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The dying, half-naked 'Turk' slips down along with his weapons. The body of the vanquished serves as a stepping stone for the transfigured Christian to ascend toward heaven. The baroque apotheosis (1738) above the Capistrano pulpit on the north side of St Stephen's Cathedral in Vienna shows John of Capistrano, canonized in 1690, as the vanquisher of the 'Turks'. Moreover, until after 1945 the inscription '1683 -schau Mahomet, du Hunt' (1683 -Look Muhammad, You Dog) hung resplendent above the main entrance of the cathedral. It was only removed by order of Cardinal Franz König.
"The dying, half-naked 'Turk' slips down along with his weapons. The body of the vanquished serves as a stepping stone for the transfigured Christian to ascending toward heaven. The baroque apotheosis (1738) above the Capistrano pulpit on the north side of St Stephen's Cathedral in Vienna shows John of Capistrano, canonized in 1690, as the vanquisher of the 'Turks'. Moreover, until after 1945 the inscription "1683 -schau Mahomet, du Hunt" (1683 -Look Muhammad, You Dog) hung resplendent above the main entrance of the cathedral. It was only removed by order of Cardinal Franz König."[1]

Anti-Turkish sentiment, also known as Anti-Turkism (Turkish: Türk karşıtlığı), or Turkophobia (Turkish: Türkofobi) is hostility, intolerance, or xenophobia against Turkish people, Turkish culture, and the Turkish language.[2][3]

The term refers to not only against Turks across all regions, but also against the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, as well as descendants of ethnic Turks such as Syrian Turkmen and Iraqi Turkmen. It is also applied to groups who developed in part under the influence of Turkish culture and traditions while converting to Islam, especially during the time of the Ottoman Empire, such as Albanians, Bosniaks and other smaller ethnic groups around Balkans.[4][5][page needed]

Early modern period

[edit]

In the early modern period, the fall of Constantinople and the Ottoman wars in Europe—part of European Christians' effort to stem the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, the predecessor to Turkey—helped fuel the development of anti-Turkism. By the middle of the 15th century, special masses called missa contra Turcos (Latin for "mass against Turks") were held in various places in Europe[6][7] to spread the message that victory over the Ottomans was only possible with the help of God and that a Christian community was therefore necessary to withstand the Turks.[6][8]

16th century

[edit]

As the Ottomans expanded their empire west, Western Europe came into more frequent contact with the Turks, often militarily.

During the Fourth Ottoman–Venetian War, the Ottomans conquered Cyprus.

In the 16th century, around 2,500 publications about the Turks—including more than 1,000 in German—were released in Europe, spreading the image of the "bloodthirsty Turk". From 1480 to 1610, twice as many books were published about the Turkish threat to Europe than about the discovery of the New World. Bishop Johann Faber of Vienna claimed, "There are no crueler and more audacious villains under the heavens than the Turks, who spare no age or sex and mercilessly cut down young and old alike and pluck unripe fruit from the wombs of mothers."[7]

Original prints from the 16th century at the Hungarian National Museum depict a Turkish warrior butchering infants.

During this time, the Ottoman Empire also invaded the Balkans and besieged Vienna, sparking widespread fear in Europe, and especially in Germany.[9] Martin Luther, the German leader of the Protestant Reformation, took advantage of these fears by asserting that the Turks were "the agents of the Devil who, along with the Antichrist located in the heart of the Catholic Church, Rome, would usher in the Last Days and the Apocalypse".[10]

Luther believed that the Ottoman invasion was God's punishment of Christians for allowing corruption in the Holy See and the Catholic Church.[11] In 1518, when he defended his 95 Theses, Luther claimed that God had sent the Turks to punish Christians just as he had sent war, plague, and earthquakes. (In response, Pope Leo X issued a papal bull in which he threatened Luther with excommunication and portrayed him as a troublemaker who advocated capitulation to the Turks.)[7] In his writings On War Against the Turk and Military Sermon Against the Turks, Luther was "consistent in his theological conception of the Turks as a manifestation of God's chastising rod". He and his followers also espoused the view that the Ottoman–Habsburg Wars were a conflict "between Christ and Antichrist" or "between God and the devil".[12]

Spurred by this argument, the Portuguese Empire, seeking to capture more land in East Africa and other parts of the world, used any encounter with the "Terrible Turk" as "a prime opportunity to establish credentials as champions of the faith on par with other Europeans".[13]

Stories of the "dog-Turk" reinforced the negative image. The dog-Turk was claimed to be a man-eating being, half-animal and half-human, with a dog's head and tail. After the Battle of Vienna in 1683, the image of the dog-Turk became a figure used to ridicule Turks in carnival processions and masquerades, where "dog-Turk" characters began to appear alongside witches and clowns.[7]

17th–18th centuries

[edit]

In Sweden, the Turks were portrayed as the archenemies of Christianity. A book by the parish priest Erland Dryselius of Jönköping, published in 1694, was titled Luna Turcica eller Turkeske måne, anwissjandes lika som uti en spegel det mahometiske vanskelige regementet, fördelter uti fyra qvarter eller böcker ("Turkish moon showing as in a mirror the dangerous Mohammedan rule, divided into four quarters or books"). In sermons, the Swedish clergy preached about the Turks' cruelty and bloodthirstiness, and how they systematically burned and plundered the areas they conquered. In a Swedish schoolbook published in 1795, Islam was described as "the false religion that had been fabricated by the great deceiver Muhammad, to which the Turks to this day universally confess".[7]

In 1718, James Puckle demonstrated two versions of his new invention, the Puckle gun: a tripod-mounted, single-barreled flintlock weapon fitted with a revolving cylinder, designed to prevent intruders from boarding a ship. The first version, intended for use against Christian enemies, fired conventional round bullets. The second, intended for use against the Muslim Ottomans, fired square bullets, designed by Kyle Tunis, which were believed to be more damaging and would, according to Puckle's patent, convince the Turks of the "benefits of Christian civilization".[14]

Voltaire and other European writers described the Turks as tyrants who destroyed Europe's heritage; with Voltaire characterizing Turks as "tyrants of the women and enemies of arts" and "barbarian usurpers who must be chased out of Europe."[7] In his book Orientalism, Edward Said noted, "Until the end of the seventeenth century the 'Ottoman peril' lurked alongside Europe to represent for the whole of Christian civilization a constant danger, and in time European civilization incorporated that peril and its lore, its great events, figures, virtues, and vices, as something woven into the fabric of life."[15]

Anti-Turkism by Ottoman ruling class

[edit]

Within the ruling class, Ottomans, called themselves "Osmanlı", to note a person of higher intellect and education with proficiency in Persian and Arabic literature, while the word "Turk" was used to discriminate against the nomad Turkomans of the steppes and Khurasan, and the illiterate Anatolian peasantry, and ethnic slurs such as Eşek Türk (donkey Turk) and Kaba Türk (rude Turk) were used to describe them. Other expressions included were "Turk-head" and "Turk-person".[16][17][18] Within the Ottoman Empire, the term of "Etrak-i bi-idrak" was sometimes used to denote the Yörük backwoodsmen, bumpkins, and nomad Turkomans in Anatolia. "Etrak-i bi-idrak", an Ottoman play on words, meant "the ignorant Turk". Another similar phrase was "Türk-i-bed-lika" which meant "the ugly-faced Turk".[19][20]

Özay Mehmet, an academic of Turkish Cypriot descent, wrote in his book Islamic Identity and Development: Studies of the Islamic Periphery:[21]

The ordinary Turks [Turkmen, or Yörüks] did not have a sense of belonging to a ruling ethnic group. In particular, they had a confused sense of self-image. Who were they: Turks, Muslims or Ottomans? Their literature was sometimes Persian, sometimes Arabic, but always courtly and elitist. There was always a huge social and cultural distance between the Imperial centre and the Anatolian periphery. As Bernard Lewis expressed it: "In the Imperial society of the Ottomans the ethnic term Turk was little used, and then chiefly in a rather derogatory sense, to designate the Turcoman nomads or, later, the ignorant and uncouth Turkish-speaking peasants of the Anatolian villages." (Lewis 1968: 1) In the words of a British observer of the Ottoman values and institutions at the start of the twentieth century: "The surest way to insult an Ottoman gentleman is to call him a 'Turk'. His face will straightway wear the expression a Londoner's assumes, when he hears himself frankly styled a Cockney. He is no Turk, no savage, he will assure you, but an Ottoman subject of the Sultan, by no means to be confounded with certain barbarians styled Turcomans, and from whom indeed, on the male side, he may possibly be descended." (Davey 1907: 209)

Modern history

[edit]

Before the 1960s, Turkey had a relatively low rate of emigration.[22] However, after the adoption of a new constitution in 1961, Turkish citizens began to migrate elsewhere.[23] Gradually, Turks became a "prominent ethnic minority group" in some Western countries.[24][25] But from the beginning, they were subject to discrimination. At times, when host countries adopted more immigrant-friendly policies, "only the Turkish workers were excluded" from them.[26]

In various European languages, the word "Turk" has acquired a meaning similar to "barbarian" or "heathen",[7][27][28] or is used as a slur or curse.[7][29] As a result, the word also has some negative connotations in the United States.[30]

Arab World

[edit]

The Arab World has a long history of mixed relations with the Turks back from the Ottoman Empire. In the past, the Ottoman conquest had absorbed a large number of Arab countries into its map, ultimately opened a chapter of a complicated relationship between Turks and Arabs. While both are Muslim majority, subsequent conflict of interests and the growing Turkification and nationalist movement had led to growing anti-Arabism among Turks, especially following the Arab Revolt during the First World War.[31]

Iraq

[edit]

The fear of Turkish influence has always dominated Iraq and as such, relationship between Iraq and Turkey has always been tense.[32]

The position of the Iraqi Turkmen has changed from being administrative and business classes of the Ottoman Empire to an increasingly discriminated against minority.[33] Since the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the Iraqi Turkmen have been victims of several massacres, such as the Kirkuk Massacre of 1959. Furthermore, under the Ba'ath Party, the persecution of Iraqi Turkmen increased, with several leaders being executed in 1979[33] as well as the Iraqi Turkmen community being victims of Arabization policies by the state, and Kurdification by Kurds seeking to push them forcibly out of their homeland.[34] Thus, they have suffered from various degrees of suppression and assimilation that ranged from political persecution and exile to terror and ethnic cleansing. Despite being recognized in the 1925 constitution as a constitutive entity, the Iraqi Turkmen were later denied this status; hence, cultural rights were gradually taken away and activists were sent to exile.[33]

In 1924, the Iraqi Turkmen were seen as a disloyal remnant of the Ottoman Empire, with a natural tie to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's new Turkish nationalist ideology emerging in the Republic of Turkey.[35] The Iraqi Turkmen living in the region of Kirkuk were perceived as posing a threat to the stability of Iraq, particularly as they did not support the ascendancy of King Faisal I to the Iraqi throne.[35] On May 4, these tensions boiled over into violence when soldiers from the Iraq Levies- a levied force raised by the British government after the First World War and consisting primarily of Assyrians- clashed with Turkmen in a Kirkuk market square after a dispute between an Assyrian soldier and a Turkmen shopkeeper. In the ensuing fracas, 200 Turkmen were killed by Assyrian soldiers.[35]

Around 20 Iraqi Turkmen civilians were killed by the Iraqi police including women and children on 12 July 1946 in Gavurbağı, Kirkuk.[36][37]

The Kirkuk massacre of 1959 came about due to the Iraqi government allowing the Iraqi Communist Party, which in Kirkuk was largely Kurdish, to target the Iraqi Turkmen.[33][38] With the appointment of Maarouf Barzinji, a Kurd, as the mayor of Kirkuk in July 1959, tensions rose following the 14 July revolution celebrations, with animosity in the city polarizing rapidly between the Kurds and Iraqi Turkmen. On 14 July 1959, fights broke out between the Iraqi Turkmen and Kurds, leaving some 20 Iraqi Turkmen dead.[39] Furthermore, on 15 July 1959, Kurdish soldiers of the Fourth Brigade of the Iraqi army mortared Iraqi Turkmen residential areas, destroying 120 houses.[39][40] Order was restored on 17 July by military units from Baghdad. The Iraqi government referred to the incident as a "massacre"[41] and stated that between 31 and 79 Iraqi Turkmen were killed and some 130 injured.[39]

Turks protesting in Amsterdam, the banner reads: 'Kirkuk is an Iraqi city with Turkmen characteristics'.

In 1980, Saddam Hussein's government adopted a policy of assimilation of its minorities. Due to government relocation programs, thousands of Iraqi Turkmen were relocated from their traditional homelands in northern Iraq and replaced by Arabs, in an effort to Arabize the region.[42] Furthermore, Iraqi Turkmen villages and towns were destroyed to make way for Arab migrants, who were promised free land and financial incentives. For example, the Ba'ath regime recognized that the city of Kirkuk was historically an Iraqi Arab city and remained firmly in its cultural orientation.[38] Thus, the first wave of Arabization saw Arab families move from the center and south of Iraq into Kirkuk to work in the expanding oil industry. Although the Iraqi Turkmen were not actively forced out, new Arab quarters were established in the city and the overall demographic balance of the city changed as the Arab migrations continued.[38]

Several presidential decrees and directives from state security and intelligence organizations indicate that the Iraqi Turkmen were a particular focus of attention during the Ba'athist Arabization campaigns in northern Iraq. For example, the Iraqi Military Intelligence issued directive 1559 on 6 May 1980 ordering the deportation of Iraqi Turkmen officials from Kirkuk, issuing the following instructions: "identify the places where Turkmen officials are working in governmental offices [in order] to deport them to other governorates in order to disperse them and prevent them from concentrating in this governorate [Kirkuk]".[43] In addition, on 30 October 1981, the Revolution's Command Council issued decree 1391, which authorized the deportation of Iraqi Turkmen from Kirkuk with paragraph 13 noting that "this directive is specially aimed at Turkmen and Kurdish officials and workers who are living in Kirkuk".[43]

As primary victims of these Arabization policies, the Iraqi Turkmen suffered from land expropriation and job discrimination, and therefore would register themselves as "Arabs" in order to avoid discrimination.[44] Thus, ethnic cleansing was an element of the Ba'thist policy aimed at reducing the influence of the Iraqi Turkmen in northern Iraq's Kirkuk.[45] Those Iraqi Turkmen who remained in cities such as Kirkuk were subject to continued assimilation policies;[45] school names, neighborhoods, villages, streets, markets and even mosques with names of Turkic origin were changed to names that emanated from the Ba'th Party or from Arab heroes.[45] Moreover, many Iraqi Turkmen villages and neighborhoods in Kirkuk were simply demolished, particularly in the 1990s.[45]

Over 135 Turkmens were massacred in 1991 during the Gulf War by the Iraqi Army.[46][47]

Iraqi Turkmen woman holding a placard written in Turkish: Kerkük'ü hiçbir güç Kürtleştiremez ("No power can Kurdify Kirkuk").

