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Islamic schools and branches
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Islamic schools and branches have different understandings of Islam. There are many different sects or denominations, schools of Islamic jurisprudence, and schools of Islamic theology, or ʿaqīdah (creed). Within Sunnī Islam, there may be differences, such as different orders (tariqa) within Sufism, different schools of theology (Atharī, Ashʿarī, Māturīdī) and jurisprudence (Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, Ḥanbalī).[1] Groups in Islam may be numerous (Sunnīs make up 87-90% of all Muslims), or relatively small in size (Ibadis, Ismāʿīlīs, Zaydīs).[2]
Differences between the groups may not be well known to Muslims outside of scholarly circles, or may have induced enough passion to have resulted in political and religious violence (Barelvism, Deobandism, Salafism, Wahhabism).[3][4][5][6] There are informal movements driven by ideas (such as Islamic modernism and Islamism), as well as organized groups with governing bodies (such as Nation of Islam). Some of the Islamic sects and groups regard certain others as deviant or not being truly Muslim (for example, Sunnīs frequently discriminate against Ahmadiyya, Alawites, Quranists, and sometimes Shīʿas).[3][4][5][6] Some Islamic sects and groups date back to the early history of Islam between the 7th and 9th centuries CE (Kharijites, Mu'tazila, Sunnīs, Shīʿas), whereas others have arisen much more recently (Islamic neo-traditionalism, liberalism and progressivism, Islamic modernism, Salafism and Wahhabism), or even in the 20th century (Nation of Islam). Still others were influential historically, but are no longer in existence (non-Ibadi Kharijites and Murji'ah).
Muslims who do not belong to, do not self-identify with, or cannot be readily classified under one of the identifiable Islamic schools and branches are known as non-denominational Muslims.
Overview
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The original schism between Kharijites, Sunnīs, and Shīʿas among Muslims was disputed over the political and religious succession to the guidance of the Muslim community (Ummah) after the death of the Islamic prophet Muhammad.[7] From their essentially political position, the Kharijites developed extreme doctrines that set them apart from both mainstream Sunnī and Shīʿa Muslims.[7] Shīʿas believe ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib is the true successor to Muhammad, while Sunnīs consider Abu Bakr to hold that position. The Kharijites broke away from both the Shīʿas and the Sunnīs during the First Fitna (the first Islamic Civil War);[7] they were particularly noted for adopting a radical approach to takfīr (excommunication), whereby they declared both Sunnī and Shīʿa Muslims to be either infidels (kuffār) or false Muslims (munafiqun), and therefore deemed them worthy of death for their perceived apostasy (ridda).[7]
In addition, there are several differences within Sunnī and Shīʿa Islam: Sunnī Islam is separated into four main schools of jurisprudence, namely Mālikī, Ḥanafī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī; these schools are named after their founders Mālik ibn Anas, Abū Ḥanīfa al-Nuʿmān, Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, respectively.[1] Shīʿa Islam, on the other hand, is separated into three major sects: Twelvers, Ismāʿīlīs, and Zaydīs. The vast majority of Shīʿa Muslims are Twelvers (a 2012 estimate puts the figure as 85%),[8] to the extent that the term "Shīʿa" frequently refers to Twelvers by default. All mainstream Twelver and Ismāʿīlī Shīʿa Muslims follow the same school of thought, the Jaʽfari jurisprudence, named after Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, the sixth Shīʿīte Imam.
Zaydīs, also known as Fivers, follow the Zaydī school of thought (named after Zayd ibn ʿAlī). Ismāʿīlīsm is another offshoot of Shīʿa Islam that later split into Nizārī and Musta'lī, and the Musta'lī further divided into Ḥāfiẓi and Ṭayyibi.[9] Ṭayyibi Ismāʿīlīs, also known as "Bohras", are split between Dawudi Bohras, Sulaymani Bohras, and Alavi Bohras.[10]
Similarly, Kharijites were initially divided into five major branches: Sufris, Azariqa, Najdat, Adjarites, and Ibadis. Of these, Ibadi Muslims are the only surviving branch of Kharijites. In addition to the aforementioned groups, new schools of thought and movements like Ahmadi Muslims, Quranist Muslims, and African-American Muslims later emerged independently.
Muslims who do not belong to, do not self-identify with, or cannot be readily classified under one of the identifiable Islamic schools and branches are known as non-denominational Muslims.
Main branches or denominations
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Sunnī Islam
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Sunnī Islam, also known as Ahl as-Sunnah waʾl Jamāʾah or simply Ahl as-Sunnah, is by far the largest denomination of Islam, comprising around 87-90% of the Muslim population in the world. The term Sunnī comes from the word sunnah, which means the teachings, actions, and examples of the Islamic prophet Muhammad and his companions (ṣaḥāba).
Sunnīs believe that Muhammad did not specifically appoint a successor to lead the Muslim community (Ummah) before his death in 632 CE, however they approve of the private election of the first companion, Abū Bakr.[12][13] Sunnī Muslims regard the first four caliphs—Abū Bakr (632–634), ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (Umar І, 634–644), ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān (644–656), and ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (656–661)—as al-Khulafāʾ ur-Rāshidūn ("the Rightly-Guided Caliphs"). Sunnīs also believe that the position of caliph may be attained democratically, on gaining a majority of the votes, but after the Rashidun, the position turned into a hereditary dynastic rule because of the divisions started by the Umayyads and others. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, there has never been another caliph as widely recognized in the Muslim world.
Followers of the classical Sunnī schools of jurisprudence and kalām (rationalistic theology) on one hand, and Islamists and Salafists such as Wahhabis and Ahle Hadith, who follow a literalist reading of early Islamic sources, on the other, have laid competing claims to represent the "orthodox" Sunnī Islam.[14] Anglophone Islamic currents of the former type are sometimes referred to as "traditional Islam".[15] Islamic modernism is an offshoot of the Salafi movement that tried to integrate modernism into Islam by being partially influenced by modern-day attempts to revive the ideas of the Muʿtazila school by Islamic scholars such as Muhammad Abduh.
Shīʿa Islam
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Shīʿa Islam is the second-largest denomination of Islam, comprising around 10–13%[16] of the total Muslim population.[17] Although a minority in the Muslim world, Shīʿa Muslims constitute the majority of the Muslim populations in Iran, Iraq and Azerbaijan, as well as significant minorities in Syria, Turkey, South Asia, Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, as well as in other parts of the Persian Gulf.[18]
In addition to believing in the supreme authority of the Quran and teachings of Muhammad, Shīʿa Muslims believe that Muhammad's family, the Ahl al-Bayt ("People of the Household"), including his descendants known as Imams, have distinguished spiritual and political authority over the community,[19] and believe that ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, was the first of these Imams and the rightful successor to Muhammad, and thus reject the legitimacy of the first three Rāshidūn caliphs.[20][full citation needed]
Major sub-denominations
[edit]- The Twelvers believe in the Twelve Shīʿīte Imams and are the only school to comply with the Hadith of the Twelve Successors, where Muhammad stated that he would have twelve successors. This sometimes includes the Alevi and Bektashi schools.
- The Isma'ili are an esoteric Shīʿīte branch that accept Isma'il ibn Jafar as the sixth Imam. Their thought is heavily influenced by philosophy of Neoplatonism.[21] Isma'ilism includes the Nizārī, Sevener, Musta‘lī, Dawudi Bohra, Hebtiahs Bohra, Sulaymani Bohra, and Alavi Bohra sub-denominations.
- The Zaydīs historically derive from the followers of Zayd ibn ʿAlī. In the modern era, they "survive only in northern Yemen".[22] Although they are a Shīʿa sect, "in modern times" they have "shown a strong tendency to move towards the Sunni mainstream".[22]
Ghulat movements
[edit]Shīʿīte groups and movements who either ascribe divine characteristics to some important figures in the history of Islam (usually members of Muhammad's family, the Ahl al-Bayt) or hold beliefs deemed deviant by mainstream Shīʿa Muslims were designated as Ghulat.[23]
- The Alawites—a distinct Arab ethno-religious group—is the only ghulat sect still in existence today.[24] Their movement was developed between the 9th and 10th centuries CE. Historically, Twelver Shīʿīte scholars such as Shaykh Tusi didn't consider Alawites as Shīʿa Muslims while condemning their beliefs, perceived as heretical.[25] The medieval Sunnī Muslim scholar Ibn Taymiyyah also pointed out that the Alawites were not Shīʿītes.[26] However, the Sunni Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, issued a fatwa recognizing them as part of the Muslim community in the interest of Arab nationalism.[27][28] And during the Syrian regime Hafez al-Assad and his son and successor Bashar al-Assad, Alawites have shown a tendency to move towards the regular Twelver Shīʿa Islam.[29]
Offshoots of Shīʿa Islam
[edit]- The Ali-Illahis are a distinct syncretic religious movement which has been practiced in parts of the Luristan region in Iran which combines elements of Shīʿa Islam with older religions. It centers on the belief that there have been successive incarnations of the Deity throughout history, and Ali-Illahis reserve particular reverence for ʿAlī who is considered one such incarnation.[30]
- The Druze are a distinct monotheistic Abrahamic religion and ethno-religious group that developed in the 11th century CE, originally as an offshoot of Ismāʿīlīsm.[31] The Druze faith further split from Ismāʿīlīsm as it developed its own unique doctrines, and finally separated from both Ismāʿīlīsm and Islam altogether;[31] these include the belief that the Imam Al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh was God incarnate.[32] Thus, the Druze don't identify themselves as Muslims,[31][33][34][35][36] and aren't considered as such by Muslims either (See: Islam and Druze).[31][37][38][39] According to the medieval Sunnī Muslim scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, the Druze were not Muslims, neither ′Ahl al-Kitāb (People of the Book), nor mushrikin (polytheists); rather, he labeled them as kuffār (infidels).[40][41][42][43]
- The Baháʼí Faith is a distinct monotheistic universal Abrahamic religion that developed in 19th-century Persia, originally derived as a splinter group from Bábism, another distinct monotheistic Abrahamic religion, itself derived from Twelver Shīʿīsm.[44][45] Baháʼís believe in an utterly transcendent and inaccessible Supreme Creator of the universe,[44] nevertheless seen as conscious of the creation,[44] with a will and purpose that is expressed through messengers recognized in the Baháʼí Faith as the Manifestations of God (all the Jewish prophets, Zoroaster, Krishna, Gautama Buddha, Jesus, Muhammad, the Báb, and ultimately Baháʼu'lláh).[44] Baháʼís believe that God communicates his will and purpose to humanity through his intermediaries, the prophets and messengers who have founded various world religions from the beginning of humankind up to the present day, and will continue to do so in the future.[44] Baháʼís and Bábis don't consider themselves as Muslims, since both of their religions have superseded Islam, and aren't considered as such by Muslims either; rather, they are seen as apostates from Islam.[44][45] Since both Baháʼís and Bábis reject the Islamic dogma that Muhammad is the last prophet, they have suffered religious discrimination and persecution both in Iran and elsewhere in the Muslim world due to their beliefs.[45] (See: Persecution of Baháʼís).
Kharijites
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The Kharijites (literally, "those who seceded") are a branch who originated during the First Fitna, the struggle for political leadership over the Muslim community, following the assassination in 656 of the third caliph Uthman.[7][46] It is an extinct sect, except the Ibadis, whose roots go back to them.[47] Kharijites originally supported the caliphate of Ali, but then later on fought against him and eventually succeeded in his martyrdom while he was praying in the mosque of Kufa. While there are few remaining Kharijite or Kharijite-related groups, the term is sometimes used to denote Muslims who refuse to compromise with those with whom they disagree.
Sufris were a major sub-sect of Kharijite in the 7th and 8th centuries, and a part of the Kharijites. Nukkari was a sub-sect of Sufris. Harūrīs were an early Muslim sect from the period of the Four Rightly-Guided Caliphs (632–661 CE), named for their first leader, Habīb ibn-Yazīd al-Harūrī. Azariqa, Najdat, and Adjarites were minor sub-sects.
Ibadism
[edit]The only Khariji Islam sub-sect extant today is Ibadism, which developed out of the 7th century CE. There are currently two geographically separated Ibadi groups—in Oman, where they constitute the majority of the Muslim population in the country, and in North Africa where they constitute significant minorities in Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.[47] Similarly to another Muslim minority, the Zaydīs, "in modern times" they have "shown a strong tendency" to move towards the Sunnī branch of Islam.[22]
Schools of Islamic jurisprudence
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Islamic schools of jurisprudence, known as madhhab, differ in the methodology they use to derive their rulings from the Quran, ḥadīth literature, the sunnah (accounts of the sayings and living habits attributed to the Islamic prophet Muhammad during his lifetime), and the tafsīr literature (exegetical commentaries on the Quran).
Sunnī
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Sunnī Islam contains numerous schools of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and schools of Islamic theology (ʿaqīdah).[1] In terms of religious jurisprudence (fiqh), Sunnism contains several schools of thought (madhhab):[1]
- the Ḥanafī school, named after Abū Ḥanīfa al-Nuʿmān (8th century CE);
- the Mālikī school, named after Mālik ibn Anas (8th century CE);
- the Shāfiʿī school, named after Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (8th century CE);
- the Ḥanbalī school, named after Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (8th century CE);
- the Ẓāhirī school, founded by Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī (9th century CE).[48]
In terms of religious creed (ʿaqīdah), Sunnism contains several schools of theology:[1]
- the Atharī school, a scholarly movement that emerged in the late 8th century CE;
- the Ashʿarī school, founded by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (10th century CE);
- the Māturīdī school, founded by Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (10th century CE).
The Salafi movement is a conservative reform branch and/or revivalist movement within Sunnī Islam whose followers do not believe in strictly following one particular madhhab. They include the Wahhabi movement, an Islamic doctrine and religious movement founded by Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, and the modern Ahle Hadith movement, whose followers call themselves Ahl al-Ḥadīth.
Shīʿa
[edit]In Shīʿa Islam, the major Shīʿīte school of jurisprudence is the Jaʿfari or Imāmī school,[49] named after Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, the sixth Shīʿīte Imam. The Jaʿfari jurisprudence is further divided into two branches: the Usuli school, which favors the exercise of ijtihad,[50] and the Akhbari school, which holds the traditions (aḵbār) of the Shīʿīte Imams to be the main source of religious knowledge.[51] Minor Shīʿa schools of jurisprudence include the Ismāʿīlī school (Mustaʿlī-Fāṭimid Ṭayyibi Ismāʿīlīs) and the Zaydī school, both of which have closer affinity to Sunnī jurisprudence.[49][52][53] Shīʿīte clergymen and jurists usually carry the title of mujtahid (i.e., someone authorized to issue legal opinions in Shīʿa Islam).
Ibadism
[edit]The fiqh or jurisprudence of Ibadis is relatively simple. Absolute authority is given to the Quran and ḥadīth literature; new innovations accepted on the basis of qiyas (analogical reasoning) were rejected as bid'ah (heresy) by the Ibadis. That differs from the majority of Sunnīs,[54] but agrees with most Shīʿa schools[55] and with the Ẓāhirī and early Ḥanbalī schools of Sunnism.[56][57][58]
Schools of Islamic theology
[edit]Aqidah is an Islamic term meaning "creed", doctrine, or article of faith.[59][60] There have existed many schools of Islamic theology, not all of which survive to the present day. Major themes of theological controversies in Islam have included predestination and free will, the nature of the Quran, the nature of the divine attributes, apparent and esoteric meaning of scripture, and the role of dialectical reasoning in the Islamic doctrine.
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Sunnism
[edit]Classical
[edit]Kalām is the Islamic philosophy of seeking theological principles through dialectic. In Arabic, the word literally means "speech/words". A scholar of kalām is referred to as a mutakallim (Muslim theologian; plural mutakallimūn). There are many schools of Kalam, the main ones being the Ashʿarī and Māturīdī schools in Sunni Islam.[61]
Ashʿarī
[edit]Ashʿarīsm is a school of theology founded by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī in the 10th century. The Ashʿarīte view was that comprehension of God's unique nature and characteristics was beyond human capability. Ashʿarī theology is considered one of the orthodox creeds of Sunni Islam alongside the Māturīdī theology.[61] Historically, the Ashʿarī theology prevails in Sufism.[61]
Māturīdīsm
[edit]Māturīdism is a school of theology founded by Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī in the 10th century, which is a close variant of the Ashʿarī school. Māturīdī theology is considered one of the orthodox creeds of Sunni Islam alongside the Ashʿarī theology,[61] and prevails in the Ḥanafī school of Islamic jurisprudence.[61] Points which differ are the nature of belief and the place of human reason. The Māturīdites state that imān (faith) does not increase nor decrease but remains static; instead, it's taqwā (piety) which increases and decreases. The Ashʿarītes affirm that belief does, in fact, increase and decrease. The Māturīdites affirm that the unaided human mind is able to find out that some of the more major sins, such as alcohol or murder, are evil without the help of revelation. The Ashʿarītes affirm that the unaided human mind cannot know if something is good or evil, lawful or unlawful, without divine revelation.
Atharism
[edit]The Atharī school derives its name from the word "tradition" as a translation of the Arabic word hadith or from the Arabic word athar, meaning "narrations". The traditionalist creed is to avoid delving into extensive theological speculation. They rely on the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and sayings of the Sahaba, seeing this as the middle path where the attributes of Allah are accepted without questioning their nature (bi-la kayf). Ahmad ibn Hanbal is regarded as the leader of the traditionalist school of creed. Western scholars of Islamic studies remark that it would be incorrect to consider Atharism and Hanbalism as synonymous, since there have been Hanbali scholars who have explicitly rejected and opposed the Athari theology.[62][63] The modern Salafi movement associates itself with the Atharī creed.[64][65][66][67]
Muʿtazilism
[edit]Muʿtazilite theology originated in the 8th century in Basra when Wasil ibn Ata left the teaching lessons of Hasan al-Basri after a theological dispute. He and his followers expanded on the logic and rationalism of Greek philosophy, seeking to combine them with Islamic doctrines and show that the two were inherently compatible. The Mu'tazilite resolved many theological and philosophical discourse issues, such as whether the Qur'an was created or eternal with God, whether evil was created by God or existed by itself, the problem of destiny versus free will, and whether the Qur'an should be interpreted allegorically or literally. In this regard, Mu'tazila places more emphasis on rationality in answering Islamic theological and philosophical questions.[68][69]
Murji'ah
[edit]Murji'ah was a name for an early politico-religious movement that referred to all those who identified faith (iman) with belief to the exclusion of acts.[70] Originating during the caliphates of Uthman and Ali, Murijites opposed the Kharijites, holding that only God has the authority to judge who is a true Muslim and who is not, and that Muslims should consider all other Muslims as part of the community.[71] Two major Murijite sub-sects were the Karamiya and Sawbaniyya.[72]
Qadariyyah
[edit]Qadariyya is an originally derogatory term designating early Islamic theologians who asserted that humans possess free will, whose exercise makes them responsible for their actions, justifying divine punishment and absolving God of responsibility for evil in the world.[73][74] Some of their doctrines were later adopted by the Mu'tazilis and rejected by the Ash'aris.[73]
Jabriyah
[edit]In direct contrast to the Qadariyyah, Jabriyah was an early Islamic philosophical school based on the belief that humans are controlled by predestination, without having choice or free will. The Jabriya school originated during the Umayyad dynasty in Basra. The first representative of this school was Al-Ja'd ibn Dirham, who was executed in 724.[75] The term is derived from the Arabic root j-b-r, in the sense which gives the meaning of someone who is forced or coerced by destiny.[75] The term Jabriyah was also a derogatory term used by different Islamic groups that they considered wrong,[76] The Ash'ariyah used the term Jabriyah in the first place to describe the followers of Jahm ibn Safwan, who died in 746, in that they regarded their faith as a middle position between Qadariyah and Jabriya. On the other hand, the Mu'tazilah considered the Ash'ariyah as Jabriyah because, in their opinion, they rejected the orthodox doctrine of free will.[77] The Shiites used the term Jabriyah to describe the Ash'ariyah and Hanbalis.[78]
Jahmiyya
[edit]Jahmis were the alleged followers of the early Islamic theologian Jahm bin Safwan who associated himself with Al-Harith ibn Surayj. He was an exponent of extreme determinism according to which a man acts only metaphorically in the same way in which the sun acts or does something when it sets.[79]
Batiniyyah
[edit]Bāṭiniyyah is a name given to an allegoristic type of scriptural interpretation developed among some Shia groups, stressing the bāṭin (inward, esoteric) meaning of texts. It has been retained by all branches of Isma'ilism and its Druze offshoot. Alevism, Bektashism and folk religion, Hurufis and Alawites practice a similar system of interpretation.[80]
Sufism
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Sufism is Islam's mystical-ascetic dimension and is represented by schools or orders known as Tasawwufī-Ṭarīqah. It is seen as that aspect of Islamic teaching that deals with the purification of the inner self. By focusing on the more spiritual aspects of religion, Sufis strive to obtain direct experience of God by making use of "intuitive and emotional faculties" that one must be trained to use.[81][full citation needed]
The following list contains some notable Sufi orders:
- The Azeemiyya order was founded in 1960 by Qalandar Baba Auliya, also known as Syed Muhammad Azeem Barkhia.
