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Far-right politics
Far-right politics
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Alt-right members preparing at the 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. Participants are carrying Gadsden flags, a Nazi flag, and Confederate battle flags.

Far-right politics, often termed right-wing extremism, encompasses a range of ideologies that are marked by ultraconservatism, authoritarianism, ultranationalism, radical anti-communism, ethnonationalism, and nativism.[1] This political spectrum situates itself on the far end of the right, distinguished from more mainstream right-wing ideologies by its opposition to liberal democratic norms and emphasis on exclusivist views. Far-right ideologies have historically included reactionary conservatism, fascism, and Nazism, while contemporary manifestations also incorporate neo-fascism, neo-Nazism, supremacism, and various other movements characterized by chauvinism, xenophobia, and theocratic or reactionary beliefs.

Key to the far-right worldview is the notion of societal purity, often invoking ideas of a homogeneous "national" or "ethnic" community. This view generally promotes organicism, which perceives society as a unified, natural entity under threat from diversity or modern pluralism. Far-right movements frequently target perceived threats to their idealized community, whether ethnic, religious, or cultural, leading to anti-immigrant sentiments, welfare chauvinism, and, in extreme cases, political violence or oppression.[2] According to political theorists, the far right appeals to those who believe in maintaining strict cultural and ethnic divisions and a return to traditional social hierarchies and values.[3]

In practice, far-right movements differ widely by region and historical context. In Western Europe, they have often focused on anti-immigration and anti-globalism, while in Eastern Europe, strong anti-communist rhetoric is more common. The United States has seen a unique evolution of far-right movements that emphasize nativism and radical opposition to central government.

Far-right politics have led to oppression, political violence, forced assimilation, ethnic cleansing, and genocide against groups of people based on their supposed inferiority or their perceived threat to the native ethnic group, nation, state, national religion, dominant culture, or conservative social institutions.[4] Across these contexts, far-right politics has continued to influence discourse, occasionally achieving electoral success and prompting significant debate over its place in democratic societies.

Overview

[edit]

Concept and worldview

[edit]
Pavel Krushevan, a prominent member of the far-right monarchist and ultranationalist Black Hundreds movement in Russia. He was the first publisher of the antisemitic forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.[5]
Charles Maurras, founder and leader of Action Française, a far-right monarchist and ultranationalist political movement in France.
Nathan Bedford Forrest, the first Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan in the United States.
Benito Mussolini, dictator of Fascist Italy (left), and Adolf Hitler, dictator of Nazi Germany (right), were fascist leaders.
D. F. Malan, Prime Minister of South Africa from 1948 to 1954 whose government established the apartheid model of racial segregation and white supremacy in South Africa.

According to scholars Jean-Yves Camus and Nicolas Lebourg, the core of the far right's worldview is organicism, the idea that society functions as a complete, organized and homogeneous living being. Adapted to the community they wish to constitute or reconstitute (whether based on ethnicity, nationality, religion or race), the concept leads them to reject every form of universalism in favor of autophilia and alterophobia, or in other words the idealization of a "we" excluding a "they".[6] The far right tends to absolutize differences between nations, races, individuals or cultures since they disrupt their efforts towards the utopian dream of the "closed" and naturally organized society, perceived as the condition to ensure the rebirth of a community finally reconnected to its quasi-eternal nature and re-established on firm metaphysical foundations.[7][8]

As they view their community in a state of decay facilitated by the ruling elites, far-right members portray themselves as a natural, sane and alternative elite, with the redemptive mission of saving society from its promised doom. They reject both their national political system and the global geopolitical order (including their institutions and values, e.g. political liberalism and egalitarian humanism) which are presented as needing to be abandoned or purged of their impurities, so that the "redemptive community" can eventually leave the current phase of liminal crisis to usher in the new era.[6][8] The community itself is idealized through great archetypal figures (the Golden Age, the savior, decadence and global conspiracy theories) as they glorify non-rationalistic and non-materialistic values such as the youth or the cult of the dead.[6]

Political scientist Cas Mudde argues that the far right can be viewed as a combination of four broadly defined concepts, namely exclusivism (e.g. racism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, ethnopluralism, chauvinism, including welfare chauvinism), anti-democratic and non-individualist traits (e.g. cult of personality, hierarchism, monism, populism, anti-particracy, an organicist view of the state), a traditionalist value system lamenting the disappearance of historic frames of reference (e.g. law and order, the family, the ethnic, linguistic and religious community and nation as well as the natural environment[9]) and a socioeconomic program associating corporatism, state control of certain sectors, agrarianism, and a varying degree of belief in the free play of socially Darwinistic market forces. Mudde then proposes a subdivision of the far-right nebula into moderate and radical leanings, according to their degree of exclusionism and essentialism.[10][11]

Definition and comparative analysis

[edit]

The Encyclopedia of Politics: The Left and the Right states that far-right politics include "persons or groups who hold extreme nationalist, xenophobic, homophobic, racist, religious fundamentalist, or other reactionary views." While the term far right is typically applied to fascists and neo-Nazis, it has also been used to refer to those to the right of mainstream right-wing politics.[12]

According to political scientist Lubomír Kopeček, "[t]he best working definition of the contemporary far right may be the four-element combination of nationalism, xenophobia, law and order, and welfare chauvinism proposed for the Western European environment by Cas Mudde."[13] Relying on those concepts, far-right politics includes yet is not limited to aspects of authoritarianism, anti-communism,[13] and nativism.[14] Claims that superior people should have greater rights than inferior people are often associated with the far right, as they have historically favored a social Darwinistic or elitist hierarchy based on the belief in the legitimacy of the rule of a supposedly superior minority over the inferior masses.[15] Regarding the socio-cultural dimension of nationality, culture and migration, one far-right position is the view that certain ethnic, racial, or religious groups should stay separate, based on the belief that the interests of one's own group should be prioritized.[16]

In Western Europe, far-right parties have been associated with anti-immigrant policies, as well as opposition to globalism and European integration. They often make nationalist and xenophobic appeals which make allusions to ethnic nationalism rather than civic nationalism (or liberal nationalism). Some have at their core illiberal policies, such as removing checks on executive authority, and protections for minorities from majority (multipluralism). In the 1990s, the "winning formula" was often to attract anti-immigrant blue collar workers and white collar workers who wanted less state intervention in the economy, but in the 2000s, this switched to welfare chauvinism.[17]

In comparing the Western European and post-Communist Central European far-right, Kopeček writes that "[t]he Central European far right was also typified by a strong anti-Communism, much more markedly than in Western Europe", allowing for "a basic ideological classification within a unified party family, despite the heterogeneity of the far right parties." Kopeček concludes that a comparison of Central European far-right parties with those of Western Europe shows that "these four elements are present in Central Europe as well, though in a somewhat modified form, despite differing political, economic, and social influences."[13] In the American and more general Anglo-Saxon environment, the most common term is "radical right", which has a broader meaning than the European radical right.[18][13] Mudde defines the American radical right as an "old school of nativism, populism, and hostility to central government [which] was said to have developed into the post-World War II combination of ultranationalism and anti-communism, Christian fundamentalism, militaristic orientation, and anti-alien sentiment."[18]

Jodi Dean argues that "the rise of far-right anti-communism in many parts of the world" should be interpreted "as a politics of fear, which utilizes the disaffection and anger generated by capitalism. [...] Partisans of far right-wing organizations, in turn, use anti-communism to challenge every political current which is not embedded in a clearly exposed nationalist and racist agenda. For them, both the USSR and the European Union, leftist liberals, ecologists, and supranational corporations – all of these may be called 'communist' for the sake of their expediency."[19]

In Hate in the Homeland: The New Global Far Right, Cynthia Miller-Idriss examines the far right as a global movement and representing a cluster of overlapping "antidemocratic, antiegalitarian, white supremacist" beliefs that are "embedded in solutions like authoritarianism, ethnic cleansing or ethnic migration, and the establishment of separate ethno-states or enclaves along racial and ethnic lines".[20]

Modern debates

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Terminology

[edit]

According to Jean-Yves Camus and Nicolas Lebourg, the modern ambiguities in the definition of far-right politics lie in the fact that the concept is generally used by political adversaries to "disqualify and stigmatize all forms of partisan nationalism by reducing them to the historical experiments of Italian Fascism [and] German National Socialism".[21] Mudde agrees and notes that "the term is not only used for scientific purposes but also for political purposes. Several authors define right-wing extremism as a sort of anti-thesis against their own beliefs."[22] While the existence of such a political position is widely accepted among scholars, figures associated with the far-right rarely accept this denomination, preferring terms like "national movement" or "national right".[21] There is also debate about how appropriate the labels neo-fascist or neo-Nazi are. In the words of Mudde, "the labels Neo-Nazi and to a lesser extent neo-Fascism are now used exclusively for parties and groups that explicitly state a desire to restore the Third Reich or quote historical National Socialism as their ideological influence."[23]

One issue is whether parties should be labelled radical or extreme, a distinction that is made by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany when determining whether or not a party should be banned.[nb 1] Within the broader family of the far right, the extreme right is revolutionary, opposing popular sovereignty and majority rule, and sometimes supporting violence, whereas the radical right is reformist, accepting free elections, but opposing fundamental elements of liberal democracy such as minority rights, rule of law, or separation of powers.[24]

After a survey of the academic literature, Mudde concluded in 2002 that the terms "right-wing extremism", "right-wing populism", "national populism", or "neo-populism" were often used as synonyms by scholars (or, nonetheless, terms with "striking similarities"), except notably among a few authors studying the extremist-theoretical tradition.[nb 2]

Relation to right-wing politics

[edit]

Italian philosopher and political scientist Norberto Bobbio argues that attitudes towards equality are primarily what distinguish left-wing politics from right-wing politics on the political spectrum:[25] "the left considers the key inequalities between people to be artificial and negative, which should be overcome by an active state, whereas the right believes that inequalities between people are natural and positive, and should be either defended or left alone by the state."[26]

Aspects of far-right ideology can be identified in the agenda of some contemporary right-wing parties: in particular, the idea that superior persons should dominate society while undesirable elements should be purged, which in extreme cases has resulted in genocides.[27] Charles Grant, director of the Centre for European Reform in London, distinguishes between fascism and right-wing nationalist parties which are often described as far right such as the National Front in France.[28] Mudde notes that the most successful European far-right parties in 2019 were "former mainstream right-wing parties that have turned into populist radical right ones."[29] According to historian Mark Sedgwick, "[t]here is no general agreement as to where the mainstream ends and the extreme starts, and if there ever had been agreement on this, the recent shift in the mainstream would challenge it."[30]

Proponents of the horseshoe theory interpretation of the left–right political spectrum identify the far left and the far right as having more in common with each other as extremists than each of them has with centrists or moderates.[31] This theory has received criticism,[32][33][34] including the argument that it has been centrists who have supported far-right and fascist regimes over socialist ones.[35]

Nature of support

[edit]

Jens Rydgren describes a number of theories as to why individuals support far-right political parties and the academic literature on this topic distinguishes between demand-side theories that have changed the "interests, emotions, attitudes and preferences of voters" and supply-side theories which focus on the programmes of parties, their organization and the opportunity structures within individual political systems.[36] The most common demand-side theories are the social breakdown thesis, the relative deprivation thesis, the modernization losers thesis and the ethnic competition thesis.[37]

The rise of far-right parties has also been viewed as a rejection of post-materialist values on the part of some voters. This theory which is known as the reverse post-material thesis blames both left-wing and progressive parties for embracing a post-material agenda (including feminism and environmentalism) that alienates traditional working class voters.[38][39] Another study argues that individuals who join far-right parties determine whether those parties develop into major political players or whether they remain marginalized.[40]

Early academic studies adopted psychoanalytical explanations for the far right's support. The 1933 publication The Mass Psychology of Fascism by Wilhelm Reich argued the theory that fascists came to power in Germany as a result of sexual repression. For some far-right parties in Western Europe, the issue of immigration has become the dominant issue among them, so much so that some scholars refer to these parties as "anti-immigrant" parties.[41]

Intellectual history

[edit]

Background

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The French Revolution in 1789 created a major shift in political thought by challenging the established ideas supporting hierarchy with new ones about universal equality and freedom.[42] The modern left–right political spectrum also emerged during this period. Democrats and proponents of universal suffrage were located on the left side of the elected French Assembly, while monarchists seated farthest to the right.[21]

The strongest opponents of liberalism and democracy during the 19th century, such as Joseph de Maistre and Friedrich Nietzsche, were highly critical of the French Revolution.[43] Those who advocated a return to the absolute monarchy during the 19th century called themselves "ultra-monarchists" and embraced a "mystic" and "providentialist" vision of the world where royal dynasties were seen as the "repositories of divine will". The opposition to liberal modernity was based on the belief that hierarchy and rootedness are more important than equality and liberty, with the latter two being dehumanizing.[44]

Emergence

[edit]

In the French public debate following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, far right was used to describe the strongest opponents of the far left, those who supported the events occurring in Russia.[7] A number of thinkers on the far right nonetheless claimed an influence from an anti-Marxist and anti-egalitarian interpretation of socialism, based on a military comradeship that rejected Marxist class analysis, or what Oswald Spengler had called a "socialism of the blood", which is sometimes described by scholars as a form of "socialist revisionism".[45] They included Charles Maurras, Benito Mussolini, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck and Ernst Niekisch.[46][47][48] Those thinkers eventually split along nationalist lines from the original communist movement, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels contradicting nationalist theories with the idea that "the working men [had] no country."[49] The main reason for that ideological confusion can be found in the consequences of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, which according to Swiss historian Philippe Burrin had completely redesigned the political landscape in Europe by diffusing the idea of an anti-individualistic concept of "national unity" rising above the right and left division.[48]

As the concept of "the masses" was introduced into the political debate through industrialization and the universal suffrage, a new right-wing founded on national and social ideas began to emerge, what Zeev Sternhell has called the "revolutionary right" and a foreshadowing of fascism. The rift between the left and nationalists was furthermore accentuated by the emergence of anti-militarist and anti-patriotic movements like anarchism or syndicalism, which shared even fewer similarities with the far right.[49] The latter began to develop a "nationalist mysticism" entirely different from that on the left, and antisemitism turned into a credo of the far right, marking a break from the traditional economic "anti-Judaism" defended by parts of the far left, in favor of a racial and pseudo-scientific notion of alterity. Various nationalist leagues began to form across Europe like the Pan-German League or the Ligue des Patriotes, with the common goal of a uniting the masses beyond social divisions.[50][51]

Völkisch and revolutionary right

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Spanish Falangist volunteer forces of the Blue Division entrain at San Sebastián, 1942

The Völkisch movement emerged in the late 19th century, drawing inspiration from German Romanticism and its fascination for a medieval Reich supposedly organized into a harmonious hierarchical order. Erected on the idea of "blood and soil", it was a racialist, populist, agrarian, romantic nationalist and an antisemitic movement from the 1900s onward as a consequence of a growing exclusive and racial connotation.[52] They idealized the myth of an "original nation", that still could be found at their times in the rural regions of Germany, a form of "primitive democracy freely subjected to their natural elites."[47] Thinkers led by Arthur de Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Alexis Carrel and Georges Vacher de Lapouge distorted Darwin's theory of evolution to advocate a "race struggle" and an hygienist vision of the world. The purity of the bio-mystical and primordial nation theorized by the Völkischen then began to be seen as corrupted by foreign elements, Jewish in particular.[52]

Translated in Maurice Barrès' concept of "the earth and the dead", these ideas influenced the pre-fascist "revolutionary right" across Europe. The latter had its origin in the fin de siècle intellectual crisis and it was, in the words of Fritz Stern, the deep "cultural despair" of thinkers feeling uprooted within the rationalism and scientism of the modern world.[53] It was characterized by a rejection of the established social order, with revolutionary tendencies and anti-capitalist stances, a populist and plebiscitary dimension, the advocacy of violence as a means of action and a call for individual and collective palingenesis ("regeneration, rebirth").[54]

Contemporary thought

[edit]

The key thinkers of contemporary far-right politics are claimed by Mark Sedgwick to share four key elements, namely apocalyptism, fear of global elites, belief in Carl Schmitt's friend–enemy distinction and the idea of metapolitics.[55] The apocalyptic strain of thought begins in Oswald Spengler's The Decline of the West and is shared by Julius Evola and Alain de Benoist. It continues in The Death of the West by Pat Buchanan as well as in fears over Islamization of Europe.[55] Ernst Jünger was concerned about rootless cosmopolitan elites while de Benoist and Buchanan oppose the managerial state and Curtis Yarvin is against "the Cathedral".[55] Schmitt's friend–enemy distinction has inspired the French Nouvelle Droite idea of ethnopluralism.[55]

CasaPound rally in Naples

In a 1961 book deemed influential in the European far-right at large, French neo-fascist writer Maurice Bardèche introduced the idea that fascism could survive the 20th century under a new metapolitical guise adapted to the changes of the times. Rather than trying to revive doomed regimes with their single party, secret police or public display of Caesarism, Bardèche argued that its theorists should promote the core philosophical idea of fascism regardless of its framework,[8] i.e. the concept that only a minority, "the physically saner, the morally purer, the most conscious of national interest", can represent best the community and serve the less gifted in what Bardèche calls a new "feudal contract".[56]

Another influence on contemporary far-right thought has been the Traditionalist School, which included Julius Evola, and has influenced Steve Bannon and Aleksandr Dugin, advisors to Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin as well as the Jobbik party in Hungary.[57]

International organizations

[edit]
National origins of Fascist International Congress participants in 1934

During the rise of Nazi Germany, far-right international organizations began to emerge in the 1930s with the International Conference of Fascist Parties in 1932 and the Fascist International Congress in 1934.[58] During the 1934 Fascist International Conference, the Comitati d'Azione per l'Universalità di Roma [it] (CAUR; English: Action Committees for the Universality of Rome), created by Benito Mussolini's Fascist Regime to create a network for a "Fascist International", representatives from far-right groups gathered in Montreux, Switzerland, including Romania's Iron Guard, Norway's Nasjonal Samling, the Greek National Socialist Party, Spain's Falange movement, Ireland's Blueshirts, France's Mouvement Franciste and Portugal's União Nacional, among others.[59][60] However, no international group was fully established before the outbreak of World War II.[58]

Following World War II, other far-right organizations attempted to establish themselves, such as the European organizations of Nouvel Ordre Européen, European Social Movement and Circulo Español de Amigos de Europa or the further-reaching World Union of National Socialists and the League for Pan-Nordic Friendship.[61] Beginning in the 1980s, far-right groups began to solidify themselves through official political avenues.[61]

With the founding of the European Union in 1993, far-right groups began to espouse Euroscepticism, nationalist and anti-migrant beliefs.[58] By 2010, the Eurosceptic group European Alliance for Freedom emerged and saw some prominence during the 2014 European Parliament election.[58][61] The majority of far-right groups in the 2010s began to establish international contacts with right-wing coalitions to develop a solidified platform.[58] In 2017, Steve Bannon would create The Movement, an organization to create an international far-right group based on Aleksandr Dugin's The Fourth Political Theory, for the 2019 European Parliament election.[62][63] The European Alliance for Freedom would also reorganize into Identity and Democracy for the 2019 European Parliament election.[61] The Euronat (1997–2009), Alliance of European National Movements (2009–2019), Alliance for Peace and Freedom are far-right European political alliances in the EU.

