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Opposition to immigration
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Opposition to immigration, also known as anti-immigration, is a political position that seeks to restrict or ban legal and illegal immigration. In the modern sense, immigration refers to the entry of people from one state or territory into another state or territory in which they are not citizens. Illegal immigration occurs when people immigrate to a country without having official permission to do so.[1] Opposition to immigration ranges from calls for various immigration reforms, to proposals to completely restrict immigration, to calls for repatriation of existing immigrants.
Anti-immigration arguments
[edit]National identity
[edit]Whether and how national identity affects attitudes toward immigration depends heavily on the meanings associated with a particular national identity. If a national identity is defined in an exclusionary way that targets ethnic or racial groups, or if an ethnic or racial majority dominates in the political structures of a nation, then that national identity is likely to be associated with attitudes against immigration. Research also suggests that people respond more strongly to appeals to national identity than they do to economic considerations when they are asked about issues relating to immigration.[2] Both Americans and Europeans are likely to overestimate the number of immigrants in their countries and to favor lower immigration.[3]
Where national identity is not defined in a way that conflicts with ethnic or racial identity, and where such groups are not excluded socio-economically, national identity can be compatible with ethnic or racial diversity.[4][2] National identity can even be an important factor for social peace in cases where there are intra-national divides. For example, a 2015 study showed that educational content emphasizing the national unity of Indonesia was an important cause of improved inter-ethnic and inter-religious relationships in Suharto's Indonesia.[5]
Isolation, separation and stability
[edit]Immigrants can be isolated in their own communities, forming self-organized communities, ghettos or parallel societies where they live according to their own culture, rather than assimilating to the native culture with a reduced or minimal spatial, social and cultural contact with the majority society into which they have immigrated. Such ethnic enclaves can be the result of humans naturally liking to be around people like themselves.[6] They might not learn the local language and might eventually undermine the national unity, as well as the cultural and religious unity of the native country.[7] Research by Jennifer Neal of Michigan State University suggests that ethnic enclaves promote social cohesion at the cost of decreasing tolerance between groups and that their size, autonomy and proximity are factors.[6] Some also suggest to devolve more power to local communities.[6]
Immigration may adversely affect social[8] and political stability.[9]
Increased competition
[edit]Economic arguments concentrate on competition for employment, and the higher burdens that some groups of immigrants may impose on social welfare systems, health systems, housing and public schools of the native state.[10] For example, Denmark's strict immigration law reform has saved the country 6.7 billion euros compared to previous more permissive approach, according to a 2011 report from the Danish Integration Ministry.[11][12]
Environmental space, quality and resource scarcity
[edit]Some people think[weasel words] there is a certain size of land needed to provide for a population ("environmental space"), e.g., to provide for the population's consumption, including absorption of waste products.[13][failed verification] Immigrants, in this logic, such as a newborn child, reduce the per-capita size of land of the native country.
Some are concerned about urban sprawl and congestion, alterations in the wildlife and natural environment of the state, and an expansive carbon footprint due to immigration.[14] Furthermore, some are concerned over a state's scarce resources, dwindling water reserves, energy, pauperized soils and solid waste.[14]
Diseases
[edit]Immigrants (and cross-border movements in general) can bring infectious diseases uncommon to the native population from their home countries[15][16][17][18][19][20] which some perceive as a threat of significance in opposition to immigration.[21][22][23]
There is a history of white supremacist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan exaggerating or fabricating a connection between immigrants and infectious disease in order to stoke anti-immigrant sentiment.[24]
Immigrant crime
[edit]Opponents of immigration often claim that immigrants contribute to higher crime rates, but research suggests that people tend to overestimate the relationship between immigration and criminality.[25][26][27] The academic literature provides mixed findings for the relationship between immigration and crime worldwide, but finds for the United States that immigration either has no impact on the crime rate or that it reduces the crime rate.[28][29][26][30][31][32][33][34][35][36]
Military unity
[edit]Some concerns regarding immigration can be found in perceived military loyalty, especially if the country of emigration becomes involved in a war with the country of immigration[37] or if a country finds itself to need conscription.
Dangerous journeys
[edit]Unauthorized or irregular migration can expose immigrants to many dangers, including exposure to harsh environments, lack of food and water, and violence from smugglers and authorities.[38] Since 2014, over 4,000 people have died each year on migration routes around the world, and this is likely to be a low estimate since many deaths are never recorded.[39]
Harshly restricting immigration and making these restrictions known to potential emigrants may prevent them from taking such dangerous journeys.[40][better source needed] In the United States, the border patrol policy of Prevention Through Deterrence has deliberately acted to divert migrants into remote areas where they are more likely to encounter life-threatening dangers.[41]
Import of culture
[edit]Immigrants bring their culture with them.[42][43][44][45][46][47][17] The immigrants' thinking, their norms, practices, customs and values shape, extend and influence the native country's culture (Leitkultur). Some such extensions and influences might not be desired by parts of the native population, for reasons that may include practises considered less civilized, restrictions as well as collisions with the native country's norms, laws and values in general.[48][49][self-published source][50][51]
Economic costs
[edit]Opponents of immigration often state that immigrants have a net negative effect on public coffers mainly due to the provisioning of medical care and welfare.[52][53][54][55][56][57][58]
Various factors influence the impact of immigrants to a nation's public coffers and their use of welfare. While immigrants can improve a state's welfare system by for example counteracting trends of aging populations their net economic impact might also be negative.[59][60] George Borjas, economics professor at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, states that "the more unskilled the immigrant, the more likely the immigrant will be a fiscal burden".[61] High-skilled immigrants have better labor market prospects than those admitted based on kinship ties or for humanitarian reasons.[62] It also depends on the tenures, wages and ages of the immigrants[63] and the country's integration system.[62]
Damage to migrants' home countries
[edit]Some opponents of immigration argue that immigration of highly skilled or well-educated individuals may hurt their home countries, which could otherwise benefit from them and build up their economy and improve their social and political system. However, that notion of "brain drain" remains largely unsupported in the academic literature. According to the economist Michael Clemens, it has not been shown that restrictions on high-skill emigration reduce shortages in the countries of origin.[64] According to the development economist Justin Sandefur, "there is no study out there... showing any empirical evidence that migration restrictions have contributed to development."[65] Hein de Haas, a professor of sociology at the University of Amsterdam, describes brain drain as a "myth".[66] Research suggests that emigration (both low- and high-skilled) is beneficial to the sending countries in terms of economy,(speculation)[67][68][69][70][71][72][73][74][75] education,[76][77][78][79][80][81] and liberal democracy.[82][83][84][85][86][87][88][89][90][91][excessive citations]
Remittances have a major impact on the developing economies of the world with the majority of remittances, $441 billion in 2015, going to developing nations. This amount is nearly triple the $131 billion of global Official Development Assistance.[92] For many developing nations, remittances received make up a significant portion of their economies often receiving over 10% of their GDP in remittances each year.[92] From a macroeconomic perspective, there is no conclusive relationship between remittances and GDP growth.[93] While remittances can boost aggregate demand and thereby spur economic activity, other research indicates that remittances may also have adverse macroeconomic impacts by increasing income inequality and reducing labour supply among recipient countries.[94]
No solution to underlying problems
[edit]Immigration may be the outcome of problems in the migrants' countries of origin. Open immigration policies and efforts do not address the problems, but keeping borders closed does not address them either.
Jeanne Park of the Council on Foreign Relations recommends European leaders to address the root causes of migration such as helping to broker an end to the Syrian Civil War, restoring stability to Libya, and increasing aid to sub-Saharan Africa. According to her, a political solution to the regional crises can make Europe no longer struggle with migrant inflows.[95] Concerning the migratory and refugee movements in and from the Horn of Africa, Günther Schröder noted that more efforts are needed to deal with its causes.[96] A report by the German Caritasverband stated that only a long-term strategy that differentiates combating the causes for migration in the countries of origin and the development of an EU migration policy can find solutions.[97] Responding to the root causes of illegal migration flows involves co-operation with third countries, including migrants' countries of origin and transit, and might manifest itself in conflict avoidance, peacekeeping and state building.[98] It has been suggested that safe havens be created within the country of origin.[99] It can be argued that immigration means that people "flee" of their country's problems instead of organizing, building up pressure, being involved in constructive foreign aid programs, or otherwise addressing them.[citation needed]
Decolonization
[edit]Some advocates of decolonization view immigrants as colonizers of the native-born or indigenous people.[100]
Suffrage
[edit]Permissive immigration policies tend to lead to worse enfranchisement for immigrants.[101]
Causes of anti-immigration views
[edit]A 2017 study comprised 18,000 interviews across eleven countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, Korea, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. The study found that "higher-skilled immigrants are preferred to their lower-skilled counterparts at all levels of native socio-economic status (SES). There is little support for the Labor Market Competition hypothesis, since respondents are not more opposed to immigrants in their own SES stratum. While skin tone itself has little effect in any country, immigrants from Muslim-majority countries do elicit significantly lower levels of support, and racial animus remains a powerful force."[102]
A paper published in 2018 found that an influx of high-skilled immigration was associated with declines in nationalist voting, but that an influx in low-skilled immigration was associated with increases in nationalist voting in elections during the 2007–2016 period.[103] Perceptions that immigrants are low skilled also caused increased opposition (though high-skilled immigrants are more likely to be welcomed).[104] A 2019 paper from Tel Aviv University identified economic competition, cultural competition, racial attitudes, and fear of crime as some of the most significant factors in opposition to immigration.[105]
While much research has been conducted to determine what causes opposition to immigration, little research has been done to determine the causes behind support for immigration.[106]
Country of origin
[edit]A study of Europe found that immigrants themselves tend to hold more favorable views of immigration.[107] The same study found no evidence that the native-born children of immigrants hold more favorable views of immigration.[107] A 2017 study found that immigrants who stay in the country longer hold more negative views of immigration than those who have only been there for a brief period, possibly due to assimilating into native society and adopting its views.[108] However, a 2025 study shows that former migrants' remain more supportive of immigration than locals even after 40 years spent in the host society, which the authors attribute to the process of cosmopolitanization, triggered by the migration experience.[109]
Economic status
[edit]A 2014 review study in the Annual Review of Political Science found that "there is little accumulated evidence that citizens primarily form attitudes about immigration based on its effects on their personal economic situation. This pattern has held in both North America and Western Europe, in both observational and experimental studies."[110] A study of Europe found the unemployed hold less favorable views towards immigration than the employed.[107]
A 2022 study found that individuals in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy became less hostile to welfare for immigrants when immigrants had a long work history in the country.[111]
A 2020 study found that "economic anxiety" had little to do with a person's view on the inflow of immigrants in the U.S. The data collected by surveys showed that respondents' negative views/feelings about immigration were not impacted by economic anxiety but instead were impacted by higher levels of ethnocentrism. This means that if someone was anti-immigrant their views were not likely to be justified through economic anxiety or viewing immigrants as burdens but instead, people were more likely to be anti-immigrant based on the higher levels of ethnocentrism the individual had.[112]
Education
[edit]Levels of education are one of the best predictors of support for anti-immigration policies and parties.[113][114][115][107] A 2016 study published in the European Economic Review found, on the basis of European survey data in the period 2002–2012, that "higher levels of education lead to a more positive reported attitude toward immigrants".[4] The authors suggest that this is explained by weaker economic competition between immigrants and educated natives, a higher aversion to discrimination among the educated, and a greater belief in the positive effects of immigration among the educated.[4] A 2013 study in the American Journal of Political Science lends some support to the economic competition theory, as highly educated Americans who exhibit lower levels of xenophobia tend to support reductions in the number of highly skilled immigrants.[116]
A 2007 study in International Organization found that "people with higher levels of education and occupational skills are more likely to favor immigration regardless of the skill attributes of the immigrants in question. Across Europe, higher education and higher skills mean more support for all types of immigrants. These relationships are almost identical among individuals in the labor force (that is, those competing for jobs) and those not in the labor force."[117] A 2018 study in the American Political Science Review found "an additional year of secondary schooling substantially reduces the probability of opposing immigration, believing that immigration erodes a country's quality of life, and feeling close to far-right anti-immigration parties."[118]
One study of Japan found that exposure to information about the benefits of immigration substantially increased support for a more open immigration policy.[119][120]
A study by Alexander Janus investigated whether social desirability pressures may partially explain reduced opposition to immigration amongst the highly educated. Using an unobtrusive questioning technique, Janus found that anti-immigration sentiments amongst American college graduates were far higher than subjects were willing to state. This indicates that support for immigration amongst the better educated may reflect expression of socially desirable views rather than actual beliefs.[121] Further evidence for this was found in a study by Creighton et al., where amongst the college educated, it was found the stated support for immigration was higher than the actual pro-immigrant sentiment. This was true for other education levels. The study also found that the 2008 economic crisis did not significantly increase anti-immigration attitudes but rather there was a greater expression of opposition to immigration, with underlying attitudes changing little before and after the crisis.[122] A 2015 study found further evidence that support for immigration amongst the educated was mainly driven by social desirability bias.[123]
Geographic proximity to immigrants
[edit]Some research suggests that geographic proximity to immigrants drives anti-immigration views,[124] also described as NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) effect.[125]
A 2017 study finds that "more rapid ethnic changes increase opposition to immigration and support for UKIP" in the United Kingdom.[126] A 2018 study found that increases in local ethnic diversity in Denmark caused "rightward shifts in election outcomes by shifting electoral support away from traditional “big government” left‐wing parties and towards anti‐immigrant nationalist parties."[127] A 2018 study in the American Political Science Review found that Greeks who had "direct exposure to refugee arrivals" showed more hostility "toward refugees, immigrants, and Muslim minorities; support for restrictive asylum and immigration policies; and political engagement to effect such exclusionary policies."[128]
Some research shows the geographic proximity to immigrants reduces anti-immigration views.[129][130] The contact hypothesis suggests that intergroup contact can reduce prejudice.[131] Other research suggests that it is the perception of proximity, not actual proximity, that drives these views.[130] A 2019 study investigated why residents of cities tend to have more positive attitudes towards immigration and cosmopolitanism. The study concluded that it was not living in a city per se that created more positive attitudes but rather the composition of the populations of cities; city populations tended to be more educated, which correlated with more positive immigration attitudes, while people who were more positive of immigration were more likely to self-select into large cities. Cities were also found to be internally heterogenous with regards to immigration attitudes, with attitudes varying between neighbourhoods.[132]
Intergenerational transmission
[edit]Some research suggests that anti-immigration views are transmitted from older generations to younger generations.[133] A 2015 study found that British communities that were more acceptant of Jews in medieval times show much more tolerance towards 20th century immigrants (chiefly Caribbean and South Asian immigrants) and 21st century immigrants (chiefly Eastern European), and less support for the far right.[134]
Cultural absolutism
[edit]The belief that some cultures are better than others, called cultural absolutism or cultural racism, is correlated with opposition to immigration.[135]: 6,12
Biological racism
[edit]The belief that some groups of people are born with different psychological abilities or personalities was found to be correlated with opposition to immigration.[135]: 6,12
Religion
[edit]A 2017 study found that by emphasizing shared religion can produce more supportive attitudes toward refugees.[136] A 2015 study of the US found that religion did not seem to determine opposition to immigration as while respondents were explicit about opposition to Muslim immigration, they also concealed significant opposition to Christian immigration due to social desirability bias. It was thus determined that religiosity or denomination did not determine explicit or implicit opposition and any differences were down to social desirability bias in this case.[137]
One 2018 study in the United Kingdom found that opposition to Muslim immigrants was not about a more negative view of Muslim (compared to Christian) immigrants but rather about rejecting fundamentalist religiosity. The study concluded that opposition based on religion was thus less about the religious group and more about political liberalism versus religious fundamentalism.[138][139]
Sociopsychological explanations
[edit]A 2014 review study in the Annual Review of Political Science found that there is substantial evidence in support of sociopsychological explanations for anti-immigration views.[110] A 2007 study in International Organization found that "the link between education and attitudes toward immigrants is driven by differences among individuals in cultural values and beliefs. More educated respondents are significantly less racist and place greater value on cultural diversity than do their counterparts; they are also more likely to believe that immigration generates benefits for the host economy as a whole."[117]
A 2017 study in the American Political Science Review argued that hostility towards immigrants is driven by disgust and can be explained as a psychological mechanism designed to protect humans from disease.[140]
Research suggests that the perception that there is a positive causal link between immigration and crime leads to greater support for anti-immigration policies or parties.[141][142][143][144][145] Research also suggests that bigotry and immigrant alienation could exacerbate immigrant criminality and bigotry. For instance, University of California, San Diego political scientist Claire Adida, Stanford University political scientist David Laitin and Sorbonne University economist Marie-Anne Valfort argue "fear-based policies that target groups of people according to their religion or region of origin are counter-productive. Our own research, which explains the failed integration of Muslim immigrants in France, suggests that such policies can feed into a vicious cycle that damages national security. French Islamophobia—a response to cultural difference—has encouraged Muslim immigrants to withdraw from French society, which then feeds back into French Islamophobia, thus further exacerbating Muslims' alienation, and so on."[146]
A study of the long-term effects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States found that the post-9/11 increase in hate crimes against Muslims decreased assimilation by Muslim immigrants.[147] Controlling for relevant factors, the authors found that "Muslim immigrants living in states with the sharpest increase in hate crimes also exhibit: greater chances of marrying within their own ethnic group; higher fertility; lower female labour force participation; and lower English proficiency."[147] A study of Germans found that the 9/11 terror attacks contributed to greater anti-immigrant sentiments.[148] States that experience terrorist acts on their own soil or against their own citizens are more likely to adopt stricter restrictions on asylum recognition.[149]
Research in 2017 also indicated opposition to immigration may be motivated by a person's concern about their group's social position.[150] Studies found that increasing Hispanic immigration to the US caused greater support for immigration restriction amongst both white Americans and non-Hispanic non-white Americans (Hispanic Americans showed no change in attitudes), suggesting that concerns about group position could motivate opposition to immigration.[151][152] Political ideology can also interact with group social position;[153] in the 2016 United States presidential election white Clinton voters were strongly opposed to the notion of white Americans limiting immigration to maintain their group position but were not generally opposed to the notion of Hispanic Americans desiring to increase their population share via increased immigration, while white Trump voters showed the opposite.[150] David Frum suggests that while mass migration has occurred historically, for societies that have undergone a demographic transition, immigration brings change faster since the native population has fewer children. This causes immigrants to be perceived not as reinforcing the native population but instead as replacing it.[154]
A study in Canada found that anti-refugee sentiments persisted more strongly among people with populist attitudes – on both sides of the political spectrum, i.e. left and right – even when controlling for demographic and economic factors, political interest, and satisfaction with democracy of the participants.[155]
Opposition to immigration by country or region
[edit]In 2018, a survey of 27 countries around the world showed that a median of 45% wanted fewer or no immigrants, 36% wanted to keep the current immigration levels and only 14% wanted immigration to increase. The median of those opposing was the highest in countries receiving the most migrants, with 51% in European countries.[156]
| Country/territory | Fewer/none (%) | About the same (%) | More (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 82 | 15 | 2 | |
| 73 | 15 | 9 | |
| 72 | 22 | 2 | |
| 71 | 18 | 5 | |
| 67 | 23 | 7 | |
| 65 | 23 | 11 | |
| 61 | 28 | 6 | |
| 60 | 24 | 15 | |
| 58 | 30 | 10 | |
| 54 | 31 | 8 | |
| 52 | 33 | 14 | |
| 50 | 26 | 20 | |
| 49 | 36 | 9 | |
| 45 | 11 | 13 | |
| 44 | 42 | 11 | |
| 42 | 38 | 20 | |
| 41 | 42 | 16 | |
| 39 | 49 | 10 | |
| 38 | 42 | 18 | |
| 37 | 44 | 14 | |
| 37 | 43 | 16 | |
| 32 | 46 | 19 | |
| 30 | 39 | 28 | |
| 29 | 44 | 24 | |
| 28 | 52 | 18 | |
| 27 | 53 | 19 | |
| 13 | 58 | 23 |
Australia
[edit]
The impact of Europeans was profoundly disruptive to Aboriginal life and, though the extent of violence is debated, there was considerable conflict on the frontier. At the same time, some settlers were quite aware they were usurping the Aborigines place in Australia. In 1845, settler Charles Griffiths sought to justify this, writing; "The question comes to this; which has the better right – the savage, born in a country, which he runs over but can scarcely be said to occupy ... or the civilized man, who comes to introduce into this ... unproductive country, the industry which supports life."[citation needed]
A sparsely populated continental nation with a predominantly European population, Australia has long feared being overwhelmed by the heavily populated Asian countries to its north. The standard policy after 1900 was "White Australia" which encouraged immigration from Britain, was suspicious of immigrants from Germany and elsewhere in Europe, and which was quite hostile to immigrants from Asia or the Pacific islands.[158] After World War II, most Australians agreed that the country must "populate or perish".[citation needed] Immigration brought people from traditional sources such as the British Isles along with, for the first time, large numbers of Southern and Central Europeans. The abolition of the so-called 'White Australia policy' during the early 1970s led to a significant increase in immigration from Asian and other non-European countries.