- The Bektashi order was founded in the 13th century by the Islamic saint Haji Bektash Veli, and greatly influenced during its formative period by the Hurufi Ali al-'Ala in the 15th century and reorganized by Balım Sultan in the 16th century. Because of its adherence to the Twelve Imams, it is classified under Twelver Shia Islam.[citation needed]
- The Chishti order (Persian: چشتیہ) was founded by (Khawaja) Abu Ishaq Shami ("the Syrian"; died 941) who brought Sufism to the town of Chisht, some 95 miles east of Herat in present-day Afghanistan. Before returning to the Levant, Shami initiated, trained, and deputized the son of the local Emir (Khwaja) Abu Ahmad Abdal (died 966). Under the leadership of Abu Ahmad's descendants, the Chishtiyya as they are also known, flourished as a regional mystical order. The founder of the Chishti Order in South Asia was Moinuddin Chishti.
- The Kubrawiya order was founded in the 13th century by Najmuddin Kubra in Bukhara in modern-day Uzbekistan.[82]
- The Mevlevi order is better known in the West as the "whirling dervishes".
- Mouride is most prominent in Senegal and The Gambia, with headquarters in the holy city of Touba, Senegal.[83]
- The Naqshbandi order was founded in 1380 by Baha-ud-Din Naqshband Bukhari. It is considered by some to be a "sober" order known for its silent dhikr (remembrance of God) rather than the vocalized forms of dhikr common in other orders. The Süleymani and Khalidiyya orders are offshoots of the Naqshbandi order.
- The Ni'matullahi order is the most widespread Sufi order of Persia today. It was founded by Shah Ni'matullah Wali (d. 1367), established and transformed from his inheritance of the Ma'rufiyyah circle.[84] There are several suborders in existence today, the most known and influential in the West following the lineage of Javad Nurbakhsh, who brought the order to the West following the 1979 Iranian Revolution.
- The Noorbakshia order,[85] also called Nurbakshia,[86][87] claims to trace its direct spiritual lineage and chain (silsilah) to the Islamic prophet Muhammad, through Ali, by way of Ali Al-Ridha. This order became known as Nurbakshi after Shah Syed Muhammad Nurbakhsh Qahistani, who was aligned to the Kubrawiya order.
- The Oveysi (or Uwaiysi) order claims to have been founded 1,400 years ago by Uwais al-Qarni from Yemen.
- The Qadiri order is among the oldest Sufi Orders. It derives its name from Abdul-Qadir Gilani (1077–1166), a native of the Iranian province of Gīlān. The order is one of the most widespread Sufi orders in the Islamic world, and can be found in Central Asia, Turkey, Balkans, and much of East and West Africa. The Qadiriyyah have not developed any distinctive doctrines or teachings outside mainstream Islam. They believe in the fundamental principles of Islam, but interpret them through mystical experience. The Ba'Alawi order is an offshoot of Qadiriyyah.
- Senussi is a religious-political Sufi order established by Muhammad ibn Ali as-Senussi. As-Senussi founded this movement due to his criticism of the Egyptian ulema.[88]
- The Shadhili order was founded by Abu-l-Hassan ash-Shadhili. Followers (murids Arabic: seekers) of the Shadhiliyya are often known as Shadhilis.[89][90]
- The Suhrawardiyya order (Arabic: سهروردية) is a Sufi order founded by Abu al-Najib al-Suhrawardi (1097–1168).
- The Tijaniyyah order attaches a large importance to culture and education, and emphasizes the individual adhesion of the disciple (murid).
Later movements
[edit]African-American movements
[edit]Many slaves brought from Africa to the Western Hemisphere were Muslims,[91] and the early 20th century saw the rise of distinct Islamic religious and political movements within the African-American community in the United States,[92] such as Darul Islam,[91] the Islamic Party of North America,[91] the Mosque of Islamic Brotherhood (MIB),[91] the Muslim Alliance in North America,[91] the Moorish Science Temple of America,[92] the Nation of Islam (NOI),[92][93][94][95] and the Ansaaru Allah Community.[96] They sought to ascribe Islamic heritage to African Americans, thereby giving much emphasis on racial and ethnic aspects[93][92][94][95][97] (see black nationalism and black separatism).[91][96][98] These black Muslim movements often differ greatly in matters of doctrine from mainstream Islam.[92][94][96][98] They include:
- Moorish Science Temple of America, founded in 1913 by Noble Drew Ali (born Timothy Drew).[95] The Moorish Science Temple of America is characterized by a strong African-American ethnic and religious identity.[92][95][99]
- Nation of Islam, founded by Wallace Fard Muhammad in Detroit in 1930,[100] with a declared aim of "resurrecting" the spiritual, mental, social, and economic condition of the black man and woman of America and the world.[92][93][94] The Nation of Islam believes that Wallace Fard Muhammad was God on earth.[98][100][101] The Nation of Islam doesn't consider the Arabian Muhammad as the final prophet and instead regards Elijah Muhammad, successor of Wallace Fard Muhammad, as the true Messenger of Allah.[92][93][94]
- American Society of Muslims: Warith Deen Mohammed established the American Society of Muslims in 1975.[91] This offshoot of the Nation of Islam wanted to bring its teachings more in line with mainstream Sunni Islam, establishing mosques instead of temples, and promoting the Five pillars of Islam.[102][103]
- Five-Percent Nation[91]
- United Nation of Islam
Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam
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Ahmadiyya |
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The Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam was founded in British India in 1889 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, who claimed to be the promised Messiah ("Second Coming of Christ"), the Mahdi awaited by the Muslims as well as a "subordinate" prophet to the Islamic prophet Muhammad.[104][105][106][107] Ahmadis claim to practice the pristine form of Islam as followed by Muhammad and his earliest followers.[108][109] They believe that it was Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's task to restore the original sharia given to Muhammad by guiding the Ummah back to the "true" Islam and defeat the attacks on Islam by other religions.[104][105][106][107][110]
There are a wide variety of distinct beliefs and teachings of Ahmadis compared to those of most other Muslims,[104][105][106][107] which include the interpretation of the Quranic title Khatam an-Nabiyyin,[111] interpretation of the Messiah's Second Coming,[105][112] complete rejection of the abrogation/cancellation of Quranic verses,[113] belief that Jesus survived the crucifixion and died of old age in India,[105][106][114] conditions of the "Jihad of the Sword" are no longer met,[105][115] belief that divine revelation (as long as no new sharia is given) will never end,[116] belief in cyclical nature of history until Muhammad,[116] and belief in the implausibility of a contradiction between Islam and science.[110] These perceived deviations from normative Islamic thought have resulted in severe persecution of Ahmadis in various Muslim-majority countries,[105] particularly Pakistan,[105][117] where they have been branded as Non-Muslims and their Islamic religious practices are punishable by the Ahmadi-Specific laws in the penal code.[118]
The followers of the Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam are divided into two groups: the first being the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, currently the dominant group, and the Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement for the Propagation of Islam.[105] The larger group takes a literalist view believing that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was the promised Mahdi and a Ummati Nabi subservient to Muhammad, while the latter believing that he was only a religious reformer and a prophet only in an allegorical sense.[105] Both Ahmadi groups are active in dawah or Islamic missionary work, and have produced vasts amounts of Islamic literature, including numerous translations of the Quran, translations of the Hadith, Quranic tafsirs, a multitude of sirahs of Muhammad, and works on the subject of comparative religion among others.[105][107] As such, their international influence far exceeds their number of adherents.[105][107][119] Muslims from more Orthodox sects of Islam have adopted many Ahmadi polemics and understandings of other religions,[120] along with the Ahmadi approach to reconcile Islamic and Western education as well as to establish Islamic school systems, particularly in Africa.[121]
Barelvi/Deobandi split
[edit]Sunni Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, comprising present-day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, are overwhelmingly Hanafi by fiqh and have split into two schools or movements—the Barelvi and the Deobandi. While the Deobandi is revivalist in nature, the Barelvi are more traditional and inclined towards Sufism.
Gülen / Hizmet movement
[edit]The Gülen movement, usually referred to as the Hizmet movement,[122] established in the 1970s as an offshoot of the Nur Movement[123] and led by the Turkish Islamic scholar and preacher Fethullah Gülen in Turkey, Central Asia, and in other parts of the world, is active in education, with private schools and universities in over 180 countries as well as with many American charter schools operated by followers. It has initiated forums for interfaith dialogue.[124][125] The Cemaat movement's structure has been described as a flexible organizational network.[126] Movement schools and businesses organize locally and link themselves into informal networks.[127] Estimates of the number of schools and educational institutions vary widely; it appears there are about 300 Gülen movement schools in Turkey and over 1,000 schools worldwide.[128][129]
Islamic modernism
[edit]Islamic modernism, also sometimes referred to as "modernist Salafism",[130][131][132][133][134] is a movement that has been described as "the first Muslim ideological response"[135] attempting to reconcile Islamic faith with modern Western values such as nationalism, democracy, and science.[136]
Islamism
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Islamism is a set of political ideologies, derived from various fundamentalist views, which hold that Islam is not only a religion but a political system that should govern the legal, economic, and social imperatives of the state. Many Islamists do not refer to themselves as such; it is not a single particular movement. Religious views and ideologies of its adherents vary, and they may be Sunni Islamists or Shia Islamists depending upon their beliefs. Islamist groups include groups such as Al-Qaeda, the organizer of the September 11, 2001 attacks and perhaps the most prominent; and the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest and perhaps the oldest. Although violence is often employed by some organizations, most Islamist movements are nonviolent.
Muslim Brotherhood
[edit]The Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun (with Ikhwan الإخوان brethren) or Muslim Brotherhood, is an organisation that was founded by Egyptian scholar Hassan al-Banna, a graduate of Dar al-Ulum. With its various branches, it is the largest Sunni movement in the Arab world, and an affiliate is often the largest opposition party in many Arab nations. The Muslim Brotherhood is not concerned with theological differences, accepting both Muslims of any of the four Sunni schools of thought and Shi'a Muslims. It is the world's oldest and largest Islamist group. It aims to re-establish the Caliphate and, in the meantime, push for more Islamisation of society. The Brotherhood's stated goal is to instill the Qur'an and sunnah as the "sole reference point for... ordering the life of the Muslim family, individual, community... and state".[citation needed]
Jamaat-e-Islami
[edit]The Jamaat-e-Islami (or JI) is an Islamist political party in the Indian subcontinent. It was founded in Lahore, British India, by Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi (with alternative spellings of last name Maudoodi) in 1941 and is the oldest religious party in Pakistan. Today, sister organizations with similar objectives and ideological approaches exist in India (Jamaat-e-Islami Hind), Bangladesh (Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh), Kashmir (Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir), and Sri Lanka, and there are "close brotherly relations" with the Islamist movements and missions "working in different continents and countries", particularly those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood (Akhwan-al-Muslimeen). The JI envisions an Islamic government in Pakistan and Bangladesh governs by Islamic law. It opposes Westernization—including secularization, capitalism, socialism, or such practices as interest-based banking, and favours an Islamic economic order and Caliphate. [citation needed]
Hizb ut-Tahrir
[edit]Hizb ut-Tahrir (Arabic: حزب التحرير) (Translation: Party of Liberation) is an international, pan-Islamist political organization which describes its ideology as Islam, and its aim the re-establishment of the Islamic Khilafah (Caliphate) to resume Islamic ways of life in the Muslim world. The caliphate would unite the Muslim community (Ummah)[137] upon their Islamic creed and implement the Shariah, so as to then carry the proselytizing of Islam to the rest of the world.[138]
Quranism
[edit]Quranism[139] or Quraniyya (Arabic: القرآنية; al-Qur'āniyya) is a quran only[140][clarification needed] branch of Islam. It holds the belief that Islamic guidance and law should only be based on the Quran, thus opposing the religious authority and authenticity of the hadith literature.[141][142] Quranists believe that God's message is already clear and complete in the Quran and it can therefore be fully understood without referencing outside texts.[143] Quranists claim that the vast majority of hadith literature are forged lies and believe that the Quran itself criticizes the hadith both in the technical sense and the general sense.[144][141][145][146][147][148][excessive citations]
Liberal and progressive Islam
[edit]Liberal Islam originally emerged from the Islamic revivalist movement of the 18th–19th centuries.[149] Liberal and progressive Islamic organizations and movements are primarily based in the Western world, and have in common a religious outlook which depends mainly on ijtihad or re-interpretation of the sacred scriptures of Islam.[149] Liberal and progressive Muslims are characterized by a rationalistic, critical examination and re-interpretation of the sacred scriptures of Islam;[149] affirmation and promotion of democracy, gender equality, human rights, LGBT rights, women's rights, religious pluralism, interfaith marriage,[150][151] freedom of expression, freedom of thought, and freedom of religion;[149] opposition to theocracy and total rejection of Islamism and Islamic fundamentalism;[149] and a modern view of Islamic theology, ethics, sharia, culture, tradition, and other ritualistic practices in Islam.[149]
Mahdavia
[edit]Mahdavia, or Mahdavism, is a Mahdiist sect founded in late 15th century India by Syed Muhammad Jaunpuri, who declared himself to be the Hidden Twelfth Imam of the Twelver Shia tradition.[152] They follow many aspects of the Sunni doctrine. Zikri Mahdavis, or Zikris, are an offshoot of the Mahdavi movement.[153]
Non-denominational Muslims
[edit]"Non-denominational Muslims" (Arabic: مسلمون بلا طائفة, romanized: Muslimūn bi-la ṭā’ifa) is an umbrella term that has been used for and by Muslims who do not belong to a specific Islamic denomination, do not self-identify with any specific Islamic denomination, or cannot be readily classified under one of the identifiable Islamic schools and branches.[154][155][156] A quarter of the world's Muslim population see themselves as "just a Muslim".[157]
Non-denominational Muslims constitute the majority of the Muslim population in seven countries, and a plurality in three others: Albania (65%), Kyrgyzstan (64%), Kosovo (58%), Indonesia (56%), Mali (55%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (54%), Uzbekistan (54%), Azerbaijan (45%), Russia (45%), and Nigeria (42%).[157] They are found primarily in Central Asia.[157] Kazakhstan has the largest number of non-denominational Muslims, who constitute about 74% of the population.[157] While the majority of the population in the Middle East identify as either Sunni or Shi'a, a significant number of Muslims identify as non-denominational.[158] Southeastern Europe also has a large number of non-denominational Muslims.[159]
In 1947, the non-sectarian movement Jama'ah al-Taqrib bayna al-Madhahib al-Islamiyyah was founded in Cairo, Egypt.[160] Several of its supporters were high-ranking scholars of Al-Ahzar University.[161] The movement sought to bridge the gap between Sunnis and Shi'is.[161] At the end of the 1950s, the movement reached a wider public, as the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser discovered the usefulness of pan-Islamism for his foreign policy.[161]
Salafism and Wahhabism
[edit]Ahle Hadith
[edit]Ahl-i Hadith (Persian: اهل حدیث, Urdu: اہل حدیث: transl. People of the traditions of the Prophet) is a movement which emerged in the Indian subcontinent in the mid-19th century. Its followers call themselves Ahl al-Hadith and are considered to be a branch of the Salafiyya school. Ahl-i Hadith is antithetical to various beliefs and mystical practices associated with folk Sufism. Ahl-i Hadith shares many doctrinal similarities with the Wahhabi movement and hence is often classified as being synonymous with the "Wahhabis" by its adversaries. However, its followers reject this designation, preferring to identify themselves as "Salafis".[162][163][164][165]
Salafiyya movement
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The Salafiyya movement is a conservative,[166] Islahi (reform)[167] movement within Sunni Islam that emerged in the second half of the 19th century and advocate a return to the traditions of the "devout ancestors" (Salaf al-Salih). It has been described as the "fastest-growing Islamic movement"; with each scholar expressing diverse views across social, theological, and political spectrum. Salafis follow a doctrine that can be summed up as taking "a fundamentalist approach to Islam, emulating the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers—al-salaf al-salih, the 'pious forefathers'....They reject religious innovation, or bidʻah, and support the implementation of Sharia (Islamic law)."[168] The Salafi movement is often divided into three categories: the largest group are the purists (or quietists), who avoid politics; the second largest group are the militant activists, who get involved in politics; the third and last group are the jihadists, who constitute a minority.[168] Most of the violent Islamist groups come from the Salafi-Jihadist movement and their subgroups.[169] In recent years, Jihadi-Salafist doctrines have often been associated with the armed insurgencies of Islamic extremist movements and terrorist organizations targeting innocent civilians, both Muslims and Non-Muslims, such as al-Qaeda, ISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh, Boko Haram, etc.[170][171][168][169] The second largest group are the Salafi activists who have a long tradition of political activism, such as those that operate in organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Arab world's major Islamist movement. In the aftermath of widescale repressions after the Arab Spring, accompanied by their political failures, the activist-Salafi movements have undergone a decline. The most numerous are the quietists, who believe in disengagement from politics and accept allegiance to Muslim governments, no matter how tyrannical, to avoid fitna (chaos).[168]
Wahhabism
[edit]The Wahhabi movement was founded and spearheaded by the Ḥanbalī scholar and theologian Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab,[172][173][174] a religious preacher from the Najd region in central Arabia,[175][176][177][178][179] and was instrumental in the rise of the House of Saud to power in the Arabian peninsula.[172] Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab sought to revive and purify Islam from what he perceived as non-Islamic popular religious beliefs and practices by returning to what, he believed, were the fundamental principles of the Islamic religion.[176][177][178][179] His works were generally short, full of quotations from the Quran and Hadith literature, such as his main and foremost theological treatise, Kitāb at-Tawḥīd (Arabic: كتاب التوحيد; "The Book of Oneness").[176][177][178][179] He taught that the primary doctrine of Islam was the uniqueness and oneness of God (tawḥīd), and denounced what he held to be popular religious beliefs and practices among Muslims that he considered to be akin to heretical innovation (bidʿah) and polytheism (shirk).[176][177][178][179]
Wahhabism has been described as a conservative, strict, and fundamentalist branch of Sunnī Islam,[180] with puritan views,[180] believing in a literal interpretation of the Quran.[172] The terms "Wahhabism" and "Salafism" are sometimes evoked interchangeably, although the designation "Wahhabi" is specifically applied to the followers of Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and his reformist doctrines.[172] The label "Wahhabi" was not claimed by his followers, who usually refer themselves as al-Muwaḥḥidūn ("affirmers of the singularity of God"), but is rather employed by Western scholars as well as his critics.[172][173][177] Starting in the mid-1970s and 1980s, the international propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism within Sunnī Islam[180] favored by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia[175][181][182] and other Arab states of the Persian Gulf has achieved what the French political scientist Gilles Kepel defined as a "preeminent position of strength in the global expression of Islam."[183]
22 months after the September 11 attacks, when the FBI considered al-Qaeda as "the number one terrorist threat to the United States", journalist Stephen Schwartz and U.S. Senator Jon Kyl have explicitly stated during a hearing that occurred in June 2003 before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the U.S. Senate that "Wahhabism is the source of the overwhelming majority of terrorist atrocities in today's world".[184] As part of the global "War on terror", Wahhabism has been accused by the European Parliament, various Western security analysts, and think tanks like the RAND Corporation, as being "a source of global terrorism".[184][185] Furthermore, Wahhabism has been accused of causing disunity in the Muslim community (Ummah) and criticized for its followers' destruction of many Islamic, cultural, and historical sites associated with the early history of Islam and the first generation of Muslims (Muhammad's family and his companions) in Saudi Arabia.[186][187][188][189]
Population of the branches
[edit]| Denomination | Population |
|---|---|
| Sunni | Varies: 87% – 90%[190][191] |
| Non-denominational Muslim | 25%[192] |
| Shia | Varies: 10% – 13%[193] |
| Ibadi | 2.7 million[194] |
| Quranism | n/a |
See also
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ a b c d e Geaves, Ronald (2021). "Part 1: Sunnī Traditions – Sectarianism in Sunnī Islam". In Cusack, Carole M.; Upal, M. Afzal (eds.). Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements. Brill Handbooks on Contemporary Religion. Vol. 21. Leiden and Boston: Brill Publishers. pp. 25–48. doi:10.1163/9789004435544_004. ISBN 978-90-04-43554-4. ISSN 1874-6691.
