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Nuclear weapon
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- MIRV design of modern ICBM nuclear warheads
- Submarine-launched ballistic missile test, a standard nuclear warhead delivery option
- Fat Man nuclear bomb in Tinian before use on Nagasaki
- Cloud following atomic bombing of Nagasaki
- F-35 drops a dummy B61 nuclear bomb during testing
- Assortment of US nuclear ICBMs
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| Weapons of mass destruction |
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| Non-state |
| Islamic State |
| Nuclear weapons by country |
| Proliferation |
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A nuclear weapon[a] is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either nuclear fission (fission or atomic bomb) or a combination of fission and nuclear fusion reactions (thermonuclear weapon[b]), producing a nuclear explosion. Both bomb types release large quantities of energy from relatively small amounts of matter.
Nuclear weapons have had yields between 10 tons (the W54) and 50 megatons for the Tsar Bomba (see TNT equivalent). Yields in the low kilotons can devastate cities. A thermonuclear weapon weighing as little as 600 pounds (270 kg) can release energy equal to more than 1.2 megatons of TNT (5.0 PJ).[1] Apart from the blast, effects of nuclear weapons include extreme heat and ionizing radiation, firestorms, radioactive nuclear fallout, an electromagnetic pulse, and a radar blackout.
The first nuclear weapons were developed by the United States in collaboration with the United Kingdom and Canada during World War II in the Manhattan Project. Production requires a large scientific and industrial complex, primarily for the production of fissile material, either from nuclear reactors with reprocessing plants or from uranium enrichment facilities. Nuclear weapons have been used twice in war, in the 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that killed between 150,000 and 246,000 people. Nuclear deterrence, including mutually assured destruction, aims to prevent nuclear warfare via the threat of unacceptable damage and the danger of escalation to nuclear holocaust. A nuclear arms race for weapons and their delivery systems was a defining component of the Cold War.
Strategic nuclear weapons are targeted against civilian, industrial, and military infrastructure, while tactical nuclear weapons are intended for battlefield use. Strategic weapons led to the development of dedicated intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missile, and nuclear strategic bombers, collectively known as the nuclear triad. Tactical weapons options have included shorter-range ground-, air-, and sea-launched missiles, nuclear artillery, atomic demolition munitions, nuclear torpedos, and nuclear depth charges, but they have become less salient since the end of the Cold War.
As of 2025[update], there are nine countries on the list of states with nuclear weapons, and six more agree to nuclear sharing. Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction, and their control is a focus of international security through measures to prevent nuclear proliferation, arms control, or nuclear disarmament. The total from all stockpiles peaked at over 64,000 weapons in 1986,[2] and is around 9,600 today.[3] Key international agreements and organizations include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and nuclear-weapon-free zones.
Testing and deployment
[edit]Nuclear weapons have only twice been used in warfare, both times by the United States against Japan at the end of World War II. On August 6, 1945, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) detonated a uranium gun-type fission bomb nicknamed "Little Boy" over the Japanese city of Hiroshima; three days later, on August 9, the USAAF[4] detonated a plutonium implosion-type fission bomb nicknamed "Fat Man" over the Japanese city of Nagasaki. These bombings caused injuries that resulted in the deaths of approximately 200,000 civilians and military personnel.[5] The ethics of these bombings and their role in Japan's surrender are to this day, still subjects of debate.
Since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons have been detonated over 2,000 times for testing and demonstration. Only a few nations possess such weapons or are suspected of seeking them. The only countries known to have detonated nuclear weapons—and acknowledge possessing them—are (chronologically by date of first test) the United States, the Soviet Union (succeeded as a nuclear power by Russia), the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Israel is believed to possess nuclear weapons, though, in a policy of deliberate ambiguity, it does not acknowledge having them.[6][7][c] Germany, Italy, Turkey, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Belarus are nuclear weapons sharing states.[6] South Africa is the only country to have independently developed and then renounced and dismantled its nuclear weapons.[8]
| Country | First tests by nuclear weapon design | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fission | Year | Boosted fission | Year | Multi-stage | Year | Multi-stage above one megaton | Year | |
| Trinity | 1945 | Greenhouse George | 1951 | Greenhouse George | 1951 | Ivy Mike | 1952 | |
| RDS-1 | 1949 | RDS-6s | 1953 | RDS-37 | 1955 | RDS-37 | 1955 | |
| Operation Hurricane | 1952 | Mosaic G1 | 1956 | Grapple 1 | 1957 | Grapple X | 1957 | |
| 596 | 1964 | 596L | 1966 | 629 | 1966 | 639 | 1967 | |
| Gerboise Bleue | 1960 | Rigel | 1966 | Canopus | 1968 | Canopus | 1968 | |
| Smiling Buddha | 1974 | Shakti I (unconfirmed) | 1998 | Shakti I (unconfirmed) | 1998 | n/a | ||
| Chagai I | 1998 | Chagai I | 1998 | n/a | n/a | |||
| #1 | 2006 | #4 (unconfirmed) | 2016 | #6 (unconfirmed) | 2017 | n/a | ||
| See Nuclear weapons and Israel § Nuclear testing | n/a | |||||||
| See South Africa and weapons of mass destruction § Nuclear weapons | n/a | |||||||
Types
[edit]
There are two basic types of nuclear weapons: those that derive the majority of their energy from nuclear fission reactions alone, and those that use fission reactions to begin nuclear fusion reactions that produce a large amount of the total energy output.[10]
Fission weapons
[edit]
All existing nuclear weapons derive some of their explosive energy from nuclear fission reactions. Weapons whose explosive output is exclusively from fission reactions are commonly referred to as atomic bombs or atom bombs (abbreviated as A-bombs). This has long been noted as something of a misnomer, as their energy comes from the nucleus of the atom, just as it does with fusion weapons.
In fission weapons, a mass of fissile material (enriched uranium or plutonium) is forced into supercriticality—allowing an exponential growth of nuclear chain reactions—either by shooting one piece of sub-critical material into another (the "gun" method) or by compression of a sub-critical sphere or cylinder of fissile material using chemically fueled explosive lenses. The latter approach, the "implosion" method, is more sophisticated and more efficient (smaller, less massive, and requiring less of the expensive fissile fuel) than the former.
A major challenge in all nuclear weapon designs is to ensure that a significant fraction of the fuel is consumed before the weapon destroys itself. The amount of energy released by fission bombs can range from the equivalent of just under a ton to upwards of 500,000 tons (500 kilotons) of TNT (4.2 to 2.1×106 GJ).[11]
All fission reactions generate fission products, the remains of the split atomic nuclei. Many fission products are either highly radioactive (but short-lived) or moderately radioactive (but long-lived), and as such, they are a serious form of radioactive contamination. Fission products are the principal radioactive component of nuclear fallout. Another source of radioactivity is the burst of free neutrons produced by the weapon. When they collide with other nuclei in the surrounding material, the neutrons transmute those nuclei into other isotopes, altering their stability and making them radioactive.
The most commonly used fissile materials for nuclear weapons applications have been uranium-235 and plutonium-239. Less commonly used has been uranium-233. Neptunium-237 and some isotopes of americium may be usable for nuclear explosives as well, but it is not clear that this has ever been implemented, and their plausible use in nuclear weapons is a matter of dispute.[12]
Fusion weapons
[edit]
The other basic type of nuclear weapon produces a large proportion of its energy in nuclear fusion reactions. Such fusion weapons are generally referred to as thermonuclear weapons or more colloquially as hydrogen bombs (abbreviated as H-bombs), as they rely on fusion reactions between isotopes of hydrogen (deuterium and tritium). All such weapons derive a significant portion of their energy from fission reactions used to "trigger" fusion reactions, and fusion reactions can themselves trigger additional fission reactions.[13]
Only six countries—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, France, and India—have conducted thermonuclear weapon tests. Whether India has detonated a "true" multi-staged thermonuclear weapon is controversial.[14] North Korea claims to have tested a fusion weapon as of January 2016[update], though this claim is disputed.[15] Thermonuclear weapons are considered much more difficult to successfully design and execute than primitive fission weapons. Almost all of the nuclear weapons deployed today use the thermonuclear design because it results in an explosion hundreds of times stronger than that of a fission bomb of similar weight.[16]
Thermonuclear bombs work by using the energy of a fission bomb to compress and heat fusion fuel. In the Teller-Ulam design, which accounts for all multi-megaton yield hydrogen bombs, this is accomplished by placing a fission bomb and fusion fuel (tritium, deuterium, or lithium deuteride) in proximity within a special, radiation-reflecting container. When the fission bomb is detonated, gamma rays and X-rays emitted first compress the fusion fuel, then heat it to thermonuclear temperatures. The ensuing fusion reaction creates enormous numbers of high-speed neutrons, which can then induce fission in materials not normally prone to it, such as depleted uranium. Each of these components is known as a "stage", with the fission bomb as the "primary" and the fusion capsule as the "secondary". In large, megaton-range hydrogen bombs, about half of the yield comes from the final fissioning of depleted uranium.[11]
Virtually all thermonuclear weapons deployed today use this "two-stage" design, but it is possible to add additional fusion stages—each stage igniting a larger amount of fusion fuel in the next stage. This technique can be used to construct thermonuclear weapons of arbitrarily large yield. This is in contrast to fission bombs, which are limited in their explosive power due to criticality danger (premature nuclear chain reaction caused by too-large amounts of pre-assembled fissile fuel). The largest nuclear weapon ever detonated, the Tsar Bomba of the USSR, which released an energy equivalent of over 50 megatons of TNT (210 PJ), was a three-stage weapon. Most thermonuclear weapons are considerably smaller than this, due to practical constraints from missile warhead space and weight requirements.[17] In the early 1950s the Livermore Laboratory in the United States had plans for the testing of two massive bombs, Gnomon and Sundial, 1 gigaton of TNT and 10 gigatons of TNT respectively.[18][19]

Fusion reactions do not create fission products, and thus contribute far less to the creation of nuclear fallout than fission reactions, but because all thermonuclear weapons contain at least one fission stage, and many high-yield thermonuclear devices have a final fission stage, thermonuclear weapons can generate at least as much nuclear fallout as fission-only weapons. Furthermore, high yield thermonuclear explosions (most dangerously ground bursts) have the force to lift radioactive debris upwards past the tropopause into the stratosphere, where the calm non-turbulent winds permit the debris to travel great distances from the burst, eventually settling and unpredictably contaminating areas far removed from the target of the explosion.
Other types
[edit]There are other types of nuclear weapons as well. For example, a boosted fission weapon is a fission bomb that increases its explosive yield through a small number of fusion reactions, but it is not a fusion bomb. In the boosted bomb, the neutrons produced by the fusion reactions serve primarily to increase the efficiency of the fission bomb. There are two types of boosted fission bomb: internally boosted, in which a deuterium-tritium mixture is injected into the bomb core, and externally boosted, in which concentric shells of lithium-deuteride and depleted uranium are layered on the outside of the fission bomb core. The external method of boosting enabled the USSR to field the first partially thermonuclear weapons, but it is now obsolete because it demands a spherical bomb geometry, which was adequate during the 1950s arms race when bomber aircraft were the only available delivery vehicles.
The detonation of any nuclear weapon is accompanied by a blast of neutron radiation. Surrounding a nuclear weapon with suitable materials (such as cobalt or gold) creates a weapon known as a salted bomb. This device can produce exceptionally large quantities of long-lived radioactive contamination. It has been conjectured that such a device could serve as a "doomsday weapon" because such a large quantity of radioactivities with half-lives of decades, lifted into the stratosphere where winds would distribute it around the globe, would make all life on the planet extinct.
In connection with the Strategic Defense Initiative, research into the nuclear pumped laser was conducted under the DOD program Project Excalibur but this did not result in a working weapon. The concept involves the tapping of the energy of an exploding nuclear bomb to power a single-shot laser that is directed at a distant target.