The Kurds claimed de facto sovereignty over land that Iraqi Turkmen regards as theirs. For the Iraqi Turkmen, their identity is deeply inculcated as the rightful inheritors of the region as a legacy of the Ottoman Empire.[48] Thus, it is claimed that the Kurdistan Region and Iraqi government has constituted a threat to the survival of the Iraqi Turkmen through strategies aimed at eradicating or assimilating them.[48] The largest concentration of Iraqi Turkmen tended to be in Tal Afar. The formation of the Kurdistan Region in 1991 created high animosity between the Kurds and Iraqi Turkmen, resulting in some Iraqi Turkmen being victims of Kurdification, according to the Liam Anderson. The largest concentration of Iraqi Turkmen tended to be in the de facto capital of Erbil, a city in which they had assumed prominent administrative and economic positions. Thus, they increasingly came into dispute and often conflict with the ruling powers of the city, which after 1996 was the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Massoud Barzani.[49]

According to Anderson and Stansfield, in the 1990s, tension between the Kurds and Iraqi Turkmen inflamed as the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were institutionalized as the political hegemons of the region and, from the perspective of the Iraqi Turkmen, sought to marginalize them from the positions of authority and to subsume their culture with an all-pervading Kurdistani identity. With the support of Ankara, a new political front of Turkmen parties, the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF), was formed on 24 April 1995.[49] The relationship between the Iraqi Turkmen Front and the KDP was tense and deteriorated as the decade went on. Iraqi Turkmen associated with the Iraqi Turkmen Front complained about harassment by Kurdish security forces.[49] In March 2000, the Human Rights Watch reported that the KDP's security attacked the offices of the ITF in Erbil, killing two guards, following a lengthy period of disputes between the two parties.[49] In 2002, the KDP created an Iraqi Turkmen political organization, the Turkmen National Association, that supported the further institutionalization of the Kurdistan Region. This was viewed by pro-ITF Iraqi Turkmen as a deliberate attempt to "buy off" Iraqi Turkmen opposition and break their bonds with Ankara.[50] Promoted by the KDP as the "true voice" of the Iraqi Turkmen, the Turkmen National Association has a pro-Kurdistani stance and has effectively weakened the ITF as the sole representative voice of the Iraqi Turkmen.[50] Beginning in 2003, there were riots between Kurds and Turkmen in Kirkuk, a city that Turkmen view as historically theirs.[51] According to United Nations reports, the KRG and Peshmerga were "illegally policing Kirkurk, abducting Turkmen and Arabs and subjecting them to torture". In Tal Afar, between 2003 and 2006, 1,350 Turkmens died and thousands of houses were damaged or demolished, resulting in 4,685 displaced families, largely stemming from sectarian tensions. Later, the Islamic State committed the Iraqi Turkmen genocide.[51]

Libya

[edit]

As for the result of the current Libyan conflict since 2014, Libya was divided into two, where the Government of National Accord in Tripoli enjoys military support from Turkey. This has fueled tensions between Ankara and the Tobruk-based government, and anti-Turkish policies have been pursued by them, [example needed] In 2019, the Tobruk-based army had arrested Turkish nationals, accusing them of sponsoring terrorism.[52] In 2020, over 15 Turkish nationals have been taken into custody for the same reason.[53] Haftar had also ordered shooting down any Turkish ships and interests, banning flights to Turkey.[54]

Saudi Arabia

[edit]

Saudi Arabia has a very tense relationship with Turkey, owing it to Ottoman-Saudi War when the Saudis were defeated by the Ottomans, which contributed to the Turkish rule for another century before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and its alliance with the Al-Rashid family against the Al-Saud.[55][56] The tensions rekindled in the 21st century with Erdoğan's desire to "revive the Ottoman Empire", which draws Saudi Arabia to be more antagonistic to Turkey.[57][58] Saudi Arabia has since then made numerous policies, such as labeling the Ottoman Empire as the occupants of Arabia, financing movies that are deemed anti-Turkish,[59][60] and recently, banning Turkish websites and leading boycotts against Turkey.[61][62]

Syria

[edit]

From the French mandate era to the Assad regime, the Turkish culture and language have perished for a section of the Syrian Turkmen community.[63] Many Syrian Turkmen have become Arabized and assimilated in areas where they form a minority. Consequently, Arabization is mainly an exception in areas where the Syrian Turkmen live in areas where they form a significant population, where they have continued to maintain their Turkish identity and language despite discriminative state policies.[63]

Since the Turkish annexation of Sanjak of Alexandretta, there is a strong anti-Turkish sentiment among the Syrian population.[64] For the Syrians, the annexation of Alexandretta became a national wound and a symbol of increasing Turkish meddling of Syrian affairs. This had led to the beginning of anti-Turkish discrimination, intensified under the government of Hafez al-Assad and the Arabization process. Syrian Turkmen, suffered discrimination over employment and education and were forbidden from writing and publishing in their native Turkish dialect.[65]

Syrian Turkmen occupied a low rung on the societal ladder, as reported by Al Bawaba, it was stated that Assad always sought to benefit his politically dominant Shiite religious minority. The report quoted Bayırbucak Turkmen as highlighting, "They would take Alawites first no matter what, even if they had degrees, Turkmen couldn't find jobs".[66]

With the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, Syrian Turkmen had sided with the Syrian opposition,[67] which fed the growth of anti-Turkism in Syria. The Syrian Armed Forces, with Russian support, often bombed Syrian Turkmen positions as well as increased xenophobic attacks against Turkmen, accusing them of being Ankara's stooge.[68]

United Arab Emirates

[edit]

In December 2017, the UAE's foreign minister, Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, shared a tweet that claimed an Ottoman general had robbed Medina during Ottoman rule. Emirati diplomat Anwar Gargash then added, "The sectarian and partisan view is not an acceptable alternative, and the Arab world will not be led by Tehran or Ankara."[69]

Kurds

[edit]

A 2013 study showed that 13.2% of the Kurds in Turkey had a negative view of Turks. Other numbers include 22.3% who would not accept a Turkish son/daughter-in-law and 5% who would not want to live next to a Turk. The study also showed that left-oriented Kurds were less likely to show tolerance towards Turks, while religious affiliation did not play any significance.[70]

Europe

[edit]

According to Fatma Müge Göçek the main reasons for anti-Turkish sentiment in Western Europe are Armenian genocide denial and the role of Turkish migrant workers in the economy.[71]

Albania

[edit]

In the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, Islamic culture and life was destroyed through state policies and a group of Albanian historians, often with nationalist perspectives promoted in their literature "the Turkish savagery" and Albanian Christian resistance toward the Ottoman Empire. Scholars who opposed anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim narratives were subjected to ostracism and penalties.[72]

In the 2010s, opposition to Turkey building mosques in Albania or exerting its political influence exists among part of the population. They view Turkey as an interfering or autocratic power and Islam as a negative imposed Ottoman legacy.[73][74]

Bulgaria

[edit]
Turkish refugees from the Veliko Tarnovo district coming into Shumen (1877).
The Bulgarian Martyresses, by Konstantin Makovsky (1877). A painting from the April Uprising, it sparked outrage in the West against Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria.

Before 1878, Turks accounted for an estimated one-third of the population of Bulgaria.[75] In 1876, approximately 70% of the country's arable land belonged to Turks. This number declined from 1923 to 1949, when an estimated 220,000 Turks moved from Bulgaria to Turkey, a migration encouraged by the Turkish government. Another wave of about 155,000 left Bulgaria from 1949 to 1951, many of them forcibly expelled.[76][77]

In 1984, the government implemented Bulgarisation policies to culturally assimilate Bulgarian Turks. Approximately 800,000 Turks were forced to adopt Bulgarian names. Furthermore, Bulgarian Turks were not allowed to use their Muslim names, speak Turkish in public places, or attend Muslim ceremonies.[78] This assimilation campaign was labelled as an attempt for national revival and was called "The Revival Process".[79]

On 24 December 1984, in the village of Mlechino, Bulgarian police and security forces shot at Turkish protesters when some 200 Turkish villagers from nearby smaller towns gathered to protest for the return of their passports and reinstatement of their Turkish names.

In many Turkish populated areas in Bulgaria, People from smaller towns and villages attempted to gather in larger towns with a government official with greater jurisdiction, to protest against the assimilation policies. These towns were often barricaded by Bulgarian security forces.[80]

On 25 December 1984, close to the town of Benkovski, some 3,000 Turkish protesters from the nearby smaller villages confronted Bulgarian security forces and demanded to have their original identification papers back. The Bulgarian security forces managed to disperse the crowd and urged them to go back to their villages and inquire from the local mayors. After returning to their towns and discovering that the local municipality didn't have their passports and ID documentation the crowd marched back towards the town of Benkovski on the next day (26 December 1984). About 500 armed personnel from Bulgarian security forces were in position. The police presence in the area was previously increased under the guise of "exercise manoeuvres". When the crowd of 2,000 Turkish villagers approached the Bulgarian security forces opened fire with automatic weapons, wounding 8 people and killing 4. One of the killed was a 17-month-old Turkish baby.[81] The victims were from the villages of Kayaloba, Kitna and Mogiljane. The gunshot wounds suggest that the security force had been aiming at the midsection of the bodies. The captured demonstrators were faced down on the snow for 2 hours and blasted with cold water coming from the fire fighting trucks. In a report by Atanas Kadirev the head of the Ministry of Interior Forces in Kardzhali stated "It was interesting how they endured the entire water from the fire fighters' cisterns". The temperature that day was minus 15 degrees Celsius.[80][82]

On the same day, 26 December 1984, in the village of Gruevo, situated in Momchilgrad county, the Turkish community temporarily resisted the entry of security forces vehicles into the village by burning truck tires on the main road, but the security forces returned at night with reinforcements. The electricity to the village was cut. The villagers organized at the village entrance but were blasted with water from fire trucks. The security forces opened fire at the villagers and several civilians were wounded and killed. The wounded were refused medical treatment. There are reports of incarcerated Turks allegedly committing suicide while held for police questioning.[83][84][85] In demonstrations in Momchilgrad at least one 16-year-old was shot and killed and there are reports of casualties also in Dzhebel.

The Bulgarian Ministry of Interior stated "during these few Christmas days there have been some 11 demonstrations in which approximately 11,000 Turks participated." A large number of the arrested protesters were later sent to the Belene labour camp at the gates of which it is written "All Bulgarian citizens are equal under the laws of the People's Republic of Bulgaria"[80]

One of the most notable confrontations between the ethnic Turk population and the Bulgarian State Security apparatus and army was in the village of Yablanovo during January 1985 where the Turkish population resisted the tanks of the 3rd Bulgarian Army for 3 days. When the village was overrun the town hall was made into a temporary Command Centre where imprisoned Turks were tortured. The torture and violation was later continued in the underground cellars of the Ministry of Interior in the city of Sliven.[86] Over 30 people are reported killed during the events in Yablanovo.[87]

These events led to the beginning of the revival of the Turkish minority identity in Bulgaria and protests took place in some of the bigger settlements in the southern and northern Turk enclaves. Moreover, the Turkish community received the solidarity of Bulgarian intellectuals and opponents of the regime.[79]

This led, a few years later, to the biggest exodus in Europe since World War II: After the Bulgaria–Turkey border was opened in June 1989, approximately 350,000 Turks left Bulgaria on tourist visas in the span of three months.[88] Eventually, more than 150,000 Turks returned to Bulgaria—especially after the removal of Todor Zhivkov from power—but more than 200,000 chose to remain in Turkey permanently.[89]

Former Bulgarian prime minister, Boyko Borisov, has been accused of having anti-Turkish tendencies.[90] In December 2009, he backed a referendum, proposed by the nationalist party Attack (Bulgarian: Атака), on whether to allow daily Turkish-language news broadcasts on Bulgarian National Television, although he later withdrew his support.[91] Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then the Turkish prime minister, "expressed his concern of rising anti-Turkish sentiments in Bulgaria"[92] to the Bulgarian prime minister. The Turkish Foreign Ministry also "expressed its concern over the rising heated rhetoric in Bulgaria".[93] According to a report by Ivan Dikov, "not just Атака but a large number of Bulgarians have resented the news in Turkish".[91]

Borisov also referred to Turks (and Romani) as "bad human material" in 2009.[94] The vice president of the Party of European Socialists, Jan Marinus Wiersma, said Borisov had "crossed the invisible line between right wing populism and extremism".[95]

Some Bulgarian historians consider Bulgars, a semi-nomadic Turkic people, as Iranian. According to Raymond Detrez, the Iranian theory is rooted in the periods of anti-Turkish sentiment in Bulgaria and is ideologically motivated.[96] Since 1989, anti-Turkish rhetoric is now reflected in the theories that challenge the thesis of the proto-Bulgars' Turkic origin. Alongside the Iranian or Aryan theory, there appeared arguments favoring an autochthonous origin.[97]

Example for recent confrontation between the Turkish population of Bulgaria and Bulgarian politicians is Banya Bashi Mosque clashes

Belgium

[edit]

There are approximately 290,000 Turkish citizens living in Belgium, The majority of whom left to Belgium in the 1950s. In the past several years, many right and left wings Belgian political parties criticized domestic Turkish politics and called for banning or deporting Turkish immigrants.[98][99]

In 2015, a female employee shouted "Dirty Turk" (in Dutch: 'Vuile Turk') at a Supervisor of Turkish origin in the Volvo car factory in Ghent, which led to a Strike action by Turkish workers at the factory.[100][101]

Filip Dewinter a right-wing Flemish nationalist party member said in May 2017 at TV-program De Zevende Dag,[102]

The solution is for Turkish minorities in Flemish region, another method should be applied not only integrate Turks into Flemish culture but assimilate Turks. Leave identity behind leaving culture behind and fully assimilate in our society, if not so return to the country of origin is the only solution.

