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Water politics
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Water politics, sometimes called hydropolitics, is politics affected by the availability of water and water resources, a necessity for all life forms and human development.
Arun P. Elhance's definition of hydropolitics is "the systematic study of conflict and cooperation between states over water resources that transcend international borders".[1] Mollinga, P. P. classifies water politics into four categories, "the everyday politics of water resources management", "the politics of water policy in the context of sovereign states", "inter-state hydropolitics" and "the global politics of water".[2] The availability of drinking water per capita is inadequate and shrinking worldwide.[3] The causes, related to both quantity and quality, are many and varied; they include local scarcity, limited availability and population pressures,[4] but also human activities of mass consumption, misuse, environmental degradation and water pollution, as well as climate change.
Water is a strategic natural resource, and scarcity of potable water is a frequent contributor to political conflicts throughout the world. With decreasing availability and increasing demand for water, some have predicted that clean water will become the "next oil"; making countries like Canada, Chile, Norway, Colombia and Peru, with this resource in abundance, the water-rich countries in the world.[5][6][7] The UN World Water Development Report (WWDR, 2003) from the World Water Assessment Program indicates that, in the next 20 years, the quantity of water available to everyone is predicted to decrease by 30%. Currently, 40% of the world's inhabitants have insufficient fresh water for minimal hygiene. More than 2.2 million people died in 2000 from diseases related to the consumption of contaminated water or drought. In 2004, the UK charity WaterAid reported that a child dies every 15 seconds from easily preventable water-related diseases; often this means lack of sewage disposal; see toilet. The United Nations Development Program sums up world water distribution in the 2006 development report: "One part of the world, sustains a designer bottled water market that generates no tangible health benefits, another part suffers acute public health risks because people have to drink water from drains or from lakes and rivers."[8] Fresh water—now more precious than ever in our history for its extensive use in agriculture, high-tech manufacturing, and energy production—is increasingly receiving attention as a resource requiring better management and sustainable use.
Riparian water rights have become issues of international diplomacy, in addition to domestic and regional water rights and politics.[9] World Bank Vice President Ismail Serageldin predicted, "Many of the wars of the 20th century were about oil, but wars of the 21st century will be over water unless we change the way we manage water."[10][11] This is debated by some, however, who argue that disputes over water usually are resolved by diplomacy and do not turn into wars.[12] Another new school of thought argues that "perceived fears of losing control over shared water might contribute towards a constant preparedness to go to war among riparian nations, just in case there is one".[13]
Water policy
[edit]Water resource policy, sometimes called water resource management or water management, encompasses the policy-making processes and legislation that affect the collection, preparation, use, disposal, and protection of water resources.[14] The long-term viability of water supply systems poses a significant challenge as a result of water resource depletion, climate change, and population expansion.[15]
Water is a necessity for all forms of life as well as industries on which humans are reliant, like technology development and agriculture.[16][17] This global need for clean water access necessitates water resource policy to determine the means of supplying and protecting water resources. Water resource policy varies by region and is dependent on water availability or scarcity, the condition of aquatic systems, and regional needs for water.[15] Since water basins do not align with national borders, water resource policy is also determined by international agreements, also known as hydropolitics.[18] Water quality protection also falls under the umbrella of water resource policy; laws protecting the chemistry, biology, and ecology of aquatic systems by reducing and eliminating pollution, regulating its usage, and improving the quality are considered water resource policy.[14] When developing water resource policies, many different stakeholders, environmental variables, and considerations have to be taken to ensure the health of people and ecosystems are maintained or improved. Finally, ocean zoning, coastal, and environmental resource management are also encompassed by water resource management, like in the instance of offshore wind land leasing.[19]
As water scarcity increases with climate change, the need for robust water resource policies will become more prevalent. An estimated 57% of the world's population will experience water scarcity at least one month out of the year by 2050.[20] Mitigation and updated water resource policies will require interdisciplinary and international collaboration, including government officials, environmental scientists, sociologists, economists, climate modelers, and activists.[21][22]

Water politics concepts
[edit]Hydro-hegemony
[edit]The framework of hydro-hegemony was postulated by scholars Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen F. Warner in 2006 as a useful analytical paradigm useful to examine the options of powerful or hegemonized riparians and how they might move away from domination towards cooperation.[23] The framework of hydro-hegemony is especially valuable in approaching cases where both powerrelations fall between the two poles of cooperation and the often discussed water wars.[24]
Hydro-hegemony refers to "hegemony at the river basin level, achieved through water resource control strategies such as resource capture, integration and containment. The strategies are executed through an array of tactics (e.g. coercion-pressure, treaties, knowledge construction, etc.) that are enabled by the exploitation of existing power asymmetries within a weak international institutional context."[23] The two pillars of hydro-hegemony are riparian position and exploitation potential. Although exceptions are possible, as a rule of thumb "upstreamers use water to get more power, downstreamers use power to get more water."[24] The actor who wins control over the resource is determined through the form of hydro-hegemony that is established, in favor of the most powerful actor ('first among equals').
In 2010, Mark Zeitoun and Ana Elisa Cascão modified the framework to constitute of four overarching pillars of power— geographical power, material power, bargaining power and ideational power.[25] As such, hydro-hegemony can be understood as hegemony at the river basin level that occurs where control over transboundary flows is consolidated by the most powerful actor.
Although Zeitoun and Warner argue that hydro-hegemony is generally a source of stability, in some instances weaker states might engage in counter-hydro-hegemony. In this instance, it is attempted to renegotiate and eventually also shift the distribution of power. Strategies that might be applied in this are attempts to shift the discourse to the favour of the non-hegemon.[26]
Water as a critical resource
[edit]Most importantly, fresh water is a fundamental requirement of all living organisms, crops, livestock and humanity included. The UNDP considers access to it a basic human right and a prerequisite for peace. The Ex-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in 2001, "Access to safe water is a fundamental human need and, therefore, a basic human right. Contaminated water jeopardizes both the physical and social health of all people. It is an affront to human dignity." With increased development, many industries, including forestry, agriculture, mining, manufacturing and recreation require sizable additional amounts of freshwater to operate. This, however, has led to increases in air and water pollution, which in turn have reduced the quality of water supply. More sustainable development practices are advantageous and necessary.
According to the WHO, each human being requires a bare minimum of 20 litres of fresh water per day for basic hygiene;[27] this equals 7.3 cubic metres (about 255 ft3) per person, per year. Based on the availability, access and development of water supplies, the specific usage figures vary widely from country to country, with developed nations having existing systems to treat water for human consumption, and deliver it to every home. At the same time however, some nations across Latin America, parts of Asia, South East Asia, Africa and the Middle East either do not have sufficient water resources or have not developed these or the infrastructure to the levels required. This occurs for many varied reasons. It has resulted in conflict and often results in a reduced level or quantity of fresh water per capita consumption; this situation leads toward disease, and at times, to starvation and death.
The source of virtually all freshwater is precipitation from the atmosphere, in the form of mist, rain and snow, as part of the water cycle over eons, millennia and in the present day. Freshwater constitutes only 3 percent of all water on Earth, and of that, slightly over two thirds is stored frozen in glaciers and polar ice caps.[28] The remaining unfrozen freshwater is mainly found as groundwater, with only a small fraction present in the air, or on the ground surface.[29] Surface water is stored in wetlands or lakes or flows in a stream or river, and is the most commonly utilized resource for water. In places, surface water can be stored in a reservoir behind a dam, and then used for municipal and industrial water supply, for irrigation and to generate power in the form of hydroelectricity. Sub-surface groundwater, although stored in the pore space of soil and rock; it is utilized most as water flowing within aquifers below the water table. Groundwater can exist both as a renewable water system closely associated with surface water and as a separate, deep sub-surface water system in an aquifer. This latter case is sometimes called "fossil water", and is realistically non-renewable. Normally, groundwater is utilized where surface sources are unavailable or when surface supply distribution is limited.
Rivers sometimes flow through several countries and often serve as the boundary or demarcation between them. With these rivers, water supply, allocation, control, and use are of great consequence to survival, quality of life, and economic success. The control of a nation's water resources is considered vital to the survival of a state.[30] Similar cross-border groundwater flow also occurs. Competition for these resources, particularly where limited, have caused or been additive to conflicts in the past.
The highlands of Ethiopia may be considered a water tower region in East Africa. Sovereign control of upland water supply is likely to govern downstream politics for many years.
Contamination from human activity
[edit]Water contamination usually occurs through a series of two mechanisms: point and non-point sources of pollution. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), point source pollution is "any single identifiable source of pollution from which pollutants are discharged, such as a pipe, ditch, ship or factory smokestack."[31] Therefore, among the most common examples of point source pollution, poor factory and sewage treatment appear high on the list; although not as frequent, but, nevertheless, equally—if not more—dangerous, oil spills are another famous example of point source of pollution. On the other hand, non-point sources of pollution are those that may come from different sources, among which, poor and badly monitored agricultural activities can negatively affect the quality of any nearby sources of water.[32]
Point sources of pollution
[edit]- Industrial products and wastes: Many harmful chemicals are used widely in local business and industry. These can become drinking water pollutants if not well managed. The most common sources of such problems are:
- Local businesses: Factories, industrial plants, and even small businesses such as gas stations and dry cleaners handle a variety of hazardous chemicals that need careful management. Spills and improper disposal of these chemicals or of industrial wastes can threaten ground water supplies.
- Leaking underground tanks and piping: Petroleum products, chemicals, and wastes stored in underground storage tanks and pipes may end up in the ground water. Tanks and piping leak if they are constructed or installed improperly. Steel tanks and piping corrode with age. Tanks are often found on farms. The possibility of leaking tanks is great on old, abandoned farm sites. Farm tanks are exempt from the EPA rules for petroleum and chemical tanks.[33]
- Landfills and waste dumps: Modern landfills are designed to contain any leaking liquids, but floods can carry conaminants over the barriers. Older dumpsites may have a wide variety of pollutants that can seep into ground water.
- Household wastes: Improper disposal of many common products can pollute ground water. These include cleaning solvents, used motor oil, paints, and paint thinners. Even soaps and detergents can harm drinking water. These are often a problem from faulty septic tanks and septic leaching fields.[33]
- Lead and copper: Elevated concentrations of lead are rarely found in source water. Lead is commonly found in household plumbing materials. Homes built before 1986 are more likely to have lead pipes, fixtures, and solder. Lead can leach into water systems when these plumbing materials corrode. The acidity or alkalinity of water – or of any solution – is expressed as pH, from 0–14. Anything neutral, for example, has a pH of 7. Acids have a pH less than 7, bases (alkaline) greater than 7 pH greatly affects corrosion. Temperature and mineral content also affect how corrosive it is. Lead in drinking water can cause a variety of adverse health effects. Exposure to lead in drinking water can cause delays in physical and mental development in babies and children. Adults who drink this water over many years could develop kidney problems or high blood pressure.[33]
- Water treatment chemicals: Improper handling or storage of water-well treatment chemicals (such as disinfectants or corrosion inhibitors) close to your well can cause problems.[33]
Non-point sources of pollution
[edit]Agricultural activities that cause non-point source pollution include:
- Poorly managed animal feeding operations
- Overgrazing
- Overworking the land (for example, plowing too often)
- Poorly managed and ineffective application of pesticides, irrigation water, and fertilizer.[32]
- Bacteria and nitrates: These contaminants are found in human and animal wastes. Septic tanks or large numbers of farm animals can also cause bacterial and nitrate pollution. Both septic systems and animal manures must be carefully managed to prevent private well contamination.[33]
- Concentrated animal feeding operations: The number of concentrated animal feeding operation, often called "factory farms," is growing. On these farms thousands of animals are raised in a small space. The large amounts of animal wastes/manures from these farms can threaten water supplies. Strict and careful manure management is needed to prevent pathogen and nutrient problems in private wells. Salts from high levels of manures can also pollute ground water.[33]
- Heavy metals: Activities such as mining and construction can release large amounts of heavy metals into nearby ground water sources. Some older fruit orchards may contain high levels of arsenic, once used as a pesticide. At high levels, these metals pose a health risk.[33]
- Fertilizers and pesticides: Farmers use fertilizers and pesticides to promote growth and reduce insect damage. These products are also used on golf courses and suburban lawns and gardens. The chemicals in these products may end up in ground water. The extent of contamination depends on the types and amounts of chemicals used and how they are applied. Local environmental conditions (such as soil types, seasonal snow, and rainfall) also impact their contamination potential.[33] Groundwater will normally look clear and clean because the ground naturally filters out particulate matter. But, natural and human-induced chemicals can be found in groundwater. As groundwater flows through the ground, metals such as iron and manganese are dissolved and may later be found in high concentrations in the water. Industrial discharges, urban activities, agriculture, groundwater pumpage, and disposal of waste all can affect groundwater quality. Contaminants can be human-induced, as from leaking fuel tanks or toxic chemical spills. Pesticides and fertilizers applied to lawns and crops can accumulate and migrate to the water table. Leakage from septic tanks and/or waste-disposal sites also can introduce bacteria to the water, and pesticides and fertilizers that seep into farmed soil can eventually end up in water drawn from a well. Or, a well might have been placed in land that was once used for something like a garbage or chemical dump site.[34] Polluted runoff is created by rainfall or snow-melt moving over and through the ground. As the runoff moves, it picks up and carries away natural and human-made pollutants, finally depositing them into watersheds via lakes, rivers, wetlands, coastal waters, and even our underground sources of drinking water.[32] In 2002, in the National Water Quality Inventory report to U.S. Congress, the states reported that agricultural non-point source (NPS) pollution is the leading cause of river and stream impairment and the second leading cause of impairment in lakes, ponds, and reservoirs.[32]
Water politics by country
[edit]OECD countries
[edit]
With nearly 2,000 cubic metres (71,000 cu ft) of water used per person per year, the United States leads the world in water consumption per capita. Among the developed OECD countries, the U.S. is highest in water consumption, then Canada with 1,600 cubic metres (57,000 cu ft) of water per person per year, which is about twice the amount of water used by the average person from France, three times as much as the average German, and almost eight times as much as the average Dane. A 2001 University of Victoria report says that since 1980, overall water use in Canada has increased by 25.7%. This is five times faster than the overall OECD increase of 4.5%. In contrast, nine OECD nations were able to decrease their overall water use since 1980 (Sweden, the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Poland, Finland and Denmark).[35][36]
India
[edit]
India–Bangladesh
[edit]The Ganges is disputed between India and Bangladesh. The water reserves are being quickly depleted and polluted, while the Gangotri glacier that feeds the river is retreating hundreds of feet each year[37] (experts blame climate change[38]) and deforestation in the Himalayas is causing subsoil streams flowing into the Ganges river to dry up. Downstream, India controls the flow to Bangladesh with the Farakka Barrage, 10 kilometers (6 mi) on the Indian side of the border. Until the late 1990s, India used the barrage to divert the river to Calcutta, to keep the city's port from drying up during the dry season. This denied Bangladeshi farmers water and silt, and it left the Sundarban wetlands and mangrove forests at the river's delta seriously threatened. The two countries have now signed an agreement to share the water more equally. Water quality, however, remains a problem, with high levels of arsenic and untreated sewage in the river water.[38]
India–Pakistan
[edit]Recently India starting constructing Kishanganga Dam thus depriving Pakistan of its 33 percent water coming in Jehlum River. Pakistan is building the same type of dam called Neelum Jehlum Dam. After the Indo Pak Treaty of 1960, Ravi and Sutleg River belong to India while Jehlum, Chenab, Indus belong to Pakistan. But still a growing dissatisfication exist on Pakistani side for sharing its water with India.