- ^ Sebastian Kusserow, Patryk Pawlak (2015). Understanding the branches of Islam (PDF). European parliamentary research service.
- ^ a b Poljarevic, Emin (2021). "Theology of Violence-oriented Takfirism as a Political Theory: The Case of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)". In Cusack, Carole M.; Upal, M. Afzal (eds.). Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements. Brill Handbooks on Contemporary Religion. Vol. 21. Leiden and Boston: Brill Publishers. pp. 485–512. doi:10.1163/9789004435544_026. ISBN 978-90-04-43554-4. ISSN 1874-6691.
- ^ a b Baele, Stephane J. (October 2019). Giles, Howard (ed.). "Conspiratorial Narratives in Violent Political Actors' Language" (PDF). Journal of Language and Social Psychology. 38 (5–6). Sage Publications: 706–734. doi:10.1177/0261927X19868494. hdl:10871/37355. ISSN 1552-6526. S2CID 195448888. Retrieved January 3, 2022.
- ^ a b Rickenbacher, Daniel (August 2019). Jikeli, Gunther (ed.). "The Centrality of Anti-Semitism in the Islamic State's Ideology and Its Connection to Anti-Shiism". Religions. 10 (8: The Return of Religious Antisemitism?). Basel: MDPI: 483. doi:10.3390/rel10080483. ISSN 2077-1444.
- ^ a b Badara, Mohamed; Nagata, Masaki; Tueni, Tiphanie (June 2017). "The Radical Application of the Islamist Concept of Takfir" (PDF). Arab Law Quarterly. 31 (2). Leiden: Brill Publishers: 134–162. doi:10.1163/15730255-31020044. ISSN 1573-0255. Archived (PDF) from the original on July 11, 2019. Retrieved October 25, 2021.
- ^ a b c d e Izutsu, Toshihiko (2006) [1965]. "The Infidel (Kāfir): The Khārijites and the origin of the problem". The Concept of Belief in Islamic Theology: A Semantic Analysis of Imān and Islām. Tokyo: Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies at Keio University. pp. 1–20. ISBN 983-9154-70-2 – via Google Books.
- ^ Guidère, Mathieu (2012). Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalism. Scarecrow Press. p. 319. ISBN 978-0-8108-7965-2 – via Google Books.
- ^ Öz, Mustafa (2011). Mezhepler Tarihi ve Terimleri Sözlüğü [The History of madh'habs and its terminology dictionary] (in Turkish). Istanbul: Ensar Publications.
- ^ "Branches of Shia Islam: Ismailis, Twelvers, and Bohras". Ismailimail. August 23, 2017. Retrieved November 28, 2018.
- ^ "Mapping the Global Muslim Population". October 7, 2009. Archived from the original on December 14, 2015. Retrieved December 10, 2014.
The Pew Forum's estimate of the Shia population (10–13%) is in keeping with previous estimates, which generally have been in the range of 10–15%.
- ^ Razwy, Sayed Ali Asgher. A Restatement of the History of Islam & Muslims. pp. 331–335.
- ^ History of the Islamic Caliphate (in Urdu). Lahore.
In pre-Islamic times, the custom of the Arabs was to elect their chiefs by a majority vote...the same principle was adopted in the election of Abu Bakr.
- ^ Brown, Jonathan A.C. (2009). Hadith: Muhammad's Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World. Oneworld Publications (Kindle edition). p. 180.
- ^ Mathiesen, Kasper (2013). "Anglo-American 'Traditional Islam' and Its Discourse of Orthodoxy" (PDF). Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies. 13: 191–219. doi:10.5617/jais.4633.
- ^ See:
- "Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population". Pew Research Center. October 7, 2009. Retrieved September 24, 2013.
The Pew Forum's estimate of the Shia population (10–13%) is in keeping with previous estimates, which generally have been in the range of 10–15%. Some previous estimates, however, have placed the number of Shias at nearly 20% of the world's Muslim population.
- "Shia". Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs. Archived from the original on December 15, 2012. Retrieved December 5, 2011.
Shi'a Islam is the second largest branch of the tradition, with up to 200 million followers who comprise around 15% of all Muslims worldwide...
- "Religions". The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. Archived from the original on December 20, 2018. Retrieved August 25, 2010.
Shia Islam represents 10–20% of Muslims worldwide...
- "Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population". Pew Research Center. October 7, 2009. Retrieved September 24, 2013.
- ^ Miller, Tracy, ed. (October 2009). Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population (PDF). Pew Research Center. Archived from the original (PDF) on October 10, 2009. Retrieved October 8, 2009.
- ^ "Shi'i | History & Beliefs | Britannica". www.britannica.com. January 11, 2024.
- ^ Corbin (1993), pp. 45–51
- ^ Tabatabaei (1979), pp. 41–44
- ^ "Early Philosophical Shiism". Cambridge University Press. Retrieved April 1, 2016.
- ^ a b c Cook, Michael (2003). Forbidding Wrong in Islam, an Introduction. Cambridge University Press.
- ^ Hodgson, M. G. S. (1965). "GHULĀT". Encyclopaedia of Islam. Vol. 2 (2nd ed.). Brill Academic Pub. pp. 1093–1095.
- ^ Cosman, Madeleine Pelner; Jones, Linda Gale (2009). "The Nusayriyya Alawis". Handbook to Life in the Medieval World, 3-Volume Set. Infobase Pub. pp. 406–407. ISBN 978-1-4381-0907-7.
The Alawis are a sect of extremist (ghuluw) Shiism, so called because of their doctrine of the deification of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the nephew of the prophet Muhammad. The movement was founded in the mid-ninth century by Muhammad ibn Nusayr al-Namiri, who also proclaimed that the 10th of the 12 Shiite imams, Ali ibn Hadi, possessed a divine nature. Alawi doctrine is secret, esoteric, and Gnostic in nature.
- ^ Barfi, Barak (January 24, 2016). "The Real Reason Why Iran Backs Syria".
- ^ Pipes, Daniel (1992). Greater Syria. Oxford University Press. p. 163. ISBN 9780195363043.
"The Nusayris are more infidel than Jews or Christians, even more infidel than many polytheists. They have done greater harm to the community of Muhammad than have the warring infidels such as the Franks, the Turks, and others. To ignorant Muslims they pretend to be Shi'is, though in reality they do not believe in God or His prophet or His book ... Whenever possible, they spill the blood of Muslims ... They are always the worst enemies of the Muslims ... war and punishment in accordance with Islamic law against them are among the greatest of pious deeds and the most important obligations." – Ibn Taymiyyah
- ^ Me'ir Mikha'el Bar-Asher; Gauke de Kootstra; Arieh Kofsky (2002). The Nuṣayr−i-ʻalaw−i Religion: An Enquiry into Its Theology and Liturgy. Brill Pub. p. 1. ISBN 978-90-04-12552-0.
- ^ Talhamy, Y. (2010). "The Fatwas and the Nusayri/Alawis of Syria". Middle Eastern Studies. 46 (2): 175–194. doi:10.1080/00263200902940251. S2CID 144709130.
- ^ Rubin, Barry (2007). The Truth about Syria. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 49. ISBN 978-1-4039-8273-5.
- ^ Layard, Austen Henry (2010). Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon: With Travels in Armenia, Kurdistan and the Desert: Being the Result of a Second Expedition Undertaken for the Trustees of the British Museum. Cambridge University Press. p. 216. ISBN 9781108016773.
- ^ a b c d Timani, Hussam S. (2021). "Part 5: In Between and on the Fringes of Islam – The Druze". In Cusack, Carole M.; Upal, M. Afzal (eds.). Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements. Brill Handbooks on Contemporary Religion. Vol. 21. Leiden; Boston: Brill Pub. pp. 724–742. doi:10.1163/9789004435544_038. ISBN 978-90-04-43554-4. ISSN 1874-6691.
- ^ Poonawala, Ismail K. (July–September 1999). "Review: The Fatimids and Their Traditions of Learning by Heinz Halm". Journal of the American Oriental Society. 119 (3). American Oriental Society: 542. doi:10.2307/605981. ISSN 0003-0279. JSTOR 605981. LCCN 12032032. OCLC 47785421.
- ^ "Are the Druze People Arabs or Muslims? Deciphering Who They Are". Arab America. August 8, 2018. Retrieved April 13, 2020.
- ^ J. Stewart, Dona (2008). The Middle East Today: Political, Geographical and Cultural Perspectives. Routledge. p. 33. ISBN 9781135980795.
Most Druze do not consider themselves Muslim. Historically they faced much persecution and keep their religious beliefs secrets.
- ^ Lewis, James (2002). The Encyclopedia of Cults, Sects, and New Religions. Prometheus Books – via Google Books.
- ^ De McLaurin, Ronald (1979). The Political Role of Minority Groups in the Middle East. Michigan University Press. p. 114. ISBN 9780030525964.
Theologically, one would have to conclude that the Druze are not Muslims. They do not accept the five pillars of Islam. In place of these principles the Druze have instituted the seven precepts noted above.
- ^ Hunter, Shireen (2010). The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity: Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.), Georgetown University. Center for Strategic and International Studies. University of Michigan Press. p. 33. ISBN 9780253345493.
Druze - An offshoot of Shi'ism; its members are not considered Muslims by orthodox Muslims.
- ^ D. Grafton, David (2009). Piety, Politics, and Power: Lutherans Encountering Islam in the Middle East. Wipf and Stock Publishers. p. 14. ISBN 9781630877187.
In addition, there are several quasi-Muslim sects, in that, although they follow many of the beliefs and practices of orthodox Islam, the majority of Sunnis consider them heretical. These would be the Ahmadiyya, Druze, Ibadi, and the Yazidis.
- ^ R. Williams, Victoria (2020). Indigenous Peoples: An Encyclopedia of Culture, History, and Threats to Survival [4 volumes]. Santa Barbara, Ca: ABC-Clio. p. 318. ISBN 9781440861185.
As Druze is a nonritualistic religion without requirements to pray, fast, make pilgrimages, or observe days of rest, the Druze are not considered an Islamic people by Sunni Muslims.
- ^ Roald, Anne Sofie (2011). Religious Minorities in the Middle East: Domination, Self-Empowerment, Accommodation. Brill Pub. p. 255. ISBN 9789004207424.
Therefore, many of these scholars follow Ibn Taymiyya'sfatwa from the beginning of the fourteenth century that declared the Druzes and the Alawis as heretics outside Islam ...
- ^ Zabad, Ibrahim (2017). Middle Eastern Minorities: The Impact of the Arab Spring. Taylor & Francis. p. 126. ISBN 9781317096733.
- ^ Knight, Michael (2009). Journey to the End of Islam. Soft Skull Press. p. 129. ISBN 9781593765521.
- ^ S. Swayd, Samy (2009). The A to Z of the Druzes. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 37. ISBN 9780810868366.
Subsequently, Muslim opponents of the Druzes have often relied on Ibn Taymiyya's religious ruling to justify their attitudes and actions against Druzes...
- ^ a b c d e f Cole, Juan (December 30, 2012) [December 15, 1988]. "BAHAISM i. The Faith". Encyclopædia Iranica. Vol. III/4. New York: Columbia University. pp. 438–446. doi:10.1163/2330-4804_EIRO_COM_6391. ISSN 2330-4804. Archived from the original on January 23, 2013. Retrieved December 11, 2020.
- ^ a b c Osborn, Lil (2021). "Part 5: In Between and on the Fringes of Islam – The Bahāʾī Faith". In Cusack, Carole M.; Upal, M. Afzal (eds.). Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements. Brill Handbooks on Contemporary Religion. Vol. 21. Leiden; Boston: Brill Pub. pp. 761–773. doi:10.1163/9789004435544_040. ISBN 978-90-04-43554-4. ISSN 1874-6691.
- ^ "Sunan Ibn Majah 176 – The Book of the Sunnah – كتاب المقدمة – Sunnah.com – Sayings and Teachings of Prophet Muhammad (صلى الله عليه و سلم)". sunnah.com. Retrieved March 30, 2022.
- ^ a b John L. Esposito, ed. (2014). "Ibadis". The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Archived from the original on August 20, 2017.
Ibadis [:] subsect of Khariji Islam founded in the eighth century. Has its strongest presence in Oman, but is also found in North Africa and various communities on the Swahili Coast.
- ^ Osman, Amr (2014). "Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī and the Beginnings of the Ẓāhirī Madhhab". The Ẓāhirī Madhhab (3rd/9th-10th/16th Century): A Textualist Theory of Islamic Law. Studies in Islamic Law and Society. Vol. 38. Leiden and Boston: Brill Publishers. pp. 9–47. doi:10.1163/9789004279650_003. ISBN 978-90-04-27965-0. ISSN 1384-1130.
- ^ a b Sachedina, Abdulaziz (2009). "Law: Shīʿī Schools of Law". The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Archived from the original on November 21, 2008.
- ^ Esposito, John L. (2014). "Usulis". The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-512558-0.
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Ahl-e-Hadith ... a branch of the international Salafi ... tradition, heavily influenced by Wahabism.
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- ^ Hasan, Noorhaidi (2010). "The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign: Transnational Islam and the Salafi madrasa in post-9/11 Indonesia". South East Asia Research. 18 (4). Taylor & Francis on behalf of the SOAS University of London: 675–705. doi:10.5367/sear.2010.0015. ISSN 2043-6874. JSTOR 23750964. S2CID 147114018.
- ^ "6 common misconceptions about Salafi Muslims in the West". OUPblog. October 5, 2016. Retrieved August 20, 2021.
- ^ Kepel, Gilles (2003). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. New York City: I.B. Tauris. pp. 61–62. ISBN 9781845112578.
- ^ a b "Terrorism: Growing Wahhabi Influence in the United States". www.govinfo.gov. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Publishing Office. June 26, 2003. Archived from the original on December 15, 2018. Retrieved June 26, 2021.
Nearly 22 months have passed since the atrocity of September 11. Since then, many questions have been asked about the role in that day's terrible events and in other challenges we face in the war against terror of Saudi Arabia and its official sect, a separatist, exclusionary and violent form of Islam known as Wahhabism. It is widely recognized that all of the 19 suicide pilots were Wahhabi followers. In addition, 15 of the 19 were Saudi subjects. Journalists and experts, as well as spokespeople of the world, have said that Wahhabism is the source of the overwhelming majority of terrorist atrocities in today's world, from Morocco to Indonesia, via Israel, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya. In addition, Saudi media sources have identified Wahhabi agents from Saudi Arabia as being responsible for terrorist attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq. The Washington Post has confirmed Wahhabi involvement in attacks against U.S. forces in Fallujah. To examine the role of Wahhabism and terrorism is not to label all Muslims as extremists. Indeed, I want to make this point very, very clear. It is the exact opposite. Analyzing Wahhabism means identifying the extreme element that, although enjoying immense political and financial resources, thanks to support by a sector of the Saudi state, seeks to globally hijack Islam [...] The problem we are looking at today is the State-sponsored doctrine and funding of an extremist ideology that provides the recruiting grounds, support infrastructure and monetary life blood of today's international terrorists. The extremist ideology is Wahhabism, a major force behind terrorist groups, like al Qaeda, a group that, according to the FBI, and I am quoting, is the "number one terrorist threat to the U.S. today".
- ^ Haider, Murtaza (July 22, 2013). "European Parliament identifies Wahabi and Salafi roots of global terrorism". Dawn. Pakistan. Retrieved August 3, 2014.
- ^ "Wahhābī (Islamic movement)". Encyclopædia Britannica. Edinburgh: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. June 9, 2020. Archived from the original on June 26, 2020. Retrieved July 1, 2020.
Because Wahhābism prohibits the veneration of shrines, tombs, and sacred objects, many sites associated with the early history of Islam, such as the homes and graves of companions of Muhammad, were demolished under Saudi rule. Preservationists have estimated that as many as 95 percent of the historic sites around Mecca and Medina have been razed.