Cyprus

[edit]

The island of Cyprus became an independent state in 1960, with power shared between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots under the London–Zürich Agreements. But in December 1963, in events that became known as Bloody Christmas in which 364 Turks were killed,[103] Turkish Cypriots were ousted from the republic and Greek Cypriots began a military campaign against them, leading to 11 years of ethnic clashes.[104] Turkish Cypriots bore the heavier cost in terms of casualties, and some 25,000—about a fifth of the population of Turkish Cypriots—were internally displaced.[105] Thousands of Turkish Cypriot houses left behind were ransacked or completely destroyed. They lived as refugees for at least ten years, until the 1974 Turkish invasion.[105] By the late 1960s, approximately 60,000 Turkish Cypriots had left their homes and moved into enclaves.[106] This resulted in an exodus of Turkish Cypriots, with the majority migrating to the United Kingdom and others to Turkey, North America, and Australia.[107]

On 13 February 1963 Greeks and Greek Cypriots attacked the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Limassol with tanks killing 16 and injuring 35 Turks.[108] Between 11 and 13 May 1964, Cypriot Police executed much as 28 Turkish Cypriot civilians in Famagusta and Akrotiri and Dhekelia.[109][110] On 14 and 15 November 1967, Greek Cypriots murdered 26 Turkish Cypriots during their retreat from Kofinou.[111][page needed]

Numerous atrocities against the Turkish Cypriot community were committed in response to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. In the Maratha, Santalaris and Aloda massacre by EOKA B, 126 people were killed on 14 August 1974.[112][113] The United Nations described the massacre as a crime against humanity, by saying "constituting a further crime against humanity committed by the Greek and Greek Cypriot gunmen."[114] In the Tochni massacre, 85 Turkish Cypriot inhabitants were massacred.[115] During the Alaminos massacre, 13 or 15 Turkish men were executed.[116]

The Washington Post covered another atrocity in which it is written that: "In a Greek raid on a small Turkish village near Limassol, 36 people out of a population of 200 were killed. The Greeks said that they had been given orders to kill the inhabitants of the Turkish villages before the Turkish forces arrived."[117]

In Limassol, upon the fall of the Turkish Cypriot enclave to the Cypriot National Guard on 20 July 1974, the Turkish Cypriot quarter was burned, women raped and children shot according to Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot eyewitness accounts.[118][119] 1300 people were then led to a prison camp.[120]

On 12 July 2020, The primate of the Church of Cyprus, Archbishop Chrysostomos II has expressed his opinions regarding the reversion of the Hagia Sophia museum to a mosque stating that "The Turks have remained uncivilized, they are rude, and they will remain [this way]." He added that "Turkey has learned to destroy, it has learned to appropriate the cultures of others and sometimes, when it does not benefit it, it destroys them and falsely presents cultures as its own."[121]

France

[edit]

Germany

[edit]
The Solingen arson attack of 1993, in which neo-Nazis set fire to a Turkish family's home, was one of the most severe instances of xenophobic violence in modern Germany.

Turks are "the most prominent ethnic minority group in contemporary Germany",[122] and discrimination and violence against them are common.[123][124] In public discourse and popular jokes, they are often portrayed as "ludicrously different in their food tastes, dress, names, and even in their ability to develop survival techniques".[125]

The number of violent acts by right-wing extremists in Germany increased dramatically between 1990 and 1992.[126] On November 25, 1992, three Turkish residents were killed in a firebombing in Mölln, a town in northern Germany.[127][128] And on May 29, 1993, in an arson attack in Solingen, five members of a Turkish family that had resided in Germany for 23 years were burnt to death.[129] Several neighbors heard someone shout "Heil Hitler!" before dousing the front porch and door with gasoline and setting fire to the home.[130] Most Germans condemned these attacks, and many marched in candlelight processions.[131]

According to Greg Nees, "because Turks are both darker-skinned and Muslim, conservative Germans are largely against granting them citizenship".[132]

Greece

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A member of the European parliament from the Greek far-right Golden Dawn party, former army lieutenant general Eleftherios Synadinos has been expelled from a European Parliament plenary session after a racist remark, stating that "As it has been expressed in scientific literature, the Turks are dirty and polluted. Turks are like wild dogs when they play but when they have to fight against their enemies they run away. The only effective way to deal with the Turks is with decisive and resolute attitudes."[133]

Ioannis Lagos, who has been a Greek lawmaker serving as a Member of the European Parliament,[134] has tore a Turkish flag made of paper into pieces in January 2020 during a session of debate for the humanitarian situation on the Greek islands due to illegal immigrations.[135]

The former Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs Theodoros Pangalos stated in 2002 that Turks have been being allowed "to drag their bloodstained boots across the carpet" in the European Union capitals and has labelled Turks as "bandits, murderers, and rapists".[136]

Netherlands

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Turks are the largest ethnic minority group in the Netherlands.[137] The first recorded attack on Turks in the Netherlands were the Afrikaanderwijk riots.[138] Although policies toward Turks in the Netherlands are more progressive than those in many other European countries, such as Germany,[139] in a report on the Netherlands in 2008, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance wrote that the Turkish minority had been particularly affected by "stigmatization of and discrimination against members of minority groups".[140] The report also noted that "the tone of Dutch political and public debate around integration and other issues relevant to ethnic minorities has experienced a dramatic deterioration".[140]

According to the European Network Against Racism, an international organization supported by the European Commission, half of all Turks in the Netherlands report having experienced racial discrimination.[141] The network also noted "dramatic growth" of Islamophobia. In 2001, another international organization, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, highlighted a negative trend in Dutch attitudes towards minorities, compared with average European Union results.[142] That analysis also noted that, compared to other Europeans, the Dutch were "more in favor of cultural assimilation of minorities" rather than "cultural enrichment by minority groups".

Malta

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The Maltese have a colourful vocabulary stemming from their fight against the Ottoman Empire during the Great Siege of Malta in 1565. For example, the expression tgħammed tork is used when the sun is visible during rainfall; it means "a Turk has been baptised", which was considered a rare event. The phrase twieled tork ("a Turk was born") is also used. Another expression is ħaqq għat-torok ("curse on the Turks"), used when something goes wrong.[143]

Former Soviet Union

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Armenia

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According to a survey conducted in 2007, 78% of Armenians see Turkey as a threat.[144]

Georgia

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Georgians look with a wary eye to Turkey's growing Neo-Ottomanism and the rise in popularity of irredentist maps showing Turkey with borders expanded into the former Ottoman Empire, usually including Adjara.[145]

Although some Turks have since come back to Meskheti (which is near the Turkish-Georgian border), the Georgians and Armenians who settled in their homes have vowed to take up arms against any who return. Many Georgians have also argued that the Meskhetian Turks should be sent to Turkey, "where they belong".[146]

Russia

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A World War I Russian propaganda poster depicting a Turk running away from a Russian

According to Stanford University history professor Robert D. Crews, Russia has been historically more tolerant towards Turkic people than any other European administrations, and many Turkic people (Volga Tatars, Bashkirs, Karachays, Nogais, Kazakhs, Chuvash, for example), most of them Muslims, were fairly treated under Tsarist Russia. However, not all Turkic peoples received such generous treatment, for instance, Crimean Tatars under Russian Tsarist administration were forced to leave their houses for Turkey due to Russian colonial politics in the Crimean peninsula.

In the Soviet Union, the NKVD and the Red Army carried out ethnic cleansing during World War II through mass deportations of Turks.[147] In June 1945, Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, formally demanded that Turkey surrender three provinces (Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin), and Moscow was also preparing to support Armenian claims to several other provinces. War against Turkey seemed possible, and Joseph Stalin wanted to drive out Turks (especially in Meskheti) who were likely to be hostile to Soviet intentions.[148] The campaign is relatively poorly documented, but Soviet sources suggest that 115,000 Turks were deported, mainly to Central Asia. Most of them settled in Uzbekistan,[149] but many others died along the way.[150]

More recently, some Turks in Russia, especially Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar, have faced human rights violations, including deprivation of citizenship and prohibitions on employment and owning property.[151] Since 2004, many Turks have left the Krasnodar region for the United States as refugees. They are still barred from full repatriation to Georgia.[152]

Vladimir Zhirinovsky claimed that "nothing will happen to the world even if the entire Turkic nation perishes".[153]

Uzbekistan

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While Turkey and Uzbekistan have a fair relationship for being commonly Turkic, some tensions were witnessed.

In 1989, 103 people died and more than 1,000 were wounded in ethnic clashes between Turks and Uzbeks. Some 700 houses were destroyed, and more than 90,000 Meskhetian Turks were driven out of Uzbekistan.[154] Many Turks see these events as their "second deportation". Those who remained in Uzbekistan complained of ethnic discrimination.[155]

Former Yugoslavia

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Iconostasis in the Church of the Ascension of Jesus, Skopje from 1867, North Macedonia. The Beheading of John the Baptist is carried out by figures stylized like Ottoman Turks.

After the Ottoman Empire fell in the early 20th century, many Turks fled as Muhacirs (refugees). Others intermarried or simply identified themselves as Yugoslavs or Albanians to avoid stigma and persecution.[156]

Historically, from the Ottoman conquest through the 19th century, many ethnically non-Turkish groups—especially the Muslim Slavs of the Balkans—were referred to in local languages as Turks. This usage is common in literature, including in the works of Ivan Mažuranić and Petar II Petrović-Njegoš. The religious ideology of Christoslavism, coined by Michael Sells, holds that "Slavs are Christian by nature and that any conversion from Christianity is a betrayal of the Slavic race".[157] Under this ideology, as seen in Croatian and Serbian nationalism, South Slavic Muslims are not regarded as part of their ethnic kin; by virtue of their Muslim faith, they become "Turks".[158]

North Macedonia

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When North Macedonia proclaimed its independence in 1991, the Macedonian state implemented nationalist politics, which aimed to assimilate Macedonian Muslims into a broader category of "Macedonians". The government banned education in Turkish in all regions to "prevent Turkification". This, however, was met with resistance by Muslims who did not support the association and wanted to learn Turkish and continue their education in Turkish. The protests failed, although one person applied to the European Court of Human Rights. The case revolved around rights to education in the mother tongue.[159]

Serbia

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During the Great Eastern Crisis more than 10,000 Muslims, including Turks, were forced to left the territory of the Serbian Principality in 1862.[160]

Bosnian War

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Ratko Mladić, Radovan Karadžić's military chief and fellow convicted criminal of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes,[161] described the conquest of Srebrenica and the ensuing massacre as an opportunity for "the Serbs to avenge themselves on the Turks".[162]

On July 11, 1995, the town of Srebrenica fell to the Bosnian Serb Army. Its commander Ratko Mladić made his infamous statement at the same day, which has been used against him during International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, while he and his entourage posing for cameras with the town in the background:[163][164][165]

Here we are, on July 11, 1995, in Serb Srebrenica. On the eve of yet another great Serb holiday, we give this town to the Serb people as a gift. Finally, after the Rebellion against the Dahis, the time has come to take revenge on the Turks in this region.

Other countries

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United States

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Anti-Turkism first appeared in the United States during World War I, when the Armenian genocide began and was reported by American newspapers.[166] These reports had reinforced a sense of solidarity to Armenians and increasingly anti-Turkish rhetorics in the United States, with the Turks being equally seen as a barbaric people.[167][168]

Israel

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As a result of the increasing Anti-Zionist and antisemitic sentiment by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and growing Israeli assertiveness, in particular toward the issue over the Armenian genocide, Turkish-Israeli relations have been greatly damaged.[169] However, Israelis have generally reserved criticism for only the Turkish government, partly due to their tie with fellow Turkic Azerbaijan.[citation needed]

After the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid, where 10 Turks were killed, and the subsequent diplomatic crisis between Israel and Turkey, the number of Israeli tourists to Turkey shrunk to 100,000 as Israelis preferred to "refrain from visiting the country that was seen to be hostile to them".

In 2019, Benjamin Netanyahu's son, Yair Netanyahu, published a tweet remarking that Istanbul was once called Constantinople, a centre of Orthodox Christianity before "Turkish occupation" of the city, sparking a political crisis between Turkey and Israel.[170]

On 12 July 2020, a group of nine Israelis made up of Christians and Jews burned the Turkish flag at the Turkish embassy in Tel Aviv in response to Erdoğan's decision to convert Hagia Sophia back into a mosque. They were later detained by Israeli police.[171]

On 10 February 2023, Israeli top rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu claimed that the earthquake that devastated Turkey was "a divine punishment" because the Turkish government had "defamed" Israel.[172]

New Zealand

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The guns and magazines used by Brenton Tarrant, the perpetrator of the Christchurch mosque shootings, were covered in white writing naming historical events, people, and motifs related to historical conflicts, wars, and battles between Muslims and European Christians,[173][174][175][176] as well as the names of recent Islamic terrorist attack victims and the names of far-right attackers.[177] Notable references from Ottoman history included Skanderbeg (an Albanian nobleman who led an uprising against the Ottoman Empire), Antonio Bragadin (a Venetian officer who broke an agreement and killed Turkish captives), 1683 (which is the date of the Second Siege of Vienna), Miloš Obilić (who is said to have killed the Ottoman Emperor Murat I in Battle of Kosovo in 1389), János Hunyadi (who had blocked Ottoman attempts to take Belgrade), Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg (who defeated the Ottomans in 1683), the Battle of Kahlenberg (which marked the beginning of the Ottoman withdrawal from the Siege of Vienna) and "Turkofagos" (Turk eater), the nickname of Greek War of Independence revolutionary Nikitaras,[173] which he used to shoot 91 people with, 51 fatal (one Turkish[178]) and 40 wounded.[179]

His 'manifesto' specifically refers to Turks and utters threats against Turkey, that Istanbul's mosques will be destroyed and Hagia Sophia will be Christianized.[179]

He also identifies himself as a "kebab removalist", referencing to the anti-Muslim 'remove kebab' meme often used by the far-right ultra-nationalists and Islamophobes, that originated from Serbia and the Fourteen Words.[180] He was also playing an associated propaganda song in his car before the shooting.[181]

In contemporary media

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Movies

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Dracula Untold

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The film has been accused of Islamophobia for the vilification of Mehmed II and for portraying the figure of Vlad the Impaler as a hero even though, according to Turkish journalist Elest Ali Korkmaz, he "indiscriminately killed Turks and Bulgarians" in real history.[182]

Midnight Express

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Midnight Express is criticized for its unfavorable portrayal of Turkish people.