The far-right Spanish party Vox initially introduced the Madrid Charter project, a planned group to denounce left-wing groups in Ibero-America, to the government of United States president Donald Trump while visiting the United States in February 2019, with Santiago Abascal and Rafael Bardají using their good relations with the administration to build support within the Republican Party and establishing strong ties with American contacts.[63][64][65] In March 2019, Abascal tweeted an image of himself wearing a morion similar to a conquistador, with ABC writing in an article detailing the document that this event provided a narrative that "symbolizes in part the expansionist mood of Vox and its ideology far from Spain".[66] The charter subsequently grew to include signers that had little to no relation to Latin America and Spanish-speaking areas.[67] Vox has advised Javier Milei in Argentina, the Bolsonaro family in Brazil, José Antonio Kast in Chile and Keiko Fujimori in Peru.[68]

Nationalists from Europe and the United States met at a Holiday Inn in St. Petersburg on March 22, 2015, for first convention of the International Russian Conservative Forum organized by pro-Putin Rodina-party. The event was attended by fringe right-wing extremists like Nordic Resistance Movement from Scandinavia but also by more mainstream MEPs from Golden Dawn and National Democratic Party of Germany. In addition to Rodina, Russian neo-Nazis from Russian Imperial Movement and Rusich Group were also in attendance. The event was attended by several notable American white supremacists including Jared Taylor and Brandon Russell.[69]

History by country

[edit]

Africa

[edit]

Morocco

[edit]

Morocco saw a spread of ultranationalism, antifeminism, and opposition to immigration themes in digital spaces.[70]

Rwanda

[edit]

A number of far-right extremist and paramilitary groups carried out the Rwandan genocide under the racial supremacist ideology of Hutu Power, developed by journalist and Hutu supremacist Hassan Ngeze.[71] On 5 July 1975, exactly two years after the 1973 Rwandan coup d'état, the far right National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND) was founded under president Juvénal Habyarimana. Between 1975 and 1991, the MRND was the only legal political party in the country. It was dominated by Hutus, particularly from Habyarimana's home region of Northern Rwanda. An elite group of MRND party members who were known to have influence on the President and his wife Agathe Habyarimana are known as the akazu, an informal organization of Hutu extremists whose members planned and lead the 1994 Rwandan genocide.[72][73] Prominent Hutu businessman and member of the akazu, Félicien Kabuga was one of the genocides main financiers, providing thousands of machetes which were used to commit the genocide.[74] Kabuga also founded Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, used to broadcast propaganda and direct the génocidaires. Kabuga was arrested in France on 16 May 2020, and charged with crimes against humanity.[75]

Interahamwe
[edit]

The Interahamwe was formed around 1990 as the youth wing of the MRND and enjoyed the backing of the Hutu Power government. The Interahamwe were driven out of Rwanda after Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front victory in the Rwandan Civil War in July 1994 and are considered a terrorist organization by many African and Western governments. The Interahamwe and splinter groups such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda continue to wage an insurgency against Rwanda from neighboring countries, where they are also involved in local conflicts and terrorism. The Interahamwe were the main perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide, during which an estimated 500,000 to 1,000,000 Tutsi, Twa and moderate Hutus were killed from April to July 1994 and the term Interahamwe was widened to mean any civilian bands killing Tutsi.[76][77]

Coalition for the Defence of the Republic
[edit]

Other far-right groups and paramilitaries involved included the anti-democratic segregationist Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR), which called for complete segregation of Hutus from Tutsis. The CDR had a paramilitary wing known as the Impuzamugambi. Together with the Interahamwe militia, the Impuzamugambi played a central role in the Rwandan genocide.[78][71]

South Africa

[edit]
Herstigte Nasionale Party
[edit]

In 1969, the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) under Albert Hertzog emerged as a breakaway group from the governing South African National Party, an Afrikaner ethno-nationalist party that implemented the racist, segregationist program of apartheid, the legal system of political, economic and social separation of the races intended to maintain and extend political and economic control of South Africa by the White minority.[79][80][81] The HNP was formed after the South African National Party re-established diplomatic relations with Malawi and legislated to allow Māori players and spectators to enter the country during the 1970 New Zealand rugby union team tour in South Africa.[82] The HNP advocated for a Calvinist, racially segregated and Afrikaans-speaking nation.[83]

Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
[edit]

In 1973, Eugène Terre'Blanche, a former police officer founded the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement), a South African neo-Nazi paramilitary organization, often described as a white supremacist group.[84][85][86] Since its founding in 1973 by Eugène Terre'Blanche and six other far-right Afrikaners, it has been dedicated to secessionist Afrikaner nationalism and the creation of an independent Boer-Afrikaner republic in part of South Africa. During negotiations to end apartheid in South Africa in the early 1990s, the organization terrorized and killed black South Africans.[87]

Togo

[edit]

Togo has been ruled by members of the Gnassingbé family and the far-right military dictatorship formerly known as the Rally of the Togolese People since 1969. Despite the legalization of political parties in 1991 and the ratification of a democratic constitution in 1992, the regime continues to be regarded as oppressive. In 1993, the European Union cut off aid in reaction to the regime's human-rights offenses. After's Eyadema's death in 2005, his son Faure Gnassingbe took over, then stood down and was re-elected in elections that were widely described as fraudulent and occasioned violence that resulted in as many as 600 deaths and the flight from Togo of 40,000 refugees.[88] In 2012, Faure Gnassingbe dissolved the RTP and created the Union for the Republic.[89][90][91]

Throughout the reign of the Gnassingbé family, Togo has been extremely oppressive. According to a United States Department of State report based on conditions in 2010, human rights abuses are common and include "security force use of excessive force, including torture, which resulted in deaths and injuries; official impunity; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrests and detention; lengthy pretrial detention; executive influence over the judiciary; infringement of citizens' privacy rights; restrictions on freedoms of press, assembly, and movement; official corruption; discrimination and violence against women; child abuse, including female genital mutilation (FGM), and sexual exploitation of children; regional and ethnic discrimination; trafficking in persons, especially women and children; societal discrimination against persons with disabilities; official and societal discrimination against homosexual persons; societal discrimination against persons with HIV; and forced labor, including by children."[92]

Americas

[edit]

Brazil

[edit]
Children make the Nazi salute in Presidente Bernardes, São Paulo, circa 1935.

During the 1920s and 1930s, a local brand of religious fascism appeared known as Brazilian Integralism, coalescing around the party known as Brazilian Integralist Action. It adopted many characteristics of European fascist movements, including a green-shirted paramilitary organization with uniformed ranks, highly regimented street demonstrations and rhetoric against Marxism and liberalism.[93]

Prior to World War II, the Nazi Party had been making and distributing propaganda among ethnic Germans in Brazil. The Nazi regime built close ties with Brazil through the estimated 100 thousand native Germans and 1 million German descendants living in Brazil at the time.[94] In 1928, the Brazilian section of the Nazi Party was founded in Timbó, Santa Catarina. This section reached 2,822 members and was the largest section of the Nazi Party outside Germany.[95][96] About 100 thousand born Germans and about one million descendants lived in Brazil at that time.[97]

After Germany's defeat in World War II, many Nazi war criminals fled to Brazil and hid among the German-Brazilian communities. The most notable example of this was Josef Mengele, a Nazi SS officer and physician known as the "Angel of Death" for his deadly experiments on prisoners at the Auschwitz II (Birkenau) concentration camp, who fled first to Argentina, then Paraguay, before finally settling in Brazil in 1960. Mengele eventually drowned in 1979 in Bertioga, on the coast of São Paulo state, without ever having been recognized in his 19 years in Brazil.[98]

The far right has continued to operate throughout Brazil[99] and a number of far-right parties existed in the modern era including Patriota, the Brazilian Labour Renewal Party, the Party of the Reconstruction of the National Order, the National Renewal Alliance and the Social Liberal Party as well as death squads such as the Command for Hunting Communists. Former President of Brazil Jair Bolsonaro was a member of the Alliance for Brazil, a far-right nationalist political group that aimed to become a political party, until 2022, when the party was disbanded. Since 2022, he is a member of the Liberal Party.[100][101][102] Bolsonaro has been widely described by numerous media organizations as far right.[103]

Guatemala

[edit]

In Guatemala, the far-right[104][105] government of Carlos Castillo Armas utilized death squads after coming to power in the 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état.[104][105] Along with other far-right extremists, Castillo Armas started the National Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional, or MLN). The founders of the party described it as the "party of organized violence".[106] The new government promptly reversed the democratic reforms initiated during the Guatemalan Revolution and the agrarian reform program (Decree 900) that was the main project of president Jacobo Arbenz Guzman and which directly impacted the interests of both the United Fruit Company and the Guatemalan landowners.[citation needed]

Mano Blanca, otherwise known as the Movement of Organized Nationalist Action, was set up in 1966 as a front for the MLN to carry out its more violent activities,[107][108] along with many other similar groups, including the New Anticommunist Organization and the Anticommunist Council of Guatemala.[106][109] Mano Blanca was active during the governments of colonel Carlos Arana Osorio and general Kjell Laugerud García and was dissolved by general Fernando Romeo Lucas Garcia in 1978.[110]

Armed with the support and coordination of the Guatemalan Armed Forces, Mano Blanca began a campaign described by the United States Department of State as one of "kidnappings, torture, and summary execution."[108] One of the main targets of Mano Blanca was the Revolutionary Party, an anti-communist group that was the only major reform oriented party allowed to operate under the military-dominated regime. Other targets included the banned leftist parties.[108] Human rights activist Blase Bonpane described the activities of Mano Blanca as being an integral part of the policy of the Guatemalan government and by extension the policy of the United States government and the Central Intelligence Agency.[111] Overall, Mano Blanca was responsible for thousands of murders and kidnappings, leading travel writer Paul Theroux to refer to them as "Guatemala's version of a volunteer Gestapo unit".[112]

Chile

[edit]
Dictator of Chile Augusto Pinochet meeting with United States President George H. W. Bush in 1990

The National Socialist Movement of Chile (MNSCH) was created in the 1930s with the funding from the German population in Chile.[113] In 1938, the MNSCH was dissolved after it attempted a coup and recreated itself as the Popular Freedom Alliance party, later merging with the Agrarian Party to create the Agrarian Labor Party (PAL).[114] PAL would go through various mergers to become the Partido Nacional Popular (Chile) [es], then National Action and finally the National Party.

Following the fall of Nazi Germany, many Nazis fled to Chile.[115][page needed] The National Party supported the 1973 Chilean coup d'état that established the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet with many members assuming positions in Pinochet's government. Pinochet headed a far-right dictatorship in Chile from 1973 to 1990.[116][117] According to author Peter Levenda, Pinochet was "openly pro-Nazi" and used former Gestapo members to train his own Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA) personnel.[115][page needed] Pinochet's DINA sent political prisoners to the Chilean-German town of Colonia Dignidad, with the town's actions being defended by the Pinochet government.[115][page needed][118][119] The Central Intelligence Agency and Simon Wiesenthal also provided evidence of Josef Mengele – the infamous Nazi concentration camp doctor known as the "Angel of Death" for his lethal experiments on human subjects – being present in Colonia Dignidad.[115][page needed][119] Former DINA member Michael Townley also stated that biological warfare weapons experiments occurred at the colony.[120]

Following the end of Pinochet's government, the National Party would split to become the more centrist National Renewal (RN), while individuals who supported Pinochet organized Independent Democratic Union (UDI). UDI is a far-right political party that was formed by former Pinochet officials.[121][122][123][124] In 2019, the far-right Republican Party was founded by José Antonio Kast, a UDI politician who believed his former party criticized Pinochet too often.[125][126][127][128] According to Cox and Blanco, the Republican Party appeared in Chilean politics in a similar manner to Spain's Vox party, with both parties splitting off from an existing right wing party to collect disillusioned voters.[129]

El Salvador

[edit]
A billboard serving as a reminder of one of many massacres in El Salvador that occurred during the civil war

During the Salvadoran Civil War, far-right death squads known in Spanish by the name of Escuadrón de la Muerte, literally "Squadron of Death, achieved notoriety when a sniper assassinated Archbishop Óscar Romero while he was saying mass in March 1980. In December 1980, three American nuns and a lay worker were gangraped and murdered by a military unit later found to have been acting on specific orders. Death squads were instrumental in killing thousands of peasants and activists. Funding for the squads came primarily from right-wing Salvadoran businessmen and landowners.[130]

El Salvadorian death squads indirectly received arms, funding, training and advice during the Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations.[131] Some death squads such as Sombra Negra are still operating in El Salvador.[132]

Honduras

[edit]

Honduras also had far-right death squads active through the 1980s, the most notorious of which was Battalion 3–16. Hundreds of people, teachers, politicians and union bosses were assassinated by government-backed forces. Battalion 316 received substantial support and training from the United States through the Central Intelligence Agency.[133] At least nineteen members were School of the Americas graduates.[134][135] As of mid-2006, seven members, including Billy Joya, later played important roles in the administration of President Manuel Zelaya.[136]

Following the 2009 Honduran constitutional crisis, former Battalion 3–16 member Nelson Willy Mejía Mejía became Director-General of Immigration[137][138] and Billy Joya was de facto President Roberto Micheletti's security advisor.[139] Napoleón Nassar Herrera, another former Battalion 3–16 member,[136][140] was high Commissioner of Police for the north-west region under Zelaya and under Micheletti, even becoming a Secretary of Security spokesperson "for dialogue" under Micheletti.[141][142] Zelaya claimed that Joya had reactivated the death squad, with dozens of government opponents having been murdered since the ascent of the Michiletti and Lobo governments.[139]

Mexico

[edit]
National Synarchist Union
[edit]

The largest far-right party in Mexico is the National Synarchist Union. It was historically a movement of the Roman Catholic extreme right, in some ways akin to clerical fascism and Falangism, strongly opposed to the left-wing and secularist policies of the Institutional Revolutionary Party and its predecessors that governed Mexico from 1929 to 2000 and 2012 to 2018.[143][144]

Peru

[edit]
Fujimorism
[edit]
Alberto Fujimori, the creator of Fujimorism

During the internal conflict in Peru and a struggling presidency of Alan García, the Peruvian Armed Forces created Plan Verde, initially a coup plan that involved establishing a government that would carry out the genocide of impoverished and indigenous Peruvians, the control or censorship of media and the establishment of a neoliberal economy controlled by a military junta in Peru.[145][146][147] Military planners also decided against the coup as they expected Mario Vargas Llosa, a neoliberal candidate, to be elected in the 1990 Peruvian general election.[148][149] Vargas Llosa later reported that Anthony C. E. Quainton, the United States Ambassador to Peru, personally told him that allegedly leaked documents of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) purportedly being supportive of his opponent Alberto Fujimori were authentic, reportedly due to Fujimori's relationship with Vladimiro Montesinos, a former National Intelligence Service (SIN) officer who was tasked with spying on the Peruvian military for the CIA.[150][151] An agreement was ultimately adopted between the armed forces and Fujimori after he was inaugurated president,[148] with many of the objectives outlined in Plan Verde implemented by Fujimori and his followers.[151][148] Fujimori then established Fujimorism, an ideology with authoritarian[152] and conservative traits[153][154] that is still prevalent throughout Peru's institutions,[155] leading Peru through the 1992 Peruvian coup d'état until he fled to Japan in 2000 during the Vladivideos scandal. Following Alberto Fujimori's arrest and trial, his daughter Keiko Fujimori assumed leadership of the Fujimorist movement and established Popular Force, a far-right political party.[156][157][158] The 2016 Peruvian general election resulted with the party holding the most power in the Congress of Peru from 2016 to 2019, marking the beginning of a political crisis. Following the 2021 Peruvian general election, far-right politician Rafael López Aliaga and his party Popular Renewal rose in popularity[159] and a far-right Congress – with the body's largest far-right bloc being Popular Force, Popular Renewal and Advance Country[160] – was elected into office.[161] Following the election, La Resistencia Dios, Patria y Familia, a neofascist militant organization would promote Fujimorism and oppose President Pedro Castillo.[162][163][164]