This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (November 2008) |
Kaveri dispute
[edit]Mexico
[edit]Mexico has experienced significant issues in preventing contamination and water pollution and in distributing clean water to households and businesses. As society has evolved and urbanization, economic growth, and increased trade have occurred, the demand for clean water has increased.[39] However, pollution associated with economic growth and industrialization combined with the arid climate have restricted access to clean water for many households and firms. The already arid climate is susceptible to droughts with increasing climate change issues, which may further hinder access to water.[40]
Mexico relies on groundwater for their water supply which has led to significant exploitation of aquifers and therefore increased costs in accessing water.[39] Mexico City is the largest city and urban center with a very high demand for drinking water. The water supply provided by the "Sistema de Aguas de la Ciudad de Mexico" (SCAMEX) is only 98 effective and has therefore left about 48,000 households in the city alone without water.[41] However, even those with access to the water provided by the city remain unsatisfied. Even those already connected to SCAMEX experience issues due to water loss and poor water quality.[41] In Mexico City, an estimated 40% of the city's water is lost through leaky pipes built at the turn of the 20th century. According to the results of a 2011 survey, up to 87% of the households in Mexico City would prefer to access water used for cooking and drinking through sources other than the tap. Alternative ways to access water include: purchasing bottled water or filtration devices, or boiling water before drinking. The issue is that these alternative measures are typically significantly more expensive than using the water provided.[41]
Middle East and North Africa
[edit]In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), water is an important resource and political issue. According to a report by the Arab League in 1999, two-thirds of Arab countries had less than 1,000 cubic metres (35,000 cu ft) of water per person per year available, which is considered the limit.[42] By 2025, it is predicted that the countries of the Arabian Peninsula will be using more than double the amount of water naturally available to them.[43] By 2030, according to the World Bank, the MENA will most likely be under the limit of absolute water scarcity, as defined by the United Nations.[44][45][46] With rapid population growth and climate change, water scarcity is unlikely to decline. Given these statistics and predictions, water is commonly interpreted as scarce in the MENA and therefore often used as an explanation for conflicts and political instability in the region. However, scholars have argued that this is a form of framing, as the problem is not necessarily the availability of water but rather the way in which it is distributed and used.[47][48]
In the context of the Middle East, with a diverse landscape of national, subnational, ideological, ethnic, religious and pan-national identities, water politics has played an important role in conflicts between Iraq, Syria, and Turkey; Egypt and other Nile riparian states; as well as Israel and Palestine. In the MENA, all major rivers cross at least one international border, such as the Tigris and Euphrates crossing three major Middle Eastern nations. The Nile even crosses eleven countries. This means that downstream riparian states are hugely affected by the actions and decisions of upstream riparian states, an actor they have little practical control over. In particular this is evident with the possibility of cutting or reducing water supply from one nation to the next. Besides rivers, other waters in the Middle East that are important for the region and international trade are the Suez Canal, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Persian Gulf.[49]
Overview by country
[edit]| Country | Water Politics |
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Water scarcity is an increasing problem in Algeria, which is reinforced by climate change and periods of drought. In 2024, protests against the water politics of the government occurred in the city of Tiaret.[45] To secure the supply of drinking water and water for the agricultural and industrial sectors, as well as to mitigate the risk of increasing water scarcity as a consequence of climate change, Algeria provided a budget of USD 5.4 billion to enhance the desalination technology in the country. By 2030, the country aims to generate nearly two thirds of its water through desalination.[50] | |
| Water politics form an important aspect for Bahrain, being an archipelago. Similar to other countries in the region, conventional water resources in Bahrain are scarce. To meet its water demands, the country therefore uses techniques such as desalination, as well as greywater filtering for irrigation. These techniques allowed Bahrain to reduce the depletion of unsustainable water resources by 20% between 2000 and 2021.[51] These goals towards a more efficient and sustainable use of water are enshrined in the Bahrain Vision 2030 and the progress made leads to country to claim a "pioneering" role in this realm.[52] Already in the 1980s different laws were implemented to manage water resources in the kingdom more efficient and sustainable, which is implemented and monitored by a variety of state institutions.[53] | |
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Egypt's water politics are heavily affected by the Nile treaties that were signed in 1902, 1929, and 1959. In these treaties, Egypt's self-proclaimed dominance over the Nile is confirmed, and Egypt is granted access to the majority of the Nile waters, as well as the right to block construction projects affecting the Nile in upstream countries.[54][55] Despite other states seeing these agreements as colonial products, Egypt perceives them as legally binding.[56][57] In the course of the intensified nationalism and the claimed descent of modern Egyptians from Pharaonic Egyptians, the Nile has become part of Egypt's national identity. This is also reflected in the securitisation of the Nile, where the river is commonly linked to the nation's existence.[58][59][60] An important step for modern Egypt, in maximising the use of the Nile across several domains, was the construction of the Aswan High Dam under Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970.[61] Besides the Aswan High Dam, Toshka was an important water policy project in Egypt. Toshka was an ambitious plan to create a new city in the southern Egyptian desert, using water from Lake Nasser to gain new land for agriculture and reduce pressure from issues such as overpopulation and food scarcity. However, the project was never finished.[62] Since Ethiopia's announcement of the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in 2011, Egypt's water politics have been dominated by the dispute over the construction and later filling and operation of the dam. Egypt has opposed the dam, fearing that it will reduce the amount of water it receives from the Nile.[63][64] According to Egypt, the dam is in conflict with the Nile agreements and International Water Law, and threatens the water security of Egypt and Sudan. Egypt fears that the Renaissance Dam will lead to less downstream flowing water in the Nile, which would affect Egypt's water security, as the country is heavily dependent on the Nile.[65][66] Additionally, this might also have negative effects on hydropower production from the Aswan High Dam.[67] In rejecting the Renaissance Dam, Egypt forms an alliance with Sudan.[68] So far, all negotiations have failed and the dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Renaissance Dam has become a national preoccupation in both countries.[59][69] | |
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In Iran from the 1980s onward, there was a water policy that now appears to have been not very future-oriented. Especially in the 1990s the construction of water infrastructure, such as dams, as well as wells to pump groundwater, increased, and today, while the population is rapidly growing, the water resources and the condition of the water infrastructure are deteriorating rapidly. In political decision-making processes, warnings from experts were—and still are—often neglected, leading some to speak of a "water mafia."[70] According to a study by Allan Hassaniyan, water politics in Iran is heavily influenced by corruption, nepotism, and what is called "environmental racism," as political decision makers often exploit nature and the state treasury to allocate more water to their local districts.[71] Due to further mismanagement and the regime's goal for food sovereignty, affected by sanctions on Iran, the agricultural sector both requires and illegally uses the vast majority of the available water.[72] These developments are intertwined with other broader issues that reduce the availability of water, such as climate change and salinisation and lead to water scarcity.[73] | |
| Following the 1991 uprising in Iraq, Saddam Hussein drained the Iraqi marshes in an act of revenge against the Marsh Arabs living in the area.[74] The destruction of the marshes, and connected to that, the habitat of the Marsh Arabs is an instance where water was weaponised in a counterinsurgency strategy. It is considered both a genocide and an ecocide. Besides counterinsurgency, scholars also argue that sectarianism played a role in the destruction of the marshes, as the majority of the population in this area was Shi'a. While the Iraqi regime accused Turkey of reducing the water flow of the Euphrates to Iraq in the process of the construction of the Atatürk Dam, thereby allegedly draining the marshes, scholars have argued that nearly all damage was done by Iraq. To drain the marshes, water from the Euphrates and Tigris was redirected into the so-called "Third River," a project by the regime that aimed to increase fertile land in Iraq. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, there were attempts by Iraqi officials, the U.S. military, and NGOs to restore the marshes.[75]
Currently, Iraq's water policies include the aim to improve engagement and cooperation with neighbouring countries to mitigate issues surrounding unequal access to water, also involving international actors such as the Netherlands.[76] In early 2025, Iraq and the United Kingdom agreed on a GBP 5.3 billion project to improve the water supply of southwestern regions of the country.[77] | |
| Although not a country, ISIS was an important actor in regional water politics during the caliphate. The areas ISIS controlled in the Middle East contained water infrastructure crucial for the populations of Syria and Iraq. Constructions such as dams or storages were important strategic goals for ISIS, from 2014 onward leading to heavy battles at the end of which ISIS controlled most of the water infrastructure along the Euphrates and Tigris in Syria and Iraq. Subsequently, water became used as a weapon through causing water shortages, inducing overflows, and intoxicating water. These strategies were used for military warfare but also to attack civilians. The control over a crucial resource such as water gave ISIS power, not only as a weapon but also in a symbolic way, underlining the group's ambition to replace the existing states. Furthermore, water and the electricity generated from hydropower were used by ISIS for its followers, its territories, and the oil production. Blowing up dams was also considered to be a realistic option in a possible strategy of ISIS in case it loses all territories and is on the brink of defeat. In 2014, especially the scenario of ISIS destroying the Mosul Dam would have had serious consequences, destroying both Mosul and Baghdad.[78] | |
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During the Zionist settlement of Palestine before the establishment of Israel in 1948, control over water was a tool to increase power in the region. Starting in the 1930s, water was declared to be an abundant resource in Palestine by zionist scholars and water companies. This argument was used to enable and increase settlement in Palestine.[79] Israel is highly active in improving its water infrastructure and methods to enhance water availably in the country. This includes desalination, new irrigation techniques, reusing water, and dams to keep up with rapid population and economic growth. However, differences in access to water can be observed as bedouins and inhabitants of occupied areas have severely less access to water.[80][81] Water is an important issue in the Arab–Israeli conflict and according to former Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon was one of the causes of the 1967 Six-Day War.[82] Article 40 of the appendix B of the September 28, 1995 Oslo accords stated that "Israel recognises Palestinians' rights on water in the West Bank".[83] Nevertheless, in the ongoing Gaza war, Israel is criticised by various scholars, activists, and politicians for the weaponisation of water. The water supply to Gaza is blocked and water infrastructure for fresh and waste water was targeted. Yoav Gallant, the former Israeli minister of defence, stated: “We are imposing a complete siege on Gaza. There will be no electricity, no food, no water, no fuel, everything will be closed.” This weaponisation of water and its consequences on civilians in Gaza are considered to be war crimes.[84][85][86][87][88] | |
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Due to its downstream position on the Jordan River and Yarmouk River, Jordan's water supply is dependant on other countries and under pressure. Therefore, together with International Organisations, Jordan is preparing new techniques to use non-conventional water resources, such as second-hand use of irrigation water and desalinisation techniques.[89] Another important project was the Disi Water Conveyance Project, transporting groundwater from the Disi aquifer in the south of Jordan to Amman.[90] After the failure of the negotiations surrounding the Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan in 1955, unlike other regional states, Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994, ending the decades of unilateral water politics. Jordans riparian position did not allow a complete withdrawal from negotiations but made cooperation necessary. Although there are still tensions between the countries, the treaty proved to be important as several shared projects enhancing water cooperation and water supply were realised since 1994. There even were plans for a "peace canal" which both countries wanted to construct together, however this project was never realised.[91] To increase its access to the Yarmouk River, Jordan signed several treaties with Syria, dating back to 1953, however the riparians power imbalance founded in geographical position along the course of the Yarmouk River can also be seen in the treaties. In treaties the countries agreed upon certain amounts of water that Syria must release to Jordan, as well as the number of dams that Syria is allowed to construct, however Syria neglected these agreements multiple times. Therefore, Jordan is considered one of the most water scarce countries in the world.[90][92] | |
| The most visible part of Kuwait's water politics are probably the Kuwait Water Towers. The towers, with their characteristic architecture, serve as water reservoirs to provide Kuwait City with desalinated water. Today, the Kuwait Water Towers consist of 31 mushroom-shaped water towers and the Kuwait Towers, and they were an important step for Kuwait towards water security and water sovereignty.[93][94] With increasing demand for water, Kuwait expanded its water reservoir system, which today consists of over 80 above-ground and more than 100 underground reservoirs.[95] | |
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In Lebanon water shortage is a problem affecting over two thirds of the country's population and this is likely to increase in the future due to climate change if there are no countermeasures. To reduce stress on the water supply, scholars identified potential in the agricultural sector which consumes slightly more than half of the country's water. The reuse of greywater for irrigation could increase the share of water available for human consumption.[96] Furthermore, decades of crisis and conflict in Lebanon have negatively affected the water infrastructure, which is struggling to meet Beirut's water demands. Therefore, inhabitants are required to use improvised water acquisition measures, the selection of which is highly affected by their financial possibilities.[97] | |
| An important water policy project in Libya was the Great Man-Made River Project started under Gaddafi. The goal was to supply the densely populated northern region of Libya with water from aquifers discovered in the south. However, the project was never finalised after the fall of Gaddafi in 2011.[98]
Libya faces severe water insecurity and is heavily dependent on non-renewable groundwater resources to a large extent. The conflicts in Libya led to water infrastructure being destroyed, further decreasing water security in the country.[99] During the civil wars, water infrastructure was deliberately targeted, leading to serious pressure on food and water security, which are intertwined and mutually reinforcing factors along with other issues such as displacement, migration, and the environmental consequences of war.[100] In September 2023, two dams collapsed in Libya following Storm Daniel. Scholars and experts have linked the collapse of the dams to the devastating effects of the civil wars on infrastructure in the country, with the storm serving as the final trigger.[101] | |
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Water politics in Morocco are shaped by the governments goal to make the water use more sustainable and efficient, as well as to increase the water supply. However, a central obstacle to this is the widespread corruption.[102] Furthermore, in some regions the distribution of water is especially unequal, as more water goes to the farming of cash-crops than to the population. In the town of Zagora, this led to protests called a "thirst revolution" in 2017. In this, a gendered dimension can be observed. Especially women and children are affected by water scarcity in these regions, as men often moved to bigger cities to work there.[103] | |