In her 1991 book Turkish Reflections: A Biography of Place, Mary Lee Settle wrote: 'The Turks I saw in Lawrence of Arabia and Midnight Express were like cartoon caricatures, compared to the people I had known and lived among for three of the happiest years of my life.'[183]

Pauline Kael, in reviewing the film for The New Yorker, commented, 'This story could have happened in almost any country, but if Billy Hayes had planned to be arrested to get the maximum commercial benefit from it, where else could he get the advantages of a Turkish jail? Who wants to defend Turks? (They don't even constitute enough of a movie market for Columbia Pictures to be concerned about how they are represented.)'[184]

One reviewer, writing for World Film Directors, wrote: "Midnight Express is 'more violent, as a national hate-film than anything I can remember', 'a cultural form that narrows horizons, confirming the audience's meanest fears and prejudices and resentments'."[185]

David Denby of New York criticized Midnight Express as 'merely anti-Turkish, and hardly a defense of prisoners' rights or a protest against prison conditions'.[186] Denby said also that all Turks in the movie — guardian or prisoner — were portrayed as 'losers' and 'swine', and that 'without exception [all the Turks] are presented as degenerate, stupid slobs'.

Turkish Cypriot film director Derviş Zaim wrote a thesis at the University of Warwick on the representation of Turks in the film, in which he concluded that the one-dimensional portrayal of the Turks as 'terrifying' and 'brutal' served merely to reinforce the sensational outcome, and was likely influenced by such factors as Orientalism and capitalism.[187]

Saturday Night Live

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Greek actress Nia Vardalos, participated in a Saturday Night Live episode where Turks were portrayed as dirty, smoking, ragtag, nose picking and anti-Armenian characters, which was heavily criticized by the Turkish Forum, a network of expat Turks which protested NBC and asked for a public apology, and the show received heavy criticism by the Turks on the internet.[188]

Expressions containing the word "Turk" in various languages

[edit]
  •  France: In old French, terms such as "C'est un vrai Turc" ("A true Turk") were used to refer to brutish and cruel individuals.[189]
  •  Italy: In contemporary Italian, phrases such as "bestemmia come un Turco" ("Cursing like a Turk") and "puzza come un Turco" ("Stinking like a Turk") were used. The phrase "fumare come un turco" ("Smoking like a Turk") is used to indicate excessive consumption of tobacco.[190]
  •  Netherlands: Some offensive expressions are "Eruit zien als een Turk" ("to look like a Turk"), which means to "seem filthy", "repulsive", or "Rijden als een Turk" ("to drive like a Turk"), meaning "to drive recklessly".[191]
  •  Germany: The common German expression "etwas türken" ("to turk something") is used to describe the act of faking something.[192]
  •  Norway: In Norwegian is used the expression "Sint som en tyrker" which means "angry as a Turk".[193]
  •  Romania: In Romanian language it is common to call "a Turk" somebody who is stubborn and not able to understand.[194]
  •  Spain: Spanish people used to say "turco" when they wanted to insult another person.[7]
  •  United Kingdom: In English, phrases such as "Johnny Turk", "out-paramour the Turk", "turn Turk" and "young Turk" were historically used.[citation needed]
  •  Sweden: In Swedish there is a racist ryhme phrase "turk på burk smakar urk" (literally "canned Turk tastes bleh"), which has been associated with anti-Turkish sentiment.[195]
  •  Iran: In persian, saying "Torkeh Khaar" is a racist slur against turkish people in Iran and translates to "Turkish Donkey"[citation needed]
  •  Colombia,  Venezuela: In Colombia and Venezuela, people used to say "turco" to refer to tricksters, usurers and descendants of Arabs who migrated during the Ottoman Empire.[196]

See also

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References

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Bibliography

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Anti-Turkish sentiment, also termed Turcophobia, refers to hostility, intolerance, or directed against , their culture, language, or the legacy of the . This phenomenon originated in the clashes between expanding Turkic forces and Christian , beginning with the against the Seljuk Turks in the 11th century and escalating with the Ottoman conquest of in 1453, which symbolized the existential threat posed by Ottoman advances into southeastern . Key historical events fueling this sentiment include the Ottoman sieges of in 1529 and 1683, which represented the high-water mark of Ottoman incursion toward and cemented perceptions of Turks as aggressors in Western , as evidenced by enduring artistic and architectural commemorations of victories over Ottoman forces. In the , anti-Turkish attitudes persist from centuries of Ottoman rule, characterized by territorial annexations, tribute systems like the , and conflicts during the empire's decline, leading to nationalist revivals that framed Turks as oppressors in post-independence narratives. Modern manifestations in trace to 20th-century labor migration, where large Turkish communities formed through guest worker programs, correlating empirically with heightened public opposition to further Turkish integration or EU membership due to observable challenges in assimilation, parallel societal structures, and socioeconomic disparities. Geopolitical tensions, including Turkey's interventions and authoritarian domestic policies under recent leadership, have intensified these views, often blending with broader concerns over and without conflation to mere . Controversies surrounding historical Ottoman events, such as population displacements in the and , frequently invoke biased academic and media interpretations that exaggerate Turkish culpability while downplaying contextual warfare dynamics, reflecting institutional tendencies toward narrative favoritism in Western .

Definition and Historical Context

Terminology and Etymology

The terms anti-Turkish sentiment, anti-Turkism, and Turkophobia (or Turcophobia) describe hostility, , , or irrational directed toward , their ethnic identity, culture, history, or the Republic of Turkey and its predecessors, particularly the . These expressions distinguish targeted animosity against Turks or Turkic groups from broader anti-Muslim prejudice, though historical overlaps exist due to the Ottoman role as a . In Turkish, equivalents include Türk karşıtlığı (opposition to Turks) and Türkofobi (Turkophobia). The suffix -phobia in "Turkophobia" derives from Greek phóbos (), combined with "Turco-" from Latin Turcus, itself borrowed from and forms of "Turk," ultimately tracing to Persian Tork or Turkic self-designations like Türk. The earliest English attestation of "Turcophobia" appears in 1829, amid European reactions to Ottoman decline and Greek independence struggles, denoting "strong aversion or hostility to or (formerly) the , or to , culture, etc." This paralleled other 19th-century ethnic phobias, reflecting nationalist sentiments during imperial contractions. Historically, "Turk" in Western European languages evoked not just but a of the invasive "Other," often conflated with Islamic since the 14th-century Ottoman incursions into the and sieges of . Medieval folk etymologies amplified negativity, linking "Turk" to Latin torquere (to twist, ) or equating Turks with demonic forces, as posited by some theologians to underscore their role as scourges against . Such linguistic associations reinforced propagandistic imagery in chronicles and sermons, predating formal terminology but embedding connotations that persist in phrases like "Turkish yoke" for Ottoman rule in .

Distinction from Anti-Islamism and Regional Prejudices

Anti-Turkish sentiment targets the ethnic , their cultural identity, and historical actions associated with the Ottoman Empire's expansion, distinct from anti-Islamism, which opposes ic doctrine, practices, or theology irrespective of ethnicity. While the ' adherence to contributed to European perceptions of threat during conquests from the 14th to 17th centuries, contemporary and historical accounts emphasized the "Turk" as a specific ethnic-military adversary, exemplified by during the 1683 Siege of Vienna portraying Turkish forces as barbaric invaders rather than generic . This ethnic framing persisted in Balkan literatures, where "Turk" denoted the ruling Anatolian Turkish and settlers, separate from local Muslim populations like Bosnian converts, whose grievances centered on Turkish-imposed hierarchies such as the child levy system that disproportionately affected Christian subjects under Turkish administration. In contrast, anti-Islamism encompasses broader religious critiques, including against Arab caliphates or Persian Safavids, without invoking Turkish-specific imperial narratives like the of by Mehmed II's Turkish armies, which symbolized Turkish dominion over Byzantine . Modern distinctions appear in secular European discourses criticizing or policies under the Republic of Turkey, such as denial of Armenian events or interventions, which target state actions linked to Turkish identity rather than Koranic interpretations. Sources attributing anti-Turkish views solely to Islamophobia often overlook these ethnic-historical , potentially reflecting biases in academic analyses favoring religious over national causal explanations. Regional prejudices, prevalent in Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean, involve biases against geographic or cultural clusters—such as anti-Slavic views in or anti-Arab sentiments in the —but anti-Turkish sentiment uniquely stems from direct experiences of Turkish-led Ottoman subjugation, including population exchanges and massacres during the 19th-20th century , where over 1.5 million Muslims, predominantly ethnic Turks, were expelled from territories like in 1877-1878. These events fostered enduring ethnic animus toward Turks as former overlords, distinguishable from generalized regional , as evidenced by differentiated treatment of Turkish minorities versus other regional groups in post-Ottoman states. In contemporary , anti-Turkish incidents among Turkish communities, such as the 1993 arson killing five Turkish immigrants, reflect cultural clashes tied to Turkish migration patterns rather than undifferentiated regional or religious hostility.

Causal Roots in Ottoman Expansionism

The Ottoman Empire's aggressive territorial expansion into southeastern commencing in the mid-14th century established enduring patterns of conquest and subjugation that engendered profound resentment among Christian populations. Following the establishment of a European foothold at Gallipoli in 1354, Ottoman forces under sultans such as and rapidly overran , capturing Adrianople () by 1362 and advancing into the through systematic campaigns against Bulgarian, Serbian, and Byzantine territories. These incursions involved brutal warfare, massacres of resistors, and imposition of tributary obligations on defeated principalities, framing the Ottomans as predatory invaders in regional chronicles and fostering a collective trauma of lost sovereignty. Central to this resentment was the system, formalized around 1365, which mandated the periodic of Christian boys—typically aged 8 to 18—from Balkan villages to serve as janissaries or palace functionaries after forcible and rigorous . Levies occurred every three to five years, extracting thousands of youths per cycle, a practice derisively termed the "blood tax" in affected communities and European accounts for its perceived cruelty as familial severance and . Contemporary Balkan and Western observers viewed not merely as recruitment but as institutionalized , exacerbating hatred toward Ottoman administrators who enforced it, as evidenced in and diplomatic reports decrying it as despotic tyranny. Complementing devshirme were incessant akıncı (raider) expeditions into Balkan and Ukrainian frontiers, capturing tens of thousands of slaves annually during peak 15th-16th century periods to supply military ranks, households, and markets. These raids devastated rural economies, depopulated villages, and perpetuated cycles of retaliation, with Ottoman forces targeting non-Muslim settlements for their vulnerability under status, which offered nominal protection at the cost of heavy taxation and vulnerability to . The resultant demographic hemorrhage and economic exploitation reinforced perceptions of Turks as enslavers, distinct from reciprocal warfare, as slaves from these operations outnumbered those from formal battles and were integral to sustaining the empire's martial economy. Ottoman thrusts deeper into , culminating in the sieges of in 1529 and 1683, amplified these grievances by threatening the continent's core, mobilizing pan-European coalitions against what was portrayed as an insatiable jihadist horde. The 1529 campaign under I mobilized over 100,000 troops, while the 1683 effort under Kara Mustafa Pasha fielded up to 200,000, both failing due to logistical overextension but leaving legacies of sacked suburbs and fortified mentalities. Habsburg and papal depicted these invasions as apocalyptic menaces to , embedding anti-Turkish motifs in art, literature, and policy that equated Ottoman expansion with barbarism and religious erasure, independent of broader anti-Islamic prejudice. These expansionist mechanisms—, coerced levies, raiding, and —causally rooted anti-Turkish sentiment in the of subaltern peoples under a prioritizing Turkic-Muslim dominance, yielding of inherent aggression that persisted beyond military reversals. Empirical records from Venetian envoys and Balkan petitions underscore how such policies, rather than abstract , drove visceral opposition, as affected groups prioritized survival against recurrent existential pressures over ideological abstraction.

Pre-Modern and Early Ottoman Period

Turkic Migrations and Initial Conquests

The Oghuz Turkic tribes, originating from the Central Asian steppes, initiated large-scale westward migrations in the , driven by pressures from other nomadic groups and opportunities for conquest following their conversion to around 985 CE near Jend. Under leaders like Seljuk Beg, these nomadic warriors consolidated power, defeating the Ghaznavid Empire at the Battle of Dandanakan on May 23, 1040, which secured control over and opened Persia to Turkic dominance. By 1055, Tughril Beg, the Seljuk sultan, entered at the invitation of the Abbasid caliph, establishing the Great and positioning Turkic forces along the Byzantine frontier in eastern . Initial incursions into began in the 1030s with raids by Seljuk forces under Tughril and his successor , exploiting Byzantine internal divisions and military weaknesses after defeats against the and . These raids intensified in the 1060s, involving plunder, enslavement of Christian populations, and disruption of agricultural heartlands, prompting Byzantine Emperor to launch a preemptive campaign in 1071. The decisive on August 26, 1071, saw forces, numbering approximately 40,000-50,000, decisively defeat Romanos's larger army of up to 100,000 through superior mobility and feigned retreats, resulting in the emperor's capture and ransom. Although Romanos negotiated a truce allowing Seljuk withdrawal, his subsequent blinding and death sparked Byzantine civil wars, enabling unchecked Turkic penetration. The aftermath accelerated Turkic settlement in , with nomadic tribes flooding the region in waves starting immediately after 1071, leading to the establishment of the by in 1077 around . By the 1080s, central had largely fallen under Seljuk control, displacing Greek-speaking Christian majorities through forced conversions, deportations, and demographic swamping by an estimated influx of hundreds of thousands of Turkic pastoralists over the following decades. This conquest eroded the Byzantine Empire's Anatolian tax base and recruitment pool, which had supplied up to two-thirds of its thematic troops, precipitating economic collapse and territorial losses exceeding 50% of Asia Minor within a generation. Among surviving Byzantine chroniclers, such as Michael Attaleiates, the Turks were depicted as ruthless barbarians whose invasions represented divine punishment but also ignited enduring Christian hostility toward them as existential threats to civilized order. These events laid foundational grievances for anti-Turkish sentiment in , framing as alien conquerors who shattered the eastern Roman frontier and foreshadowed further expansions into the .