Prime Minister John Curtin supported White Australia policy, saying "This country shall remain forever the home of the descendants of those people who came here in peace to establish in the South Seas an outpost of the British race."[159]
Prime Minister Stanley Bruce was a supporter of the White Australia Policy, and made it an issue in his campaign for the 1925 Australian Federal election.[160]
It is necessary that we should determine what are the ideals towards which every Australian would desire to strive. I think those ideals might well be stated as being to secure our national safety, and to ensure the maintenance of our White Australia Policy to continue as an integral portion of the British Empire.[160] We intend to keep this country white and not allow its people to be faced with the problems that at present are practically insoluble in many parts of the world.[161]
H. V. Evatt, leader of the Labor Party throughout the 1950s, also defended the White Australia Policy. There was a strong view in Australia that any softening of the White Australia stance might result in cheaper labour being imported from overseas. Another prevailing sentiment was that multiculturalism resulted in instability. Evatt, opposing resolutions which could have led to more Asian immigration to Australia, told the Chinese delegation at San Francisco:
You have always insisted on the right to determine the composition of your own people. Australia wants that right now. What you are attempting to do now, Japan attempted after the last war [the First World War] and was prevented by Australia. Had we opened New Guinea and Australia to Japanese immigration then the Pacific War by now might have ended disastrously and we might have had another shambles like that experienced in Malaya.[162]
Arthur Calwell, who led the Labor Party from 1960 to 1967, supported the White Australia policy. This is reflected by Calwell's comments in his 1972 memoirs, Be Just and Fear Not, in which he made it clear that he maintained his view that non-European people should not be allowed to settle in Australia. He wrote:
I am proud of my white skin, just as a Chinese is proud of his yellow skin, a Japanese of his brown skin, and the Indians of their various hues from black to coffee-colored. Anybody who is not proud of his race is not a man at all. And any man who tries to stigmatize the Australian community as racist because they want to preserve this country for the white race is doing our nation great harm... I reject, in conscience, the idea that Australia should or ever can become a multi-racial society and survive.[163]
It was the high-profile historian Geoffrey Blainey, however, who first achieved mainstream recognition for the anti-multiculturalist cause when he wrote that multiculturalism threatened to transform Australia into a "cluster of tribes". In his 1984 book All for Australia, Blainey criticised multiculturalism for tending to "emphasise the rights of ethnic minorities at the expense of the majority of Australians" and also for tending to be "anti-British", even though "people from the United Kingdom and Ireland form the dominant class of pre-war immigrants and the largest single group of post-war immigrants."
According to Blainey, such a policy, with its "emphasis on what is different and on the rights of the new minority rather than the old majority," was unnecessarily creating division and threatened national cohesion. He argued that "the evidence is clear that many multicultural societies have failed and that the human cost of the failure has been high" and warned that "we should think very carefully about the perils of converting Australia into a giant multicultural laboratory for the assumed benefit of the peoples of the world."[164]
In one of his many criticisms of multiculturalism, Blainey wrote:
For the millions of Australians who have no other nation to fall back upon, multiculturalism is almost an insult. It is divisive. It threatens social cohesion. It could, in the long-term, also endanger Australia's military security because it sets up enclaves which in a crisis could appeal to their own homelands for help.
Blainey remained a persistent critic of multiculturalism into the 1990s, denouncing multiculturalism as "morally, intellectually and economically ... a sham".
During the early 1990s, Australia had two parties with their name in opposition to immigration. Australians Against Further Immigration and Reclaim Australia: Reduce Immigration.
In the 1996 election Pauline Hanson was elected to the federal seat of Oxley. In her controversial maiden speech to the House of Representatives, she expressed her belief that Australia "was in danger of being swamped by Asians". Hanson went on to form the One Nation Party, which initially won nearly one quarter of the vote in Queensland state elections before entering a period of decline due to internal disputes.[165] The name "One Nation" was meant to signify national unity, in contrast to what Hanson said was an increasing division in Australian society caused by government policies favouring migrants (multiculturalism) and indigenous Australians.[166]
Some Australians reacted angrily to One Nation, as Hanson was subjected to water balloons filled with urine at public speeches, ridiculed in the media, and received so many death threats she filmed a "good-bye video" in the case of her assassination.[167] She was imprisoned by the government on political corruption charges, which were dropped after her imprisonment.
In recent years, however, Hanson returned to politics in 2016 after being elected as One Nation Senator for Queensland, and the rise of other anti-immigrant parties such as the Australian Liberty Alliance and groups such as the United Patriots Front indicates that anti-immigration sentiment may be becoming mainstream.[citation needed]
Europe
[edit]
A February 2017 poll of 10,000 people in 10 European countries by Chatham House found on average a majority (55%) were opposed to further Muslim immigration, with opposition especially pronounced in several countries: Austria (65%), Poland (71%), Hungary (64%), France (61%) and Belgium (64%). Except for Poland, all of those had recently suffered jihadist terror attacks or been at the centre of a refugee crisis. Of those opposed to further Muslim immigration, 3/4 classify themselves as on the right of the political spectrum. Of those self-classifying as on the left of the political spectrum, 1/3 supported a halt.[168] According to a Yougov poll in 2018, majorities in all seven polled countries were opposed to accepting more migrants: Germany (72%), Denmark (65%), Finland (64%), Sweden (60%), United Kingdom (58%), France (58%) and Norway (52%).[169] A 2025 YouGov poll found the proportion of respondents which found immigration in the last 10 years too high was 81% in Germany, 80% in Spain, 73% in Sweden, 71% in Britain and Italy while 69% in France.[170]
Political opposition to high levels of legal immigration has been associated with certain right-wing parties in the EU. The issue increased with the European migrant crisis in 2015 with large numbers of refugees from the Middle East and Africa making dangerous trips to Europe and many deaths en route. With high levels of unemployment and partly unassimilated non-European immigrant populations already within the EU, parties opposed to immigration have improved their position in polls and elections. Right-wing parties critical to immigration have entered the government in Austria, Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Slovakia, and have become major factors in English, Swedish, German and French politics.[171]
Immigration is one of the central political issues in many European countries, and increasingly also at European Union level. The anti-immigration perspective is predominantly nationalist, cultural and economic. A new index measuring the level of perceived threat from immigrants has been recently proposed and applied to a data set covering 47 European countries and regions.[172]
In France, the National Front opposed immigration as of 2000.[173] In the 1988 elections, 75% of supporters of its leader Jean-Marie Le Pen believed France had too many immigrants as opposed to 35% of all voters.[174][needs update]
In the European Parliament, some political groups oppose to illegal immigration including European People's Party Group, Patriots for Europe and European Conservatives and Reformists Group.
Denmark
[edit]According to a poll in 2017, two out of three (64%) wished for limiting immigration from Muslim countries which was an increase from 2015 (54%).[175]
In Denmark, the parliamentary party most strongly associated with anti-immigration policies is the Danish People's Party.[176][177]
France
[edit]According to an Ipsos poll in September 2019, 65% responded that accepting migrants did not improve the situation in France and 45% responded that accepting migrants deprived the French of social services.[178]
The largest party in Senate Les Républicains have a right-wing populist views on immigration[179]
The National Rally is the largest party in France with anti immigration views.[180][181]
Germany
[edit]In 2018, a poll by Pew Research found that a majority (58%) wanted fewer immigrants to be allowed into the country, 30% wanted to keep the current level and 10% wanted to increase immigration.[156]
Greece
[edit]In February 2020, more than 10,000 individuals attempted to cross the border between Greece and Turkey after Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan opened its border to Europe, but they were blocked by Greek army and police forces. Hundreds of Greek soldiers and armed police resisted the trespassers and fired tear gas at them. Among those who attempted to cross the majority were not war refugees from Syria, but the largest group was from Afghanistan and the next largest from Pakistan along with significant numbers of migrants from African countries Ethiopia, Morocco and Algeria. Greece responded by refusing to accept asylum applications for a month.[182][183][184] Among the illegal immigrants who were apprehended between 28 February and 5 March by Greek authorities in the Evros region 64% were from Afghanistan, 19% were from Pakistan, 5% were from Turkey, 4% from Syria and 2.6% from Somalia.[184]
Hungary
[edit]
In 2015 during the European migrant crisis, Hungary built a razor-wire fence on its border to Serbia to stop migrants from entering the European Union.[185]
In 2016, Hungary held a referendum related to the European Union's migrant relocation plans. An overwhelming majority of voters (98.36%) rejected the EU's migrant quotas.
Mi Hazánk has anti immigration policies.
Ireland
[edit]In 2022, during the Ukrainian refugee crisis, the Irish Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth (DCEDIY) set up transitional shelters for refugees from various backgrounds, which lead to nationwide protests, which the Garda Síochána say numbered 307 in 2022 and at least a further 169 as of August 2023[update].[186][187][188] They started over concerns over the lack of information given to the people in the areas beforehand,[189] an overcrowding of facilities and the existing housing crisis,[190] refugee welfare,[191] and the lack of women and children in the initial group.[192]
As news of the protests spread, far-right protestors used the events to express their opposition to immigration and many have been criticized as being racist, which is what led to the counter-protests in County Cork and in the "Ireland for All" rally.[193][194] Some minority parties such as the National Party,[195] the Irish Freedom Party,[196] and Ireland First oppose immigration.[197] Independent politicians opposed to immigration also formed the now defunct Immigration Control Platform and party Identity Ireland want to tighten border control restrictions and have been described by the TheJournal.ie as anti-immigrant.[198] There is also an Irish off-shoot of Pegida.[199][200]
Social media campaigns have united the far-right activists to join the anti-immigration protests. Anti-immigration activists have used Telegram to communicate and started campaigns such as #IrelandIsFull, a hashtag that trended on Twitter.[201] The DCEDIY projected a shortfall of 15,000 beds for refugees in December 2022 and admitted that there was mounting pressure to house 65,000 people.[202][201]
Controversy has been raised over the loss or destruction of travel documents by 2,232 asylum seekers who were over 16 and traveling through Dublin Airport in 2022 after a freedom of information request. Reports had been made of the destruction of passports during transit in 2019.[203][204]
In May 2023, a Red C/The Business Post poll found that 75% of people thought that Ireland is taking in too many refugees.[205]
Italy
[edit]According to poll published by Corriere della Sera, one of two respondents (51%) approved closing Italy's ports to further boat migrants arriving via the Mediterranean, while 19% welcomed further boat migrants.[206]
In 2018, a poll by Pew Research found that a majority (71%) wanted fewer immigrants to be allowed into the country, 18% wanted to keep the current level and 5% wanted to increase immigration.[156]
Poland
[edit]In 2023, Poland held a referendum with a question "Do you support the admission of thousands of illegal immigrants from the Middle East and Africa, in accordance with the forced relocation mechanism imposed by the European bureaucracy?. 96.79% of voters voted no. The referendum was boycotted by the main opposition parties resulting in a turnout of only 40% (compared to more than 70% for the election).
Portugal
[edit]Portugal had little immigration until a sudden influx in the 1970s, as ex-colonists, most of them ethnically white, returned.[207] After the former Portuguese African colonies gained independence, and because nationals of Portuguese-speaking nations can freely live and work in Portugal without much bureaucracy, an incremental growth of immigration from Portugal's former overseas possessions was observed over the past few decades, primarily from Brazil, Cape Verde, Angola and Mozambique.[208][209] The country now has nearly 240,000 Brazilians[210] and about 350,000 people born in an African country.[211] Although immigrants are mostly concentrated in urban and suburban areas, mainly on Portugal's coast, Portuguese authorities have in recent times encouraged immigration, notably from Brazil, to rural areas, in an effort to increase an ever shrinking population.[212] The growth of the number of immigrants has been linked to an escalation of anti-immigration sentiments and protests throughout Portugal since the mids 2000's.[213][214]
Until recently,[when?] far-right party "National Renewal Party", known as PNR, was the only one in Portugal which actively targeted[clarification needed] the mass-immigration and ethnic minorities (mainly related to Gypsy and African communities) issues.[215][216] After years of growing support—0.09% 4,712 2002, 0.16% 9,374 2005, 0.20% 11,503 2009, 0.31% 17,548 2011— it managed 0.50%, or 27,269, of the electorate in the 2015 Portuguese legislative election. Since 2019, far-right political party Chega has gained traction in the country. Following the 2019 Portuguese legislative election, the party's president, André Ventura, assured a seat in Assembly of the Republic, after having received over 66,000 votes, 1,3% of the electorate.[217] In the 2020 Azorean regional election, the party secured two assemblyman to the regional parliament[218] and, during the 2021 Portuguese presidential election, André Ventura managed to gather approximately 500,000 votes, 12% of the total.[219] The party opposes immigration and has been described by the media and mainstream parties as xenophobic.[220] Chega has an estimated 28,000 militant members[221] and is expected to continue to rise in popularity and political force.[222]
Spain
[edit]A January 2004 survey by Spanish newspaper El País found that the "majority" of Spaniards believed immigration was too high.[223]
In Spain, as of 2005, surveys found "in descending order, jobs, crime and housing" were the primary concerns for citizens opposed to immigration.[224]
Small Neo-fascist parties, such as Movimiento Social Español, openly campaign using nationalist or anti-immigrant rhetoric as do other small far-right parties such as National Democracy (Spain) and España 2000. These parties have never won national or regional parliamentary seats.[citation needed]
Sweden
[edit]A 2008 study, which involved questionnaires circulated to 5000 people, showed that less than a quarter of the respondents (23%) wanted to live in areas characterised by cultural, ethnic and social diversity.[225] A 2016 SOM Institute survey published by University of Gothenburg reported that between the years 2011 and 2016, the estimated share of people with concerns about the increasing number of immigrants increased from around 20% to 45%.[226] In 2018, a poll by Pew Research found that a majority (52%) wanted fewer immigrants to be allowed into the country, 33% wanted to keep the current level and 14% wanted to increase immigration.[156]
On the question of repatriation of the asylum immigrants, 61% of native respondents in 1990 thought that it was a good suggestion, with this figure steadily decreasing over the ensuing years to a low of around 40% in 2014. In 2015, there was an increase in respondents in favor of repatriation, with a majority, 52%, deeming it a good suggestion. The proportion of respondents who felt repatriation was neither a good nor bad proposal simultaneously dropped from almost 40% to 24%.[226]
In February 2020 finance minister Magdalena Andersson encouraged migrants to head for countries other than Sweden. Andersson stated in an interview that integration of immigrants in Sweden wasn't working, neither before nor after 2015, and that Sweden cannot accept more immigration than it is able to integrate.[227]
The party's most strongly associated with anti-immigration policies are Sweden Democrats and Alternative for Sweden.
Switzerland
[edit]
United Kingdom
[edit]In the UK the British National Party made opposition to immigration one of their central policies in the 2010 general election.[229] In 2015 the anti-mass-immigration party, UKIP, proposed setting up a Migration Control Commission, tasked with bringing down net migration.[230]
The vote for the UK to leave the EU was successful in Britain, with several commentators suggesting that populist concern over immigration from the EU was a major feature of the public debate.[231] British Prime Minister David Cameron resigned over the vote. He had agreed to hold a vote on leaving the EU, due in part to the Conservative party losing votes to UKIP.[232]
As of 2025, the British Democrats, Britain First, UKIP, and Reform UK have anti immigration policies.