During the Starfish Prime high-altitude nuclear test in 1962, an unexpected effect was produced which is called a nuclear electromagnetic pulse. This is an intense flash of electromagnetic energy produced by a rain of high-energy electrons which in turn are produced by a nuclear bomb's gamma rays. This flash of energy can permanently destroy or disrupt electronic equipment if insufficiently shielded. It has been proposed to use this effect to disable an enemy's military and civilian infrastructure as an adjunct to other nuclear or conventional military operations. By itself it could as well be useful to terrorists for crippling a nation's economic electronics-based infrastructure. Because the effect is most effectively produced by high altitude nuclear detonations (by military weapons delivered by air, though ground bursts also produce EMP effects over a localized area), it can produce damage to electronics over a wide, even continental, geographical area.[20]
Research has been done into the possibility of pure fusion bombs: nuclear weapons that consist of fusion reactions without requiring a fission bomb to initiate them. Such a device might provide a simpler path to thermonuclear weapons than one that required the development of fission weapons first, and pure fusion weapons would create significantly less nuclear fallout than other thermonuclear weapons because they would not disperse fission products. In 1998, the United States Department of Energy divulged that the United States had, "...made a substantial investment" in the past to develop pure fusion weapons, but that, "The U.S. does not have and is not developing a pure fusion weapon", and that, "No credible design for a pure fusion weapon resulted from the DOE investment".[21]
Nuclear isomers provide a possible pathway to fissionless fusion bombs. These are naturally occurring isotopes (178m2Hf being a prominent example) which exist in an elevated energy state. Mechanisms to release this energy as bursts of gamma radiation (as in the hafnium controversy) have been proposed as possible triggers for conventional thermonuclear reactions.
Antimatter, which consists of particles resembling ordinary matter particles in most of their properties but having opposite electric charge, has been considered as a trigger mechanism for nuclear weapons.[22][23][24] A major obstacle is the difficulty of producing antimatter in large enough quantities, and there is no evidence that it is feasible beyond the military domain.[25] However, the US Air Force funded studies of the physics of antimatter in the Cold War, and began considering its possible use in weapons, not just as a trigger, but as the explosive itself.[26] A fourth generation nuclear weapon design[22] is related to, and relies upon, the same principle as antimatter-catalyzed nuclear pulse propulsion.[27]
Most variation in nuclear weapon design is for the purpose of achieving different yields for different situations, and in manipulating design elements to attempt to minimize weapon size,[11] radiation hardness or requirements for special materials, especially fissile fuel or tritium.
Tactical nuclear weapons
[edit]
Some nuclear weapons are designed for special purposes; most of these are for non-strategic (decisively war-winning) purposes and are referred to as tactical nuclear weapons.
The neutron bomb purportedly conceived by Sam Cohen is a thermonuclear weapon that yields a relatively small explosion but a relatively large amount of neutron radiation. Such a weapon could, according to tacticians, be used to cause massive biological casualties while leaving inanimate infrastructure mostly intact and creating minimal fallout. Because high energy neutrons are capable of penetrating dense matter, such as tank armor, neutron warheads were procured in the 1980s (though not deployed in Europe) for use as tactical payloads for US Army artillery shells (200 mm W79 and 155 mm W82) and short range missile forces. Soviet authorities announced similar intentions for neutron warhead deployment in Europe; indeed, they claimed to have originally invented the neutron bomb, but their deployment on USSR tactical nuclear forces is unverifiable.[citation needed]
A type of nuclear explosive most suitable for use by ground special forces was the Special Atomic Demolition Munition, or SADM, sometimes popularly known as a suitcase nuke. This is a nuclear bomb that is man-portable, or at least truck-portable, and though of a relatively small yield (one or two kilotons) is sufficient to destroy important tactical targets such as bridges, dams, tunnels, important military or commercial installations, etc. either behind enemy lines or pre-emptively on friendly territory soon to be overtaken by invading enemy forces. These weapons require plutonium fuel and are particularly "dirty". They also demand especially stringent security precautions in their storage and deployment.[citation needed]
Small "tactical" nuclear weapons were deployed for use as antiaircraft weapons. Examples include the USAF AIR-2 Genie, the AIM-26 Falcon and US Army Nike Hercules. Missile interceptors such as the Sprint and the Spartan also used small nuclear warheads (optimized to produce neutron or X-ray flux) but were for use against enemy strategic warheads.[citation needed]
Other small, or tactical, nuclear weapons were deployed by naval forces for use primarily as antisubmarine weapons. These included nuclear depth bombs or nuclear armed torpedoes. Nuclear mines for use on land or at sea are also possibilities.[citation needed]
Weapons delivery
[edit]

The system used to deliver a nuclear weapon to its target is an important factor affecting both nuclear weapon design and nuclear strategy. The design, development, and maintenance of delivery systems are among the most expensive parts of a nuclear weapons program; they account, for example, for 57% of the financial resources spent by the United States on nuclear weapons projects since 1940.[28]
The simplest method for delivering a nuclear weapon is a gravity bomb dropped from aircraft; this was the method used by the United States against Japan in 1945. This method places few restrictions on the size of the weapon. It does, however, limit attack range, response time to an impending attack, and the number of weapons that a country can field at the same time. With miniaturization, nuclear bombs can be delivered by both strategic bombers and tactical fighter-bombers. This method is the primary means of nuclear weapons delivery; the majority of US nuclear warheads, for example, are free-fall gravity bombs, namely the B61, which is being improved upon to this day.[11][29]

Preferable from a strategic point of view is a nuclear weapon mounted on a missile, which can use a ballistic trajectory to deliver the warhead over the horizon. Although even short-range missiles allow for a faster and less vulnerable attack, the development of long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) has given some nations the ability to plausibly deliver missiles anywhere on the globe with a high likelihood of success.
More advanced systems, such as multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), can launch multiple warheads at different targets from one missile, reducing the chance of a successful missile defense. Today, missiles are most common among systems designed for delivery of nuclear weapons. Making a warhead small enough to fit onto a missile, though, can be difficult.[11]
Tactical weapons have involved the most variety of delivery types, including not only gravity bombs and missiles but also artillery shells, land mines, and nuclear depth charges and torpedoes for anti-submarine warfare. An atomic mortar has been tested by the United States. Small, two-man portable tactical weapons (somewhat misleadingly referred to as suitcase bombs), such as the Special Atomic Demolition Munition, have been developed, although the difficulty of combining sufficient yield with portability limits their military utility.[11]
Nuclear strategy
[edit]Nuclear warfare strategy is a set of policies that deal with preventing or fighting a nuclear war. The policy of trying to prevent an attack by a nuclear weapon from another country by threatening nuclear retaliation is known as the strategy of nuclear deterrence. The goal in deterrence is to always maintain a second strike capability (the ability of a country to respond to a nuclear attack with one of its own) and potentially to strive for first strike status (the ability to destroy an enemy's nuclear forces before they could retaliate). During the Cold War, policy and military theorists considered the sorts of policies that might prevent a nuclear attack, and they developed game theory models that could lead to stable deterrence conditions.[30]

Different forms of nuclear weapons delivery (see above) allow for different types of nuclear strategies. The goals of any strategy are generally to make it difficult for an enemy to launch a pre-emptive strike against the weapon system and difficult to defend against the delivery of the weapon during a potential conflict. This can mean keeping weapon locations hidden, such as deploying them on submarines or land mobile transporter erector launchers whose locations are difficult to track, or it can mean protecting weapons by burying them in hardened missile silo bunkers. Other components of nuclear strategies included using missile defenses to destroy the missiles before they land or implementing civil defense measures using early-warning systems to evacuate citizens to safe areas before an attack.
Weapons designed to threaten large populations or to deter attacks are known as strategic weapons. Nuclear weapons for use on a battlefield in military situations are called tactical weapons.
Critics of nuclear war strategy often suggest that a nuclear war between two nations would result in mutual annihilation. From this point of view, the significance of nuclear weapons is to deter war because any nuclear war would escalate out of mutual distrust and fear, resulting in mutually assured destruction. This threat of national, if not global, destruction has been a strong motivation for anti-nuclear weapons activism.
Critics from the peace movement and within the military establishment[citation needed] have questioned the usefulness of such weapons in the current military climate. According to an advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice in 1996, the use of (or threat of use of) such weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, but the court did not reach an opinion as to whether or not the threat or use would be lawful in specific extreme circumstances such as if the survival of the state were at stake.

Another deterrence position is that nuclear proliferation can be desirable. In this case, it is argued that, unlike conventional weapons, nuclear weapons deter all-out war between states, and they succeeded in doing this during the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union.[31] In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Gen. Pierre Marie Gallois of France, an adviser to Charles de Gaulle, argued in books like The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age (1961) that mere possession of a nuclear arsenal was enough to ensure deterrence, and thus concluded that the spread of nuclear weapons could increase international stability. Some prominent neo-realist scholars, such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, have argued, along the lines of Gallois, that some forms of nuclear proliferation would decrease the likelihood of total war, especially in troubled regions of the world where there exists a single nuclear-weapon state. Aside from the public opinion that opposes proliferation in any form, there are two schools of thought on the matter: those, like Mearsheimer, who favored selective proliferation,[32] and Waltz, who was somewhat more non-interventionist.[33][34] Interest in proliferation and the stability-instability paradox that it generates continues to this day, with ongoing debate about indigenous Japanese and South Korean nuclear deterrent against North Korea.[35]
The threat of potentially suicidal terrorists possessing nuclear weapons (a form of nuclear terrorism) complicates the decision process. The prospect of mutually assured destruction might not deter an enemy who expects to die in the confrontation. Further, if the initial act is from a stateless terrorist instead of a sovereign nation, there might not be a nation or specific target to retaliate against. It has been argued, especially after the September 11, 2001, attacks, that this complication calls for a new nuclear strategy, one that is distinct from that which gave relative stability during the Cold War.[36] Since 1996, the United States has had a policy of allowing the targeting of its nuclear weapons at terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction.[37]

Robert Gallucci argues that although traditional deterrence is not an effective approach toward terrorist groups bent on causing a nuclear catastrophe, Gallucci believes that "the United States should instead consider a policy of expanded deterrence, which focuses not solely on the would-be nuclear terrorists but on those states that may deliberately transfer or inadvertently leak nuclear weapons and materials to them. By threatening retaliation against those states, the United States may be able to deter that which it cannot physically prevent."[38]
Graham Allison makes a similar case, arguing that the key to expanded deterrence is coming up with ways of tracing nuclear material to the country that forged the fissile material. "After a nuclear bomb detonates, nuclear forensics cops would collect debris samples and send them to a laboratory for radiological analysis. By identifying unique attributes of the fissile material, including its impurities and contaminants, one could trace the path back to its origin." The process is analogous to identifying a criminal by fingerprints. "The goal would be twofold: first, to deter leaders of nuclear states from selling weapons to terrorists by holding them accountable for any use of their weapons; second, to give leaders every incentive to tightly secure their nuclear weapons and materials."[39]
According to the Pentagon's June 2019 "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations" of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs website Publication, "Integration of nuclear weapons employment with conventional and special operations forces is essential to the success of any mission or operation."[40][41]
Governance, control, and law
[edit]Because they are weapons of mass destruction, the proliferation and possible use of nuclear weapons are important issues in international relations and diplomacy. In most countries, the use of nuclear force can only be authorized by the head of government or head of state.[d] Despite controls and regulations governing nuclear weapons, there is an inherent danger of "accidents, mistakes, false alarms, blackmail, theft, and sabotage".[42]
In the late 1940s, lack of mutual trust prevented the United States and the Soviet Union from making progress on arms control agreements. The Russell–Einstein Manifesto was issued in London on July 9, 1955, by Bertrand Russell in the midst of the Cold War. It highlighted the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and called for world leaders to seek peaceful resolutions to international conflict. The signatories included eleven pre-eminent intellectuals and scientists, including Albert Einstein, who signed it just days before his death on April 18, 1955. A few days after the release, philanthropist Cyrus S. Eaton offered to sponsor a conference—called for in the manifesto—in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Eaton's birthplace. This conference was to be the first of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, held in July 1957.
By the 1960s, steps were taken to limit both the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries and the environmental effects of nuclear testing. The Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) restricted all nuclear testing to underground nuclear testing, to prevent contamination from nuclear fallout, whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) attempted to place restrictions on the types of activities signatories could participate in, with the goal of allowing the transference of non-military nuclear technology to member countries without fear of proliferation.

In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established under the mandate of the United Nations to encourage development of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, provide international safeguards against its misuse, and facilitate the application of safety measures in its use. In 1996, many nations signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,[43] which prohibits all testing of nuclear weapons. A testing ban imposes a significant hindrance to nuclear arms development by any complying country.[44] The Treaty requires the ratification by 44 specific states before it can go into force; as of 2012[update], the ratification of eight of these states is still required.[43]
Additional treaties and agreements have governed nuclear weapons stockpiles between the countries with the two largest stockpiles, the United States and the Soviet Union, and later between the United States and Russia. These include treaties such as SALT II (never ratified), START I (expired), INF, START II (never in effect), SORT, and New START, as well as non-binding agreements such as SALT I and the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives[45] of 1991. Even when they did not enter into force, these agreements helped limit and later reduce the numbers and types of nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia.