United States

[edit]

In United States politics, the terms "extreme right", "far-right", and "ultra-right" are labels used to describe "militant forms of insurgent revolutionary right ideology and separatist ethnocentric nationalism", according to The Public Eye.[165] The terms are used for groups and movements such as Christian Identity,[165] the Creativity Movement,[165] the Ku Klux Klan,[165] the National Socialist Movement,[165][166][167] the National Alliance,[165] the Joy of Satan Ministries,[166][167] and the Order of Nine Angles.[168] These far-right groups share conspiracist views of power which are overwhelmingly anti-Semitic and reject pluralist democracy in favor of an organic oligarchy that would unite the perceived homogeneously racial Völkish nation.[165][168] The far-right in the United States is composed of various neo-fascist, neo-Nazi, white nationalist, and white supremacist organizations and networks who have been known to refer to an "acceleration" of racial conflict through violent means such as assassinations, murders, terrorist attacks, and societal collapse, in order to achieve the building of a white ethnostate.[169]

Radical right
[edit]
Though US President Trump said in September 2025 that "the radicals on the left are the problem" with political violence,[170] cumulatively over decades, most extremist killings in the US have been caused by right-wing perpetrators.[171] From 2022 through 2024, all 61 political killings were committed by right-wing extremists.[172]
Over decades, right wing ideologically motivated homicides have substantially outnumbered those perpetrated by left wing perpetrators in the US.[173] Also, far-right motivated homicides have occurred much more frequently than jihadi violence inspired by Islamic extremism (not shown in chart).[173]
Ku Klux Klan parade in Washington, D.C., September 1926

Starting in the 1870s and continuing through the late 19th century, numerous white supremacist paramilitary groups operated in the South, with the goal of organizing against and intimidating supporters of the Republican Party. Examples of such groups included the Red Shirts and the White League. The Second Ku Klux Klan, which was formed in 1915, combined Protestant fundamentalism and moralism with right-wing extremism. Its major support came from the urban South, the Midwest, and the Pacific Coast.[174] While the Klan initially drew upper middle class support, its bigotry and violence alienated these members and it came to be dominated by less educated and poorer members.[175]

Between the 1920s and the 1930s, the Ku Klux Klan developed an explicitly nativist, pro-Anglo-Saxon Protestant, anti-Catholic, anti-Irish, anti-Italian, and anti-Jewish stance in relation to the growing political, economic, and social uncertainty related to the arrival of European immigrants on the American soil, predominantly composed of Irish people, Italians, and Eastern European Jews.[176] The Ku Klux Klan claimed that there was a secret Catholic army within the United States loyal to the Pope, that one million Knights of Columbus were arming themselves, and that Irish-American policemen would shoot Protestants as heretics. Their sensationalistic claims eventually developed into full-blown political conspiracy theories, to the point that the Klan claimed that Roman Catholics were planning to take Washington and put the Vatican in power and that all presidential assassinations had been carried out by Roman Catholics.[177][178] The prominent Klan leader D. C. Stephenson believed in the antisemitic canard of Jewish control of finance, claiming that international Jewish bankers were behind the World War I and planned to destroy economic opportunities for Christians. Other Klansmen believed in the Jewish Bolshevism conspiracy theory and claimed that the Russian Revolution and communism were orchestrated by Jews. They frequently reprinted parts of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and New York City was condemned as an evil city controlled by Jews and Roman Catholics. The objects of the Klan fear tended to vary by locale and included African Americans as well as American Roman Catholics, Jews, labour unions, liquor, Orientals, and Wobblies. They were also anti-elitist and attacked "the intellectuals", seeing themselves as egalitarian defenders of the common man.[179] During the Great Depression, there were a large number of small nativist groups, whose ideologies and bases of support were similar to those of earlier nativist groups. However, proto-fascist movements such as Huey Long's Share Our Wealth and Charles Coughlin's National Union for Social Justice emerged which differed from other right-wing groups by attacking big business, calling for economic reforms, and rejecting nativism. Coughlin's group later developed a racist ideology.[180]

During the Cold War and the Red Scares, the far right "saw spies and communists influencing government and entertainment. Thus, despite bipartisan anticommunism in the United States, it was the right that mainly fought the great ideological battle against the communists."[181] The John Birch Society, founded in 1958, is a prominent example of a far-right organization mainly concerned with anti-communism and the perceived threat of communism. Neo-Nazi militant Robert Jay Matthews of the White supremacist group The Order came to support the John Birch Society, especially when conservative icon Barry Goldwater from Arizona ran for the presidency on the Republican Party ticket. Far-right conservatives consider John Birch to be the first casualty of the Cold War.[182] In the 1990s, many conservatives turned against then-President George H. W. Bush, who pleasured neither the Republican Party's more moderate and far-right wings. As a result, Bush was primared by Pat Buchanan. In the 2000s, critics of President George W. Bush's conservative unilateralism argued it can be traced to both Vice President Dick Cheney who embraced the policy since the early 1990s and to far-right Congressmen who won their seats during the conservative revolution of 1994.[13]

Although small voluntary militias had existed in the United States throughout the latter half of the 20th century, the groups became more popular during the early 1990s, after a series of standoffs between armed citizens and federal government agents, such as the 1992 Ruby Ridge siege and 1993 Waco Siege. These groups expressed concern for what they perceived as government tyranny within the United States and generally held constitutionalist, libertarian, and right-libertarian political views, with a strong focus on the Second Amendment gun rights and tax protest. They also embraced many of the same conspiracy theories as predecessor groups on the radical right, particularly the New World Order conspiracy theory. Examples of such groups are the patriot and militia movements Oath Keepers and the Three Percenters. A minority of militia groups, such as the Aryan Nations and the Posse Comitatus, were White nationalists and saw militia and patriot movements as a form of White resistance against what they perceived to be a liberal and multiculturalist government. Militia and patriot organizations were involved in the 2014 Bundy standoff[183][184] and the 2016 occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge.[185][186]

National Socialist Movement rally on the west lawn of the US Capitol, Washington, DC, 2008

After the September 11 attacks in 2001, the counter-jihad movement, supported by groups such as Stop Islamization of America and individuals such as Frank Gaffney and Pamela Geller, began to gain traction among the American right. The counter-jihad members were widely dubbed "Islamophobic" for their vocal criticism of the Islamic religion and its founder Muhammad,[187] and their belief that there was a significant threat posed by Muslims living in America.[187] Its proponents believed that the United States was under threat from "Islamic supremacism", accusing the Council on American-Islamic Relations and even prominent conservatives such as Suhail A. Khan and Grover Norquist of supporting radical Islamist groups and organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The alt-right emerged during the 2016 United States presidential election cycle in support of the Donald Trump's presidential campaign (see: Trumpism). It draws influence from paleoconservatism, paleolibertarianism, white nationalism, the manosphere, and the Identitarian and neoreactionary movements. The alt-right differs from previous radical right movements due to its heavy internet presence on websites such as 4chan.[188]

Chetan Bhatt, in White Extinction: Metaphysical Elements of Contemporary Western Fascism, says that "The 'fear of white extinction', and related ideas of population eugenics, have travelled far and represent a wider political anxiety about 'white displacement' in the US, UK, and Europe that has fuelled the right-wing phenomena referred to by that sanitizing word 'populism', a term that neatly evades attention to the racism and white majoritarianism that energizes it."[189]

Asia

[edit]

India

[edit]

Bharatiya Janata Party in India has been claimed to combine economic nationalism with religious nationalism.[190]

Indonesia

[edit]

Some islamists in Indonesia are far-right.[191]

Iran

[edit]

The two main political camps in today's Iran are Principlists and Reformists.[192] Principlists, especially "Neoconservatives", have far-right and ultra-conservative views.[193]

Iraq

Hawpa is a Kurdish Neo-Nazi organization in Iraq.[194]

Israel

[edit]
Flag of Kach, used by Kahanists

Kach was a radical Orthodox Jewish, religious Zionist political party in Israel, existing from 1971 to 1994.[195] Founded by Rabbi Meir Kahane in 1971, based on his Jewish-Orthodox-nationalist ideology subsequently known as Kahanism, which held the view that most Arabs living in Israel are enemies of Jews and Israel itself, and believed that a Jewish theocratic state, where non-Jews have no voting rights, should be created.[196] The party secured a single seat in the Knesset in the 1984 election,[197] but was subsequently barred from standing in elections, and both it and Kahanism organizations were banned outright in 1994 by the Israeli cabinet under 1948 anti-terrorism laws,[198] following statements by it in support of the 1994 Cave of the Patriarchs massacre by a Kach supporter.[199]

In 2015, the Kach party and Kahanist movement were believed to have an overlapping membership of fewer than 100 people,[200][201] with links to the modern party Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) party,[202][203] which, running on a Kahanist and anti-Arab platform,[204][205] won six seats in the 2022 Israeli legislative election, having run jointly with fellow far-right parties Religious Zionist Party and Noam.[206][207] The thirty-seventh government of Israel which formed after the 2022 Israeli legislative election as subsequently been critiqued as Israel's most hardline and far-right government to date.[208][209] The coalition government consists of six parties: Likud, United Torah Judaism, Shas, Otzma Yehudit, Religious Zionist Party and Noam, so having half of its coalition partners hailing from the far-right. The government has been noted for its significant shift towards far-right policies, and the appointment of controversial far-right politicians, including Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, to positions of considerable influence.[210]

Ties with European far-right
[edit]

There is also a complex relationship between Israel and the European far-right[211] that has been developing for more than 15 years.[212] The first major public sign of their alliance was in 2010 at an international far-right conference in Tel Aviv organized by a Likud party member.[213] A primary motivation is a shared anti-Islam ideology but there is also a common dislike of the European Union, of Arab and Muslim immigrants as well as support for undermining democracy and installing autocratic, or worse, rulers and regimes. "Yair Netanyahu, the prime minister's son, last week called for the death of the European Union and the return of a "Christian" Europe."[214] Other details suggest a deeper collaboration between the Likud party and the German AfD. "In 2019, the Bundestag passed a resolution condemning B.D.S. as antisemitic..The history of the resolution is telling. A version was originally introduced by the AfD"[215] Netanyahu's government has actively cultivated relations with various European far-right parties and leaders, including Vlaams Belang, Attack, the Freedom Party of Austria, the Alliance for the Union of Romanians and the Sweden Democrats.[216]

These parties offer strong support for Israel's hardline policies towards Palestinians, its opposition to Palestinian statehood, and its pro-settlement stance.[citation needed] Netanyahu has also cultivated a particularly strong bond with Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party in Hungary, a key player in the European far-right landscape and a Russian strategic ally.[citation needed] The Likud party recently joined the Patriots for Europe alliance in the European Parliament as an observer member.[citation needed]

Japan

[edit]
Gaisen Uyoku (街宣右翼), a Japanese far-right group, holding an anti-China speech at the square of Kinshichō Station in Sumida, Tokyo (2010)

In 1996, the National Police Agency estimated that there were over 1,000 extremist right-wing groups in Japan, with about 100,000 members in total. These groups are known in Japanese as Uyoku dantai. While there are political differences among the groups, they generally carry a philosophy of anti-leftism, hostility towards China, North Korea and South Korea, and justification of Japan's role and war crimes in World War II. Uyoku dantai groups are well known for their highly visible propaganda vehicles fitted with loudspeakers and prominently marked with the name of the group and propaganda slogans. The vehicles play patriotic or wartime-era Japanese songs. Activists affiliated with such groups have used Molotov cocktails and time bombs to intimidate moderate Japanese politicians and public figures, including former Deputy Foreign Minister Hitoshi Tanaka and Fuji Xerox Chairman Yotaro Kobayashi. An ex-member of a right-wing group set fire to Liberal Democratic Party politician Koichi Kato's house. Koichi Kato and Yotaro Kobayashi had spoken out against Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine.[217] Openly revisionist, Nippon Kaigi is considered "the biggest right-wing organization in Japan."[218][219]

Malaysia

[edit]

Far-right non-governmental organizations have been appropriating human rights language in Malaysia.[220]

South Korea

[edit]

Since the founding of the South Korea in 1948, authoritarian conservative dictatorships such as Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee, and Chun Doo-hwan have continued until 1987.

Yoon Suk Yeol, who was sworn in as South Korea's president from 2022 to 2025, is criticized for far-right political views.[221][222]

Taiwan (Republic of China)

[edit]
Before 1992
[edit]

In 1947, the February 28 incident was created by the Kuomintang–led nationalist government. In the aftermath of this incident, martial law was enforced in Taiwan from 1949, and the Great Retreat took place the same year. Chiang Kai-shek ruled authoritarian conservative, anti-communist and Chinese ultranationalist. Until martial law was lifted in 1987, Taiwanese nationalists, leftists and liberals were politically suppressed.

After 1992
[edit]
Party flag of Patriot Alliance Association (PAA)

In modern Taiwanese politics after 1992 Consensus, the 'mainstream' political left advocated Taiwanese nationalism (including independence) and the political right defended Chinese nationalism (including unification). As a result, Taiwan's political landscape is somewhat unique from Western countries; the "far-right" New Party,[223] Patriot Alliance Association,[224] Chinese Unification Promotion Party,[224][225] and others advocate for one country, two systems, the unification policy proposed by the Chinese Communist Party.[226][227] These far-right [Chinese] nationalists are sometimes referred to as "radical pro-unification factions" (Chinese: 急統派).[224] By contrast, most politicians in the centre-right conservative Kuomintang after the Taiwanese democratization reject one country, two systems.[228][229]

Some radical Taiwanese nationalists are also considered far-right: the Taiwan Statebuilding Party is officially a "left-wing" in support of Taiwanese independence, but is also referred to as "far-right" due to anti-Chinese nativism;[230][231][232] the Taiwanese Localism Front, a radical anti-communist organization, is also referred to as the far-right;[233][234] ultra-nationalistic actions of the pro-independence Pan-Green Coalition (led by the Democratic Progressive Party) have been dubbed the "Green Terror".[235]

Europe

[edit]

Armenia

[edit]

The Armenian-Aryan Racialist Political Movement and the Adequate Party are the main far-right political movements in Armenia.[236][237]

Croatia

[edit]

Individuals and groups in Croatia that employ far-right politics are most often associated with the historical Ustaše movement, hence they have connections to neo-Nazism and neo-fascism. That World War II political movement was an extremist organization at the time supported by the German Nazis and the Italian Fascists. The association with the Ustaše has been called neo-Ustashism by Slavko Goldstein.[238] Most active far-right political parties in Croatia openly state their continuity with the Ustaše.[239] These include the Croatian Party of Rights and Authentic Croatian Party of Rights.[239] Croatia's far-right often advocates the false theory that the Jasenovac concentration camp was a "labour camp" where mass murder did not take place.[240]

The coalition led by Miroslav Škoro's far-right Homeland Movement came third at the 2020 parliamentary election, winning 10.9% of the vote and 16 seats.[241][242]

Estonia

[edit]
General Andres Larka speaking in 1933

Estonia's most significant far-right movement was the Vaps movement. Its ideological predecessor Valve Liit was founded by Admiral Johan Pitka and later banned for maligning the government. The organization became politicized quickly Vaps soon turned into a mass fascist movement.[243] In 1933, Estonians voted on Vaps' proposed changes to the constitution and the party later won a large proportion of the vote. However, the State Elder Konstantin Päts declared state of emergency and imprisoned the leadership of the Vaps. In 1935, all political parties were banned. In 1935, a Vaps coup attempt was discovered, which led to the banning of the Finnish Patriotic People's Movement's youth wing that had been secretly aiding and arming them.[244][245]

Far-right torch march in Tallinn

During World War II, the Estonian Self-Administration was a collaborationist pro-Nazi government set up in Estonia, headed by Vaps member Hjalmar Mäe.[246] In the 21st century, the coalition-governing Conservative People's Party of Estonia been described as far right.[247] The neo-Nazi terrorist organization Feuerkrieg Division was found and operates in the country, with some members of the Conservative People's Party of Estonia having been linked to the Feuerkrieg Division.[248][249][250][251] The party's youth organization Blue Awakening organizes an annual torchlight march through Tallinn on Estonia's Independence Day. The event has been harshly criticized by the Simon Wiesenthal Center that described it as "Nuremberg-esque" and likened the ideology of the participants to that of the Estonian Nazi collaborators.[252][253]

Finland

[edit]
The Peasant March, a show of force in Helsinki by the Lapua Movement on 7 July 1930

In Finland, support for the far right was most widespread between 1920 and 1940 when the Academic Karelia Society, Lapua Movement, Patriotic People's Movement and Vientirauha operated in the country and had hundreds of thousands of members.[254] Far-right groups exercised considerable political power during this period, pressuring the government to outlaw communist parties and newspapers and expel Freemasons from the armed forces.[255][256] During the Cold War, all parties deemed fascist were banned according to the Paris Peace Treaties and all former fascist activists had to find new political homes.[257] Despite Finlandization, many continued in public life. Three former members of the Waffen SS served as ministers of defense; Sulo Suorttanen and Pekka Malinen as well as Mikko Laaksonen.[258][259]