Asia
[edit]India
[edit]India has anti-immigration parties at the state level. Two anti-immigration parties in the state of Maharashtra, the Shiv Sena and the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena, are a proponent of the idea that migrants from Northern India steal jobs from the native Marathi people, with a history of attacking immigrants and accusing them of playing a role in crime in the city of Mumbai. The Shiv Sena also has a history of threatening the Pakistani cricket team from coming to Mumbai and also threatening Australian cricket players in the Indian Premier League, following racially motivated attacks on Indian students in Australia in 2009.
In the last few decades, there has been a rise in the anti-illegal immigration attitudes in the North East Indian states like Assam, which has become a common entry point for illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. Riots have occurred between the native tribes of Assam and illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.
In 2019, the Government of India introduced the Citizenship Amendment Act, which gives a faster path to Indian citizenship for Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, and Christian religious minorities that have immigrated both legally and illegally from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan that suffer religious persecution (provided they arrived in India before 31 December 2014).[233] Any refugees from these groups that arrived after the cutoff must reside in India for at least 5 years before they can gain citizenship. Widespread protests have been held, both opposing and supporting the Act.
The National Register of Citizens is a register of all Indian citizens whose creation is mandated by the 2003 amendment of the Citizenship Act, 1955. Its purpose is to document all the legal citizens of India so that the illegal migrants can be identified and deported.[234][235] It has been implemented for the state of Assam starting in 2013–2014.[citation needed] The Government of India plans to implement it for the rest of the country in 2021.[236]
Israel
[edit]
In 2012, Israel constructed a barrier on its border with Egypt which reduced the number of illegal immigrants crossing the border into Israel, from 16000 in 2011 to fewer than 20 in 2016 which represents a decrease of 99%.[237][238] The government tried offering money to migrants to encourage them to return to their countries of origin, while the Supreme Court blocked the government's attempts to deport them.[237]
In December 2017, the parliament approved legislation which would allow the government to overrule the Supreme Court to deport 40000 illegal immigrants. In the preceding decade, some 60000 illegal immigrants entered Israel by crossing the border with Egypt. Some were legitimate refugees, most were economic migrants.[237]
Japan
[edit]The movement for Japanese cultural isolation, sakoku (鎖 国), arose in Edo period Japan, in response to the strong influence of Western culture. The study of (ancient) Japanese literature and culture was called kokugaku (国 学; "country study").
Turkey
[edit]Established against the increasing number of legal and illegal refugees in Turkey as much as several millions, Victory Party (Turkey) has been the leader of return of the refugees to their home countries in Turkey since the day it was founded. The Victory Party's founding manifesto has numerous references to the founding father of the modern Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his nationalist revolution after World War I. Ümit Özdağ defines the mass refugee influx from the Middle East to Turkey as “strategically engineered migration”—a renewed imperialist plot, resurfacing a century after the republic's inception (referencing to the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920). Only this time, Ümit Özdağ suggests, the imperialists will not use a “rental Greek army” to upend Turkey's sovereignty; they will instead install a Sunni Arab population of refugees to undermine Turkish national identity.
The Victory Party promises to send all fugitives and asylum seekers within one year. Although there is not a very high rate of votes among the public for now, it seems to have received 4.1% of the votes in some polls. The slogan of the party is "Victory Party will come, refugees will go." Foreign policy reported on Victory Party (Turkey) and Ümit Özdağ Turkey’s Far Right Has Already Won
Americas
[edit]Brazil
[edit]Brazil is a country of immigrants and developed a reputation for "warm welcome" of people all over the world. Nevertheless, different analysts often dispute how truthful this image is and, although openly xenophobic manifestation were uncommon, some scholars denounce it existence in more subtle ways.[239]
Despite the fact that Brazil was considered a safe haven for neighboring refugees and immigrants, xenophobic violence has erupted. Brazil received up to 3000 Syrian refugees becoming the largest receiver of such in Latin America.[240] However, xenophobic and islamophobic attacks were reported against Syrian refugees and Muslims in general.[240] After the alleged beating of a shop owner during a robbery by alleged Venezuelan migrants, riots occurred in the Brazilian-Venezuelan border which included attacks on Venezuelans nationals, destruction of refugee tents and fires.[241] 1200 Venezuelans went back to their homeland as a result and the administration of President Michel Temer increased military personnel in the border. The burning of the refugee camps was reported in national and international news outlet and the authorities announce they will investigate and prosecute the authors.
During the Brazilian general election in 2018, then far-right presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro said the government should not turn its back on popular sentiment in Roraima, and proposed the creation of refugee camps with the help of the United Nations.[242] Once he became president, Bolsonaro said he would adopt more rigorous criteria for the entry of foreigners to Brazil, but ruled that he would not repatriate Venezuelan immigrants to their country.[243]
Canada
[edit]
Opponents of immigration to Canada have argued that immigration to Canada is unsustainable and puts pressure on resources such as worsening the country's current housing crisis.[244] They argue that Canadian cities are limited in size and cannot take an infinite number of people. This also further creates a competition for jobs and puts a strain on the economy, the environment and tax funded public services.[245][246] Economic and housing resources seems to be the largest concern for Canadians, and recent studies show declining fear of immigrants threatening cultures or values.[247]
Historically, Canada has implemented a variety of anti-immigration laws. In the early 19th century Canadian immigration laws specifically discriminated against people based on class, race, and disability. These policies continued into the 20th century, which did not change until following World War II.[248]
In a 2013 interview with the French news magazine L'Express Canadian academic and environmental activist David Suzuki stated that Canada's immigration policy was "crazy" and "Canada is full". However, he insisted that Canada should "open its doors to those who are oppressed" and accept refugees.[249] The leader of the People's Party of Canada, Maxime Bernier believes that current immigration harms Canadian values, and also makes it more difficult for real refugees to come to Canada.[250]
In a 2017 poll conducted by the Angus Reid Institute, a majority of respondents (57%) indicated that they believed Canada should accept fewer immigrants and refugees.[251] Despite this more recent surveys immigration is one of the smallest concerns to the average Canadian, with only 2% of Canadian surveyed ranking immigration as their largest concern.[252] Concerns for immigration seem to be directly tied to cost of living increases that the country has faced, with Canadians feeling housing costs are increasing due to immigration.[253]
The National Citizens Alliance was a far-right political party in Canada that regularly held anti-immigration rallies.[254][255]
The political parties Avenir Quebec, Bloc Québécois, People's party and factions of Conservative party have anti-immigration views, the former minister of foreign Affairs Maxime Bernier and some members of conservative party and regional conservative parties, such as Jason Kenney, François Legault, Scott Reid have anti-immigration views.
Costa Rica
[edit]Anti-immigrant feelings date back to the late 19th century and early 20th century with the country's first waves of migrations from places like China, Lebanon and Poland. Non-Polish European migration dates back to practically the independence from Spain but was generally well received.[256] Polish migration was mostly Jewish thus the backlash was due to anti-Semitism. Records of the time show Chinese migrants as the most affected by prejudice especially from government official and the first anti-Chinese laws were enacted as far back as the 1910s.[256] In 1903 President Ascensión Esquivel Ibarra enacted one of the first decrees forbidding non-White immigration and explicitly stating that migration from Asians, Blacks, Gypsies, Arabs and Turks was not allowed.[256] Although these laws were common in Latin America at the time, and Costa Rica's government eventually became the lead force in its abolishment.[256]
Polish, Chinese and Lebanese migrants would integrate fully into Costa Rican society with time to the point that many prominent Costa Ricans from industry, politics, arts, academy, etc. are of those descents.[256] Latin American migrants became the next source of mistrust and opposition, especially Nicaraguan and Colombian migrants. During the second half of the 20th century and to this date Costa Rica receives numerous waves of Latin American migrants from all the region, but Nicaraguans are by far the higher group among immigrant population encompassing 74.6% of the immigrant population,[257] followed by Colombians and Americans (immigrants in general are 9% of the population) making ethnic Nicaraguans and binational Nicaraguan-Costa Rican citizens one of the most notorious ethnic minorities in Costa Rica outnumbering other groups like African-Costa Ricans.[257] This caused debate in the country with some voices claiming for harder regulations and border control.[257][256] The issue was one of the main topics of the 2002 election and was again important for the 2018's campaign with right-wing politicians like Otto Guevara quoting Donald Trump as an inspiration[258] and calling for harsher migratory laws and eliminating the citizenship by birth in the Constitution. The Migration Law was reform globally in 2005 hardening some of the requirements for entering, staying and working on the country which was criticized as excessive,[259] but further reforms, the last one in 2009, reduce some of the impact of the more controversial parts of the law.[259] Far-right ultra-conservative National Restoration Party, that held an important role in the 2018 presidential election, also holds anti-migration positions.[260][261]
After a series of fake news spread by several far-right Facebook pages[262] inciting hatred against Nicaraguan migrants, an anti-migration manifestation was organized on 18 August 2018 known as the "Taken of La Merced" after Nicaraguan refugees were falsely accused of having "taking" La Merced Park in San Jose, a common gathering of the Nicaraguan community.[262] Although some of the protesters were peaceful, participation of openly neo-Nazi groups and violent hooligans with criminal records caused riots and attacks on Nicaraguans or people suspected of being. The national police Public Force intervened[263] with up to 44 people arrested, 36 of such were Costa Rican and the rest Nicaraguans. Several violent articles including Molotov bombs[262] were confiscated and some of the protesters identify themselves with Swastikas[262][263] and yelled "¡Fuera nicas!" (Nicas out!).[264] A pro-immigrant manifestation was scheduled a week later with a high attendance.[265] Further anti-migration protests (this time with the explicit exclusion of hooligans and neo-nazi) were organized in later days but with lesser participation.
Mexico
[edit]This section needs to be updated. (May 2024) |
In Mexico, during the first eight months of 2005, more than 120,000 people from Central America were deported to their countries of origin. This is a much higher number than the people deported in the same period in 2002, when only 1 person was deported in the entire year.[266] Many women from countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (most of former USSR), Asia and Central and South America are offered jobs at table dance establishments in large cities throughout the country, causing the National Institute of Migration (INM) in Mexico to raid strip clubs and deport foreigners who work without the proper documentation.[267]
Mexico has very strict laws pertaining to both illegal and legal immigrants.[268] The Mexican constitution restricts non-citizens or foreign-born persons from participating in politics, holding office, acting as a member of the clergy, or serving on the crews of Mexican-flagged ships or airplanes. Certain legal rights are waived, such as the right to a deportation hearing or other legal motions. In cases of flagrante delicto, any person may make a citizen's arrest on the offender and his accomplices, turning them over without delay to the nearest authorities.
Many immigration restrictionists in the United States have accused the Mexican government of hypocrisy in its immigration policy, noting that while the Government of Mexico and Mexican Americans are demanding looser immigration laws in the United States and oppose the 2010 Arizona Immigration Bill, at the same time Mexico is imposing even tighter restrictions on immigration into Mexico from Central America and other places than the Arizona law. However, Mexico started enforcing those laws which they previously ignored at the direct request of the United States, which saw a surge of Central American immigration during the Bush years; the newly elected president[who?] of Mexico has stated his desire to be more open, and would not deport Central Americans on their way to the United States or those who wish to remain in Mexico.[citation needed]
Panama
[edit]The recent exodus of Venezuelan migrants in Panama encouraged the xenophobic and anti-migration public speech from Panamanian nationalist groups.[31]
United States
[edit]you have nothing in common with
And if you don't stop people that you've never seen before, that you have nothing in common with, your country is going to fail. ... This double-tailed monster [of green energy and immigration] destroys everything in its wake, and they cannot let that happen any longer. You're doing it because you want to be nice, you want to be politically correct, and you're destroying your heritage.


In the United States, opponents of immigration typically focus on perceived adverse effects, such as economic costs (job competition and burdens on education and social services); negative environmental impact from accelerated population growth; increased crime rates, and in the long run, changes in traditional identities and values.[271]
In countries where the majority of the population is of immigrant descent, such as the United States, opposition to immigration sometimes takes the form of nativism.[272]
In the United States, opposition to immigration has a long history, starting in the late 1790s, in reaction to an influx of political refugees from France and Ireland. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 severely restricted the rights of immigrants. Nativism first gained a name and affected politics in the mid-19th century United States because of the large inflows of immigrants from cultures that were markedly different from the existing Protestant culture. Nativists primarily objected to Roman Catholics, especially Irish Americans. Nativist movements included the American Party of the mid-19th Century (formed by members of the Know-Nothing movement), the Immigration Restriction League of the early 20th Century, and the anti-Asian movements in the West, resulting in the Chinese Exclusion Act and the so-called "Gentlemen's Agreement" which was aimed at the Japanese. Major restrictions became law in the 1920s and sharply cut the inflow of immigrants until 1965, when they ended.[272] The federal government took charge of finding and deporting illegal aliens, which it still does.[273]
Immigration again became a major issue from the 1990s onward, with burgeoning rates of undocumented immigration, particularly by Mexicans who crossed the Southern border, and others who overstayed their visitor visas. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 provided an amnesty which was described as the amnesty to end all amnesties but it had no lasting impact on the flow of illegal immigrants.[274]
By 2014, the Tea Party movement narrowed its focus away from economic issues, spending and Obamacare to attacking President Barack Obama's immigration policies. They saw his immigration policies as threatening to transform American society. They tried but failed to defeat leading Republicans who supported immigration programs, such as Senator John McCain. A typical slogan appeared in the Tea Party Tribune: "Amnesty for Millions, Tyranny for All." The New York Times reported:
- What started five years ago as a groundswell of conservatives committed to curtailing the reach of the federal government, cutting the deficit and countering the Wall Street wing of the Republican Party has become a movement largely against immigration overhaul. The politicians, intellectual leaders and activists who consider themselves part of the Tea Party movement have redirected their energy from fiscal austerity and small government to stopping any changes that would legitimize people who are here illegally, either through granting them citizenship or legal status.[275]
As of 2014, over 42.4 million immigrants were living in the United States. This was about 13.3% of the entire United States population at that time.[276]
In 2016, New York City millionaire and media personality, Donald Trump, ran a successful presidential campaign aimed at ending illegal immigration. Trump portrayed himself as the outsider who would "Make America Great Again," calling out to the Tea Party movement and the like who wanted to "take their country back." Several of his campaign promises included construction of a border wall along the US–Mexico border, a temporary suspension of migration to the United States from several Muslim-majority nations, and the deportation of undocumented immigrants. Trump was known for his "Make America Great Again" rhetoric which could become provocative, inciting violence at his campaign rallies. A major part of his 2016 campaign was opposition to "political correctness", which he criticized as too nice, when we need to be stronger and tougher. Although Trump's Democratic rival Hillary Clinton, and even some of his fellow Republicans, such as John McCain and Mitt Romney, called Trump's "Make America Great Again"/anti-immigrant rhetoric racist, xenophobic, Islamophobic, and dangerous, but his proposals found strong support in the heartland and the south.
On November 8, 2016, Trump won as the 2016 US presidential election against his Democratic rival Hillary Clinton. Although Clinton won the popular vote, Trump won the electoral college.
Trump was later inaugurated on January 20, 2017. After taking the oath of office, Trump gave a speech that lacked any of the incendiary rhetoric many people had grown accustomed to, such as when he argued that prejudice isn't consistent with patriotism – though many still viewed his speech as divisive. He tried to strike a balance between rallying his supporters and uniting the country. The speech seemingly called out previous US politicians, including the former presidents sitting next to him, as being ineffective and inadequate at leading most Americans. It also echoed much of the same isolationist and nativist rhetoric that his campaign had inspired, in which Trump related his election to that of a revolution in the country, promising to take the country back. Nationalism ran high, with Trump stating that America would come first in every situation from that moment forward, and in the finale he repeated his longstanding campaign promise to Make America Great Again.
Promptly after his inauguration, Trump issued an executive order to begin construction of a border wall along the US-Mexico border and limit the number of refugees and foreigners entering the country. Then on January 27, 2017, he issued an executive order banning the admission of travelers from seven Muslim-majority nations, which was met with large protests at airports all over the nation. The order would not only shut down the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days but also suspend entry from seven countries for 90 days. Since the countries subject to the ban were Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, Trump’s travel ban was referred to by critics and supporters alike as “the Muslim ban.” After the original executive order, there were two more modified versions of the travel ban, which were all met with polarized reactions from politicians and the general public alike.
Later on in his presidency, in April 2018, the Trump administration’s zero-tolerance family separation policy saw migrant children taken from their parents, until it was suspended in response to public opposition on June 20, 2018. But immigration became the focus again in the lead-up to the midterm elections when President Trump sent troops to the border to meet a migrant caravan. Tensions came to a head on November 25, 2018, when border agents fired tear gas after migrants rushed barriers. Tear gas has been used at the border since 2010, but critics called its use on a desperate group with small children overkill. In one of the more surreal moments of 2018, the President at first denied that children had been gassed, despite plenty of photos. This was also met with large nationwide protests and polarized reactions from politicians and the general public alike.
- Labor unions
The American Federation of Labor (AFL), a coalition of labor unions formed in the 1880s, vigorously opposed unrestricted immigration from Europe for moral, cultural, and racial reasons. The issue unified the workers who feared that an influx of new workers would flood the labor market and lower wages.[277] Nativism was not a factor because upwards of half the union members were themselves immigrants or the sons of immigrants from Ireland, Germany and Britain. However, nativism was a factor when the AFL even more strenuously opposed all immigration from Asia because it represented (to its Euro-American members) an alien culture that could not be assimilated into American society. The AFL intensified its opposition after 1906 and was instrumental in passing immigration restriction bills from the 1890s to the 1920s, such as the 1921 Emergency Quota Act and the Immigration Act of 1924 and seeing that they were strictly enforced.[278]
Mink (1986) concludes that the link between the AFL and the Democratic Party rested in part on immigration issues, noting the large corporations, which supported the Republicans, wanted more immigration to augment their labor force.[279]
The United Farm Workers was committed to restricting immigration during Cesar Chavez tenure. Chavez and Dolores Huerta, cofounder and president of the UFW, fought the Bracero Program that existed from 1942 to 1964. Their opposition stemmed from their belief that the program undermined U.S. workers and exploited the migrant workers. Since the Bracero Program ensured a constant supply of cheap immigrant labor for growers, immigrants could not protest any infringement of their rights, lest they be fired and replaced. Their efforts contributed to Congress ending the Bracero Program in 1964. In 1973, the UFW was one of the first labor unions to oppose proposed employer sanctions that would have prohibited hiring illegal immigrants.