Nuclear weapons have also been opposed by agreements between countries. Many nations have been declared Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, areas where nuclear weapons production and deployment are prohibited, through the use of treaties. The Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) prohibited any production or deployment of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Treaty of Pelindaba (1964) prohibits nuclear weapons in many African countries. As recently as 2006 a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone was established among the former Soviet republics of Central Asia prohibiting nuclear weapons.

In 1996, the International Court of Justice, the highest court of the United Nations, issued an Advisory Opinion concerned with the "Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons". The court ruled that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would violate various articles of international law, including the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions, the UN Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Given the unique, destructive characteristics of nuclear weapons, the International Committee of the Red Cross calls on States to ensure that these weapons are never used, irrespective of whether they consider them lawful or not.[46]
Additionally, there have been other, specific actions meant to discourage countries from developing nuclear arms. In the wake of the tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, economic sanctions were (temporarily) levied against both countries, though neither were signatories with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. One of the stated casus belli for the initiation of the 2003 Iraq War was an accusation by the United States that Iraq was actively pursuing nuclear arms (though this was soon discovered not to be the case as the program had been discontinued). In 1981, Israel had bombed a nuclear reactor being constructed in Osirak, Iraq, in what it called an attempt to halt Iraq's previous nuclear arms ambitions; in 2007, Israel bombed another reactor being constructed in Syria.
In 2013, Mark Diesendorf said that governments of France, India, North Korea, Pakistan, UK, and South Africa have used nuclear power or research reactors to assist nuclear weapons development or to contribute to their supplies of nuclear explosives from military reactors.[47] In 2017, 122 countries mainly in the Global South voted in favor of adopting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which eventually entered into force in 2021.[48]
The Doomsday Clock measures the likelihood of a human-made global catastrophe and is published annually by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. The Doomsday Clock is set a certain time from midnight, midnight being the time of global catastrophe. The two years with the highest likelihood had previously been 1953, when the Clock was set to two minutes until midnight after the US and the Soviet Union began testing hydrogen bombs, and 2018, following the failure of world leaders to address tensions relating to nuclear weapons and climate change issues.[49] In 2023, following the escalation of nuclear threats during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the doomsday clock was set to 90 seconds, the highest likelihood of global catastrophe since the existence of the Doomsday Clock.[50] Given the lack of progress towards peace in Ukraine, the Doomsday Clock was moved to 89 Seconds to midnight in 2025.[51]
As of 2024, Russia has intensified nuclear threats in Ukraine and is reportedly planning to place nuclear weapons in orbit, breaching the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. China is significantly expanding its nuclear arsenal, with projections of over 1,000 warheads by 2030 and up to 1,500 by 2035. North Korea is progressing in intercontinental ballistic missile tests and has a mutual-defense treaty with Russia, exchanging artillery for possible missile technology. Iran is currently viewed as a nuclear "threshold" state.[52]
Disarmament
[edit]
Nuclear disarmament refers to both the act of reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons and to the end state of a nuclear-free world, in which nuclear weapons are eliminated.
Beginning with the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and continuing through the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, there have been many treaties to limit or reduce nuclear weapons testing and stockpiles. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has as one of its explicit conditions that all signatories must "pursue negotiations in good faith" towards the long-term goal of "complete disarmament". The nuclear-weapon states have largely treated that aspect of the agreement as "decorative" and without force.[53]
Only one country—South Africa—has ever fully renounced nuclear weapons they had independently developed. The former Soviet republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine returned Soviet nuclear arms stationed in their countries to Russia after the collapse of the USSR.
Proponents of nuclear disarmament say that it would lessen the probability of nuclear war, especially accidentally. Critics of nuclear disarmament say that it would undermine the present nuclear peace and deterrence and would lead to increased global instability. Various American elder statesmen,[54] who were in office during the Cold War period, have been advocating the elimination of nuclear weapons. These officials include Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn, and William Perry. In January 2010, Lawrence M. Krauss stated that "no issue carries more importance to the long-term health and security of humanity than the effort to reduce, and perhaps one day, rid the world of nuclear weapons".[55]

In January 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev publicly proposed a three-stage program for abolishing the world's nuclear weapons by the end of the 20th century.[56] In the years after the end of the Cold War, there have been numerous campaigns to urge the abolition of nuclear weapons, such as that organized by the Global Zero movement, and the goal of a "world without nuclear weapons" was advocated by United States President Barack Obama in an April 2009 speech in Prague.[57] A CNN poll from April 2010 indicated that the American public was nearly evenly split on the issue.[58]
Some analysts have argued that nuclear weapons have made the world relatively safer, with peace through deterrence and through the stability–instability paradox, including in south Asia.[59][60] Kenneth Waltz has argued that nuclear weapons have helped keep an uneasy peace, and further nuclear weapon proliferation might even help avoid the large scale conventional wars that were so common before their invention at the end of World War II.[34] But former Secretary Henry Kissinger said in 2010 that there is a new danger, which cannot be addressed by deterrence: "The classical notion of deterrence was that there was some consequences before which aggressors and evildoers would recoil. In a world of suicide bombers, that calculation doesn't operate in any comparable way".[61] George Shultz has said, "If you think of the people who are doing suicide attacks, and people like that get a nuclear weapon, they are almost by definition not deterrable".[62]
As of early 2019, more than 90% of world's 13,865 nuclear weapons were owned by Russia and the United States.[63][64]
United Nations
[edit]The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) is a department of the United Nations Secretariat established in January 1998 as part of the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan's plan to reform the UN as presented in his report to the General Assembly in July 1997.[65]
Its goal is to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and the strengthening of the disarmament regimes in respect to other weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological weapons. It also promotes disarmament efforts in the area of conventional weapons, especially land mines and small arms, which are often the weapons of choice in contemporary conflicts.
Controversy
[edit]Ethics
[edit]Even before the first nuclear weapons had been developed, scientists involved with the Manhattan Project were divided over the use of the weapon. The role of the two atomic bombings of the country in Japan's surrender and the US's ethical justification for them has been the subject of scholarly and popular debate for decades. The question of whether nations should have nuclear weapons, or test them, has been continually and nearly universally controversial.[66]
Notable nuclear weapons accidents
[edit]The production and deployment of nuclear weapons has involved many accidents that resulted in either some radiation casualties, or the near-miss possibility of the unauthorized and unintended detonation of a nuclear weapon. These include:
- August 21, 1945: While conducting experiments on a plutonium-gallium core at Los Alamos National Laboratory, physicist Harry Daghlian received a lethal dose of radiation when an error caused it to enter prompt criticality. He died 25 days later, on September 15, 1945, from radiation poisoning.[67]
- May 21, 1946: While conducting further experiments on the same core at Los Alamos National Laboratory, physicist Louis Slotin accidentally caused the core to become briefly supercritical. He received a lethal dose of gamma and neutron radiation, and died nine days later on May 30, 1946. After the death of Daghlian and Slotin, the mass became known as the "demon core". It was ultimately used to construct a bomb for use on the Nevada Test Range.[68]
- February 13, 1950: a Convair B-36B crashed in northern British Columbia after jettisoning a Mark IV atomic bomb. This was the first such nuclear weapon loss in history. The accident was designated a "Broken Arrow"—an accident involving a nuclear weapon, but which does not present a risk of war. Experts believe that up to 50 nuclear weapons were lost during the Cold War.[69]
- May 22, 1957: a 42,000-pound (19,000 kg) Mark-17 hydrogen bomb accidentally fell from a bomber near Albuquerque, New Mexico. The detonation of the device's conventional explosives destroyed it on impact and formed a crater 25 feet (7.6 m) in diameter on land owned by the University of New Mexico. According to a researcher at the Natural Resources Defense Council, it was one of the most powerful bombs made to date.[70]
- June 7, 1960: the 1960 Fort Dix IM-99 accident destroyed a Boeing CIM-10 Bomarc nuclear missile and shelter and contaminated the BOMARC Missile Accident Site in New Jersey.
- January 24, 1961: the 1961 Goldsboro B-52 crash occurred near Goldsboro, North Carolina. A Boeing B-52 Stratofortress carrying two Mark 39 nuclear bombs broke up in mid-air, dropping its nuclear payload in the process. One of the weapons went through every one of its stages of its firing sequence, save one safety switch.[71]
- 1965 Philippine Sea A-4 crash, where a Skyhawk attack aircraft with a nuclear weapon fell into the sea.[72] The pilot, the aircraft, and the B43 nuclear bomb were never recovered.[73] It was not until 1989 that the Pentagon revealed the loss of the one-megaton bomb.[74]
- January 17, 1966: the 1966 Palomares B-52 crash occurred when a B-52G bomber of the USAF collided with a KC-135 tanker during mid-air refuelling off the coast of Spain. The KC-135 was completely destroyed when its fuel load ignited, killing all four crew members. The B-52G broke apart, killing three of the seven crew members aboard.[75] Of the four Mk28 type hydrogen bombs the B-52G carried,[76] three were found on land near Almería, Spain. The non-nuclear explosives in two of the weapons detonated upon impact with the ground, resulting in the contamination of a 2-square-kilometer (490-acre) (0.78 square mile) area by radioactive plutonium. The fourth, which fell into the Mediterranean Sea, was recovered intact after a 21⁄2-month-long search.[77]
- January 21, 1968: the 1968 Thule Air Base B-52 crash involved a United States Air Force (USAF) B-52 bomber. The aircraft was carrying four hydrogen bombs when a cabin fire forced the crew to abandon the aircraft. Six crew members ejected safely, but one who did not have an ejection seat was killed while trying to bail out. The bomber crashed onto sea ice in Greenland, causing the nuclear payload to rupture and disperse, which resulted in widespread radioactive contamination.[78] One of the bombs remains lost.[79]
- September 18–19, 1980: the Damascus Accident occurred in Damascus, Arkansas, where a Titan Missile equipped with a nuclear warhead exploded. The accident was caused by a maintenance man who dropped a socket from a socket wrench down an 80-foot (24 m) shaft, puncturing a fuel tank on the rocket. Leaking fuel resulted in a hypergolic fuel explosion, jettisoning the W-53 warhead beyond the launch site.[80][81][82]
Governmental nuclear agencies frequently point to their procedures and technical safeguards as what has prevented accidental nuclear explosions. But it has also been argued by historians, political scientists, and historical participants that in many instances, the avoidance of an unintended nuclear explosions was due less to correct implementation of controls, but instead can be attributed to disobedience, technical failures, or other factors beyond strict human control.[citation needed] Reliance on non-controlled factors is sometimes referred to as "luck".[83] General George Lee Butler, commander of the US Strategic Air Command (1991–1992), argued in 1999 that "...we escaped the Cold War without a nuclear holocaust by some combination of skill, luck, and divine intervention, and I suspect the latter in greatest proportion."[84] Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State during the Cuban Missile Crisis, concluded similarly in 1969 that it was ultimately "plain dumb luck" that resolved that crisis peacefully.[85]
Nuclear testing and fallout
[edit]

Over 500 atmospheric nuclear weapons tests were conducted at various sites around the world from 1945 to 1980. Radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons testing was first drawn to public attention in 1954 when the Castle Bravo hydrogen bomb test at the Pacific Proving Grounds contaminated the crew and catch of the Japanese fishing boat Lucky Dragon.[86] One of the fishermen died in Japan seven months later, and the fear of contaminated tuna led to a temporary boycotting of the popular staple in Japan. The incident caused widespread concern around the world, especially regarding the effects of nuclear fallout and atmospheric nuclear testing, and "provided a decisive impetus for the emergence of the anti-nuclear weapons movement in many countries".[86]
As public awareness and concern mounted over the possible health hazards associated with exposure to the nuclear fallout, various studies were done to assess the extent of the hazard. A Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/ National Cancer Institute study claims that fallout from atmospheric nuclear tests would lead to perhaps 11,000 excess deaths among people alive during atmospheric testing in the United States from all forms of cancer, including leukemia, from 1951 to well into the 21st century.[87][88] As of March 2009[update], the US is the only nation that compensates nuclear test victims. Since the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1990, more than $1.38 billion in compensation has been approved. The money is going to people who took part in the tests, notably at the Nevada Test Site, and to others exposed to the radiation.[89][90]
In addition, leakage of byproducts of nuclear weapon production into groundwater has been an ongoing issue, particularly at the Hanford site.[91]
Effects of nuclear explosions
[edit]Effects of nuclear explosions on human health
[edit]
Some scientists estimate that a nuclear war with 100 Hiroshima-size nuclear explosions on cities could cost the lives of tens of millions of people from long-term climatic effects alone. The climatology hypothesis is that if each city firestorms, a great deal of soot could be thrown up into the atmosphere which could blanket the earth, cutting out sunlight for years on end, causing the disruption of food chains, in what is termed a nuclear winter.[92][93]
People near the Hiroshima explosion and who managed to survive the explosion subsequently suffered a variety of horrible medical effects. Some of these effects are still present to this day:[94]
- Initial stage – the first 1–9 weeks, in which are the greatest number of deaths, with 90% due to thermal injury or blast effects and 10% due to super-lethal radiation exposure.
