major factions—including Holger Danske, BOPA, and conservative-leaning groups—under five council members to streamline , intelligence sharing, and postwar planning, effectively serving as an underground government recognized by Allied forces by July 1944. This body directed over 20,000 participants by war's end, prioritizing actions that maximized disruption without provoking excessive reprisals early on. Tactics evolved from passive obstruction—such as bureaucratic delays and cultural defiance through public singing of Danish anthems—to aggressive sabotage after the August 1943 government crisis, targeting railways (over 1,000 derailments recorded), factories producing war materiel, and collaborating firms to hinder German logistics. Groups employed small, compartmentalized cells for security, using explosives from SOE drops for precise operations like rail line bombings and factory arsons, while BOPA integrated popular front strategies to broaden recruitment beyond communists. Liquidations by Holger Danske's specialized units neutralized threats via ambushes and executions, often in response to Gestapo infiltrations. Strikes, coordinated via the Freedom Council, paralyzed Copenhagen in summer 1944 and other cities in 1943, combining worker unrest with youth demonstrations to amplify economic pressure on occupiers. These methods inflicted measurable damage, such as millions of Danish kroner in sabotage costs, while minimizing open confrontations due to Denmark's dense population and limited arms.

Sabotage Operations and Allied Coordination

The Danish resistance conducted sabotage operations targeting German military logistics, including railway lines, factories producing war materials, and freight transports, with actions intensifying after the German declaration of on August 29, 1943. Groups such as Holger Danske, a non-communist network, and BOPA (Bourgeois Partisans), which drew from communist cells, executed bombings, arson, and machine damage to hinder troop movements and armaments output, often in coordination with strikes that paralyzed urban areas. These efforts escalated in summer 1944 amid broader civil unrest in , contributing to disruptions that aligned with Allied strategic needs. Coordination with Allied forces emerged through early intelligence links via neutral Sweden and Danish exiles in , where figures like politician John Christmas Møller collaborated with British (SOE) from May 1942 to promote sabotage via appeals. The SOE, directed to incite disruption across occupied , supported Danish groups by endorsing actions that targeted Nazi , though initial mistrust of Danish resolve delayed deeper integration until resistance unification. The establishment of the Danish Freedom Council on September 16, 1943, consolidated major sabotage factions—including Holger Danske and BOPA—under a single command, enabling synchronized operations with Allied priorities such as pre-invasion disruptions. Escaped leaders like Svend Truelsen further bridged gaps by liaising at SOE headquarters in 1944, facilitating tactical alignment despite tensions between sabotage advocates and intelligence-focused elements. Youth outfits, exemplified by the 's early arson and vandalism from 1941, exemplified grassroots momentum that fed into these coordinated campaigns.

Role of Communists and Internal Divisions

The Danish Communist Party (DKP) initially refrained from opposing the German occupation following the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, viewing as an ally of the until on June 22, 1941, when invaded the USSR. In response, German authorities in Denmark interned prominent communists, prompting underground DKP members to organize resistance cells focused on anti-fascist agitation and early . These efforts positioned communists among the pioneers of active opposition, leveraging their pre-war organizational experience despite comprising a small fraction of the population. By early 1942, communists established the Kommunistiske Partisaner (KOPA), a network dedicated to industrial against German supply lines, which was rebranded as Borgerlige Partisaner (BOPA) in to attract non-communist recruits and emphasize broad anti-occupation goals. Under central coordination from , BOPA grew to approximately 350 members by 1944, executing high-impact operations such as the June 6, 1944, destruction of the Globus arms factory in , which disrupted German munitions production. This group accounted for a significant share of wartime acts, targeting railways, factories, and shipping, often in coordination with British-supplied explosives, though losses reduced active membership to 179 by liberation in May 1945. The resistance movement exhibited ideological fractures, with communists advocating militant class-based tactics and sabotage, contrasting with conservative or liberal groups like Holger Danske, which prioritized intelligence gathering and selective strikes to minimize reprisals. Non-communist factions harbored mistrust toward BOPA's Soviet alignment and radicalism, fearing post-war efforts, as evidenced by early resistance drawing from right-of-center elements wary of proletarian upheaval. The Danish Freedom Council, formed on September 16, 1943, to unify disparate groups under Allied recognition, included DKP representatives but allocated them limited seats—typically two amid broader conservative dominance—to curb communist influence and ensure coordinated, non-revolutionary strategy. These tensions persisted, with saboteurs spanning political extremes until late 1944, yet pragmatic alliance prevented outright schism amid escalating German crackdowns.