- ^ Rabasa, Angel; Benard, Cheryl (2004). "The Middle East: Cradle of the Muslim World". The Muslim World After 9/11. Rand Corporation. p. 103, note 60. ISBN 0-8330-3712-9.
- ^ Howden, Daniel (August 6, 2005). "The destruction of Mecca: Saudi hardliners are wiping out their own heritage". The Independent. Archived from the original on October 20, 2011. Retrieved December 21, 2009.
- ^ Finn, Helena Kane (October 8, 2002). "Cultural Terrorism and Wahhabi Islam". Council on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on September 4, 2014. Retrieved August 5, 2014.
It is the undisputed case that the Taliban justification for this travesty [the destruction of the Buddha statues at Bamiyan] can be traced to the Wahhabi indoctrination program prevalent in the Afghan refugee camps and Saudi-funded Islamic schools (madrasas) in Pakistan that produced the Taliban. ...In Saudi Arabia itself, the destruction has focused on the architectural heritage of Islam's two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, where Wahhabi religious foundations, with state support, have systematically demolished centuries-old mosques and mausolea, as well as hundreds of traditional Hijazi mansions and palaces.
- ^ "Field Listing :: Religions — The World Factbook – Central Intelligence Agency". Central Intelligence Agency. Archived from the original on March 7, 2020. Retrieved June 12, 2020.
- ^ "Mapping the Global Muslim Population". Pew Research Center. October 7, 2009.
- ^ "Preface". Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project. August 9, 2012. Retrieved June 12, 2020.
- ^ "Mapping the Global Muslim Population". Pew Research Center. October 7, 2009.
- ^ Brenton Betts, Robert (July 31, 2013). The Sunni-Shi'a Divide: Islam's Internal Divisions and Their Global Consequences. Potomac Books. pp. 14–15. ISBN 9781612345222. Retrieved August 7, 2015 – via Google Books.
External links
[edit]Islamic schools and branches
View on GrokipediaFoundational Principles and Early Schisms
Core Islamic Tenets Shared Across Branches
All major branches of Islam, including Sunni and Shia, affirm the six articles of faith (arkan al-iman) as the foundational creed derived from the Quran (e.g., Surah Al-Baqarah 2:177) and prophetic traditions, encompassing belief in Allah as the singular, omnipotent creator; His angels as obedient intermediaries; His divine scriptures, with the Quran as the final, unaltered revelation transmitted verbatim to Muhammad between 610 and 632 CE; the prophets as human messengers, culminating in Muhammad as the seal of prophethood; the Day of Judgment with accountability for deeds; and divine decree (qadar), wherein Allah's omniscience predetermines events while human free will operates within that framework.[5][4] These tenets achieve near-universal adherence among Muslims globally, with surveys indicating over 90% affirmation in both Sunni-majority and Shia-majority regions, underscoring their role as the doctrinal core transcending sectarian interpretations.[5] In practice, these beliefs manifest through the Five Pillars (arkan al-islam), obligatory acts binding on all physically and financially capable adult Muslims: the shahada, reciting "There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is His messenger" as the entry to faith; salat, performing five daily prayers facing the Kaaba in Mecca; zakat, annual almsgiving of 2.5% on savings to aid the needy; sawm, fasting from dawn to sunset during Ramadan for spiritual purification; and hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime.[4][2] While Shia traditions incorporate supplementary duties such as emphasis on wilayat (guardianship of Ali and the Imams) alongside these pillars, the core five remain uniformly recognized and observed, with variations limited to ritual details like prayer hand positions or zakat recipients rather than the obligations themselves.[2][4] The Quran's status as the verbatim, inimitable word of Allah—revealed in Arabic over 23 years and preserved without alteration since its compilation under Caliph Uthman around 650 CE—further unites branches, serving as the primary legal and ethical source interpreted through hadith and scholarly consensus, though interpretive methodologies diverge thereafter.[4] This shared scriptural foundation, coupled with Muhammad's sunnah (exemplary conduct documented in authenticated hadith collections like Sahih al-Bukhari for Sunnis and Kitab al-Kafi for Shia), ensures doctrinal continuity amid historical schisms originating post-632 CE over political succession rather than these essentials.[6]The Prophet's Succession and the Sunni-Shia Divide
The death of Muhammad on June 8, 632 CE, in Medina, without an explicit designation of a successor, precipitated a leadership crisis among the early Muslim community.[7] While Muhammad's final illness prevented formal arrangements, pre-Islamic Arabian tribal customs emphasized consultation (shura) for selecting leaders, influencing the immediate response.[1] The Ansar (Medinan helpers) convened at the Saqifah hall to nominate one of their own, Sa'd ibn Ubada, fearing dominance by the Quraysh emigrants (Muhajirun), but Umar ibn al-Khattab and Abu Bakr intervened, arguing for Quraysh primacy due to Muhammad's tribal affiliation.[8] Abu Bakr, a close companion and father-in-law of Muhammad, was pledged allegiance as the first caliph (khalifah, or successor) by key figures including Umar and Uthman ibn Affan, establishing the Rashidun Caliphate's elective principle.[7] Ali ibn Abi Talib, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, along with his supporters (later termed Shi'at Ali, or partisans of Ali), was occupied with the Prophet's burial and initially withheld allegiance, citing procedural irregularities and a belief in Ali's superior claim through familial proximity and merit.[9] Ali pledged to Abu Bakr after several months, reportedly under pressure to preserve community unity amid the Ridda Wars (apostasy rebellions), though tensions persisted.[8] The Sunni tradition, comprising the majority, upholds this selection as legitimate consensus-based governance rooted in the Sunnah (Prophet's example and community practice), viewing the caliphate as a political office open to the most qualified from the Prophet's companions.[1] In contrast, Shia doctrine posits that Muhammad implicitly appointed Ali as imam (spiritual and temporal leader) through divine guidance, emphasizing hereditary succession within the Ahl al-Bayt (Prophet's household) to maintain doctrinal purity and authority.[9] Shias cite the Event of Ghadir Khumm in March 632 CE (18 Dhu al-Hijjah, 10 AH), during the return from the Farewell Pilgrimage, where Muhammad declared, "For whomever I am his mawla (master/guardian), Ali is his mawla," interpreting it as explicit designation amid a revelation (Quran 5:67) urging announcement.[10] Sunnis acknowledge the event but construe mawla as denoting friendship or support, not succession, aligning with the subsequent communal election.[10] This initial schism over authority—elective meritocracy versus divinely ordained lineage—crystallized during Ali's caliphate (656–661 CE), marked by civil wars (Fitnas) like the Battle of the Camel (656 CE) and Siffin (657 CE), which alienated groups and entrenched doctrinal divergences, though the core divide traces to 632 CE's unresolved succession.[9] By the late 7th century, Sunnis formalized adherence to the first four caliphs (Rashidun) as rightly guided, while Shias rejected the first three as illegitimate, awaiting the twelfth imam in Twelver branch or upholding Zaydi elective elements among others.[11] Historical accounts vary by sectarian transmission, with Sunni sources emphasizing pragmatic unity and Shia narratives highlighting marginalization of Ali's rights, reflecting interpretive lenses on the same foundational events.[8]Emergence of Kharijites and Proto-Sectarian Conflicts
The Kharijites emerged during the First Fitna (656–661 CE), the initial civil war within the early Muslim community, specifically as a faction that seceded from the forces of Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib following the inconclusive Battle of Siffin against Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan in July 657 CE.[12] This battle, fought near the Euphrates River in present-day Syria, pitted Ali's army, primarily from Kufa in Iraq, against Muawiya's Syrian forces over disputes regarding Uthman ibn Affan's assassination and caliphal legitimacy; as combat stalled, Muawiya's troops raised Qur'ans on spear tips to demand arbitration based on divine scripture, a tactic that divided Ali's supporters.[13] A radical group within Ali's ranks, numbering several thousand, rejected this human arbitration as illegitimate, chanting "la hukma illa lillah" (no judgment except God's), and accused Ali of compromising Islamic purity by agreeing to it, thereby marking their doctrinal break emphasizing absolute piety and rejection of any leader who deviated from strict scriptural adherence.[14] These proto-Kharijites, initially allies of Ali against Muawiya, withdrew to the village of Harura near Kufa, where they formalized their dissent by declaring major sinners (including Ali and those accepting arbitration) as unbelievers (kafir), justifying rebellion and takfir (excommunication) against perceived apostates—a principle that distinguished them from emerging Sunni and Shia alignments focused on consensus or familial succession.[15] Their ideology prioritized egalitarian leadership by the most pious Muslim, regardless of tribal or Quraysh lineage, over Ali's claim rooted in proximity to the Prophet Muhammad, reflecting early tensions between meritocratic puritanism and established authority structures. Ali initially sought reconciliation, sending emissaries like Abd Allah ibn Abbas to debate them, but their intransigence escalated into open revolt as they assassinated Ali's governor in Kufa and raided pro-Ali tribes, compelling military confrontation.[13] The decisive clash occurred at the Battle of Nahrawan in July 658 CE, where Ali's forces, estimated at 14,000, overwhelmed the roughly 4,000 Kharijites, resulting in near-total annihilation of the rebels, with only a few hundred survivors fleeing eastward.[15] This proto-sectarian conflict underscored foundational rifts in interpreting caliphal authority and sin: Kharijites viewed compromise with political rivals as moral betrayal warranting violence, contrasting with Ali's pragmatic governance amid civil strife, and their survival in pockets across Iraq and Arabia perpetuated cycles of insurgency against subsequent Umayyad rulers.[14] One Nahrawan survivor, Abd al-Rahman ibn Muljam, later coordinated the 661 CE assassination of Ali in Kufa, an act that solidified Kharijite notoriety as extremists while accelerating the Sunni-Shia schism by enabling Muawiya's ascension.[12] These events prototyped sectarian dynamics by institutionalizing dissent through ideological purity tests, influencing later groups like the Ibadi survivalists, though mainstream narratives often portray Kharijites as disruptive outliers rather than principled protesters against elite consolidation.[13]Sunni Islam: The Majority Orthodox Tradition
Historical Formation and Adherence to Sunnah
Sunni Islam's historical formation originated in the immediate aftermath of Prophet Muhammad's death on June 8, 632 CE, when senior companions convened at Saqifa Bani Sa'ida to elect Abu Bakr as the first caliph, prioritizing communal consensus (ijma) and merit over familial claims to leadership. This decision, supported by the majority of Medinan residents and emigrants, set the precedent for the Rashidun Caliphate, encompassing Abu Bakr (r. 632–634 CE), Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634–644 CE), Uthman ibn Affan (r. 644–656 CE), and Ali ibn Abi Talib (r. 656–661 CE), whose tenures expanded Islamic rule from Arabia to Persia and Byzantium while adhering to the Prophet's practices.[16] Those affirming the legitimacy of these caliphs as guided successors (Rashidun) formed the proto-Sunni nucleus, contrasting with emerging Shia partisanship favoring Ali's exclusive divine appointment and Kharijite rejection of arbitration at Siffin in 657 CE.[17] The distinct Sunni identity, termed Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah (People of the Tradition and the Main Body), crystallized during the Abbasid era (750–1258 CE), particularly in response to sectarian divergences and rationalist challenges like Mu'tazilism.[18] During the mihnah (inquisition) from 833 to 848 CE, traditionalists such as Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855 CE) resisted Abbasid-imposed Mu'tazilite doctrines on the created Quran, defending anthropomorphic interpretations rooted in prophetic reports and companions' consensus.[18] By the 10th century, figures like Abu Ja'far al-Tahawi (d. 933 CE) formalized creedal statements in works such as al-Aqida al-Tahawiyya, emphasizing adherence to the Quran, Sunnah, and the paths of the Salaf (early generations).[18] The Seljuk restoration in 1055 CE further entrenched this orthodoxy against Buyid Shi'a influence, solidifying Sunnism as the dominant tradition comprising approximately 85–90% of Muslims today.[17] Central to Sunni formation is unwavering adherence to the Sunnah—the Prophet's exemplary conduct, sayings, and tacit approvals—authenticated through systematic hadith criticism developed from the 8th century onward by scholars prioritizing continuous chains of trustworthy narrators (isnad) and doctrinal coherence (matn).[19] Pioneering collections include Muhammad al-Bukhari's Sahih al-Bukhari (compiled 846 CE), vetted from over 600,000 reports to yield 7,275 authentic hadiths, and Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj's Sahih Muslim (d. 875 CE) with around 7,500 entries, forming the nucleus of the Kutub al-Sittah (Six Books).[19] This traditionist approach, championed by ahl al-hadith circles, elevated the Sunnah alongside the Quran as the primary sources for theology (aqidah) and law (fiqh), with supplementary reliance on scholarly consensus (ijma) and analogical reasoning (qiyas), distinguishing Sunnis from Quranists or those subordinating hadith to rationalism.[19] Such methodological rigor ensured causal fidelity to the Prophet's normative example, underpinning Sunni claims to represent the ummah's preserved orthodoxy.[17]
Schools of Jurisprudence (Madhabs)
The schools of jurisprudence, known as madhhabs, represent formalized methodologies within Sunni Islam for interpreting Sharia through deduction from the Quran, Sunnah, consensus (ijma), and analogy (qiyas), among other tools. These schools emerged in the 8th and 9th centuries CE amid regional scholarly traditions and debates over legal reasoning, with the four principal ones—Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali—gaining orthodox status by the 10th century due to their rigorous engagement with primary sources and mutual recognition among Sunni scholars as valid paths to divine law.[20] Unlike sectarian divisions, madhabs emphasize complementary approaches rather than exclusivity, allowing jurists to follow one while respecting others' rulings in areas of disagreement.[21] The Hanafi madhhab, founded by Abu Hanifa al-Nu'man (699–767 CE) in Kufa, Iraq, prioritizes rational discretion (ra'y) alongside textual sources, incorporating istihsan (juristic preference) to favor equitable outcomes over strict analogy.[22] It draws heavily from Iraqi scholarly consensus and became the most widespread school, predominant in Turkey, the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Indian subcontinent, where Ottoman and Mughal empires institutionalized it.[23] The Maliki madhhab, established by Malik ibn Anas (711–795 CE) in Medina, emphasizes the normative practices of Medina's inhabitants ('amal ahl al-Madinah) as a living embodiment of Sunnah, supplemented by Hadith and masalih mursala (public interest).[24] Malik's al-Muwatta (compiled circa 760–795 CE) serves as its foundational text, and the school prevails in North and West Africa, including Morocco, Algeria, and Nigeria, reflecting early Islamic heartland influences.[25] The Shafi'i madhhab, developed by Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi'i (767–820 CE), systematized usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) in his al-Risala (circa 815 CE), hierarchically ordering sources to prioritize Hadith authentication while permitting qiyas for novel cases.[26] Al-Shafi'i, trained in both Medina and Iraq, bridged earlier traditions; the school dominates in East Africa, Yemen, Lower Egypt, and Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia and Malaysia.[25] The Hanbali madhhab, attributed to Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780–855 CE) in Baghdad, adheres most strictly to Quran and authentic Hadith, minimizing analogy and personal opinion in favor of transmitted reports, as evidenced by Ibn Hanbal's resistance to rationalist theology during the Mihna inquisition (833–848 CE).[27] It remains influential in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, where state enforcement aligns with its textualist rigor.[25]| School | Founder | Key Methodological Emphasis | Primary Regions |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hanafi | Abu Hanifa (699–767 CE) | Reason (ra'y), istihsan, flexible qiyas | Turkey, Central/South Asia, Balkans |
| Maliki | Malik ibn Anas (711–795 CE) | Medinan practice ('amal), public welfare | North/West Africa |
| Shafi'i | Al-Shafi'i (767–820 CE) | Structured usul al-fiqh, Hadith primacy | Southeast Asia, East Africa, Yemen |
| Hanbali | Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780–855 CE) | Literal Hadith adherence, limited analogy | Arabian Peninsula |
Theological Orientations (Aqidah Schools)
In Sunni Islam, aqidah (creed or theological doctrine) refers to the systematic articulation of core beliefs derived from the Quran, Sunnah, and consensus of early generations, addressing topics such as divine attributes, human free will, faith, and eschatology. The three principal aqidah schools—Athari, Ash'ari, and Maturidi—emerged between the 9th and 10th centuries CE as responses to rationalist challenges from Mu'tazila theology, which emphasized uncreated human reason over textual literalism. While sharing foundational Sunni tenets like the uncreated Quran, the prophets' infallibility in conveying revelation, and God's absolute transcendence, these schools diverge in methodology: Atharis prioritize unqualified affirmation of scriptural texts, whereas Ash'aris and Maturidis employ dialectical theology (kalam) to defend orthodoxy against philosophical excesses, often interpreting ambiguous divine attributes to avoid anthropomorphism.[28][29] The Athari school, also termed the creed of the Salaf or Ahl al-Hadith, adheres strictly to the apparent meanings of Quran and hadith reports (athar) without speculative interpretation (ta'wil) or philosophical intrusion. It affirms God's attributes—such as hand, face, and descent—as real and eternal, negating resemblance to creation (tashbih) and modality (kayfiyya) via the formula "without how" (bila kayf), as exemplified in the creed of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855 CE). Atharis reject the notion of acquired faith (iman as increasing or decreasing through deeds), viewing it as fixed post-puberty, and emphasize divine predestination (qadar) without compromising human accountability through transmitted texts rather than rational proofs. Historically predominant among early Hanbali and some Shafi'i scholars, Atharism remains influential in Salafi and certain traditionalist circles, though less formalized in institutional theology compared to its rationalist counterparts.[28] The Ash'ari school was founded by Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari (d. 936 CE), a former Mu'tazilite who shifted to defend Sunni orthodoxy using kalam arguments after a reported vision in 912 CE. Key doctrines include occasionalism—wherein God directly creates all acts, rendering human power "acquired" (kasb)—and a nuanced approach to attributes: affirming them eternally but reinterpreting anthropomorphic terms (e.g., God's "hand" as power) to preserve transcendence, contrasting Athari literalism. Ash'aris hold that faith comprises affirmation and action, allowing increase via obedience, and prioritize consensus (ijma') alongside reason in establishing proofs for God's existence and unity (tawhid). Developed further by figures like al-Baqillani (d. 1013 CE), this school gained prominence in Shafi'i and Maliki jurisprudence, shaping theology in regions like North Africa, Egypt, and the Levant through Abbasid-era madrasas.[30][28] Parallel to Ash'arism, the Maturidi school originated with Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (d. 944 CE) in Samarqand, aligning closely with Hanafi jurisprudence and emphasizing innate human reason (fitra) as a Quranic tool for recognizing truth independently of revelation. Maturidis affirm human responsibility in moral choice, positing that God creates the act's occurrence but humans acquire it through will, and they interpret divine attributes similarly to Ash'aris but allow greater scope for rational deduction in theology, such as arguing ethical obligations (taklif) require discernible good and evil via intellect. Unlike Ash'aris, they view faith as unchangeable in essence (belief in heart and tongue) but increasable in degree, and they reject coercive divine command theory by grounding some ethics in primordial human disposition. Prevalent among Turkic, Central Asian, and South Asian Sunnis—encompassing areas like Turkey, Afghanistan, and the Indian subcontinent—Maturidism spread via Ottoman and Mughal institutions, comprising a significant portion of global Hanafi adherents.[28][31] Collectively, Ash'ari and Maturidi orientations dominate Sunni theological discourse, endorsed by medieval consensus as safeguards against rationalist deviations, with Atharism serving as the textual anchor critiqued by some modern reformers for insufficient philosophical engagement. Despite intra-Sunni debates—e.g., Salafi critiques of kalam as innovation—the schools coexist under the umbrella of Ahl al-Sunnah, united against extremes like anthropomorphism or negationism.[29][28]Sufi Integration and Mystical Dimensions