- Intermediate stage – from 10 to 12 weeks. The deaths in this period are from ionizing radiation in the median lethal range – LD50
- Late period – lasting from 13 to 20 weeks. This period has some improvement in survivors' condition.
- Delayed period – from 20-plus weeks. Characterized by numerous complications, mostly related to healing of thermal and mechanical injuries, and if the individual was exposed to a few hundred to a thousand millisieverts of radiation, it is coupled with infertility, sub-fertility and blood disorders. Furthermore, ionizing radiation above a dose of around 50–100-millisievert exposure has been shown to statistically begin increasing one's chance of dying of cancer sometime in their lifetime over the normal unexposed rate of ~25%, in the long term, a heightened rate of cancer, proportional to the dose received, would begin to be observed after ~5-plus years, with lesser problems such as eye cataracts and other more minor effects in other organs and tissue also being observed over the long term.
Fallout exposure—depending on if further afield individuals shelter in place or evacuate perpendicular to the direction of the wind, and therefore avoid contact with the fallout plume, and stay there for the days and weeks after the nuclear explosion, their exposure to fallout, and therefore their total dose, will vary. With those who do shelter in place, and or evacuate, experiencing a total dose that would be negligible in comparison to someone who just went about their life as normal.[95][96]
Staying indoors until after the most hazardous fallout isotope, I-131 decays away to 0.1% of its initial quantity after ten half-lifes—which is represented by 80 days in I-131s case, would make the difference between likely contracting Thyroid cancer or escaping completely from this substance depending on the actions of the individual.[97]
Effects of nuclear war
[edit]
Nuclear war could yield unprecedented human death tolls and habitat destruction. Detonating large numbers of nuclear weapons would have an immediate, short term and long-term effects on the climate, potentially causing cold weather known as a "nuclear winter".[98][99] In 1982, Brian Martin estimated that a US–Soviet nuclear exchange might kill 400–450 million directly, mostly in the United States, Europe and Russia, and maybe several hundred million more through follow-up consequences in those same areas.[100] Many scholars have posited that a global thermonuclear war with Cold War-era stockpiles, or even with the current smaller stockpiles, may lead to the extinction of the human race.[101] The International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War believe that nuclear war could indirectly contribute to human extinction via secondary effects, including environmental consequences, societal breakdown, and economic collapse. It has been estimated that a relatively small-scale nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan involving 100 Hiroshima yield (15 kilotons) weapons, could cause a nuclear winter and kill more than a billion people.[102]
According to a peer-reviewed study published in the journal Nature Food in August 2022, a full-scale nuclear war between the US and Russia would directly kill 360 million people and more than 5 billion people would die from starvation. More than 2 billion people could die from a smaller-scale nuclear war between India and Pakistan.[99][103][104]
Public opposition
[edit]

Peace movements emerged in Japan and in 1954 they converged to form a unified "Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs." Japanese opposition to nuclear weapons tests in the Pacific Ocean was widespread, and "an estimated 35 million signatures were collected on petitions calling for bans on nuclear weapons".[105]
In the United Kingdom, the Aldermaston Marches organised by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) took place at Easter 1958, when, according to the CND, several thousand people marched for four days from Trafalgar Square, London, to the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment close to Aldermaston in Berkshire, England, to demonstrate their opposition to nuclear weapons.[106][107] The Aldermaston marches continued into the late 1960s when tens of thousands of people took part in the four-day marches.[105]
In 1959, a letter in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists was the start of a successful campaign to stop the Atomic Energy Commission dumping radioactive waste in the sea 19 kilometers from Boston.[108] In 1962, Linus Pauling won the Nobel Peace Prize for his work to stop the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, and the "Ban the Bomb" movement spread.[66]
In 1963, many countries ratified the Partial Test Ban Treaty prohibiting atmospheric nuclear testing. Radioactive fallout became less of an issue and the anti-nuclear weapons movement went into decline for some years.[86][109] A resurgence of interest occurred amid European and American fears of nuclear war in the 1980s.[110]
Costs and technology spin-offs
[edit]According to an audit by the Brookings Institution, between 1940 and 1996, the US spent $11.7 trillion in present-day terms[111] on nuclear weapons programs, 57% of which was spent on building nuclear weapons delivery systems. Six-point-three percent of the total amount, $732 billion in present-day terms, was spent on environmental remediation and nuclear waste management—for example, cleaning up the Hanford site—and 7% of the total $820 billion was spent on making nuclear weapons themselves.[112]
Non-weapons uses
[edit]Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) are nuclear explosions conducted for non-military purposes, such as activities related to economic development including the creation of canals. During the 1960s and 1970s, both the United States and the Soviet Union conducted a number of PNEs.[113] The United States created plans for several uses of PNEs, including Operation Plowshare.[114] Six of the explosions by the Soviet Union are considered to have been of an applied nature, not just tests.
The United States and the Soviet Union later halted their programs. Definitions and limits are covered in the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976.[115][116] The stalled Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty of 1996 would prohibit all nuclear explosions, regardless of whether they are for peaceful purposes or not.[117]
History of development
[edit]
In the first decades of the 19th century, physics was revolutionized with developments in the understanding of the nature of atoms including the discoveries in atomic theory by John Dalton.[118] Around the turn of the 20th century, it was discovered by Hans Geiger and Ernest Marsden and then Ernest Rutherford, that atoms had a highly dense, very small, charged central core called an atomic nucleus. In 1898, Pierre and Marie Curie discovered that pitchblende, an ore of uranium, contained a substance—which they named radium—that emitted large amounts of radiation. Ernest Rutherford and Frederick Soddy identified that atoms were breaking down and turning into different elements. Hopes were raised among scientists and laymen that the elements around us could contain tremendous amounts of unseen energy, waiting to be harnessed. In 1905, Albert Einstein described this potential in his famous equation, E = mc2.
At the time however, there was no known mechanism which could be used to unlock the vast energy potential that was theorized to exist inside the atom. The only particle then known to exist within the nucleus was the positively-charged proton, which would act to repel protons set in motion towards it. Then in 1932, a key breakthrough was made with the discovery of the neutron. Having no electric charge, the neutron is able to penetrate the nucleus with relative ease.
In January 1933, the Nazis came to power in Germany and suppressed Jewish scientists. Physicist Leo Szilard fled to London where, in 1934, he patented the idea of a nuclear chain reaction using neutrons. The patent also introduced the term critical mass to describe the minimum amount of material required to sustain the chain reaction and its potential to cause an explosion (British patent 630,726). The patent was not about an atomic bomb per se, as the possibility of chain reaction was still very speculative. Szilard subsequently assigned the patent to the British Admiralty so that it could be covered by the Official Secrets Act.[119] This work of Szilard's was ahead of the time, five years before the public discovery of nuclear fission and eight years before a working nuclear reactor. When he coined the term neutron inducted chain reaction, he was not sure about the use of isotopes or standard forms of elements. Despite this uncertainty, he correctly theorized uranium and thorium as primary candidates for such a reaction, along with beryllium which was later determined to be unnecessary in practice. Szilard joined Enrico Fermi in developing the first uranium-fuelled nuclear reactor, Chicago Pile-1, which was activated at the University of Chicago in 1942.[120]
In Paris in 1934, Irène and Frédéric Joliot-Curie discovered that artificial radioactivity could be induced in stable elements by bombarding them with alpha particles; in Italy Enrico Fermi reported similar results when bombarding uranium with neutrons. He mistakenly believed he had discovered elements 93 and 94, naming them ausenium and hesperium. In 1938 it was realized these were in fact fission products.[citation needed]

In December 1938, Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann reported that they had detected the element barium after bombarding uranium with neutrons. Lise Meitner and Otto Robert Frisch correctly interpreted these results as being due to the splitting of the uranium atom. Frisch confirmed this experimentally on January 13, 1939.[121] They gave the process the name "fission" because of its similarity to the splitting of a cell into two new cells. Even before it was published, news of Meitner's and Frisch's interpretation crossed the Atlantic.[122] In their second publication on nuclear fission in February 1939, Hahn and Strassmann predicted the existence and liberation of additional neutrons during the fission process, opening up the possibility of a nuclear chain reaction.
Between 1939 and 1940, Joliot-Curie's team applied for a patent family covering different use cases of atomic energy, one (case III, in patent FR 971,324 - Perfectionnements aux charges explosives, meaning Improvements in Explosive Charges) being the first official document explicitly mentioning a nuclear explosion as a purpose, including for war.[123] This patent was applied for on May 4, 1939, but only granted in 1950, being withheld by French authorities in the meantime.
Uranium appears in nature primarily in two isotopes: uranium-238 and uranium-235. When the nucleus of uranium-235 absorbs a neutron, it undergoes nuclear fission, releasing energy and, on average, 2.5 neutrons. Because uranium-235 releases more neutrons than it absorbs, it can support a chain reaction and so is described as fissile. Uranium-238, on the other hand, is not fissile as it does not normally undergo fission when it absorbs a neutron.
By the start of the war in September 1939, many scientists likely to be persecuted by the Nazis had already escaped. Physicists on both sides were well aware of the possibility of utilizing nuclear fission as a weapon, but no one was quite sure how it could be engineered. In August 1939, concerned that Germany might have its own project to develop fission-based weapons, Albert Einstein signed a letter to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt warning him of the threat.[124]

Roosevelt responded by setting up the Uranium Committee under Lyman James Briggs but, with little initial funding ($6,000), progress was slow. It was not until the U.S. entered the war in December 1941 that Washington decided to commit the necessary resources to a top-secret high priority bomb project.[125]
Organized research first began in Britain and Canada as part of the Tube Alloys project: the world's first nuclear weapons project. The Maud Committee was set up following the work of Frisch and Rudolf Peierls who calculated uranium-235's critical mass and found it to be much smaller than previously thought which meant that a deliverable bomb should be possible.[126] In the February 1940 Frisch–Peierls memorandum they stated that: "The energy liberated in the explosion of such a super-bomb...will, for an instant, produce a temperature comparable to that of the interior of the sun. The blast from such an explosion would destroy life in a wide area. The size of this area is difficult to estimate, but it will probably cover the centre of a big city."See also
[edit]- Cobalt bomb
- Cosmic bomb (phrase)
- Cuban Missile Crisis
- Dirty bomb
- International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
- List of global issues
- List of nuclear weapons
- List of states with nuclear weapons
- Nth Country Experiment
- Nuclear blackout
- Nuclear bunker buster
- Nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom
- Nuclear weapons in popular culture
- Nuclear weapons of the United States
- OPANAL (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean)
- Three Non-Nuclear Principles of Japan
Notes
[edit]- ^ Also known as an atom bomb, atomic bomb, nuclear bomb, or nuclear warhead, and colloquially as an A-bomb, nuke, or simply the Bomb
- ^ Also known colloquially as an H-bomb or Hydrogen Bomb
- ^ See also Mordechai Vanunu
- ^ In the United States, the President and the Secretary of Defense, acting as the National Command Authority, must jointly authorize the use of nuclear weapons.
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7 hour rule: At 7 hours after detonation the fission product activity will have decreased to about 1/10 (10%) of its amount at 1 hour. At about 2 days (49 hours-7X7) the activity will have decreased to 1% of the 1-hour value
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{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link) - ^ "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on April 3, 2024. Retrieved May 14, 2024.
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Bibliography
[edit]- Bethe, Hans Albrecht. The Road from Los Alamos. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. ISBN 0-671-74012-1.
- DeVolpi, Alexander, Minkov, Vladimir E., Simonenko, Vadim A., and Stanford, George S. Nuclear Shadowboxing: Contemporary Threats from Cold War Weaponry. Fidlar Doubleday, 2004 (Two volumes, both accessible on Google Book Search. Content of both volumes is now available in the 2009 trilogy by Alexander DeVolpi: Nuclear Insights: The Cold War Legacy.).
- Glasstone, Samuel and Dolan, Philip J. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (third edition). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. Available online (PDF).
- NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations (Part I – Nuclear). (Archived April 8, 2015, at the Wayback Machine). Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force: Washington, D.C., 1996
- Hansen, Chuck. U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History. Arlington, TX: Aerofax, 1988.