On a few occasions, concerns that illegal immigrant labor would undermine UFW strike campaigns led to a number of controversial events, which the UFW describes as anti-strikebreaking events, but which have also been interpreted as being anti-immigrant. In 1969, Chavez and members of the UFW marched through the Imperial and Coachella Valleys to the border of Mexico to protest growers' use of illegal immigrants as strikebreakers. Joining him on the march were Reverend Ralph Abernathy and U.S. Senator Walter Mondale.[280] In its early years, the UFW and Chavez went so far as to report illegal immigrants who served as strikebreaking replacement workers (as well as those who refused to unionize) to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.[281][282][283][284][285]
In 1973, the United Farm Workers set up a "wet line" along the United States-Mexico border to prevent Mexican immigrants from entering the United States illegally and potentially undermining the UFW's unionization efforts.[286] During one such event, in which Chavez was not involved, some UFW members, under the guidance of Chavez's cousin Manuel, physically attacked the strikebreakers after peaceful attempts to persuade them not to cross the border failed.[287][288][289]
In 1979, Chavez used a forum of a U.S. Senate committee hearing to denounce the federal immigration service, which he said the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service purportedly refused to arrest illegal Mexican immigrants who Chavez claims are being used to break the union's strike.[290]
Bernie Sanders opposes guest worker programs[291] and he is also skeptical of skilled immigrant (H-1B) visas, saying, "Last year, the top 10 employers of H-1B guest workers were all offshore outsourcing companies. These firms are responsible for shipping large numbers of American information technology jobs to India and other countries".[292] In an interview with Vox, he stated his opposition to an open borders immigration policy, describing it as such:
[A] right-wing proposal, which says essentially there is no United States. [...] [Y]ou're doing away with the concept of a nation-state. What right-wing people in this country would love is an open-border policy. Bring in all kinds of people, work for $2 or $3 an hour, that would be great for them. I don't believe in that. I think we have to raise wages in this country, I think we have to do everything we can to create millions of jobs.[293][294]
Africa
[edit]South Africa
[edit]Several periods of violent riots against migrants have occurred in South Africa in the past decade, some resulting in fatalities. Countries from which the migrants targeted originated include Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.[295][296]
In March 2019, groups armed with machetes broke into the homes of migrants in Durban. At least six people were killed, several were wounded, and their homes were looted. At least 300 Malawi migrants were forced to leave the country. In separate attacks, foreign truck drivers were forced out of their vehicles and were attacked with knives. On 2 April 2019, another group of migrants in Durban was attacked[by whom?] and forced to flee their homes. The escalating violence added tension to the 2019 South African general election.[297]
Operation Dudula is a political organization described as xenophobic and linked to violent targeting of immigrants.
Effects of anti-immigration policies
[edit]Anti-immigrant policies can affect law and order, social security, and international relations as well as inequality issues.[298]
See also
[edit]- America First (policy)
- Aporophobia
- Criticism of economic growth
- Criticisms of globalization
- Divide and rule
- Economic migrant
- Economic results of migration
- Emigration
- Environmental migrant
- Environmental racism
- Executive Order 13769
- Global labor arbitrage
- Human capital flight
- Human overpopulation
- Immigration and crime
- Immigration policy
- Immigration reduction in the United States
- Immigration reform
- International Organization for Migration
- Islamization and Islamophobia
- Left-wing terrorism
- Make America Great Again
- Nativism (politics)
- Non-refoulement
- People smuggling
- Political asylum
- Refugee
- Right of foreigners to vote
- Right-wing terrorism
- Rivers of Blood speech
- Single-issue politics
- Trump administration family separation policy
- Trumpism
- With Open Gates
- Xenophobia
References
[edit]- ^ "Definition of Illegal immigrant in English". Merriam Webster Dictionary.
- ^ a b Mylonas, Harris; Tudor, Maya (11 May 2021). "Nationalism: What We Know and What We Still Need to Know". Annual Review of Political Science. 24 (1): 109–132. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-041719-101841.
- ^ Citrin, Jack; Sides, John (March 2008). "Immigration and the Imagined Community in Europe and the United States". Political Studies. 56 (1): 33–56. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00716.x. S2CID 145792964. Retrieved 28 September 2021.
- ^ a b c Wimmer, Andreas (8 May 2018). Nation Building. Princeton University Press. doi:10.1515/9781400888894. ISBN 978-1-4008-8889-4. S2CID 240305736.
- ^ Roth, Christopher; Sumarto, Sudarno (2 November 2015). "Does Education Increase Interethnic and Interreligious Tolerance? Evidence from a Natural Experimen".
- ^ a b c "End of nations: Is there an alternative to countries?". New Scientist. Archived from the original on 18 March 2017. Retrieved 10 May 2017.
- ^ Parallelgesellschaften?, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, No. 1–2 (2006)
- ^ Sobel, Andrew (10 September 2009). Challenges of Globalization: Immigration, Social Welfare, Global Governance. Routledge. ISBN 9781135216955. Retrieved 10 May 2017.
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We conducted a series of survey experiments, fielded in nearly identical ways across eleven countries on four continents: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, Korea, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. Evidence from several of these individual country studies has presented elsewhere.
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In this paper we document the impact of immigration at the regional level on Europeans' political preferences as expressed by voting behavior in parliamentary or presidential elections between 2007 and 2016.
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- Finzsch, Norbert; Schirmer, Dietmar, eds. (1998). Identity and intolerance : nationalism, racism, and xenophobia in Germany and the United States. Washington, D.C. Cambridge: German Historical Institute Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521591584.
- Lucassen, Leo (2005). The immigrant threat: the integration of old and new migrants in western Europe since 1850. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press. ISBN 9780252072949. Examines Irish immigrants in Britain, Polish immigrants in Germany, Italian immigrants in France (before 1940), and (since 1950), Caribbeans in Britain, Turks in Germany, and Algerians in France.
- Schori Liang, Christina, ed. (2007). Europe for the Europeans the foreign and security policy of the populist radical right. Aldershot, England Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate. ISBN 9780754686255.
Further reading
[edit]- Esses, Victoria M. (2021-01-04). "Prejudice and Discrimination Toward Immigrants". Annual Review of Psychology. 72 (1)
Opposition to immigration
View on GrokipediaHistorical Foundations
Pre-Modern and Colonial Eras
In ancient Greece, city-states exhibited xenophobic tendencies alongside traditions of hospitality (xenia), with policies restricting foreigners (xenoi) to prevent dilution of civic identity and economic competition. Athens, for instance, classified resident aliens as metics, subjecting them to registration, special taxes, and exclusion from citizenship and land ownership, driven by concerns over political infiltration and resource strain during periods of demographic pressure.[9] Similar attitudes prevailed in Sparta, where helots and perioikoi—non-citizen populations—faced severe controls to maintain military cohesion against perceived internal threats from outsiders.[10] In the Roman Republic and Empire, opposition to mass influxes of barbarians and migrants intensified, particularly from the late Republic onward, as senators and elites decried the cultural incompatibility and irrationality of northern tribes, justifying military exclusion and assimilation policies. By the 4th and 5th centuries CE, as Germanic groups settled within imperial borders amid economic decline, native Romans voiced fears of social upheaval, with rhetoric portraying immigrants as threats to Roman order and contributing to debates over the Empire's fall.[11][12] Xenophobic domestic policies, including expulsions and restrictions on non-citizen rights, reflected elite anxieties over labor displacement and urban overcrowding in Rome itself.[13] During the medieval period in Europe, guilds and monarchs imposed barriers on foreign artisans and traders to protect local economies, while expulsions of Jewish communities—such as England's 1290 edict under Edward I—affected over 2,000 families amid accusations of disloyalty and usury, prioritizing communal homogeneity.[14] In the colonial Americas, European settlers regulated inflows despite labor needs; New England colonies from the 1640s enacted laws barring paupers, vagrants, and convicts to avoid welfare burdens, with Puritans in the 18th century protesting Scotch-Irish arrivals for straining food resources and altering religious demographics.[15][16] Southern colonies similarly restricted Catholic immigrants to preserve Protestant dominance, reflecting sovereignty claims over demographic composition.[15]19th and Early 20th Century Restrictions
In the United States, the late 19th century saw the enactment of the first significant federal immigration restrictions amid rising nativist concerns over economic competition and cultural preservation. The Page Act of 1875 prohibited the importation of women for prostitution, primarily targeting Chinese women, and extended to convicts and contract laborers, reflecting early efforts to curb unwanted Asian inflows.[17] This was followed by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which suspended immigration of Chinese laborers for ten years and barred them from naturalization, driven by labor unions' claims of wage undercutting during railroad construction and mining booms.[18][19] The Act responded to violent anti-Chinese riots in cities like Denver and Rock Springs, Wyoming, where native workers blamed immigrants for job losses amid economic downturns. The Geary Act of 1892 extended the exclusion for another decade and required Chinese residents to carry residence certificates, with non-compliance punishable by deportation, further institutionalizing racial barriers.[17] By the early 20th century, broader quotas emerged; the Emergency Quota Act of 1921 capped annual immigrants at 3% of each nationality's 1910 U.S. population, aiming to favor Northern and Western Europeans.[20] This culminated in the Immigration Act of 1924, which reduced quotas to 2% of the 1890 census—deliberately earlier to minimize Southern and Eastern European shares—and banned Asian immigration entirely outside small exemptions, reflecting fears of cultural dilution and post-World War I radicalism.[20][21] The law limited total quota immigrants to 150,000 annually, a sharp drop from pre-war peaks exceeding 1 million.[22] Similar policies arose in other settler nations. Australia's Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, one of the new federation's first laws, empowered officials to administer dictation tests in any European language to exclude non-whites, effectively implementing the White Australia policy to protect wages and British heritage from Asian laborers.[23] The policy stemmed from colonial-era fears of Chinese gold rush migrants overwhelming local workers, with federation debates emphasizing racial homogeneity for social cohesion.[24] In Europe, restrictions were patchier; Britain's Aliens Act of 1905 targeted destitute Jews fleeing pogroms, limiting entry to those with means, amid urban overcrowding concerns, though continental nations like France maintained open policies until interwar quotas.[15] These measures were underpinned by organizations like the U.S. Immigration Restriction League, founded in 1894 by Boston elites to advocate literacy tests and quotas preserving the "English-speaking race," citing empirical data on immigrant illiteracy rates exceeding 70% for Southern Europeans.[25] Proponents argued such policies prevented fiscal burdens and maintained democratic stability, with congressional records documenting labor displacement evidence from the 1880-1920 influx of 25 million immigrants.[21] While criticized today, contemporary supporters viewed them as pragmatic responses to rapid demographic shifts threatening national identity and economic equilibrium.[26]Post-World War II Shifts and Modern Resurgence
Following World War II, Western immigration policies initially retained pre-war restrictions, with the United States upholding national origins quotas that limited entries to about 150,000 annually, favoring Northern and Western Europeans while capping others.[27] European nations, facing labor shortages for reconstruction, introduced temporary guest worker programs; West Germany signed recruitment agreements with Italy in 1955, followed by Turkey in 1961, admitting over 2.6 million foreign workers by 1973 to fuel its economic miracle.[28] These measures prioritized economic needs over long-term integration, assuming workers would return home, but family reunification policies extended stays, transforming temporary inflows into permanent settlement.[29] The 1965 U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act, enacted amid civil rights momentum, abolished national origins quotas, imposing hemispheric caps instead—120,000 for the Western Hemisphere—and prioritizing family ties and skills, which shifted inflows toward Latin America, Asia, and Africa, with foreign-born population rising from 4.8% in 1970 to 13.9% by 2015.[30] In Europe, the 1973 oil crisis and ensuing recessions prompted halts to labor recruitment, yet chain migration continued, swelling non-EU populations; by the late 1970s, public opposition emerged amid rising unemployment and visible integration strains, as Gallup polls showed consistent majorities of Americans favoring reduced immigration levels from 1965 onward.[31] Early signs included the founding of France's National Front in 1972, which campaigned against North African inflows, and U.S. debates over undocumented Mexican entries, estimated at three million by the 1950s' end but surging post-1965 reforms.[32] Modern resurgence intensified from the 1990s, driven by economic globalization, welfare burdens, and security concerns; California's Proposition 187 in 1994, passed by 59% of voters, sought to deny public services to undocumented immigrants, reflecting backlash to perceived fiscal costs.[33] The September 11, 2001, attacks heightened scrutiny of Middle Eastern migration, while Europe's 2015-2016 migrant crisis saw over 1.8 million asylum claims, predominantly from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, fueling parties like Germany's Alternative for Germany (AfD), which entered parliaments amid integration failures and localized crime spikes.[34] In the U.S., Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign emphasized border security, resonating with voters concerned over unauthorized entries exceeding 400,000 annually in prior years, while the UK's Brexit referendum in 2016, supported by 52%, prioritized regaining control over EU free movement that had tripled net migration to 300,000 yearly by 2015.[35] These developments marked a rejection of unchecked inflows, grounded in observable demographic pressures and policy outcomes rather than prior post-war optimism.[36]Foundational Principles and Rationales
National Sovereignty and the Right to Exclude
National sovereignty, as recognized in international law, grants states the authority to regulate entry into their territory and exclude non-citizens, forming the basis for opposition to unrestricted immigration. This principle derives from the Westphalian system established in 1648, which emphasizes territorial integrity and non-interference, allowing governments to determine membership in their political community.[37] Under customary international law, the right to control borders is nearly absolute, with exceptions limited to narrow humanitarian obligations such as non-refoulement under the 1951 Refugee Convention, which applies only to those fearing persecution and does not extend to economic migrants or general population movements.[38] Proponents of immigration restriction argue that diluting this authority undermines the state's capacity to safeguard citizens' interests, as unchecked inflows can alter demographic balances and strain resources without democratic consent.[39] Philosophically, the right to exclude rests on first-principles reasoning about communal self-determination: just as individuals possess property rights to admit or deny entrants to their homes, nations—as associations of citizens—hold analogous rights over their collective domain to preserve shared values, security, and welfare systems. Michael Walzer, in Spheres of Justice (1983), contends that political communities are not global but bounded, justifying exclusion to maintain internal justice and prevent the "tyranny of the majority" inverted by external impositions.[40] This view counters cosmopolitan arguments for open borders by emphasizing causal realities: mass immigration without selection can erode trust in institutions, as evidenced by surveys showing native populations' concerns over cultural dilution in high-inflow countries like Sweden, where public support for stricter controls rose to 62% by 2022 amid rising parallel societies.[41] Critics from egalitarian perspectives challenge this as inconsistent with human rights, yet such positions often overlook empirical precedents where sovereign exclusions have stabilized nations, such as Australia's post-1901 "White Australia" policy evolution into points-based systems that correlate with sustained economic growth without welfare overload.[42] In practice, assertions of the right to exclude manifest in policies resisting supranational mandates, as seen in Hungary's 2015 border fence and rejection of EU migrant quotas, which Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán defended as essential to preserving national identity and security against over 400,000 unauthorized crossings that year.[39] Similarly, the United States' Title 8 of the Immigration and Nationality Act codifies exclusionary powers, with Supreme Court precedents like Chae Chan Ping v. United States (1889) affirming plenary federal authority over admission, rooted in sovereignty rather than treaty obligations. These examples illustrate that effective exclusion correlates with lower unauthorized entries—U.S. apprehensions dropped 89% from 2000 peaks to 2020 lows during enforcement eras—supporting the causal claim that sovereignty enables deliberate policy over reactive crisis management.[43] While academic sources influenced by globalist paradigms may downplay this right due to institutional biases favoring mobility, the persistence of sovereign controls in 193 UN member states underscores its empirical and legal primacy.[44]Preservation of Cultural and Social Cohesion
Opponents of immigration contend that large-scale influxes from culturally dissimilar groups erode social cohesion by diminishing interpersonal trust and communal engagement. Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam's 2007 study, based on interviews with over 30,000 individuals across 41 U.S. communities, found that higher ethnic diversity correlates with lower social capital, including reduced trust in neighbors and institutions, and decreased civic participation, a phenomenon termed "hunkering down."[45] This effect persisted even after controlling for socioeconomic factors, suggesting diversity itself hampers bridging ties across groups.[46] A meta-analysis of 87 studies confirms a statistically significant negative relationship between ethnic diversity—often driven by immigration—and social trust levels.[47] In Europe, similar patterns emerge; for instance, research on U.S. immigrant inflows, applicable to European contexts with comparable demographic shifts, indicates that sudden increases in immigrant populations reduce natives' social cohesion, measured by volunteering and community involvement.[48] These findings underpin arguments that unchecked immigration fragments societies into insular enclaves, weakening the shared norms essential for cooperation and public goods provision. Cultural preservation concerns focus on the dilution of host nations' traditions, languages, and values when immigration outpaces assimilation. In Sweden, Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson stated in April 2022 that decades of failed integration have fostered "parallel societies" where immigrant communities operate under separate norms, contributing to riots and gang violence disconnected from Swedish societal fabric.[49] Similarly, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared in October 2010 that multiculturalism had "utterly failed," as immigrants formed isolated groups resistant to adopting core national values.[50] British Prime Minister David Cameron echoed this in 2011, asserting that state-sponsored multiculturalism promoted segregation over integration, exacerbating social divisions.[51] Such developments manifest in tangible cultural clashes, including demands for religious accommodations incompatible with secular laws, such as parallel legal systems or suppression of native customs in diverse urban areas. Low intermarriage rates—often below 10% between natives and non-Western immigrants in countries like the Netherlands and France—further evidence persistent cultural separation rather than fusion.[52] Proponents of restriction argue that prioritizing cultural compatibility preserves the host society's identity and stability, averting the balkanization observed in historically diverse but unmanaged polities. Multiple European leaders' admissions of policy failures highlight the causal link between lax immigration controls and cohesion breakdown, informing calls for selective policies favoring assimilable migrants.[49][50]Demographic Stability and Long-Term Sustainability