Fall of Constantinople and Balkan Subjugation

The fall of Constantinople on May 29, 1453, marked the end of the Byzantine Empire after a 53-day siege led by Sultan Mehmed II, who commanded an Ottoman force estimated at 80,000 to 100,000 troops against approximately 7,000 to 10,000 defenders under Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos. The city's formidable walls were breached using massive bombards designed by Hungarian engineer Orban, enabling Ottoman forces to overwhelm the defenders; following the conquest, the city was subjected to three days of pillage, resulting in thousands of deaths and enslavements, with Hagia Sophia converted into a mosque. This event, viewed in Europe as the catastrophic loss of Christendom's eastern bastion, elicited shock and calls for crusades from figures like Pope Nicholas V, though fragmented European powers failed to mount a unified response, fostering a pervasive sense of vulnerability to Ottoman aggression. Contemporary accounts portrayed the Turks as barbaric invaders, amplifying fears that echoed through European literature and sermons, framing the conquest as divine punishment yet primarily attributing it to Ottoman military prowess and Byzantine disunity. In the ensuing decades, Ottoman forces systematically subjugated the , securing by the 1360s and decisively defeating Serbian forces at the in 1389, which paved the way for vassalage and eventual direct rule. By 1459, the fall of the Serbian Despotate's capital to eliminated the last independent Serbian stronghold, while Bosnia succumbed in 1463 after King Stephen Tomašević's execution, extending Ottoman control westward. These conquests involved brutal sieges, forced migrations, and the imposition of the system, whereby Christian boys aged 8 to 18 from Balkan villages were periodically levied—often every three to five years—converted to , and trained as elite soldiers or administrators, severing familial ties and fueling generational resentment among subject populations. The practice, which supplied up to 200,000 recruits over centuries, was decried by Christian communities as a "blood tax" that eroded demographic and cultural continuity, embedding anti-Turkish animus in Balkan and resistance narratives. European chroniclers and refugees from these conquests disseminated accounts of Ottoman atrocities, including mass executions and enslavements during campaigns, which solidified perceptions of Turks as existential threats to Christian and . While Ottoman administration later introduced relative stability via the millet system allowing religious autonomy under status, the initial phases of subjugation—characterized by razzias, forced conversions, and heavy taxation—prioritized dominance, engendering enduring hostility that manifested in Venetian-Ottoman wars and Hungarian defenses. This period's legacy contributed to a causal chain wherein conquest-induced traumas underpinned later nationalist revivals, with primary sources like papal bulls and Venetian dispatches reflecting unvarnished alarm over the "Turkish peril" rather than sanitized interpretations prevalent in some modern academic narratives influenced by institutional biases.

European Encounters and Military Clashes

The Ottoman Empire's expansion into southeastern Europe in the late 14th and 15th centuries provoked direct military responses from European coalitions, exemplified by the Crusade of Nicopolis in 1396, where a multinational force of approximately 10,000-20,000 knights and soldiers from , , and other states clashed with Sultan Bayezid I's army near the Danube River, resulting in a decisive Ottoman victory that killed or captured most crusader leaders and solidified Turkish control over . This defeat, marked by Ottoman tactics of feigned retreats luring disorganized European heavy cavalry into ambushes, intensified fears of Turkish incursions as far as the ' borders with , fostering narratives of the "Turk" as an unstoppable scourge against . By the 16th century, under , Ottoman forces advanced deeper into the continent, culminating in the on August 29, 1526, where an Ottoman army of about 60,000-100,000 troops overwhelmed a Hungarian force of roughly 25,000-35,000 led by King Louis II, leading to the deaths of the king and much of the in under two hours of combat. The ensuing conquest partitioned , with central regions under direct Ottoman rule, vassal states in , and Habsburg control in the west, displacing populations and enabling practices like the system of Christian child levy for service, which Europeans decried as barbaric enslavement. This victory exposed to threat, prompting the first Siege of Vienna in 1529, where Suleiman's 100,000-strong army besieged the Habsburg capital for three weeks but withdrew due to harsh weather, supply shortages, and stout defenses under Count Nicholas von Salm, halting immediate Ottoman penetration into German lands yet perpetuating the image of Turks as relentless invaders. Naval confrontations further galvanized European resistance, as seen in the on October 7, 1571, where the —a coalition of Spanish, Venetian, and papal fleets totaling around 200 galleys and 80,000 men under Don John of Austria—inflicted a catastrophic defeat on an Ottoman armada of similar size, capturing or sinking over 200 Turkish vessels and killing approximately 25,000-30,000 Ottoman sailors and soldiers. Though the Ottomans rebuilt their fleet, Lepanto symbolized a rare check on their Mediterranean dominance, inspiring European chronicles that celebrated it as divine deliverance from Turkish naval terror, including galley slavery and coastal raids. The apex of perceived Ottoman menace came with the second Siege of Vienna in 1683, when Kara Mustafa's force of 100,000-150,000 besieged the city from July to September, only to be routed by a relieving of 70,000-80,000 under Polish King John III Sobieski, whose winged hussars charged decisively on September 12, killing tens of thousands of Ottomans and capturing vast artillery and supplies. This failure marked the Ottoman high-water mark in , triggering territorial losses via the in 1699 and reinforcing long-standing European depictions of Turks as existential foes through woodcuts, sermons, and histories emphasizing their reputed cruelty in sieges, such as impalements and mass enslavements.

19th-Century Decline and Nationalist Backlash

The began on March 25, 1821, with uprisings in the and , organized by the secret society amid long-standing Greek grievances against Ottoman rule, including the discriminatory dhimmi status imposing higher taxes, restrictions on arms and church bells, and the devshirme system of forcibly recruiting Christian boys into Janissary corps. These practices, enforced by Ottoman sultans since the 15th-century conquest, fostered a collective resentment framing "Turks" as alien tyrants incompatible with Greek Orthodox identity and self-rule. Initial Greek successes, such as the capture of Tripolitsa in October 1821 where revolutionaries massacred thousands of Muslim Ottoman garrison troops, Albanian auxiliaries, and local —estimated at over 5,000 in the Jewish case alone—reflected reciprocal ethnic targeting aimed at eradicating Ottoman presence. Ottoman Sultan responded ferociously, ordering the execution of Ecumenical Patriarch Gregory V in on April 22, 1821, and unleashing reprisals that killed thousands of urban , including merchants and , to deter further revolt. The 1822 epitomized this brutality: Ottoman naval forces under Kara Ali Pasha bombarded and invaded the neutral island, slaughtering approximately 25,000 inhabitants and enslaving 45,000 more from a of 120,000, with widespread reports of rape, torture, and village burnings. Such acts, documented in European eyewitness accounts, amplified anti-Turkish sentiment by portraying Ottoman forces as barbaric hordes driven by religious fanaticism rather than mere imperial defense, though Greek irregulars like klephts had long conducted guerrilla raids embodying proto-nationalist hatred. European surged in response, with intellectuals and volunteers like —who died at in 1824—idealizing Greeks as classical heirs endangered by "Turkish despotism," often invoking civilizational clash narratives that dehumanized Ottomans as Asiatic invaders unfit for Europe. This bias ignored Greek atrocities, such as the systematic expulsion or killing of Muslim communities exceeding 20,000 in early revolts, prioritizing humanitarian rhetoric against Ottoman excess to justify intervention. By , a combined British, French, and Russian fleet destroyed the Ottoman-Egyptian armada at Navarino, tipping the balance; the 1830 London Protocol granted Greek autonomy, formalized as independence in 1832 under King Otto, after total casualties approached 240,000 including civilians. The conflict thus entrenched anti-Turkish views in , equating Ottoman rule with existential threat and legitimizing ethnic homogenization, while Ottoman loyalists suffered near-total demographic erasure in the new state.

Balkan Uprisings and Wars

![Depiction of Bulgarian martyrs during the Ottoman suppression of the April Uprising][float-right] The , erupting in 1804, marked the initial major uprising against Ottoman rule in the , triggered by the on February 4, 1804, in which Ottoman janissaries executed over 70 Serbian leaders in , sparking widespread revolt against perceived tyrannical governance and tax abuses. Ottoman forces responded with brutal reprisals, including mass executions and village burnings, which intensified Serbian resolve and fostered deep-seated animosity toward Turkish administrators and military units, viewed as symbols of alien domination. By 1815, following the Second Serbian Uprising in 1815, Serbia achieved de facto autonomy under the Treaty of Bucharest, though full independence came later, with the events cementing narratives of Turkish cruelty in Serbian collective memory. The Greek War of Independence, beginning in 1821, escalated anti-Turkish sentiment across through documented Ottoman massacres, such as the in March 1822, where Ottoman troops and irregulars killed approximately 25,000 Greek islanders and enslaved 45,000 others in retaliation for the uprising. These atrocities, including systematic rapes and forced conversions, were reported by European diplomats and fueled philhellenic movements, portraying Turks as barbaric oppressors incompatible with Christian civilization, despite mutual violence like the Greek-led Tripolitsa massacre of Muslim civilians in October 1821. The war's success in 1830, establishing an independent Greek state, reinforced Balkan perceptions of Ottoman rule as inherently oppressive, with Turkish forces bearing the brunt of blame for civilian sufferings that numbered in the tens of thousands. In , the against Ottoman taxation and cultural suppression provoked the from May 1-5, 1876, where Ottoman bashi-bazouk irregulars, led by Ahmed Agha, slaughtered up to 5,000 unarmed Bulgarian civilians, including women and children, in the town of , leaving piles of mutilated bodies in churches and homes. Eyewitness accounts by American journalist Januarius MacGahan detailed the horrors, including impalements and decapitations, which shocked Europe and prompted William Gladstone's pamphlet "Bulgarian Horrors" denouncing Turkish "atrocities" as evidence of civilizational clash. Overall, Ottoman reprisals during the uprising claimed 15,000-30,000 Bulgarian lives, galvanizing international intervention and embedding images of Turkish savagery in Balkan historiography. These events culminated in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, initiated on April 24, 1877, after Russia's declaration of war to support Balkan insurgents, resulting in Ottoman defeats and the on March 3, 1878, which proposed a large Bulgarian state and independences for and . The subsequent in 1878 moderated these gains but affirmed Balkan autonomies, expelling Ottoman control from much of the region and displacing hundreds of thousands of Muslim Turks, whose flight and reported expulsions further entrenched mutual resentments, with Christian narratives emphasizing liberation from Turkish yoke. The wars' casualties exceeded 200,000, predominantly Ottoman, yet Balkan victories solidified anti-Turkish views as rooted in empirical experiences of and subjugation rather than mere .

Armenian Massacres and Prelude to Genocide

The Hamidian massacres of 1894–1896, ordered under Sultan Abdul Hamid II, targeted Armenian communities across eastern Anatolia and urban centers like Istanbul and Van, resulting in an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 Armenian deaths through killings, starvation, and exposure. These pogroms were initiated in response to Armenian revolutionary groups, such as the Social Democratic Hunchakian Party and Dashnaktsutyun, which organized protests and attacks on Ottoman officials and Muslim villagers to pressure for reforms and autonomy amid Russian incursions and internal Ottoman decline. Ottoman forces, supplemented by Kurdish Hamidiye cavalry regiments formed in 1891, conducted systematic raids on Armenian villages starting with the Sasun uprising in August 1894, where rebels resisted tax collection and defended against prior Kurdish depredations, escalating into broader reprisals that spared neither combatants nor civilians. European diplomats and missionaries documented the disproportionate violence, including mass burnings of churches and homes, which fueled international outrage and the sultan's epithet as the "Red Sultan," though Ottoman records emphasized Armenian insurgencies as the casus belli, with mutual casualties including thousands of Muslims. The massacres abated by 1897 following diplomatic interventions, including the Berlin Concert's unfulfilled reform demands from 1878, but they entrenched Armenian distrust of Ottoman commitments and radicalized nationalist factions, while hardening Turkish-Muslim solidarity against perceived Christian separatism. This period exemplified causal patterns of imperial repression: Armenian demands for security against nomadic raids clashed with centralizing policies, triggering cycles of rebellion and overreaction that claimed far more Armenian lives due to demographic asymmetries and state-backed irregulars. Following the of July 1908, which restored the 1876 constitution and promised equality, initial Armenian-Turkish cooperation dissolved amid counter-revolutionary unrest, culminating in the of April–May 1909. In , a conservative uprising against the (CUP) government provided cover for mobs, soldiers, and local officials to kill an estimated 15,000 to 30,000 , with widespread , rapes, and destruction of over 2,000 homes and businesses. Triggers included rumors of Armenian arms stockpiling and CUP favoritism toward , but the violence extended to non-combatants in rural areas like Sis and Haçin, where Armenian self-defense committees formed too late to stem the tide. CUP leaders, including future genocide architects like , tacitly endorsed or failed to halt the killings, revealing ideological undercurrents of viewing as internal threats amid Balkan losses. These events, though framed by Ottoman apologists as reactions to Armenian disloyalty, demonstrated premeditated targeting patterns—disarmament followed by pogroms—that prefigured World War I deportations, as perpetrators refined methods of mass elimination under the guise of security. Internationally, Adana's horrors, reported by U.S. Consul Oscar Heizer who witnessed corpse-strewn streets, amplified anti-Ottoman sentiment, associating Turkish rule with recurrent Christian extermination and eroding any reformist illusions. By 1914, cumulative trauma from these massacres had polarized communities, with Armenian militias expanding and CUP radicals consolidating power, setting the stage for genocidal policies once war provided impunity.