- Hansen, Chuck, "Swords of Armageddon: U.S. nuclear weapons development since 1945" (CD-ROM & download available; 2nd Ed.). (Archived December 30, 2016, at the Wayback Machine). PDF. 2,600 pages, Sunnyvale, California, Chucklea Publications, 1995, 2007. ISBN 978-0-9791915-0-3.
- Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994. ISBN 0-300-06056-4.
- Jungk, Robert (1958). Brighter than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists. New York: Harcourt. ISBN 0-15-614150-7. OCLC 181321.
{{cite book}}: ISBN / Date incompatibility (help) - The Manhattan Engineer District, "The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki" (1946), Archived February 4, 2012, at the Wayback Machine
- (in French) Jean-Hugues Oppel, Réveillez le président, Éditions Payot et rivages, 2007 (ISBN 978-2-7436-1630-4). The book is a fiction about the nuclear weapons of France; the book also contains about ten chapters on true historical incidents involving nuclear weapons and strategy.
- The Effects of Nuclear War. Office of Technology Assessment, May 1979.
- Rhodes, Richard. Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995. ISBN 0-684-82414-0.
- Rhodes, Richard (1986). The Making of the Atomic Bomb. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-671-44133-7. OCLC 13793436.
- Shultz, George P. and Goodby, James E. The War that Must Never Be Fought, Hoover Press, 2015, ISBN 978-0-8179-1845-3.
- Smyth, Henry DeWolf. Atomic Energy for Military Purposes. (Archived April 21, 2017, at the Wayback Machine). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1945. Smyth Report – the first declassified report by the US government on nuclear weapons.
- Weart, Spencer R. Nuclear Fear: A History of Images. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988. ISBN 0-674-62836-5.
- Weart, Spencer R. The Rise of Nuclear Fear. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012. ISBN 0-674-05233-1.
Further reading
[edit]- Laura Grego and David Wright, "Broken Shield: Missiles designed to destroy incoming nuclear warheads fail frequently in tests and could increase global risk of mass destruction", Scientific American, vol. 320, no. no. 6 (June 2019), pp. 62–67. "Current U.S. missile defense plans are being driven largely by technology, politics and fear. Missile defenses will not allow us to escape our vulnerability to nuclear weapons. Instead large-scale developments will create barriers to taking real steps toward reducing nuclear risks—by blocking further cuts in nuclear arsenals and potentially spurring new deployments." (p. 67.)
- Michael T. Klare, "Missile Mania: The death of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty [of 1987] has escalated the arms race", The Nation, vol. 309, no. 6 (September 23, 2019), p. 4.
- Moniz, Ernest J., and Sam Nunn, "The Return of Doomsday: The New Nuclear Arms Race – and How Washington and Moscow Can Stop It", Foreign Affairs, vol. 98, no. 5 (September / October 2019), pp. 150–161. Former U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz and former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn write that "the old [strategic] equilibrium" between the United States and Russia has been "destabilized" by "clashing national interests, insufficient dialogue, eroding arms control structures, advanced missile systems, and new cyberweapons... Unless Washington and Moscow confront these problems now, a major international conflict or nuclear escalation is disturbingly plausible—perhaps even likely." (p. 161.)
- Thomas Powers, "The Nuclear Worrier" (review of Daniel Ellsberg, The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner, New York, Bloomsbury, 2017, ISBN 9781608196708, 420 pp.), The New York Review of Books, vol. LXV, no. 1 (January 18, 2018), pp. 13–15.
- Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety, Penguin Press, 2013, ISBN 1594202273. The book became the basis for a 2-hour 2017 PBS American Experience episode, likewise titled "Command and Control". Nuclear weapons continue to be equally hazardous to their owners as to their potential targets. Under the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, nuclear-weapon states are obliged to work toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.
- Tom Stevenson, "A Tiny Sun" (review of Fred Kaplan, The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War, Simon and Schuster, 2021, 384 pp.; and Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age, Cornell, 2020, 180 pp.), London Review of Books, vol. 44, no. 4 (24 February 2022), pp. 29–32. "Nuclear strategists systematically underestimate the chances of nuclear accident... [T]here have been too many close calls for accidental use to be discounted." (p. 32.)
- David Wright and Cameron Tracy, "Over-hyped: Physics dictates that hypersonic weapons cannot live up to the grand promises made on their behalf", Scientific American, vol. 325, no. 2 (August 2021), pp. 64–71. "Failure to fully assess [the potential benefits and costs of hypersonic weapons] is a recipe for wasteful spending and increased global risk." (p. 71.)
External links
[edit]- Nuclear Weapon Archive from Carey Sublette: reliable source, has links to other sources and an informative FAQ.
- The Federation of American Scientists (Archived October 18, 1996, at the Wayback Machine) provides information on weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons and their effects
- Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues (Archived March 2, 2001, at the Wayback Machine) – contains resources related to nuclear weapons, including a historical and technical overview and searchable bibliography of web and print resources
- Video archive of US, Soviet, UK, Chinese and French Nuclear Weapon Testing at sonicbomb.com
- The National Museum of Nuclear Science & History (United States) (Archived March 27, 2021, at the Wayback Machine) – located in New Mexico; a Smithsonian Affiliate Museum
- Nuclear Emergency and Radiation Resources (Archived May 15, 2021, at the Wayback Machine)
- The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb at AtomicArchive.com
- Los Alamos National Laboratory: History (Archived January 15, 2009, at the Wayback Machine)—US nuclear history
- Race for the Superbomb , PBS website on the history of the H-bomb
- Recordings of recollections of the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
- The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project or NPIHP is a global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history through archival documents, oral history interviews and other empirical sources.
- NUKEMAP3D (Archived August 28, 2015, at the Wayback Machine) – a 3D nuclear weapons effects simulator powered by Google Maps.
Nuclear weapon
View on GrokipediaFundamentals
Principles of nuclear reactions
Nuclear fission releases energy through the splitting of heavy atomic nuclei, primarily isotopes such as uranium-235 (^235U) or plutonium-239 (^239Pu), when they absorb a neutron and become unstable, fragmenting into lighter nuclei while emitting 2 to 3 additional neutrons on average per event.[9] These neutrons, if not captured or lost, can induce further fissions, establishing an exponential chain reaction provided the neutron multiplication factor—defined as the ratio of neutrons produced to those absorbed or escaping—exceeds unity (k > 1).[10] For weapons, rapid energy release demands a sudden transition to supercriticality, where k >> 1, amplifying the reaction before disassembly dissipates the assembly.[11] Achieving supercriticality necessitates a minimum fissile mass, known as the critical mass, which depends on geometry, density, impurities, and neutron reflectors or tampons that minimize leakage; familiar fissile materials like ^235U exhibit high fission cross-sections for low-energy (thermal) neutrons, on the order of hundreds of barns, facilitating initiation with moderated or slowed neutrons.[9] Early empirical validation came from the Chicago Pile-1 experiment on December 2, 1942, which demonstrated the first controlled chain reaction using natural uranium and graphite moderator, confirming neutron multiplication sufficient for k ≈ 1.006 at low power levels through precise stack measurements of neutron flux. Plutonium-239, bred from uranium-238 in reactors, offers a lower critical mass than ^235U due to its higher fission probability per neutron absorption, enabling more compact designs.[10] The energy yield arises from the mass defect—the difference between the initial nucleus mass and the sum of fission products and neutrons—converted via Einstein's equation E = mc², where approximately 0.1% of the fissile mass transforms into energy, yielding about 200 MeV per fission event, predominantly as kinetic energy of fragments and neutrons.[9] This equates to roughly 1 megawatt-day of thermal energy per kilogram of ^235U fully fissioned, far exceeding chemical reactions, with total yields expressed in TNT equivalents (1 kiloton ≈ 4.184 × 10^{12} joules).[10] Nuclear fusion in weapons exploits the fusion of light nuclei, particularly the deuterium-tritium (D-T) reaction (^2H + ^3H → ^4He + n + 17.6 MeV), which releases energy by forming a more stable helium nucleus, though it requires extreme conditions: plasma temperatures above 100 million kelvin and densities enabling frequent collisions before radiative cooling.[12] Unlike fission, fusion does not sustain via inherent chain reactions but demands an initial fission "primary" to provide the compressive shock and radiation for ignition, as D-T cross-sections peak at keV energies yet require inertial confinement to overcome Coulomb repulsion.[13] Per unit mass, D-T fusion liberates over four times the energy of uranium fission, amplifying yields when boosted or staged.[14]Basic weapon designs
Nuclear weapons achieve explosive yields through rapid assembly of fissile material into a supercritical configuration, initiating a chain reaction via neutron-induced fission. The two foundational designs for fission-based weapons are the gun-type and implosion-type assemblies, each tailored to the properties of specific fissile isotopes. Gun-type designs propel one subcritical mass of fissile material into another using conventional high explosives, relying on the relatively low spontaneous fission rate of uranium-235 to allow sufficient assembly time before predetonation.[15] This method, exemplified by the Little Boy prototype developed during the Manhattan Project and deployed in 1945, utilized enriched uranium-235 in a barrel-like configuration where a projectile slug impacts a target ring to form the supercritical mass.[16] Implosion-type designs, necessitated by plutonium-239's higher spontaneous fission due to plutonium-240 impurities in reactor-produced material, employ precisely timed detonations of surrounding conventional explosives to symmetrically compress a subcritical plutonium core to supercritical density.[17] Originating from concepts advanced by Seth Neddermeyer at Los Alamos Laboratory, this approach required extensive hydrodynamic simulations and explosive lens configurations to ensure uniform inward shock waves, as implemented in the Fat Man prototype of 1945.[18] Unlike the linear propulsion of gun-type, implosion demands millisecond synchronization to avoid asymmetry-induced failure.[19] Both designs incorporate tampers and neutron reflectors to enhance efficiency beyond pure theoretical fission chains. Tampers, typically dense materials like uranium or tungsten, hydrodynamically confine the expanding core while reflecting neutrons back into the fissioning region, reducing neutron leakage and prolonging the reaction.[20] Reflectors, such as beryllium, further minimize escape by scattering neutrons with minimal absorption or moderation.[21] High isotopic purity remains critical, as impurities elevate predetonation risks, particularly in plutonium where reactor breeding introduces neutron-emitting isotopes.[17] Boosted fission refines these designs by injecting a small quantity of fusionable gas, such as a deuterium-tritium mixture, into the fissile core's hollow pit prior to compression. Upon fission initiation, the gas undergoes partial fusion, releasing high-energy neutrons that accelerate the chain reaction and increase fission efficiency without relying on full thermonuclear staging.[22] This technique, developed post-1945, allows smaller fissile inventories for comparable performance by leveraging fusion neutrons to prompt additional fissions.[23]Historical Development
Pre-1945 research and Manhattan Project
The discovery of nuclear fission occurred in December 1938, when German chemists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann, working at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, bombarded uranium with neutrons and chemically identified barium as a product, indicating the uranium nucleus had split into lighter elements.[24] [25] This experimental result was theoretically explained in early 1939 by Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch, who coined the term "fission" by analogy to biological cell division and calculated the enormous energy release from mass defect, approximately 200 MeV per fission event.[24] [26] Concurrently, physicists like Leo Szilard recognized the potential for a self-sustaining chain reaction if neutrons from fission could induce further fissions, prompting concerns over weaponization amid rising Nazi Germany's control over uranium research.[24] In response to intelligence about German efforts, Szilard drafted a letter signed by Albert Einstein on August 2, 1939, warning President Franklin D. Roosevelt that recent work on uranium fission could lead to "extremely powerful bombs of a new type" via chain reactions, and that Germany might secure supplies of uranium from Czechoslovakia.[27] [28] The letter, delivered on October 11, 1939, spurred the formation of the Advisory Committee on Uranium, which funded initial U.S. research but progressed slowly due to skepticism and resource constraints.[27] [29] Parallel British investigations culminated in the 1941 MAUD Committee report, which affirmed the feasibility of a uranium bomb requiring about 25 pounds of U-235 and producible within two years, influencing U.S. acceleration post-Pearl Harbor.[27] The Manhattan Project formalized in June 1942 as the Manhattan Engineer District under the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, with Major General Leslie Groves appointed director in September; J. Robert Oppenheimer was selected as scientific director for the Los Alamos Laboratory in late 1942.[30] [31] The effort ultimately employed over 130,000 personnel and cost nearly $2 billion by 1945, establishing secretive sites including Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for uranium enrichment; Hanford, Washington, for plutonium production; and Los Alamos, New Mexico, for weapon assembly.[32] [30] Central challenges included separating fissile U-235 (only 0.7% of natural uranium) from U-238, addressed via electromagnetic isotope separation using 1,400 calutrons at Oak Ridge's Y-12 plant and parallel gaseous diffusion at K-25, both requiring massive industrial-scale facilities to yield bomb-grade material by mid-1945.[32] Plutonium-239 production involved breeding via neutron capture in uranium-238 within graphite-moderated reactors at Hanford, with the first controlled chain reaction achieved December 2, 1942, by Enrico Fermi's Chicago Pile-1 experiment; subsequent Hanford reactors faced startup issues like xenon poisoning but produced sufficient Pu-239 by 1944, complicated by its higher spontaneous fission rate necessitating advanced assembly methods.[32] [30] These efforts culminated in the Trinity test on July 16, 1945, at the Alamogordo Bombing Range in New Mexico, detonating a plutonium implosion device code-named "Gadget" suspended 100 feet above ground, yielding approximately 21 kilotons of TNT equivalent and confirming the viability of compression to supercritical mass despite risks of fizzle from plutonium impurities.[33] [34] [35] The test's success, observed by Groves and Oppenheimer, validated empirical data on yield, fireball dynamics, and radiation effects, enabling transition to combat deployment.[35] Oppenheimer later recalled that the detonation evoked a verse from the ancient Indian Hindu scripture Bhagavad Gita: "Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds."[36]Early proliferation and Cold War buildup