| The Sultanate of Oman has a very diverse climate, with the southern parts of the country being affected by the seasonal monsoon.[104] Especially, the city of Salalah is popular for its many wadis and rivers. In the Hajar Mountains, the traditional Aflaj Irrigation System is still in place and is part of the UNESCO World Heritage list.[105] However, nowadays, Oman relies heavily on desalination for its water, which makes up more than 85 percent of the drinking water.[106] | |
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Already during the Mandate era, access to water was politicised in Palestine. Where local farmers developed practices to negotiate the relative water scarcity, British government officials perceived these practices as outdated and "backward." The inherently racist strategy of the colonial leadership was to cooperate with the first Zionist settlers in Palestine, as Jews were seen as superior to Arabs and therefore able to use the land and resources more efficiently. Under the official aim to increase agricultural output and reduce diseases, Palestinian farmers saw their access to water diminish, as it was reformed by an alliance of convenience of Zionists and the Mandate leadership. Part of the restructuring of water management in Mandate Palestine was the draining of areas such as Lake Hula resulting in the resettlement of Palestinians, making it an important element in the settler colonisation of Palestine.[107] After the occupation of the West Bank in 1967, Israel limited the access of Palestinians to water, while in the illegal settlements there are no restrictions on water use.[108] Today, most water sources in Palestine are controlled by Israel, leading to a dependence of Palestinians on Mekorot and concessions by Israeli lawmakers. The Oslo Accords enshrined the unequal access to water in legal codes, as they allocate the majority of shared watercourses to Israel.[109][110] This imbalance in access to water also affects the per day consumption of water per person which is around 3-4 times higher in Israel than in the occupied Palestinian territories.[109][108] In Gaza, according to Amnesty International, around 90-95% of the water is unusable for the population.[108] Already before the Gaza war a weaponisation of water could be observed, as the access to water and the use of water management facilities in Gaza is heavily restricted by Israel.[87][88][111] According to Human Rights Watch, the population in Gaza has less than a tenth of the minimum amount of water humans need per day according to the World Health Organization.[112] Therefore, this is considered a war crime by many NGOs, governments, scholars, and activists.[84] | |
| Despite being one of the most water scarce countries when it comes to conventional water resources, Qatar has a very high consumption of water for different purposes ranging from private use, over public parks, to the construction sector. This water is mainly won through desalination and Qatari citizens receive it for free from the government. To fulfil the water demands Qatar is continuously expanding its water infrastructure.[113] Furthermore the country aims to reduce the use of water and make it more efficient and sustainable in line with SDG 6 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals.[114] | |
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In the formation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, water was an important means of power, as access to water enabled the Al Saud family to assert their dominance and use it to generate stability. Before the discovery and boom of oil, large parts of the Saudi Arabian population were peasants. Therefore, control over access to water could be used to distribute it and, through this, exercise power and create stability.[115] As groundwater resources are shrinking, Saudi Arabia's dependence on desalination for water has been increasing since 1950. Currently, just under two-thirds of the water demand in the KSA is met by desalinated water.[116] In 1980, the East-West-Pipeline transporting desalinated water from the city of Jubail to Riyadh was constructed.[117] Groundwater is often used for irrigation purposes in more rural agricultural areas of the kingdom.[118] Water also plays an important role in Saudi Arabia's ambitious NEOM project. To meet the city's water demands, it will entirely depend on desalination. Therefore, to meet the goal of the city being entirely CO2 neutral, new solutions to the energy-intensive desalination process are required. Furthermore, the city plans to recycle all of its wastewater.[119] | |
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Water politics in Sudan are historically connected to those in Egypt. Under colonial rule, Sudan was a party to the Nile agreements of 1902 and 1929, where access to water and power in the Nile region was mainly distributed between Egypt and, to a lesser extent, Sudan.[54] After the country became independent in 1956, tensions arose as the new Sudanese government did not recognise the earlier Nile agreements and opposed the Aswan High Dam. After the Sudanese military coup in 1958, Sudan and Egypt made mutual concessions to build dams on the Nile, resulting in another agreement signed in 1959, which reinforced the key contents of the 1929 agreement.[55] The allocation of Nile waters, as formulated in the Nile agreements, is still seen as legally binding by Sudan today, despite criticism from other states regarding the colonial influence in the agreements.[56][57] In 2015, Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia signed a Declaration of Principles expressing the goal of increasing cooperation and, ultimately, enhancing regional prosperity.[120] After Ethiopia announced its plans to construct the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Sudan initially welcomed the project. However, after another military coup in 2019, there was a rapprochement between Sudan and Egypt, with both countries expressing shared rejection of the Renaissance Dam. In 2020 and 2021, Sudan and Egypt conducted the military exercises "Guardians of the Nile" and "Nile Eagles" together.[68] Sudan participates in the ongoing negotiations on the filling and operation of the Renaissance Dam.[121] | |
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Syria is facing severe water shortages and water insecurity. The decline of water in the Euphrates River leads to several intertwined issues in Syria. As an important source for irrigation, reduced Euphrates waters lead to increased rural flight as farming is becoming very hard. However, this rural flight to urban centres leads to a rapid and somewhat uncontrolled population growth in cities and puts severe tension on the (water) infrastructure of these cities. Furthermore, the lack of water in the Euphrates leads to energy shortages as less turbines in Syrian dams can be used. However, it is often argued that these issues could have been partially prevented by better water management in the past decades. With the Civil War starting in 2011, water had the potential to increase conflict but also for limited rapprochement, as state engineers carried out maintenance work on dams in areas controlled by ISIS or Kurdish militias. Currently, however, the water mismanagement continues as reforms are not consequently implemented and the depletion of groundwater resources remains high. Together with the lack of cooperation between Syria and Turkey, this is most likely to increase water scarcity in the future.[122][123] Turkish dams on the Euphrates have significantly reduced the availability of water, partially as Turkey weaponises the dams in an attempt to weaken the Kurdish YPG. Given Turkeys ties with the HTS militia that took power in Syria in late 2024, it will be interesting to see how the tensions between the countries around water evolve in the future.[123][124] | |
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Although the access to clean water was added to the Constitution in 2022, water scarcity remains a problem in Tunisia for humans, animals, agriculture, and the economy. Therefore, the Tunisian Ministry of Agriculture has published plans to enhance the availability of water sources, the access to them, and the efficient use of water in different steps until 2050.[125] In Tunisisia water scarcity acts intertwined with climate change and leads to phenomenons such as desertification and rural flight. Especially the agricultural sector, which for long has focused on water intensive export crops, is affected by increasing water scarcity.[126] The World Bank is engaging in projects aiming to improve water security in Tunisia.[127] | |
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The plans for the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), published in 2007, included the construction of the IIısu Dam, which is part of a broader network of Turkish dams on the Euphrates and Tigris, close to the borders with Iraq and Syria. These dams face criticism from Iraq and Syria, as they significantly reduce the amount of water flowing downstream in the two rivers, which are crucial for Syria's and Iraq's water supply. Similar to the dispute over GERD between Egypt and Ethiopia, it can be observed in the case of Turkey and Iraq/Syria that negotiations are difficult, as the parties have opposing interests. Furthermore, the Ilısu Dam is argued to be targeting Kurds, as it destroys some of their lands and the city of Hasankeyf. There are even accusations against Turkey of using dams to deprive Syrian Kurds of water, which would constitute a weaponisation of water.[49][128] | |
| Water politics are an important field in the UAE and there even is a policy paper dedicated to it called "Water Security Strategy 2036." In this, the UAE states its aim to increase the sustainability of desalination and to improve the efficient use of water in the country. Furthermore, the policy paper states a belief in and commitment to international solutions for water scarcity.[129] | |
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Before 2014, the vast majority of water in Yemen was used by the agricultural sector. Especially in the last third of the 20th century a shift towards the cultivation of cash-crops for export took place. These crops such as bananas, citrus, and khat were often poorly aligned to the climate and availability of water in Yemen.[130] The ongoing Yemeni Civil War has increased the already existing water scarcity in Yemen. Currently, it is estimated that more than 50% of the population do not have access to clean water. During the war, water infrastructure was destroyed or is no longer functional due to a lack of maintenance and spare parts. The Houthis, as well as the government troops and their allies, have weaponised water, therefore committing war crimes.[131][132][133] Different international actors, such as United Nations Development Programme, the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization are active in Yemen and aim to increase water cooperation and increase water supply.[134] In response to the Gaza War, the Houthis started to attack ships in the Red Sea along the coast of Yemen. This Red Sea Crisis is ongoing and has led to intensified airstrikes on Yemen, as well as delays and rising prices in international trade, as one of the most important shipping routes between Europe, the MENA, and Asia has become increasingly dangerous to pass.[135][136][137] |
South America
[edit]The Guaraní Aquifer, located between the Mercosur countries of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, with a volume of about 40,000 km3, is an important source of fresh potable water for all four countries. It is replenished by water from rains and small rivers and streams, mainly on its margins. As populational growth in its area is still relatively high (the feeder areas of the aquifer, especially the wettest ones, may locate even important and big metropolitan areas such as São Paulo and Curitiba), monitoring is required to avoid deplenishing, and pollution, that would be associated with the still very weak environmental legislation concerning farming and with the still low performance of the coverage of sanitation (mainly in the form of discharge of untreated sewage and exposed untreated garbage, including urban, what potentializes problems associated with flooding), in the countries affected.
United States
[edit]The Water Justice movement is a largely grassroots US movement, with small groups of citizens taking the issue into their own hands by means of protesting, petitioning, fundraising, or donating items such as water filters in order to broaden access to clean water. Some well-known people have used their exposure to further the cause of water justice: Erin Brockovich, media personality and environmental activist has spoken against Flint officials' mishandling of the water crisis there.[138][139] Actress Shailene Woodley was arrested at a Dakota Access Pipeline protest, writing afterwards about her experience: "If you are a human who requires water to survive, then this issue directly involves you."[140]
Another key player arguing to defend access to clean water in the Standing Rock protests is the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Chairman, Dave Archambault II, who has spoken to the Human Rights Council at the U.N. in Geneva on behalf of his tribe. In a separate statement, Archambault thanked those who fought the pipeline "in the name of protecting our water."[141]
The Water Justice movement has also moved globally, encompassing a wide array of diverse groups such as the Global Water Justice Movement, Friends of the Right to Water, the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, Food and Water Watch, and the Heinrich Böll Foundation. Groups such as these believe that water is part of the global commons, and thus argue against the privatization of water resources and give the state the responsibility of ensuring the right to water.[142][143]
Legal acts
[edit]To prevent increased pollution, environmental damage, and to keep drinking water clean, various Legal acts have been signed into law.
- The Clean Water Act: The Clean Water Act was signed into law in 1948 under the name Federal Water Pollution Control Act, with expanded recognition and amendments in 1972. Amendments included:
- The Ocean Dumping Act: The Ocean Dumping Act was signed into law in 1972 to prevent excess pollution from entering the ocean. The EPA has the authority to fine no more than $50,000 for each breach of permit. The act also allows for general research and EPA research into ridding the ocean of pollutant dumping.[145]
- Shore Protection Act (SPA): The Shore Protection Act comes from title IV of the Ocean Dumping Act. It forbids vessels from carrying waste within coastal waters without a permit.[146]
- Right To Water: Also known as the Human Right to Water and Sanitation, it was established by the United Nations on July 28, 2010. It was added to international law when the UN recognized water and general sanitation as a basic human right. It requires states and nations to provide clean, accessible drinking water to their people.[147]
- Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA): The Safe Drinking Water Act was put into law in 1974. It provides protection to water both above and below ground. In 1996, amendments were added requiring the EPA to assess risks and costs when creating standards for this law.[148]
Activism
[edit]When it comes to America alone, there has been much activity surrounding the issues of water in Standing Rock, ND and Flint, Michigan. When the issue arose of a pipeline being implemented on the Standing Rock Indian Reservation of North Dakota, residents began to take action almost immediately. When the pipeline was proposed in January 2016, the Sioux tribe released a petition that garnered almost half a million signatures within three months.[149] This postponed the construction of the pipeline, but the action did not stop there. In July of the same year, the tribe attempted to sue the Army Corps of Engineers with the argument that it would harm the area's water supply. This only led the Energy Transfer Partners to file a counter lawsuit, saying that the group was hindering their work.[149] 2016 presidential candidate Jill Stein led movements against the construction, which included spray painting a bulldozer with the phrase, "I approve this message".[150] Adding to the publication of the issue, actress Shailene Woodley was arrested for blocking the construction of the pipeline.[151] The debate on whether or not the pipeline will actually be built is still in progress.
The water crisis in Flint, Michigan has also led activists to focus on getting clean water to the people. After the 2014 decision to make the Flint River the primary water source of the town, residents quickly noticed the quality of their water declining.[152] The American Civil Liberties Union filed multiple lawsuits against the administration in Flint, saying that the levels of lead in the water is absurd, and demanded the pipes be replaced.[153] This has yet to happen, and the people of Flint continue to struggle for clean water.
Related organizations and programs
[edit]Several state and national organizations and programs are dedicated to the access of safe water. The scope of these organizations are varied by their outreach (from focusing on a small county to working globally) and the aspects of water justice they are contributing to. Many of these organizations work within governmental systems while others work outside of them.[154] These organizations have helped aid in the understanding and knowledge of water related issues, how they affect individuals and communities, and have found solutions to improve safe water access.
Categories of water justice organizations and programs include:
- Education: The United States of America has some of the safest drinking water supplies in the world. Despite this, there are several cases and outbreaks of illnesses and related health issues due to contaminated water reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention every year.[155] Several organizations work to educate communities about proper water safety procedures and places emphasis on individuals and communities to understand where their water supply comes from.