The Jewish Question

Pre-Occupation Policies on Jewish Refugees

In the early , Denmark maintained a generally restrictive policy amid the , prioritizing economic stability and employment for its citizens, which limited acceptance of Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi in . Between 1933 and 1940, however, the Danish government permitted the entry of approximately 4,500 Jewish refugees primarily from , , and , though many arrived via irregular means or as transit cases. Of these, around 3,000 were subsequently expelled or departed voluntarily due to stringent residency requirements and economic pressures, resulting in a net retention of roughly 1,500. Danish authorities tightened controls following the 1933 Nazi rise to power, implementing border checks and visa mandates that effectively barred most destitute or unskilled Jewish applicants, reflecting broader European trends of refugee aversion driven by unemployment rates exceeding 20% in Denmark by 1933. In response to the 1938 pogroms, Denmark declined to liberalize policies despite international appeals, with Foreign Minister Thorvald Stauning's government citing domestic welfare burdens and fears of social unrest from rapid demographic shifts. At the 1938 Évian Conference on Jewish refugees, Denmark joined 31 other nations in refusing significant quota increases, affirming its commitment to minimal intake to avoid straining resources. By 1939, legislation empowered officials to deport illegal entrants, including , with several hundred turned back at borders or sea ports; this persisted into early 1940, underscoring a pragmatic over humanitarian imperatives amid rising antisemitic incidents domestically and regionally. aid organizations, such as the Danish Jewish community and Quaker groups, provided limited shelter and transit support, but state reluctance stemmed from causal factors like fiscal constraints—Denmark's GDP had fallen 15% since —and avoidance of provoking , given trade dependencies. These measures contrasted with Denmark's small native Jewish population of about 5,000-6,000, who enjoyed legal equality since 1849 , yet faced episodic that amplified official caution.

1943 Deportation Attempt and Flight to Sweden

In late September 1943, following increased by Danish resistance groups and the of the Danish government on August 29, directed the German authorities in Denmark to prepare for the deportation of the country's approximately 7,800 Jewish residents to concentration camps. On September 28, approved the operation, with implementation scheduled to begin on the night of October 1–2, targeting synagogues and known Jewish addresses in and other areas. Werner Best, the German plenipotentiary general in Denmark, received the deportation directive but sought to execute it in a manner that minimized disruption to the "model protectorate" status Denmark had maintained under occupation, where anti-Jewish measures had been largely avoided until then. Best's subordinate, Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz, the German shipping attaché, alerted Danish social democrats and officials to the impending raids on September 29, prompting immediate warnings to Jewish communities through clergy, physicians, and resistance networks. Duckwitz also traveled to Sweden on October 1 to secure assurances from the Swedish government for receiving refugees, which Stockholm provided without hesitation due to geographic proximity across the Øresund strait. The , including groups like the Elsinore Sewing Club, rapidly organized the evacuation, coordinating with fishermen, civilians, and even some German naval personnel who turned a blind eye. were hidden in homes, hospitals, and churches before being transported by small boats—often fishing vessels—from ports like Gilleleje, , and to Swedish shores over the subsequent three weeks, with crossings typically occurring under cover of darkness to evade patrols. This effort involved broad civilian participation, with ordinary providing shelter, forged documents, and funds, reflecting a societal consensus against segregation that had persisted since Denmark's pre-occupation integration of as equal citizens. By mid-October 1943, approximately 7,200 Danish and 700 non-Jewish relatives had reached safety in , representing over 95% of the targeted population and averting mass . The operation's success stemmed from the advance notice, which allowed dispersal before raids commenced, combined with the short 10–20 kilometer sea route to and minimal German enforcement zeal in Denmark compared to , where deportations faced less opposition. German forces arrested around 500 who could not escape, but the bulk of the flight underscored the limits of Nazi control in a with strong national cohesion and geographic advantages.