Captain Arvi Kalsta addressing an SKJ meeting

The skinhead culture gained momentum during the late 1980s and peaked during the late 1990s. Numerous hate crimes were committed against refugees, including a number of racially motivated murders.[260][261]

Today, the most prominent neo-Nazi group is the Nordic Resistance Movement, which is tied to multiple murders, attempted murders and assaults of political enemies was found in 2006 and proscribed in 2019. Prominent far-right parties include the Blue-and-Black Movement and Power Belongs to the People.[262] The second biggest Finnish party, the Finns Party, has been described as far right.[263][264][265][266] The former leader of the Finns party and current speaker of the Parliament Jussi Halla-aho, has been convicted of hate speech due to his comments stating that, "Prophet Muhammad was a pedophile and Islam justifies pedophilia and Pedophilia was Allah's will." Finns Party members have frequently supported far-right and neo-Nazi movements such as the Finnish Defense League, Soldiers of Odin, Nordic Resistance Movement, Rajat Kiinni (Close the Borders), and Suomi Ensin (Finland First). "[267] In the 1990s and 2000s, before the breakthrough of the Finns Party, a few neo-Nazi candidates enjoyed success, like Janne Kujala of Finland - Fatherland (founded as Aryan Germanic Brotherhood) and Jouni Lanamäki who was previously associated with the Nordic Reich Party.[268][269] Pekka Siitoin of the National Democracy Party was the fifth most popular candidate in Naantali city council elections.[270]

The NRM and Finns party and other far-right groups organize an annual torch march demonstration in Helsinki in memory of the Finnish SS-battalion on the Finnish independence day which ends at the Hietaniemi cemetery where members visit the tomb of Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim and the monument to the Finnish SS Battalion.[271][272] The event is protested by antifascists, leading to counterdemonstrators being violently assaulted by NRM members who act as security. The demonstration attracts close to 3,000 participants according to the estimates of the police and hundreds of officers patrol Helsinki to prevent violent clashes.[273][274][275][276]

France

[edit]
A Génération Identitaire demonstration in France, 2017

The largest far-right party in Europe is the French anti-immigration party National Rally, formally known as the National Front.[277][278] The party was founded in 1972, uniting a variety of French far-right groups under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen.[279] Since 1984, it has been the major force of French nationalism.[280] Jean-Marie Le Pen's daughter Marine Le Pen was elected to succeed him as party leader in 2012. Under Jean-Marie Le Pen's leadership, the party sparked outrage for hate speech, including Holocaust denial and Islamophobia.[281][282]

Germany

[edit]
Right-wing populists protesting against Islam in Germany, 2008

In 1945, the Allied powers took control of Germany and banned the swastika, Nazi Party and the publication of Mein Kampf. Explicitly Nazi and neo-Nazi organizations are banned in Germany.[283] In 1960, the West German parliament voted unanimously to "make it illegal to incite hatred, to provoke violence, or to insult, ridicule or defame 'parts of the population' in a manner apt to breach the peace." German law outlaws anything that "approves of, glorifies or justifies the violent and despotic rule of the National Socialists."[283] Section 86a of the Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Code) outlaws any "use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations" outside the contexts of "art or science, research or teaching". The law primarily outlaws the use of Nazi symbols, flags, insignia, uniforms, slogans and forms of greeting.[284] In the 21st century, the German far right consists of various small parties and two larger groups, namely Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Pegida.[283][285][286][287]

In March 2021, the Germany domestic intelligence agency Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution placed the AfD under surveillance, the first time in the post-war period that a main opposition party had been subjected to such scrutiny.[288]

In contemporary Germany, Far-right parties such as National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), German People's Union (DVU) and Alternative for Germany (AfD) are stronger in eastern Germany.

Greece

[edit]
Metaxism
[edit]
Ioannis Metaxas

The far right in Greece first came to power under the ideology of Metaxism, a proto-fascist ideology developed by dictator Ioannis Metaxas.[289] Metaxism called for the regeneration of the Greek nation and the establishment of an ethnically homogeneous state.[290] Metaxism disparaged liberalism, and held individual interests to be subordinate to those of the nation, seeking to mobilize the Greek people as a disciplined mass in service to the creation of a "new Greece".[290]

The Metaxas government and its official doctrines are often compared to conventional totalitarian-conservative dictatorships such as Francisco Franco's Spain or António de Oliveira Salazar's Portugal.[289][291] The Metaxist government derived its authority from the conservative establishment and its doctrines strongly supported traditional institutions such as the Greek Orthodox Church and the Greek Royal Family; essentially reactionary, it lacked the radical theoretical dimensions of ideologies such as Italian Fascism and German Nazism.[289][291]

Axis occupation of Greece and aftermath
[edit]
German soldiers in 1941 raising the German War Flag over the Acropolis which would be taken down by Manolis Glezos and Apostolos Santas in one of the first acts of resistance

The Metaxis regime came to an end after the Axis powers invaded Greece. The Axis occupation of Greece began in April 1941.[292] The occupation ruined the Greek economy and brought about terrible hardships for the Greek civilian population.[293] The Jewish population of Greece was nearly eradicated. Of its pre-war population of 75–77,000, only around 11–12,000 survived, either by joining the resistance or being hidden.[294] Following the short-lived interim government of Georgios Papandreou, the military seized power in Greece during the 1967 Greek coup d'état, replacing the interim government with the right-wing United States-backed Greek junta. The Junta was a series of military juntas that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974. The dictatorship was characterized by right-wing cultural policies, restrictions on civil liberties and the imprisonment, torture and exile of political opponents. The junta's rule ended on 24 July 1974 under the pressure of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, leading to the Metapolitefsi ("regime change") to democracy and the establishment of the Third Hellenic Republic.[295][296]

Until 2019, the dominant far-right party in Greece in the 21st century was the neo-Nazi[297][298][299][300][301][302][303] and Mataxist inspired[304][305][306][307][308] Golden Dawn.[309][310][311][312][313] At the May 2012 Greek legislative election, Golden Dawn won 21 seats in the Hellenic Parliament, receiving 6.97% of the vote.[314][315] It became the third largest party in the Greek Parliament with 17 seats after the January 2015 election, winning 6.28% of the vote.[316]

Founded by Nikolaos Michaloliakos, Golden Dawn had its origins in the movement that worked towards a return to right-wing military dictatorship in Greece. Following an investigation into the 2013 murder of Pavlos Fyssas, an anti-fascist rapper, by a supporter of the party,[317] Michaloliakos and several other Golden Dawn parliamentarians and members were arrested and held in pre-trial detention on suspicion of forming a criminal organization.[318] The trial began on 20 April 2015[319] and eventually led to the conviction of 7 of its leaders for heading a criminal organization and 61 other defendants for participating in a criminal organization.[320] Guilty verdicts on charges of murder, attempted murder, and violent attacks on immigrants and left-wing political opponents were also delivered and prison sentences of a combined total of over 500 years were handed out.

Golden Dawn later lost all of its remaining seats in the Greek Parliament in the 2019 Greek legislative election, and[321] a 2020 survey showed the party's popularity plummeting to just 1.5%, down from 2.9% in previous year's elections.[322] This means that the largest party in Greece that is considered right wing to far right is Greek Solution, which has been described as ideologically ultranationalist[323][324] and right-wing populist.[325] The party garnered 3.7% of the vote in the 2019 Greek legislative election, winning 10 out of the 300 seats in the Hellenic Parliament and 4.18% of the vote in the 2019 European Parliament election in Greece, winning one seat in the European Parliament.[326]

Italy

[edit]

The far right has maintained a continuous political presence in Italy since the fall of Mussolini. The neo-fascist party Italian Social Movement (1946–1995), influenced by the previous Italian Social Republic (1943–1945), became one of the chief reference points for the European far-right from the end of World War II until the late 1980s.[327]

Silvio Berlusconi and his Forza Italia party dominated politics from 1994. According to some scholars, it gave neo-fascism a new respectability.[328] Caio Giulio Cesare Mussolini, great-grandson of Benito Mussolini, stood for the 2019 European Parliament election as a member of the far right Brothers of Italy party.[328] In 2011, it was estimated that the neo-fascist CasaPound party had 5,000 members.[329] The name is derived from the fascist poet Ezra Pound. It has also been influenced by the Manifesto of Verona, the Labour Charter of 1927 and social legislation of fascism.[330] There has been collaboration between CasaPound and the identitarian movement.[331]

The European migrant crisis has become an increasingly divisive issue in Italy.[332] Interior Minister Matteo Salvini has been courting far-right voters. His Northern League party has become an anti-immigrant, nationalist movement. Both parties are using Mussolini nostalgia to further their aims.[328]

Netherlands

[edit]

Despite being neutral, the Netherlands was invaded by Nazi Germany on 10 May 1940 as part of Fall Gelb.[333] About 70% of the country's Jewish population were killed during the occupation, a much higher percentage than comparable countries such as Belgium and France.[334] Most of the south of the country was liberated in the second half of 1944. The rest, especially the west and north of the country still under occupation, suffered from a famine at the end of 1944 known as the Hunger Winter. On 5 May 1945, the whole country was finally liberated by the total surrender of all German forces. Since the end of World War II, the Netherlands has had a number of small far-right groups and parties, the largest and most successful being the Party for Freedom led by Geert Wilders.[335] Other far-right Dutch groups include the neo-Nazi Dutch People's Union (1973–present),[336] the Centre Party (1982–1986), the Centre Party '86 (1986–1998), the Dutch Block (1992–2000), New National Party (1998–2005) and the ultranationalist National Alliance (2003–2007).[337][338]

Poland

[edit]
National Radical Camp march in Kraków, July 2007

Following the collapse of Communist Poland, a number of far-right groups came to prominence including The National Revival of Poland, the European National Front, the Association for Tradition and Culture "Niklot".[339] The All-Polish Youth and National Radical Camp were recreated in 1989 and 1993, respectively becoming Poland's most prominent far-right organizations. In 1995, the Anti-Defamation League estimated the number of far-right and white power skinheads in Poland at 2,000.[340] Since late 2000s smaller fascist groups have merged to form the neo-Nazi Autonome Nationalisten. A number of far-right parties have run candidates in elections including the League of Polish Families, the National Movement with limited success.[341]

In 2019, the Confederation Liberty and Independence earned 1,256,953 votes which was 6.81% of the total vote in an election that saw a historically high turnout. Members of far-right groups make up a significant portion of those taking part in the annual Independence March in central Warsaw which started in 2009 to mark Independence Day. About 60,000 were in the 2017 march marking the 99th anniversary of independence, with placards such as "Clean Blood" seen on the march.[342] Law and Justice, the previous governing party of Poland, is widely described as far-right.[343][344]

Romania

[edit]

The preeminent far-right party in Romania is the Greater Romania Party, founded in 1991 by Tudor, who was formerly known as a "court poet" of Communist dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu[345] and his literary mentor, the writer Eugen Barbu, one year after Tudor launched the România Mare weekly magazine, which remains the most important propaganda tool of the PRM. Tudor subsequently launched a companion daily newspaper called Tricolorul. The historical expression Greater Romania refers to the idea of recreating the former Kingdom of Romania which existed during the interwar period. Having been the largest entity to bear the name of Romania, the frontiers were marked with the intent of uniting most territories inhabited by ethnic Romanians into a single country and it is now a rallying cry for Romanian nationalists. Due to internal conditions under Communist Romania after World War II, the expression's use was forbidden in publications until after the Romanian Revolution in 1989. The party's initial success was partly attributed to the deep rootedness of Ceaușescu's national communism in Romania.[346]

Both the ideology and the main political focus of the Greater Romania Party are reflected in frequently strongly nationalistic articles written by Tudor. The party has called for the outlawing of the ethnic Hungarian party, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, for allegedly plotting the secession of Transylvania.[347]

Russia

[edit]

The period of development of Russian fascism in the 1930s–1940s was characterized by sympathy for Italian fascism and German Nazism and pronounced anti-communism and antisemitism.

The Russian Fascist Party in the first half of the 20th century. The slogan "Let's get our homeland!" is also used by the modern far-right in Russia.

Russian fascism has its roots in the movements known in history as the Black Hundreds and the White movement. It was distributed among white émigré circles living in Germany, Manchukuo, and the United States. In Germany and the United States (unlike Manchukuo), they practically did not conduct political activity, limiting themselves to the publication of newspapers and brochures.

Some ideologues of the white movement, such as Ivan Ilyin and Vasily Shulgin, welcomed the coming to power of Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany, offering their comrades-in-arms the fascist "method" as a way to fight socialism, communism, and godlessness. At the same time, they did not deny fascist political repression and antisemitism and even justified them.[348]

Far right Russian demonstration

With the outbreak of World War II, Russian fascists in Germany supported Nazi Germany and joined the ranks of Russian collaborators.

Some Russian neo-Nazi organizations are part of the international World Union of National Socialists (WUNS, founded in 1962). As of 2012, six Russian organizations are among the officially registered members of the union: National Resistance, National Socialist Movement – Russian Division, All-Russian Public Patriotic Movement "Russian National Unity", National Socialist Movement "Slavic Union" (prohibited by a court decision in June 2010), and others. The following organizations are not included in WUNS: the National Socialist Society (banned by a court decision in 2010), the Russian All-National Union (banned in September 2011), and others, such as skinheads: Legion Werewolf (liquidated in 1996), Schultz-88 (liquidated in 2006), White Wolves (liquidated in 2008–2010), New Order (ceased to exist), Russian goal (ceased to exist), and others. Some of the more radical neo-Nazi organizations, using terrorist methods, belonged to skinhead groups such as the Werewolf Legion (liquidated in 1996), Schultz-88 (liquidated in 2006), White Wolves (liquidated in 2008–2010), New Order (ceased to exist), "Russian Goal" (ceased to exist), and others.[349]

Until the end of the 1990s, one of the largest parties of Russian national extremists was the neo-Nazi socio-political movement "Russian National Unity" (RNE), founded by Alexander Barkashov in 1990. At the end of 1999, the RNE made an unsuccessful attempt to take part in the elections to the State Duma. Barkashov considered "true Orthodoxy" as a fusion of Christianity with paganism and advocated the "Russian God" and the "Aryan swastika" allegedly associated with it. He wrote about the Atlanteans, the Etruscans, and the "Aryan" civilization as the direct predecessors of the Russian nation, in a centuries-old struggle with the "Semites", the "world Jewish conspiracy", and the "dominance of the Jews in Russia". The symbol of the movement was a modified swastika. Barkashov was a parishioner of the "True Orthodox ("Catacomb") Church", and the first cells of the RNE were formed as brotherhoods and communities of the RTOC.[350]

The ideology of Russian neo-Nazism is closely connected with the ideology of Slavic neo-paganism (rodnovery). In a number of cases, there are also organizational ties between neo-Nazis and neo-pagans. One of the founders of Russian neo-paganism, the former dissident Alexey Dobrovolsky (pagan name – Dobroslav) shared the ideas of Nazism and transferred them to his neo-pagan teaching.[350][351] Modern Russian neo-paganism took shape in the second half[352] of the 1970s and is associated with the activities of Dobrovolsky and Moscow Arabist Valery Yemelyanov (neo-pagan name – Velemir),[353][351] both supporters of antisemitism. Rodnoverie is a popular religion among Russian skinheads.[354][355] These skinheads, however, do not usually practice their religion.[356]

Historian Dmitry Shlapentokh wrote that, as in Europe, neo-paganism in Russia pushes some of its adherents to antisemitism. This antisemitism is closely related to negative attitudes towards Asians, and this emphasis on racial factors can lead neo-pagans to neo-Nazism. The tendency of neo-pagans to antisemitism is a logical development of the ideas of neo-paganism and imitation of the Nazis, and is also a consequence of a number of specific conditions of modern Russian politics. Unlike previous regimes, the modern Russian political regime, as well as the ideology of the middle class, combines support for Orthodoxy with philosemitism and a positive attitude towards Muslims. These features of the regime contributed to the formation of specific views of neo-Nazi neo-pagans, which are represented to a large extent among the socially unprotected and marginalized Russian youth. In their opinion, power in Russia was usurped by a cabal of conspirators, including hierarchs of the Orthodox Church, Jews, and Muslims. Contrary to external differences, it is believed that these forces have united in their desire to maintain power over the Russian "Aryans".[357]

Serbia

[edit]
Chetniks in Belgrade, 1920

In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, multiple far-right organizations and parties operated during the late Interwar period such as the Yugoslav National Movement (Zbor), Yugoslav Radical Union (JRZ) and Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists (ORJUNA). Zbor was headed by Dimitrije Ljotić, who during the World War II collaborated with the Axis powers.[358] Ljotić was a supporter of Italian fascism,[359] and he advocated for the establishment of a centralized Yugoslav state that would be dominated by Serbs, and a return to Christian traditions.[360] Zbor was the only registered political party in Yugoslavia that openly promoted antisemitism and xenophobia.[361] JRZ was registered as a political party in 1934 by Milan Stojadinović, a right-wing politician who expressed his support towards Italian fascism during his premiership.[362] JRZ was initially a coalition made up of Stojadinović's, Anton Korošec's and Mehmed Spaho's supporters, and the party was the main stronghold for Yugoslav ethnic nationalists and supporters of Karađorđević dynasty.[363] ORJUNA was a prominent organization in the 1920s that was influenced by fascism.[359] During World War II, Chetniks, an ethnic ultranationalist movement rose to prominence.[364] Chetniks were staunchly anti-communist and they supported monarchism and the creation of a Greater Serbian state.[365][366] They, including their leader Draža Mihailović, extensively collaborated with the Axis powers in the second half of the World War II against their common enemy, the Yugoslav Partisans.[367]