Opponents of high immigration levels argue that persistent low fertility rates among native populations in Western countries, combined with higher fertility among immigrants, threaten long-term demographic stability by accelerating ethnic and cultural transformations. In the European Union, the total fertility rate (TFR) stood at 1.38 live births per woman in 2023, well below the replacement level of 2.1 required for population stability without immigration.[53] In contrast, immigrant women in the EU exhibited a TFR of 2.02 children, exceeding that of native-born women and contributing to differential population growth rates that favor non-native groups over generations.[54] This disparity, rooted in varying cultural norms and socioeconomic factors from origin countries, results in a gradual shift where descendants of immigrants increasingly comprise larger shares of the youth cohorts, potentially eroding the numerical predominance of indigenous populations. The United Nations' 2001 Replacement Migration report quantified the scale of immigration required to offset Europe's aging and declining populations, illustrating the unsustainability of relying on inflows for demographic balance. For the EU-15 countries, maintaining constant population size through 2050 would necessitate 863,000 migrants annually, but stabilizing the working-age population or potential support ratio would demand 1.4 to 13 million per year, depending on the metric—figures deemed impractical and likely to induce profound societal changes.[55][56] Critics contend that such projections underscore how immigration, rather than a neutral demographic fix, perpetuates a cycle of further inflows, as higher immigrant fertility sustains demand for additional migrants to maintain economic ratios, risking irreversible majority-minority transitions in nations historically defined by ethnic homogeneity.[57] Policies prioritizing native birth rates over immigration offer an alternative path to sustainability, as exemplified by Hungary's approach under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Hungary has implemented family incentives, including tax exemptions for mothers of four or more children and housing subsidies, aiming for demographic self-sufficiency by 2035 without mass immigration, in contrast to broader European reliance on external labor.[58] Despite challenges, such as incomplete achievement of birth rate targets, this strategy seeks to preserve national identity and welfare systems calibrated for a culturally cohesive populace, avoiding the integration strains and parallel societies observed elsewhere.[59] Long-term stability, in this view, hinges on endogenous population renewal to avert fiscal pressures from an inverted age pyramid and to sustain social trust essential for public goods provision in diverse settings.Empirical Evidence of Adverse Impacts
Economic Costs and Labor Market Effects
Opponents of immigration argue that inflows, particularly of low-skilled workers, exert downward pressure on wages and employment for native-born workers in comparable skill groups, as basic supply-and-demand dynamics in labor markets predict increased competition will reduce equilibrium wages. Economist George J. Borjas, analyzing U.S. data from 1980 to 2000, found that a 10 percentage point rise in the immigrant share of the labor force lowers wages for native high school dropouts by 8.9% and reduces their employment probability by 4.3 percentage points, with effects concentrated among less-educated men. Similar displacement occurs as natives shift to higher-skill occupations or out of affected regions, though aggregate employment may rise due to complementary high-skilled natives and capital owners benefiting from cheaper labor. These findings contrast with spatial studies emphasizing geographic mobility, which often yield smaller estimates (0-1% wage reduction per 10% immigrant influx), but Borjas critiques such approaches for underestimating national labor market integration.[60] Fiscal costs amplify labor market strains, as low-skilled immigrants and their dependents consume more in public services than they contribute in taxes, creating net burdens on host economies. The 2017 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report concludes that first-generation immigrants are more costly to governments than natives, with less-educated arrivals imposing lifetime deficits due to higher welfare usage, education expenditures for children, and lower tax payments.[61] A 2025 analysis estimates that an immigrant without a high school diploma arriving at age 30 generates a $130,000 net fiscal cost over 30 years in the U.S., factoring in descendants' lower earnings and higher benefit draw; unlawful immigrants average an $80,000 deficit.[62] In Europe, non-EU migrants often yield negative net fiscal positions even assuming full integration, with costs exceeding contributions in most countries per a 2020-2023 EU study, straining budgets amid welfare generosity.[63] Broader economic costs include reduced incentives for native workforce participation and skill investment, as subsidized low-wage immigration fills roles that might otherwise command higher pay or automation. Borjas calculates that immigration accounts for 20-40% of the wage decline for U.S. low-skilled natives since 1980, eroding returns to human capital and contributing to inequality among working-class groups.[64] While high-skilled immigration boosts innovation and GDP, mass low-skilled inflows—prevalent in recent decades—prioritize short-term GDP growth over per-capita prosperity, with empirical evidence showing minimal overall wage gains for natives and persistent fiscal drags from unbalanced skill composition.Crime Rates and Public Safety Concerns
Opponents of immigration frequently cite statistical overrepresentation of immigrants in crime data, particularly for violent offenses, as a key public safety concern. In Sweden, individuals born abroad are registered as crime suspects at a rate 2.5 times higher than those born in Sweden with two Swedish-born parents, according to official government analysis of 2017-2021 data.[65] This disparity persists after controlling for age, gender, and socioeconomic factors, with foreign-born individuals comprising 58% of suspects for total crime despite representing about 33% of the population in 2017.[66] Overrepresentation is especially pronounced in lethal violence, where those with foreign backgrounds are suspected at rates up to five times higher than natives.[67] Similar patterns emerge in other Nordic countries. In Denmark, non-Western immigrants committed crimes at 1.86 times the rate of native Danes in 2022, with even higher multiples for specific offenses like violence and property crime among certain origin groups.[68] Norwegian official statistics from 2017 indicate that immigrants and their Norwegian-born children are overrepresented as registered offenders, with non-Western immigrants showing elevated rates for violent and sexual crimes relative to the native population.[69] In Germany, following the 2015-2016 influx of over one million asylum seekers, crimes attributed to refugees rose 79% from 2014 to 2015, contributing to broader increases in violent incidents.[70] By 2023, non-German suspects accounted for 41% of overall crime suspects, exceeding their approximately 17% share of the population, with notable elevations in knife attacks and sexual assaults linked to migrant cohorts.[71] These disparities fuel arguments that mass immigration, especially from culturally dissimilar regions, strains public safety by importing higher-risk demographics less deterred by local norms or enforcement. Peer-reviewed analyses in Denmark confirm persistent overrepresentation even after statistical adjustments for confounders like poverty, attributing part of the gap to selection effects in migrant flows.[72] Critics of restrictive interpretations note that aggregate U.S. studies often find lower offending rates among undocumented immigrants compared to natives—for instance, Texas data showing illegal immigrants with homicide conviction rates of 2.2 per 100,000 versus 3.0 for natives from 2013-2022—but contend such figures understate risks by excluding unsolved crimes or underreporting in immigrant-heavy areas.[73][74] Nonetheless, European evidence underscores causal links between rapid, unvetted inflows and localized crime surges, informing opposition emphasis on border controls to mitigate imported criminality.[75]Fiscal Strain on Welfare and Public Services
Opponents of immigration contend that inflows, particularly of low-skilled workers, refugees, and family members, generate net fiscal deficits by increasing expenditures on welfare benefits, education, healthcare, and housing subsidies while contributing disproportionately less in taxes due to lower employment rates and earnings.[61] This strain is amplified in generous welfare states where eligibility rules allow access to non-contributory benefits shortly after arrival, leading to higher per-capita usage among certain immigrant groups compared to natives.[76] In the United States, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine's 2017 analysis found that first-generation immigrants impose a net fiscal cost on governments, with less-educated arrivals (those without a high school diploma) generating a lifetime net drain of approximately $117,000 in present value terms, driven by higher reliance on public services like Medicaid and education for children relative to tax payments.[77][78] Illegal immigrants exacerbate this, costing taxpayers an estimated $150.7 billion annually in federal, state, and local expenditures net of taxes, including $18.4 billion for welfare programs and $23.1 billion for medical services as of 2017 data updated for inflation.[79] These costs persist across generations through family reunification, where additional dependents further elevate public service demands without commensurate economic contributions. European examples underscore similar patterns, particularly for non-Western immigrants. In Denmark, a 2017 study calculated that immigrants from non-Western countries yield a negative lifetime fiscal impact of about 4.1 million Danish kroner (roughly €550,000) per person, contrasting with a positive contribution of 1.4 million kroner from Western-origin migrants, due to lower labor force participation and higher welfare dependency rates exceeding 50% for some groups.[80][81] In Sweden, foreign-born households received 7.2 billion Swedish kronor in social welfare expenditures in 2013, compared to 5.4 billion for native households, with non-EU migrants showing welfare usage rates up to twice that of natives in non-contributory programs.[82] Germany's local governments face elevated fiscal pressures from immigration surges, with a 2024 analysis indicating that refugee inflows increase municipal spending on integration and services by 10-20% in high-inflow districts, outpacing revenue gains from immigrant taxes.[83] Public services beyond direct welfare bear the brunt of population-driven demand. In the United Kingdom, net migration of over 700,000 in 2022 contributed to NHS waiting lists surpassing 7.6 million and a housing shortage of 4.3 million units by 2024, as immigrant households—often larger and lower-income—consume disproportionate shares of social housing (25% occupancy despite comprising 15% of the population) and emergency care.[84] These dynamics prompt policy responses like Denmark's 2021 welfare reforms tightening benefits for new arrivals, which reduced non-Western immigrant dependency by 15%, highlighting causal links between lax eligibility and fiscal overload.[85] Overall, such evidence supports arguments that unrestricted immigration undermines welfare sustainability by accelerating entitlement growth without matching fiscal inflows, potentially raising taxes or cutting services for natives.[86]Health Risks and Disease Transmission
Opposition to immigration highlights the importation of infectious diseases from regions with higher prevalence rates, facilitated by incomplete screening, latent infections, and gaps in vaccination coverage among migrants. Empirical data indicate that foreign-born individuals often account for a disproportionate share of certain communicable diseases in host countries, straining public health systems and risking community transmission. For instance, inadequate pre-entry health checks or post-arrival follow-up can allow diseases like tuberculosis (TB) to spread, particularly when migrants originate from endemic areas.[87][88] In the United States, non-U.S.-born persons represented 75.8% of reported TB cases in 2023, despite comprising about 14% of the population. The incidence rate of TB among foreign-born individuals was 17.1 times higher than among U.S.-born persons in 2022. A majority of these cases trace to countries with high TB burdens, such as Mexico, the Philippines, India, Vietnam, and China, which together accounted for over half of foreign-born TB patients. Many infections are latent upon arrival and may reactivate years later, evading initial screening protocols.[89][90][91] Similar patterns emerge for other pathogens. Migrants from high-prevalence regions show elevated rates of hepatitis B (0–5.6% in some groups from the eastern Mediterranean), hepatitis C, and HIV, often linked to origins in sub-Saharan Africa or Asia. In Europe, forced migration correlates with rises in vaccine-preventable diseases like TB and chickenpox, due to overcrowding in transit and lower immunization rates. Measles outbreaks have been tied to unvaccinated migrants and travelers, with studies noting increased risk in migrant populations despite claims minimizing their role; for example, resurgences in Europe post-2015 involved importation from endemic areas. Antimicrobial-resistant strains, more common among migrants, further complicate treatment and transmission control.[92][93][94] These risks underscore causal links between mass inflows from disease-endemic areas and localized epidemics, as evidenced by peer-reviewed analyses of migrant health screenings revealing undetected carriers. Public health authorities acknowledge higher burdens among migrants, yet implementation gaps—such as voluntary screening or limited enforcement—persist, fueling arguments for stricter border health measures to mitigate transmission to native populations.[95][96]Additional Specific Risks
Environmental Resource Depletion
Opponents of immigration highlight its role in accelerating population growth within developed nations, where high per capita resource consumption amplifies depletion of water, land, energy, and other finite assets. In the United States, immigration has driven the majority of net population gains, contributing to at least half of growth in 38 states between 2023 and 2024, thereby intensifying demands on infrastructure and natural resources.[97] This dynamic is compounded by immigrants' adoption of host-country consumption patterns, which often exceed those in origin countries by factors of 10 or more for energy and emissions, leading to net global increases in resource strain rather than reductions.[98] A key concern is elevated greenhouse gas emissions, as migration shifts individuals from low-emission developing regions to high-emission industrialized ones. Research shows that net immigration countries exhibit per capita CO2 emissions nearly three times higher than net emigration countries, with empirical models linking U.S. immigration flows to substantial emission spikes; for instance, 740,000 immigrants were projected to add approximately 9 million metric tons of CO2-equivalent emissions through lifestyle adjustments in consumption and energy use.[99] [100] In Europe, population growth—including from immigration—has been associated with significant rises in CO2 output and urban land expansion, straining ecosystems and biodiversity in densely populated areas.[101] Water resources face particular pressure in water-stressed regions, where immigration-fueled growth outpaces supply infrastructure. In the U.S. Southwest, for example, population surges have heightened competition for aquifers and rivers, contributing to overuse and subsidence in states like Arizona and Nevada.[102] Urban sprawl driven by these demographics further erodes arable land and habitats, with studies estimating that immigration-related growth accounts for much of the increased impervious surfaces and deforestation in high-immigration corridors.[103] Proponents of restriction argue that curbing inflows would alleviate these pressures, preserving carrying capacity without relying on contested technological offsets like desalination, which themselves demand energy resources.[102]Security Threats Including Terrorism
Opponents of immigration argue that large-scale inflows, especially irregular migration from unstable or jihadist-influenced regions, facilitate the entry of potential terrorists, straining intelligence and border vetting capacities. In the United States, encounters with individuals matching the Terrorist Screening Database—a list of known or suspected terrorists—at the southwest land border rose to 172 in fiscal year 2023, up from lower figures in previous years, with 85% of all land border suspected terrorist encounters occurring at this porous frontier.[104][105] These incidents underscore how unvetted crossings enable threats to bypass standard screening, as affirmed in the Department of Homeland Security's 2025 Homeland Threat Assessment, which describes a high domestic terrorism environment exacerbated by transnational actors exploiting migration pathways.[106] In Europe, jihadist terrorism constitutes the dominant security concern, with perpetrators frequently originating from or radicalized within migrant communities, and migration routes serving as conduits for operatives.[107] Empirical analyses indicate that immigration from terrorism-endemic countries diffuses risks through ethnic networks, enabling recruitment and operational support for attacks.[108] European security agencies explicitly regard immigration—legal or irregular—as a risk multiplier for jihadist threats, given the challenges in screening large volumes from high-risk areas like the Middle East and North Africa.[109] High-profile cases, such as the 2016 Berlin Christmas market truck ramming by Anis Amri—a failed Tunisian asylum seeker who traversed multiple EU countries undetected—illustrate how asylum systems can be exploited, contributing to fatalities and heightened public fears of infiltration.[110] Beyond direct attacks, immigration-related security vulnerabilities encompass broader threats like organized crime syndicates using migrant flows for human smuggling and potential espionage, though terrorism remains the focal concern due to its asymmetric lethality. The absolute risk per migrant may be low, yet scaled to millions of annual entries, it yields detectable threats, as evidenced by ongoing arrests of foreign-born plotters in both regions.[111] Government data and assessments consistently link unsecured borders to elevated terrorism probabilities, informing opposition calls for stricter controls to prioritize national security over open access.[112]Brain Drain and Harm to Origin Countries
Brain drain refers to the emigration of highly educated and skilled individuals from developing countries to more developed nations, often resulting in a net loss of human capital for the origin countries that have invested in their training. This phenomenon deprives source countries of professionals critical for economic development, innovation, and public services, as emigrants typically do not return in sufficient numbers to offset the outflow. Empirical studies indicate that such migration can exacerbate shortages in key sectors like healthcare and engineering, hindering growth in low-income nations.[113] In sub-Saharan Africa, brain drain has led to severe deficits in medical personnel; for instance, Nigeria experiences a high emigration rate of doctors, with historical data showing that losses in trained physicians often exceed annual domestic production of new graduates, straining healthcare systems. A study on Kenya quantified the economic cost of emigrating doctors at approximately US$86 million for 167 professionals, reflecting the forgone returns on public investments in education. Similarly, the African Capacity Building Foundation reports that the continent loses around 20,000 skilled workers annually to developed countries, contributing to persistent underdevelopment in technical and administrative capacities.[114][115][116] Developing countries in Asia and Latin America also face analogous challenges; India, as the world's largest exporter of physicians, sees many of its trained doctors migrate to countries like the United States and United Kingdom, leading to domestic shortages despite high production rates. The International Monetary Fund notes that brain drain lowers the overall human capital stock in origin countries, potentially increasing income inequality by concentrating remaining skills among elites and reducing incentives for local investment in education. While remittances from emigrants provide financial inflows—totaling billions annually—they often fail to fully compensate for the direct loss of productive talent, particularly in public sectors where private returns are low.[117][118] Critics of unrestricted high-skilled immigration argue that it perpetuates dependency cycles, as origin countries subsidize the education of migrants who contribute to host economies without reciprocal benefits, a dynamic evidenced by fiscal losses in small island and least-developed nations where emigration rates exceed 30% for tertiary-educated populations. World Bank analyses confirm brain drain effects in specific labor-exporting contexts, such as certain Latin American countries, where outflows reduce innovation and institutional capacity. However, the net impact varies; in larger economies with robust diaspora networks, some studies suggest potential "brain gain" through knowledge transfers, though evidence for outright harm remains strongest in resource-constrained settings with limited compensatory mechanisms.[119][120]Drivers of Opposition Sentiment
Economic and Class-Based Factors