Outcomes, Myths, and Causal Factors

Of the approximately 7,800 in at the outset of the German occupation in 1940, roughly 7,220 fled to between October 1 and 28, 1943, primarily via small fishing boats across the strait. An estimated 464 to 476 Danish were captured and deported to the in Bohemia and Moravia, where 51 died during internment; the survivors returned to after liberation. This resulted in a Jewish of over 98 percent in , the highest among Nazi-occupied European countries. Common myths surrounding the events include the claim that King Christian X publicly wore a yellow badge in solidarity with ordered to do so by German authorities in 1940, a story propagated post-war but unsupported by evidence, as no such order was issued in and the king did not wear the badge. Another misconception portrays the as a spontaneous, altruistic national uprising driven solely by humanitarian exceptionalism, overlooking strategic calculations by Danish officials to preserve the "" as a domestic amid collapsing cooperation with German authorities, as well as selective profiteering by some fishermen charging fees for transport. Recent scholarship challenges the narrative of unanimous Danish resistance, noting that pre-1943 policies under the collaborationist government tolerated limited anti-Jewish measures and that the mass flight succeeded partly due to fragmented German enforcement rather than uniform opposition. The success stemmed from multiple causal factors, including advance warnings of the planned October 1-2, 1943, roundup disseminated through resistance networks and sympathetic German officials like diplomat , who alerted Danish leaders and Swedish counterparts on September 28. Proximity to neutral , which proactively offered asylum to all Danish and mobilized its for patrols, facilitated evacuation by over 1,000 small vessels, often operated by fishermen motivated by payment or coercion avoidance. The timing followed the breakdown of Denmark's "cooperation policy," escalating and prompting German deportations, but also unifying disparate actors—clergy issuing public condemnations, civil servants delaying registries, and Jewish communities organizing self-evacuation—while German military disarray from Eastern Front demands limited pursuit. These elements, rather than inherent cultural traits, explain the operation's efficacy, as similar rescues failed elsewhere without geographic and diplomatic enablers.

Overseas Territories

Faroe Islands under British Occupation

Following Germany's invasion of Denmark on April 9, 1940, British forces initiated Operation Valentine to secure the strategically vital in the North Atlantic, preempting potential German control over regional sea lanes and communications infrastructure such as the cable and wireless station in . On , 1940, the cruiser HMS Suffolk arrived in harbor, followed by the landing of approximately 250 on April 13, establishing the occupation without resistance. Local governor Carl Aage Hilbert issued a formal but cooperated with the British, maintaining cordial relations while the Faroese (parliament) convened and rejected an immediate pro-independence proposal. British administration respected the islands' status as a Danish province, appointing a consul and agreeing not to interfere in internal governance, though a Naval Officer in Command and later the Faroe Islands Force oversaw military operations from headquarters at Skansin fortress in Tórshavn. Troop rotations included replacement of the initial Royal Marines by Lovat Scouts in May 1940 and Scottish Cameronians in 1942, with garrison sizes reduced from 1944 onward as threats diminished. Infrastructure developments supported Allied naval and air efforts, including construction of Vágar airfield (opened June 8, 1942, and closed July 29, 1944), roads, bridges, and hundreds of barracks—many of which remain in use—along with four fuel tanks at Søldarfjørður by September 1943 for ship refueling. The British also contributed to the Northern Barrage, laying 11,883 mines between 1940 and 1942 to hinder U-boat activity, though this resulted in occasional damage to local vessels and homes. Economically, the occupation stimulated growth in the sector, Denmark's primary industry on the islands, through expanded exports to Britain and new processing facilities, offsetting wartime disruptions despite of over 200 Faroese . projects provided and modernized , fostering a post-occupation economic legacy that included the gifted airfield. Socially, interactions led to approximately 170 marriages between British servicemen and Faroese women, influencing local culture, while the British recognition of the Faroese flag Merkið bolstered . Withdrawals accelerated in 1944 with airfield closure, and by mid-1945, most forces departed, with the occupation formally ending on May 13, 1945, when control reverted to ; lingering elements like a radar station at Nólsoy persisted briefly into 1945. The period, often termed the "Friendly Occupation," left no record of significant local opposition and contributed to heightened Faroese autonomy aspirations post-war.