20th-Century Dissolution and Genocides

World War I and Armenian Genocide

The Ottoman Empire's entry into World War I on the side of the Central Powers in October 1914 heightened suspicions among the ruling Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) toward the empire's Armenian population, whom they accused of potential collaboration with invading Russian forces due to historical ethnic ties and documented Armenian revolutionary activities in eastern Anatolia. These fears, combined with longstanding nationalist policies under the Young Turk regime, culminated in a systematic campaign of deportations and massacres beginning on April 24, 1915, when Ottoman authorities arrested and executed approximately 250 Armenian intellectuals and leaders in Constantinople, marking the initiation of the genocide. The Tehcir (Deportation) Law enacted on May 27, 1915, provided the legal pretext for forcibly relocating Armenians from eastern provinces to desert regions in Syria and Mesopotamia, ostensibly for security reasons, though contemporary eyewitness accounts and Ottoman telegrams reveal orders for extermination en route. Implementation involved irregular paramilitary units of the Special Organization (Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa), composed of convicts and tribal militias, who conducted death marches, mass drownings, and killings, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 1 to 1.5 million —over half the prewar Armenian population—through starvation, disease, exposure, and direct violence between 1915 and 1916, with residual massacres extending into 1923. German and Austrian diplomats, allied with the Ottomans, documented the scale of atrocities in reports that contradicted official Ottoman claims of mere wartime relocations to counter Armenian uprisings, such as the limited Van rebellion in April 1915. While Ottoman records cite Armenian insurgencies as justification, declassified CUP directives and survivor testimonies indicate a premeditated policy of ethnic homogenization, targeting not only combatants but entire communities, including women and children, to resolve the "" permanently. These events profoundly intensified anti-Turkish sentiment, portraying the Ottoman leadership—and by extension, —as perpetrators of one of the 20th century's first systematic genocides, a view reinforced by Allied wartime reports and postwar trials of CUP leaders in 1919-1920, where of intentional destruction was presented. The Turkish Republic's subsequent of genocidal intent, framing the deaths as mutual wartime casualties, has perpetuated grievances among communities and sympathetic international observers, framing as evasive on historical and fostering enduring distrust in Turkish motives, particularly in contexts of and territorial claims. This denialism, rooted in state that emphasizes Armenian disloyalty over of one-sided devastation, contrasts with scholarly consensus on the genocidal character, thereby sustaining narratives of Turkish aggression in global discourse on Ottoman legacies.

Greco-Turkish War and Population Exchanges

The Greco-Turkish War erupted in May 1919 when Greek forces, backed by Allied powers, landed at Smyrna (Izmir) to secure territories promised under the 1919 , advancing deep into in pursuit of the of reclaiming historic Greek lands. Greek troops pushed to the by July 1921, but suffered a major defeat in the Battle of Sakarya (23 August–13 September 1921), after which Turkish Nationalist forces under Mustafa Kemal launched a counteroffensive, culminating in the recapture of Smyrna on 9 September 1922. The Greek army's disorganized retreat involved reported atrocities against Turkish civilians, with Allied observers documenting systematic burnings of villages and mass killings that eroded international support for Greece. Turkish forces' entry into Smyrna triggered reprisal violence against Greek and Armenian residents, including mass executions and the Great Fire of Smyrna (13–15 September 1922), which razed the Greek and Armenian quarters and killed an estimated 10,000 to 100,000 civilians according to eyewitness diplomatic and missionary accounts, though Turkish official narratives attribute the fire to Greek or Armenian arson. These events, amplified by survivor testimonies, cemented in Greek collective memory a view of Turks as aggressors intent on eradicating Christian populations, fueling enduring anti-Turkish animosity despite mutual wartime excesses. The (11 October 1922) and subsequent (24 July 1923) formalized the war's end, mandating the largest compulsory in modern history: roughly 1.22 million Greek Orthodox Christians from , Eastern , and Pontus were deported to , while about 355,000–400,000 from were sent to , often under duress and with minimal possessions. Intended to resolve ethnic conflicts by creating homogeneous nation-states, the exchange instead intensified Greek resentment, as uprooted refugees—comprising nearly 20% of 's population—preserved oral histories of Turkish violence and dispossession, perpetuating generational hostility toward . This trauma contributed to long-term bilateral tensions, evident in Greek cultural depictions of Turks as historical oppressors.

Arab Revolt and Post-Ottoman Resentments

The erupted on June 5, 1916, when Sharif Hussein bin Ali, Emir of , initiated an uprising against Ottoman rule, beginning with attacks on the Ottoman garrison in and coordinated strikes by his sons, Emirs and Faisal, on and other garrisons. This rebellion, lasting until 1918, was framed by its leaders as a quest for Arab independence from what they portrayed as Turkish domination, drawing on widespread Arab grievances over Ottoman centralization policies that marginalized non-Turkish populations. British support, including arms and advisors like , amplified the revolt's military effectiveness, particularly through guerrilla raids on the , which disrupted Ottoman supply lines. Underlying causes included the (CUP), or , regime's post-1908 shift toward , which enforced Turkish as the administrative language, curtailed usage in and courts, and prioritized ethnic Turks in provincial , fostering perceptions of cultural and political subjugation among . These measures, combined with harsh drives during that disproportionately burdened Arab communities and Ottoman suppression of secret societies, eroded loyalty to the empire, transforming earlier calls for Ottoman reform into demands for autonomy or separation. Arab officers, resentful of 's exclusionary effects, defected en masse to the revolt, viewing Ottoman authority as synonymous with Turkish ethnic chauvinism rather than pan-Islamic . In the post-Ottoman era, following the empire's 1918 collapse and the 1924 , Arab nationalists in newly independent states like , , and Transjordan perpetuated narratives of Ottoman rule as four centuries of Turkish oppression, emphasizing Turkification's role in stifling and autonomy. Interwar Arab intellectuals and leaders blamed economic stagnation and political fragmentation on the Ottoman legacy, often conflating the multi-ethnic empire with Turkish , which sustained anti-Turkish undertones in historical memory and . This sentiment was evident in the Hashemite kingdoms' foundational myths, where the revolt symbolized liberation from "Turkish tyranny," despite the empire's earlier integration of Arab elites and the fact that many had initially supported Young Turk constitutionalism before its ethnic turn. Such resentments persisted into the mid-20th century, influencing Arab states' reluctance to align with and reinforcing a causal link between perceived Ottoman-era injustices and modern regional identities.

Regional Manifestations in the Middle East

Kurdish Conflicts and Autonomy Struggles

The in , estimated at 12-15 million and concentrated in the southeast, has pursued greater autonomy and cultural recognition since the founding of the Republic of in 1923, viewing the central government's policies as assimilationist and suppressive of ethnic identity. Early revolts, such as the in 1925 and the Dersim uprising in 1937-1938, demanded regional and religious freedoms but were met with decisive military suppression, resulting in thousands of deaths and forced relocations that entrenched perceptions of Turkish state hostility toward Kurdish distinctiveness. The contemporary phase intensified with the formation of the (PKK) in 1978, which launched an armed insurgency on August 15, 1984, through coordinated attacks on security posts in Eruh and Şemdinli, killing Turkish personnel and marking the onset of aimed at carving out an autonomous Kurdish region. The PKK's objectives evolved to include , , and , framing the conflict as resistance against Turkish denial of Kurdish and cultural suppression, such as bans on Kurdish-language until reforms in the 2000s. This narrative has fueled anti-Turkish sentiment among , portraying the government as an existential threat to their survival as a distinct people, though the PKK's tactics, including civilian-targeted bombings, have been designated as by , the , and the . Turkish efforts have involved extensive military operations, including cross-border incursions into starting in the 1980s and intensified campaigns in post-2016, displacing over 1 million from southeastern villages between 1984 and 1999 through village clearances and scorched-earth tactics to deny PKK safe havens. The conflict has claimed approximately 40,000 lives since 1984, including over 5,000 civilians, 6,000 security personnel, and the remainder PKK militants, with surges in violence following the collapse of ceasefires, such as the 2013-2015 peace process derailed by the July 2015 that killed 34 people and prompted PKK reprisals. These operations, while reducing PKK presence domestically, have amplified Kurdish grievances by associating Turkish forces with indiscriminate destruction, thereby sustaining cycles of resentment and portraying as an occupier in Kurdish-majority areas. Attempts at resolution, including Abdullah Öcalan's 1999 capture and subsequent calls for , have yielded temporary lulls but faltered amid mutual distrust, with recent 2024-2025 talks overshadowed by ongoing Turkish strikes in and targeting PKK affiliates. Kurdish autonomy aspirations persist through political parties like the DEM Party, which advocate non-violent but face dissolution threats and arrests, reinforcing narratives of systemic Turkish opposition to Kurdish . This unresolved dynamic continues to manifest anti-Turkish sentiment in Kurdish diaspora communities and regionally, where Turkey's actions are critiqued as expansionist threats to broader Kurdish homelands.

Arab Perspectives on Ottoman Legacy

The Ottoman Empire's governance over Arab provinces, spanning from the conquest of in 1517 to the empire's collapse in 1918, elicited mixed responses among Arab elites and populations, though predominantly frames it as a era of Turkish subjugation and cultural alienation. Early Ottoman administration integrated local Arab notables (ayan) and religious scholars (), who often legitimized sultanic rule as an extension of Islamic caliphal authority, fostering relative stability in regions like , , and the Hijaz through the millet system that granted communal autonomy. However, this accommodation eroded with the 19th-century reforms, which centralized power in , imposed Turkish officials on Arab provinces, and disrupted traditional local power structures, breeding resentment among Arab intellectuals who perceived these changes as efforts that marginalized language and customs in favor of dominance. By the late Ottoman period, particularly under the Young Turk regime from 1908 onward, Arab grievances intensified due to policies perceived as discriminatory, including disproportionate conscription of Arab men into the military during World War I—over 300,000 Arabs served, many forcibly—and economic exploitation amid wartime famines that killed hundreds of thousands in Greater Syria between 1915 and 1918. These factors fueled the Arab Revolt of 1916, led by Sharif Hussein bin Ali of Mecca, who on June 5 declared independence from Ottoman rule, citing "Turkish tyranny" and violations of Islamic principles as justifications, with revolt forces capturing key sites like Aqaba by July 1917 in alliance with British expeditions. Arab secret societies, such as al-Fatat founded in 1911 and Jam'iyat al-'Arab al-Fatat in 1913, articulated this sentiment through clandestine advocacy for decentralization or outright separation, viewing Ottoman rule as an alien imposition that stifled Arab political agency. Post-1918 nationalist narratives, amplified in the mandates era, entrenched an image of the Ottoman legacy as one of stagnation and , attributing regional —such as inadequate despite some Ottoman investments like the completed in —to Turkish neglect and extraction, while downplaying complicity in provincial governance. This perspective persists in some contemporary discourse, where Ottoman history is taught as a prelude to colonial betrayal, fostering latent anti-Turkish attitudes evident in reactions to Turkey's regional interventions, though recent scholarship highlights the era's cultural continuities and challenges overly negative portrayals as products of post-imperial myth-making rather than unvarnished history. For instance, Bruce Masters' analysis underscores how chroniclers of the 16th-18th centuries often praised Ottoman stability over prior disarray, suggesting nationalist biases later amplified divisions.

Contemporary Tensions with Neighbors (Syria, Iraq)

Turkey's military interventions in northern , initiated in 2016 with targeting ISIS and Kurdish YPG forces, have elicited significant resentment among Syrian and , who view them as violations of sovereignty and ethnic displacement efforts. Subsequent operations, such as Olive Branch in Afrin (January-March 2018) and Peace Spring (October 2019), involved ground incursions and control over territories, leading to reports of widespread local opposition to perceived "Turkification" policies, including demographic shifts through resettlement of Syrian and Turkish-backed militias. The Syrian Network for documented resentment among Afrin residents and displaced persons against organized changes favoring Turkish influence, amid civilian casualties estimated at over 500 from Turkish strikes between 2016 and 2020 by human rights monitors. Syrian state media and opposition voices alike frame these actions as occupation, exacerbating historical animus rooted in the 1939 of , which Syrian official maps still depict as Syrian territory, fueling irredentist claims. In Iraq, Turkey's cross-border operations against PKK bases in the Kurdistan Region, numbering over 1,000 drone strikes and artillery attacks since 2019, have provoked official protests and public backlash for infringing on Iraqi and causing civilian disruptions. The Iraqi , under , condemned intensified incursions in 2024 as escalatory, demanding withdrawal while navigating domestic pressures from pro-Iran militias portraying as an aggressor. Kurdish protesters stormed a outpost in in January 2019, resulting in one death and injuries, reflecting localized fury over perceived invasions; similar demonstrations occurred in 2007 against threatened ground operations. Public anger in Iraq has been amplified by establishment of militarized "security zones" spanning hundreds of square kilometers, frustrating civilians through displacement and economic restrictions, with analysts noting these actions elevate PKK legitimacy by framing as an external threat.