Opposition to immigration often stems from concerns over labor market competition, particularly among low-skilled and working-class natives, where influxes of immigrants can increase the supply of workers willing to accept lower wages, thereby depressing earnings for incumbents. Economist George Borjas has estimated that a 10% increase in the immigrant share of the labor force reduces wages for native high school dropouts by approximately 5% in the short run, with effects persisting due to skill downgrading among natives.[121][122] The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine's 2017 review of empirical studies concluded that immigration has a small but negative impact on wages and employment for prior low-skilled immigrants and native-born workers without high school diplomas, equivalent to a 1-2% wage reduction per decade from the 1990s to 2010s, though effects on overall native employment are minimal.[123] These dynamics arise from basic supply-and-demand principles in labor markets, where expanded low-wage labor pools enable employers to hire at reduced rates, disproportionately affecting those at the bottom of the skill distribution who lack mobility to higher-wage sectors.[124] Class-based divides amplify this opposition, as working-class individuals, facing direct competition, exhibit stronger resistance compared to higher-income groups who benefit indirectly from cheaper goods, services, and expanded consumer markets. Studies indicate that personal economic shocks, such as job losses in trade-exposed industries, significantly boost public opposition to unauthorized immigration, with affected workers perceiving immigrants as exacerbating unemployment risks.[125] In Europe, economic downturns have correlated with heightened anti-immigration sentiment among lower socioeconomic strata, where voters attribute stagnant wages and service strains to migrant inflows, fueling support for restrictionist policies.[126] Employers and capital owners, conversely, often advocate for immigration to access low-cost labor, creating a cleavage where elite interests align with pro-immigration stances while blue-collar workers bear the localized costs of displacement.[127] This pattern holds across contexts, as evidenced by U.S. data showing that regions with rapid low-skilled immigrant growth experience slower wage growth for natives in manual occupations, estimated at 0.8% reductions from compositional shifts between 2000 and 2010.[128] Empirical analyses underscore that these effects are not uniform but concentrated among the least advantaged, fostering resentment when policy prioritizes aggregate growth over distributional equity. Borjas' national-level approach, contrasting with localized studies finding negligible impacts, reveals that internal migration diffuses competition, masking average effects while intensifying them for immobile low-skilled workers in high-immigration areas.[129][130] Consequently, opposition manifests as a rational response to perceived threats to economic security, particularly in deindustrialized communities where immigration coincides with secular declines in manufacturing employment from 17 million jobs in 1990 to 12 million by 2020, amid rising foreign-born shares in those sectors.[131] Such factors explain persistent working-class skepticism toward open borders, independent of cultural considerations.Cultural and Identity-Based Concerns
Opponents of immigration frequently cite the preservation of national culture, traditions, and ethnic identity as central motivations, arguing that mass inflows from demographically and culturally distinct groups foster parallel societies and dilute historical continuity.[132] These concerns are rooted in observations of incomplete assimilation, where immigrant communities maintain separate institutions, languages, and norms, potentially leading to fragmented social fabrics.[133] For instance, in Western Europe, surveys indicate widespread apprehension that immigrants resist adopting host customs, with only modest increases in perceived willingness to integrate since 2014 in countries like Germany and the UK.[133] Empirical research underscores these worries through evidence of diversity's impact on social cohesion. Robert Putnam's 2007 analysis of U.S. communities found that higher ethnic diversity correlates with lower interpersonal trust, reduced civic participation, and increased isolation—a phenomenon termed "hunkering down"—in the short term, as residents withdraw from collective activities amid perceived cultural fragmentation.[134] This pattern holds across multiple studies, where ethnic heterogeneity negatively affects generalized trust, independent of economic factors, suggesting causal links between rapid demographic shifts and eroded community bonds.[52] Such findings challenge optimistic multiculturalism narratives, as even proponents like Putnam acknowledge initial erosive effects before potential long-term bridging occurs through sustained contact.[135] National identity concerns amplify opposition, particularly when immigration alters the demographic majority's relative position. In Europe, where diversity views are more negative than in the U.S., majorities in nations like Italy and Hungary express pessimism about immigrants enriching their culture, viewing inflows as threats to core values tied to language, religion, and historical heritage.[136] Perceived cultural incompatibilities, such as clashes over gender roles or religious practices, further fuel resistance, with research linking anti-immigrant sentiment to fears of social conflict arising from unassimilated groups.[137] These identity-based drivers persist despite economic benefits in some cases, highlighting culture's primacy in public preferences for restrictive policies.[138]Psychological and Evolutionary Roots
Opposition to immigration arises in part from evolved psychological adaptations that favor in-group members and mitigate risks from out-groups. Evolutionary psychology posits that kin selection, which promotes altruism toward genetic relatives, extends to broader ethnic or national groups perceived as inclusive fitness vehicles, fostering preferences for cultural and genetic similarity while inducing aversion to dissimilar outsiders. This mechanism underlies xenophobic tendencies, as individuals prioritize resource allocation and cooperation within perceived kin networks, viewing immigrants as potential free-riders or competitors lacking shared genetic interests.[139][140] A key driver is the behavioral immune system, an adaptive suite of cognitive and emotional responses to pathogen threats, which heightens vigilance toward novel or foreign stimuli associated with disease risk. Disgust sensitivity, a measurable trait reflecting this system, consistently predicts stronger opposition to immigration across diverse populations, with individuals exhibiting higher sensitivity rating immigrants—particularly from pathogen-prevalent regions—as greater threats to public health and social order. Empirical studies, including cross-national surveys in the United States and Denmark, demonstrate that this link persists even after controlling for economic or ideological factors, suggesting an automatic, heuristically driven bias rather than purely learned prejudice.[141][142][143] Territoriality and resource defense instincts further root anti-immigration sentiment in ancestral environments where group boundaries protected against incursions that could deplete local endowments. The endowment effect, amplified by evolved parochial altruism, leads residents to overvalue their established territories and resist demographic shifts that alter group composition, as seen in heightened opposition among those with dependents or in high-competition scenarios. Gender differences align with these patterns, with men displaying more restrictive attitudes, particularly when safeguarding family units, reflecting adaptive asymmetries in threat perception and mate guarding. While some critiques question the universality of disease-driven xenophobia under acute threats like pandemics, the preponderance of evidence from experimental and correlational data supports these mechanisms as causal contributors to immigration skepticism.[144][145][146]Global and Regional Examples
North America
Opposition to immigration in North America has manifested historically through legislative restrictions and public nativist movements, often driven by economic competition, cultural preservation concerns, and security fears. In the United States, early examples include the Naturalization Act of 1795 requiring immigrants to renounce foreign allegiances and the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 targeting perceived radical influences from Europe.[147] The Immigration Act of 1924 imposed national origin quotas to limit inflows from Southern and Eastern Europe amid post-World War I economic anxieties and eugenics-influenced views on assimilation.[20] Contemporary opposition frequently centers on unauthorized border crossings, with public sentiment fluctuating based on enforcement levels and economic conditions; for instance, a Gallup poll in June 2024 found 55% of Americans favoring reduced immigration overall, though this dropped to 30% by July 2025 amid stabilized border encounters, while 79% viewed immigration as beneficial to the country.[148] Support for legal pathways remains high, with a September 2025 poll indicating record levels, particularly among Democrats (87%) and even rising among Republicans (48% viewing illegal immigrants positively in some contexts), yet illegal immigration ranked as a top voter concern in the 2024 election cycle.[149][150]United States
In the United States, opposition intensified in the late 20th and early 21st centuries due to surges in unauthorized migration from Latin America, straining public resources and wages in low-skilled sectors. Post-9/11 security concerns amplified calls for stricter controls, leading to policies like the Secure Fence Act of 2006 authorizing border barriers.[35] A March 2025 Pew survey revealed 89% of Republicans supported arrests of unauthorized immigrants at protests, compared to 44% of Democrats, highlighting partisan divides where economic and cultural assimilation fears predominate among opponents.[151] Despite a post-2024 election U-turn toward higher immigration approval in some polls, 64% favored pathways to legal status for most unauthorized immigrants as of June 2025, indicating nuanced views favoring order over blanket restriction.[152][153] Critics of mainstream narratives, including those from outlets like Politico, argue that reported "U-turns" may understate persistent Republican concerns over fiscal burdens and crime correlations, as evidenced by localized data on sanctuary city impacts.[153]Canada
Canada's opposition to immigration has grown notably since 2023, diverging from its historical pro-immigration consensus, amid rapid population growth exacerbating housing shortages and infrastructure strain. An Environics Institute survey in fall 2025 found 56% of Canadians believing the country accepts too many immigrants, a figure stable from 2024 but up sharply from prior decades, with 80% of Conservative supporters viewing levels as excessive.[154][155] Public opinion research from Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada indicated support for current levels hit a 30-year low by 2024, with only 40% agreeing the nation needs more immigrants as of October 2025, particularly among non-immigrants and younger cohorts facing affordability pressures.[156][157] Political polarization is evident, as 70% of Conservative backers in 2024 polls perceived immigration negatively, compared to 27% of Liberals, fueling demands for caps tied to economic capacity rather than ideological openness.[158]Mexico
Opposition to immigration in Mexico primarily targets Central American migrants transiting northward, viewed as straining southern border resources and public services. A 2019 poll revealed 64% of Mexicans considering immigrants a burden on the economy, with 55% favoring deportation, sentiments reinforced by government actions like deploying National Guard to the Guatemala border under President López Obrador to curb caravans.[159] Recent Pew data from 2024 shows mixed bilateral views, with 60% of Americans unfavorable toward Mexico's border handling, indirectly highlighting Mexican domestic resistance to unmanaged flows that could provoke U.S. retaliation.[160] While less quantified in recent polls than in the U.S. or Canada, causal factors include labor market competition and security risks from unvetted entrants, with Mexico's enforcement prioritizing national sovereignty over humanitarian absolutism.[161]United States
Opposition to immigration in the United States has deep historical roots, exemplified by the Immigration Act of 1924, which established national origins quotas to limit inflows primarily from Southern and Eastern Europe and Asia, aiming to preserve the nation's predominantly Anglo-Saxon cultural composition.[21] [20] Earlier measures, such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, similarly restricted entry based on concerns over labor competition and cultural differences.[17] The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act shifted policy toward family reunification and skills, leading to a dramatic increase in non-European immigration and renewed debates over assimilation rates, with studies indicating slower cultural integration among recent cohorts compared to earlier European waves due to larger volumes and differing origins.[162] In contemporary discourse, economic factors drive much opposition, particularly the adverse effects on low-skilled native workers; economist George Borjas's research estimates that immigration reduces wages for high school dropouts by 3 to 5 percent, with impacts concentrated among competing laborers.[64] [163] Fiscal burdens further fuel resistance, as low-education immigrants impose net lifetime costs on taxpayers exceeding $300,000 per individual at federal, state, and local levels, according to analyses updating National Academies findings, with illegal immigrants exacerbating strains through greater reliance on public services relative to tax contributions. [62] [79] Security and cultural concerns also underpin opposition, including elevated involvement of noncitizens in certain crimes; U.S. Customs and Border Protection reported over 15,000 arrests of criminal noncitizens at the southwest border in fiscal year 2024 alone, many with prior convictions for serious offenses.[164] State-level data, such as from Texas, indicate higher incarceration rates for illegal immigrants compared to natives for homicide and other violent crimes, challenging narratives of uniformly lower offending.[165] Public sentiment reflects these issues, with 55 percent of Americans favoring reduced immigration in 2024 amid record border encounters exceeding 2.4 million, though support for stricter enforcement persists despite a 2025 poll dip to 30 percent desiring cuts, amid perceptions of policy shifts.[166] [148] Politically, opposition manifested prominently in the 2016 and 2024 elections, where border security and mass deportation proposals garnered significant support, driven by causal links between unchecked inflows and community disruptions, including cultural enclaves resisting assimilation and straining social cohesion.[167] Recent surges under prior administrations heightened awareness of resource depletion in housing and schools, reinforcing arguments for enforcement prioritizing national interests over humanitarian expansions often critiqued for overlooking systemic biases in advocacy sources favoring open borders.[168]Canada
Opposition to immigration in Canada has intensified since 2023, driven primarily by concerns over housing shortages and economic pressures, with public support for high immigration levels reaching a 30-year low. In 2024, 58% of Canadians reported believing immigration levels were too high, the highest share since 1998, reflecting a 14-point increase from the previous year. By fall 2025, this figure stood at 56%, indicating a stabilization after peaking amid ongoing affordability challenges. Polling also shows 60% of Canadians disagreeing that the country needs more immigrants, with 50% viewing immigration as harmful to the nation overall. These sentiments are particularly strong among Conservative voters, 80% of whom in 2025 polls cited excessive immigration as a concern. The housing crisis forms the core of opposition, as rapid population growth—97.6% from immigration in 2023—has outpaced construction, with 5.1 new residents added per housing unit started that year, the highest ratio in over five decades of data. A government analysis from 2006–2021 found that a 1% influx of new immigrants correlates with a 3.8% rise in median house prices, exacerbating affordability issues in major cities where newcomers concentrate. Economic factors, including job competition and strained public services, further fuel discontent, with surveys linking anti-immigration views to perceptions of over-population and stagnant wages amid high temporary resident inflows. In response, the federal government shifted to a more restrictive policy in 2024, aiming to reduce temporary residents to 5% of the population by 2026, though critics argue prior levels under the Liberal administration overwhelmed infrastructure. Politically, Conservative Party leader Pierre Poilievre has channeled this opposition, advocating "very hard caps" on immigration to prioritize integration and alleviate housing pressures, while calling for an end to the temporary foreign worker program in 2025. He attributes systemic issues like unaffordable rents and healthcare wait times to unchecked inflows, positioning reduced immigration as essential for sustainable growth. This stance resonates amid partisan divides, with 70% of Conservative supporters viewing immigration negatively compared to 27% of Liberals. While some advocacy groups downplay immigration's role in favor of zoning or investment failures, empirical data on supply-demand mismatches supports the causal link to public backlash, prompting even official projections to forecast widened housing gaps without further curbs.Mexico
In Mexico, opposition to immigration centers on irregular inflows from Central America and beyond, fueled by perceptions of economic strain, increased crime, and overburdened public services. A 2019 poll indicated that 64% of Mexicans viewed immigrants as a burden on the country, with 55% supporting their deportation, reflecting widespread concerns over resource competition in a nation grappling with its own socioeconomic challenges.[159] Local sentiments have manifested in border regions, such as Tijuana, where residents in 2018 expressed growing irritation with Central American migrant caravans overwhelming shelters, hospitals, and sanitation systems, leading to public protests and calls for stricter enforcement.[169] Mexican government policy has responded with robust enforcement, particularly at the southern border, including detentions and deportations that underscore domestic opposition to uncontrolled transit migration aimed at the United States. Between 2019 and 2023, authorities deported approximately 500,000 migrants, many from Central America, amid intensified operations following U.S. pressure but aligned with national priorities to curb flows that exacerbate local insecurity from cartel involvement in smuggling.[170] Asylum applications in Mexico tripled from 2020 to 2023 before declining in 2024, yet irregular encounters persisted, prompting sustained military deployments and legal barriers under the General Law on Population, which prioritizes Mexican nationals for employment and welfare.[171] Politically, opposition transcends parties, with even the ruling Morena coalition under Presidents López Obrador and Sheinbaum maintaining restrictive measures, as unrestricted immigration risks voter backlash in a country where nationalism and self-preservation instincts prevail over humanitarian appeals from international bodies. This stance contrasts with Mexico's historical emigration to the north, fostering a pragmatic realism: having experienced outbound migration's brain drain and remittances dependency, Mexico resists becoming a net importer of low-skilled labor amid its 40% poverty rate and youth unemployment.[159]Europe
Opposition to immigration in Europe has surged since the 2015 migrant crisis, which saw over 1 million arrivals primarily from the Middle East and Africa, straining public resources and fueling debates over integration and national identity.[172] Public opinion polls from 2023-2025 indicate widespread sentiment that immigration levels are excessive and poorly managed, with majorities in countries like Germany, France, and Italy expressing preferences for stricter controls. A February 2025 YouGov survey across seven Western European nations found significant portions attributing negative societal effects to immigration, including cultural erosion and economic pressures.[173] In the UK, 52% of respondents in April 2023 advocated reducing immigration numbers.[2] This opposition transcends age groups, with younger Europeans (15-24) showing increased negativity toward immigration, rising from 32% in 2019 to higher levels by late 2023 in several nations.[174] Economic concerns form a core driver, rooted in empirical evidence of net fiscal costs from non-Western immigration. Studies consistently show that immigrants from non-Western countries impose a negative fiscal impact on host nations due to lower labor market participation, higher welfare dependency, and limited tax contributions over lifetimes.[175][176] For instance, in the Netherlands, large-scale unskilled non-Western immigration has been linked to substantial long-term fiscal deficits.[177] These dynamics exacerbate welfare state strains, as native taxpayers bear disproportionate costs without commensurate economic benefits from low-skilled inflows. Cultural and identity-based opposition stems from observable failures in assimilation, including the formation of parallel societies and resistance to secular norms among Muslim migrant communities, which surveys identify as key public worries.[172] Security apprehensions are amplified by crime data, where non-citizens and recent migrants are overrepresented in offenses. In Sweden, migrants comprised 58% of crime suspects in 2017 despite forming 33% of the population, with elevated rates in violent crimes like murder.[178] German federal statistics for 2022 recorded around 310,000 non-German suspects, excluding immigration violations, indicating disproportionate involvement in criminal activity relative to population share.[71] While some analyses dispute overall crime spikes, refugee inflows have correlated with delayed increases in local crime rates one year post-arrival.[75] These patterns, documented in official reports, contrast with narratives in certain media and academic sources that minimize links, potentially reflecting institutional biases toward downplaying integration challenges.[179] Politically, opposition manifests in the electoral gains of restrictionist parties, which by 2024 held governing roles in seven European countries and advanced in the European Parliament elections amid voter prioritization of migration controls.[180] In response, EU leaders in October 2024 elevated immigration to a top agenda item, signaling a policy pivot toward external border fortifications and returns pacts, though implementation lags behind public demands for sovereignty over admissions.[181] This shift underscores causal realities: unchecked mass migration undermines social cohesion and fiscal sustainability, prompting realist backlash against idealistic open-border approaches.United Kingdom