Iceland's Independence Process

Iceland had been in a with since the Danish-Icelandic Act of Union signed on December 1, 1918, which granted Iceland in domestic affairs while retained responsibility for and defense. The German invasion of on April 9, 1940, severed communications between and Reykjavik, leaving Iceland's government under Prime Minister effectively isolated from Danish authority. On May 10, 1940, British forces launched Operation Fork, occupying key sites in without resistance to preempt potential German control of the North Atlantic and protect convoy routes. The Icelandic government protested the as a violation of neutrality but lacked the military means to resist; it negotiated terms allowing British troops to remain while maintaining internal . In July 1940, the (Icelandic parliament) passed legislation assuming control over foreign affairs, citing Denmark's incapacitation under occupation, which effectively sidelined Danish oversight. The assumed responsibility for the occupation on July 7, 1941, following an Icelandic-American defense agreement that replaced British forces with American troops, further securing Allied strategic interests amid escalating Atlantic threats. Throughout the war, Iceland's government cooperated with the occupiers on logistics and defense while preserving neutrality in rhetoric, though economic ties deepened with the Allies; this de facto independence from Danish influence accelerated nationalist momentum for full . By 1944, with Denmark still under German control and the war nearing its European conclusion, moved to terminate the 1918 union. A held May 20–23, 1944, saw 97.5% of voters approve ending the union and 95.5% endorse a an constitution, reflecting broad consensus driven by wartime self-reliance and resentment over historical Danish dominance. On June 17, 1944, at , formally declared itself a , dissolving the monarchy and union; , emerging from occupation, recognized the in 1945 without dispute. This process marked the culmination of Icelandic gained amid disruptions, transitioning from nominal to complete .

Greenland's Strategic Allied Use

Following the German occupation of Denmark on April 9, 1940, Greenland's local administration, led by governors Eske Brun in the north and Aksel Svane in the south, invoked emergency powers under a 1925 Danish law to maintain autonomy and neutrality amid severed communications with . This isolation prompted pragmatic alignment with the Allies, particularly the , to safeguard the territory from potential Axis encroachment, given its position on great-circle routes across the North Atlantic and its unique resources. In April 1941, Danish ambassador , acting independently, signed a defense agreement with the U.S., facilitating American protection; by summer 1941, Brun's administration formalized joint defense arrangements with U.S. forces, prioritizing supply security and military infrastructure over formal Danish oversight. Greenland's primary strategic value lay in its cryolite deposits at Ivigtut, a mineral essential for refining into aluminum for production, supplying up to 90% of the Allies' needs during the . U.S. forces secured the mine early, with patrols and units defending it against German attempts, including a 1943-1944 by Otto Kretschmer's team that was thwarted, preventing disruptions to aluminum output critical for the Allied air campaign. Economically, this cooperation enabled Greenland to export to the U.S. and , bolstering local trade and infrastructure while funding self-sufficiency measures like expanded and operations. Militarily, the U.S. constructed a network of airfields and bases under the Bluie code, starting with Bluie West One at in July 1941, which served as a key staging point for ferrying over 10,000 aircraft to via the North Atlantic route, reducing losses from direct ocean crossings. Bluie West Eight (Sondrestromfjord) followed, hosting Army Air Forces units for refueling and repairs, while eastern sites like Bluie East Two supported . These installations, numbering over a dozen by 1943, also enabled , with U.S. Navy and vessels patrolling Greenland's coasts to counter threats and secure routes. To deny meteorological data advantageous for operations and navigation, Allied forces, including the U.S.-led North-East Sledge Patrol established in , dismantled at least three German weather stations by 1944, employing hunters and dog sleds for patrols covering thousands of kilometers in extreme conditions. This intelligence edge proved decisive in the . By war's end on May 5, 1945, Brun relinquished emergency powers, restoring Danish sovereignty, though U.S. bases persisted into the postwar era, underscoring 's enduring geostrategic role.