Sufism, known as tasawwuf, constitutes the interior, mystical pursuit within Sunni Islam, focusing on the purification of the soul (tazkiyah al-nafs) to attain direct gnosis of God (ma'rifah) through disciplined practices like dhikr (invocation of divine names) and adherence to a spiritual master (murshid or sheikh). Originating in the 8th century CE among ascetic scholars in urban centers such as Basra and Kufa, it arose amid concerns over materialism following the Umayyad expansion, with early exemplars like Hasan al-Basri (d. 728 CE) emphasizing renunciation (zuhd) and ethical introspection rooted in Quranic injunctions to fear God inwardly (Quran 59:18).[32] By the 9th century, figures such as Al-Junayd of Baghdad (d. 910 CE) formalized Sufi doctrine, insisting on sobriety (sahw) and conformity to Sharia to distinguish authentic mysticism from ecstatic excesses.[33] Sufi fraternities (tariqas), emerging prominently from the 12th century, embedded these mystical elements into Sunni orthodoxy by aligning with established juridical schools (madhabs), such as the Hanbali-affiliated Qadiriyya order founded by Abdul Qadir Jilani (d. 1166 CE) in Baghdad, or the Naqshbandiyya, which prioritizes silent dhikr and strict adherence to prophetic norms. These orders structure spiritual ascent through initiatic chains (silsila) tracing to the Prophet Muhammad via Abu Bakr or Ali, complementing exoteric law (sharia) with esoteric realization (haqiqa). Theologians like Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111 CE) integrated Sufism into Sunni creed in works such as Ihya' Ulum al-Din, arguing it fulfills the prophetic hadith on inner jihad against the ego, thus preserving doctrinal unity against rationalist deviations.[34][35] Despite broad acceptance, Sufism's mystical claims—such as the doctrine of wahdat al-wujud (unity of existence) articulated by Muhyi al-Din Ibn Arabi (d. 1240 CE)—provoke debate within Sunni circles for potentially blurring divine transcendence (tanz ih), echoing accusations of monism leveled by contemporaries like Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328 CE). Reformist strains, notably Wahhabism founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792 CE), reject Sufi rituals including shrine visitation (ziyarat) and saintly intercession (tawassul) as impermissible innovations (bid'ah) that foster idolatry (shirk), prioritizing a literalist return to Quran and Sunnah unmediated by hierarchical orders.[36] This tension underscores Sufism's dual role: enriching Sunni devotional life in traditional societies (e.g., over 100 tariqas historically documented across the Muslim world) while inviting purist critiques that view it as accretions diluting foundational tawhid (divine oneness).[37]Shia Islam: The Imami and Partisan Traditions
Core Doctrine of Imamate and Twelver Dominance
The doctrine of the Imamate constitutes the foundational theological pillar of Shia Islam, positing that after the Prophet Muhammad's death in 632 CE, legitimate spiritual and temporal authority resides exclusively in a divinely appointed lineage of Imams descending from Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law, and his wife Fatima. These Imams are regarded as infallible (ma'sum), possessing divinely inspired knowledge (ilm ladunni) to interpret the Quran and Sunnah, safeguard the faith from distortion, and guide the Muslim community (ummah) in both exoteric and esoteric matters. This succession is not elective or consensual, as in Sunni caliphate models, but predetermined by God through explicit designation (nass) by the preceding Imam, ensuring continuity of prophetic guidance amid political upheavals.[38][39] Twelver Shiism (Ithna Ashariyya), the predominant Shia branch, specifies twelve Imams in this chain: beginning with Ali (d. 661 CE), followed by Hasan (d. 670 CE), Husayn (d. 680 CE), and continuing through Ali Zayn al-Abidin (d. 713 CE), Muhammad al-Baqir (d. 733 CE), Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765 CE), Musa al-Kazim (d. 799 CE), Ali al-Rida (d. 818 CE), Muhammad al-Jawad (d. 835 CE), Ali al-Hadi (d. 868 CE), Hasan al-Askari (d. 874 CE), and culminating in Muhammad al-Mahdi (b. 869 CE). The twelfth Imam, known as the Mahdi or the "guided one," is believed to have entered a minor occultation (ghayba sughra) from 874 to 941 CE, during which he communicated through four deputies, followed by the major occultation (ghayba kubra) starting in 941 CE, wherein he remains hidden but alive, awaiting divine command to reappear and establish justice. This eschatological expectation underscores the Imamate's ongoing relevance, with interim religious authority delegated to qualified scholars (mujtahids) via ijtihad during the occultation.[40][41] Twelver dominance within Shia Islam emerged historically through doctrinal consolidation and political patronage, comprising roughly 85% of the global Shia population of approximately 200-300 million adherents as of recent estimates. Early Twelver communities coalesced around hadith transmissions from Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq, who systematized jurisprudence (fiqh) amid Abbasid persecution, fostering resilience via networks of scholars in centers like Qom and Najaf. Decisive ascendancy occurred under the Safavid dynasty, which from 1501 CE enforced Twelver Shiism as Iran's state religion, converting a predominantly Sunni population through incentives, coercion, and clerical importation from Lebanon and Iraq, thereby institutionalizing the Imamate's doctrines and elevating Twelver ulama to governance roles that persist in structures like Iran's velayat-e faqih. This state-backed propagation marginalized rival Shia branches, such as Ismailism, and positioned Twelvers as the demographic and influential core of Shiism in key regions including Iran (90-95% of its 80+ million Muslims), Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain.[42][43][44]Ismaili, Zaydi, and Other Sub-Branches
Ismailism developed as a branch of Shia Islam after the death of the sixth Imam, Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, in 765 CE, when a faction upheld his eldest son, Ismaʿīl ibn Jaʿfar, as the seventh Imam, rejecting the Twelver designation of Mūsā al-Kāẓim.[45] This divergence emphasized bāṭinī (esoteric) exegesis of the Quran and hadith, viewing the Imam as the bearer of exclusive interpretive authority over the inner, spiritual dimensions of revelation, beyond its ẓāhir (literal) form.[45] Ismailis established the Fatimid Caliphate in 909 CE, ruling over North Africa, Egypt, and parts of the Levant until 1171 CE, during which they promoted intellectual pursuits, including philosophy and sciences, under imams who doubled as caliphs. A major schism occurred after the death of Imam al-Mustanṣir Bi'llāh in 1094 CE, dividing adherents into Nizārīs, who followed his son Nizār, and Mustaʿlīs, who supported his younger son al-Mustaʿlī; the Nizārīs constitute the largest subgroup today, numbering around 12-15 million globally, with communities in India, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, East Africa, Syria, and diaspora populations in Europe and North America.[46] The Nizārī line continues under a living, hereditary Imam, currently the 49th, Prince Karim IV (Aga Khan IV), who succeeded in 1957 and emphasizes ethical pluralism, intellectual pluralism, and social welfare through institutions like the Aga Khan Development Network.[45] Mustaʿlī Ismailis, fewer in number (under 1 million), split further into Tayyibī Bohras, including Dawoodi, Sulaymanī, and Alawī subgroups, primarily in India and Yemen, led by a dāʿī muṭlaq (absolute missionary) as Imam's representative during an era of concealment.[45] Core doctrines include the perpetual Imamate as divine proof (ḥujja), seven pillars of faith (expanding the five with walāya—allegiance to the Imam—and jihād), and cycles of prophetic revelation culminating in the Imam's guidance for contemporary application.[45] Zaydism originated with the failed rebellion of Zayd ibn ʿAlī, a grandson of Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī, against Umayyad authority in Kufa in 740 CE, where Zayd was killed, but his advocacy for qualified leadership among Ahl al-Bayt descendants gained followers.[47] Zaydis recognize only five infallible Imams—ʿAlī, al-Ḥasan, al-Ḥusayn, ʿAlī Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn, and Muḥammad al-Bāqir—while subsequent Imams must be Ḥasanid descendants (from al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī) who publicly proclaim their claim, demonstrate scholarly merit, and undertake armed uprising (khurūj) against unjust rule, rejecting quietism or hereditary designation without action.[47] This contrasts with Twelver and Ismaili occultation (ghayba) doctrines, as Zaydis deny hidden Imams and prioritize ongoing ijtihād (independent reasoning) in jurisprudence, which closely mirrors Hanafi fiqh with Muʿtazilī theological influences, including the Quran's createdness, human free will, and divine justice without infallible intermediaries beyond the early Imams.[47] Zaydi Imams ruled northern Yemen from the early 10th century until the 1962 republican revolution overthrew the last Imam, Muḥammad al-Badr; today, Zaydis form about 35% of Yemen's population (roughly 10-12 million people), concentrated in the north, with the Ḥūthī movement invoking Zaydi heritage amid Yemen's civil war, though incorporating Twelver rituals like self-flagellation.[48][47] Small Zaydi communities persist in Saudi Arabia and Iran, but the sect's emphasis on activism and rationalism has led to its marginalization relative to Twelvers. Other early Shia sub-branches emerged from succession disputes but largely merged or extincted by the 9th-10th centuries, illustrating fluid interpretations of Imamate. The Kaysāniyya supported Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyya (d. 700 CE), a son of ʿAlī by a non-Fāṭimid wife, as Mahdī in occultation, fostering proto-messianic ideas that influenced later Shia eschatology, including concepts of return (rajʿa), but dissipated after supporting failed revolts like that of al-Mukhtār al-Thaqafī in 685 CE. The Fāṭḥiyya briefly followed ʿAbd Allāh al-Aftāḥ as successor to Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, while the Waqifiyya halted recognition at Mūsā al-Kāẓim, viewing him as the occulted Qāʾim; both groups either assimilated into Twelver ranks or vanished amid persecutions. These sects underscore causal tensions in early Shia formation—disagreements over eligibility, visibility, and activism—but lacked enduring structures, unlike Ismaili or Zaydi lines.Esoteric Interpretations and Ghulat Extremes
In Shia Islam, esoteric interpretations, particularly through ta'wil (esoteric exegesis), seek to uncover the inner (batin) dimensions of Quranic verses and hadiths, transcending their exoteric (zahir) legal and literal senses to reveal spiritual, symbolic truths. This method posits that the Quran possesses multiple layers of meaning, with ta'wil "returning" texts to their primordial origins, often guided by the Imam's interpretive authority.[49] Ismaili Shiism elevates ta'wil as foundational, viewing the Imam as the living embodiment of esoteric knowledge who unveils hidden realities of prophecy, creation, and divine hierarchy, distinct from mere juristic application.[50] Twelver Shiism, while acknowledging esoteric aspects in traditions attributed to the Imams, subordinates ta'wil to exoteric jurisprudence (fiqh) and rejects interpretations that nullify apparent obligations, associating unchecked esotericism with the Batiniyya—a term historically applied pejoratively to groups prioritizing inner meanings over outer forms.[51] The Ghulat ("extremists") represent fringes of early Shia thought accused of ghuluww (exaggeration), elevating Ali ibn Abi Talib and subsequent Imams to divine, incarnational, or super-prophetic statuses that compromise tawhid (God's oneness). Emerging primarily in 8th- and 9th-century Kufa, these sects included the Saba'iyya, who deified Ali as a pre-existent god, and the Kaysaniyya, who proclaimed Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyyah's divinity or occultation as the Mahdi.[52] Other groups, such as the Mughiriyya and Khattabiyya, incorporated Gnostic dualism, attributing to Imams infinite prescience of the unseen (ghayb) or creative powers akin to God's.[53] Mainstream Shia sources, drawing from heresiographical traditions and Imam-attributed narrations, document condemnations of Ghulat beliefs; for example, Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765 CE) reportedly repudiated followers claiming the Imams' godhood or abrogation of prayer and fasting via esoteric license.[54] [55] Ghulat doctrines often featured secretive rituals, trinitarian formulations (e.g., Ali-Muhammad-Salman as divine aspects), and syncretism with pre-Islamic or Gnostic elements, fostering isolated communities with private gatherings.[52] While some concepts like Imam occultation (ghayba) and return (raj'a) permeated Twelver eschatology without deification, ghuluww was systematically anathematized to preserve Imams as infallible human guides subordinate to Muhammad's prophecy and God's transcendence.[56] Later offshoots, such as the Nusayriyya (Alawites, emerging circa 9th century under Muhammad ibn Nusayr), perpetuated Ghulat traits through veiled esotericism, reincarnation (tanasukh), and Ali's exaltation, though they integrate Twelver ritual forms outwardly; Twelver scholars classify them as deviant for these excesses.[52] Ismailis similarly disavow ghuluww, confining ta'wil to Imam-guided symbolism without divinizing figures, despite historical Fatimid-era accusations of Batiniyya extremism by rivals.[49] These extremes marginalized Ghulat groups, reducing them to small, often persecuted enclaves by the medieval period, with primary evidence surviving in orthodox polemics rather than their own texts.[54]Ibadi Islam and Surviving Early Dissent
Origins as Moderate Kharijites
The Kharijite movement arose amid the First Fitna (656–661 CE), particularly following the arbitration controversy after the Battle of Siffin in 657 CE, when a faction of Ali ibn Abi Talib's supporters rejected compromise with Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan and insisted that rightful leadership belonged exclusively to the most pious believers, irrespective of lineage. This group, initially coalescing around the principle of la hukma illa lillah ("no judgment but God's"), splintered after Ali's victory over radicals at the Battle of Nahrawan in 659 CE, where thousands of extremists were killed, prompting survivors to form quieter networks in urban centers like Basra.[13] The Ibadi faction emerged from this moderate Basran strand around 680 CE, prioritizing juristic scholarship and doctrinal restraint over the perpetual insurgency favored by groups like the Azariqa.[57] Jabir ibn Zayd al-Azdi (d. ca. 93 AH/711–712 CE), a Tabi'i scholar and companion of early figures like Abdullah ibn Abbas, played a pivotal role as the foundational jurist of the Ibadis, compiling hadith transmissions with short isnads and emphasizing independent reasoning in fiqh while avoiding overt political confrontation with Umayyad authorities.[58] Unlike radical Kharijites who issued blanket takfir (declarations of unbelief) against fellow Muslims for political allegiance or grave sins—often justifying indiscriminate violence—Ibadis under Jabir's influence classified major sinners in a liminal state of kufr (disbelief) that did not equate to full apostasy, thereby prohibiting their execution and upholding communal protections for life and property.[59] This theological nuance, rooted in selective Quranic exegesis and hadith, fostered a doctrine of wala (association with the pious) and bara'a (dissociation from the impious) that tolerated temporary coexistence under flawed rulers when rebellion risked greater harm.[60] Abdallah ibn Ibad al-Tamimi (d. ca. 700 CE), a Basran leader from the Tamim tribe, formalized this moderation in the 680s CE by organizing the group—later named Ibadiyya after him—against the extremism of the Azariqa, who had fled to rural strongholds and targeted non-combatants. Ibn Ibad advocated kitman (concealment or dissimulation of beliefs) as a pragmatic strategy for survival under oppressive rule, explicitly rejecting the radicals' mandate for immediate jihad against any imam not meeting stringent piety criteria and their willingness to deem entire communities kafir.[57][61] By the early 8th century, this approach had crystallized the Ibadis as a distinct school, transmitting teachings through networks in Iraq and southern Arabia, where they established an imamate in Hadhramaut by the mid-8th century, marking their divergence from Kharijite militancy toward institutionalized quietism and consensus-based leadership selection.[61] This evolution preserved Ibadi viability amid the consolidation of Umayyad and Abbasid power, contrasting with the annihilation of more belligerent Kharijite sects.[13]Distinct Jurisprudence and Theology
Ibadi jurisprudence derives from the same primary sources as other Islamic legal traditions—the Quran, authentic Sunnah, scholarly consensus (ijma'), and analogical reasoning (qiyas)—yet features distinct interpretive methodologies and rulings shaped by early Basran scholars like Jabir ibn Zayd (d. 93/711 CE). A core divergence lies in the prioritization of communal election for leadership via shura (consultation), rejecting hereditary or tribal prerequisites such as Quraysh descent for the imam, with piety (taqwa) as the paramount qualification.[62][63] In ritual law, Ibadis mandate major ablution (ghusl) for resuming fasting after impurity, paralleling prayer requirements, and deem grave sins sufficient to nullify the fast, unlike predominant Sunni positions that limit invalidation to specific acts. Divorce procedures also differ, as pronouncing triple talaq in one session does not finalize it irrevocably, allowing revocation periods absent in some Sunni madhhabs. Juridical development occurred in phases: formative in 8th-century Basra, intermediate transmission to Oman and North Africa by the 9th century, and maturation through texts like the Mudawwana of Abu Ghanim al-Khurasani (3rd/9th century), emphasizing hadith validation and regional consensus over taqlid (imitation).[64][65][63] Theologically, Ibadis espouse a rationalist framework akin to Mu'tazilism, positing that human intellect innately grasps monotheism (tawhid) and ethical basics prior to revelation, rendering denial thereof culpable even in isolated communities. They affirm the Quran's createdness (makhluq), distinguishing God's eternal speech (kalam nafsi) from its verbal manifestation, and negate anthropomorphic attributes while upholding divine justice ('adl) and human accountability (qadar) without fatalism. Sinners are categorized hierarchically: minor transgressors remain full community members, while grave ones (fasiqs) incur dissociation (bara'a) but not automatic takfir unless manifesting hostility, contrasting Kharijite extremism and Sunni inclusivity toward monotheistic sinners. This framework, articulated in works by early mutakallimun like Abu al-Mu'thir al-Tamimi (d. 3rd/9th century), fosters doctrinal conservatism paired with pragmatic tolerance, as evidenced in Omani governance since the 8th century.[66][66][67]Contemporary Presence and Stability
Ibadi Islam maintains a presence primarily in Oman, where adherents constitute the majority of the population, estimated at around 2.5 to 3 million globally, with over 90% residing there.[66] In Oman, Ibadism serves as the de facto state religion, with the ruling Al Said dynasty adhering to it since 1744, fostering a stable governance structure that emphasizes consultation and avoids the sectarian conflicts prevalent elsewhere in the Muslim world.[68] Smaller communities persist in North Africa, including the M'zab Valley in Algeria (approximately 150,000-200,000 Mozabites), the Nafusa Mountains in Libya (tribal groups numbering tens of thousands), and Djerba Island in Tunisia (a few thousand), as well as Zanzibar in Tanzania, where Ibadis form a historical minority tied to Omani influence.[69] These diaspora populations have preserved their distinct jurisprudence and theology amid surrounding Sunni majorities. The stability of Ibadi communities stems from doctrinal emphases on moral integrity, tolerance toward non-hostile non-Ibadis, and aversion to fitna (civil strife), enabling coexistence and diplomatic neutrality.[67] Oman's Ibadi-led monarchy has maintained internal peace since quelling a 1970s communist insurgency in Dhofar, promoting religious freedom for minorities while upholding Ibadi primacy, which has contributed to the country's role as a mediator in regional conflicts, such as between Iran and Saudi Arabia.[70] In Algeria and Tunisia, Ibadi groups enjoy relative autonomy in their enclaves, with the Mozabites maintaining economic self-sufficiency through trade and craftsmanship, though they faced marginalization under post-independence secular regimes. Libyan Ibadis in the Nafusa Mountains navigated the 2011 civil war by aligning with anti-Gaddafi forces, preserving community structures amid ongoing instability.[71] Despite their small numbers—less than 0.2% of global Muslims—Ibadi institutions demonstrate resilience through endogenous leadership selection via shura (consultation) and adaptation to modern statehood without compromising core tenets.[66] No significant doctrinal schisms or external existential threats have emerged in recent decades, contrasting with more fractious Sunni or Shia branches; instead, Ibadism's emphasis on walaya (association with believers) and bara'a (dissociation from aggressors) has sustained communal cohesion.[72] This stability is evidenced by the absence of Ibadi involvement in transnational jihadism, with Oman's security apparatus effectively countering radical influences through inclusive policies rather than repression.[67]Cross-Cutting Theological Schools
Rationalist Mu'tazilism and Its Decline