The Soviet Union achieved nuclear capability through a combination of indigenous research and espionage from the Manhattan Project, with physicist Klaus Fuchs providing critical design information on plutonium implosion devices starting in 1945.[37] This intelligence, alongside contributions from other spies, enabled the USSR to test its first fission device, RDS-1 (a near-copy of the U.S. Fat Man bomb), on August 29, 1949, at Semipalatinsk, yielding approximately 22 kilotons and ending the U.S. monopoly just four years after Hiroshima.[38] The test caught U.S. intelligence off-guard, as estimates had predicted a Soviet bomb no earlier than 1952, prompting accelerated American programs amid fears of strategic vulnerability.[39] In response, the United States pursued thermonuclear weapons, detonating the first full-scale hydrogen bomb, Ivy Mike, on November 1, 1952, at Enewetak Atoll, with a yield of 10.4 megatons—over 700 times the power of the Nagasaki bomb.[40] This breakthrough, based on the Teller-Ulam configuration, shifted the arms race toward multi-megaton devices, with the Soviet Union following suit in August 1953 via its own boosted-fission test and achieving a true thermonuclear detonation by 1955. Proliferation extended to allies: the United Kingdom conducted its first successful thermonuclear test in November 1957 during Operation Grapple, yielding 1.8 megatons, while France exploded its initial fission device, Gerboise Bleue (70 kilotons), on February 13, 1960, in the Algerian Sahara, marking independent European entry into the nuclear club.[41][42] Geopolitical rivalries fueled massive arsenal expansion, with the U.S. establishing a nuclear triad by the early 1960s: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (e.g., Atlas deployments in 1959), sea-based submarine-launched ballistic missiles (Polaris in 1960), and strategic bombers (B-52s with gravity bombs).[43] U.S. stockpiles peaked at 31,255 warheads in 1967, while the Soviet Union reached approximately 40,000 by 1986, driven by mutual suspicions and doctrines emphasizing assured destruction.[44][45] This buildup reflected technological one-upmanship, including multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) in the 1970s, which multiplied warhead delivery without proportional platform increases. Tensions peaked during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, when U.S. reconnaissance revealed Soviet medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, capable of striking the U.S. mainland; President Kennedy's naval quarantine and brinkmanship negotiations averted escalation, as Khrushchev withdrew the weapons in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba and secret removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey.[46] The 13-day standoff underscored the perils of nuclear parity pursuits, yet reinforced buildup incentives, as both superpowers viewed proliferation and deployment as hedges against perceived first-strike advantages.[47]Post-Cold War dynamics and recent modernization
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States and Russia pursued significant reductions in their nuclear arsenals through a series of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START). The 2010 New START treaty, which entered into force in 2011 and was extended until February 2026, capped each side at 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers, and 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers, representing a roughly 30% cut from pre-treaty levels.[48] [49] These limits contributed to a drawdown from Cold War peaks exceeding 30,000 warheads each to combined deployed strategic stockpiles of approximately 3,100 by 2025, though total inventories including non-deployed and retired warheads remain higher.[5] As of January 2025, the United States maintains an estimated 3,700 warheads in its active military stockpile for delivery by operational forces, with a total inventory of about 5,177 including 1,477 awaiting dismantlement.[50] Russia possesses roughly 4,380 warheads in military stockpiles, contributing to a global total of approximately 9,614 such warheads across all nuclear-armed states, down from over 70,000 in 1986 but stable or slightly increasing since 2020 due to modernization offsetting retirements.[51] China holds over 600 warheads, up from about 500 in 2024, with projections indicating growth to more than 1,000 by 2030 amid silo construction and missile deployments.[52] [53] Eroding arms control, including Russia's 2022 suspension of New START inspections amid its invasion of Ukraine, has spurred renewed modernization efforts. The United States is replacing its Minuteman III ICBMs with the LGM-35A Sentinel by the 2030s and Ohio-class submarines with Columbia-class boats starting in the early 2030s, at costs exceeding initial estimates due to technical challenges.[54] [55] Russia has deployed the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle on SS-19 and Sarmat ICBMs since 2019, enhancing penetration of missile defenses with speeds exceeding Mach 20.[56] China is expanding its DF-41 road-mobile ICBM force, capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) over 12,000 km, alongside new silo fields for fixed ICBMs.[57] These programs reflect a shift toward qualitative improvements in survivability, accuracy, and yield flexibility. Rising geopolitical tensions drive this reversal of post-Cold War de-escalation trends. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 prompted explicit nuclear threats from officials, including lowered doctrinal thresholds for use against non-nuclear aggression, heightening escalation risks and prompting NATO reassessments of deterrence.[58] China's opaque buildup challenges U.S. extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, while North Korea's April 2023 test of the solid-fueled Hwasong-18 ICBM, followed by subsequent launches, advances its liquid-to-solid propellant transition for quicker, more survivable strikes.[59] With New START's expiration looming absent renewal, analysts warn of a potential arms race, as mutual verification lapses and emerging technologies like hypersonics erode strategic stability.[60]Weapon Types
Fission-based weapons
Fission-based nuclear weapons derive their explosive energy exclusively from the chain reaction of nuclear fission in fissile isotopes such as uranium-235 or plutonium-239, without incorporation of fusion stages.[10] These devices achieve supercriticality through rapid assembly of fissile material, typically via gun-type or implosion mechanisms, to sustain an exponential neutron multiplication leading to rapid energy release.[61] Yields range from under 1 kiloton to approximately 500 kilotons of TNT equivalent, constrained by the need for precise compression and the physical limits of fission fuel utilization.[62] The gun-type design propels one subcritical mass of fissile material into another using conventional explosives, suitable primarily for highly enriched uranium (HEU) due to its low rate of spontaneous fission.[61] The Little Boy device, detonated over Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, employed about 64 kilograms of HEU enriched to roughly 80% U-235, achieving a yield of 15 kilotons while fissioning only about 1.4% (approximately 0.9 kilograms) of the fissile material.[63] This inefficiency arises from the assembly occurring at velocities around 300 meters per second, limiting neutron generation before disassembly by the explosion's expansion.[64] Implosion-type designs surround a subcritical fissile core with high explosives arranged to uniformly compress it, increasing density to achieve supercriticality more rapidly and efficiently.[61] This method is essential for plutonium-239, as impurities like plutonium-240 (typically limited to under 7% in weapons-grade material) produce spontaneous neutrons that risk predetonation in slower gun assemblies, leading to low-yield fissions.[65] The Fat Man bomb, dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945, used 6.2 kilograms of plutonium-239 in an implosion configuration, yielding 21 kilotons with an efficiency of about 20%, fissioning roughly 1.2 kilograms of the core.[66] Compression speeds of 1,000 to 3,000 meters per second in implosion enable higher efficiencies, though requiring sophisticated lens-shaped explosive charges for symmetry.[64] Efficiencies in pure fission weapons generally span 1% to 20% of the fissile material undergoing fission, with advanced designs approaching 50% in larger assemblies through optimized tampers and reflectors, though practical yields rarely exceed 500 kilotons due to challenges in uniform compression and neutron economy without fusion boosting.[10] Material constraints, such as the critical mass (about 52 kilograms for bare U-235 versus 10 kilograms for Pu-239), and sensitivity to impurities further limit scalability and reliability.[62] Tactical variants adapt these principles for lower yields (typically 1 to 50 kilotons) in artillery shells or short-range missiles, emphasizing compactness over maximum power for battlefield applications in military doctrines.[62]Fusion-enhanced weapons
Fusion-enhanced weapons, commonly termed thermonuclear weapons, employ a multi-stage design where an initial fission explosion triggers fusion reactions in a secondary stage, dramatically increasing explosive yield beyond fission-only limits. The core innovation is the Teller-Ulam configuration, conceived in 1951 by physicists Edward Teller and Stanislaw Ulam, which utilizes radiation implosion: X-rays generated by the fission primary are confined within a radiation case to uniformly compress and heat the fusion secondary, typically containing lithium-6 deuteride as fuel.[67] This compression ignites deuterium-tritium fusion, releasing high-energy neutrons that further enhance fission in surrounding materials.[68] The first successful test of this design occurred on November 1, 1952, with the U.S. Ivy Mike shot at Enewetak Atoll, yielding 10.4 megatons of TNT equivalent—over 700 times the Nagasaki bomb's energy—and vaporizing the 4.6-square-kilometer Elugelab island.[69] Subsequent U.S. tests, such as Castle Bravo on March 1, 1954, achieved an unexpected 15 megatons due to unanticipated lithium-7 fusion reactions, underscoring the empirical challenges in yield prediction. The Soviet Union demonstrated comparable capability with its August 12, 1953, Joe-4 test, though initial designs yielded around 400 kilotons before adopting full Teller-Ulam principles.[70] Yield scaling in thermonuclear weapons follows empirical laws derived from test data, where energy output increases nonlinearly with secondary mass and compression efficiency; for optimized designs, yield-to-weight ratios approach 6 megatons per ton theoretically, though practical limits arise from delivery constraints and material ablation.[71] The pinnacle of tested yields was the Soviet Tsar Bomba, detonated on October 30, 1961, over Novaya Zemlya with a 50-megaton yield—scaled down from a 100-megaton design by replacing the uranium tamper with lead to reduce fallout—equivalent to 3,800 Hiroshima bombs.[72] Unlike this non-operational test device, modern operational thermonuclear weapons typically have yields between a few hundred kilotons to 1-5 megatons, focusing on accuracy, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), and reliable delivery systems rather than raw single-explosion power.[5] In many operational thermonuclear weapons, over 80% of the yield derives from fast fission of the secondary's depleted uranium tamper, induced by 14 MeV neutrons from D-T fusion, rather than fusion itself, highlighting the hybrid fission-fusion nature.[71] Designs often incorporate fusion boosting, where small quantities of fusion fuel in the primary pit generate neutrons to accelerate the fission chain reaction, improving efficiency and enabling compact high-yield warheads; this boosts primary yield by up to 100% while minimizing required fissile material.[73] Variable-yield features, known as dial-a-yield, allow pre-set adjustments via mechanisms like partial fusion fuel insertion or tamper modifications, tailoring output from kilotons to megatons for strategic flexibility, as seen in U.S. systems tested in the 1960s onward.[74] These enhancements, validated through over 1,000 nuclear tests by major powers before the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, enable scalable deterrence but raise proliferation risks due to the design's reliance on precise physics rather than exotic materials alone.[71]Advanced and tactical variants