- Industry: Many water justice organizations work within industries related to community water to create safer water infrastructure. Many provide certification to certain professions to ensure work and product quality related to water.[156] Additionally, many organizations have created groups for professions that deal with water infrastructure and safety. Some of these profession include public health professionals, engineers, and scientific researchers.[157]
- Research: Several of these organizations also promote environmental and public health related research and aid in funding and education of these projects.[158]
- Governmental:Many organizations related to water justice work with or within the government to enact change in water policy and management. This can include city and state governments, to the federal government, to Tribal governments.[159]
Case studies: Africa
[edit]Obuasi, Ghana is the home of one of the world's top gold mining sites. It was in 1897 when the first machinery was used to mine the gold from the region.[160] As the years went by, new strategies were needed to establish out ways to "treat the ores".[160] By 1908, A leading chemist was brought in to help with the strategies and brought his Australian method of "dry crushing and roasting preparatory to treatment with cyanide".[160] Many rivers, fishing areas, and irrigation systems have been either slightly or permanently damaged.[161] The mining industry has tried to compensate by building standpipes but for many, they have been to no use. The average amount of contamination in the water system of Obuasi was over 10–38 times the maximum amount that is allowable by law.[162] The two main sources of the contamination is the arsenic powder that flows out from the mills[163] and the extensive amount of run-off water that is disposed of through dams.[162] "Thus in the processing of the ore for gold, the dust may contain particles of the ore, ferric oxide, oxides of arsenic and sulphur".[164] The dust will then get carried into the atmosphere and settle on the soil, humans, and rivers.[164] In Obuasi, they receive a high annual rainfall due to the tropical rainforest that surrounds it (Smedley, 1996, 464). During precipitation or rainfall, the dust "may be oxidized to the trioxide by the air and be converted to the sulphate in dew and rainwater".[164] The soil is the main target of contamination because the soil is contaminated and whatever vegetation grows and decays goes right back in the soil which results in the contamination of the groundwater.[164] However, the groundwater is not as polluted as the streams or rivers mainly due to the high dissolving process of the arsenic and due to the basement rocks that lie between the groundwater and the soil. "The only disadvantage is that whatever is deposited on the surface soil may be carried to greater depths with time by rainwater (Gish et al, 2010, 1973)".[164] The most extensively damaged areas are the ones closest to the mines, but with the wind carrying the dust, areas hundreds of miles away are getting contaminated by the chemicals.[165] Due to the extensive output of the chemicals from the mining mills and un resolved toxic spills, many rivers, streams, lakes and irrigation systems have been damaged or obsolete.[166] The local residents have been affected greatly by this phenomenon. Residents have seen the environmental changes especially in the water. Sludge floats down on streams that were once main sources of drinking water according to local residents.[161] All the marine life in the rivers and streams has died due to the high amounts of chemicals in the water.[167] According to Action Aid, residents have seen pipes that run straight into local streams and rivers that were depositing the waste directly sometimes causing flooding of the streams and rivers (2006, 11). Many local farmers suffered the hardest with the contamination of the water. Due to the irrigation systems using the contaminated water to irrigate all of the soil were then contaminated as well.[161] The soil was no longer usable, causing the killing off their crops that were used for their business as well as for their own families.[161] Children have also been targeted and affected by the pollution. According to Action Aid, many schools have been flooded with the over flow of the local streams, causing the children to leave school, sometimes permanently. AngloGold Ashanti (AGA) has put up standpipes to compensate for the contaminated water supplies, but these have also been useless to the locals. Standpipes were installed in the 1940s and 50s that have now been contaminated with arsenic from the mills.[168] AGA staff claim it is because of them being made of iron, but studies have shown large amounts of arsenic in the water.[168] Many standpipes have been either broken or obsolete.[161] This leads to the residents to walk at least 1.5 miles to go get clean water.[169] All the work the local people have to go through to get clean water is uncalled for. No compensation has been giving to the local residents for the damage they have done to their water and environment.
Economy
[edit]Global economy
[edit]Globalization has benefitted the economy greatly through increased trade and production of food, energy, and goods. However, the increase of trade and production of goods requires large quantities of water, in fact the OECD countries predict that by 2050, the global demand for water will increase by 55%.[170] Multiple countries and organizations have declared a water crisis. Water is a finite resource that is shared between nations, within nations, multiple interest groups and private organizations. Roughly 50% of all water available is located between two or more nation states.[170] Water politics and management requires efficient water allocation through policies and cooperation between nations. Poor water politics and practices can result in water conflict, which is more common surrounding freshwater due to its necessity for survival. Countries that have a greater supply of water have greater economic success due to an increase in agricultural business and the production of goods, whereas countries, which have limited access to water, have less economic success.[171] This gap in economic success due to water availability can also result in water conflict. The World Trade Organization has emerged as a key figure in the allocation of water in order to protect the agricultural trade.[171] Water is an essential commodity in the global market for economic success.
Jordan River
[edit]The Jordan River conflict, otherwise known as the War over Water is an example of transboundary conflict between Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine. This water conflict begun in 1953 as a result of poor water politics and management between nation states and negotiations are ongoing.[172] The conflict begun with Jordan's intention to irrigate land using a shared basin for agriculture and economic purposes, in response, Israel closed the gates of a dam in the Sea of Galilee, draining the water available.[173] Negotiations started with the Bunger Plan that would allocate water from the Jordan River fairly among the surrounding nations, however Israel declared its riparian rights were not recognized.[173] The consequences of the Jordan River conflict has resulted in economic damages to irrigation, agriculture, production, and resources to all of the nation states involved. The World Health Organization records that the total global economic loss associated with inadequate water politics, supply and sanitation is estimated at $260 billion annually USD.[174] The Jordan River conflict demonstrates a lack of efficient transboundary water politics, which has contributed to this annual global economic loss. Currently, negotiations have attempted to establish a fair divide and share of the Jordan River, but have had little success.[173]
Aral Sea
[edit]The water conflict in the Aral Sea is an ongoing transboundary conflict starting from 1991 between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.[175][176] Social causes such as economic development, population growth, electricity demand, and pollution has resulted in water scarcity.[175] The water scarcity has resulted in limited availability to allocate water efficiently between the neighboring countries.[176] The water scarcity has impacted many aspects of life and resources such as; fish, biodiversity, water, air pollution, forestry, agricultural land and ecosystem availability.[175] The impact of poor water politics and management has negatively influenced the economy of the surrounding countries and has created stress on resources that are crucial to the agricultural sector.[175][176] Research indicates that water scarcity can cost regions up to 6 percent of their GDP and cause migration, which negatively impacts the local economy.[177] There have been multiple attempts to resolve the conflict from different organizations such as The Interstate Commission for Water Coordination, Interstate Council of the Aral Sea, and The Aral Sea Basin Program, but the issue is still ongoing.[175]
Local economy
[edit]Water politics is present within nations, otherwise known as subnational. The shared jurisdiction of access to water between intergovernmental actors is crucial to efficient water politics. Inefficient water politics at the subnational level has a greater impact on the local economy through increased costs for businesses, increased costs for the agricultural sector, decreased local competitiveness, decrease in local jobs and infrastructure costs.[178] For instance, Texas plans to build reservoirs to combat water shortages; these reservoirs will cost more than $600 per acre-foot for construction.[179] Subnational states have a crucial role in water politics through managing local water sources and addressing issues concerning water politics such as allocation, scarcity and water pollution.
Colorado River basin
[edit]The Colorado River basin is transboundary basin shared between the United States and Mexico. However at the subnational level within United States, the basin is shared between Colorado, Utah, Arizona, Nevada and California. The Colorado River Basin demonstrates intergovernmental conflict over the autonomy of water politics.[180] Intergovernmental water politics has many actors such as private organizations and interest groups. Cooperation in subnational water politics can result in economic benefits through shared costs and risk for infrastructure. In addition, efficient water politic management results in profitable allocations of water that can sustain irrigation and the agricultural sector.
Human Rights
[edit]
Water is an absolute necessity in human sustainability and human survival. There is no human activity that can be sustained without the use of water whether it be at a direct or indirect level.[181] The United Nations declared access to water as a fundamental basic human right under articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant, which identifies and protects rights at an international level. In addition, the Millennium Development Goals of 2000 includes the sharing and fair allocation of water as a major goal.[182] The United Nations and Millennium Development Goals oppose water privatization because water is a human right and every human being is entitled to water use. Equal access to water entails that no individual should be given privilege over the other at the absolute basic level. The sale of water cannot be permitted or justified under the United Nations at the basic level because water is seen as a universal human right. The right to water was created specifically to assist poor individuals in developing countries through attaining equitable access to water to prevent illness and death.[182][183] Additionally, water rights are also associated with protecting the environment, strengthening the economy and strengthening the water delivery system.[182]
There have been many agreements set in place to try to avoid inequality and conflict with the use of water. Still, international leaders are struggling with incorporating bilateral and multilateral agreements to ensure efficient and fair water allocation. For instance, there are approximately 275 river basins and 270 ground water aquifers with policies that manage the sharing of the resource by two or more nations.[183] Despite the use of policies in the shared management of water, there have been multiple conflicts between nations because of poor water allocation.[183] Likewise, there has been over 300 water treaties signed internationally in dealing with water sharing yet the management and allocation of water is still unresolved.[181] Currently, policies and agreements intended to address water politics and allocation between nation states are insufficient. The United Nations has not presented an initiative to create a strategic framework to penalize nations, which have water conflicts.[182] Without enforcement of such policies and frameworks nations feel minimal pressure in complying with policies, resulting in continued inefficient practice of water politics. There has been a demand from countries and interest groups for the United Nations to set out a policy with rules and boundaries on water sharing and allocation. This policy must include clear-cut penalties for countries that go against the policies.[183]
As the availability of water decreases daily, the demand for policies and agreements to address water allocation and sharing increases. Bilateral and multilateral agreements are most important for third world countries since water is a scarce resource, and they will be the first to face water shortages.[183] The purpose of agreements is to ensure that all individuals have access to water as part of their fundamental basic human rights. Developed countries can offer resources to trade for water but third world countries are not as well off as developed countries and will lag behind. If agreements are not set in place many third world countries will have no choice but to turn to warfare in order to secure water.[182] Water wars can arise over the necessity of water for survival; a lack of water can result in economic consequences, biodiversity consequences, environmental consequences, illness and even death. The United Nations emphasizes and prioritizes water as a human right. However, the United Nations fails to create a policy that appropriately creates balance in terms of water-sharing and allocation.[182]
Hydropsychology
[edit]The creation of policies and agreements becomes even more difficult when the matter of hydropsychology is factored in. Hydropsychology is known as the use of water at the micro-level or at the individual level. Hydropsychology is advantageous because it studies the use of water at the smaller scale. Hydropsychology is noted as the bottom-up approach whereas hydropolitics (water politics) is the top-down approach.[183] Historically, hydropsychology was not given much attention because international leaders focused on international water sharing and allocation rather than domestic use.[181] Currently, international leaders are now requesting urgent and increased attention from the international community on the matter of hydropsychology because it greatly impacts water scarcity.[181] For example, the United States has a large abundance of water; as a result the United States micro-level management of water provides the ability for the United States to have recreational activities such as water parks that provides economic advantages. Whereas, many third world countries do not have access to clean water and their situation will only worsen as the water supply lessens.[181] Hydropsychology is important because it determines how much of the world's water supply is being used at the micro-level. Furthermore, the usage of water for recreational activity instead of sustainability creates a significant increase in the attention that hydropsychology is now receiving as there are drastic gaps between the availability of water in countries. Some countries use water freely for recreation, whereas other countries had limited supplies for survival, efficient water politics addresses this issue through good water allocation and management.[181][183] Hydropsychology indicates that the interest of certain individuals and communities in certain countries takes precedence over the importance of equality and water as a human right.[183] However countries can utilize resources however they please, international agreements exist to avoid water conflict between nations through efficient water allocation practices.
There has been a proposition in a more balanced approach for water-sharing and allocation through a combination of large scale politics on the international level and smaller scale politics (hydropsychology) rather than focusing strictly one a singular approach. This balanced approach would include policies created at community levels and national levels in order to address the issue of water-sharing and allocation.[183] Currently, hydropolitics only studies water at the international level and hydropsychology studies water at local level. The failure of hydropolitics on its own is demonstrated through the conflicts that have occurred in the past and present between nations that share and manage water together. Thus the combination of hydropolitics and hydropsychology would assist international leaders with addressing water-sharing. Both hydropolitics and hydropsychology have different approaches on dealing with the matter and the different ideas can merge to create a more complete solution.[181][183] The combination of hydropsychology and hydropolitics will also assist in dealing with matters such as virtual water trading, river linking scheme, large dams, and climate change.[183] The advantage is based on the premise that the use of water starts at the individual level, which eventually impacts the actions of governments and major institutions.[183] The international level pays minimal attention to local affairs but has extensive knowledge on international policies. Subsequently, the local level pays minimal attention to international affairs but has major knowledge on local water use. Thus, the combination of the two make up for the lack of attention each level gives to the other. It is also important to note that the individual level has an impact on the governmental level, which affects the abundance of water, and international agreements that will be created. The reconciliation of hydropolitics and hydropsychology must be considered in dealing with water-sharing.[181][183] The importance of hydropsychology was neglected in the past but its importance is extremely evident for the present and future.