The Mu'tazila emerged in the early 8th century in Basra, Iraq, founded by Wāṣil ibn ʿAṭāʾ (d. 748 CE), a student of the theologian al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī who withdrew (iʿtizāl) from his circle over a dispute regarding the status of grave sinners, leading to the school's name.[73] This rationalist theological movement emphasized the application of human reason ('aql) alongside revelation to interpret Islamic doctrine, drawing partial influence from Greek philosophical traditions introduced via translations in Abbasid intellectual circles.[74] Central to Mu'tazili thought were the uṣūl al-khams (five principles): tawḥīd (strict unity and transcendence of God), ʿadl (divine justice, implying human free will and moral responsibility), the promise of reward and threat of punishment (waʿd wa-waʿīd), the intermediate status of major sinners (al-manzila bayna al-manzilatayn), and the obligation to enjoin good and forbid evil (al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahy ʿan al-munkar).[73] Mu'tazilis argued for human free will (qadar), rejecting predestination to uphold God's justice, as evil actions could not be attributed to a benevolent deity; they also maintained the Quran's created nature (makhlūq), viewing it as a temporal divine speech to preserve tawḥīd from implying eternal attributes akin to polytheism.[74][75] Mu'tazilism reached its zenith as state-sponsored theology under the Abbasid caliphs, particularly al-Maʾmūn (r. 813–833 CE), who elevated it in Baghdad's intellectual milieu amid translations of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic texts.[73] Key figures like Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf (d. ca. 841 CE) systematized its kalām (dialectical) methods to defend orthodoxy against dualists, anthropomorphists, and Shi'a extremists, fostering schools in Basra and Baghdad that trained generations of scholars.[73] In 833 CE, al-Maʾmūn initiated the miḥna (inquisition), compelling scholars to affirm the Quran's createdness under threat of imprisonment or flogging, targeting traditionalists who viewed the Quran as uncreated and eternal like God's essence.[73] Prominent resisters like Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855 CE) endured persecution, framing Mu'tazili rationalism as an innovation (bidʿa) subordinating scripture to speculative reason.[73] Successors al-Muʿtaṣim (r. 833–842 CE) and al-Wāthiq (r. 842–847 CE) continued the policy, but it faltered as enforcement alienated the scholarly class and populace reliant on hadith literalism. The decline accelerated after Caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–861 CE) abolished the miḥna in 849 CE, restoring traditionalist scholars and suppressing Mu'tazili dominance to consolidate Abbasid legitimacy amid political fragmentation.[73] Coercive imposition bred resentment, portraying Mu'tazilism as elitist and detached from prophetic traditions, while its rationalist excesses—such as allegorizing anthropomorphic verses—clashed with the textualism of ḥadīth scholars.[75] A pivotal shift came with Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (874–936 CE), a former Mu'tazili who recanted around 912 CE, critiquing its overreliance on reason and developing a theology subordinating 'aql to naṣṣ (textual evidence) through atomistic occasionalism and metaphorical interpretation of attributes.[75] Al-Ashʿarī's school gained traction by reconciling kalām defenses with Sunni orthodoxy, attracting patronage from Seljuks and Mamluks by the 11th century, marginalizing Mu'tazilis in Sunni heartlands.[75] Parallel Māturīdī theology in Transoxiana offered similar balances, further eclipsing Mu'tazilism, which persisted marginally in Zaydī Shīʿism in Yemen but waned elsewhere due to loss of institutional support and intellectual appeal amid hadith revivals.[74] By the 12th century, Mu'tazili texts were largely polemically preserved by opponents, underscoring how its causal emphasis on reason conflicted with the realist primacy of revelation in mainstream Islamic epistemology.[73]Traditionalist Schools: Ash'ari, Maturidi, and Athari
The traditionalist schools of Sunni theology, Ash'ari, Maturidi, and Athari, represent orthodox responses to rationalist challenges posed by Mu'tazilism, emphasizing fidelity to scriptural texts while varying in their use of dialectical reasoning (kalam). These schools collectively form the theological backbone of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah, with Ash'arism and Maturidism employing kalam to defend core doctrines like divine attributes and predestination, whereas Atharism eschews speculative theology in favor of direct textual affirmation.[28][76] Ash'arism, founded by Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari (c. 874–936 CE), who transitioned from Mu'tazili rationalism to Sunni orthodoxy around 912 CE, reconciles reason and revelation by affirming God's attributes as described in Quran and Sunnah without ascribing modality or likeness (bila kayf), rejecting anthropomorphism and Mu'tazili negation. Key principles include occasionalism, where God directly creates all events and human actions, negating independent causality in creation, and the acquisition (kasb) theory, positing humans acquire acts willed by God. Ash'arism predominates in Shafi'i and Maliki jurisprudence, influencing major scholars like al-Ghazali (d. 1111 CE) and gaining institutional support through Abbasid and later Seljuk patronage.[76][77][78] Maturidism, established by Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (d. 944 CE) in Samarqand, parallels Ash'arism but accords greater role to human reason in discerning ethical basics prior to revelation, viewing faith as belief without necessarily including outward actions, though actions remain obligatory post-belief. It affirms human responsibility for actions while upholding divine omnipotence and predestination, differing from Ash'arism by prioritizing rational evidence alongside revelation in conflicts and affirming innate knowledge of God's existence through fitrah. Predominant among Hanafis in Central Asia, Turkey, and the Indian subcontinent, Maturidism integrated with Ottoman scholarship, comprising roughly 30% of Sunni Muslims today.[28][79] Atharism, rooted in the approach of Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780–855 CE) and early Salaf, rejects kalam theology outright, advocating affirmation of divine attributes exactly as stated in primary sources without interpretation (ta'wil), delegation of meaning (tafwid), or speculative inquiry, adhering to "without how" (bila kayf) to avoid innovation (bid'ah). It emphasizes textual literalism tempered by negation of resemblance (tashbih), influencing Hanbali jurisprudence and serving as a precursor to later Salafi movements, though traditional Atharis like some Hanbalis differ from modern literalist interpretations by avoiding over-literalism. Atharism persists among certain hadith-oriented scholars, prioritizing emulation of the pious predecessors (Salaf al-Salih) over philosophical defenses.[28][80][81] These schools coexist within Sunni Islam, with mutual recognition as orthodox despite methodological variances, as evidenced by historical alliances against shared threats like Mu'tazilism during the Mihna trials (833–848 CE) and later philosophical incursions.[28]Marginal and Extinct Theological Positions
The Jahmiyya, named after Jahm ibn Safwan (d. 128 AH/746 CE), represented an early theological stance emphasizing the utter transcendence of God (tanzih) to the point of negating all affirmative divine attributes mentioned in scripture, interpreting them as metaphorical to avoid anthropomorphism; they also held that the Quran was created rather than eternal. This position, which arose amid Umayyad-era debates in Khorasan, faced vehement opposition from traditionalists for undermining scriptural literalism and was largely eradicated by the 3rd/9th century through refutations by figures like Ahmad ibn Hanbal, leaving no independent following.[82][83] The Karramiyya, founded by Muhammad ibn Karram (d. 255 AH/869 CE) in eastern Iran, adopted a literalist anthropomorphic creed within a Hanafi-Murji'ah framework, asserting that God possesses a finite body (jism) and spatial direction while rejecting incarnation; they gained traction among ascetics and rulers in Khurasan and Transoxiana during the 3rd-5th/9th-11th centuries but declined due to doctrinal isolation and absorption or suppression by maturing Sunni orthodoxy.[84][85] Debates over divine predestination (qadar) yielded the Qadariyya, an 8th-century group (emerging around 100-150 AH/718-767 CE) that prioritized human free will and moral responsibility, rejecting Umayyad endorsements of compulsion to legitimize political actions and insisting individuals create their deeds independently of God's coercive decree. Opposed by predestinarians, their views influenced but were subsumed into the Mu'tazila by the 3rd/9th century, rendering the distinct Qadariyya position obsolete as balanced syntheses prevailed.[86][87] In contrast, the Jabriyya upheld absolute divine compulsion (jabr), positing that human actions are entirely determined by God's will without agency, a stance critiqued for absolving sinners and implying divine authorship of evil; originating as a reaction to free-will advocates during early Abbasid times (2nd/8th century), it persisted marginally among some literalists but faded as derogatory label and theological middle paths like Ash'arism rejected its extremes.[88][89] The Murji'ah, arising post-First Fitna (ca. 40 AH/661 CE) as a quietist response to Kharijite extremism, defined faith (iman) solely as inner belief and verbal affirmation, excluding deeds and deferring judgment on grave sinners to God rather than declaring them apostates; while influential in early Umayyad politics for promoting stability, their separation of works from faith was marginalized by the 4th/10th century as mainstream creeds integrated actions into faith's perfection.[90][91]Modern Revivalist and Reform Movements
Salafism, Wahhabism, and Literalist Revival
Salafism emerged as a transnational Sunni revivalist movement in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, advocating a return to the practices of the salaf al-salih—the first three generations of Muslims following the Prophet Muhammad—through strict adherence to the Quran and authentic Sunnah while rejecting religious innovations (bid'ah) and uncritical adherence to traditional schools of jurisprudence (taqlid).[92] This approach prioritizes textual literalism, drawing from earlier literalist traditions like the Ahl al-Hadith, and was shaped by reformers such as Muhammad Rashid Rida in Syria and Muhammad Abduh in Egypt amid colonial-era challenges to Islamic authority.[93] Salafis view later theological developments, such as extensive rationalist interpretations or Sufi practices, as deviations, emphasizing emulation of the Prophet's companions in creed, worship, and conduct.[92] Wahhabism represents an earlier, localized Salafi manifestation originating in 18th-century Najd, central Arabia, founded by the Hanbali scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), who sought to purify tawhid (monotheism) by condemning practices like shrine veneration and saint intercession as shirk (polytheism).[94] In 1744, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab forged a pact with Muhammad bin Saud, the tribal leader of Diriyah, merging religious ideology with political expansionism; this alliance enabled conquests across the Arabian Peninsula, establishing the first Saudi state by 1806 and laying the foundation for modern Saudi Arabia's state religion.[95] Unlike broader Salafism's diverse strands—which include quietist apolitical adherents, political activists, and jihadis—Wahhabism remained tied to Saudi governance, rejecting modern influences outright and focusing on purging perceived corruptions through direct scriptural revival.[94] The literalist revival inherent in these movements prioritizes unambiguous textual readings, affirming God's attributes (e.g., hand, face) as described in the Quran without allegorical reinterpretation (ta'wil) or negation, countering Ash'ari and Mu'tazili theological accommodations that Salafis deem anthropomorphic dilutions.[93] Influenced by medieval figures like Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), this methodology extends to jurisprudence, favoring independent reasoning (ijtihad) by qualified scholars over madhhab-bound emulation, and to practices like rigid enforcement of hudud punishments and segregation of genders based on hadith.[92] In the 20th century, Saudi oil wealth facilitated global dissemination via institutions like the Muslim World League (est. 1962), funding mosques, schools, and literature that promoted Salafi-Wahhabi teachings, reaching tens of millions and influencing movements from quietist dawah networks to more activist groups.[93] While critics attribute intolerance or extremism to these literalist emphases—evident in Saudi campaigns destroying historical sites until the 21st century—the core causal impetus remains a first-principles restoration of seventh-century Islam against accretions, as articulated in foundational texts like Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's Kitab al-Tawhid.[94]Quranism and Rejection of Hadith
Quranism, also referred to as Quran-only Islam, constitutes a heterodox Islamic orientation that posits the Quran as the exclusive and fully sufficient source of religious guidance, explicitly repudiating the normative authority of Hadith collections and the derived Sunnah. Adherents maintain that the Quran's self-description as a complete, detailed, and preserved revelation (e.g., Quran 6:114–115, 16:89) renders supplementary texts superfluous and potentially corrupting, arguing that Hadith—narratives of the Prophet Muhammad's sayings and actions compiled two to three centuries after his death—introduce human fabrications, contradictions with the Quran, and historical inaccuracies unverifiable by rigorous chains of transmission (isnad).[96] This stance derives from a literalist interpretation privileging textual self-sufficiency over traditionalist accretions, with Quranists contending that Quranic injunctions to "obey the Messenger" (e.g., Quran 4:59) refer solely to adherence to the Quran as Muhammad's conveyed message, not to extra-Quranic reports.[96] Historical precedents for Hadith skepticism appear sporadically in early Islamic intellectual debates, such as among certain rationalist or proto-Mu'tazilite figures who prioritized Quran and reason over uncorroborated reports, though systematic rejection remained marginal until the modern era.[97] The contemporary Quranist movement gained traction in the 20th century amid reformist critiques of orthodoxy, notably through Malaysian thinker Kassim Ahmad (1930–2017), whose 1962 book Hadith: A Re-evaluation asserted that Hadith literature, lacking divine authentication akin to the Quran, fosters sectarianism and obscures rational inquiry into the text. Ahmad's work, drawing on Quranic claims of self-explanation (e.g., Quran 25:33), provoked fatwas declaring it heretical and led to his brief imprisonment, highlighting tensions with established clerical authorities.[98] Similar impulses emerged in contexts like Egypt and Nigeria, where groups such as the Kala Kato in northern Nigeria interpret "Quran-only" adherence literally, often clashing with Sunni majorities over practices like ritual prayer forms absent explicit Quranic detail. Critics from Sunni and Shia establishments argue that Hadith rejection undermines core Islamic practices, such as the five daily prayers' structure, pilgrimage rites, and legal details, which rely on authenticated Prophetic exemplars referenced in the Quran (e.g., Quran 59:7), rendering Quranism practically deficient and doctrinally isolated.[96] Quranists counter that such dependencies reflect post-Quranic innovations, citing empirical issues like Hadith anachronisms (e.g., references to events post-dating Muhammad) and the absence of any Quranic mandate for Hadith compilation or preservation. Globally, Quranists number in the low thousands, dispersed and often covert due to apostasy accusations and persecution in countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan, where adherence invites social ostracism or legal penalties; no comprehensive surveys exist, but anecdotal evidence points to pockets in Turkey, Iran, and diaspora communities.[99] This marginal status underscores Quranism's challenge to institutionalized Islam, prioritizing individual textual engagement over scholarly consensus (ijma) or tradition.Islamic Modernism and Adaptation Attempts
Islamic Modernism arose in the late 19th century as an intellectual response among Muslim thinkers to European colonial dominance and the perceived superiority of Western science and governance, seeking to reinterpret Islamic sources through rational inquiry to foster compatibility with modernity.[100] Proponents advocated reviving ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) over strict taqlid (imitation of classical schools), arguing that the Quran and Sunnah inherently supported progress, education, and constitutionalism without necessitating wholesale abandonment of faith.[101] This movement contrasted with both rigid traditionalism and emerging literalist revivals by emphasizing Islam's rational foundations, though it often prioritized elite discourse over grassroots implementation.[102] Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897), an Iranian activist, catalyzed the movement through pan-Islamic advocacy, urging Muslims to unite against imperialism while adopting scientific knowledge, as outlined in his 1883 treatise The Refutation of the Materialists.[100] He influenced reforms across Ottoman, Persian, and Egyptian contexts, promoting the idea that true Islamic revival required blending religious zeal with modern tools, yet his efforts yielded limited institutional change amid autocratic resistance.[101] His disciple Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), Egypt's Grand Mufti from 1899, advanced educational reforms at Al-Azhar University starting in 1895, integrating secular subjects like mathematics and history into curricula to produce adaptable ulama.[102] Abduh's Risalat al-Tawhid (1897) posited reason as complementary to revelation, defending Quranic compatibility with Darwinian evolution and Newtonian physics, though he upheld core Sharia elements like hudud punishments.[103] Adaptation attempts included constitutional experiments, such as the 1906 Persian and 1908 Ottoman parliaments influenced by modernist ideas of limited monarchy under Islamic oversight, and initiatives for women's education, like Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's 1875 founding of Aligarh Muslim University in India to equip Muslims with Western sciences while preserving orthodoxy.[100] In Indonesia, modernist organizations like Muhammadiyah (founded 1912) established schools blending Islamic ethics with hygiene and arithmetic, reaching over 29 million members by 2010 through practical reforms.[104] However, these efforts faced causal barriers: colonial suppression eroded sovereignty, while internal resistance from ulama viewed ijtihad revival as eroding divine law's immutability, leading to hybrid outcomes where secularism advanced in Turkey post-1924 but provoked backlash elsewhere.[105] Empirically, modernism achieved partial successes in urban elites—evident in Abduh's fatwas permitting interest-based banking under necessity (darura) and Iqbal's (1877–1938) philosophical synthesis of Islam with Bergsonian vitalism in The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (1930)—but faltered in mass adoption, as socioeconomic stagnation and post-colonial authoritarianism favored Islamist alternatives promising uncompromised Sharia revival.[101] By the mid-20th century, movements like the Muslim Brotherhood supplanted modernist gradualism with activist mobilization, reflecting modernism's inability to resolve tensions between fixed scriptural imperatives (e.g., gender roles, apostasy penalties) and egalitarian modernity, as critiqued in analyses of its interpretive selectivity.[105] Academic portrayals often overstate its transformative potential, overlooking data on persistent illiteracy rates (e.g., 50% in Egypt as late as 1950) and the rise of Wahhabism, which captured state resources in Saudi Arabia from 1744 onward.[100]Political Islamism and Activist Branches
Origins in Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded on March 22, 1928, in Ismailia, Egypt, by Hassan al-Banna, a schoolteacher and Islamic scholar who sought to counter British colonial influence, secular modernization, and the perceived erosion of Islamic values in society. Al-Banna envisioned Islam as a complete system governing all aspects of life—spiritual, social, economic, and political—drawing on Quranic principles and the Prophet Muhammad's example to advocate for Sharia implementation through grassroots organization, education, and moral reform rather than immediate revolution.[106] The group's early activities included establishing schools, mosques, and welfare programs to build a pious Muslim base, while criticizing both Western materialism and the complacency of traditional religious scholars (ulama) who avoided political engagement. This approach represented a departure from classical Sunni schools' focus on jurisprudence (fiqh) and theology (kalam), prioritizing instead collective action to restore Islamic governance.[107] By the 1930s and 1940s, the Brotherhood expanded into a mass movement with branches across Egypt and influence in Sudan, Syria, and Palestine, promoting a flexible interpretation of Sunni orthodoxy that incorporated elements of Salafi puritanism—such as rejecting bid'ah (innovations) and taqlid (blind adherence to madhhabs)—while adapting to modern organizational tactics like youth wings and publications. Al-Banna's assassination in 1949 amid clashes with the Egyptian government did not halt its growth; successors like Sayyid Qutb radicalized its ideology, emphasizing jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance) as applicable to contemporary Muslim societies under secular rule, thus framing political activism as a religious duty. This evolution positioned the Brotherhood as a progenitor of Islamist branches that view democracy as a tool for eventual theocratic ends, influencing entities from Turkey's AKP to Hamas.[106][107] In parallel, Jamaat-e-Islami emerged on August 26, 1941, in Lahore, British India, under Abul A'la Maududi, a journalist and theologian who critiqued both Hindu-majority nationalism and Muslim separatism as deviations from divine sovereignty. Maududi articulated Islam as an ideological alternative to Western liberalism and communism, positing hakimiyya (God's sole sovereignty) as incompatible with man-made laws, and called for an elite vanguard (jema'ah) to educate, proselytize, and seize state power to enforce Sharia. Rooted in Sunni revivalism akin to the Deobandi tradition but transcending madhhab boundaries, the group rejected Sufi mysticism and folk practices as shirk-adjacent, focusing on textualist exegesis to mobilize urban intellectuals and youth against partition-era secularism.[108][109] Post-1947 partition, Jamaat-e-Islami reoriented toward Pakistan as a laboratory for Islamic state-building, advocating constitutional amendments for Sharia supremacy while participating in elections and alliances, much like the Brotherhood's pragmatic infiltration strategy. Maududi's writings, emphasizing jihad as both defensive warfare and systemic struggle against un-Islamic rule, inspired South Asian offshoots and global networks, including ties to Brotherhood affiliates in Europe. Both movements' shared emphasis on ideological purity, mass mobilization, and phased Islamization—over doctrinal scholasticism—catalyzed political Islamism as a distinct "school" within Sunni Islam, spawning activist branches that prioritize ummah-wide revival over ethnic or sectarian divides, though their vanguardism has drawn criticism from traditionalists for resembling Kharijite extremism in rhetoric.[110][111]Hizb ut-Tahrir and Caliphate Advocacy