Regional Manifestations in Europe

Greco-Cypriot Enmities

Greco-Cypriot resentment toward Turks originated in the Ottoman Empire's conquest and administration of from 1571 to 1878, during which the Greek Orthodox majority faced systemic subordination as dhimmis, including higher taxation, restricted rights, and suppression of uprisings such as the 1821 revolt that resulted in mass executions and village burnings. This era instilled a of alien domination, reinforced by cultural narratives of Turkish "yoke" that persisted into the British colonial period after 1878. The movement for union with Greece intensified anti-Turkish sentiments in the 20th century, as viewed —comprising about 18% of the population—as obstacles to national and potential fifth columnists loyal to . A 1950 plebiscite organized by the Orthodox Church saw 96% of participating endorse , amid rising nationalist fervor that portrayed Turkish presence as incompatible with Hellenic identity. , fearing subjugation in a Greece-dominated state, countered with taksim demands for partition, deepening mutual distrust. Intercommunal violence escalated with the guerrilla campaign (1955–1959) against British rule, which targeted not only colonial forces but also , killing hundreds and prompting retaliatory TMT actions; EOKA's rhetoric explicitly framed Turks as invaders to be expelled. Post-independence in 1960 under a power-sharing , Greek Cypriot president Makarios proposed amendments in 1963 that would dilute Turkish veto powers, sparking clashes that displaced thousands of into besieged enclaves, where they endured sieges and sniper fire until 1968. Greek Cypriot irregulars and security forces were responsible for most of the 300–500 deaths in these episodes, fostering Turkish Cypriot narratives of genocide-like persecution while entrenching Greco-Cypriot views of Turks as inherently separatist. The 1974 crisis crystallized Greco-Cypriot enmities: a coup on July 15 by the Greek junta and EOKA B elements installed Nikos Sampson, aiming to enforce enosis and prompting Turkey's "peace operation" invasion on July 20, followed by a second offensive on August 14 that secured 37% of the island. The conflict caused approximately 3,000–5,000 deaths, including over 1,000 Greek Cypriot civilians and soldiers, and displaced around 170,000–200,000 Greek Cypriots from the north, many losing homes to Turkish military seizures and subsequent settlement of 100,000+ mainland Turks. Greco-Cypriots decry the ongoing occupation by 30,000–40,000 Turkish troops, property expropriations, and the unresolved fate of 1,619 missing persons (mostly Greek Cypriots as of 2024) as evidence of Turkish expansionism, with public discourse often invoking "Turkish barbarism" rooted in Ottoman precedents. Despite UN resolutions like 353 (1974) calling for withdrawal, the division persists, with Greco-Cypriot polls showing persistent low trust in Turkish intentions and support for EU leverage against Ankara.

Balkan States (Bulgaria, Serbia, North Macedonia)

![Konstantin Makovsky - The Bulgarian martyresses][float-right] In , anti-Turkish sentiment traces to the Ottoman conquest completed in 1396, initiating nearly five centuries of rule characterized by heavy taxation, forced conversions, and periodic revolts. The exemplified escalating resistance, as Bulgarian revolutionaries sought independence, prompting Ottoman irregular forces known as bashi-bazouks to between 12,000 and 15,000 civilians in , an event documented by British and French consular reports and dubbed the "Bulgarian Horrors." These atrocities, including mass killings in and other villages, fueled national narratives of Turkish brutality and galvanized international intervention, culminating in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and Bulgarian autonomy. Communist policies in the 1980s amplified historical grievances through the "," a campaign of targeting the ethnic Turkish minority, which comprised about 10% of the population. From late 1984 to 1985, authorities mandated the replacement of Turkish names with Bulgarian ones, banned traditional attire and rituals, and suppressed Turkish-language media, leading to widespread protests and an estimated 320,000 Turks fleeing to by mid-1989. This state-orchestrated erasure, justified as countering "foreign" influences, reinforced perceptions of Turks as existential threats, though post-1989 returns and democratic reforms have moderated overt expressions while cultural memory endures in education and . Serbian anti-Turkish sentiment stems from the Ottoman subjugation following the in 1389, mythologized in as a foundational defeat symbolizing Christian resilience against Islamic expansion. Resistance intensified in the 19th century with the of 1804, led by Karađorđe Petrović, which challenged Ottoman authority through guerrilla warfare and secured de facto autonomy by 1830, followed by full independence after the 1878 . Ottoman practices such as the system—levying Christian boys for service—and punitive taxation embedded views of Turks as oppressors, echoed in folk expressions like "crn kao Turčin" (black like a Turk), denoting deep-seated . While less vitriolic than in neighboring states due to shared Slavic-Muslim dynamics in Bosnia, historical narratives portray the Ottoman era as a "Turkish ," influencing modern identity and occasional spikes in sentiment during Turkey's regional assertiveness. In North Macedonia, Ottoman legacy fosters anti-Turkish views through centuries of administrative integration into Rumelia province, where haiduk bands and early revolts from the 15th century resisted tax farming and religious impositions. The Ilinden–Preobrazhenie Uprising of 1903, organized by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, aimed to end Ottoman control via coordinated rebellions in regions like Kruševo, resulting in harsh suppressions that killed thousands and highlighted Turkish forces' role in quelling Slavic aspirations. This period's economic exploitation, including timar land grants to Muslim elites, entrenched perceptions of Ottoman rule as extractive and culturally alienating, perpetuated in post-independence historiography despite a Turkish minority of around 4% holding parliamentary seats. Contemporary sentiments, while subdued by EU integration goals, resurface in debates over Ottoman-era monuments, viewed by some as symbols of subjugation rather than shared heritage.

Western Europe (Germany, France, Netherlands)

Anti-Turkish sentiment in , , and the largely stems from post-World War II labor migration policies that brought millions of Turkish workers to these countries, resulting in large, often poorly integrated communities. In , the 1961 recruitment agreement with initiated the influx of (guest workers), who were initially expected to return home but largely stayed, leading to and a population of approximately 2.9 million people of Turkish descent by 2023. Integration failures, including higher rates of welfare dependency and criminality in some Turkish subclans, have fueled native resentment, particularly in eastern states where amplifies anti-immigrant views. The far-right (AfD) party, which surged to second place in the 2025 federal elections with anti-immigration platforms criticizing "parallel societies" fostered by Turkish diaspora loyalty to Erdogan's , exemplifies this political manifestation. A pivotal incident underscoring violent anti-Turkish sentiment occurred on May 29, 1993, in , where four far-right German youths firebombed a home inhabited by Turkish immigrants, killing five women and children: Gürsün İnce (27), Hatice Genç (18), Gülüstan Öztürk (12), Hülya Genç (9), and Saime Genç (4). The attackers cited frustration over perceived preferential treatment of foreigners amid economic hardship, reflecting broader xenophobic currents post-reunification. While such lethal attacks are infrequent, field experiments indicate persistent labor market discrimination against Turkish-named applicants, with callback rates lower in the Netherlands than Germany, suggesting entrenched biases. In France, with a smaller Turkish community of around 600,000, sentiment intertwines with broader Islamophobia and geopolitical frictions. The 2020 ban on the Grey Wolves, a Turkish ultranationalist group linked to violent incidents including assaults on and , was justified by the government as curbing hate speech and extremism imported from . This followed heightened tensions under President Macron, who accused Turkey of exporting radicalism via diaspora networks, amid Erdogan's criticisms of French secularism. Discrimination manifests in citizenship revocations for jihadist-linked Turks and mosque vandalism, though empirical data attributes much hostility to non-integrated Islamist elements rather than ethnicity alone. The Netherlands, hosting about 400,000 Turkish descendants, mirrors Germany's guest worker legacy but with sharper political rhetoric. Far-right leader Geert Wilders of the Party for Freedom has repeatedly targeted Turks, calling President Erdogan a "terrorist" in 2021 and demanding expulsion of the Turkish ambassador, while opposing EU accession and Turkish political campaigning on Dutch soil. The 2017 diplomatic crisis, where Dutch authorities barred Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu from holding a referendum rally, escalated into riots by pro-Erdogan protesters, highlighting native backlash against perceived foreign meddling. Studies confirm higher perceived and actual discrimination against Turks in hiring and housing, exacerbated by community insularity and support for illiberal Turkish policies.

Regional Manifestations Elsewhere

Caucasus and Former Soviet States (Armenia, Georgia)

In Armenia, anti-Turkish sentiment stems primarily from the Ottoman Empire's mass deportation and killings of Armenians from 1915 to 1923, which Armenia and much of the international community recognize as coupled with Turkey's ongoing official denial of these events as This historical grievance is compounded by the absence of diplomatic relations and the closure of the shared land border since April 1993, imposed by Turkey in solidarity with Azerbaijan following Armenia's occupation of territories outside Nagorno-Karabakh during the First Karabakh War. The border closure has isolated Armenia economically, forcing reliance on Georgia for transit and contributing to perceptions of encirclement by hostile neighbors. Turkey's military backing of Azerbaijan in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War of September-November 2020, including the supply of Bayraktar TB2 drones that inflicted heavy Armenian losses, intensified these views, reviving narratives of Turkey as an existential threat akin to Ottoman-era aggression. Public opinion reflects this: a 2022 International Republican Institute (IRI) survey found 90% of Armenians identifying Turkey as the primary political threat to their country, with 77% viewing it unfavorably overall. A 2023 IRI poll similarly showed 89% considering Turkey a major threat, while a 2024 survey indicated 56% opposed reopening the border without preconditions like genocide recognition. These attitudes manifest in domestic politics, where normalization protocols signed in 2009 were abandoned amid Azerbaijani pressure, and public protests against any concessions to Ankara. In Georgia, anti-Turkish sentiment is milder and more regionally concentrated than in Armenia, rooted in Ottoman suzerainty over western Georgian territories like Adjara until their cession to Russia in 1878, but overshadowed by stronger historical animosities toward Russia. Bilateral ties remain robust, with Turkey as Georgia's second-largest trading partner (trade volume exceeding $2 billion in 2023) and a key investor in infrastructure like the However, concerns over Turkish economic dominance and cultural influence fuel localized resentment, particularly in Adjara's Batumi, where rapid Turkish property acquisitions and construction projects evoke fears of "Turkification." Public wariness has surfaced in protests against specific Turkish-led initiatives, such as the 2021 Namakhvani hydroelectric power plant in Rioni Valley, opposed by thousands citing environmental damage and foreign overreach, and the 2016-2017 resistance to a new mosque in Batumi, framed by nationalists as an erosion of Georgian Orthodox identity amid rumors of forced Islamization. These sentiments are often amplified by pro-Kremlin actors and fringe parties like the Alliance of Patriots, who portray Turkey as an expansionist threat to divert attention from Russian influence, as seen in disinformation campaigns since 2019 emphasizing "Turkish expansionism" in Georgian media and social platforms. Despite this, broader Georgian opinion views Turkey more favorably than Russia, with political relations stable since independence recognition in 1991 and no equivalent to Armenia's border blockade.

United States and Diaspora Dynamics

In the United States, anti-Turkish sentiment has been prominently shaped by the lobbying efforts of Armenian and Greek diasporas, which advocate for policies recognizing historical grievances against the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey. The Armenian-American community, through organizations like the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), has successfully pushed for congressional resolutions affirming the Armenian Genocide. On October 29, 2019, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H. Res. 296 by a vote of 405-11, stating that it is U.S. policy to commemorate the systematic killing of 1.5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923 as genocide. The Senate followed with unanimous passage of S. Res. 150 on December 12, 2019, marking the first such formal recognition by both chambers. These non-binding measures, driven by diaspora influence on lawmakers in districts with significant Armenian populations such as California and Massachusetts, have been cited by Turkish officials as evidence of biased U.S. policy that equates modern Turkey with Ottoman actions. Greek-American lobbying, via groups like the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA), complements this by emphasizing disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, portraying Turkey as expansionist. These ethnic interest groups have historically outperformed the Turkish-American lobby in shaping perceptions, partly due to larger populations—Greek Americans number around 3 million and Armenian Americans about 500,000 self-identified in the census, compared to fewer than 300,000 Turkish Americans by similar metrics—and earlier, more unified organizational efforts. The Turkish Coalition of America and Assembly of Turkish American Associations have countered with campaigns promoting balanced histories, but their impact remains limited amid competing narratives that frame Turkey as a historical aggressor. This diaspora rivalry manifests in congressional hearings, funding allocations favoring Armenia and Greece, and media amplification of anti-Turkish themes, often without equivalent scrutiny of Ottoman-era complexities or Turkey's strategic NATO role. Turkish Americans, concentrated in New Jersey, New York, and Texas, report sporadic discrimination tied to these dynamics, particularly during U.S.-Turkey tensions like the 2016 coup attempt or S-400 purchase disputes. A 2025 survey of Turkish Americans identified discrimination as a concern for 12.3% of respondents, linking it to broader anti-Muslim sentiment post-9/11 and perceptions of Turkey under President Erdogan as authoritarian. Incidents include verbal harassment and vandalism against Turkish cultural centers, though physical violence remains rare compared to Europe; protests during Erdogan's U.S. visits, such as in 2017, have occasionally escalated but primarily involved clashes initiated by Turkish security against demonstrators. Overall, U.S. anti-Turkish sentiment operates more through institutional channels—academia, policy, and elite discourse influenced by diaspora advocacy—than widespread public hostility, reflecting causal links to unresolved historical denialism and geopolitical frictions rather than grassroots xenophobia.

Israel and Strategic Frictions

Relations between Israel and Turkey, once marked by military cooperation and strategic alignment in the 1990s, deteriorated significantly following the 2010 Mavi Marmara flotilla incident, in which Israeli naval commandos intercepted a Gaza-bound aid convoy organized by Turkish activists, resulting in the deaths of nine Turkish citizens. Turkey severed diplomatic ties, demanding a formal apology and compensation from Israel, which issued an apology in 2013 but faced ongoing recriminations that halted normalization efforts until a partial restoration of ties in 2022. This event crystallized mutual distrust, with Turkish public discourse framing the raid as an act of aggression, while Israeli officials viewed the flotilla as a provocative challenge to the Gaza blockade enforced to curb arms smuggling. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey's hosting of Hamas leaders and provision of political and financial support to the group—designated a terrorist organization by Israel, the United States, and the European Union—has intensified strategic frictions, positioning Ankara as a patron of Israel's primary adversary in Gaza. Erdoğan has repeatedly equated Israel's actions with those of , refusing to label the group a terrorist entity and accusing Israel of genocide, rhetoric that Israeli Diaspora Affairs Minister Amichai Chikli described in October 2025 as portraying Erdoğan as "a jihadist in a suit" and a "sworn enemy of Israel and the West." These positions have led to Turkey's severance of diplomatic relations with Israel in November 2024 amid the Gaza conflict, alongside threats of military involvement, prompting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to explicitly oppose any Turkish troop deployment in postwar Gaza stabilization efforts. Such developments have fostered heightened anti-Turkish sentiment within Israeli strategic and public spheres, where Turkey is increasingly perceived not merely as a rhetorical foe but as an enabler of Islamist militancy through its NATO membership and regional influence. Israeli analyses highlight Turkey's indirect threats via proxies in Syria and its media amplification of confrontational narratives, including discussions of potential military clashes, as exacerbating security dilemmas without prompting equivalent hostility from Western allies. Despite persistent economic trade exceeding $7 billion annually as of 2023, these frictions underscore a causal link between Erdoğan's Islamist foreign policy and Israeli views of Turkey as an unreliable and ideologically opposed actor, distinct from earlier pragmatic engagements.