Tactical nuclear weapons, distinguished from strategic counterparts by their lower yields and intended use in battlefield or regional scenarios, generally range from sub-kiloton to approximately 10 kilotons of TNT equivalent.[75] These designs aim to provide military commanders with options for limited nuclear employment, potentially deterring adversary escalation or responding to tactical threats without invoking full strategic retaliation, though critics argue they lower the threshold for nuclear use.[76] A prominent example is the U.S. W76-2 warhead, a variable-yield modification of the W76-1 with an explosive output of 5-7 kilotons, first deployed in late 2019 aboard Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines following authorization in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.[77] [78] Enhanced radiation weapons, commonly known as neutron bombs, represent an advanced variant prioritizing lethal neutron flux over blast and thermal effects to incapacitate personnel while sparing infrastructure. Developed in the U.S. during the 1950s and first tested in the 1960s, these low-yield thermonuclear devices emit high-energy neutrons that penetrate armor and cause rapid biological damage through ionizing radiation, with yields tuned to around 1 kiloton to maximize personnel lethality within a radius of several hundred meters.[79] The U.S. produced variants such as the W70 for Lance missiles and W79 for artillery shells in the 1970s, but production faced political hurdles; President Carter halted deployment in 1978 amid public opposition, only for it to resume under Reagan in 1981 before eventual phase-out by the 1990s due to arms control and doctrinal shifts.[80] Such weapons were conceptualized for countering massed armored formations, as in potential European theater conflicts, where neutrons could neutralize tank crews without widespread structural destruction.[81] Earth-penetrating variants, or "bunker-busters," modify gravity bombs to burrow into soil or rock before detonation, channeling seismic energy to destroy hardened underground targets like command centers. The U.S. B61-11, introduced in 1997 as a replacement for the B53 bomb, features a hardened casing allowing penetration of 6-10 feet into frozen or dry soil, with a selectable yield up to 400 kilotons, though operational use emphasizes lower settings for tactical precision.[82] [83] Efficacy remains debated, as penetration depth limits coupling of explosive energy to deep facilities (beyond 100 meters overburden), often requiring higher yields that risk significant surface fallout and collateral damage compared to conventional penetrators.[84] These designs support limited warfare by targeting fortified positions without necessitating surface-level strategic strikes, but analyses indicate they provide marginal advantages over precision-guided conventional alternatives against many hardened sites.[85] Salted nuclear designs, which incorporate materials like cobalt or gold to amplify long-term radioactive fallout upon fission, remain theoretical constructs rather than deployed weapons, aimed at area denial through persistent contamination rather than immediate blast effects. Proposed in concepts like the cobalt bomb since the 1950s, these would transmute stable isotopes into high-activity emitters via neutron capture, rendering large territories uninhabitable for years, but no nation has confirmed production or testing due to their doomsday implications and incompatibility with deterrence doctrines favoring controlled escalation.[86] The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review also endorsed pursuing a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) with low-yield options as a longer-term supplement to submarine capabilities, intended for flexible regional responses, though subsequent administrations have debated its necessity amid fiscal and strategic reviews.[87] [88] Overall, these variants underscore efforts to adapt nuclear arsenals for sub-strategic roles, balancing precision and restraint against risks of miscalculation in confined conflicts.[89]Delivery Mechanisms
Strategic ballistic systems
Strategic ballistic systems encompass intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) designed for ranges exceeding 5,500 kilometers, enabling global reach for nuclear deterrence. These systems prioritize survivability, rapid response, and precision through solid-fuel propulsion, inertial navigation augmented by stellar or GPS updates, achieving circular error probable (CEP) values under 200 meters for modern variants.[90] Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) allow a single booster to deliver 3 to 10 warheads to distinct targets, often accompanied by penetration aids like decoys and chaff to counter missile defenses.[91] The United States maintains approximately 400 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs in silos across Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota, each capable of carrying up to three MIRVs though currently limited to single warheads under arms control agreements.[92] With a range of over 13,000 kilometers and CEP below 200 meters, the liquid-fueled system from the 1970s has undergone life-extension upgrades, but full replacement by the solid-fueled LGM-35A Sentinel is slated for initial operational capability around 2029, extending service through 2075.[90][93] Russia's RS-24 Yars forms the backbone of its mobile ICBM force, with over 100 road- or rail-mobile launchers deployed by 2025, featuring a 10,500-kilometer range, up to six MIRVs, and evasive maneuvers to enhance survivability against preemptive strikes.[94][95] China's DF-41, a road-mobile ICBM entering service in 2017, boasts a 15,000-kilometer range and capacity for up to 10 MIRVs, bolstering its silo- and transporter-based arsenal amid projections of 700 ICBMs by 2035.[96][97] SLBMs provide a sea-based second-strike capability, with U.S. Ohio-class submarines carrying 14 to 20 Trident II (D5) missiles each, totaling up to 240 deployed launchers under treaty limits, with a range exceeding 7,600 kilometers and MIRV options for 4 to 8 warheads.[92] The three-stage solid-propellant Trident II employs astro-inertial guidance for high accuracy, supporting life-extension programs into the 2040s.[98] Russia deploys the RSM-56 Bulava on Borei-class submarines, achieving operational status in 2019 with an 8,000-kilometer range, MIRV capability for 6 to 10 warheads, and cold-launch from submerged platforms to minimize detection.[99][100] China's JL-3 SLBM, publicly displayed in 2025, extends its sea-based triad with ranges approaching intercontinental distances, complementing Type 094 submarines.[101] Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), while not strictly intercontinental, contribute to strategic postures in Asia, such as Russia's limited legacy systems or China's DF-26 with 4,000-kilometer range, though primary emphasis remains on ICBMs and SLBMs for global deterrence. Accuracy enhancements across these systems, often below 100 meters CEP with terminal guidance, underscore their role in counterforce targeting of hardened sites.[102]Air- and sea-launched options
Air-launched nuclear delivery systems utilize strategic bombers to deploy gravity bombs or cruise missiles, providing flexibility and recall capability absent in ground- or sea-based ballistic options. The United States operates 46 nuclear-capable B-52 Stratofortress bombers, supplemented by B-2 Spirit stealth bombers for penetrating advanced air defenses and the B-21 Raider, a dual-capable stealth platform entering service to deliver both conventional and nuclear munitions.[103][104][105] Russia's Tu-160M supersonic bomber carries up to 12 nuclear-armed Kh-102 cruise missiles, enabling strikes at ranges up to 12,000 km while evading detection through speed and low-altitude profiles.[106] The B61 gravity bomb family, with variable yields from 0.3 to 340 kilotons in its Mod 12 variant, forms the backbone of air-delivered tactical and strategic options, including NATO's nuclear sharing program where approximately 180 units are forward-deployed in Europe for delivery by dual-capable aircraft such as the F-35 Lightning II.[107][108] The AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), carried by B-52s, achieves ranges over 2,400 km at subsonic speeds using inertial navigation and terrain contour-matching to fly low and avoid radar, enhancing survivability over ballistic trajectories.[109][110] Sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles emphasize submarine survivability, with platforms remaining hidden until launch. Russia maintains the 3M-14 Kalibr family, nuclear-capable variants of which were ordered in batches including 56 units in 2025 for delivery through 2026, deployable from submarines and surface vessels for regional or standoff strikes.[111] The United States decommissioned its submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) in 2013, citing arms control compliance, though subsequent reviews have debated reintroduction to bolster non-nuclear conflict escalation options without risking strategic assets.[112] These air- and sea-launched systems enhance overall deterrence through inherent mobility and low observability: bombers permit mission abortion post-launch detection, while submerged submarines ensure second-strike credibility, contrasting with vulnerable fixed silos and allowing proportional response via precision guidance.[112]Emerging delivery technologies
Russia's Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, deployed on December 27, 2019, represents a key advancement in hypersonic nuclear delivery, achieving speeds exceeding Mach 27 upon re-entry and integrating with intercontinental ballistic missiles for ranges over 6,000 kilometers.[113][56] China's DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle, operational since approximately 2020 and paired with the DF-17 medium-range missile, enables nuclear payloads over distances of 1,800 to 2,500 kilometers, emphasizing maneuverability to challenge interception.[114][115] These systems face engineering hurdles, including extreme thermal stresses from atmospheric friction requiring advanced materials for heat dissipation, and precise guidance amid plasma-induced blackouts that disrupt onboard electronics and communications.[116][117] Potential countermeasures include boost-phase interception to disrupt launch trajectories before glide initiation, though such capabilities remain limited against operational deployments.[118] Fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS), revived by China's August 2021 test of a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle launched into low Earth orbit, allow payloads to circle the globe before de-orbiting toward targets, bypassing traditional midcourse detection arcs and evading ground-based missile defenses oriented against southern hemispheric approaches.[119][120] This orbital path can compress strategic warning times to as little as 10-15 minutes compared to over 30 minutes for conventional ICBMs, heightening risks of compressed decision timelines in crisis scenarios.[121][122]Physical and Strategic Effects
Immediate detonation effects
The immediate effects of a nuclear detonation encompass the blast wave, thermal radiation, and prompt ionizing radiation released within seconds to minutes of the explosion. These phenomena derive primarily from the rapid release of energy in the form of a fireball, which expands and interacts with the atmosphere, generating overpressure, intense heat, and high-energy particles. Empirical models, validated against historical detonations like those at Hiroshima (approximately 15 kilotons yield) and Nagasaki (21 kilotons), quantify these effects as scaling with yield via approximate cube-root proportionality for blast and thermal radii.[123] Blast effects stem from the shock wave propagating outward, characterized by peak overpressure in pounds per square inch (psi). An overpressure of 5 psi typically destroys conventional residential buildings by shattering windows, collapsing walls, and hurling debris, equivalent to impacts exceeding 180 tons on a two-story house wall. At 3.5 psi, serious injuries occur from flying glass and structural failures, while 8-10 psi levels most commercial and factory structures, and 20 psi demolishes reinforced concrete. In Hiroshima, the blast wave flattened wooden structures and brick buildings out to about 1.6 kilometers from ground zero, with total destruction radii aligning with models predicting 5 psi contours for airbursts optimized at altitudes around 500-600 meters.[124][125][126][123] Thermal effects arise from the fireball's emission of infrared and visible radiation, igniting materials and causing burns. For a 10-kiloton airburst, third-degree burns—destroying skin tissue—extend to approximately 1.6 kilometers, with first- and second-degree burns reaching farther. Larger yields amplify this: a 1-megaton detonation can produce third-degree burns tens of kilometers away under clear conditions, as the thermal pulse delivers energy fluxes exceeding 10 calories per square centimeter sufficient for charring flesh and spontaneous fires. In Nagasaki, flash heat bubbled roof tiles and caused severe burns up to 2 kilometers, corroborating data where exposed individuals suffered retinal damage and ignition of clothing within line-of-sight distances.[127][126][123] Prompt ionizing radiation, including gamma rays and neutrons, delivers lethal doses primarily near ground zero due to rapid atmospheric attenuation. For a 10-kiloton fission weapon, the 50% lethal dose (LD50) from gamma and neutron flux extends about 1 kilometer, causing acute radiation syndrome through cellular ionization. In a 1-megaton device, this radius may reach 1-2 kilometers for unshielded personnel, though neutrons contribute disproportionately in fusion-enhanced designs. Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors within 1 kilometer exhibited immediate fatalities from these rays, with neutron doses estimated at 10-20 grays in hypocenters.[126][128][123] Airbursts, detonated 500-1000 meters above ground, maximize blast and thermal radii by allowing unobstructed shock wave propagation and reduced energy absorption into the earth, optimizing 5 psi overpressure contours for area coverage—critical for urban targets as in historical strategic planning. Groundbursts, conversely, crater the surface and couple more energy into seismic effects but diminish standoff damage due to terrain interaction and fireball-ground contact, trading radius for localized intensity.[129][130]Radiation, fallout, and long-term consequences
Prompt radiation from a nuclear detonation consists primarily of gamma rays and neutrons emitted within the first minute after the explosion, capable of inflicting lethal doses to individuals within approximately 1-2 kilometers of ground zero for a 1-megaton yield, depending on shielding and burst height.[131] This initial radiation arises directly from the fission and fusion reactions and neutron interactions in the weapon's core and surrounding materials, penetrating deeply into tissues and causing acute radiation syndrome at doses exceeding 2-6 gray.[132] Unlike residual radiation, prompt effects diminish rapidly with distance due to inverse square law attenuation and are minimized in air bursts where the fireball does not interact extensively with the ground.[2] Residual radiation encompasses fission products, activated soil, and structural materials that persist after the initial burst, manifesting as fallout that contaminates air, water, and soil for days to decades. Ground bursts generate substantial local fallout by vaporizing and irradiating surface debris, which then precipitates within tens to hundreds of kilometers downwind, whereas air bursts reduce local fallout by avoiding ground interaction but can inject finer particles into the stratosphere for potential global dispersion.[133] Key isotopes in fallout include strontium-90, a beta emitter with a half-life of 28.1 years that mimics calcium in biological uptake, accumulating in bones and contributing to long-term leukemia risks.[134] Empirical patterns from over 500 atmospheric tests conducted between 1945 and 1963 demonstrate that local fallout dominates health threats from tactical or counterforce strikes, while global fallout from high-yield stratospheric injections peaked in the mid-1960s but declined sharply post-test ban without inducing widespread climatic disruption.[135] High-altitude detonations above 30 kilometers produce negligible fallout but generate intense electromagnetic pulses (EMP) via Compton scattering of gamma rays in the atmosphere, inducing voltage surges that damage unshielded electronics over continental scales. The 1962 Starfish Prime test, a 1.4-megaton burst at 400 kilometers altitude, triggered streetlight failures and telephone outages across Hawaii—1,400 kilometers distant—and degraded seven satellites through radiation belt formation, illustrating EMP's capacity to disrupt power grids and communications without direct blast or thermal effects.[136] Long-term consequences include elevated cancer incidence among exposed populations, as evidenced by the Radiation Effects Research Foundation's Life Span Study of Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors, which attributes approximately 500 excess solid cancers and leukemias per 100,000 persons per sievert of whole-body exposure, though linear no-threshold extrapolations to low doses remain debated due to potential thresholds or adaptive responses observed in subsets of the cohort.[137] Projections of nuclear winter—severe global cooling from soot-laden firestorms—lack empirical validation from historical tests, which lofted millions of tons of radioactive debris without measurable temperature anomalies beyond localized effects, underscoring critiques of 1980s models for overestimating urban fire ignition and stratospheric soot persistence based on unverified assumptions rather than scaled observations.[138] These theoretical scenarios, while highlighting risks from massive countervalue exchanges, have been revised downward in subsequent analyses to emphasize regional rather than hemispheric climatic impacts, prioritizing verifiable data from test archives over speculative simulations.[139]Population and infrastructure impacts