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), meaning "Party of Liberation," was established in 1953 in Jerusalem by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, a Palestinian Islamic scholar and former judge trained in Sharia at Al-Azhar University and Dar al-Ulum in Cairo.[112][113] Al-Nabhani's writings, including Nizam al-Islam (The System of Islam) and a draft constitution for the caliphate, form the core of HT's ideology, which posits that Muslims must revive the caliphate as the sole legitimate political structure to implement divine sovereignty through Sharia.[113] The group views the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 as a catastrophic rupture caused by Western imperialism and secular Muslim rulers, necessitating a methodical restoration to unify the ummah (global Muslim community) and expand Islamic rule.[114] HT's caliphate advocacy centers on a three-stage methodology: tarbiyyah (ideological cultivation of members), taksir (interaction with society to expose rulers' failures and recruit elites), and siyasah shar'iyyah (political agitation to secure bay'ah, or oath of allegiance, from influential figures like military officers to appoint a caliph).[115] The organization rejects electoral participation, viewing democracy as taghut (false divinity) that usurps God's law, and instead promotes non-violent intellectual and media campaigns, including leaflets, conferences, and online propaganda, to build momentum without direct confrontation.[116] Once the caliphate is re-established, HT doctrine permits military jihad for territorial expansion and defense, drawing on classical Islamic jurisprudence that distinguishes preparatory non-violence from obligatory conquest under a legitimate Islamic state.[115][114] Despite HT's official rejection of terrorism, suicide bombings, and insurgency in the current phase—labeling such acts as premature and counterproductive—its materials glorify historical jihad, martyrdom, and antisemitic tropes portraying Jews and Western powers as eternal enemies of Islam.[117][118] Critics, including Western governments and counter-extremism analysts, argue this rhetoric serves as a "conveyor belt" to violence, with documented cases of HT members defecting to groups like al-Qaeda or ISIS after internalizing its apocalyptic worldview.[117][119] HT operates in over 40 countries through secretive cells (usra), with estimated tens of thousands of adherents, particularly in Central Asia (e.g., Uzbekistan, Tajikistan), Western Europe, and Australia, where it has hosted large rallies demanding caliphal restoration.[113][120] The group faces widespread bans for fomenting extremism: proscribed in the United Kingdom as of January 19, 2024, under terrorism laws for glorifying violence; outlawed in Indonesia since 2017; suppressed in Russia, China, and Central Asian states since the 1990s-2000s via arrests and media blackouts; and designated a terrorist entity in countries like Bangladesh and Germany.[121][122][118] HT's current global leader, Ata Abu Rashta, a Jordanian engineer, continues al-Nabhani's line from Jerusalem, emphasizing digital outreach amid physical crackdowns, though its rigid ideology—eschewing alliances with secular or nationalist movements—limits broader appeal and sustains underground persistence.[113][117]Jihadist Offshoots and Extremist Interpretations
Jihadist offshoots represent radical fringes within Sunni Islam that interpret jihad primarily as perpetual armed struggle against perceived apostate regimes, non-believers, and even fellow Muslims deemed insufficiently pious, often employing takfir to justify violence. This ideology, known as Salafi-jihadism, seeks to emulate the earliest Muslim community through literalist adherence to Quran and Hadith, rejecting post-prophetic innovations and advocating global caliphate restoration via offensive warfare, diverging sharply from classical Sunni jurisprudence that limits jihad to defensive contexts or under legitimate authority.[123][124][125] These interpretations gained traction in the late 20th century, fueled by the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), where Arab volunteers, inspired by Wahhabi funding and Deobandi networks, formed transnational networks emphasizing military jihad as a religious duty over spiritual struggle (the "greater jihad" in traditional hadith). Key ideologues like Sayyid Qutb, in his 1964 work Milestones, portrayed modern Muslim societies as jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance), warranting revolutionary violence, while Abdullah Azzam extended this to obligatory global jihad against "infidels." Such views reject mainstream Sunni scholarly consensus, which historically conditioned jihad on caliphal authority and proportionality, instead promoting decentralized, leaderless resistance.[126][127][128] Prominent groups include Al-Qaeda, founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden to coordinate Afghan mujahideen and later targeting the West, with affiliates like Al-Shabaab (pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda in 2012) conducting attacks in Somalia and beyond. The Islamic State (ISIS), emerging in 2014 from Al-Qaeda in Iraq under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, escalated extremism by declaring a caliphate on June 29, 2014, enforcing brutal hudud punishments and enslaving Yazidis, drawing 30,000–40,000 foreign fighters by 2015 through apocalyptic prophecies rooted in selective hadith interpretations. The Taliban, rooted in Deobandi Hanafi literalism since 1994, impose strict sharia but host jihadists like Al-Qaeda remnants, despite doctrinal clashes with ISIS-Khorasan, an ISIS offshoot active since 2015 targeting Shia and Taliban alike in Afghanistan.[129][130][131] These offshoots' casualty toll exceeds 100,000 since 2000, per Global Terrorism Database metrics, with ideologies sustaining recruitment via online propaganda that amplifies fringe fatwas over established madhhabs. While comprising less than 0.1% of global Muslims, their impact stems from exploiting grievances like foreign interventions and governance failures, yet core tenets—indiscriminate takfir and suicide bombings as martyrdom—contradict prophetic prohibitions on killing civilians and suicide, as affirmed in sahih hadith collections. Mainstream Sunni bodies, including Al-Azhar, have issued fatwas condemning them as khawarij-like deviants since the 1990s.[132][133][134]Marginal and Emerging Groups
Ahmadiyya and Claims of Prophethood
The Ahmadiyya movement originated in 1889 when Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908), a religious scholar from Qadian in British India, founded the community and initially claimed in 1891 to be the Promised Messiah and Mahdi awaited by Muslims, fulfilling prophecies in Islamic eschatology without abrogating Muhammad's finality of prophethood.[135] By around 1901–1902, Ahmad expanded his claim to include being a subordinate prophet (nabi) and messenger (rasul) in a non-law-bearing capacity, describing himself as a "buruz" or spiritual reflection of Muhammad, through which divine revelation continued in subordination to the Quran and Sunnah.[136] [137] Ahmadis interpret Quran 33:40—"Muhammad is not the father of any of your men, but the Messenger of Allah and the Seal of the Prophets"—as affirming Muhammad's superiority and endorsement of truthful subordinate prophets, rather than absolute termination of all prophethood.[138] This doctrinal innovation directly contravenes the mainstream Sunni and Shia interpretation of Quran 33:40, which unambiguously establishes Muhammad as the final prophet (khatam an-nabiyyin), closing the chain of prophethood after him, a belief rooted in the verse's explicit wording and corroborated by early Islamic scholarship and consensus among the four Sunni imams.[139] [140] Orthodox Muslims across sects view any post-Muhammad prophethood claim as heretical, nullifying the claimant's Muslim status, as it implies imperfection in Muhammad's universal message and contradicts hadith foretelling no prophets after him.[141] [142] Ahmad's prophethood assertion precipitated immediate theological schisms and fatwas of apostasy from scholars in India, escalating to organized opposition; following his death in 1908, the movement split in 1914 into the larger Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama'at (Qadian branch), which upholds the prophethood claim under a khalifa system, and the smaller Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement, which rejects it, viewing Ahmad solely as a mujaddid (reformer).[143] The doctrine's incompatibility with Islamic orthodoxy has fueled marginalization, culminating in severe persecution, particularly in Pakistan, where a 1974 constitutional amendment declared Ahmadis non-Muslims, and 1984's Ordinance XX criminalized their profession of faith, use of Islamic terminology, or propagation of Ahmad's claims as blasphemy punishable by death or life imprisonment. [144] This legal framework, justified by defenders as protecting the finality of prophethood (khatme-nabuwwat), has enabled mob violence, mosque desecrations, and targeted killings, with over 4,000 Ahmadis charged under blasphemy laws since 1984 and annual attacks on worship sites reported as recently as 2023.[145]Barelvi-Deobandi Divide in South Asia
The Barelvi-Deobandi divide represents a significant schism within South Asian Sunni Islam, particularly among Hanafi adherents, originating in late 19th-century British India as responses to colonial pressures and internal reform debates. The Deobandi movement emerged in 1866 with the founding of Darul Uloom Deoband seminary by Muhammad Qasim Nanautavi and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, aimed at revitalizing orthodox Islamic scholarship, resisting Western influences, and countering Hindu revivalism through rigorous scriptural education.[146][147] In contrast, the Barelvi movement, crystallized around Ahmed Raza Khan (1856–1921) in Bareilly, positioned itself as a defender of traditional Sufi-infused practices against perceived Deobandi puritanism, emphasizing devotion to the Prophet Muhammad and saintly intercession as integral to Sunni piety.[148][149] Theological divergences center on the nature of prophetic attributes, ritual innovations (bid'ah), and Sufi customs. Deobandis advocate a stricter interpretation of tawhid (divine unity), viewing excessive veneration of the Prophet—such as attributing to him eternal knowledge of the unseen (ilm-e-ghaib) or light-like essence (noor)—as bordering on shirk (polytheism), while permitting taqlid (adherence to legal schools) but critiquing shrine pilgrimages and milad-un-Nabi (Prophet's birthday) celebrations as unprophetic accretions.[150][151] Barelvis, conversely, uphold the Prophet's pre-eternal light and the legitimacy of intercessory practices at saints' tombs (ziyarat), urs festivals, and public milad observances, issuing fatwas declaring Deobandi scholars as kafirs (unbelievers) for allegedly diminishing prophetic status, a stance rooted in Khan's prolific writings like Husam al-Haramayn.[152][153] These positions reflect causal tensions: Deobandi emphasis on textual literalism fostered alliances with global reformist currents, whereas Barelvi devotion preserved syncretic South Asian folk Islam against Arab-influenced austerity.[154] Historical antagonisms intensified through mutual takfir (declarations of apostasy), with Khan's 1906 fatwas from Mecca and Medina condemning Deobandis influencing retaliatory critiques from Deobandi ulama like Khalil Ahmad Saharanpuri.[153] Post-partition, the rift politicized in Pakistan and India, where Deobandi networks—numbering over 20,000 madrasas by the 1980s—gained militant traction via Afghan jihad ties, culminating in the Taliban's Deobandi-rooted ideology under leaders like Mullah Omar, who trained in Pakistani Deobandi seminaries.[155][156] Barelvis, comprising an estimated 50-60% of Pakistani Sunnis, faced shrine attacks by Deobandi extremists, such as the 2010 Data Darbar bombing in Lahore killing 42, highlighting sectarian violence over doctrinal purity.[152] In contemporary South Asia, the divide manifests in electoral politics and counter-radicalization efforts, with Barelvi groups like Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan mobilizing against perceived blasphemies, while Deobandi factions influence policy through Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. Empirical data from Pew surveys indicate Barelvi dominance in rural Punjab and Sindh, yet Deobandi rigor appeals in urban and Pashtun areas, perpetuating cycles of rivalry absent institutional reconciliation.[148] This intra-Sunni contest underscores broader causal realism in Islamic pluralism: doctrinal rigidity, rather than mere socio-economic factors, sustains fragmentation, as evidenced by over 150 years of unresolved fatwa wars.[157]Non-Denominational and Progressive Variants
Non-denominational Muslims eschew affiliation with traditional sects such as Sunni or Shia, prioritizing direct adherence to the Quran, the example of Muhammad, and rational inquiry over clerical hierarchies or denominational divisions. This approach emerged prominently in the late 20th century amid calls for Islamic unity, viewing sectarianism as a historical deviation that fragments the ummah. Adherents often reject taqlid (imitation of legal schools) in favor of independent ijtihad, arguing that core Islamic principles suffice without institutional mediation.[158] Progressive variants represent a subset of reformist thought, primarily in Western diaspora communities, that reinterpret Islamic texts through lenses of contemporary ethics, emphasizing human rights, gender equity, and pluralism. Organizations like Muslims for Progressive Values (MPV), established in 2007, advocate for women's leadership in prayer, interfaith marriages, and inclusion of LGBTQ individuals, framing these as extensions of Quranic justice (adl) and compassion (rahma). MPV's principles include separation of religion and state, freedom of expression, and opposition to patriarchal interpretations, positioning Islam as compatible with democratic norms. Such groups rely on selective ijtihad to challenge hadith-based rulings on issues like apostasy or inheritance, often prioritizing ethical outcomes over literalist exegesis.[159][160] These variants remain marginal, with limited numerical presence—MPV operates as a small nonprofit with chapters in select cities and no reported membership exceeding thousands—contrasting sharply with the billions adhering to orthodox branches. Mainstream Islamic authorities frequently critique them as culturally assimilated or doctrinally deviant, arguing that progressive reinterpretations undermine sharia's immutability and invite bid'ah (innovation). Ethnographic studies highlight their contestation for public legitimacy against conservative currents, yet they garner minimal acceptance in majority-Muslim societies, where empirical surveys show overwhelming preference for traditional jurisprudence.[161][162]Sufism: Mysticism Within and Beyond Orthodoxy
Historical Evolution from Early Asceticism
Early Islamic asceticism, known as zuhd, emerged in the late 7th century CE amid the rapid expansion of Muslim conquests, which brought wealth and political power that some perceived as corrupting the original simplicity of prophetic practice. Ascetics emphasized renunciation of material excess, rigorous self-discipline, and exclusive devotion to God, drawing from Quranic injunctions against worldly attachment (e.g., Quran 57:20) and hadiths urging moderation. This movement was not a rejection of the world per se but a prioritization of the hereafter, manifesting in practices like poverty, fasting, and night vigils among the tabi'un (successors to the Prophet's companions).[163][164] A pivotal figure in this tradition was al-Hasan al-Basri (642–728 CE), a Basran scholar and preacher who critiqued Umayyad rulers for injustice and urged taqwa (God-consciousness) through ascetic detachment. Al-Hasan's teachings, delivered in public sermons, focused on inner piety over ritual formalism, influencing early moral reform and earning him recognition as a proto-Sufi exemplar despite his avoidance of mystical excesses. His emphasis on combating the soul's base desires (riyadat al-nafs) laid groundwork for later spiritual purification, though he remained rooted in orthodox jurisprudence.[165][166] The transition from zuhd to tasawwuf (Sufism proper) occurred in the 8th century CE, incorporating mystical dimensions like divine love (mahabba) and gnosis (ma'rifa) alongside asceticism. Rabi'a al-Adawiyya (c. 717–801 CE), a Basran freed slave, exemplified this shift by advocating worship for God's sake alone, transcending fear of punishment or hope of reward—a departure from al-Hasan's fear-oriented piety. Her poetry and reported sayings, preserved in hagiographies, introduced selfless devotion, influencing subsequent Sufis like al-Muhasibi (d. 857 CE). This evolution reflected broader intellectual ferment in Iraq, blending ascetic rigor with introspective spirituality, yet early Sufis faced accusations of innovation (bid'a) from literalists.[167][33] By the early 9th century, figures like Ibrahim ibn Adham (d. 778 CE), who abandoned Balkh's governorship for wandering mendicancy, further bridged zuhd and mysticism, emphasizing renunciation as a path to divine proximity. These developments occurred within Sunni orthodoxy, predating formalized orders (tariqas), and were sustained by treatises like Ibn al-Mubarak's Kitab al-Zuhd (d. 797 CE), which compiled ascetic traditions without esoteric claims.[168][169]Key Orders (Tariqas) and Practices
Sufi orders, known as tariqas, represent structured spiritual paths emphasizing direct experiential knowledge of God through disciplined practices under the guidance of a spiritual master (sheikh or pir). Each tariqa maintains a chain of transmission (silsila) linking its founder to the Prophet Muhammad, often via Ali ibn Abi Talib or the early caliphs, with formal organization solidifying around the 12th century as Sufism institutionalized amid political fragmentation in the Islamic world.[170] Initiation into a tariqa typically involves bay'ah, a pledge of allegiance where the disciple (murid) submits to the sheikh's authority, committing to obedience, ethical conduct, and spiritual discipline in exchange for guidance toward purification (tazkiyah) and annihilation of the ego (fana).[171] This hierarchical relationship fosters moral accountability, with the sheikh serving as a conduit for divine grace (barakah), though practices vary by order, balancing adherence to Sharia with esoteric inner work (tariqat).[172] Central to tariqa life is dhikr, the rhythmic invocation of God's names or phrases to foster constant remembrance (tadhakkur) and detach from worldly illusions. Performed individually or in group sessions (majlis), dhikr can be vocal and ecstatic (jahri, involving chanting, swaying, or dance) or silent and introspective (khafi, focusing on heart-centered repetition without audible sound).[173] Complementary practices include sama' (spiritual audition), where poetry, music, or song induces ecstatic states (wajd), and khalwa (seclusion retreats) for intensified meditation and self-examination, often lasting days or weeks under supervision to combat spiritual stagnation. Daily litanies (awrad)—prescribed recitations post-prayer—reinforce discipline, while ethical precepts like humility, charity, and service to humanity underpin outward conduct, distinguishing tariqas from purely ascetic individualism.[174] Prominent tariqas exhibit distinctive emphases while sharing core methods:- Qadiri Order: Founded by Abdul Qadir Gilani (1077–1166 CE) in Baghdad, it spread widely across the Muslim world, emphasizing vocal dhikr and public preaching to integrate Sufism with orthodox scholarship; Gilani's tomb remains a pilgrimage site, attracting millions annually.[175]
- Naqshbandi Order: Originating in 12th-century Central Asia from the Khwajagan lineage, it prioritizes silent dhikr, sober restraint, and social engagement, influencing Ottoman and Mughal rulers; by the 19th century, reformist branches like the Mujaddidi emphasized strict Sharia compliance amid anti-colonial resistance.[37]
- Chishti Order: Established by Abu Ishaq Shami (d. 940 CE) and popularized in South Asia by Moinuddin Chishti (1142–1236 CE), it favors ecstatic sama' with music and poetry, fostering inclusivity toward non-Muslims through charity and tolerance, with over 100 million adherents historically in India.