After the re-establishment of the multi-party system in Serbia in 1990, multiple right-wing movements and parties began getting popularity from which the Serbian Radical Party was the most successful.[359] Vojislav Šešelj, who founded the party, promoted popular notions of "international conspiracy against the Serbs" during the 1990s which gained him popularity in the 1992 and 1997 election.[368] During the 1990s, SRS has been also described as neofascist due to their vocal support of ethnic ultranationalism and irredentism.[369][370] Its popularity went into decline after the 2008 election when its acting leader Tomislav Nikolić seceded from the party to form the Serbian Progressive Party.[371] Besides SRS, during the 2000s multiple neofascist and Neo-Nazi movements began getting popular, such as Nacionalni stroj, Obraz and 1389 Movement.[372] Dveri, an organization turned political party, was also a prominent promoter of far-right content, and they were mainly known for their clerical-fascist, socially conservative and anti-Western stances.[373][374] Since 2019, the far-right Serbian Party Oathkeepers has gained popularity mainly due to their ultranationalist views,[375] including the openly neofascist Leviathan Movement.[376][377]

Slovenia

[edit]
There are multiple groups and organisations within Slovenia which are or have been engaged in far-right political activity, and right-wing extremism. Their political activity has traditionally opposed and targeted socially progressive policies, and minorities (in particular; the LGBT community, and ethnic minorities like the Roma and immigrants (particularly those from the Southern Balkans),[378][379][380][381] and espoused traditional ultraconservative and reactionary views and values.[378][380] More recently, a rise in new, incipient alt-right groups has been noted, particularly as a reaction to the European migrant crisis.[citation needed] While far-right actors have been responsible for multiple acts of violent extremism in Slovenia[379][380][382] it is a relatively minor issue in the country.[383][failed verification]

Spain

[edit]
The history of the far-right in Spain dates back to at least the 1800s and refers to any manifestation of far-right politics in Spain. Individuals and organizations associated with the far-right in Spain often employ reactionary traditionalism, religious fundamentalism, corporate Catholicism, and fascism in their ideological practice. In the case of Spain, according to historian Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, the predominance of Catholicism played an essential role in the suppression of external political innovations such as Social Darwinism, positivism, and vitalism in Spanish far-right politics.[384]

Switzerland

[edit]

The Swiss People's Party, one of the leading right-wing parties in Switzerland, is widely described as far-right.[385][386][387][388]

United Kingdom

[edit]

The British far-right rose out of the fascist movement. In 1932, Oswald Mosley founded the British Union of Fascists (BUF) which was banned during World War II.[389] Founded in 1954 by A. K. Chesterton, the League of Empire Loyalists became the main British far-right group at the time. It was a pressure group rather than a political party, and did not contest elections. Most of its members were part of the Conservative Party and were known for politically embarrassing stunts at party conferences.[390] Other fascist parties included the White Defence League and the National Labour Party who merged in 1960 to form the second British National Party (BNP).[391]

With the decline of the British Empire becoming inevitable, British far-right parties turned their attention to internal matters. The 1950s had seen an increase in immigration to the UK from its former colonies, particularly India, Pakistan, the Caribbean and Uganda. Led by John Bean and Andrew Fountaine, the BNP opposed the admittance of these people to the UK. A number of its rallies such as one in 1962 in Trafalgar Square ended in race riots. After a few early successes, the party got into difficulties and was destroyed by internal arguments. In 1967 it joined forces with John Tyndall and the remnants of Chesterton's League of Empire Loyalists to form Britain's largest far-right organization, the National Front (NF).[392] The BNP and the NF supported extreme loyalism in Northern Ireland, and attracted Conservative Party members who had become disillusioned after Harold Macmillan had recognized the right to independence of the African colonies and had criticized Apartheid in South Africa.[393]

Some Northern Irish loyalist paramilitaries have links with far-right and neo-Nazi groups in Britain, including Combat 18,[394][395] the British National Socialist Movement[396] and the NF.[397] In 2004, The Guardian reported that loyalist paramilitaries had been responsible for numerous racist attacks in loyalist areas.[398] During the 1970s, the NF's rallies became a regular feature of British politics. Election results remained strong in a few working-class urban areas, with a number of local council seats won, but the party never came anywhere near winning representation in parliament.

British National Party (BNP) vote share in the 2010 UK general election.

Since the 1970s, the NF's support has been in decline whilst Nick Griffin and the current British National Party (BNP) grew in popularity. Around the turn of the 21st century, the BNP won a number of council seats. At its peak in the late 2000s, the party had 54 local council seats, one seat in the London Assembly, two seats in the European Parliament, and were the official opposition in the Barking and Dagenham London Borough Council. The party received almost a million votes in the 2009 European Parliament elections, and contested the majority of UK parliamentary seats in the 2010 general election. The party's membership was 12,632 and its financial resources were an estimated £1,983,947.[45] The BNP would record their highest ever vote in a general election with half a million or 1.9% of the popular vote. This is the highest ever vote for a British Far-right party.

By the early 2010s the BNP saw its support and membership quickly collapse due to internal divisions caused by a disappointing performance in the 2010 elections. Griffin was ousted as leader in 2014 after losing his European Parliament seat, and since then the party has been in terminal decline under the leadership of Adam Walker.

A number of breakaway groups have been established by former members of the BNP, such as Britain First by ex-councillor Paul Golding, the British Democrats by ex-MEP and leadership candidate Andrew Brons, as well as Patriotic Alternative by Mark Collett. UK Independence Party (UKIP) leader Nigel Farage claimed that his party absorbed much of the BNP's former voters during their electoral peak in the early 2010s.[399] The party was accused of shifting towards far-right, anti-Islam politics under the leadership of Paul Nuttall and Gerard Batten during its decline in the late 2010s. Anti-Islam activist and former UKIP leadership candidate Anne Marie Waters established the far-right For Britain Movement, which gained a small number of ex-BNP councillors. It was deregistered in 2022, and subsequently a large portion of prominent far-right activists began coalescing around the British Democrats, which (following UKIP's loss of its few councillors on 4 May 2023, leaving it with only a few parish and town councillors) quickly established itself as the UK's only far-right party with any electoral representation.

Oceania

[edit]

Australia

[edit]
Captain Francis de Groot declares the Sydney Harbour Bridge open in March 1932.

Coming to prominence in Sydney with the formation of the New Guard (1931) and the Centre Party (1933), the far right has played a part in Australian political discourse since the second world war.[400] These proto-fascist groups were monarchist, anti-communist and authoritarian in nature. Early far-right groups were followed by the explicitly fascist Australia First Movement (1941).[401][402] The far right in Australia went on to acquire more explicitly racial connotations during the 1960s and 1970s, morphing into self-proclaimed Nazi, fascist and antisemitic movements, organizations that opposed non-white and non-Christian immigration such as the neo-Nazi National Socialist Party of Australia (1967) and the militant white supremacist group National Action (1982).[403][404][405]

Since the 1980s, the term has mainly been used to describe those who express the wish to preserve what they perceive to be Judeo-Christian, Anglo-Australian culture and those who campaign against Aboriginal land rights, multiculturalism, immigration and asylum seekers. Since 2001, Australia has seen the development of modern neo-Nazi, neo-fascist or alt-right groups such as the True Blue Crew, the United Patriots Front, Fraser Anning's Conservative National Party and the Antipodean Resistance.[406]

New Zealand

[edit]

A small number of far-right organizations have existed in New Zealand since World War II, including the Conservative Front, the New Zealand National Front and the National Democrats Party.[407][408] Far-right parties in New Zealand lack significant support, with their protests often dwarfed by counter protest.[409] After the Christchurch mosque shootings in 2019, the National Front "publicly shut up shop"[410] and largely went underground like other far-right groups.[411]

Fiji

[edit]
Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party
[edit]

The Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party was a far-right political party which advocated Fijian ethnic nationalism.[412] In 2009, party leader Iliesa Duvuloco was arrested for breaching the military regime's emergency laws by distributing pamphlets calling for an uprising against the military regime.[413] In January 2013, the military regime introduced regulations that essentially de-registered the party.[414][415]

Pan-national

[edit]

European Union

[edit]

The development of a pan-European identity among far-right members of the European parliament has been claimed.[416]

Islamic extremism

[edit]

Some Islamic extremists view Islam superior to all other ideologies and non-Muslims as inferior.[417] Some Islamic extremism can be seen as far-right,[191] and can have some social acceptance in some countries.[220] Dhimmi refers to the inferior status of non-Muslims in some historic Islamic states.[418]

Online

[edit]

A number of far-right internet pages and forums are focused on and frequented by the far right. These include Stormfront and Iron March.

Far-right internet movements gained popularity and notoriety online in 2012, and this has not stopped.[419] In the United States, they gained many followers during the 2016 presidential election, the time after the election during Obama's last months in office in 2016, and in 2017.[419]

Stormfront

[edit]

Stormfront is the oldest and most prominent neo-Nazi website,[420] described by the Southern Poverty Law Center and other media organizations as the "murder capital of the internet".[421] In August 2017, Stormfront was taken offline for just over a month when its registrar seized its domain name due to complaints that it promoted hatred and that some of its members were linked to murder. The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law claimed credit for the action after advocating for Stormfront's web host, Network Solutions, to enforce its Terms of Service agreement which prohibits users from using its services to incite violence.[422]

Iron March

[edit]

Iron March was a fascist web forum founded in 2011 by Russian nationalist Alexander "Slavros" Mukhitdinov. An unknown individual uploaded a database of Iron March users to the Internet Archive in November 2019 and multiple neo-Nazi users were identified, including an ICE detention center captain and several active members of the United States Armed Forces.[423][424] As of mid 2018, the Southern Poverty Law Center linked Iron March to nearly 100 murders.[425][423] Mukhitdinov remained a murky figure at the time of the leaks.[426]

Terrorgram

[edit]

The Terrorgram community on Telegram is a network of Telegram channels and accounts that subscribe to and promote militant accelerationism. Terrorgram channels are neofascist in ideology, and regularly share instructions and manuals on how to carry out acts of racially motivated violence and anti-government, anti-authority terrorism.[427] In 2021, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), an international think-tank, exposed more than two hundred neo-Nazi pro-terrorism telegram channels that make up the Terrorgram network, many of which contained instructions to build weapons and bombs.[428][429][430]

Right-wing terrorism

[edit]
Though U.S. President Trump claimed that "the radicals on the left are the problem"[170] with political violence, from 2013 through 2022 75% of extremist killings in the U.S. were caused by right-wing perpetrators.[431] From 2022 through 2024, all 61 political killings were committed by right-wing extremists.[172]

Right-wing terrorism is terrorism motivated by a variety of far right ideologies and beliefs, including anti-communism, neo-fascism, neo-Nazism, racism, xenophobia and opposition to immigration. This type of terrorism has been sporadic, with little or no international cooperation.[432] Modern right-wing terrorism first appeared in western Europe in the 1980s and it first appeared in Eastern Europe following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[433]

Right-wing terrorists aim to overthrow governments and replace them with nationalist or fascist-oriented governments.[432] The core of this movement includes neo-fascist skinheads, far-right hooligans, youth sympathizers and intellectual guides who believe that the state must rid itself of foreign elements in order to protect rightful citizens.[433] However, they usually lack a rigid ideology.[433]

According to Cas Mudde, far-right terrorism and violence in the West have been generally perpetrated in recent times by individuals or groups of individuals "who have at best a peripheral association" with politically relevant organizations of the far right. Nevertheless, Mudde follows, "in recent years far-right violence has become more planned, regular, and lethal, as terrorists attacks in Christchurch (2019), Pittsburgh (2018), and Norway (2011) show."[29]

See also

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References

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Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Far-right politics encompasses ideologies and movements positioned beyond mainstream conservatism on the political right, commonly described in scholarly analyses by elements such as nativism—a blend of nationalism and opposition to out-groups—authoritarianism favoring hierarchical order, and rejection of liberal universalism in favor of in-group cultural and ethnic identity. This article explores far-right politics through its definition and core concepts, historical origins and evolution, ideological foundations, sociopolitical support and dynamics, global manifestations by region, contemporary issues and networks, controversies and associated phenomena, and policy impacts and outcomes.

Definition and Core Concepts

Defining Far-Right Politics

Far-right politics refers to ideologies and movements to the right of mainstream conservatism. It encompasses radical-right variants that engage democratically while challenging liberal norms, and extreme-right variants that reject democracy outright. Scholarly typologies, such as those by Cas Mudde, highlight nativism—prioritizing ethnically or culturally defined native groups—, authoritarianism—favoring enforced order and security—, and populism—as core traits, distinguishing far-right positions from centrist or mainstream right-wing approaches. Broader scholarly consensus often includes ultranationalism, anti-egalitarianism, opposition to liberal pluralism, and elements like traditionalism or anti-globalism, with definitions varying by region and context.

Key Ideological Elements

Far-right ideologies encompass several recurring conceptual elements. Nativism prioritizes native populations within the nation-state, portraying outsiders as threats to social cohesion. Authoritarianism endorses strong state mechanisms to enforce stability and uniformity. Populism contrasts native identities with elites viewed as disconnected from national interests. Traditionalism advocates preservation of established cultural norms against progressive alterations. Sovereignty and anti-globalism assert national independence from supranational influences and cosmopolitan integration. Welfare chauvinism and protectionism limit social welfare and economic safeguards to native groups, excluding outsiders. Scholarly consensus identifies nativism, authoritarianism, and populism as the core traits. However, the literature lacks agreement on whether all core traits must be universally present across far-right entities—such as authoritarianism in all cases—or if varying combinations suffice. This influences the classification of qualifying parties and movements. Opposition to liberal democracy often serves as a broader criterion, with the others frequently associated.

Distinctions from Mainstream Right-Wing Politics

Far-right politics differs from mainstream right-wing politics primarily in its approach to liberal democratic constraints and pluralism. Mainstream conservatism accepts universal pluralism and individual rights within democratic institutions, prioritizing stability and the rule of law. In contrast, far-right variants reject these norms, favoring hierarchical social orders and exclusionary criteria for belonging. On governance preferences, mainstream right-wing politics emphasizes incremental reforms through existing institutions, while far-right approaches pursue more radical systemic changes, often via nativist or authoritarian strategies. Regarding the concept of the nation, mainstream variants typically endorse civic nationalism rooted in shared values and citizenship, supporting assimilation. Far-right nationalism prioritizes ethnic or cultural homogeneity to maintain demographic integrity. These distinctions arise from far-right perceptions of mainstream inadequacies in addressing rapid societal transformations. However, operational criteria for distinguishing far-right from mainstream right-wing politics are not universally established, with the boundary often contested and varying by analytical frameworks and contexts.

Terminology Debates and Misconceptions

The term "far-right" serves as an umbrella for ideologies right of conservatism, with scholarly debates focusing on boundaries between radical right—opposing liberal norms via nativism, authoritarianism, and populism within democratic systems—and extreme right, which rejects democracy and may involve violence. This typology, advanced by scholars like Cas Mudde, underscores how many far-right actors engage electorally rather than through paramilitary means. Debates highlight varying applications of the term across contexts, with some analyses noting its expansion to include diverse challenges to consensus. Terminological choices carry analytical implications, such as labeling parties achieving substantial vote shares (e.g., 25%) as "radical" within certain political science frameworks like those from scholars such as Cas Mudde, versus classifying them as mainstream nationalist parties in perspectives emphasizing electoral integration, which can frame movements as fringe extremism rather than indicators of mainstream political realignment. Common associations often link far-right solely to historical fascism or white supremacy, overlooking protectionism or anti-globalism in non-racial forms. In contemporary discourse, the term "far-right" is subject to partisan contestation. Conservatives frequently argue that it lacks precision and is applied to delegitimize mainstream right-wing positions and suppress debate, while left-leaning perspectives regard it as an accurate descriptor of ideologies that challenge core liberal democratic principles. This divide reflects differing interpretations of the term's scope in modern politics, underscoring the need for precise, context-specific application to maintain analytical clarity. Such terminological debates also encompass the placement of fascism on the left-right spectrum, as in Zeev Sternhell's analysis of its synthesis of nationalist and revisionist elements. Precise terminology aids in distinguishing democratic nationalists from extremists for accurate classification.

Historical Origins and Evolution

Pre-Modern and 19th-Century Precursors

Opposition to the French Revolution fostered counter-revolutionary ideologies that emphasized hierarchical social orders, divine authority, and tradition over rationalist egalitarianism. These ideas privileged organic societal bonds and influenced later defenses of authority against liberal reforms. Counter-revolutionary thought intertwined with romantic nationalism, which idealized the nation as an organic entity rooted in folk culture, language, and ethnic ties rather than civic contracts. These ideas contributed to exclusionary national identities prioritizing homogeneity over universalism. By mid-century, these strands evolved into political movements blending nativism, anti-immigrant sentiment, and defense of traditional hierarchies, rejecting Enlightenment universalism in favor of authoritarian restorations that shared emphases with far-right politics on sovereignty, identity, and anti-modernity.