![Atomic cloud over Nagasaki from Koyagi-jima][float-right] Nuclear strategies differentiate between counterforce operations targeting hardened military installations, such as intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, and countervalue strikes aimed at population concentrations and economic infrastructure. United States Minuteman III silos are engineered to endure overpressures of up to 2,000 pounds per square inch, sufficient to resist damage from nuclear detonations yielding several hundred kilotons to low megatons at optimal distances, though direct hits by higher-yield weapons could overwhelm them.[140] Russian silo-based ICBMs, including SS-18 and SS-27 variants, incorporate similar hardening levels, typically rated against 1-5 megaton equivalents depending on burial depth and reinforced concrete encasement, complicating full counterforce disarming strikes.[141] In limited exchanges, declassified models project severe but regionally contained population losses. A scenario involving roughly 100 warheads, akin to tactical escalations over urban fronts, could inflict 20-30 million immediate fatalities from blast, thermal radiation, and fires, with totals escalating to 50-80 million including injuries and short-term radiation effects, based on urban density and yield assumptions from 15-500 kilotons per device.[142][143] Princeton simulations of NATO-Russia tactical phases, deploying 300 lower-yield weapons, estimate over 2 million initial casualties in Europe alone, underscoring that even restrained use avoids global extinction but devastates targeted demographics and strains survivor logistics.[143] Infrastructure vulnerabilities amplify these effects, particularly via electromagnetic pulse (EMP) from high-altitude bursts, which induce voltage surges capable of frying unshielded transformers and control systems across thousands of square kilometers, potentially blacking out national grids for extended periods.[144] Direct blasts would pulverize urban transport hubs, water treatment, and supply chains, with recovery timelines spanning 6-24 months for power restoration, informed by analogies to the 1977 New York blackout's multi-week disruptions scaled for irreplaceable hardware losses.[145] The aggregate economic toll from a single-city strike, extrapolated from Hiroshima's 1945 devastation adjusted for modern densities, exceeds trillions in reconstruction, deterring escalation as evidenced by zero battlefield uses since 1945 amid proxy wars and crises.[146]Deterrence and Strategic Doctrine
Evolution of nuclear strategy
The doctrine of massive retaliation emerged under President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "New Look" policy, announced in 1953, which prioritized strategic nuclear forces to deter Soviet aggression while reducing conventional military expenditures amid fiscal constraints following the Korean War.[147] This approach, articulated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, threatened an overwhelming nuclear response to any communist incursion, aiming to exploit U.S. monopoly on deliverable atomic bombs until the mid-1950s Soviet buildup eroded it.[148] However, its credibility waned during limited conflicts like the 1950-1953 Korean War, where U.S. leaders refrained from nuclear escalation against Chinese intervention despite Dulles's rhetoric, revealing the doctrine's inflexibility for sub-strategic threats.[149] By the early 1960s, under President John F. Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, U.S. strategy shifted to "flexible response," formalized in National Security Action Memorandum 160 on June 6, 1962, emphasizing graduated options across conventional, tactical nuclear, and strategic levels to match aggression's scale and preserve escalation control.[150] McNamara's doctrine incorporated assured destruction thresholds—calculating that 400 one-megaton equivalents could destroy 25% of Soviet population and 50-75% of industry—while prioritizing counterforce targeting of military assets over pure city-busting to enable limited nuclear exchanges without automatic all-out war.[151] This evolution addressed massive retaliation's "all-or-nothing" rigidity, informed by game-theoretic insights into bargaining under uncertainty, as U.S. planners sought credible responses to crises like the 1961 Berlin standoff.[152] Thomas Schelling's 1966 work Arms and Influence formalized escalation concepts, proposing a "ladder" of incremental steps—from conventional probes to sub-strategic nuclear demonstrations—to manipulate adversary risk perceptions and compel de-escalation without crossing into mutual annihilation.[153] Rooted in historical near-misses like the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, where U.S. naval quarantine signaled resolve without immediate strikes, these ideas influenced doctrines by highlighting manipulation of commitment and "salience" in ambiguous threats, enabling sub-strategic options such as tactical yields under 1 kiloton for battlefield use.[154] Empirical evidence from proxy wars, including Vietnam (1955-1975) and multiple Indo-Pakistani conflicts, supports deterrence's efficacy under evolving strategies, as no nuclear weapon has been used in combat since 1945 despite intense superpower rivalries and regional flashpoints.[155]Mutual assured destruction and credibility
Mutual assured destruction (MAD) posits a strategic equilibrium in which nuclear-armed adversaries possess second-strike capabilities sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on each other, rendering a first strike irrational under rational actor assumptions. This doctrine emerged as a cornerstone of Cold War stability, where the certainty of mutual societal devastation—through targeted strikes on urban-industrial centers—deterred escalation to nuclear war. Empirical assessments from the era indicated that as few as 400 high-yield warheads, equivalent to roughly 400 megatons, could demolish the population and economic infrastructure of a superpower, achieving "assured destruction" without requiring numerical superiority.[156] Such thresholds underscored MAD's reliance on survivable retaliatory forces rather than first-strike dominance, fostering a balance where neither side could disarm the other preemptively. Credibility in MAD hinges on the perceived resolve to execute retaliatory strikes, particularly in extended deterrence scenarios where nuclear powers shield allies from aggression. For NATO, the U.S. nuclear umbrella extended protection to Western Europe, signaling commitment through forward-deployed weapons and integrated command structures that blurred the line between conventional defense and nuclear escalation.[157] Deployments like tactical nuclear artillery in Europe reinforced this coupling, convincing adversaries that limited incursions would trigger broader nuclear responses, thereby stabilizing the deterrence bargain. However, deterrence models often underestimate human resolve, treating actors as purely utility-maximizing without accounting for ideological commitments or domestic pressures that could compel retaliation despite costs.[158] Critiques of MAD highlight decoupling risks, where widening conventional military disparities erode the credibility of nuclear threats by tempting adversaries to pursue limited gains below the nuclear threshold. If one side achieves overwhelming conventional superiority—enabling rapid territorial conquests before retaliation—it may calculate that the defender's leadership would prioritize self-preservation over escalation, severing the link between conventional defeat and nuclear response.[159] This vulnerability is amplified in scenarios with geographic separation or asymmetric stakes, as game-theoretic models fail to capture the causal realism of resolve shaped by honor, alliances, or regime survival imperatives, potentially destabilizing the equilibrium.[160] A key empirical success of MAD lies in its prevention of a Soviet conventional invasion of Western Europe, despite the Warsaw Pact's numerical advantages in tanks and troops during the Cold War. Soviet war plans, such as those uncovered in declassified documents, contemplated rapid armored thrusts through the Fulda Gap, yet refrained amid the shadow of U.S. strategic forces capable of retaliating against Soviet cities.[161] This non-event aligns with deterrence theory's causal logic: the prospect of mutual devastation outweighed potential gains, preserving peace without direct nuclear use, though attribution remains inferential given counterfactual nature.[162]Contemporary doctrines and efficacy debates
The United States maintains a policy allowing for the potential first use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend vital interests, as outlined in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, which emphasizes nuclear weapons' role in deterrence while incorporating low-yield options like the W76-2 for escalation control in limited scenarios.[163][164] Russia's nuclear doctrine, updated in November 2024, permits nuclear responses to conventional threats posing existential risks or supported by nuclear-armed states, incorporating an "escalate to de-escalate" posture that envisions limited nuclear use to terminate conflicts on favorable terms.[165][166] China upholds a no-first-use policy, committing to employ nuclear weapons solely in retaliation to a nuclear attack, a posture maintained amid arsenal modernization to ensure second-strike capabilities.[52][167] Debates on nuclear efficacy center on deterrence's empirical track record—no interstate nuclear use since 1945 despite multiple crises—attributed to mutual risk aversion rather than luck, with quantitative analyses linking arsenals to the absence of great-power wars, a historical anomaly.[168] The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's 2025 Yearbook warns of an emerging qualitative arms race, driven by modernization and eroding controls, potentially increasing miscalculation risks as states pursue hypersonic and low-yield innovations.[169] Proponents of persistence argue this competition reinforces stability through mirrored capabilities, while abolition advocates overlook iterated game dynamics where verification failures incentivize covert cheating, as defectors gain decisive advantages in rebuilt arsenals absent mutual oversight.[170] Critiques of total disarmament highlight systemic incentives for non-compliance: in repeated prisoner's dilemma frameworks modeling arms treaties, high-stakes payoffs favor preemptive cheating by revisionist actors, as seen in historical treaty evasions, rendering zero-stockpile regimes unverifiable and prone to rapid reconstitution by technologically advanced states.[171] No-first-use flaws compound this, as empirical deterrence relies on ambiguous threats to cover conventional-nuclear blurred lines, a flexibility absent in rigid policies that may embolden limited probes, per causal analyses of crisis bargaining.[172] Thus, doctrines prioritizing tailored deterrence sustain efficacy absent foolproof alternatives.Global Arsenals and Proliferation
Nuclear-armed states and current stockpiles
As of early 2025, nine states possess nuclear weapons, with a global total inventory of approximately 12,241 warheads, including about 9,614 in military stockpiles available for potential use by operational forces and roughly 3,912 deployed with delivery systems.[5] The United States and Russia together account for approximately 87 percent of the world's total nuclear inventory and 83 percent of military stockpiles.[5] These figures derive from estimates informed by declassified data, satellite imagery, and intelligence assessments, though uncertainties persist for opaque programs due to secrecy and verification challenges akin to fundamental limits on observation.[5] The following table summarizes military stockpiles, deployed warheads, and key modernization notes for each state:| Country | Military Stockpile | Deployed Warheads | Modernization Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Russia | 4,309 | 1,718 strategic | Stockpile increasing amid replacement of Soviet-era systems; emphasis on tactical weapons and hypersonic delivery.[5] |
| United States | 3,700 | 1,670 strategic + 100 nonstrategic | Ongoing life-extension programs for warheads like W87 and B61; deployment of new Sentinel ICBMs planned.[5] |
| China | 600 | 24 strategic | Rapid expansion, with silo construction and new missile types; projected to exceed 1,000 warheads by 2030.[5] |
| France | 290 | 280 | Stable force with upgrades to M51 submarine-launched missiles; air-launched component not routinely deployed.[5] |
| United Kingdom | 225 | 120 | Increasing cap to 260 warheads; transition to Dreadnought-class submarines from Vanguard fleet.[5] |
| India | 180 | None (central storage) | Ongoing fissile material production and development of Agni-series missiles and submarine capabilities.[5] |
| Pakistan | 170 | None (central storage) | Expanding arsenal with short-range Nasr missiles and cruise systems; reliant on aircraft and land-based launchers.[5] |
| Israel | 90 | None declared | Undeclared program focused on Jericho missiles and submarine-launched options; estimates highly uncertain.[5] |
| North Korea | 50 | None deployed | Accelerating tests of Hwasong ICBMs and submarine capabilities; fissile material growth uncertain but increasing.[5] |