Privatization
[edit]Privatization of water companies has been contested on several occasions because of poor water quality, increasing prices, and ethical concerns. In Bolivia for example, the proposed privatization of water companies by the International Monetary Fund was met by popular protests in Cochabamba in 2000, which ousted Bechtel, a US engineering firm based in San Francisco. Suez has started retreating from South America because of similar protests in Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and Córdoba, Argentina.[184] Consumers took to the streets to protest water rate hikes of as much as 500 percent mandated by Suez. In South and Central America, Suez has water concessions in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Mexico. "Bolivian officials fault Suez for not connecting enough households to water lines as mandated by its contract and for charging as much as $455 a connection, or about three times the average monthly salary of an office clerk", according to The Mercury News.[185]
South Africa also made moves to privatize water, provoking an outbreak of cholera that killed 200.[186]
In 1997, World Bank consultants assisted the Philippine government in the privatization of the city of Manila's Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems (MWSS). By 2003, water price increases registered at 81% in the east zone of the Philippines and 36% in the west region. As services became more expensive and inefficient under privatization, there was reduced access to water for poor households. In October 2003, the Freedom from Debt Coalition reported that the diminished access to clean water resulted in an outbreak of cholera and other gastrointestinal diseases.[187]
Water privatization is a strategy utilized to deliver a secure and sustainable supply of water from private organizations rather than having the public sector provide this service.[188] Privatization of water politics entails a reorganization of water allocation from the public sector to the private sector through privatization and commercialization of water.[189] The government forfeits the management of water politics to a private organization. Private organizations allocate water based on capitalism mechanisms.[189] The commercialization of water politics in the private sector distributes water based on rationales that concern economic profitability.[189]
Historically, water privatization has resulted in civil disputes, protests and wars. The United Nations classifies access to clean drinking water as a universal human right.[190]
Mexico City
[edit]Water privatization has been adopted in Mexico City to combat the growing concern of poor water politics offered by the public sector. Under the public sector, it was estimated that Mexico City lost up to 40% of its water through leaky pipes.[191] In 1994, Mexico City privatized its water services through the Distrito Federal to tackle water shortages.[188] The environmental and economic scenario at the time pressured the Party of the Democratic Revolution to adapt water privatization in order to address water shortages.[188] Mexico City is one of few examples of a successful privatization of water services. From 1994 to 2003 multinational water corporations provided an increase of water quality services, while the public sector held control of infrastructure.[188] However, recently Mexico City has faced some hardships in water privatization due to contract negotiations between the public and private sector, which has resulted in stalled efficiency of water services.[188]
Bolivia
[edit]Bolivia privatized its water supply in the city of Cochabamba in 1999 to Sempa, a multinational private water organization.[192] Afterwards, Bolivia signed a $2.5 billion contract, behind closed doors for Cochabamba's water system to Aguas del Tunari.[193] The privatization of Cochabamba's water supply resulted in The Cochabamba Water War, which started in 1999 and concluded in 2000. The Cochabamba Water War resulted in multiple protests and violent outbreaks in response to the privatization of water.[192][193] Aguas del Tunari promised to provide electricity and irrigation to Cochabamba. In addition, Bechtel, a major shareholder of Aguas del Tunari, ensured that water and sewage services would increase dramatically under private management.[193] However, Cochabamba citizens were told that these services would result in a 35% increase in costs for water.[194][193] The Bolivian government enacted Law 2029 which provided a regime of concessions regarding the provision of water, Law 2029 essentially gave the private sector the water monopoly and exclusive rights to water within Cochabamba.[194] The goal of law 2029 was to provide more efficient water services to areas in Cochabamba that had a population over 10,000 citizens through water privatization.[194] The situation in Cochabamba was exacerbated when the cost of water doubled, and even tripled in certain areas.[194] The rise in costs was due to the construction of the Misicuni dam project and the debt left behind by Sempa.[193] The drastic increase in cost for water supply resulted in protests that shut down the city for four days.[193] Peaceful protests led by Oscar Olivera quickly became violent causing multiple protests that lasted days resulting in the Bolivian government declaring a state of emergency [194][193] The Cochabamba water war concludes with President Huge Banzer resigning from office, leaving Bolivia in similar conditions before the privatization of water [193]
See also
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- ^ "Drinking Water National and State Organizations and Programs". www.nesc.wvu.edu. Archived from the original on 2020-01-28. Retrieved 2017-03-01.
- ^ Jones, Gordon. "FWR Home Page". www.fwr.org. Retrieved 2017-03-01.
- ^ "National Tribal Environmental Council | Tribal Climate Change Guide". tribalclimateguide.uoregon.edu. Retrieved 2017-03-01.
- ^ a b c "Ashanti Company History" (PDF). AngloGold Ashanti. 2005.
- ^ a b c d e Action Aid, 2006, 3
- ^ a b Action Aid, 2006, 9
- ^ Golow et al., 703
- ^ a b c d e Golow et al., 2010, 703
- ^ Golow et al., 2010, 706
- ^ Action Aid, 2006, 5
- ^ ActionAid, 2006, 3
- ^ a b Action Aid, 2006, 15
- ^ Action Aid, 2006, 16
- ^ a b Holmgren, Torgny; Jägerskog, Dr Anders; Berggren, Jens; Joyce, John (30 August 2013). "The global water crisis – why water politics matter for business security". The Guardian.
- ^ a b Hoekstra, Arjen (January 2010). WHO: The Relation Between International Trade and Freshwater Scarcity (PDF) (Report). pp. 1–26.
- ^ Cartwright, Randy. "JORDAN". gurukul.ucc.american.edu. Archived from the original on 2016-12-22. Retrieved 2017-03-30.
- ^ a b c Wolf, Aaron; Newton, Joshua. "Case studies | Water Conflict Management and Transformation at OSU". transboundarywaters.orst.edu. Archived from the original on 2018-02-25. Retrieved 2017-03-30.
- ^ Hutton, Guy (March 2013). "Global costs and benefits of reaching universal coverage of sanitation and drinking-water supply". Journal of Water and Health. 11 (1): 1–12. doi:10.2166/wh.2012.105. PMID 23428544.
- ^ a b c d e "Conflict Over Water in the Aral Sea | ECC Factbook". ECC Library. 9 February 2015.
- ^ a b c Wolf, Aaron; Newton, Joshua. "Case studies | Water Conflict Management and Transformation at OSU". transboundarywaters.orst.edu. Archived from the original on 2018-02-18. Retrieved 2017-03-30.
- ^ "High and Dry: Climate Change, Water, and the Economy". World Bank.
- ^ "Home page".
- ^ Alamaro, Moshe (30 September 2014). "Water politics must adapt to a warming world". Nature. 514 (7520): 7. Bibcode:2014Natur.514....7A. doi:10.1038/514007a. PMID 25279881.
- ^ Moore, Scott M. (19 January 2017). "The dilemma of autonomy: decentralization and water politics at the subnational level". Water International. 42 (2): 222–239. Bibcode:2017WatIn..42..222M. doi:10.1080/02508060.2017.1276038. hdl:10986/26253. S2CID 157939313.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Elhance (1 February 2000). "Hydropolitics: Grounds for Despair, Reasons for Hope". International Negotiation. 5 (2): 201–222. doi:10.1163/15718060020848730.
- ^ a b c d e f Khadka, Arjun Kumar (22 January 2010). "The Emergence of Water as a 'Human Right' on the World Stage: Challenges and Opportunities". International Journal of Water Resources Development. 26 (1): 37–49. Bibcode:2010IJWRD..26...37K. doi:10.1080/07900620903391838. S2CID 154480603.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Sivakumar, Bellie (16 October 2013). "Planning and management of shared waters: hydropolitics and hydropsychology – two sides of the same coin". International Journal of Water Resources Development. 30 (2): 200–210. doi:10.1080/07900627.2013.841072. S2CID 154793056.
- ^ WATER-LATIN AMERICA: Suez Packs Its Bags and Won't Be Back
- ^ "Bolivia's water wars coming to end under Morales". Mercury News. February 26, 2006.
- ^ "Water privatisation: ask the experts". BBC News. December 10, 2004.
- ^ "Rights Education Empowers People in the Philippines". Aurora Parong. 1995.
- ^ a b c d e Pierce, Gregory (December 2012). "The Political Economy of Water Service Privatization in Mexico City, 1994–2011". International Journal of Water Resources Development. 28 (4): 675–691. Bibcode:2012IJWRD..28..675P. doi:10.1080/07900627.2012.685126. S2CID 153813854.
- ^ a b c Ahlers, R. (29 April 2010). "Fixing and Nixing: The Politics of Water Privatization". Review of Radical Political Economics. 42 (2): 213–230. doi:10.1177/0486613410368497. S2CID 154802023.
- ^ "UN-Water: Home". www.unwater.org.
- ^ "BBC NEWS". news.bbc.co.uk.
- ^ a b "Water war in Bolivia". The Economist. 10 February 2000.
- ^ a b c d e f g h "Bolivia – Leasing the Rain. Timeline: Cochabamba Water Revolt". PBS.
- ^ a b c d e Coleman, Thomas (2012). "Who Owns the Water? An Analysis of Water Conflicts in Latin American and Modern Water Law" (PDF). Intersections. 12 (2): 1–19.
Bibliography
[edit]- Boccaletti, Giulio. Water: A Biography (Pantheon Books, 2021) online review of this book
- "Gold Rush" (PDF). Action Aid. 2006. Retrieved 29 March 2010.
- Golow, A.A; A Schlueter; S Amihere-Mensah; H.L.K. Granson; M.S Tetteh (1996). "Distribution of Arsenic and Sulphate in the Vicinity of Ashanti Goldmine at Obuasi, Ghana". Bulletin of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology. 56 (5): 703–710. Bibcode:1996BuECT..56..703G. doi:10.1007/s001289900103. PMID 8661851. S2CID 44760105..
- Rahaman, M. M. (Editor) in need Issue: Water Wars in 21st Century along International Rivers Basins: Speculation or Reality?, International Journal of Sustainable Society, Vol. 4, Nos. 1/2, 193 pages. 2012
- "HRW, Decade, Water for Life, 2015, UN-Water, United Nations, MDG, Water, Sanitation, Financing, Gender, IWRM, Human Right, Transboundary, Cities, Quality, Food Security, General Comment, BKM, Albuquerque". United Nations, July 2010. Retrieved 2 March. 2017.
United States
[edit]- Burch, Jr., John R. Water Rights and the Environment in the United States (ABC-CLIO 2015), a comprehensive documentary and reference guide to historical water issues.
- Carson, Rachel, Silent Spring (Riverside Press, 1962), highly influential in shaping public opinion in United States.
- Copeland, Claudia. Ocean Dumping Act: A Summary of the Law. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1999. National Oceanic and Atmosphere Administration. Congressional Research Service, 15 December 2015. Retrieved 2 March 2017.
- Serageldin, I. "Water: conflicts set to arise within as well as between states", Nature, Vol. 459, p. 163. 2009.
- Smith, Frank E. ed. Conservation in the United States: Land and Water 1900–1970 (1971) 780pp of primary sources
- "Drinking Water National and State Organizations and Programs" Archived 2020-01-28 at the Wayback Machine. Drinking Water National and State Organizations and Programs. National Environmental Services Center, 2013. Retrieved 2 March 2017.
- "Drinking Water Safety". Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 19 May 2014. Retrieved 2 March 2017.
- "History of the Clean Water Act". EPA. Environmental Protection Agency, 25 May 2016. Retrieved 2 March 2017.
- "Human Health and Contaminated Water". EPA. Environmental Protection Agency, 7 June 2016. Retrieved 2 March 2017.
- Perlman, Howard. "Contaminants Found in Groundwater". Contaminants Found in Groundwater, USGS Water Science School. The USGS Water Science School, 2 December 2016. Retrieved 2 March 2017.
- "Summary of the Shore Protection Act". EPA. Environmental Protection Agency, 30 December 2016. Retrieved 2 March 2017.
- "Summary of the Safe Drinking Water Act". EPA. Environmental Protection Agency, 7 February 2017. Retrieved 2 March 2017.
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- US Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. "Nonpoint Source Pollution". NOAA's National Ocean Service Education. U.S. Department of Commerce, 19 December 2004. Retrieved 2 March 2017.
- "Water Contamination". Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 11 October 2016. Retrieved 2 March 2017.
External links
[edit]- ISARM Internationally Shared Aquifer Resources Management
- Water Wars Multimedia on water scarcity and hydropolitics in East Africa
- Israel Ministry of the Environment Archived 2012-02-09 at the Wayback Machine
- Israel's Chronic Water Problem
- Water and Environmental Racism. Lesson by Matt Reed and Ursula Wolfe-Rocca.