Interwar Fascism and Authoritarianism

Fascism emerged in Italy amid post-World War I economic instability and fear of communist revolution, evolving from paramilitary squads suppressing leftist activities into a movement gaining support from threatened elites. Structural features included militarism, a leader cult, and rejection of individualism, distinguishing it within broader authoritarian trends. In Germany, National Socialism developed as a fascist variant, capitalizing on economic crises for electoral gains and consolidating power through decrees suspending liberties and granting legislative authority to the executive, dismantling democratic institutions. Authoritarian regimes proliferated across interwar Europe, incorporating far-right elements like ultranationalism, anti-communism, and hierarchical order, arising from democratic breakdowns amid economic crises and treaty resentments, prioritizing state authority over liberal institutions.

Post-World War II Reconfiguration

Postwar denazification and defascistization in Europe imposed legal constraints that dissolved explicit fascist organizations, but far-right elements survived through rebranding into legal parties emphasizing anti-communism, adapting to Cold War dynamics for legitimacy. In Italy and Germany, these movements outwardly rejected totalitarianism while upholding core tenets like national sovereignty and corporatism, achieving parliamentary entry through rhetorical moderation to evade bans and gain acceptance within democratic frameworks. Outside Europe, far-right influences occasionally drew on similar fascist models in authoritarian contexts, but the primary reconfiguration occurred in Europe, where adaptations emphasized electoral participation and ideological repackaging over mass mobilization. These European shifts positioned far-right currents as niche opposition forces, leveraging alliances and moderation to navigate postwar constraints.

Late 20th-Century Resurgence

The late 20th-century resurgence of far-right politics was associated with socioeconomic pressures including globalization's economic disruptions, deindustrialization in Western industrial sectors, post-communist transitions in Eastern Europe, and rising migration flows. These pressures contributed to economic marginalization and cultural anxieties among affected populations, which in turn fueled resistance to supranational integration and demographic transformations. Party-system fragmentation in Europe and North America created opportunities for populist radical right parties to enter the political mainstream from the 1980s onward. These parties appealed to voters disillusioned with traditional parties through emphases on national sovereignty, identity preservation, and protectionist measures. This marked a shift toward electoral viability alongside structural changes in party systems.

Ideological Foundations

Nationalism and Identity Politics

Far-right ideology grounds nationalism in the premise that ethnic and cultural homogeneity underpins social cohesion and effective governance. This distinguishes it from mainstream conservative support for controlled immigration, which stems from economic pressures, security concerns, or integration challenges, without viewing ethnic purity as a core goal. Far-right nationalist thought varies in emphasis: ethnic boundaries (ancestry-based), cultural boundaries (tradition-based), or civic elements (institutional loyalty). Conceptions of belonging rely on perceived organic cohesion mechanisms that prioritize homogeneity for national unity. Thus, advocacy for immigration restrictions reflects this ideology rather than standalone pragmatism. This ethnonationalist framework draws on historical interwar precedents linking national revival to exclusionary preservation of core identities. Far-right opposes mass and , framing them as threats to demographic stability. Sub-replacement fertility—Europe's total fertility rate of 1.38 in 2023—heightens concerns about replacement through net migration. This differs from pragmatic restrictions that avoid ethnic preservation goals. Identity politics in this vein inverts progressive models, prioritizing majority preservation as a collective right, as seen in the Identitarian movement's ethno-pluralist push for segregated cultural spaces to avoid intergroup conflict since 2012. Such views justify repatriation for non-assimilators. Proponents cite parallel societies in high-immigration areas, including what they term "no-go zones" in Sweden, to bolster identity-focused responses.

Anti-Globalism and Sovereignty

Far-right anti-globalism asserts the primacy of national sovereignty over supranational entities, critiquing structures like the EU for transferring competencies in immigration and trade to unaccountable bodies that, according to this perspective, circumvent democratic mechanisms. Far-right critiques identify erosions of sovereignty, such as qualified majority voting overriding national vetoes on migrant quotas following the 2015 crisis. Far-right ideology posits that globalism prioritizes capital mobility over domestic cohesion, prompting responses such as Hungary's rejecting EU pacts as violations of and France's advocating treaty renegotiation to reclaim border controls, referencing overrides of referenda like the 2005 EU Constitution rejection. Economically, far-right positions emphasize protectionism through tariffs rather than multilateral agreements, attributing deindustrialization—with 20% manufacturing job losses in certain regions from 1991 to 2020—and fiscal constraints, as critiqued by Italy's amid 140% GDP debt by 2023, to EU rules. In foreign policy, far-right skepticism toward NATO expansion emphasizes autonomy, with groups like in the promoting repatriation of powers.

Traditionalism Versus Progressivism

Far-right traditionalism defends evolved hierarchies—such as gender roles, the , and religious authority—against 's egalitarian reconfiguration. Proponents argue that organic structures sustain stability, while progressive individualism fosters social atomization. Influenced by , far-right traditionalists view modernity as regressive toward materialistic flattening, with proponents identifying "cultural Marxism" as a driver of cultural decay. Policies like Hungary's family incentives seek to preserve traditional structures against fertility declines, with proponents framing progressivism's erosion of as a factor in institutional distrust reflected in trends. Opposition extends to curricula promoting , as in Poland's restrictions on "LGBT ideology" to safeguard Catholic norms. Traditionalism prioritizes historical continuity over social experimentation.

Economic Populism and Protectionism

Far-right proponents often employ interventionist policy mechanisms such as tariffs, subsidies, and welfare restrictions—distinct from core ideological premises like ethnic nationalism and authoritarianism—to address perceived globalization effects, though these tools have been used across the political spectrum without far-right endorsement. They posit that globalization enables elite capture displacing workers and eroding sovereignty, sometimes favoring "welfare chauvinism" to prioritize nationals amid immigration and offshoring pressures. Such approaches may reject neoliberalism by embedding trade policies in national priorities. U.S. examples include Trump's 2018 steel tariffs citing national security concerns, pressuring trade concessions amid deficits. European variants link deindustrialization—EU manufacturing down 10% 2008-2019—to policy reversals, including France's national preference, Germany's euro exit advocacy, and Italy's critiques of supply chain vulnerabilities favoring domestic industries. Empirical studies note 2-5% wage drops from import competition, with far-right framing emphasizing long-term sovereignty gains over consumer costs. Mainstream economists argue that protectionism raises consumer prices, distorts markets, and reduces efficiency, potentially slowing overall economic growth.

Sociopolitical Support and Dynamics

Demographics and Voter Profiles

Far-right political movements and parties in and draw support from voters who are disproportionately male, particularly young men, often with lower levels of formal , and residing in rural or economically declining regions. This profile reflects concerns over , cultural change, and economic insecurity, with empirical data from recent elections indicating a broadening base beyond traditional older, working-class demographics. In Europe, far-right voter bases have shown a marked shift toward younger cohorts, especially males under 35, amid rising dissatisfaction with mainstream policies on migration and identity. Support is strongest among men aged 18-24 and those in eastern states with histories of deindustrialization, including some voters with immigrant backgrounds who prioritize stricter border controls. In France, appeal is evident among 25-34-year-olds, with overrepresentation among rural residents and blue-collar workers in northern and southern peripheries facing job losses in manufacturing. Across the 2024 European Parliament elections, far-right parties similarly appealed to young men citing cultural erosion and economic stagnation, with gender gaps widening: young men supported such parties at rates double those of young women in multiple countries. In the United States, supporters aligned with far-right nationalist themes mirrored European patterns but with greater ethnic diversity. Support is concentrated among men without college degrees, including gains among and men, in non-metropolitan areas and among voters prioritizing border security and trade . Educational divides are stark, with stronger backing from non-college-educated whites versus college graduates, while age data reveal surges among under-30 men, driven by opposition to progressive cultural policies. Women show less support, with stronger leftward tilts among college-educated and urban subgroups. The following table provides a summary snapshot of key demographic patterns:
Region/PartyKey DemographicsSupport Highlights (Recent Elections)
(e.g., AfD, RN)Young men (18-34), rural residents, low-education workersHigh youth male support; rural strongholds in deindustrialized areas
(e.g., Trump 2024)Non-college-educated men (white, Hispanic), rural votersStrong male support overall; gains among non-college whites and youth males
These profiles underscore causal links to localized grievances, such as job competition from and perceived elite detachment, rather than inherent ideological , as evidenced by polling on issue priorities like and .

Causal Factors Driving Support

Support for far-right politics correlates with experiences of downward and economic insecurity, particularly among working-class and lower-middle-class voters facing stagnant wages and job displacement from and . Empirical analyses across European countries indicate that long-term declines in occupational prospects for native-born workers explain a significant portion of vote shares for such parties, as shown in from 2000–2020 after controlling for demographics. Rising income inequality exacerbates this, as cross-national studies from 1990–2018 demonstrate that increases in inequality predict notable rises in populist right support, distinct from left-wing alternatives. Perceived threats to , rather than absolute alone, further propel alignment, with risks like exposure and escalating rental costs in urban areas amplifying grievances over . A 2025 Equitable Growth report, drawing on and national election surveys, finds that individuals in high-risk housing markets exhibit higher odds of endorsing far-right platforms, attributing this to eroded community standing amid since the 1980s. Financial crises reinforce these patterns, as historical data from 1870–2014 reveal spikes in right-wing votes following downturns, unlike symmetric left-wing responses. Immigration-related anxieties, rooted in competition for jobs, , and public services, constitute a core driver, with surveys consistently ranking it as the top issue for far-right voters—e.g., 60–70% in 2024 European polls citing it over economic woes. Research on voter coalitions highlights how alignment of economic with cultural preservation mobilizes support, as seen in and where net migration surges correlated with vote gains for anti-immigration parties from –2022. These factors interplay causally, as econometric models disentangling effects show amplifying economic discontent in localized labor markets. Institutional distrust and elite alienation provide additional impetus, with far-right supporters exhibiting markedly lower trust in media, parliaments, and bodies, as reflected in data from 2010–2020. This stems from perceived failures in addressing grievances, fostering a dynamic where voters prioritize and ; for instance, post-2008 bailout resentments in and boosted such parties in subsequent elections. While academic narratives sometimes frame these as mere "," causal evidence from instrumental variable approaches underscores material roots, including policy-induced shocks like measures correlating with support increases. These documented material grievances—economic insecurity, immigration concerns, and institutional distrust—intersect with the ideological foundations of far-right politics, such as nationalism, anti-globalism, and identity politics, as detailed in earlier sections. Empirical patterns raise the question of whether voter support primarily reflects alignment with far-right ideology or instead channels widespread mainstream concerns through parties positioned to respond to them. Studies indicate that for many supporters, backing arises from pragmatic, issue-based motivations rather than full ideological commitment, with parties serving as outlets for protest against mainstream failures in addressing these grievances.

Organizational Structures and Movements

Far-right organizations engaged in democratic processes, such as formal , operate within electoral systems through hierarchical leadership and bureaucratic apparatuses to contest elections and influence policy. For example, Europe's (AfD), established in 2013, employs a formalized party structure emphasizing anti-immigration platforms and internal factions debating strategy. These entities prioritize voter mobilization and legislative participation over extralegal actions. In contrast, far-right groups rejecting democratic institutions include paramilitary militias, decentralized activist networks, and leaderless cells that operate outside electoral frameworks, often prioritizing operational capacity, direct action, or violence. Paramilitary-style militias in the United States, such as the founded in 2009, adopt quasi-military chains of command with training in firearms and tactics, justified as defenses against perceived federal overreach. These groups recruit from military veterans and focus on preparedness rather than ballots. Decentralized networks like the , originating in France's Génération Identitaire in 2012, employ non-hierarchical cells for street actions and media stunts promoting ethnic , fostering transnational links without central authority. , articulated by former Klan leader in his 1983 essay, encourages autonomous "phantom cells" or lone actors to execute actions independently, minimizing risks from arrests—as seen in the Atomwaffen Division's shift from an online forum in 2015 to fragmented cells promoting accelerationist violence before partial disassembly by 2020. Structured neo-Nazi groups like the National Socialist Movement, active since 1974, maintain rallies and under a Führer-led but have experienced membership declines to under 100 by the 2010s due to schisms. Hate groups such as the follow cyclical patterns, with its second iteration peaking at 4-5 million members in the 1920s via fraternal lodge structures before fragmenting into rival klaverns by the due to prosecutions. Modern variants, including active clubs from around 2020, stress and combat training in small units to counter "white genocide" narratives, coordinating via encrypted apps rather than formal rolls. These non-democratic structures adapt to via factors like rural demographics for militias and online since the , with empirical data showing violent groups typically smaller (under 100 members) than nonviolent ones (over 500). This distinction between organizations engaged in democratic processes and those rejecting democratic institutions does not map cleanly onto the diverse cases discussed in regional manifestations, where electoral parties and fringe groups often coexist and interact within broader far-right ecosystems.

Global Manifestations by Region

Europe

Far-right politics in Europe encompasses a range of nationalist, anti-immigration, and Euroskeptic movements that prioritize national sovereignty, cultural homogeneity, and traditional social structures over supranational integration and liberal multiculturalism. Following marginalization after due to associations with and , these ideologies reemerged in the late through parties like France's National Front (now ) and Austria's Freedom Party, gaining traction amid economic globalization and rising migration. By the 2010s, electoral breakthroughs occurred, fueled by the , which saw over 1 million asylum seekers enter the continent, primarily from and , prompting backlash against open-border policies. Electoral data indicates sustained growth: in the 2024 European Parliament elections, right-wing populist parties secured approximately 25% of seats collectively, with groups like and European Conservatives and Reformists expanding influence. These parties advocate policies such as border fortifications, of irregular migrants, and renegotiation of treaties to restore national veto powers, amid observed trends linking demographic shifts to public support for migration controls and sovereignty measures. As of 2025, such formations participate in governments across seven states, influencing on migration and fiscal .

Western Europe

In Western Europe, far-right parties have demonstrated integration into democratic institutions through substantial electoral successes, with vote shares ranging from 15-31% in recent national and European elections, active parliamentary participation, and coalition formations in several cases, positioning them as significant political forces rather than marginal entities excluded from the system. These patterns reflect responses to urban-rural divides, working-class disillusionment, and the 2015 migrant crisis, which correlated with rises in localized crime and welfare strain. Germany's (AfD) doubled its 2019 share to 15.9% in the 2024 EU elections, polling over 30% in eastern districts and 20.8% nationally by early 2025 amid opposition to green mandates and migration. France's reached 31.37% in 2024 EU voting, leading snap elections with 33.15% in the first round, advocating national preference policies amid net migration exceeding 300,000 in 2023. The ' (PVV) won 23.5% in 2023, while Sweden's Democrats polled 20.5% post-2022, linking support to migrant-related violence spikes. The UK's captured 14.3% in 2024 despite electoral system constraints, driven by post- migration discontent. These patterns show statistical correlations, such as a 1% immigrant stock increase linking to 1.78-2.97% higher far-right voting.

Eastern Europe

Eastern European far-right politics emphasizes governance participation, blending with resistance to EU liberal pressures, achieving policy influence through voter-endorsed sovereignty measures. Hungary's , under , holds a constitutional since 2022, implementing border fences reducing illegal crossings by 99% and family subsidies raising birth rates. Poland's (PiS) governed 2015-2023, enacting child benefits that cut poverty from 23% to 4.2% and boosted fertility to 1.46, framing judicial reforms as sovereignty defenses. Slovakia's 2023 coalitions prioritized , while 's AUR reached 18% in 2024 EU polls opposing migration pacts, and 's Revival secured 14% in 2024 advocating NATO skepticism. The Czech SPD and Estonia's EKRE maintain double-digit support for ethnic preservation. The classification of governing parties like Fidesz and PiS as far-right is debated in political science, with their constitutional supermajorities and broad voter mandates indicating mainstream nationalist appeal rather than purely fringe extremism, as analyses describe Fidesz as a radicalized conservative party from mainstream origins. These participations demonstrate efficacy in demographic stability, countering backsliding narratives with measurable outcomes.

Southern Europe

Southern Europe's far-right integrates ideological variations of economic , cultural defenses against , and opposition to fiscal transfers, addressing youth unemployment and migration strains. Italy's , led by , formed government post-2022 with 26%, enacting naval blockades cutting arrivals 60% and achieving GDP growth above Eurozone averages. Spain's Vox rose to 15% by 2025, opposing separatism and gender laws amid 26% youth unemployment. Portugal's Chega quadrupled seats to 50 in 2025, targeting corruption and housing crises from 150,000 annual inflows. Greece's Greek Solution holds 4.4%, focusing on Orthodox identity post-Golden Dawn dissolution. These variations correlate with welfare pressures, prioritizing native priorities over multiculturalism.

North America

Far-right politics in North America manifests through decentralized networks, militias, and online communities that emphasize ultranationalism, identity preservation, and opposition to multiculturalism and federal overreach. Typical organizational forms include fringe alliances, vigilante groups, and digital subcultures rather than hierarchical mass movements, often blending anti-government sentiments with cultural traditionalism. These elements remain politically marginal, attracting limited direct electoral support but exerting influence on mainstream conservative discourse regarding immigration, sovereignty, and economic protectionism. The following subsections detail developments in the United States and Canada.