- Shadhili Order: Named after Abu al-Hasan al-Shadhili (1196–1258 CE) in North Africa, it stresses inner litanies (hizb) and minimal external ritual, promoting detachment from worldly attachments while maintaining scholarly rigor; its diffusion via disciples reached sub-Saharan Africa and Europe.[176]
Doctrinal Tensions with Legalist Schools
Sufi doctrines emphasizing ma'rifah (gnosis) and inner purification often clashed with the legalist schools' strict adherence to zahiri (exoteric) interpretations of Sharia, particularly in Hanbali-influenced traditions that prioritized literal adherence to Quran and Sunnah over mystical allegories. Legalists, such as adherents of Athari creed, accused certain Sufi practices of introducing bid'ah (innovation) and bordering on shirk (polytheism), including tawassul through saints and visitation of mausoleums for intercession, which they viewed as unwarranted mediation absent explicit prophetic precedent.[177][178] A pivotal historical critique emerged from Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328 CE), who distinguished between "sober" Sufism aligned with orthodoxy—praising early ascetics like Abdul Qadir Jilani—and "excessive" forms influenced by pantheistic ideas such as Ibn Arabi's wahdat al-wujud (unity of being), which he condemned as blurring creator-creation distinctions and resembling infidelity. Ibn Taymiyyah's treatises, including Kitab al-Jawab al-Sahih, argued that such doctrines deviated from prophetic tawhid, advocating instead for direct emulation of the Salaf (pious predecessors) without esoteric intermediaries.[179][180] In the 18th century, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's reformist movement intensified these tensions by systematically rejecting Sufi rituals like circumambulation of graves and seeking blessings (barakah) from awliya (saints), deeming them idolatrous corruptions that had permeated Ottoman-era Islam. This opposition fueled the First Saudi State's campaigns from 1803–1806 CE, during which Wahhabi forces demolished shrines in Karbala and Mecca, viewing them as sites of polytheistic veneration rather than mere commemoration.[36] Modern Salafi currents, drawing from these precedents, extend the critique to Sufi organizational structures like tariqas (orders), faulting the unquestioning loyalty to a shaykh as potentially eclipsing submission to divine law and fostering cult-like hierarchies. Doctrinal rifts also encompass free will versus predestination, where Sufis often leaned toward Ash'ari occasionalism infused with mystical insight, while strict legalists upheld a more deterministic Athari view to avoid perceived anthropomorphism in divine attributes. These clashes have persisted, manifesting in fatwas declaring participation in Sufi dhikr gatherings with music or dance as impermissible, though some traditional madhhab scholars historically accommodated purified Sufism within fiqh frameworks.[181][177]Inter-Sectarian Conflicts and Controversies
Historical Persecutions and Wars of Succession
The disputes over leadership succession following the death of Muhammad on June 8, 632 CE, initiated the foundational divisions among early Muslims, with a council at Saqifa electing Abu Bakr as caliph, bypassing claims that Ali ibn Abi Talib, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, held divine designation for the role. This political rift, rooted in differing views on authority—elective consensus versus familial inheritance—escalated under subsequent caliphs, as Uthman ibn Affan's rule (644–656 CE) fueled grievances over perceived favoritism toward his Umayyad kin, culminating in his assassination by rebels in Medina on June 17, 656 CE. Ali's subsequent caliphate faced immediate challenges, marking the onset of the First Fitna (656–661 CE), a civil war that fractured the ummah into proto-Sunni, proto-Shia, and emerging Kharijite factions.[182][9][183] The First Fitna's major engagements included the Battle of the Camel in late November 656 CE near Basra, where Ali's forces defeated an army led by Aisha (Muhammad's widow), Talha, and Zubayr, resulting in approximately 10,000–20,000 deaths and underscoring intra-Quraysh rivalries. Tensions with Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan, Umayyad governor of Syria, led to the Battle of Siffin in July 657 CE along the Euphrates River, involving tens of thousands on each side; the inconclusive stalemate prompted arbitration invoking Quranic judgment, which Kharijites rejected as human interference in divine will, prompting their secession and assassination of Ali in Kufa on January 27, 661 CE. Muawiya's subsequent establishment of hereditary rule in the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750 CE) institutionalized Sunni-leaning elective principles while marginalizing Alids, setting precedents for sectarian violence driven by power consolidation rather than purely theological divergence.[183][184][185] Succession conflicts persisted into the Second Fitna (680–692 CE), exacerbated by Muawiya's designation of his son Yazid I as heir, contravening consultative norms and prompting Husayn ibn Ali's refusal of allegiance from Medina. Inviting support from Kufa, Husayn marched with about 72 companions but was intercepted at Karbala on October 10, 680 CE (10 Muharram 61 AH), where an Umayyad army of 4,000–30,000 under Umar ibn Sa'd surrounded and slaughtered them after denying water, with Husayn's head sent to Damascus as trophy. This massacre, framed by Shia as tyrannical usurpation, galvanized narratives of Alid martyrdom and Imamic infallibility, while Sunnis increasingly viewed it as a tragic political miscalculation amid stabilizing the caliphate. The event spurred revolts like the Tawwabin uprising in 685 CE and Mukhtar's rebellion in 686 CE, further entrenching branches amid cycles of reprisal.[186][187][2] Umayyad policies institutionalized persecution of perceived Alid sympathizers, including public cursing of Ali from pulpits and suppression of pro-Alid movements, contributing to over 10,000 documented Alid deaths or exiles by 750 CE. The Abbasid Revolution (747–750 CE), initially backed by Shia discontent, overthrew the Umayyads but swiftly pivoted to Sunni orthodoxy, viewing Twelver and Ismaili Imams as threats to legitimacy; Caliph al-Mansur imprisoned Ja'far al-Sadiq's successors, while Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809 CE) confined Musa al-Kadhim, who died in 799 CE amid allegations of poisoning, though historical accounts vary on intent versus natural causes. Abbasid Mihna inquisitions (833–848 CE) targeted rationalist Mutazilites but spared core Sunni schools, while Shia faced episodic purges, such as the execution of Yahya ibn Abd Allah in 792 CE after a failed revolt. These patterns—political suppression masquerading as doctrinal enforcement—perpetuated minority vulnerabilities, with Kharijites also persecuted as rebels, shaping branch resilience through taqiyya (concealment) and underground networks. Later Shia dynasties like the Fatimids (909–1171 CE) reciprocated by targeting Sunnis in Egypt, inverting the dynamic but affirming succession wars' legacy of retaliatory cycles.[188][189][4]Doctrinal Clashes on Authority, Free Will, and Predestination
One of the earliest and most enduring doctrinal conflicts in Islamic theology centered on qadar (divine decree), pitting advocates of human free will against those emphasizing absolute predestination, with implications for divine justice and human accountability. Emerging during the Umayyad era (661–750 CE), the debate intensified amid political turmoil, such as after the Battle of Siffin in 657 CE, where questions arose about whether sinners could remain Muslims if their actions were predestined.[190] The Qadariyya championed free will to uphold moral responsibility, opposing the Jabriyya's view that humans act as compelled agents of God's will, a position sometimes invoked by rulers to justify oppression.[191] The Mu'tazila, systematizing Qadariyya thought from the 8th century, prioritized reason ('aql) as an interpretive authority alongside revelation, arguing that God's justice ('adl) requires human freedom, as predestining evil would render divine punishment unjust.[192] In opposition, the Ash'ari school, established by Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari (874–936 CE) after his break from Mu'tazilism, subordinated reason to textual tradition, affirming God's creation of all acts while introducing kasb (acquisition): humans voluntarily acquire divinely created actions, preserving omniscience and predestination without absolving responsibility.[193] Athari traditionalists, aligned with Hanbali jurisprudence, rejected speculative theology altogether, insisting on literal adherence to Quran and hadith over rationalist constructs.[194] These clashes peaked during the mihna (inquisition) of 833–848 CE under Abbasid caliphs like al-Ma'mun (r. 813–833 CE), who enforced Mu'tazili positions—including the Quran's createdness, tied to rejecting eternal attributes that might imply predestination flaws—through state persecution of dissenters.[195] Figures like Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780–855 CE), a traditionalist, endured imprisonment and flogging for opposing these impositions, galvanizing resistance that ended the mihna under al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–861 CE) and marginalized Mu'tazilism, paving the way for Ash'ari dominance in Sunni orthodoxy.[194] Sunni-Shia divergences amplified these tensions: Sunnis vest interpretive authority in scholarly consensus (ijma') and analogy (qiyas), derived from the Prophet's companions and elected caliphs, rejecting hereditary or infallible leadership post-Muhammad.[196] Shia, particularly Twelvers, counter with the Imamate—divinely appointed, infallible descendants of Ali (d. 661 CE)—as the sole authoritative interpreters, incorporating 'adl (divine justice) as a foundational principle that bolsters free will against deterministic extremes, though affirming predestination in outcomes known to God.[2] This authority schism, rooted in the 632 CE succession dispute, fueled ongoing interpretive clashes, with Shia esoteric exegesis (ta'wil) contrasting Sunni literalism (tafsir), often exacerbating sectarian polemics on whether human agency aligns with or subordinates to divine will.[197]Modern Sectarian Violence in the Middle East
The escalation of sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia Muslims in the Middle East intensified following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, which dismantled the Sunni-dominated Ba'athist regime and empowered the Shia majority through democratic processes, prompting a Sunni insurgency and retaliatory Shia militia activities that framed the conflict along doctrinal lines of authority and legitimacy inherited from the seventh-century schism.[198] This power vacuum facilitated the rise of al-Qaeda in Iraq, which evolved into ISIS, explicitly targeting Shia as rafidah (rejectors) for their veneration of Ali and rejection of the first three caliphs, leading to systematic massacres that met the legal criteria for genocide under international definitions.[199] In Iraq, the February 2006 bombing of the Al-Askari Shrine in Samarra, attributed to Sunni extremists, ignited widespread reprisals, with sectarian death squads killing thousands; the United Nations documented over 34,000 civilian deaths in 2006 alone, predominantly from targeted bombings, executions, and clashes between Sunni insurgents and Shia groups like the Mahdi Army.[200] By 2007, the violence peaked with monthly civilian casualties exceeding 3,000, though U.S. troop surges and Sunni Awakening councils reduced intensity, displacing millions and entrenching communal militias.[201] In Syria, the 2011 uprising against Bashar al-Assad's Alawite-led regime—Alawites being a Shia offshoot—rapidly acquired sectarian dimensions as Sunni rebels, backed by Gulf states, confronted Assad's forces supported by Iran and Shia Hezbollah militias from Lebanon, resulting in over 500,000 deaths by 2023, with atrocities including barrel bombings on Sunni areas and rebel executions of Alawite civilians.[4] Iran's deployment of Revolutionary Guards and Afghan Shia militias framed the conflict as a defense against Sunni extremism, while ISIS's territorial gains from 2013-2017 involved purging Shia and Alawite populations from captured areas like Palmyra and Deir ez-Zor, exacerbating demographic shifts and refugee flows exceeding 6 million.[198] Yemen's civil war, erupting in 2014 with Houthi Zaydi Shia rebels—backed by Iran—overthrowing the Sunni-leaning government, drew Saudi-led Sunni coalition intervention in 2015, leading to a proxy confrontation that killed over 150,000 by 2021, including famine and airstrikes on civilian targets, though Houthis historically lacked deep anti-Sunni animus until politicized by the conflict.[202] Saudi framing emphasized countering Iranian expansionism, but the war amplified local sectarian rhetoric, with Salafi groups attacking Shia shrines. ISIS's caliphate declaration in 2014 across Iraq and Syria institutionalized anti-Shia violence, executing over 1,700 Shia recruits at Camp Speicher in Tikrit in June 2014 and destroying Shia holy sites like Imam Ali's shrine in Najaf attempts, while viewing Shia Twelver eschatology as polytheistic innovation.[198] Broader Iran-Saudi proxy dynamics fueled these fires, with Tehran arming Shia militias in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, and Riyadh supporting Sunni factions, though empirical analyses indicate geopolitical ambitions—resource control, regional hegemony—often instrumentalize rather than stem from primordial sectarian hatred, as evidenced by pre-2003 relative amity in mixed areas.[203] Post-2020, a 2023 China-brokered détente reduced overt proxy escalations, yet low-level clashes persist in Iraq's Hashd al-Shaabi militias versus Sunni tribes and Yemen's Houthi-Saudi border skirmishes, with over 20,000 Yemeni combat deaths since 2022 amid Red Sea disruptions.[198] Despite claims of waning sectarianism due to exhaustion and state reconstructions, doctrinal fault lines remain vulnerable to exploitation by non-state actors, sustaining cycles of vengeance in fragile polities.[204]Debates on Tolerance, Apostasy, and Heresy
In classical Sunni jurisprudence, the four major schools—Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali—consistently prescribe capital punishment for adult male apostates from Islam, grounded in hadith reports attributing to Muhammad the statement that "Whoever changes his religion, kill him," with variations in procedural details such as opportunities for repentance.[205] The Hanafi school mandates a three-day grace period for tawba (repentance) before execution, while the others generally allow it but emphasize immediate enforcement if unrepented; women apostates receive imprisonment rather than death in Hanafi and some Shafi'i views, reflecting interpretations of hadith leniency toward female combatants.[206] In Twelver Shia fiqh, the ruling aligns closely, with execution for male apostates and life imprisonment for females unless they repent, justified by narrations from the Imams viewing apostasy as a threat to the community's doctrinal integrity.[207] Modern debates pit traditionalists, who defend the penalty as ijma' (consensus) derived from Sunnah to deter societal upheaval akin to the early Ridda Wars (632–633 CE), against reformists arguing it lacks explicit Quranic warrant—citing verses like 2:256 ("no compulsion in religion") and 18:29—and stems from political treason rather than mere belief change.[208] [209] Enforcement persists in at least 10 countries as of 2023, including Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Mauritania, where Sharia courts have issued death sentences, though executions are rarer due to evidentiary hurdles requiring public renunciation and rejection of core tenets.[210] Intra-branch tensions arise, as Salafi-Wahhabi strains in Hanbali tradition accelerate takfir for apostasy, while modernist Hanafis in South Asia occasionally advocate suspension amid secular constitutions.[205] Heresy (bid'ah or kufr) debates center on takfir, the declaration of a professing Muslim as an unbeliever, which classical schools restrict to clear violations like denying Muhammad's prophethood or obligatory prayers, prohibiting hasty application to avoid fitna (discord).[211] Sunni branches differ: Ash'ari theologians emphasize intent over literalism to curb extremism, whereas Athari literalists in Hanbali circles, influencing groups like ISIS, broaden it to include insufficient creed adherence, sparking intra-Sunni clashes as seen in 2017 ISIS radio broadcasts retracting overzealous takfir fatwas against fellow jihadists.[212] Shia traditions, particularly Twelver, apply takfir cautiously to Sunnis only for imputed disbelief in Imamate but internally condemn deviant subgroups like Alawites as ghulat (extremists), historically fueling persecutions under Safavid rule (1501–1736 CE).[207] Tolerance toward non-Muslims under classical fiqh manifests in the dhimmi pact, granting People of the Book (Jews, Christians, later Zoroastrians) protection of life, property, and worship in exchange for jizya poll tax and submission to Islamic sovereignty, as codified in pacts from Abu Bakr's era (632–634 CE).[213] Restrictions included bans on proselytizing, church bells, or new houses of worship, positioning dhimmis as subordinates rather than equals, with violations like blasphemy triggering corporal or capital penalties akin to apostasy.[213] Debates persist: traditionalists view it as merciful covenant per Quran 9:29, enabling coexistence under Muslim rule as in Umayyad Spain (711–1031 CE), while critics and some reformists highlight its discriminatory essence, arguing modern pluralism demands abandonment for full citizenship rights, as unevenly realized in post-colonial states like Pakistan where blasphemy laws proxy for dhimmi-era intolerance.[213] Branchal variances include Shia extension of dhimma to more groups under Imami fiqh but with stricter enforcement against perceived heresy among non-Shia Muslims.[207]Demographic and Geographical Overview
Global Population Breakdown by Branch
Sunni Muslims constitute the largest branch of Islam, comprising approximately 85-90% of the global Muslim population, or an estimated 1.7 to 1.8 billion adherents as of 2025.[214][215] This dominance stems from historical spread across the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, where Sunni adherence aligns with the majority interpretation of Islamic governance and jurisprudence derived from the companions of the Prophet Muhammad.[214] Shia Muslims form the second-largest branch, accounting for 10-13% of Muslims worldwide, totaling roughly 200 to 260 million people.[214][216] The majority of Shia are Twelvers (Ithna Ashariyya), concentrated in Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain, emphasizing the line of Twelve Imams as rightful successors; smaller Shia sub-branches include Ismailis (about 10-15 million, mainly in South Asia and East Africa) and Zaydis (around 5-10 million, primarily in Yemen).[214]| Branch | Estimated Adherents (millions) | Percentage of Muslims | Primary Regions |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sunni | 1,700-1,800 | 85-90% | Middle East, North Africa, South/Southeast Asia |
| Shia (total) | 200-260 | 10-13% | Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, South Asia |
| Twelver | 150-200 | 7-10% | Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan |
| Ismaili | 10-15 | <1% | India, Pakistan, Tanzania |
| Zaydi | 5-10 | <1% | Yemen |
| Ibadi | 2-3 | <1% | Oman, North Africa |
| Other (e.g., Ahmadiyya) | 10-20 | <1% | South Asia, diaspora communities |