Water politics
View on GrokipediaCore Concepts and Frameworks
Definitions and Scope of Hydropolitics
Hydropolitics denotes the confluence of political processes and water resource management, encompassing the authoritative claims, allocation decisions, and utilization of freshwater as a strategic asset, particularly in shared hydrologic systems.[12] This field scrutinizes how state power influences water governance, including upstream control over downstream flows and the negotiation of usage rights amid competing national interests.[1] Originating in geopolitical discourse, the concept evolved from early 20th-century analyses of resource rivalries to a broader interdisciplinary examination integrating international relations, hydrology, and environmental policy, though it lacks a singular canonical definition due to varying emphases across scholarly traditions.[1] The scope of hydropolitics centers on transboundary contexts, where sovereignty over international waters generates tensions or alliances, as evidenced by approximately 310 delineated international river basins spanning 150 countries and covering 47.1% of Earth's land area (excluding Antarctica).[13] These basins sustain over 52% of the global population and channel around 60% of freshwater discharge, rendering them focal points for disputes over dams, diversions, and pollution that transcend borders.[14] [13] While interstate dynamics predominate, the purview extends to domestic policies that ripple internationally, such as irrigation expansions or conservation mandates, and incorporates non-state actors like multinational corporations in resource extraction.[1] Empirically, hydropolitics addresses causal factors like hydrologic variability—exacerbated by climate shifts—and anthropogenic pressures including population growth and inefficient usage, which amplify allocation inequities without invariably precipitating violence; historical records indicate rare outright wars over water, with cooperation treaties outnumbering acute conflicts by a factor of over 3:1 since 1945. Key analytical lenses include power asymmetries in basin hegemonies and the securitization of water as a national imperative, distinguishing it from narrower hydrodiplomacy focused solely on treaty-making.[12] This framework underscores water's role not merely as a commodity but as a vector for broader geopolitical maneuvering, informed by verifiable basin data rather than alarmist scarcity paradigms.[1]Hydro-hegemony and Power Asymmetries
Hydro-hegemony refers to the exercise of dominance over transboundary water resources at the basin level, where a riparian state leverages relative power advantages to shape resource allocation and interactions in its favor. Introduced by Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner in 2006, the framework analyzes how such hegemony manifests through strategies including resource capture (direct control via infrastructure like dams), containment (suppressing rival claims), and integration (co-opting weaker states into compliant arrangements).[15] This approach draws on Gramscian notions of hegemony, emphasizing not just coercive "hard" power—such as military or geographic positioning—but also "soft" power elements like ideological influence and negotiated norms to legitimize control.[16] Power asymmetries underpin hydro-hegemony, arising from disparities in upstream/downstream geography, economic capacity for exploitation (e.g., dam-building ability), and broader geopolitical leverage. Upstream states often hold structural advantages, as water flows unidirectionally, enabling them to regulate quantities before downstream riparians can access them; for instance, in the Euphrates-Tigris basin, Turkey's Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), initiated in 1980 and encompassing 22 dams by 2023, has captured up to 40-50% of the Euphrates' flow during dry periods, reducing downstream availability for Syria and Iraq by as much as 30% in low-flow years.[17] These asymmetries favor bilateral negotiations over multilateral equity, with upstream actors like Turkey resisting binding data-sharing or allocation treaties, as evidenced by the absence of a comprehensive basin agreement despite decades of talks since the 1920s.[18] Downstream states, constrained by dependency, may accommodate hegemony to avoid escalation, though this can entrench inequities; Iraq, receiving 70% of its water from the basin, has protested flow reductions but lacks enforcement mechanisms.[19] In the Nile Basin, historical hydro-hegemony shifted from downstream dominance to contested upstream challenges, illustrating how power dynamics evolve with changing capacities. Egypt long maintained hegemony via colonial-era treaties (e.g., 1929 Anglo-Egyptian and 1959 Egypt-Sudan pacts allocating 55.5 and 18.5 billion cubic meters annually to Egypt and Sudan, respectively, while ignoring upstream states), backed by military superiority and geographic centrality.[20] However, Ethiopia's construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), begun in 2011 and filling its 74 billion cubic meter reservoir in phases through 2023, has disrupted this by potentially withholding 20-25% of Nile flow during filling, prompting Egyptian threats of intervention but yielding no binding resolution amid Ethiopia's growing regional influence.[21] Such cases underscore that hydro-hegemony persists not merely through scarcity but via sustained power imbalances, where weaker riparians' securitization rhetoric often yields to pragmatic concessions, as seen in the Nile Basin Initiative's (1999) failure to enforce equitable principles against entrenched claims.[22] Empirical analysis reveals that basins with high asymmetry (e.g., military expenditure gaps exceeding 10:1) exhibit lower cooperation rates, prioritizing sovereignty over collective governance.[23]Water Security Versus Scarcity Narratives
The scarcity narrative frames water as a depleting finite resource, wherein rising global demand—projected to exceed supply by 40% by 2030—inevitably leads to crises, conflicts, and geopolitical tensions, often prioritizing hydrological limits over human agency.[24] This perspective, advanced in international reports and policy discourse, attributes shortages primarily to population growth, climate variability, and overextraction, with claims that half the world's population already faces high water stress.[25] [26] However, such framings have been critiqued as socially and politically constructed, embedding scarcity in agendas that overemphasize economic valuation while sidelining inequities in access and governance failures.[27] [28] Empirical assessments reveal that absolute global shortages are overstated; total renewable freshwater resources stand at approximately 43,750 km³ annually, with per capita availability declining due to population pressures but remaining sufficient in aggregate when accounting for technological potential.[29] Localized scarcities frequently stem from mismanagement, such as inefficient agricultural withdrawals (which consume 70% of global freshwater), inadequate infrastructure, and pollution, rather than inherent physical deficits—evident in regions like the Middle East where desalination has expanded supply without sparking predicted "water wars."[30] [31] [32] Sources amplifying scarcity, including some UN and NGO reports, may reflect institutional incentives toward alarmism, yet data from hydrological models indicate that governance reforms and efficiency gains could meet demands without systemic collapse.[33] [34] The water security narrative, by contrast, adopts a holistic lens, defining it as the reliable provision of sufficient, safe water for human needs while mitigating risks from disasters, pollution, and inequity through adaptive strategies like supply augmentation and decentralized systems.[35] [36] This shift—from demand-side rationing to supply enhancement via innovations such as desalination and wastewater reuse—addresses root causes like political asymmetries and infrastructural decay, as demonstrated in cases where improved allocation reduced effective scarcity without altering hydrological inflows.[35] [37] Security-oriented policies prioritize resilience and equity, recognizing that insecurity disproportionately affects vulnerable populations due to social injustices rather than uniform resource depletion.[27] [38]Historical Evolution
Pre-Modern Water Conflicts and Governance
In ancient Mesopotamia, the development of large-scale irrigation systems from around 6000 BCE necessitated cooperative governance among city-states to manage the Tigris and Euphrates rivers' unpredictable floods and droughts, with rulers organizing labor for canals that spanned hundreds of kilometers and supported populations exceeding 1 million by the Early Dynastic period (c. 2900–2350 BCE).[39] These systems, including levees and reservoirs, were politically controlled by kings who claimed divine authority over water distribution, as evidenced by inscriptions crediting rulers like Ur-Nanshe of Lagash (c. 2500 BCE) with canal construction to avert famine.[40] The earliest documented water conflict arose between the Sumerian city-states of Lagash and Umma around 2500 BCE over control of irrigation canals and fertile lands in the Gu'edena region, escalating into a century-long series of wars triggered by Umma's alleged diversion of water from shared boundary ditches.[41] This dispute, commemorated on the Stele of Vultures erected by Eannatum of Lagash (c. 2450 BCE), involved military campaigns where water infrastructure was targeted, marking the first recorded instance of interstate warfare explicitly linked to hydraulic resources.[42] Similar tensions persisted, as seen in Babylonian disputes involving damming the Tigris, which disrupted downstream agriculture and prompted retaliatory engineering projects.[7] By the Old Babylonian period, codified laws formalized water governance, with Hammurabi's Code (c. 1750 BCE) imposing penalties for irrigation negligence, such as requiring compensation in grain equivalent to damages if a farmer's canal breach flooded a neighbor's field (Law 55), or death for deliberate upstream diversion causing crop failure (Law 53).[43] These provisions reflected causal dependencies in arid environments, where equitable canal maintenance prevented systemic crop losses affecting up to 80% of caloric intake from barley, and underscored state enforcement to maintain social order amid power asymmetries between upstream and downstream users.[44] In ancient Egypt, pharaonic governance centralized water control around the Nile's annual inundation, with basin irrigation systems—diverting floodwaters into fields via dikes and sluices—sustaining a population of 1–2 million by 2000 BCE and enabling surplus production under state oversight from the Old Kingdom (c. 2686–2181 BCE).[45] Rulers like those of the Middle Kingdom (c. 2050–1710 BCE) regulated distribution through priestly bureaucracies and royal decrees, minimizing conflicts by aligning water allocation with flood predictability, though upstream Nubian diversions occasionally strained relations, as noted in inscriptions from Senusret III's campaigns (c. 1870 BCE).[46] Medieval Islamic polities advanced governance through qanat systems in Persia and North Africa, subterranean galleries channeling groundwater over distances up to 70 kilometers to irrigate arid lands, governed by communal mirab overseers who enforced rotational shares based on land ownership and resolved disputes via sharia-derived arbitration from the 8th century CE onward.[47] In contrast, European feudal systems from the 9th to 15th centuries often localized water control via manorial mills and weirs, leading to inter-lord conflicts, such as those over Rhine tributaries where upstream damming reduced downstream flow by 20–50%, prompting royal interventions like England's Statute of Marbridges (1285) limiting stream obstructions.[48] These pre-modern frameworks highlight how institutional designs, from centralized hydraulic despotism to decentralized customs, mitigated scarcity-driven violence while adapting to regional hydrogeographies.[49]20th Century Transboundary Treaties and Wars
The 20th century saw a proliferation of transboundary water treaties aimed at allocating shared resources amid rising populations, irrigation demands, and post-colonial state formations, though these agreements often reflected power asymmetries favoring downstream or hegemon states. Between 1900 and 2000, over 150 such treaties were concluded globally, shifting from boundary demarcation to functional cooperation on allocation and infrastructure, yet many perpetuated inequities by sidelining upstream riparians or prioritizing colonial-era claims. Empirical records indicate these pacts reduced outright diversionary conflicts but frequently sowed seeds for future disputes through rigid quotas that ignored hydrological variability and emerging users.[50] A pivotal example is the Indus Waters Treaty signed on September 19, 1960, between India and Pakistan, mediated by the World Bank after nine years of negotiations triggered by India's upstream dams post-1947 partition, which threatened Pakistan's agrarian economy reliant on the basin's 168 billion cubic meters annual flow. The treaty divided the six rivers: India received unrestricted use of the eastern tributaries (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej, averaging 33 billion cubic meters yearly) for irrigation and hydropower, while Pakistan gained the western ones (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, averaging 135 billion cubic meters) with limited Indian usage for non-consumptive purposes; it also established the Permanent Indus Commission for dispute resolution and facilitated transitional canal funding.[51] This allocation, based on pre-partition usage data rather than equitable principles, has endured three wars between the parties but faces strain from climate-induced flows declining 10-20% since 1960 and India's hydropower projects. In the Nile Basin, spanning 11 countries and supplying 300 million people with 84 billion cubic meters annually, colonial legacies dominated 20th-century accords. The 1929 Exchange of Notes between Britain (representing upstream territories) and Egypt affirmed Egypt's "natural and historical rights" to the full flow, mandating upstream construction obtain Egyptian approval to prevent reduced discharges, a provision rooted in Egypt's downstream dependence rather than basin-wide equity.[52] The 1959 Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, post-independence, estimated the Nile's "mean" flow at 84 billion cubic meters after evaporation losses and allocated 55.5 billion to Egypt (66%) and 18.5 billion to Sudan (22%), earmarking the rest for evaporation at Aswan while excluding Ethiopia, Uganda, and others contributing 40-50% of flow via tributaries; it enabled Egypt's Aswan High Dam (completed 1970) for storage but reinforced bilateral dominance, prompting upstream grievances. These pacts, ignoring upstream abstractions and losses in the Sudd swamps (up to 50% evaporation), have constrained equitable renegotiation, with Egypt historically threatening military action against upstream dams.[53]| Treaty | Date | Parties | Key Provisions |
|---|---|---|---|
| Boundary Waters Treaty | January 11, 1909 | United States, Canada | Prohibited upstream diversions harming the other party; established International Joint Commission for approvals and disputes over Great Lakes and boundary rivers.[54] |
| US-Mexico Water Treaty | February 3, 1944 | United States, Mexico | Allocated Colorado River waters (1.5 million acre-feet annually to Mexico) and Rio Grande shares; created International Boundary and Water Commission for management.[55] |
| Indus Waters Treaty | September 19, 1960 | India, Pakistan | Divided Indus system rivers; Permanent Commission for implementation; no storage limits on allocated rivers beyond specified run-of-river uses.[51] |
| Columbia River Treaty | January 17, 1961 | United States, Canada | Joint development of four dams for flood control and power (15.5 million acre-feet storage); downstream benefits shared via power sales.[56] |
Post-Cold War Developments and Institutions
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 facilitated a surge in transboundary water cooperation agreements, peaking in 1992 amid territorial realignments and the emergence of new riparian states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.[60] This period marked a pivot from Cold War-era bilateral tensions toward multilateral frameworks, driven by shared basin vulnerabilities exposed by post-communist transitions, such as the Aral Sea crisis, where upstream diversions had depleted the waterbody by over 90% since the 1960s, exacerbating regional disputes.[1] Empirical analyses indicate that organizational proximity—through international regimes and information exchanges—sustained this trend, though underlying power asymmetries persisted, often favoring upstream states in negotiations.[60] A foundational shift occurred at the 1992 International Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin, Ireland, which articulated four principles emphasizing water as an economic good, stakeholder participation, and integrated management, laying the groundwork for the global adoption of integrated water resources management (IWRM) paradigms.[61] These principles influenced subsequent policies, including those of the World Bank, which integrated IWRM into lending criteria for water projects by the mid-1990s.[62] In 1996, the Global Water Partnership (GWP) was established as an intergovernmental network, supported by the World Bank, UNDP, and Sweden, to advance IWRM through technical assistance and policy dialogue across over 170 countries, focusing on coordinated development to mitigate scarcity without prioritizing equitable allocation in asymmetric basins.[63] The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, adopted on May 21, 1997, codified principles of equitable and reasonable utilization, no significant harm, and prior notification for planned measures, applying to surface and groundwater systems crossing borders.[64] Though only 37 states had ratified it by 2024—reflecting resistance from downstream powers like China and Egypt wary of ceding veto power—it entered into force on August 17, 2014, after the required 35 ratifications, providing a baseline for dispute resolution amid rising dam constructions.[65] Regional bodies proliferated, such as the 1999 Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), formed by Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and six upstream states to pursue cooperative development, yielding investments exceeding $1 billion in infrastructure like early warning systems by 2019, though tensions over Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam underscored limits in enforcing benefit-sharing.[66] Post-1990s treaties emphasized data exchange and joint management over outright allocation, with examples including the 1994 Israel-Jordan water annex to their peace treaty, allocating fixed Jordan River shares (Israel: 50 million cubic meters annually; Jordan: 200 million), and the 1995 Mekong River Agreement establishing the Mekong River Commission for sustainable development among Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam.[67] By 2007, transboundary treaties had evolved to cover 70% of international drainage areas, shifting from navigation-focused pacts to ecosystem protection and hydropower coordination, yet implementation gaps persisted due to non-binding provisions and enforcement challenges in hegemonic basins like the Euphrates-Tigris, where Turkey's Southeastern Anatolia Project dams reduced downstream flows by up to 40% since the 1990s. These institutions, while promoting dialogue, have been critiqued for underemphasizing causal drivers like population growth—e.g., Nile Basin population doubling to 600 million since 1990—and upstream infrastructure unilateralism, per analyses from riparian data.[68]Water as a Strategic Resource