United States

Far-right politics in the United States draws from historical nativist and supremacist traditions, including post-Civil War groups like the Ku Klux Klan and 20th-century neo-Nazi and militia formations influenced by events such as Ruby Ridge and Waco, which fostered anti-government sentiments culminating in acts like the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. In the 21st century, the "Patriot" movement and alt-right networks have proliferated, blending anti-government extremism with white identity politics through online ecosystems. The alt-right, a loosely organized subculture emphasizing opposition to multiculturalism and promoting memes, emerged in the 2010s, with figures like Richard Spencer popularizing the term around 2008; it gained visibility at the 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, where participants from neo-Nazi, KKK, and alt-right groups clashed with counter-protesters, resulting in the death of Heather Heyer. Contemporary networks include the Proud Boys, formed in 2016 to oppose antifa, and militias like the Oath Keepers and Three Percenters, some of whose members joined the January 6, 2021, Capitol riot. Federal assessments highlight racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs) and domestic violent extremists (DVEs) as key threats, with right-wing attacks comprising most extremist fatalities since 1990, though definitional variances affect data. These decentralized movements, numbering in the low tens of thousands of active participants, contrast with mainstream conservatism by embracing explicit racialism over shared nationalist priorities like border security.

Canada

Far-right activity in has historically mirrored U.S. patterns but on a smaller scale, with early instances including chapters in and during the 1920s-1930s, targeting Catholics and immigrants. Post-war fascist sympathizers and the in the 1980s-1990s advanced white nationalist agendas through skinhead networks and . Far-right extremism in remains politically marginal but has seen growth in organized networks and online influence since the mid-2010s, with the number of right-wing extremist groups tripling between 2015 and 2020 according to security assessments. Historically rooted in sporadic nativist and white supremacist formations like the Western Guard Party in the , which advocated racial separation, contemporary manifestations emphasize anti- vigilantism, opposition to , and accelerationist ideologies promoting to rebuild ethno-nationalist orders. Canadian authorities distinguish radical right elements, which critique elites through non-violent , from the extreme right, which endorses or employs against perceived threats like or liberal governance. Prominent groups include , initiated in 2020 by podcaster Jeremy MacKenzie as a satirical yet online collective envisioning a breakaway "Diagolon" territory spanning , , and parts of the U.S., with rhetoric blending memes, anti-government sentiment, and white identity preservation; it has been classified as a terrorist threat by U.S. and Canadian intelligence for ties to and recruitment of armed militants. The , a Western chauvinist fraternity founded in 2016, established Canadian chapters engaging in street brawls and rallies against left-wing protests, leading to its designation as a terrorist entity under Canada's Anti-Terrorism Act in February 2021 due to patterns of , including glorification of the , 2021, U.S. Capitol breach. In Quebec, La Meute, formed in 2015, mobilized thousands online against Islamic immigration through anti-Sharia campaigns and border patrols, though it disbanded formally in 2021 amid internal fractures. Violence associated with far-right ideologies has been predominantly lone-actor or small-cell driven, with notable incidents including the January 29, 2017, where Alexandre Bissonnette killed six and injured five, citing online exposure to far-right figures and anti-feminist manifestos as motivations. tracks ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) encompassing far-right threats, maintaining a medium national terrorism risk level as of 2022, with far-right actors contributing to plots like planned attacks on cultural sites. Politically, the (PPC), launched by in 2018 after his Conservative exit, channels right-wing populist discontent with calls to cap at 150,000 annually, end policies, and prioritize , securing 5.0% of the popular vote (840,000 ballots) in the 2021 federal election but zero seats under first-past-the-post rules. While media outlets frequently label the PPC far-right for its stances on cultural integration and restrictions—echoing protests in 2022—its platform lacks explicit ethno-nationalism or violence endorsement, aligning more with libertarian critiques of state overreach than traditional far-right authoritarianism.

Asia and Middle East

Far-right politics in often revolves around ultranationalist sentiments emphasizing ethnic homogeneity, opposition to immigration, and revisionist histories, with manifestations varying by country's dominant cultural and religious frameworks. In the , far-right politics primarily emerge through ethno-religious nationalist ideologies emphasizing exclusivity, territorial maximalism, and opposition to perceived demographic threats from non-core populations. These variants differ from European counterparts by integrating with , often in response to regional conflicts and minority-majority dynamics.

Key Asian Examples

In , uyoku dantai constitute a network of ultranationalist organizations promoting ethnic Japanese supremacy, historical revisionism denying atrocities like the , and opposition to pacifist constitutional constraints on military power. Over 1,000 such groups existed as of 2014, with membership exceeding 100,000 individuals who deploy propaganda sound trucks in urban areas to broadcast militant slogans and imperial-era anthems. These entities often intersect with figures and maintain influence through for shrine visits by politicians and textbook alterations minimizing wartime aggression. The party exemplifies electoral far-right mobilization in , advocating strict controls and rhetoric framing foreign residents as a demographic threat via concepts like "silent ." In the July 20, 2025, upper house election, secured 14 seats, marking a surge from prior obscurity and reflecting voter discontent with and perceived cultural erosion under centrist governance. Party platforms prioritize repatriation of non-citizens and economic , drawing support from demographics alienated by . India's (RSS), established on September 27, 1925, by , operates as a volunteer-based Hindu nationalist cadre emphasizing drills, cultural homogenization, and resistance to perceived Islamic . With an estimated 5-6 million active members across thousands of local branches (shakhas) by 2025, the RSS ideologically anchors the (BJP), which has governed nationally since 2014 under , a former RSS affiliate. doctrine, articulated in V. D. Savarkar's 1923 treatise, posits Hindu identity as coterminous with Indian nationhood, fostering policies like citizenship laws favoring non-Muslim refugees and cow protection vigilantism that have escalated communal clashes, including over 50 deaths in 2017 beef-related incidents. Critics, including monitors, attribute minority disenfranchisement to RSS influence, though proponents frame it as corrective nationalism post-Mughal and British eras. In , the , founded circa 2013 by monk Ashin Wirathu, represents Buddhist ultranationalism targeting Muslim minorities as existential threats to dominance, advocating boycotts and segregation. Linked to the 2017 Rohingya , where military operations displaced 700,000 and killed thousands per UN estimates, the movement's rhetoric incited pogroms like the 2012 riots claiming 44 lives. Ma Ba Tha, its political extension dissolved in 2017 but operative underground, pressured legislation restricting and , reflecting synergies between clerical authority and state security apparatuses against demographic shifts. Such groups exploit post-colonial ethnic fractures, prioritizing preservation over pluralistic .

Middle Eastern Variants

Prominent examples include in and the Phalangist movement in , both of which have advocated authoritarian measures, violence, and policies favoring one ethnic or religious group over others. Turkey's far-right is exemplified by the (MHP) and its Grey Wolves militia, whose platforms promote pan-Turkic ideology and opposition to Kurdish separatism, framing Kurds as existential threats. The MHP has allied with President Erdoğan's AKP, amplifying anti-PKK rhetoric that justifies military operations in and . Grey Wolves, known for street violence against leftists and minorities, embody aggressive rooted in 1960s-1980s clashes that claimed over 5,000 lives. These movements prioritize ethnic Turkish-Islamic identity. Kahanism, founded by Rabbi Meir Kahane in the 1970s through the Kach party, promotes Jewish supremacy and the expulsion of Arabs from Israel and the occupied territories to ensure a Jewish demographic majority. Kahane's Jewish Defense League, established in the United States in 1968, engaged in vigilante actions against perceived anti-Semites before shifting focus to Israel, where Kach secured one Knesset seat in the 1984 elections with 1.2% of the vote. The party was banned in 1988 under anti-racism laws for its platform calling for the forcible transfer of non-Jews, and designated a terrorist organization by Israel in 1994 following the Cave of the Patriarchs massacre by adherent Baruch Goldstein, who killed 29 Palestinians in 1994. Despite bans, Kahanist ideas persist through successor groups like Kahane Chai and influence contemporary parties such as Otzma Yehudit, led by Itamar Ben-Gvir, which won six seats in the 2022 elections as part of the Religious Zionism alliance. Ben-Gvir's appointment as national security minister in Benjamin Netanyahu's November 2022 coalition marked the mainstreaming of these views, with policies advancing West Bank settlement expansion and judicial reforms criticized for undermining democratic checks. The Lebanese Phalange, or Kataeb Party, founded in 1936 by Pierre Gemayel, drew inspiration from European fascist youth organizations like Spain's Falange, promoting Maronite Christian nationalism, anti-communism, and a confessional state structure favoring Lebanon's Christian communities. As a paramilitary force during the 1975-1990 civil war, the Phalangists controlled East Beirut and allied with Israel against Palestinian factions, perpetrating the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacres where allied militias killed between 800 and 3,500 Palestinian civilians and Lebanese Shia under Israeli oversight, as documented by Israel's Kahan Commission inquiry. The party's regulatory forces numbered around 15,000 fighters at peak, engaging in sectarian violence that contributed to over 150,000 deaths in the war. Post-war, the Kataeb transitioned to electoral politics, holding seats in parliament but declining influence amid Hezbollah's rise; in 2022 elections, it secured four seats under leader Samy Gemayel, advocating economic liberalization and opposition to Syrian influence while retaining right-wing stances on national sovereignty. These movements reflect causal pressures of existential security dilemmas in multi-ethnic states, where far-right ideologies justify preemptive exclusion to preserve group survival amid historical pogroms, wars, and refugee influxes. In , Kahanism's electoral gains correlate with spikes in Palestinian violence, such as the Second Intifada (2000-2005), boosting support for hardline security policies. In , Phalangist militancy arose from fears of Muslim demographic shifts post-1948 Palestinian influx, leading to constitutional revisions in 1989 that diluted Christian political dominance. Unlike Islamist groups dominating Arab politics, these variants prioritize secular or religious ethno-nationalism over pan-Arab or pan-Islamic unity, though both face accusations of from adversaries and internal critics.

Latin America

Far-right politics in has historically emphasized authoritarian governance, fierce anti-communism, and nationalist sentiments, often emerging in response to perceived threats from leftist movements and insurgencies during the . Unlike European variants focused on ethnic purity or , Latin American manifestations prioritized military-backed regimes to suppress subversion, implement , and maintain social order amid tensions. These movements drew partial inspiration from European but adapted to local contexts, such as combating and . Regional patterns include a focus on security against insurgencies, neoliberal economic stabilization to counter crises, and relative de-emphasis on ultranationalism given Latin America's ethnic diversity and migration dynamics. Early examples include Brazilian Integralism, founded in 1932, which adapted fascist models with Catholic elements before being suppressed. Authoritarian regimes in countries like Chile under Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990) and Peru under Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) combined anti-communist repression with market-oriented reforms to address economic chaos and insurgencies. In Argentina, the 1976-1983 military junta employed state terrorism against subversives during the Dirty War. Contemporary figures, such as Argentina's Javier Milei and El Salvador's Nayib Bukele, reflect a resurgence emphasizing cultural conservatism, anti-globalism, and aggressive security measures, while Brazil's Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2023) evoked military dictatorship legacies in promoting law and order. These adaptations highlight far-right priorities on order and economic pragmatism over ideological purity, distinguishing them from European nativism.

Major Cases

The Chilean military dictatorship under General , established by the 1973 against socialist President , illustrates far-right authoritarianism's response to perceived communist threats in . Pinochet's regime suppressed leftist institutions, banned , and targeted Marxist sympathizers, resulting in over 3,000 deaths or disappearances and widespread . Economically, it implemented -inspired neoliberal reforms, privatizing enterprises and reducing tariffs to combat over 500%, achieving stabilization despite initial recession and rising inequality. This case exemplifies far-right prioritization of anti-communist sovereignty and market-oriented protectionism against ideological subversion, with a 1988 plebiscite enabling amid protests, highlighting tensions between authoritarian stability and democratic pressures. In Peru, Alberto Fujimori's 1990–2000 presidency demonstrates far-right strongman tactics against and economic collapse, confronting terrorism (over 30,000 deaths since 1980) and 7,650% . The "Fujishock" measures liberalized markets, reducing inflation to 139% by 1991 and fostering 7% annual GDP growth (1993–1997), while the 1992 auto-golpe suspended institutions for decree rule and insurgency suppression, including capturing leader . However, reliance on death squads like for massacres and corruption via aide underscored human rights costs, leading to Fujimori's 2000 flight, 2009 conviction for , and 2017 pardon. Analytically, it reflects far-right economic populism and nationalist security measures prioritizing order over liberal norms, balancing short-term gains against long-term authoritarian legacies. Jair Bolsonaro's 2019–2023 Brazilian presidency exemplifies electoral far-right mobilization, securing 55% in 2018 by invoking nostalgia for the 1964–1985 , promoting , law-and-order, and traditional values against leftist dominance. Policies included pension reforms, privatizations, and agricultural aiding post-recession recovery, but environmental laxity drove Amazon to 11,088 km² in 2019, and handling contributed to over 700,000 deaths amid institutional clashes. His nationalist rhetoric and military ties underscore far-right identity politics and anti-globalist sovereignty, with 2022 election loss followed by the January 8, 2023, Brasília unrest, revealing persistent tensions between populism and democratic institutions.

Africa and Oceania

Far-right politics in Africa and Oceania exhibit marginal influence relative to other regions, often adapting global nationalist themes to local contexts such as ethnic separatism, post-colonial identity struggles, and anti-immigration sentiments. In Africa, manifestations frequently intersect with tribal or minority resistance narratives, while in Oceania, they emphasize cultural preservation amid demographic shifts, though both areas feature limited organizational cohesion and electoral viability, overshadowed by mainstream or indigenous movements.

African Instances

In South Africa, far-right politics have manifested primarily among Afrikaner nationalist groups resisting post-apartheid changes, emphasizing ethnic separatism, cultural preservation, and opposition to perceived threats to white minority interests. The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), founded in 1973 by Eugène Terre'Blanche, emerged as a paramilitary organization advocating for an independent Boer republic, incorporating neo-Nazi symbols and conducting armed actions, including the 1993 World Trade Centre invasion and 1994 Bophuthatswana clash, resulting in fatalities. The group weakened after Terre'Blanche's 1997 imprisonment and 2010 murder, amid ongoing farm attacks disproportionately affecting Afrikaner farmers—over 400 annually per police data—framed by supporters as defensive ethno-nationalism rooted in historical events like the Great Trek. Splinter variants persist, alongside non-violent groups like the Suidlanders, established in 2006, which prepare evacuation plans for up to 800,000 Afrikaners anticipating state collapse, and self-reliant enclaves such as Orania, a whites-only town with about 2,500 residents by 2023. Beyond South Africa, far-right elements in Africa are limited, intertwined with ethnic nationalisms; in North Africa, ethno-nationalist rhetoric against sub-Saharan migrants has surged under leaders like Tunisia's Kais Saïed since 2021, with over 1,000 monthly deportations by 2023, amid riots and supremacist exclusion in Algeria and Morocco blending Arab identity politics. In sub-Saharan Africa, indigenous formations remain marginal, overshadowed by tribal ethno-nationalism, as in the 1994 Rwandan genocide where Hutu Power extremists killed 800,000 Tutsis under supremacist ideology rooted in colonial divisions, or historical fascist emulations like Ethiopia's Lictor Youth under Italian occupation. Authoritarian regimes, such as Togo's under Gnassingbé Eyadéma (1967–2005), displayed right-wing traits but lacked explicit far-right ideology. Overall, African instances reflect localized responses to decolonization, with southern African white-minority variants most akin to global patterns.

Oceania Developments

In Australia, far-right activism centers on anti-immigration and nationalist sentiments, amplified by high migration levels—518,000 net overseas arrivals to June 2023—and concerns over infrastructure and integration, culminating in 2025 rallies drawing thousands against multiculturalism. Pauline Hanson's One Nation party, founded in 1997, advocates immigration restrictions, border security, and opposition to globalization, securing Senate seats and 5-7% national polling, rejecting far-right labels while mainstreaming nativist rhetoric. Fringe groups like Australia First Party and National Socialist Network achieve negligible electoral success under 1%, amid state laws criminalizing Nazi salutes. New Zealand's far-right landscape features fragmented extremism rather than parties, with roots in neo-Nazi networks waning post-1970s crackdowns; the 2019 Christchurch mosque attacks by Brenton Tarrant, killing 51, spurred gun laws and counter-terrorism but limited nationalist traction. Groups like Action Zealandia focus on ethnonationalism and youth recruitment amid Māori rights debates, with low hundreds in membership and no parliamentary presence. Populist elements in the 2023 conservative coalition, including New Zealand First's immigration caps and policy reversals on indigenous co-governance (6-8% support), align with right-wing priorities but remain within mainstream conservatism. In Pacific Islands, nationalist movements prioritize independence and resource control, as in Bougainville or New Caledonia, over exclusionism. Overall, Oceania emphasizes Australia's mobilization over New Zealand's subdued extremism, prioritizing security responses.

Contemporary Issues and Networks

Political Parties and Electoral Gains

Far-right parties have secured electoral advances by adopting standard democratic strategies, including the normalization of their ideologies within mainstream political discourse, which reduces negative voter perceptions and enables broader acceptance—tactics also employed by other opposition movements integrating into competitive politics. Party professionalization, encompassing organizational refinement, sophisticated media strategies, and coherent policy platforms, has enhanced their competitiveness and appeal to diverse electorates, akin to approaches used by various parties seeking mainstream viability. These parties have also cultivated issue ownership on priorities such as control, framing themselves as authoritative voices against perceived cultural and security threats. Coalition strategies, a routine aspect of parliamentary bargaining, have further propelled gains, with far-right formations entering governing alliances or exerting influence as pivotal partners, thereby translating votes into policy concessions on sovereignty and protectionism. In the , the establishment of transnational groups like Identity and Democracy has coordinated efforts across national boundaries, amplifying collective bargaining power and ideological cohesion.