Economic and Social Impacts

Wartime Economy and Resource Management

Following the German invasion on April 9, 1940, Denmark's economy was oriented toward supporting the German war effort through agricultural exports, as the country lacked significant industrial capacity for armaments production. Under agreements, a fixed portion of Danish output—primarily bacon, , eggs, and —was allocated for export to , with deliveries peaking between 1943 and 1945 when Denmark provided approximately 14% of meat and consumed in major German cities and over 20% of the Wehrmacht's needs in those categories. This integration stemmed from Denmark's pre-war dependence on German markets for 60-70% of its agricultural surplus, which the occupation authorities leveraged to secure compliance without full economic plunder. The Danish retained control over domestic , implementing to balance exports and internal needs; for instance, , , and faced strict quotas from early 1941, while meat distribution was prioritized for exports over local consumption. Energy resources were managed through pre-war stockpiles of and , supplemented by that limited private use and industrial fuel by mid-1940, averting immediate collapse despite Germany's seizure of shipping . surged 50-100% in the first year due to disruptions and monetary expansion from German payments for goods, yet wage controls and price caps by Danish authorities contained broader until campaigns intensified shortages after 1943. This cooperative framework resulted in Denmark maintaining one of Europe's highest living standards under occupation, with caloric intake averaging 2,800-3,000 per day through 1943—far exceeding levels in or other occupied territories—owing to agricultural self-sufficiency and minimal forced labor extraction. However, escalating Allied bombings and resistance actions from 1944 disrupted supply chains, leading to premiums of 200-300% on rationed items and a shift toward and home production. Post-liberation assessments by Danish officials acknowledged that export commitments had preserved industrial capacity and employment, avoiding the devastation seen in more exploited nations like or .

Food Shortages, Black Markets, and Hardships

Rationing of foodstuffs in Denmark began prior to full occupation, with and restricted in March 1940 to curb imports amid emerging European shortages, followed by sugar, butter, and other staples as German demands intensified after , 1940. The policy stemmed from Germany's extraction of Danish agricultural output, which supplied 10-15% of the Reich's overall food consumption during the war, including peak deliveries of meat and pork equivalent to 14% of urban German needs and over 20% for the by 1943-1945. This export obligation, enforced through negotiated cooperation rather than outright plunder, depleted domestic supplies despite 's agricultural self-sufficiency, leading to official rations for bread, meat, dairy, and fats via coupon books issued to civilians. Black markets emerged as supplements to official distributions, particularly for , , and imported luxuries, with prices inflating due to and risk of penalties under occupation regulations. Sensible pricing initially motivated farmers to sustain production, limiting black market proliferation compared to harsher occupations, though urban consumers increasingly relied on illicit trade amid uneven rural-urban access. By 1943-1944, resistance activities, including strikes and industrial sabotage, disrupted logistics and farm outputs, exacerbating supply gaps and fueling underground exchanges, though no widespread ensued. Civilian hardships manifested in caloric deficits and nutritional imbalances, with urban working-class households facing the brunt from rationed staples like (limited to small weekly allotments) and , prompting substitutions with potatoes, grains, and foraged items. risks rose, evidenced by post-war studies linking wartime deprivation to elevated incidence (0.7% higher risk per exposure metric), though mortality remained low absent . Rural areas fared better via direct farm access, but overall strains contributed to social tensions, including 1944 general strikes that halted food processing and distribution in cities like .

Post-Liberation Currency Reform

Following the German capitulation on May 5, 1945, Denmark faced severe economic distortions from five years of occupation, including excess from German expenditures in Danish currency, widespread , inflation, and illicit exports of notes to . To address these issues and restore monetary stability, the Danish enacted an emergency in July 1945 authorizing a comprehensive currency . The aimed primarily to invalidate notes illegally exported during the occupation—estimated to have been smuggled out by German forces and collaborators—and to uncover hidden fortunes evading taxation, thereby reducing circulating and curbing inflationary pressures. Danmarks Nationalbank had secretly prepared for the reform by designing and printing new banknote series in 1943 and 1944, under wartime secrecy to prevent German discovery. Implementation began on July 22, 1945, requiring all old notes to be exchanged at banks within a limited period; exchanges were validated using coupons detached from citizens' ration cards, which capped amounts per person and facilitated tracking of large holdings. The new "substitution series" featured denominations of 5, 10, 50, 100, and 500 kroner, with security motifs such as interwoven figures on the 5-krone note and a farmer plowing with horses on the 500-krone note, printed in sizes ranging from 130 x 72 mm for the smallest to 174 x 108 mm for the largest. Pre-reform notes became non-redeemable after the exchange deadline, effectively demonetizing unexchanged currency. The successfully withdrew 71 million kroner, equivalent to 6% of the total circulating , which were presumed to stem from illicit occupation-era activities. It also revealed approximately 2,500 million kroner in previously undeclared wealth, representing 18% of the total fortunes reported post-exchange, enabling enhanced enforcement and recovery. By blocking portions of holdings and invalidating suspect , the measure mitigated excess accumulated under occupation, when German payments had flooded the without corresponding production increases, thus laying groundwork for postwar stabilization and reconstruction. Lower denominations like the 5- and 10-krone from this series remained in circulation until 1954, when they were replaced amid ongoing monetary normalization.