Geopolitical Leverage and Weaponization
Turkey's control over the Euphrates and Tigris rivers through the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), encompassing 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric plants completed or under construction since 1980, has enabled Ankara to reduce downstream flows to Syria and Iraq by up to 40-50% during dry periods, fostering dependency and serving as implicit leverage in negotiations over Kurdish issues, migration, and security cooperation.[69] [70] In 2023, Iraq accused Turkey of releasing only 275 cubic meters per second from the Euphrates—below the 500 cubic meters per second agreed in a 1987 protocol—exacerbating downstream shortages amid droughts, with Turkish officials citing domestic needs while critics interpret the action as strategic withholding to extract concessions.[71] China's 11 mainstream dams on the Lancang River (upper Mekong), operational since the early 2000s with a combined capacity exceeding 21,000 megawatts, allow Beijing to regulate flows affecting 60 million downstream residents in Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, where reduced wet-season releases have intensified droughts, as evidenced by satellite data showing withheld water during the 2019-2020 crisis that halved Vietnam's Mekong Delta rice yields.[72] Analysts have described this as political leverage, with China increasing releases during diplomatic tensions to signal goodwill or withholding to assert dominance, though Beijing attributes variations to hydropower optimization and climate factors.[73] Israel's post-1967 capture of the Golan Heights and West Bank aquifers grants it de facto control over 80% of the Jordan River basin's freshwater, diverting approximately 300 million cubic meters annually for domestic use while allocating fixed shares to Jordan under the 1994 peace treaty—50 million cubic meters from the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers plus 30 million from Lake Tiberias—limiting Jordan's riparian rights and enabling water as a bargaining chip in bilateral relations and Palestinian negotiations.[74] [75] Direct weaponization occurs through infrastructure destruction or denial in armed conflicts, escalating from leverage to tactical disruption. In the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow targeted over 100 water facilities, including the June 6, 2023, destruction of the Kakhovka Dam which released 18 cubic kilometers of water, flooding 620 square kilometers, displacing 17,000 people, and contaminating supplies for millions while crippling irrigation for 584,000 hectares of farmland.[76] The Islamic State (ISIS) seized Mosul Dam in Iraq (August 2014) and Tabqa Dam in Syria (2014), manipulating releases to flood adversary territories—such as 2015 Euphrates inundations near Fallujah—while denying water to Mosul's 1.5 million residents and generating revenue from controlled hydropower, tactics that sustained territorial control until liberation in 2017.[77] [78] Global incidents of water-related violence reached a record 347 in 2023, a 150% increase from 2022, often involving dams and pipelines as targets in the Middle East and Ukraine.[79]Economic Valuation and Allocation Challenges
Economic valuation of water resources presents inherent difficulties due to its status as both a private consumable and a public good essential for life, complicating the application of standard market pricing mechanisms. Water's multifaceted uses—spanning irrigation, industrial processes, household consumption, and ecological maintenance—generate non-market values such as existence and bequest benefits that resist quantification through revealed preference methods like hedonic pricing or travel cost approaches.[80] These challenges intensify in politically charged contexts, where governments often subsidize water to agricultural sectors, which account for approximately 70% of global freshwater withdrawals, fostering inefficiencies and overextraction without reflecting true scarcity costs.[81] For instance, underpricing discourages adoption of water-saving technologies, exacerbating depletion in basins like the Colorado River, where allocations based on outdated 1922 compacts ignore modern economic realities and climate variability.[82] Allocation mechanisms further compound these valuation issues, as decisions frequently prioritize political constituencies over economic efficiency, leading to suboptimal distributions amid scarcity. In transboundary settings, equitable sharing frameworks struggle with asymmetric power dynamics and differing national priorities; the UNECE Handbook identifies negotiation phases involving data-sharing and benefit allocation as prone to deadlock due to unverifiable claims of historical rights or future needs.[83] Administrative allocations, common in developing regions, often favor influential users like large agribusinesses, resulting in externalities such as groundwater overdraft—evident in India's Punjab region, where subsidized electricity for pumps has depleted aquifers at rates exceeding recharge by 80% in some districts.[84] Market-based instruments, such as cap-and-trade systems trialed in Australia's Murray-Darling Basin since 2007, demonstrate potential for reallocating water to higher-value uses, yielding agricultural output gains of up to 15% through efficiency trades, yet face resistance from entrenched users decrying "water grabs."[85] These challenges manifest in broader economic risks, with freshwater ecosystem degradation threatening up to $58 trillion in global value—equivalent to 60% of annual GDP—as reported by WWF in 2023, underscoring the underappreciation of water's role in supply chains for food, energy, and manufacturing.[86] Politically, reforming pricing to internalize scarcity costs encounters barriers like public opposition to perceived commodification of a basic need, necessitating tiered structures that safeguard minimal access while charging marginal users, as advocated in economic models for scarcity management.[87] In transboundary disputes, such as those over the Euphrates-Tigris, upstream dam constructions by Turkey since the 1980s have reduced downstream flows by 40-50%, prompting allocation models that incorporate bankruptcy theory to simulate fair divisions under deficit conditions, though implementation falters without enforceable verification.[88] Ultimately, integrating robust valuation—via input-output analyses linking water to sectoral productivity—into allocation policies remains constrained by data asymmetries and institutional biases favoring short-term gains over long-term sustainability.[89]Empirical Drivers of Scarcity: Population, Usage, and Technology
Global population has risen from approximately 2.5 billion in 1950 to over 8 billion in 2023, with projections estimating 9.7 billion by 2050, contributing to a forecasted 55% increase in total water demand by mid-century due to expanded human needs for food, sanitation, and industry.[90] This growth amplifies pressure on renewable freshwater resources, which total about 42,810 cubic kilometers annually but are unevenly distributed, with 2.5 billion people already facing high water stress in 2020.[91] However, empirical analyses indicate that population alone explains only a portion of rising demand; per capita consumption patterns, driven by urbanization and dietary shifts toward water-intensive crops and meat, often exert stronger causal influence, as evidenced by stagnant or declining per capita withdrawals in high-income nations despite population stability.[92] Water usage patterns reveal agriculture as the dominant consumer, accounting for roughly 70% of global freshwater withdrawals, primarily for irrigation to support staple crops like rice and wheat that require 1,000–4,000 liters per kilogram produced.[93] Industry follows at about 19%, encompassing cooling in power plants and manufacturing processes, while domestic use constitutes around 11%, focused on household sanitation and drinking.[94]| Sector | Share of Global Withdrawals | Primary Uses |
|---|---|---|
| Agriculture | ~70% | Irrigation for crops and livestock |
| Industry | ~19% | Thermoelectric power, manufacturing |
| Domestic | ~11% | Drinking, sanitation, hygiene |
International and Transboundary Dynamics
Major Shared Basins and Disputes (Nile, Mekong, Euphrates-Tigris)
The Nile River Basin, spanning 11 countries and covering 3.2 million square kilometers, is a focal point of transboundary water disputes primarily involving upstream Ethiopia and downstream Egypt and Sudan. Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), under construction since 2011 on the Blue Nile with a reservoir capacity of 74 billion cubic meters capable of storing two years of the river's flow, aims to generate 6,450 megawatts of hydropower to support Ethiopia's economic growth.[101] Egypt, which derives 97% of its renewable water from the Nile and relies on it for agriculture irrigating 96% of its arable land, views the GERD as an existential threat due to potential reductions in downstream flow affecting the Aswan High Dam's operations and increasing drought vulnerability.[102] Historical colonial-era agreements, including the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, allocated Egypt 55.5 billion cubic meters annually and Sudan 18.5 billion, excluding upstream states and granting Egypt veto power over projects, which Ethiopia rejects as inequitable given it contributes 85% of the Nile's flow via the Blue Nile.[101] Negotiations since 2015, mediated by the African Union and United States, have failed to yield a binding treaty on filling schedules or drought operations; Ethiopia proceeded with unilateral reservoir filling in July 2020 (740 million cubic meters) and 2021 (over 5 billion cubic meters), prompting Egypt to warn of military options and escalate to the UN Security Council in 2021.[101] Sudan experiences mixed impacts, with risks of flooding during filling but potential hydropower benefits and improved irrigation from regulated flow, though its civil war since 2023 has sidelined participation.[103] The Mekong River Basin, shared by six countries including upstream China and Myanmar and downstream Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, faces escalating disputes over hydropower development altering flow regimes and ecosystems. China has constructed 12 mainstream dams on the upper Mekong (known as the Lancang River) since 1993, with a combined capacity exceeding 21,000 megawatts, enabling water retention that exacerbates downstream droughts, as evidenced by the 2019-2020 low-flow crisis reducing Vietnam's Mekong Delta water levels by up to 1 meter and causing salinity intrusion affecting 1.6 million hectares of farmland.[104] Laos, pursuing hydropower exports, has built or approved over 100 dams, including controversial projects like the Luang Prabang Dam (1,460 MW, approved 2021), which downstream states criticize for blocking sediment vital for the delta's 50 million tons of annual deposition supporting Vietnam's rice production of 25 million tons from the region.[105] These developments have halved sediment delivery to the delta since 1990, threatening fisheries yielding $17 billion annually across the basin and displacing communities, while China's data-sharing under the 2020 Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism remains limited and non-binding.[104] The Mekong River Commission, established in 1995 by the lower riparian states, lacks enforcement power over upstream actors, leading Vietnam to pursue bilateral diplomacy and multilateral pressure amid geopolitical tensions, including U.S.-China rivalry, with no comprehensive basin-wide treaty resolving allocation or environmental impacts.[106] The Euphrates-Tigris Basin, originating in Turkey and flowing through Syria and Iraq with contributions from Iran, supplies critical water to an arid region but is marred by disputes over upstream dam construction reducing downstream shares. Turkey's Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), initiated in 1980, includes 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric plants controlling 40% of the Euphrates' headwaters, such as the Atatürk Dam (completed 1990, reservoir 48.7 billion cubic meters), which during initial filling diverted 70% of flow for months, prompting Iraq to lose up to 80% of its Euphrates supply in 1989-1990 and Syria to accuse Turkey of aggression.[69] A 1990 security protocol between Turkey and Syria mandates a minimum 500 cubic meters per second release from Turkey to Syria (with Syria passing 58% to Iraq), but lacks enforcement, leading to recurrent crises like the 2018-2020 droughts where Iraq's flows dropped 50% below normal, exacerbating agricultural losses for 70% of its irrigated land dependent on the rivers.[70] Iraq, receiving 70% of its water from the basin, faces compounded threats from Turkish dams like Ilisu (1,200 MW, operational 2020s) on the Tigris, ISIS sabotage of the Mosul Dam in 2014, and inefficient usage, with no trilateral treaty beyond ad hoc memoranda; Syria's civil war since 2011 has further strained coordination, as upstream control enables Turkey to leverage water for regional security objectives including countering Kurdish separatism.[107][70]Treaties, Commissions, and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, adopted in 1997 and entering into force on August 17, 2014, establishes principles of equitable and reasonable utilization and the obligation not to cause significant harm to other states sharing watercourses, applying to over 276 international drainage basins worldwide.[64][65] As of 2024, 39 states are parties, with notable absences including upstream powers like China and Turkey, limiting its enforcement in contested basins such as the Mekong and Euphrates-Tigris.[65] The convention provides a framework for dispute settlement through negotiation, fact-finding commissions, or referral to arbitration or the International Court of Justice, though its effectiveness depends on ratification and domestic implementation.[64] Basin-specific commissions facilitate cooperative management and data sharing. The Indus Waters Treaty of September 19, 1960, between India and Pakistan, allocates the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) primarily to India and the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan, with provisions for limited uses by the upstream state and resolution via a Permanent Indus Commission, neutral experts, or arbitration; it has endured three wars and mediated disputes over projects like India's Kishanganga dam.[51][108] The Nile Basin Initiative, established in 1999 by ten riparian states including Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia, promotes equitable utilization through shared investments in infrastructure and data exchange, though tensions persist over Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam without a binding allocation treaty.[109] The Mekong River Commission, formed in 1995 by Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam under the Agreement on Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, coordinates procedures for water use notifications and prior consultations on projects like dams, addressing upstream Laos' hydropower expansions amid downstream flood and fishery concerns.[110] In the Euphrates-Tigris basin, lacking a trilateral treaty, bilateral protocols govern flows: Turkey's 1987 protocol with Syria guarantees 500 cubic meters per second from the Euphrates, while Syria's 1990 accord with Iraq allocates 58% of Euphrates waters to Iraq and 42% to Syria, yet enforcement falters due to upstream damming reducing flows by up to 50% since the 1970s.[70][111] A 2021 Turkey-Iraq memorandum seeks data sharing and minimum flows, but without binding allocations, disputes recur amid droughts and non-state actors' interference.[70] Conflict resolution mechanisms often invoke ad hoc arbitration or third-party mediation, as in the International Joint Commission's role under the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty between the United States and Canada for Great Lakes management, which has resolved over 100 references through binational reference processes emphasizing empirical data on flows and harms.[112] Empirical analyses of over 800 transboundary agreements indicate that institutionalized commissions correlate with reduced violence, though upstream infrastructure investments frequently strain downstream relations absent robust enforcement.[113][114]Rising Incidents of Water-Related Violence (2020s Trends)
In the 2020s, documented instances of violence linked to water resources have surged globally, with the Pacific Institute recording 248 verified events in 2023 alone, compared to just 19 in 2010, marking a more than tenfold increase driven primarily by protests over shortages, pollution, and access disputes.[79] This escalation reflects compounding pressures from climate variability, population growth, and governance failures in water allocation, particularly in arid regions where economic and physical access to water directly precipitates unrest. Many incidents involve non-state actors clashing with authorities or each other, rather than interstate wars, underscoring water's role as a trigger for domestic instability rather than outright armed conflict between nations.[115] In Iran, acute water scarcity fueled widespread protests in Khuzestan province starting July 2021, where farmers and residents demonstrated against drought-exacerbated shortages and alleged mismanagement of upstream dams, leading to violent clashes with security forces that resulted in at least three civilian deaths and one police officer killed over six nights.[116] These events, dubbed the "Uprising of the Thirsty," spread to other areas like Isfahan and continued sporadically into 2022, with demonstrators blocking roads and setting fires amid government crackdowns involving tear gas and arrests.[117] Similar patterns emerged in Iraq, where severe droughts reduced Tigris and Euphrates inflows by upstream damming and climate impacts, prompting hundreds to protest water shortages in Babil province on July 25, 2025, amid temperatures exceeding 50°C, with demonstrators decrying failed infrastructure and corruption in distribution.[118] By October 2025, protests extended to Maysan, Basra, and Kirkuk over unpaid wages tied to agricultural collapse and irrigation bans, highlighting how water crises amplify socioeconomic grievances in the region.[119] Intra-state violence over water has also intensified in India, where the Pacific Institute attributes a portion of the global rise to interpersonal and communal conflicts, including homicides; a 2023 UNODC study found that disputes over water resources contributed to approximately one in five murders nationwide, often involving rival claims to wells or canals in water-stressed states like Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu.[120] In Mexico, criminal groups have exploited scarcity for profit through water theft and extortion, with cartels in Michoacán using violence to control illicit extraction from aquifers and pipelines, exacerbating tensions in rural areas where legal supplies have dwindled by up to 40% due to drought.[121] These cases illustrate a trend where water-related violence, while rarely escalating to full-scale wars, increasingly manifests as localized riots, killings, and organized crime, straining state capacity in vulnerable regions.[122]Domestic Policies and Governance