Online Ecosystems and Digital Mobilization

Anonymous imageboards such as 4chan's /pol/ board and 8chan (later 8kun) have served as incubators for far-right discourse, enabling anonymous users to share memes, manifestos, and calls to action that facilitate radicalization and event coordination. These platforms' lack of moderation allows rapid dissemination of ideas, including those inspiring attacks like the 2019 Christchurch mosque shootings, where the perpetrator announced intentions on 8chan. Deplatforming efforts by mainstream sites have pushed users toward alternative ecosystems, yet studies indicate that such measures often fail to dismantle network cohesion, as followers migrate to less regulated spaces while maintaining ideological continuity. The 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville exemplified digital mobilization, with organizers using servers and private groups to coordinate logistics, recruit participants, and strategize messaging to downplay overt . These tools bridged disparate online communities, drawing hundreds to the event despite internal fractures revealed in leaked chats. Post-event of figures like those involved accelerated shifts to platforms; for instance, Gab, launched in 2016 as a free-speech alternative, saw user surges, claiming 2.3 million new registrations in early 2021 amid broader restrictions. Telegram has emerged as a key hub for far-right channels, hosting thousands of extremist groups worldwide by 2024, with its aiding discreet mobilization and sharing. The platform gained 25 million users in 72 hours following the 2021 shutdown, including spikes in far-right subscribers, enabling sustained activity despite crackdowns elsewhere. Features like large group chats and support real-time coordination for protests, as seen in European lone-actor radicalizations amplified via Telegram post-October 2023 events. While mainstream platforms like X (formerly Twitter) impose content rules, Spaces audio rooms have been utilized by far-right actors for elite-level networking and engagement. Empirical analyses reveal that digital ecosystems enhance far-right reach through viral memes and cross-platform migration, with deplatforming sometimes inadvertently boosting resilience by fostering decentralized networks. Recruitment messaging on these sites emphasizes shared grievances, drawing in users via accessible formats rather than overt ideology, contributing to electoral influences like meme-driven campaigns in 2016 U.S. politics. However, visibility remains constrained compared to pre-deplatforming eras, with alt-platform audiences like Gab's—where only 1% of U.S. adults regularly consume news—limiting broader societal impact.

International Alliances and Influences

Far-right political parties have increasingly coordinated through formal parliamentary groups in the , reflecting shared priorities on national sovereignty, immigration restriction, and . The Patriots for Europe group, established on July 8, 2024, emerged as the third-largest bloc in the with representation from 12 countries, including France's under and Hungary's led by , totaling around 84 members focused on opposing and promoting patriotic policies. Similarly, the Europe of Sovereign Nations initiative, co-founded in 2024 by Germany's (AfD) alongside Bulgaria's Revival party, emphasizes strict anti-immigration stances and resistance to integration, though it remains smaller with limited cohesion. These alliances extend beyond electoral bodies into informal transnational networks, facilitated by digital platforms and personal connections among leaders. Movements like the Identitarian Generation maintain chapters across and , coordinating actions against migration through symbolic campaigns such as ship interceptions in the Mediterranean, drawing ideological inspiration from figures like Renaud Camus's "Great Replacement" theory. Conferences and summits, including those organized by think tanks affiliated with parties like Italy's , enable strategy-sharing on countering , with attendance from U.S. conservatives amplifying transatlantic ties. External influences shape these dynamics, notably from non-European actors seeking to leverage far-right sentiments. Russian entities have documented efforts to cultivate relationships with European far-right groups via funding, media amplification, and ideological alignment on anti-Western narratives, achieving partial success in parties like France's , which received loans from Russian banks in the 2010s before shifting stances post-2022 invasion. Conversely, American political developments, particularly Donald Trump's 2024 reelection, have invigorated European counterparts by validating protectionist and anti-globalist agendas, prompting increased policy emulation in areas like border security despite lacking formal institutional links. networks, such as "active clubs" training in combat and , demonstrate cross-border diffusion of tactics from U.S. white nationalist circles to European groups, monitored by agencies for potential escalation. Global cooperation remains constrained by inherent nationalist divergences, limiting deep integration compared to leftist internationals, yet shared opposition to fosters ad-hoc collaborations, as seen in joint protests against migration pacts. Empirical data from parliamentary voting records show these groups occasionally align on votes but fragment on economic or issues, underscoring tactical rather than ideological unity.

Controversies and Associated Phenomena

Violence and Terrorism Assessments

The U.S. Department of Security's 2025 Homeland Threat Assessment identifies racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs), frequently linked to fringe far-right ideologies such as , as a persistent domestic capable of inspiring lone-actor attacks on minorities, targets, and . These actors, categorized under domestic violent extremists (DVEs), are assessed to pose risks through online and small-cell operations, such as those associated with groups like Atomwaffen Division, though the report notes only 4 DVE attacks (resulting in 1 death) and 7 disrupted plots from September 2023 to July 2024. Importantly, this violence stems from isolated extremists or fringe cells lacking organizational connections to mainstream far-right political parties, which operate within democratic frameworks, participate in elections, and publicly disavow terrorism. In comparison, homegrown violent extremists inspired by foreign terrorist organizations like conducted 2 attacks and had 3 plots disrupted in the same period, underscoring DVEs' edge in immediacy but not necessarily in lethality. Empirical analyses reveal a decline in far-right terrorism activity. A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report documented a plunge in right-wing terror attacks in 2025, marking the first year in over 30 that left-wing attacks outnumbered them, with right-wing incidents dropping amid heightened scrutiny post-January 6, 2021. From 2010 to 2023, domestic terrorism fatalities totaled under 200 across ideologies, with right-wing extremists responsible for a plurality in some datasets but far below the scale of Islamist-inspired attacks globally or historically in the U.S. (e.g., 9/11's 2,977 deaths). Advocacy groups like the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) attributed all 2024 U.S. extremist-related murders to right-wing actors, yet broader government data incorporates left-wing and apolitical violence, and selective ideological labeling can inflate perceptions. In , Europol's 2025 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT), covering 2024 data, records 58 total terrorist attacks across EU states, with jihadist remaining the predominant threat due to higher numbers of completed attacks, foiled plots, and arrests compared to ethno-nationalist and racially motivated (ENRMV), which encompasses far-right elements typically limited to fringe actors rather than mainstream parties. ENRMV incidents were limited, primarily involving foiled plots and arrests (e.g., 20-30 annually in recent years), often tied to anti-immigration or supremacist motives, but resulted in minimal fatalities relative to jihadist operations. Assessments highlight jihadist networks' transnational reach as a greater operational concern, though far-right online propagation raises alarms for potential escalation. Globally, the Institute for Economics and Peace's (GTI) 2025 indicates that over 90% of deaths in 2024 occurred in conflict zones driven by Islamist groups like affiliates, with far-right confined mostly to Western lone-actor events causing fewer than 50 deaths worldwide since 2010. Comparative studies find Islamist extremists more prone to high-casualty attacks than right-wing counterparts.
Region/PeriodFar-Right/Right-Wing Attacks/PlotsFatalitiesComparison to Other Ideologies
U.S. (Sep 2023-Jul 2024)4 attacks, 7 plots (DVEs incl. RMVEs)12 attacks by Islamist-inspired (HVEs)
U.S. (2025 YTD)Fewer than left-wing attacks (CSIS)Low (decline noted)Left-wing outpaces right-wing for first time in 30+ years
(2024)Limited ENRMV attacks; ~20-30 arrestsMinimal58 total attacks, jihadist dominant
Global (2010-2024)<50 deaths from far-rightLow>90% deaths from Islamist groups (GTI)

Accusations of Racism and Authoritarianism

Critics, including mainstream media outlets and advocacy groups, have frequently accused far-right political actors of harboring racist ideologies, often citing opposition to immigration or multiculturalism as evidence of underlying racial animus rather than policy preferences based on cultural or economic concerns. These accusations typically frame nationalist rhetoric—such as calls to preserve demographic majorities in Western nations—as veiled white nationalism, drawing from historical associations with groups like the Ku Klux Klan, despite far-right movements today largely disavowing explicit biological racism in favor of cultural preservation arguments. For instance, in the United Kingdom, Reform UK faced scrutiny in April 2025 for candidates' social media posts deemed offensive, leading to accusations of racism from political opponents and media reports. Similarly, the Proud Boys, a pro-Western fraternity associated with far-right activism, have been labeled racist by analysts for online rhetoric that blends irony with exclusionary views on race and identity, though the group maintains its stance is patriotic rather than supremacist. In the United States, far-right involvement in events like the 2017 Charlottesville has been cited as emblematic of , with participants chanting slogans interpreted by critics as endorsing white separatism, resulting in widespread condemnation and legal actions against attendees for rather than alone. Empirical studies on and , however, have yielded mixed results; a 1991 analysis found no elevated levels among conservatives compared to liberals when controlling for other factors, suggesting accusations may sometimes conflate ideological disagreement with . Reports of far-right hate crimes, such as those tracked by the U.S. Department of Justice, include race-based threats by individuals self-identifying as skinheads, but aggregate data shows disproportionately from left-leaning actors in recent years, complicating narratives of far-right exceptionalism in racial animus. Accusations of against far-right figures center on alleged desires to erode democratic institutions in favor of centralized power, often exemplified by claims against for efforts to challenge the 2020 election results, which prosecutors and scholars have likened to tactics used by autocrats to weaponize state mechanisms. In , Hungary's , aligned with far-right , faces charges from international observers of consolidating power through media control and judicial reforms, deemed authoritarian despite maintaining electoral legitimacy. , a policy blueprint associated with U.S. conservatives, has been critiqued by left-leaning think tanks as enabling authoritarian governance akin to models in or , though proponents argue it restores constitutional balances eroded by prior administrations. Such claims frequently emanate from outlets like and the Center for , institutions with documented progressive biases that may amplify threats to liberal norms while downplaying similar tendencies elsewhere. Critics assert that far-right preferences for strong and national inherently threaten pluralism, pointing to support for figures like in , accused of authoritarian leanings during his 2019-2023 presidency for military praise and policy centralization. Yet, quantitative assessments of global indicate that while far-right extremism contributes to incidents, the overall rise since the 1970s involves multifaceted polarization, not unilateral far-right culpability. In , the (AfD) party has been accused of authoritarian sympathies via alleged foreign influence, such as Russia spying claims in 2025, though these remain unproven allegations from rival politicians. These accusations often prioritize interpretive frameworks over verifiable institutional erosion, as far-right governments like Orbán's have sustained multiparty elections without suspending constitutions, challenging blanket authoritarian labels.

Supporters' Responses to Criticisms

Supporters of far-right aligned policies argue that portrayals of such movements as inevitable precursors to violence or dictatorship rely on selective framing and disproportionate emphasis on potential threats, rather than comprehensive assessments of actions or voter support. They contend that media coverage, often shaped by progressive viewpoints, amplifies these narratives without equivalent scrutiny of comparable left-leaning mobilizations, conflating concerns over cultural preservation, border security, and sovereignty with accusations of supremacism. Proponents emphasize empirical policy outcomes, such as correlations between stricter immigration controls and reduced public safety risks, as evidence against claims of inherent danger. They distinguish mainstream political efforts from fringe violence, asserting that academia and journalism underreport governance successes and electoral mandates—viewed as expressions of popular sovereignty—while focusing on outliers. These counter-claims prioritize verifiable metrics like crime statistics and democratic continuity over predictive or anecdotal indictments.

Media Framing Debates

Mainstream media outlets frequently portray far-right politics through framing patterns that emphasize extremism and threats to democracy, including labeling practices such as applying terms like "neo-Nazi" or "white supremacist" to a broad spectrum of nationalist or conservative positions, while underreporting comparable left-wing activities. This selective framing aligns with the left-leaning ideological predominance in journalism, where the 2022 American Journalist Study indicates approximately 36% of U.S. journalists identify as Democrats, 3.4% as Republicans, and the majority as independents (51.7%), many leaning left, contributing to distortions in public perception of political risks. While critiquing these biases in left-leaning media and academic sources, analyses of far-right politics, including classifications and framing in this article, often draw from the available scholarly literature, which may inherit similar ideological limitations; thus, critical evaluation of sources remains essential. Coverage analyses reveal agenda-setting biases through disproportionate attention to far-right relative to its empirical incidence and selection effects that minimize left-wing . For instance, a 2022 study found U.S. media devoted significantly more resources to right-wing threats than to left-wing violence, despite data from sources like the for Strategic and International Studies showing over 25 attacks or plots by left-wing actors since 2015 compared to fluctuating right-wing figures. In , electoral gains by parties skeptical of mass immigration, such as Italy's in 2022, were routinely prefixed with "far-right" in headlines, overshadowing policy platforms focused on and . The 2017 Charlottesville rally illustrates such biases, where coverage emphasized far-right aggression despite mutual clashes, framing the event primarily as unilateral right-wing violence. Academic institutions amplify these portrayal mechanisms through research and labeling practices influenced by left-wing dominance, evidenced by faculty political donations exceeding 95% to Democrats in social sciences, which categorizes routine conservative opposition to as "extremist." Reports critique this as producing skewed extremism databases, such as those from the ADL, which inflate far-right counts by including non-violent actors while minimizing Islamist or left-wing parallels, influencing policies like . This institutional tilt fosters a feedback loop reinforcing narratives of far-right peril, often detached from data on lethality, where START Consortium findings indicate Islamist extremism caused more U.S. fatalities post-9/11 than far-right actions until recent years.

Policy Impacts and Outcomes

Implemented Policies

In , the government led by , which took office on October 22, 2022, implemented measures to reduce illegal Mediterranean crossings, including bilateral agreements with and for naval patrols and repatriations, as well as outsourcing asylum processing to via a November 2023 treaty. These policies emphasized external border controls over internal redistribution, differing from prior EU-wide mechanisms. Fiscally, Meloni's administration cut public spending and introduced incentives such as flat taxes for new hires and self-employed workers. In , Viktor Orbán's Fidesz-led governments since 2010 enacted pro-natalist family policies, including lifetime exemptions for women with four or more children (introduced 2019), grandparental leave, and subsidies covering up to 80% of home purchases for young families with two children. These policies prioritized native over . Economically, Hungary's shift to work-based welfare and foreign investment incentives involved regulatory simplifications and labor market activations. Denmark's adoption of restrictive immigration frameworks, influenced by the Danish People's Party's parliamentary leverage since the 2001 center-right coalition, included "ghetto laws" from 2018 mandating , dispersal of non-Western migrants, and asset seizures for welfare claims.

Empirical Effects on Society and Economy

Economic indicators in Hungary showed a 43.9% increase in GDP per capita from 2010 to 2023, surpassing the EU average growth of 16.2%, with unemployment reaching historic lows of approximately 3.5% by 2019 and remaining below 5% through much of the decade. However, post-2022 performance weakened, with GDP contracting 0.9% in 2024 and inflation peaking at 25% in 2023, leading to revised 2025 growth forecasts of 1.8%. In Italy, GDP grew 0.7% in both 2023 and 2024, with the deficit trimmed below 3% of GDP via job growth adding 300,000 positions, and unemployment falling from 8.1% in 2022 to 6.5% by mid-2025. U.S. protectionist tariffs from 2017-2021 yielded negligible net manufacturing job gains, with exposed sectors losing 1.4% of jobs due to higher costs and retaliation, and overall manufacturing employment stagnating at 12.8 million. Fiscal indicators reflected mixed outcomes, including sustained per capita gains in Hungary relative to pre-2010 trends despite criticisms of crony capitalism, and Italy's structural debt persisting at 140% of GDP. Demographic trends in Hungary saw the total fertility rate rise from 1.25 births per woman in 2010 to 1.59 in 2021, exceeding the EU average of 1.53, with annual births increasing from 90,000 to peaks near 100,000 before falling to 1.38 and a record low of 77,500 in 2024 amid economic pressures; these measures cost 5% of GDP annually. Migration flows declined by 60% in Italy to 66,317 irregular sea arrivals in 2024 from prior peaks exceeding 150,000, correlating with reduced short-term welfare and housing strains, as non-EU migrants' initial fiscal costs often exceed contributions per European Commission analyses; this alleviated urban sanctuary pressures where pre-existing inflows correlated with localized welfare spikes. Crime-safety measures showed contested immigration links, with large-scale European waves correlating to no aggregate homicide rise but 0.5-1% property crime increases in affected areas per UK and German data, while restrictions avoided such risks without broad victimization upticks. Social trust indicators rose in polls amid cultural preservation efforts, with observations of diversity-induced cohesion erosion in high-immigration Nordic states, though causation remains indirect and debated.

Criticisms and Responses

Critics argue that far-right policies contribute to democratic backsliding by concentrating power in executive branches and undermining judicial independence, as seen in Hungary under Viktor Orbán, where reforms have eroded checks and balances, and in Poland under the Law and Justice government, which altered court structures and faced EU sanctions for rule-of-law violations. Economic critiques focus on cronyism and inefficiency, such as the allocation of state contracts to political allies, which proponents of these policies counter by highlighting sustained electoral legitimacy, including repeated victories without suspension of competitive elections. On social impacts, detractors link immigration restrictions to heightened xenophobia and violence, citing U.S. data on right-wing extremists accounting for a majority of ideologically motivated fatalities. Counterarguments emphasize contextual crime outcomes, with mixed European evidence on immigrant-crime links and benefits from tighter controls, such as reduced gang-related violence in Denmark, contrasted with foreign-born overrepresentation in violent crimes in Sweden per official statistics; far-right violence remains rare among adherents. Health and welfare critiques claim that austerity-like measures in far-right administrations harm public outcomes, while proponents point to policy stability, family subsidies supporting demographic trends, and voter approval for reforms without broader institutional erosion.

References

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