Liberation and Aftermath

German Capitulation and Danish Forces

On 4 May 1945, Field Marshal accepted the of German forces in northwest , the , and at , marking the effective capitulation of approximately 250,000 German troops stationed in Danish territory. The announcement was broadcast via British radio at 20:35 Danish time, with the surrender taking formal effect at 08:00 on 5 May 1945. Unlike in other theaters, the process in Denmark unfolded without large-scale combat, as German commanders, facing by advancing Allied armies and lacking orders to fight to the last, complied with the terms across and the islands. In the immediate aftermath, Danish resistance groups—numbering around 50,000 active members by war's end—seized strategic sites including ports, bridges, radio stations, and government offices to avert potential German scorched-earth tactics or sabotage. Elements of the British 11th Armoured Division crossed the German-Danish border at on 5 May, advancing to and to supervise and detain high-ranking German officials, including Karl Dönitz's provisional government. Local German commanders, such as General Hans von Hanneken in , formally handed over authority to Danish civil officials and resistance leaders, facilitating a rapid transition with minimal disorder. Denmark's conventional military had been demobilized and disarmed by German order on 29 August 1943, following the collapse of the cooperation policy and imposition of direct occupation, leaving only scattered units and the resistance's improvised groups operational. To address this vacuum, the Danish exile government in coordinated with neutral to form the Danish Brigade in late 1943, recruiting around 4,600-5,000 volunteers (primarily escaped soldiers, refugees, and conscripts) for training as a "police force" capable of securing the homeland. Equipped with rifles, , and vehicles under a 25 million kroner , the brigade emphasized pioneer engineering, infantry tactics, and rapid deployment, with an attached air squadron of 21 pilots trained on bombers. Mobilized on 5 May 1945 as DANFORCE, the brigade shipped from to and other ports starting 10 May, arriving in full by mid-month to support Allied oversight without engaging in major hostilities due to the capitulation's bloodlessness. Its primary tasks included clearing minefields, guarding 200,000-300,000 disarmed Germans (many of whom were repatriated by ), and preventing looting amid food shortages and refugee influxes from . Casualties were limited to three brigade soldiers killed in a street clash with lingering German holdouts. This deployment marked the initial reconstitution of Danish armed forces, blending pre-war traditions with Swedish doctrinal influences like decentralized command, and formed the core for the post-war army's expansion to 50,000 personnel by 1947.

Treatment of Collaborators and German Refugees

Following the German capitulation on May 5, 1945, Danish authorities, guided by the Freedom Council and , initiated widespread arrests of suspected collaborators, including members of the Danish National Socialist Workers' Party (DNSAP), informers to the , and volunteers in German units such as . Special tribunals, established under the June 1945 Treason Act (forræderiloven), prosecuted cases of aiding the enemy, with procedures emphasizing but expedited for national security. Ordinary DNSAP membership alone did not warrant punishment absent additional acts like or , reflecting a distinction between ideological and active . Over 10,000 individuals faced trial in these courts between 1945 and 1947, with sentences typically involving fines, loss of civil rights, or ; severe cases, such as those involving executions or , drew harsher penalties, including the temporary restoration of . Approximately 100 death sentences were issued, of which 42 were executed by firing squad at sites near between 1946 and 1948, targeting high-profile figures like SS collaborators. Many sentences were later commuted or reduced during amnesties in the late 1940s, prioritizing societal reintegration over prolonged retribution, though public resentment led to social ostracism and economic boycotts for those convicted. Concurrently, Denmark managed a influx of around 250,000 German refugees—primarily women, children, and elderly from eastern territories—who had been forcibly relocated by Nazi authorities starting in to evade the Soviet advance. Post-liberation, these civilians, along with surrendering personnel (totaling about 30,000 POWs), were disarmed and confined to over 1,100 camps, including the large Oksbøl facility housing up to 35,000. Conditions were austere due to Denmark's own wartime scarcities, with refugees receiving minimal rations (often below subsistence levels), limited medical access, and restrictions on movement; able-bodied internees were later compelled to perform labor, such as coastal demining under Allied oversight. Mortality was stark, particularly among infants and the elderly, with approximately 13,000 deaths in 1945 alone—7,000 under age five—from , , and exacerbated by and Denmark's system. Overall fatalities reached 17,000 by 1949, when repatriation to concluded, though fueled discriminatory policies like segregated facilities and delayed aid, contrasting with Denmark's humanitarian record elsewhere. A small number of refugees, deemed non-Nazi, integrated permanently, but most camps emphasized temporary over welfare, reflecting pragmatic resource constraints rather than systematic malice.