Property Rights Regimes and Allocation Systems
Water property rights regimes define the legal entitlements to use and transfer water resources within national boundaries, influencing how scarcity is managed and conflicts arise. In many jurisdictions, these regimes evolved from common law principles adapted to local hydrology and economic needs. The riparian doctrine, prevalent in water-abundant regions such as the eastern United States, grants landowners adjacent to a watercourse the right to reasonable use of the flow without significantly diminishing its quantity or quality for downstream users; during shortages, rights are typically shared proportionally among riparians.[123] This system assumes plentiful supply and prioritizes equitable access over efficiency, but it can discourage investment in storage or diversion due to vague boundaries and limited transferability.[124] In contrast, the prior appropriation doctrine, dominant in arid western U.S. states like Colorado and California, establishes "first in time, first in right" for beneficial uses such as irrigation or mining, requiring actual diversion and application to maintain the right.[125] Adopted during 19th-century settlement to facilitate agriculture amid scarcity, this regime quantifies entitlements in volume and allows trading or forfeiture for non-use, fostering markets that reallocate water to higher-value uses.[126] Empirical analysis indicates prior appropriation enabled irrigated farming to contribute up to 10-15% of GDP growth in western states by 1920 through expanded cultivation, though it has led to over-allocation exceeding sustainable yields in basins like the Colorado River.[126] Hybrid systems, combining elements of both, exist in states like Oklahoma, where riparian rights apply to streams but appropriation governs reservoirs.[127] Groundwater allocation often follows distinct rules, such as the common-law rule of capture permitting unlimited pumping by overlying owners, which has induced depletion in unconfined aquifers; regulatory overlays, including permit systems in Texas since 1953, impose pumping limits tied to safe yield estimates to mitigate the tragedy of the commons.[128] Internationally, domestic regimes vary: Australia's 2004 National Water Initiative established cap-and-trade markets for surface and groundwater entitlements, reducing overuse in the Murray-Darling Basin by 20-30% through transferable rights, though political resistance from irrigators delayed implementation.[129] In South Africa, post-1998 reforms under the National Water Act centralized allocation via licenses prioritizing basic human needs and ecological reserves, shifting from race-based riparian claims to administrative equity, yet enforcement challenges persist due to informal diversions.[130] Allocation systems operationalize these regimes through mechanisms like administrative permitting, where governments issue volumetric quotas based on priority dates or use types, as in California's Central Valley Project allocations favoring senior agricultural rights during droughts.[131] Market mechanisms, enabled by severable and transferable rights, have demonstrated efficiency gains; a study of Chilean water markets post-1981 privatization found trades reallocating 5-10% of entitlements annually to urban and industrial sectors, increasing overall value by reflecting scarcity prices.[130] Proportional or rotational sharing, common in farmer-managed systems in India and parts of the U.S., distributes fixed flows equitably but often incentivizes race-to-pump behavior in groundwater contexts.[132] Empirical evidence supports that well-defined, enforceable property rights reduce overextraction compared to open-access regimes; for instance, introducing priority rights in Spanish irrigation districts cut water use by 15-25% while maintaining yields through better scheduling.[133] However, political capture by entrenched users can entrench inefficient allocations, as seen in U.S. federal subsidies perpetuating low-value crops despite higher urban demands.[134] These regimes shape domestic water politics by pitting agricultural lobbies against urban growth, with reforms toward tradable rights often facing opposition despite evidence of net welfare gains.[135]Regulatory Frameworks: Subsidies, Pricing, and Efficiency
In many countries, domestic regulatory frameworks for water allocate resources through subsidies that often prioritize affordability over sustainability, resulting in distorted incentives and inefficient use. Agricultural water subsidies, which account for a significant portion of public expenditures in water-scarce regions, frequently cover operation and maintenance costs at rates below full recovery, encouraging over-extraction from aquifers and surface sources. For instance, in the western United States, federal subsidies for irrigation infrastructure have historically enabled low-cost access to water, leading to annual overuse estimated in the billions of cubic meters, as farmers expand cultivation of water-intensive crops without facing marginal costs. Similarly, flat-rate or unmetered subsidies in developing economies, such as those for groundwater pumping in parts of India and Pakistan, have contributed to aquifer depletion rates exceeding recharge by 20-50% in key basins, exacerbating scarcity without proportional productivity gains.[136][137][138] Pricing mechanisms under these frameworks typically fail to reflect full economic costs, including environmental externalities like depletion and pollution, which undermines efficiency. Low or zero volumetric pricing signals abundance, prompting households and industries to consume 20-50% more than under cost-reflective tariffs, as evidenced by comparative studies across OECD countries where subsidized urban water led to higher per capita use without improving access equity. Reforms toward full cost recovery, incorporating capital, operational, and environmental charges, have demonstrated conservation benefits; for example, tiered pricing implementations in Chinese agricultural districts reduced water application by 15-25% while maintaining crop yields through better allocation, as farmers shifted to higher-value uses. In contrast, subsidies for irrigation efficiency technologies, such as drip systems, often trigger rebound effects where total withdrawals increase due to expanded irrigated area, negating net savings at the basin level.[139][140][141] Regulatory efforts to enhance efficiency include mandates for metering and leak detection, which, when paired with progressive pricing, yield measurable reductions in losses—up to 30% in municipal systems adopting universal metering, per World Bank analyses of urban reforms. However, political resistance to subsidy phase-outs persists due to short-term affordability concerns, even as empirical data from pricing adjustments in water-stressed areas show long-term gains in both supply sustainability and user welfare through reinvested revenues for infrastructure. These frameworks highlight a causal tension: while subsidies address immediate access barriers, they systematically erode incentives for conservation, with full cost recovery emerging as a mechanism to align pricing with scarcity realities and promote adaptive efficiency.[142][143][144]Infrastructure Development: Dams, Irrigation, and Desalination
Large dams serve as critical infrastructure for water storage, hydropower generation, and flood control, but their development frequently intensifies political tensions, particularly in transboundary basins. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), initiated in 2011 on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia, illustrates this dynamic; with a planned capacity of 6,450 megawatts, it aims to generate over 15,000 megawatts of electricity potential for the region but has provoked disputes with downstream Egypt and Sudan, which fear reductions in Nile flows by up to 25% during initial filling phases, potentially affecting irrigation and hydropower at Egypt's High Aswan Dam.[145][101] Negotiations stalled as of 2023 without a binding agreement on filling schedules or drought operations, highlighting how upstream infrastructure asserts sovereignty while downstream states invoke historical treaties like the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement allocating 55.5 billion cubic meters annually to Egypt.[146] Empirical assessments indicate large dams trap 1-3% of global sediment flux, reducing downstream delta fertility and contributing to coastal erosion, as observed in the Nile Delta where sedimentation has declined by 50-80% post-Aswan.[147] Irrigation systems, expanding globally to support agriculture—which consumes approximately 70% of freshwater withdrawals—often rely on politically subsidized infrastructure that incentivizes inefficiency and overuse. In regions like South Asia, low water pricing and free electricity for pumps have led to groundwater depletion rates exceeding recharge by 20-30% annually in parts of India and Pakistan, fostering domestic conflicts over resource allocation.[148][138] Between 2000 and 2020, over half of new irrigated area developed in already water-stressed basins, amplifying scarcity; for instance, U.S. data from 2023 shows 45% of irrigation water sourced from surface supplies, with subsidies distorting markets and delaying efficiency technologies like drip systems, which recover only 10-20% of potential savings without policy reform.[149][150] Politically, these subsidies sustain rural constituencies but externalize costs, including salinization affecting 20% of irrigated lands worldwide and reduced aquifer sustainability.[151] Desalination infrastructure emerges as a strategic response to scarcity in arid politics, bypassing river dependencies through seawater processing, though its high energy demands—typically 3-4 kilowatt-hours per cubic meter for reverse osmosis—tie it to fossil fuel subsidies or nuclear integration. The Middle East accounts for 45.9% of global capacity, producing 68 million cubic meters daily as of 2024, with Saudi Arabia's Ras Al-Khair plant at 1,036,000 cubic meters per day exemplifying scale for domestic security.[152][153] Israel's program, operational since the 2000s, supplies 70-80% of municipal water via plants like Sorek (624,000 cubic meters daily since 2013), enabling agricultural exports amid blockade politics and reducing reliance on Jordan River allocations disputed with neighbors.[154] This shift has geopolitical implications, as Gulf states invest billions—projected market growth to $16.9 billion by 2033—to insulate against shared aquifer depletion, though brine discharge elevates local salinity by 1-2 parts per thousand, straining marine ecosystems without transboundary accords.[155] Overall, such developments underscore causal trade-offs: dams and irrigation prioritize volume control at ecological costs, while desalination offers independence but demands fiscal realism to avoid overextension.[156]Economic Dimensions
Market Mechanisms and Pricing Reforms
Market mechanisms in water allocation, such as tradable water entitlements and scarcity-based pricing, aim to reallocate resources from lower- to higher-value uses by reflecting supply constraints through economic signals rather than administrative fiat.[157] These approaches, often implemented via cap-and-trade systems or volumetric pricing reforms, have been adopted in regions facing chronic scarcity to incentivize conservation and efficiency, drawing on principles of property rights to minimize rent-seeking and over-extraction.[158] Empirical studies indicate that functional water markets can reduce waste by enabling transfers during droughts, with prices rising to curb demand; for instance, in Australia's southern Murray-Darling Basin, water prices effectively signaled scarcity levels from 2007 to 2021, facilitating reallocations that enhanced overall basin productivity.[157] However, success depends on clear, enforceable rights and low transaction costs, as informal exchanges precede formal markets in scarcity-prone areas with pre-existing entitlements.[159] Pricing reforms, shifting from subsidized flat rates to tiered or marginal-cost structures, have demonstrated demand reductions in empirical trials. In China, post-2015 urban residential pricing adjustments lowered annual water use by 3-4% in treated cities compared to controls, per difference-in-differences analysis, though long-term conservation required complementary enforcement.[160] Agricultural reforms under China's integrated water pricing policy increased farmer incomes by 31.9% while promoting crop shifts away from high-consumption varieties, underscoring how price signals can align incentives without infrastructure overhauls.[161] Yet, political resistance arises from incumbent users benefiting from historical subsidies, often leading to hybrid systems where full marginal pricing is diluted to mitigate short-term shocks.[162] Case studies reveal mixed outcomes on efficiency versus externalities. Chile's 1981 Water Code, establishing tradable rights without extraction limits, spurred private investment and agricultural expansion, with markets reallocating water to higher-value exports like fruit orchards by the 1990s; empirical data from 1990 onward showed transfers averaging 50-100 million cubic meters annually in key basins, boosting GDP contributions from irrigated sectors.[163] [164] In California's Central Valley, temporary water transfers during the 2012-2016 drought saved an estimated $400 million in agricultural losses by shifting supply from fallow fields to permanent crops, though permanent markets remain constrained by conveyance barriers.[165] Critiques highlight equity risks, as markets can exacerbate disparities by favoring wealthier buyers, potentially displacing smallholders; in Chile, unregulated hoarding depleted streams, harming ecosystems and indigenous communities, prompting 2021 reforms to prioritize human consumption and minimum flows.[166] [167] Environmental safeguards, such as return-flow requirements or ecological reservations, are essential to internalize externalities, as unchecked trading has led to aquifer overdraft or river dewatering in semiarid settings.[168] Overall, while markets outperform rigid quotas in dynamic scarcity scenarios—evidenced by 10-20% efficiency gains in traded volumes across Australian and Chilean basins—political implementation hinges on balancing allocative gains against distributive impacts, often requiring compensatory transfers or caps to sustain public support.[169] In politically contested contexts, such as transboundary basins, hybrid mechanisms blending markets with oversight have proven more resilient than pure privatization, averting conflicts over windfall gains.[170]Privatization Outcomes: Empirical Evidence from Global Cases
Empirical studies on water privatization reveal mixed outcomes, with improvements in operational efficiency and infrastructure investment in some regulated environments, but frequent challenges in affordability, access equity, and contract stability, particularly in developing economies where regulatory capacity is limited. A World Bank analysis of global case studies found enhancements in labor productivity, operating costs, and service reliability in select instances, yet no consistent superiority over public management across metrics like coverage or leakage reduction.[171] Similarly, econometric reviews indicate no statistically significant efficiency gains from private operation compared to public utilities when controlling for investment levels and regulatory oversight.[172] In Manila, Philippines, privatization via concessions in 1997 yielded notable successes for one operator, Manila Water, which reduced non-revenue water losses from 63% to 13% by 2022 through network rehabilitation and metering, while expanding household connections from 67% to 99% and providing 24-hour supply to 98% of served customers.[173] The counterpart, Maynilad, faced initial financial distress from currency devaluation but later improved coverage and quality under renegotiated terms, contributing to overall metro-wide access gains from 67% pre-privatization to near-universal by the 2010s.[174] These results stemmed from performance-based contracts with incentives for efficiency, though critics note persistent disparities in poor areas without targeted subsidies.[175] Conversely, the 1999 privatization in Cochabamba, Bolivia, collapsed within months amid the "Water War" protests, triggered by tariff increases of up to 200% under the Aguas del Tunari consortium, which prioritized cost recovery over subsidies for low-income users.[176] Pre-privatization coverage stood at around 76%, but post-renationalization in 2000, the public utility restored affordability yet struggled with sustained investment, resulting in stagnant sewage treatment at 53% and no net access gains.[177] The failure highlighted risks in weak regulatory frameworks, where foreign investors demanded full cost recovery without adequate protections for vulnerable populations, leading to contract termination and political backlash.[178] In the United Kingdom, full privatization of water and sewerage in 1989 facilitated £100 billion in infrastructure investments by 2020s standards, markedly improving river quality compliance from 39% in 1990 to over 90% by 2010 through mandated environmental upgrades.[179] However, customer bills rose 50% in the first four years and 40% above inflation over 17 years, funding dividends and debt accumulation rather than proportional efficiency gains, with productivity improvements largely predating privatization.[180][172] Studies attribute limited operational efficiencies to retained public-like regulation, underscoring that capital access, not ownership form, drove upgrades.[181] France's concession model, dominant since the 19th century, initially lowered unit costs by 20-30% in some municipalities through private operators like Veolia and Suez, but performance varied with contract terms, and over 100 remunicipalizations occurred by 2020 due to price hikes exceeding 10% upon renewal.[182] In Marseille, privatization from 1988 correlated with bill increases of 60-100% by 2013, prompting remunicipalization in 2014, which cut prices by 15-20% while maintaining service levels, suggesting public management can match efficiency under strong oversight.[183] Empirical comparisons show no absolute private advantage, with outcomes hinging on competitive bidding and tariff caps rather than privatization per se.[179]| Case | Key Outcome Metrics | Challenges |
|---|---|---|
| Manila (1997-) | NRW: 63% → 13%; Coverage: 67% → 99% | Affordability in slums; initial operator distress |
| Cochabamba (1999) | Tariffs +200%; Contract canceled | Protests; No access gains post-failure |
| UK (1989-) | River quality: 39% → 90%; Investments £100bn | Bills +40% real; High debt/dividends |
| France (ongoing) | Costs -20-30% initially; 100+ remunicipalizations | Price hikes at renewal; Variable equity |