Opposition to immigration in the United Kingdom has deep historical roots, with public surveys indicating high levels of concern as early as the 1960s, where 85-86% expressed opposition in elections of 1964, 1966, and 1979.[2] A pivotal moment occurred in 1968 when Conservative MP Enoch Powell delivered his "Rivers of Blood" speech, warning that continued mass immigration from Commonwealth countries would lead to communal violence and cultural displacement, citing anecdotes of social tensions in Wolverhampton; the speech resonated with significant public support, as polls showed up to 74% agreement in some surveys, though it resulted in Powell's dismissal from the shadow cabinet.[182][183] The expansion of EU free movement in the 2000s intensified opposition, as net migration surged following the 2004 enlargement, with an average annual inflow of 336,000 non-UK nationals from 2011 to 2020, contributing to strains on housing, wages, and public services in working-class communities.[184] This culminated in the 2016 Brexit referendum, where immigration control was a central voter motivation, with 52% voting to leave the EU to restore border sovereignty and reduce inflows.[2] Post-Brexit, net migration remained elevated due to non-EU sources, reaching 906,000 in the year to June 2023 and 728,000 to June 2024, before declining to 431,000 in 2024 amid policy changes like visa restrictions on students and care workers.[185] Public opinion polls reflect persistent dissatisfaction, with 58% identifying immigration as a top issue in September 2025, 57% viewing it as important in Q4 2025, and a majority favoring reductions, including 47% believing illegal migrants outnumber legal ones.[186][188] Politically, parties like UKIP and later Reform UK capitalized on these sentiments; Reform secured 14.3% of the vote and five MPs in the 2024 general election, advocating for halting small boat crossings, mass deportations of up to 600,000 illegal entrants, and abolishing indefinite leave to remain.[189][190] Tensions erupted in summer 2024 riots across 27 towns following the Southport stabbings by a suspect whose asylum claim was mishandled, sparking protests against unchecked Channel crossings (over 30,000 in 2024) and perceived failures in integration, with 1,280 arrests amid clashes targeting migrant hotels.[191][192]France
Opposition to immigration in France has intensified amid rising concerns over cultural integration, security, and economic strain, particularly from non-European sources. Public opinion surveys indicate that 56% of respondents in 2024 believed there were too many immigrants in the country, an increase of 7 percentage points from 2022.[193] Immigration ranked as a top priority alongside crime, cited by 22% of respondents in a 2025 poll.[194] This sentiment influenced voting patterns, with hostility to immigration driving support in the 2024 European Parliament elections.[195] The National Rally (RN), formerly the National Front, has channeled this opposition through policies advocating "national preference," stricter border controls, and increased deportations. In the 2024 parliamentary elections, RN and allies secured 33% of the national vote in the first round, positioning immigration as a core issue.[196] The party proposes prioritizing French citizens for jobs, housing, and welfare, alongside ending family reunification and birthright citizenship.[197] France deported 27% more irregular migrants in 2024 compared to prior years, reflecting governmental alignment with tougher measures.[198] Economic data underscores grievances, with non-European immigrants facing unemployment rates over twice that of natives—19.5% versus 8%—while showing higher reliance on welfare benefits.[199] [200] Over 30 years, immigration's net fiscal impact has been negative, with immigrants and descendants contributing less in taxes than they receive in transfers.[201] Crime statistics reveal overrepresentation: foreigners, comprising 7.4% of the population in 2019, accounted for 14% of justice system cases, and 48% of Paris crimes in 2022.[202] [203] Security fears, amplified by events like the 2023 riots following the police shooting of a teenager of North African descent and prior Islamist terror attacks such as the 2015 Charlie Hebdo killings by second-generation immigrants, have bolstered anti-immigration views.[204] These incidents, often linked to unassimilated migrant communities, highlight causal links between mass immigration and social unrest, despite some studies controlling for socioeconomic factors finding no direct crime correlation.[205] Younger demographics, including millennials, exhibit stronger anti-immigration attitudes, with 50% expressing negative views in 2024 polls.[174]Germany
Opposition to immigration in Germany intensified following the 2015-2016 migrant crisis, during which over one million asylum seekers, primarily from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, entered the country under Chancellor Angela Merkel's open-door policy. This influx, justified by the slogan "Wir schaffen das" (We can do this), triggered widespread public concern over integration challenges, cultural compatibility, and resource strain on social services. Events such as the mass sexual assaults in Cologne on New Year's Eve 2015-2016, perpetrated largely by migrants from North Africa and the Middle East, amplified fears of public safety and eroded trust in authorities' handling of uncontrolled migration.[206] The rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party exemplifies organized political opposition, with its platform emphasizing strict border controls, deportation of rejected asylum seekers, and "remigration" policies targeting those deemed incompatible with German values. By 2025, AfD secured significant electoral gains, polling at around 20-25% nationally and achieving second-place status in federal elections, driven primarily by voter frustration with persistent high immigration levels—over 300,000 asylum applications annually in recent years—and perceived failures in assimilation. Public opinion surveys consistently rank immigration as a top concern, with a majority favoring reduced inflows and tougher enforcement; for instance, in early 2025 polls, economic stagnation compounded by migration costs ranked alongside security fears as key issues. AfD leader Alice Weidel advocated mass deportations of migrants with criminal records or no integration prospects, resonating amid incidents like the 2024 Solingen stabbing by a Syrian asylum seeker.[207][208][209] Grassroots movements like Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West), founded in Dresden in 2014, mobilized tens of thousands in protests against what participants viewed as creeping Islamization and parallel societies fostered by unchecked Muslim immigration. Pegida's peak attendance exceeded 25,000 in 2015, but by 2024, it disbanded as opposition shifted toward electoral avenues, though sporadic demonstrations continued in eastern Germany against local migrant housing and crime spikes. Government statistics indicate crimes attributed to foreign suspects rose 18% in 2023, fueling arguments that demographic shifts correlate with elevated violent offenses, despite some econometric studies disputing causation.[210][211] Under Chancellor Friedrich Merz's coalition post-February 2025 elections, policies tightened with suspended family reunifications for certain asylum seekers, ended fast-track citizenship after three years, and increased deportations—reaching 18,384 in 2024, a 21% rise from prior years—reflecting mainstream adoption of restrictive measures previously marginalized as "far-right." These reforms, including outflanking AfD on migration controls, aim to address public demands for order amid ongoing arrivals via Balkan routes and ongoing debates over cultural erosion in urban areas with high migrant concentrations.[212][213][214]Hungary
Hungary's government, led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán since 2010, has pursued robust opposition to mass immigration, emphasizing national sovereignty and cultural preservation amid the 2015 European migrant crisis, when over 390,000 migrants transited through the country. In July 2015, construction began on a 175-kilometer border barrier along the Serbian frontier, completed by September, equipped with razor wire and patrol roads, which reduced daily illegal crossings from thousands to dozens within months.[215] [216] [217] To counter European Union proposals for mandatory migrant relocation quotas, Hungary conducted a referendum on October 2, 2016, asking whether the EU should impose resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens without parliamentary approval; 98.4% of voters rejected it, though turnout at 43.9% fell short of the 50% threshold for validity. The government followed with the 2018 "Stop Soros" laws, imposing penalties on organizations aiding illegal border crossings and restricting asylum applications to border zones. These measures, coupled with designating Serbia a safe third country, have maintained low asylum inflows, dropping to 3,397 applications in 2017 from peaks exceeding 170,000 in 2015.[218] [219] [220][221] Public sentiment strongly supports these restrictions, with surveys showing 77% opposition to EU quotas and Hungary ranking among Europe's most immigration-skeptical nations, where even younger demographics express higher resistance than elders in some polls. In 2022, only 55,000 long-term residence permits were granted, mainly to labor migrants from Ukraine and neighboring states, keeping the foreign-born population below 6%. Hungary rejected the EU's 2024 Migration and Asylum Pact, seeking an opt-out to prioritize border controls over solidarity mechanisms.[222] [174][223][224]Sweden
Opposition to immigration in Sweden intensified following the 2015 migrant crisis, during which the country received 163,000 asylum applications, the highest per capita in Europe.[225] This influx, primarily from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, strained public resources and integration efforts, leading to widespread concerns over welfare costs, cultural assimilation, and rising crime rates.[226] Public sentiment shifted markedly, with a 2025 survey indicating that 73% of Swedes viewed immigration levels over the past decade as too high.[227] The Sweden Democrats (SD), founded in 1988 with a nationalist platform opposing multiculturalism and advocating restrictive immigration policies, capitalized on these issues.[228] By 2022, SD secured 20.5% of the vote, becoming the second-largest party and influencing government policy through a supply-and-confidence agreement with the center-right bloc.[229] Their stance emphasizes halting asylum immigration from non-European countries, prioritizing labor migration, and deporting criminal migrants, reflecting voter priorities on security and social cohesion.[228] Crime statistics underscore key drivers of opposition: individuals born abroad are 2.5 times more likely to be registered as crime suspects than those born in Sweden with two Swedish-born parents.[65] Persons with foreign backgrounds, comprising 33% of the population in 2017, accounted for 58% of crime suspects on reasonable grounds, with overrepresentation in violent offenses like murder (five times higher for those with foreign-born parents).[66][67] Gang-related shootings and bombings, often linked to unintegrated migrant communities, have fueled demands for policy reversal.[226] In response, Sweden enacted significant policy tightenings starting in 2016, including temporary residence permits, border controls, and stricter family reunification rules.[230] Further reforms under the 2022-2025 center-right government extended naturalization requirements to eight years, raised salary thresholds for work permits, and shifted focus to labor immigration over asylum.[231][232] These measures contributed to a drop in asylum applications to 12,000 in 2024 and net emigration for the first time in over 50 years.[225][233] Mainstream parties, including Social Democrats, have adopted tougher rhetoric to regain voter trust, marking a consensus on curbing non-integrative inflows.[234]Asia and Oceania
In Japan, opposition to immigration has intensified in recent years due to concerns over cultural preservation, social norms, and economic competition amid stagnant wages and an aging population. Public sentiment has shifted against increased foreign inflows, with surveys indicating widespread reluctance to accept large-scale unskilled labor migration, attributing it to potential social disruptions like littering and norm violations by foreigners.[235][236] In the July 2025 House of Councillors election, the anti-immigration Sanseito party secured unexpected seats by campaigning on "opposition to the excessive acceptance of foreigners," reflecting populist backlash against perceived globalization pressures.[237][238] Policymakers have historically resisted opening borders, citing public opinion as a barrier, even as labor shortages persist; this stance aligns with Japan's low immigration rate of about 2% foreign-born population as of 2023.[239][240]Australia
Australia's opposition to high immigration levels has surged amid housing shortages and infrastructure strain, with Lowy Institute polls showing 46% of respondents in 2024 viewing annual migrant numbers as "too high," up from prior years.[241] This sentiment fueled nationwide anti-immigration rallies on August 31, 2025, organized by groups like March for Australia, protesting record net overseas migration peaks—though figures later declined 37% from 2023 highs of over 500,000.[242][243] Policies such as offshore processing and boat turnbacks under both major parties reflect enduring public demands for control, prioritizing skilled migrants via a points system while rejecting unskilled entries; a 2025 realestate.com.au survey found 52% favoring a temporary pause in non-essential migration to ease domestic pressures.[244][245] Economic analyses link high inflows—averaging 1.5% population growth annually—to wage suppression in low-skill sectors, bolstering calls for reductions despite overall support for selective, merit-based intake.[246]India
In India, opposition to immigration centers on illegal cross-border entries, particularly from Bangladesh into northeastern states like Assam, where influxes have altered demographics and strained resources since the 1970s. The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) of 2019, implemented in March 2024, fast-tracks citizenship for non-Muslim refugees from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan fleeing persecution, explicitly excluding Muslims to prioritize verifiable victims while enabling deportation of undocumented entrants via the National Register of Citizens (NRC).[247] Assam's regional movements, including the 1979–1985 agitation that killed thousands, demanded expulsion of post-1971 migrants, reflecting fears of cultural and linguistic erosion in indigenous Assamese society.[248] The policy faced protests in urban centers and Muslim-majority areas, with critics alleging discrimination, but border-state residents largely back stricter verification to curb estimated millions of illegals, as evidenced by Assam's 2019 NRC excluding 1.9 million applicants pending appeals.[247] Government data from 2023 peg undocumented migration at over 20 million nationwide, fueling security concerns tied to radicalization and economic burdens on locals.[248]Japan
Japan exhibits strong societal and political opposition to large-scale immigration, rooted in a cultural emphasis on ethnic homogeneity and social cohesion, which empirical data links to low crime rates and high interpersonal trust.[240] Historically restrictive policies have limited permanent settlement, with foreign residents comprising only about 3% of the population as of late 2024, despite a 10.5% annual increase to 3.77 million driven by temporary labor programs for sectors like construction and caregiving.[249] This controlled approach contrasts with Western mass immigration models, prioritizing selective, skill-based inflows over family reunification or asylum expansions, as evidenced by the 2018 Immigration Control Act's focus on specified skilled workers without pathways to citizenship for most.[250] Public resistance has intensified amid rapid demographic shifts, with a 2025 NHK poll revealing 64% of respondents viewing foreigners as overly favored by policies, fueling perceptions of unfair resource allocation and cultural erosion.[236] Nationalist groups like the Sanseito party, advocating explicit opposition to "excessive acceptance of foreigners," secured notable gains in the July 2025 parliamentary elections, capitalizing on grievances over "stealth immigration"—temporary workers who overstay or form communities without integration.[251][238] Incidents involving migrant groups, such as Kurdish communities in Saitama Prefecture, have heightened concerns about localized crime spikes and parallel societies, prompting protests and calls for stricter enforcement.[252][253] Opposition draws from causal observations of integration failures elsewhere, with Japanese surveys citing fears of welfare strain, language barriers, and diminished national identity as key drivers; for instance, areas with high foreign concentrations report elevated petty crime and school dropout rates among immigrant children.[253] Policymakers, including figures like incoming Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, face pressure to balance labor shortages—exacerbated by a fertility rate of 1.2 and shrinking workforce—against these sentiments, often opting for automation and domestic incentives over immigration liberalization.[254] This resistance reflects a pragmatic realism: Japan's model sustains economic stability without the social fractures seen in high-immigration nations, though critics argue it risks long-term stagnation absent bolder reforms.[237]Australia
Opposition to immigration in Australia has historical roots in the White Australia policy, enacted through the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, which aimed to restrict non-European settlement to preserve cultural homogeneity and protect native-born workers from labor market competition.[23] This policy, supported by major political parties and trade unions, limited immigration primarily to those of British or European descent until its dismantling began in the 1960s and was formally ended in 1973 under the Whitlam government.[255] The policy reflected widespread public sentiment favoring demographic continuity and economic safeguards for the working class, with federation leaders citing fears of being "swamped" by Asian migrants.[256] In the post-policy era, opposition persisted amid rising multiculturalism and asylum seeker arrivals, particularly unauthorized boat arrivals peaking in the early 2000s. The Howard government's Pacific Solution in 2001, involving offshore processing, addressed public concerns over border security and resource strain from irregular migration, reducing boat arrivals from over 4,000 in 2001 to near zero by 2008.[257] Contemporary opposition focuses on high permanent and net overseas migration levels, which reached 518,000 in the year to June 2023, exacerbating housing shortages and infrastructure pressures.[258] Polls indicate 53% of Australians view current immigration intake as too high, with 60% expressing similar concerns in 2025 surveys, linking it to declining living standards and per capita GDP growth.[259][260] Political expression of this opposition is evident in the rise of Pauline Hanson's One Nation party, founded in 1997, which advocates capping annual visas at 130,000—a reduction of over 570,000 from recent levels—to prioritize housing availability, wage protection, and cultural integration.[261] Hanson has warned against mass migration "swamping" Australian identity, gaining traction amid 2025 protests against record migration amid a housing crisis where vacancy rates fell below 1% and rents rose 8% annually.[262][263] Public concerns also encompass economic impacts, with net migration contributing to population growth outpacing housing supply by 240,000 dwellings annually, and cultural cohesion, as evidenced by debates over integration failures in multicultural policies.[264] Government responses include maintaining 185,000 permanent visas for 2025-26 while forecasting net migration decline to 335,000, though critics argue this remains unsustainable given infrastructure deficits.[262][265]India
Opposition to immigration in India centers predominantly on illegal entries, particularly from Bangladesh, driven by concerns over demographic alterations, resource strain, and national security in border regions. The Assam Movement from 1979 to 1985, led by the All Assam Students' Union (AASU), mobilized widespread protests against undocumented migrants who entered after March 25, 1971, culminating in the Assam Accord of 1985, which set January 1, 1966, as the cutoff for detecting foreigners and promised their deportation.[266] [267] This movement highlighted fears of cultural dilution and loss of indigenous influence, with the Muslim population in Assam rising from 24.7% in 1951 to 34% by 2011, attributed partly to infiltration.[268] In recent years, sentiments have intensified in northeastern states and urban areas like Delhi, where raids target suspected Bangladeshi "infiltrators," leading to evictions and pushbacks at the border. In 2025, Indian authorities pushed back thousands of suspected illegal migrants to Bangladesh, bypassing lengthy deportation processes due to diplomatic and logistical hurdles.[269] Prime Minister Narendra Modi described illegal immigration as an "orchestrated drive to change demography" in August 2025, announcing a high-powered mission to counter infiltration amid threats to indigenous identities.[270] Political rhetoric from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) frames such migration as a security risk, linking it to cross-border terrorism and vote-bank politics by opposition parties.[271] The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) of 2019 reflects this stance by expediting citizenship for non-Muslim refugees from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan who arrived before December 31, 2014, while excluding Muslims to prioritize persecuted minorities without endorsing undocumented Muslim entries.[272] Public support for stringent measures remains strong in affected regions, though national surveys on immigration attitudes are sparse; localized polls and electoral outcomes in Assam and West Bengal indicate endorsement of National Register of Citizens (NRC) updates to identify and expel illegals.[273] Challenges persist, including porous borders spanning over 4,000 kilometers and estimates of 20 million illegal Bangladeshi residents, underscoring ongoing enforcement efforts like border fencing and biometric identification.[274]Other Regions
South Africa
Opposition to immigration in South Africa is characterized by recurrent xenophobic violence and political mobilization against migrants, primarily from Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and other African nations, amid high unemployment rates exceeding 32% and perceptions of resource strain.[275] In the May 29, 2024, general elections, anti-immigration rhetoric dominated campaigns, with parties attributing economic woes and crime to foreign nationals, contributing to the African National Congress losing its parliamentary majority.[276] [277] Xenophobic incidents, including assaults, evictions, and service denials, persisted, though reported violence decreased from prior years; Xenowatch documented 59 cases in 2024, displacing 2,946 people.[278] [279] Public sentiment reflects deep-seated resentment, fueled by narratives of immigrants undercutting wages and overwhelming public services in a country hosting over 2.9 million migrants, or about 5% of the population.[280] Political parties remain divided ahead of 2026 local elections, with some advocating stricter border controls and deportation of undocumented migrants to address illegal immigration estimated in the hundreds of thousands.[281] Empirical studies link this opposition to zero-sum economic perceptions rather than generalized prejudice, as locals prioritize native employment in a context of 45% youth unemployment.[282]Brazil