Legacy and Controversies

Historiographical Debates on Cooperation vs. Heroism

Historiographical debates surrounding Denmark's experience under German occupation from April 9, 1940, to May 5, 1945, have long revolved around the relative emphasis on the government's policy of samarbejdspolitik (cooperation) versus narratives of widespread heroism and resistance. Proponents of the cooperation view argue that it preserved Danish democratic institutions, including the and (Folketinget), until the German crackdown in August 1943, by accommodating Nazi demands in exchange for autonomy and reduced repression. This approach, which Hitler touted as a "model ," enabled economic continuity and shielded civilians from the harsher fates of other occupied nations, with Danish authorities maintaining control over police and judiciary. However, critics contend that such compliance facilitated German exploitation, as Denmark's agricultural exports—primarily bacon, butter, and fish—sustained the , with food supplies constituting a key factor in the occupiers' tolerance of Danish self-rule. Post-war Danish scholarship, particularly from the 1940s to the 1970s, prioritized a heroic framing to forge national cohesion amid wartime divisions, spotlighting resistance milestones like the , operations that damaged over 1,000 German installations by 1945, and the near-total rescue of Denmark's 7,800 via fishing boats to in October 1943. This narrative marginalized evidence of collaboration, such as the enlistment of roughly 6,000 Danes in units like , which fought on the Eastern Front, or the pre-1943 governmental reluctance to disrupt economic ties with . Historians like Ole Chlyst Thomsen have noted how this selective memory simplified complex realities, portraying as uniformly defiant while understating internal power struggles and the gradual escalation of resistance only after cooperation faltered. Revisionist works since the 1980s, including those by Uffe Østergård, have reevaluated not merely as capitulation but as a calculated "" that bought time for resistance networks to organize, though they acknowledge its moral ambiguities and role in prolonging occupation until Allied advances forced German capitulation. Empirical analyses reveal that while incidents rose sharply post-—totaling over 1,000 acts by war's end—pre-1943 compliance included Danish firms fulfilling Nazi contracts and authorities expelling 21 Jewish refugees to between 1940 and 1943, complicating claims of inherent heroism. These debates underscore causal tensions: arguably minimized immediate (fewer than 3,500 Danish civilian deaths directly from occupation) but arguably emboldened German staying power, prompting ongoing scrutiny of whether pragmatic adaptation equated to ethical compromise or strategic realism. Contemporary historians caution against binary framings, advocating spectral analyses of reactions ranging from acquiescence to defiance, informed by declassified archives revealing the interplay of and .