Opposition to immigration in Brazil has intensified in border regions due to the influx of over 1.2 million Venezuelan migrants since 2017, straining infrastructure in states like Roraima, where local populations faced overburdened hospitals, schools, and housing.[283] In Roraima, exposure to this migration wave correlated with electoral shifts toward right-wing candidates in 2018 and 2022, as voters associated arrivals with increased crime and economic pressure, evidenced by a 2018 outbreak of violence expelling hundreds of Venezuelans and prompting temporary border closures.[284] [285] Nationally, while policies under both Bolsonaro and Lula administrations facilitated regularization for 98% of Venezuelan arrivals through relocation programs benefiting over 100,000 by 2023, anti-migrant sentiment rose regionally, with studies showing worsened attitudes post-exodus coinciding with Latin America's broader trend.[286] [287] Bolsonaro proposed revoking expansive migration laws and establishing camps, reflecting populist appeals to curb unchecked flows amid Roraima's population surge of 10% from migrants.[285] Despite federal openness, local resistance persists, driven by verifiable costs like Roraima's health system collapse in 2018, underscoring causal links between rapid inflows and public backlash.[288]South Africa
Opposition to immigration in South Africa is marked by pervasive public hostility and recurrent episodes of xenophobic violence, primarily targeting migrants from other African countries such as Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Mozambique. Surveys indicate strong anti-immigrant sentiment, with 71% of respondents in the 2017 Human Sciences Research Council Social Attitudes Survey identifying immigrants as the primary threat to South African interests.[289] A 2025 GovDem survey reported 73% distrust toward African immigrants, attributed to economic hardship, competition for jobs in informal sectors, and perceptions of increased crime.[290] These attitudes favor restrictive policies, including opposition to granting foreigners equal rights to citizens and calls for mass deportations.[291] Xenophobic violence has resulted in significant casualties and displacement, with data from Xenowatch documenting 669 deaths, 5,310 looted shops, and 127,572 people displaced since major outbreaks began in 2008.[275] Incidents peaked during economic downturns and were exacerbated by rumors of immigrant involvement in crime or resource hoarding, amid South Africa's unemployment rate exceeding 32% in 2024.[292] While fewer large-scale attacks occurred in 2024 compared to prior years, political rhetoric during the May 2024 elections amplified tensions, with over 30 parties incorporating anti-immigrant platforms to capitalize on voter frustrations over service delivery failures blamed on migrants.[276][277] Underlying drivers include realistic threat perceptions from rapid influxes—South Africa hosts over 2.9 million immigrants, comprising about 5% of the population—competing in low-skill labor markets where locals face structural barriers.[293] The 2020 South African Social Attitudes Survey highlighted anti-immigrant stereotypes as the strongest predictor of opposition to refugee welfare inclusion, outweighing factors like economic dissatisfaction alone.[294] Protests against foreign-owned spaza shops and truck drivers underscore demands for policy enforcement, reflecting causal links between unchecked migration, local economic exclusion, and social unrest rather than mere prejudice.[295]Brazil
Opposition to immigration in Brazil has been most pronounced in northern border regions amid the influx of over 260,000 Venezuelan migrants by 2018, exacerbating local strains in states like Roraima where public services and housing faced overload.[296] This migration, driven by Venezuela's economic collapse and political crisis, led to heightened local tensions over competition for jobs, rising petty crime, and overburdened healthcare and welfare systems, with Roraima's migrant population temporarily surpassing local capacity.[297] A pivotal event occurred on August 18, 2018, in Pacaraima, when residents protested and violently expelled Venezuelan migrants from makeshift camps after a Brazilian citizen was reportedly stabbed during a robbery attributed to migrants, resulting in the destruction of tents, burning of belongings, and flight of over 1,200 Venezuelans back across the border.[298] [299] The Brazilian government responded by deploying 600 troops to secure the border and temporarily halting regular migrant entries, reflecting acute local opposition to unmanaged inflows.[300] Public sentiment has shown substantial support for immigration restrictions; a December 2018 survey indicated that 52% of Brazilians fully agreed and 18% somewhat agreed with stricter controls, amid concerns over security and economic impacts.[301] Despite this, Brazil's national policies have emphasized humanitarian reception, with over 50,000 Venezuelans granted refugee status by 2021 under both Jair Bolsonaro and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva administrations, prioritizing regional solidarity over broad restrictions.[302] Brazilian far-right discourse has critiqued Venezuelan socialism via migration examples but has not centered anti-immigration platforms akin to those in Europe or the U.S., partly due to Brazil's low overall foreign-born population of under 1%.[303]Outcomes of Restrictive Policies
Reductions in Immigration Flows and Costs
Restrictive immigration policies implemented in several countries have demonstrably reduced unauthorized and asylum inflows, leading to lower public expenditures on processing, housing, and welfare support for migrants. In Hungary, the construction of a border fence in 2015, coupled with stringent enforcement, prevented over one million illegal crossings by 2025, sharply curtailing entries from the Western Balkans route during the European migrant crisis.[304][305] This policy shift reduced the strain on Hungary's asylum system, which had processed tens of thousands of applications annually prior to 2015, down to fewer than 100 grants per year in subsequent periods.[306] Australia's "Operation Sovereign Borders," initiated in 2013, intercepted and turned back boats carrying unauthorized arrivals, reducing irregular maritime arrivals from over 20,000 in 2013 to effectively zero by 2014, a level sustained through 2023.[307][308] These measures, including offshore processing, averted fiscal outlays estimated in billions for onshore detention and resettlement, as pre-policy surges had driven annual costs exceeding AUD 1 billion for boat-related operations alone.[309] Denmark's reforms since 2015, including tightened family reunification rules and welfare restrictions for non-Western immigrants, halved asylum inflows from peak 2015 levels of over 31,000 to around 15,000 by 2023, while reducing migrant welfare dependency rates from 50% to under 30% for recent cohorts.[310][311] Such policies lowered per-migrant public costs, as non-EU immigrants impose net fiscal deficits averaging EUR 2,000-5,000 annually in Nordic contexts, per integration-adjusted estimates.[63] Broader analyses indicate that curbing low-skilled immigration yields fiscal savings, with first-generation non-EU migrants contributing negative net present values of up to USD 100,000 per individual over lifetimes in host economies, primarily due to welfare usage exceeding tax revenues.[312] In the EU, recent surges added 0.2% of GDP in initial fiscal burdens, implying that sustained reductions could preserve equivalent public funds for native priorities without dynamic offsets from second-generation effects.[313] These outcomes underscore causal links between policy stringency and diminished inflows, though long-term enforcement costs, such as Hungary's unreimbursed border expenditures exceeding EUR 1 billion, must be weighed against averted integration expenses.[314]Improvements in Social Cohesion and Security
Restrictive immigration policies have been associated with preserved levels of social trust and cohesion in nations maintaining low levels of ethnic diversity. Research by political scientist Robert Putnam indicates that increased ethnic diversity from immigration erodes social capital, including interpersonal trust and community engagement, in the short to medium term, as observed in U.S. communities with higher diversity. Policies limiting rapid demographic changes thus help sustain higher baseline trust by avoiding such "hunkering down" effects. In Japan, where immigration remains minimal—comprising less than 2% of the population—homogeneity contributes to strong social cohesion, evidenced by high interpersonal trust levels comparable to or exceeding those in many Western nations. Surveys show Japanese respondents reporting trust in others at rates around 40-50%, supporting efficient social norms and low conflict.[315] This contrasts with diverse societies experiencing Putnam-like declines, underscoring how restrictive approaches preserve cultural uniformity and mutual reliance.[316] On security, Hungary's 2015 border fence and subsequent strict controls reduced illegal crossings from over 400,000 in 2015 to near zero, correlating with sustained low crime rates. The country's homicide rate stands at 0.77 per 100,000, ranking among Europe's lowest, while overall crime incidents halved since 2010 amid Europe's rising trends.[317][318] These outcomes align with reduced exposure to migrant-related risks, as European studies document non-Western immigrants' overrepresentation in certain crimes, such as a strong link to rape convictions in Sweden after controls.[319] Italy's policies under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni since 2022 have slashed irregular sea arrivals by 64%, from 157,000 in 2023 to under 60,000 in 2024, bolstering border security and diminishing smuggling networks' influence.[320] This decline mitigates potential security threats from uncontrolled entries, including lagged crime increases observed in refugee-receiving areas elsewhere in Europe.[75] Such measures prioritize verifiable integration capacity, fostering public confidence in national safety.[321]Criticisms and Unintended Consequences
Restrictive immigration policies in nations with sub-replacement fertility rates have drawn criticism for accelerating workforce contraction and elevating dependency ratios, thereby straining public finances and economic productivity. In Japan, where the total fertility rate stood at 1.20 in 2023, the working-age population has shrunk by over 5 million since 2010, fostering acute labor shortages in sectors like elderly care and manufacturing that foreign workers partially mitigate despite ongoing restrictions.[322][323] These shortages have prompted a record 2.3 million foreign workers by early 2025, yet critics argue that tighter controls exacerbate inflationary pressures and hinder growth by limiting labor inflows.[324][325] In Italy, a fertility rate of 1.18 in 2024 has contributed to a resident population decline of approximately 0.08% annually, with projections indicating a potential 10-15% drop in the labor force by mid-century absent higher immigration.[326][327] Immigration has offset some depopulation, particularly in rural areas, but restrictive approaches are faulted for insufficiently addressing the fiscal burdens of an aging populace, including rising pension and healthcare costs that outpace contributions from a diminishing native workforce.[328][329] Hungary's stringent policies, amid a 4.5% unemployment rate in 2024, have led to 77% of firms reporting recruitment difficulties, underscoring unintended economic bottlenecks in a tight labor market.[330] Emigration of skilled Hungarians to OECD nations, totaling 45,000 in 2022, compounds domestic shortages, with critics contending that anti-immigration stances overlook the need for targeted inflows to sustain competitiveness without fully eroding cultural homogeneity.[223][330] Broader analyses highlight how such policies, while curbing irregular entries, inadvertently amplify challenges in funding social welfare systems, as shrinking tax bases fail to support expanding retiree cohorts in low-immigration contexts.[322][331] Empirical models suggest that without adaptive migration, GDP per capita growth could stagnate due to reduced innovation and productivity from demographic stagnation, though proponents counter that automation and pro-natal policies offer alternatives, albeit with implementation lags.[323][325]Debates and Counterperspectives
Responses to Accusations of Prejudice
Opponents of immigration maintain that their positions derive from verifiable socioeconomic and security data, rather than irrational prejudice or animus toward specific ethnic or racial groups. They argue that concerns about labor market competition, fiscal strain, public order, and cultural erosion reflect causal analyses of policy outcomes, not blanket hostility. For instance, surveys indicate that opposition often prioritizes economic pressures and integration challenges over identity-based bias, with cultural factors exerting a stronger influence than personal financial motives in shaping negative attitudes toward high immigration levels.[6][332] Economic analyses provide empirical substantiation for these claims, demonstrating that influxes of low-skilled immigrants displace native workers and suppress wages in affected sectors. Harvard economist George Borjas's examination of the 1980 Mariel Boatlift, which brought 125,000 Cuban migrants to Miami, revealed a 10-30% decline in wages for high school dropouts and other low-skilled natives in the city. Broader modeling estimates that immigration-generated labor supply shifts reduce native wages by amounts equivalent to a $402 billion annual transfer from competing workers to immigrants and employers. These effects disproportionately burden lower-income natives, justifying restrictionist views on grounds of distributional equity rather than discriminatory intent.[333][64] On social cohesion, research links rapid ethnic diversification to measurable declines in interpersonal trust and community engagement, challenging narratives that equate diversity advocacy with unalloyed progress. Political scientist Robert Putnam's study of 30,000 Americans found that residents in more diverse communities "hunker down," exhibiting lower trust in neighbors, reduced volunteering, and diminished social ties across all ethnic groups. Meta-analyses confirm a consistent negative correlation between ethnic diversity and social trust across multiple datasets, attributing this to short-term frictions from cultural dissimilarities and weakened shared norms.[45][52] Public safety concerns similarly rest on patterns of overrepresentation in crime statistics among certain immigrant cohorts, particularly in Europe. In Sweden, individuals born abroad are 2.5 times more likely to be registered as crime suspects than those born in Sweden to Swedish parents, a disparity persisting after controlling for age and socioeconomic factors. Such data, drawn from official records, underpin arguments that unchecked inflows heighten risks of violent and property crimes, framing opposition as a pragmatic response to causal risks rather than xenophobia. Even among immigrants, higher-skilled and economically integrated individuals express greater opposition to further immigration, indicating that reservations stem from self-interested assessments of competition and societal strain, not inherent prejudice.[65][334]Evaluation of Pro-Immigration Claims
Pro-immigration arguments frequently assert that immigration generates net economic benefits by expanding the labor force, boosting GDP, and filling skill gaps, yet empirical analyses reveal that these gains are unevenly distributed and often overstated when accounting for fiscal costs and labor market displacements. For instance, while aggregate GDP may rise due to increased population, per capita income for natives can stagnate or decline, as resources are redistributed from lower-skilled workers to capital owners and high-skilled immigrants. Economist George Borjas has demonstrated through labor market models that a 10% increase in immigrant supply reduces wages for native high school dropouts by 4-7%, with minimal overall growth effects after subtracting displacement costs.[335] Similarly, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine's 2017 report found short-term wage declines of 0-5% for low-skilled natives, persisting over decades for those without college degrees.[123] Fiscal neutrality or surplus is another common claim, positing that immigrants contribute more in taxes than they consume in services, but longitudinal studies indicate substantial net costs, particularly from low-skilled and family-based inflows. A 2024 Manhattan Institute analysis estimated the lifetime fiscal drain per low-education immigrant at $300,000 to $1 million, driven by welfare usage, education, and healthcare expenditures exceeding tax revenues, even in second generations.[336] The American Enterprise Institute's 2025 update corroborated this, showing U.S. states with high low-skilled immigration facing annual deficits of 1-2% of GDP when including indirect costs like reduced native productivity.[312] High-skilled immigrants, such as H-1B visa holders, do yield positive fiscal impacts via innovation—contributing to 32% of U.S. patents since 1990 despite comprising 16% of inventors—but they represent a minority (under 20%) of total inflows, with overall immigration skewing toward lower contributors.[337] On innovation and demographic renewal, proponents argue immigrants drive entrepreneurship and counter aging populations, yet evidence tempers these benefits when disaggregating by skill. High-skilled migrants enhance firm-level patents and regional startups, as seen in studies linking H-1B expansions to 10-15% rises in local innovation rates, but mass low-skilled immigration correlates with no such gains and exacerbates dependency ratios by increasing non-working youth and retirees relative to contributors.[338][339] Borjas critiques the conflation, noting that unrestricted flows dilute average human capital, yielding negligible long-term growth beyond population effects.[340] Social claims of diversity fostering cohesion and cultural enrichment face direct contradiction from causal data on trust erosion. Robert Putnam's 2007 study across 30,000 U.S. respondents found that higher ethnic diversity predicts lower social trust, reduced community engagement, and "hunkering down" behaviors, with effects persisting after controls for income and crime—attributable to reduced interpersonal familiarity rather than prejudice.[45] Replications in Europe confirm this, showing 5-10% trust drops in diverse neighborhoods, challenging narratives of inevitable integration without assimilation policies.[341] Humanitarian rationales, while invoking moral imperatives, overlook chain migration's amplification: U.S. data post-1965 reforms show initial refugees spawning 3-5 times more low-skilled relatives, compounding fiscal and cohesion strains without proportional humanitarian offsets.[342] These evaluations highlight that pro-immigration claims often rely on selective high-skilled examples or aggregate metrics ignoring distributional harms, with empirical rigor—via randomized or instrumental variable designs—revealing trade-offs favoring restriction for low-skilled inflows to protect native low earners and public finances. While benefits accrue in targeted systems like Canada's points-based model, open-border advocacy underperforms causal predictions of sustained prosperity.[343]Long-Term Policy Lessons
Empirical evidence from Hungary demonstrates that robust physical border barriers, combined with legal enforcement, can achieve substantial long-term reductions in unauthorized entries. Following the construction of a border fence in 2015, illegal crossings dropped by nearly 100% compared to peak levels during the 2015 migrant crisis, with apprehensions falling from over 170,000 in that year to fewer than 2,000 annually by 2019.[344] This outcome underscores the policy lesson that passive deterrence measures, such as open borders or symbolic patrols, fail to stem flows, whereas tangible infrastructure deters crossings and shifts migration routes, preserving national sovereignty over entry controls.[345] Selective admission criteria, exemplified by Australia's points-based system introduced in the late 1980s and refined over decades, prioritize migrants with skills, language proficiency, and age factors that align with labor market needs, yielding sustained economic contributions with minimal fiscal burdens. This approach has enabled Australia to maintain high immigration levels—over 200,000 permanent skilled visas annually—while ensuring net positive impacts on GDP per capita and innovation, as skilled entrants exhibit employment rates exceeding 80% within years of arrival and lower welfare dependency than family or humanitarian streams.[346] [347] Long-term data indicate that such systems mitigate risks of labor market displacement for natives and cultural enclaves by favoring assimilable, high-human-capital profiles, contrasting with unselective policies that amplify unemployment among low-skilled natives.[348] Denmark's post-2015 reforms, including tightened asylum rules and welfare restrictions for non-citizens, highlight the necessity of linking immigration to integration capacity, reducing long-term dependency and enhancing social trust. By capping benefits for new arrivals and mandating language and employment milestones, Denmark lowered non-Western immigrant welfare usage from over 50% in prior cohorts to under 40% in recent ones, while boosting employment rates by 10-15 percentage points among refugees.[349] [350] Sweden's policy reversal toward restrictions after 2015, prompted by surging crime and fiscal strains—where non-Western immigrants comprised 58% of suspects in violent crimes despite being 20% of the population—further illustrates that delayed enforcement erodes public support and necessitates harsher corrections, including net emigration for the first time in decades by 2024.[65] [351] These cases collectively affirm that sustainable immigration policies require upfront assessment of demographic sustainability, cultural compatibility, and infrastructural limits, avoiding the pitfalls of humanitarian overreach that strain welfare systems and erode cohesion. Peer-reviewed analyses confirm that restrictions, when paired with legal pathways for compatible entrants, outperform lax regimes in preserving economic productivity and public goods, as unchecked inflows correlate with declining trust and rising parallel societies.[352] Governments ignoring these dynamics risk reversible policy U-turns, as evidenced by Europe's shift from open-door paradigms post-2015, emphasizing proactive calibration over reactive crises.[353]References
- https://www.[statista](/page/Statista).com/statistics/649683/immigration-as-an-issue-gb/