Post-War Trials and National Reckoning

Following the German capitulation on May 5, 1945, Denmark initiated a comprehensive legal known as rettens oprør to prosecute individuals accused of , collaboration, and war crimes during the occupation. Special tribunals were established under emergency legislation enacted on June 26, 1945, amending the penal code to include for acts aiding the enemy, such as membership in units like the or participation in paramilitary groups like the Schalburg Corps. These courts operated alongside regular judiciary processes, prioritizing cases involving violence, espionage, or direct support for German operations, with trials commencing as early as June 1945 and continuing into the early 1950s. Over 10,000 Danes faced trial for collaboration-related offenses, resulting in thousands of convictions ranging from fines and property confiscation to lengthy imprisonment; approximately 500 received death sentences, though many were commuted to life terms. Executions totaled 46, carried out by firing squad primarily at the site of Copenhagen's former Vestre Fængsel prison between 1946 and 1950, targeting high-profile figures such as members responsible for suppressing resistance and volunteers who fought on the Eastern Front. Foreign collaborators, including some Germans, were often extradited or handled separately, with Denmark prosecuting fewer than 100 non-Danes for war crimes, focusing on those integrated into local units. The process emphasized individual culpability over collective guilt, sparing those involved in passive economic cooperation under the government's initial policy. The trials facilitated a national reckoning with the occupation's moral ambiguities, as Denmark's early strategy of cooperation—endorsed by the Stauning government and King Christian X—had preserved and mitigated harsher reprisals but enabled limited collaboration by groups like the Danish Nazi Party (DNSAP), which peaked at around 50,000 members in 1943 before declining. Post-war narratives initially amplified resistance heroism, such as and the 1943 Jewish rescue, to foster unity, yet historiographical analysis later highlighted how this obscured widespread acquiescence and economic incentives for collaboration, with ordinary citizens benefiting from German labor demands. polls and survivor accounts reflect a consensus that the purges restored without descending into widespread , though critics noted inconsistencies, such as lighter sentences for industrialists profiting from German contracts compared to frontline auxiliaries. This reckoning influenced Denmark's post-war identity, reinforcing commitments to democratic resilience and integration by 1949, while suppressing overt fascist remnants; amnesties in the 1950s gradually reintegrated many convicts, signaling closure amid priorities. Archival restrictions until the 1990s delayed fuller examination of collaboration's scale, including the expulsion of Jewish refugees pre-1943, underscoring ongoing debates over whether official cooperation constituted pragmatic shield or inadvertent facilitation of Nazi aims.

Long-Term Effects on Danish Identity and Policy

The experience of German occupation from 1940 to reinforced a Danish emphasizing resilience, collective moral action, and nonviolent defiance, as evidenced by the widespread resistance activities that included , intelligence gathering, and the near-total of Denmark's population. Over 7,200 Jews were evacuated to in through coordinated efforts involving civilians, clergy, and fishermen, an event that post-war historiography elevated as a symbol of unified and ethical fortitude, distinct from the initial policy of cooperation with occupiers. This narrative marginalized the earlier accommodation phase, where the government sought to preserve under Nazi oversight, and instead prioritized stories of underground heroism, shaping public memory through memorials, literature, and education that portrayed as a small nation preserving its democratic values against . Psychological legacies persisted, with survivors and their descendants reporting vivid flashbulb memories of key events like the 1943 rescue and 1944 strikes, contributing to intergenerational trauma but also a heightened sense of communal and toward . Post-war trials of approximately 13,500 alleged collaborators, resulting in over 2,000 prison sentences and fines totaling millions of kroner, underscored taboos against perceived disloyalty, embedding a cultural aversion to ideological while fostering introspection about the costs of pragmatic concessions during occupation. These reckonings, though lenient compared to neighbors like , integrated into by distinguishing Danish "exceptionalism"—minimal deportations and intact —from more devastated occupied states, though critics note this downplayed economic benefits from early , such as sustained trade with . In policy terms, the occupation eroded Denmark's pre-war commitment to armed neutrality, prompting alignment with Western alliances amid threats reminiscent of 1940 vulnerabilities. Denmark ratified the on April 4, 1949, becoming a founding member to deter future invasions, with parliamentary debates citing the rapid German overrun as a cautionary lesson against ; this shift included hosting Allied bases but rejecting peacetime nuclear weapons on soil, reflecting "footnote politics" of cautious . Domestically, wartime scarcities and social strains accelerated consolidation, with the 1947 currency reform stabilizing the economy and enabling expansions like universal child allowances in 1948 and old-age pensions reforms by 1956, framed as bulwarks against the inequalities exposed by occupation-era black markets and . Long-term, this fostered a "flexicurity" model blending high social protections with market flexibility, influenced by the perceived need for internal cohesion to withstand external shocks, though direct causal links remain debated among historians favoring continuity from interwar social reforms over rupture from 1940-1945. Foreign policy evolved into "small-state realism," prioritizing EU integration for economic leverage while maintaining opt-outs on defense and currency—evident in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty exemptions—to preserve sovereignty lessons from occupation, balancing interdependence with autonomy. This approach, evident in Denmark's active contributions post-1990s despite historical pacifism, traces to the occupation's demonstration that neutrality invites exploitation, redirecting national strategy toward without full supranational surrender.

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