Turkish Denialism and Official Narratives

State-Sponsored Rejection of Genocide Claims

The Turkish government maintains that the mass deaths of during estimated at up to 1.5 million by proponents of recognition, resulted from wartime conditions, intercommunal violence, and relocations rather than a deliberate state-orchestrated , rejecting the application of the term as defined by the UN . This position frames the events as mutual tragedies affecting Muslims and alike, with Ottoman authorities acting in response to Armenian rebellions and alliances with Russia. Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, enacted in 2005 and amended in 2008 to require Justice Ministry approval for prosecutions, criminalizes "insulting the Turkish nation" and has been invoked against individuals affirming the Armenian events as genocide, interpreting such statements as denigration of national identity. Notable cases include the 2005-2006 prosecution of author for comments on Armenian and Kurdish deaths, and more recent trials such as that of lawyer Eren Keskin and activist Barış Yarkın in 2024 for using the term "genocide," though they were acquitted amid procedural scrutiny. The provision reflects state efforts to safeguard official historical narratives, with critics arguing it stifles academic and public discourse on Ottoman-era atrocities. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has consistently echoed this denial, condemning international recognitions as politically motivated distortions; in April 2021, he described U.S. President Joe Biden's affirmation of the genocide as "groundless" and damaging to bilateral ties, asserting it ignored Ottoman defensive measures against Armenian uprisings. Earlier, in 2015, Erdoğan stated that Turkey "cannot accept" the genocide label, dismissing European Parliament resolutions as irrelevant and emphasizing equivalent Muslim casualties during the period. In 2019, he countered Armenian claims by highlighting historical "stains" in accusers' records, such as colonialism, to relativize Ottoman actions. This stance extends to other alleged Ottoman genocides, including those against Assyrian Christians and Pontic Greeks, which Turkish authorities similarly attribute to wartime chaos rather than systematic extermination policies. historiography, disseminated through state institutions and education, promotes joint historical commissions—such as the 2005 Turkey-Armenia protocol proposal—to reexamine archives, positioning as a call for impartial scholarship over "one-sided" allegations. Such policies have prompted diplomatic responses, including Turkey's severance of ties with countries advancing recognitions, underscoring the linkage between historical and national

Promotion of Counter-Histories

The Turkish government actively promotes narratives portraying the Ottoman Empire's policies toward Christian minorities in the early 20th century as defensive responses to existential threats rather than orchestrated extermination campaigns. Official accounts emphasize that the 1915 relocation of Armenians was a temporary security measure amid World War I, prompted by Armenian armed rebellions—such as the Van uprising in April 1915—and collaboration with invading Russian forces, which resulted in the deaths of Muslim civilians. These relocations, according to state historiography, lacked genocidal intent, as evidenced by Ottoman archival records and post-war military tribunals that prosecuted some perpetrators of excesses, with total Armenian deaths estimated by Turkish sources at around 300,000-500,000, comparable to Muslim losses from similar intercommunal violence. Similar framings apply to Greek and Assyrian populations, depicting their deportations and massacres as regrettable wartime byproducts of loyalty to Allied powers or local insurgencies, without systematic state orchestration. State-sponsored institutions like the Turkish Historical Society (Türk Tarih Kurumu) advance these counter-histories through publications and research that prioritize Ottoman documents over foreign eyewitness accounts or demographic studies, arguing that claims of genocide conflate legitimate counterinsurgency with ethnic targeting. The society's works, often disseminated internationally, assert that Armenian, Greek, and Assyrian communities benefited from Ottoman millet systems of autonomy and tolerance for centuries, with 1915-1923 events representing mutual tragedies rather than one-sided atrocities; for instance, they highlight Armenian massacres of Turks in eastern Anatolia as causal precursors. Turkey's supports this by funding conferences, exhibits, and lobbying efforts abroad to challenge genocide resolutions, proposing joint historical commissions with affected states for "impartial" archival review, a stance maintained since the 2001 initiative with Armenia. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, since 2014, promotion has intensified via educational reforms and cultural media to revive Ottoman grandeur as a counterweight to Kemalist secularism and Western critiques. Revised school curricula, implemented in 2017, expand Ottoman history coverage by 30-50% in some grades, emphasizing imperial multiculturalism and military valor while minimizing minority persecutions, framing the empire's dissolution as a victim of European imperialism and internal betrayals. State-backed television series, such as Diriliş: Ertuğrul (2014-2019) viewed by over 100 million domestically, depict Ottomans as just rulers protecting diverse subjects, implicitly rebutting genocide allegations by showcasing harmonious coexistence. Erdoğan's speeches, like his 2015 Gallipoli address rejecting Armenian genocide labels, reinforce this, tying historical denial to national unity and positioning Turkey as a aggrieved party in global memory politics. These efforts, while domestically popular, face international skepticism from historians citing pre-relocation massacres and telegraphic orders indicating extermination intent, though Turkish sources dismiss such evidence as fabricated or decontextualized.

Domestic Suppression of Dissent

The Turkish Penal Code's Article 301, enacted in 2005, criminalizes "insulting the Turkish nation" and has been invoked to prosecute individuals for publicly acknowledging the Armenian Genocide or related events, framing such statements as threats to national identity. Courts have applied it to historians, journalists, and activists, with penalties including fines and imprisonment, though European Court of Human Rights rulings have occasionally overturned convictions on free speech grounds. Prominent cases illustrate enforcement: In 2006, Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk faced charges under Article 301 for referencing Armenian and Kurdish deaths in a foreign interview, sparking international condemnation before charges were dropped. Journalist Hrant Dink, editor of the bilingual Turkish-Armenian newspaper Agos, endured multiple under the article for "insulting Turkishness" via genocide discussions, culminating in his assassination on January 19, 2007, by a nationalist gunman whose revealed state complicity elements. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, post-2016 coup attempt purges expanded suppression, targeting academics via emergency decrees for signing petitions like the 2016 "Academics for Peace" declaration, which critiqued state policies but intersected with historical revisionism debates; over 5,000 academics were dismissed, including those researching Ottoman-era atrocities. In February 2024, authors Rabia Keskin and Yiğit Yarkın were tried under Article 301 for employing the term "genocide" in writings on Armenian history, with prosecutors citing it as denigrating national honor. Human rights monitors report self-censorship prevails, as public discourse challenging official narratives risks professional ruin or legal action, perpetuating denial as state orthodoxy.

Contemporary Developments and Drivers

Neo-Ottoman Foreign Policy Under Erdogan

Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey's foreign policy has increasingly incorporated elements of Neo-Ottomanism, characterized by assertive interventions in regions once part of the blending nationalist revivalism with Islamist outreach to project influence beyond its borders. This approach, evident since the early 2010s, emphasizes Turkey's role as a regional hegemon, often invoking historical Ottoman legacies to justify military and diplomatic actions in the Middle East, Balkans, and North Africa. Erdoğan's rhetoric, including references to the collapse of the as a national catastrophe, has framed these policies as restorative, prioritizing ties with Muslim-majority states while challenging Western dominance. Key manifestations include Turkey's military operations in Syria, initiated in 2016 with Operation Euphrates Shield to counter Kurdish YPG forces affiliated with the PKK, followed by further incursions like Operation Olive Branch in 2018 and Peace Spring in 2019, resulting in control over approximately 8,000 square kilometers of northern Syrian territory by 2020. In Libya, Turkey deployed troops, drones, and Syrian mercenaries starting in January 2020 to support the UN-recognized Government of National Accord against the Haftar-led forces, securing maritime agreements that expanded Turkish influence in the eastern Mediterranean. Support for Azerbaijan during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict involved supplying Bayraktar TB2 drones and military advisors, contributing to Azerbaijan's territorial gains and prompting accusations of Turkish expansionism. These actions, often militarized and tied to the "Blue Homeland" doctrine asserting expansive maritime claims, have strained relations with neighbors like Greece, where naval standoffs in the Aegean Sea escalated in 2020 over energy exploration rights. This policy has fueled anti-Turkish sentiment by evoking fears of neo-imperial revivalism, particularly in Europe and the Middle East, where interventions are perceived as destabilizing and self-serving. In Greece and Cyprus, Erdoğan's maritime assertions and historical revisionism—such as challenging the —have revived longstanding animosities, leading to heightened public opposition and EU sanctions threats in 2020. Gulf Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, view Turkey's backing of Islamist groups like the and its Syrian proxy deployments as a direct challenge to their influence, framing it as Ottoman-style hegemony in a nascent regional "cold war." In Armenia, Turkey's alliance with Azerbaijan intensified ethnic tensions, with post-2020 rhetoric portraying Turkish drones as enablers of "genocidal" advances, exacerbating diaspora-led boycotts and protests against Turkish goods. Critics, including NATO allies, argue that such adventurism prioritizes Erdoğan's domestic consolidation over alliance cohesion, amplifying perceptions of Turkey as an unreliable, aggressive power.

Refugee Inflows and Economic Grievances

In the context of the 2015-2016 European migrant crisis, Turkey's hosting of over 3.6 million Syrian refugees positioned it as a pivotal transit point for irregular migration to the European Union, with approximately 1 million migrants crossing via the Aegean Sea route in 2015 alone. The 2016 EU-Turkey Statement, under which the EU pledged €6 billion in aid to Turkey for migrant management and resettlement, aimed to curb these flows, yet Turkey's subsequent threats to "open the gates" intensified European perceptions of Ankara wielding migration as geopolitical leverage. This dynamic peaked in February 2020, when Turkey suspended border controls following Syrian military advances in Idlib, prompting over 100,000 migrants to mass at the Greek-Turkish frontier; Greek forces responded with pushbacks and fortifications, framing the episode as Turkish aggression that exacerbated local economic strains from prior asylum seeker arrivals. Such actions fueled anti-Turkish resentment in Greece and frontline EU states, where public discourse increasingly portrayed Turkey not merely as a reluctant host but as an instrumental actor prioritizing diplomatic concessions over border security. Economic pressures from these inflows compounded grievances, as EU countries absorbed hundreds of thousands of arrivals routed through Turkey, straining public finances and labor markets; for instance, Greece's migrant reception costs surged to €1.5 billion annually by 2016, amid broader EU expenditures exceeding €20 billion for emergency responses. In northern Europe, where many migrants eventually settled, native populations voiced concerns over wage suppression and welfare competition, with surveys indicating that 60-70% of respondents in Germany and the Netherlands linked migration to economic insecurity by 2020. These sentiments extended to anti-Turkish undertones, as Turkey's leverage tactics were seen to undermine EU sovereignty, prompting backlash against Turkish leadership and diaspora communities perceived as extensions of Ankara's influence. Parallel to crisis-driven inflows, longstanding Turkish labor migration under 1960s guest worker programs has sustained economic grievances in host countries like Germany, home to over 3 million people of Turkish origin. Turkish immigrants exhibit higher welfare dependency rates than natives, with studies showing a 20-30% elevated propensity for benefit receipt after controlling for demographics, contributing to net fiscal costs estimated at €3-5 billion annually for MENAPT-origin groups including Turks. In Germany, where non-citizens comprise 45% of unemployment benefit recipients despite being 15% of the population, public discourse has highlighted Turkish communities' lower labor participation—unemployment rates twice the national average—and integration shortfalls, such as third-generation educational gaps, as burdens on social systems. Similar patterns in the Netherlands, with Turkish-Moroccan groups facing scrutiny for disproportionate welfare use, have informed populist critiques framing Turkish migration as a persistent economic drag rather than a temporary labor solution. These data-driven perceptions have intertwined with cultural alienation, amplifying anti-Turkish sentiment amid native grievances over resource allocation. In both refugee and labor contexts, causal links between Turkish-linked migration and economic strain—evidenced by persistent fiscal imbalances and opportunity costs for low-skilled natives—have rationalized hostility, distinct from generalized xenophobia, as policymakers like Germany's acknowledged integration failures among Turkish guest workers as a self-inflicted policy error. While some analyses note offsetting demographic benefits from immigration, the asymmetry of short-term costs has predominated in public opinion, sustaining narratives of Turkish migration as a vector for unresolved economic inequities.

Recent Incidents and Media Amplification (2020s)

In the wake of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War from September to November 2020, Turkish provision of drones, military advisors, and rhetorical support to heightened anti-Turkish sentiment in , reviving collective memories of Ottoman-era massacres and framing as an existential threat to Armenian security. Public demonstrations in during the conflict included chants and signage decrying Turkish "aggression," with protesters linking Azerbaijani advances to neo-Ottoman ambitions under President Erdogan. Diaspora communities echoed this, as on October 11, 2020, thousands rallied outside the Turkish Consulate in , burning effigies and demanding an end to Turkish backing of Azerbaijan amid fears of regional encirclement. European media outlets amplified these tensions by portraying Turkey's role as escalatory and revisionist, often without equivalent scrutiny of Armenian territorial claims in , thereby reinforcing narratives of Turkish irredentism in outlets like The Guardian and Al Jazeera. Similar amplification occurred in coverage of Greece-Turkey maritime disputes, where Turkey's deployment of survey vessels like Oruç Reis in 2020 prompted Greek protests and EU sanctions rhetoric, with Greek media emphasizing over 4,600 Turkish airspace violations that year as evidence of expansionism. By 2022, violations exceeded 10,000, correlating with public incidents such as Greek military personnel chanting vulgar anti-Turkish slogans during parades, which Ankara protested as inflammatory. Among Turkish diaspora in Europe, discrimination reports surged in the mid-2020s amid far-right electoral gains and anti-immigration sentiments, with Turkish students citing classroom exclusions, verbal harassment, and assaults on mosques in countries like Germany and the Netherlands. In Germany, where Turks form Europe's largest Muslim minority, incidents of physical attacks and property vandalism rose alongside AfD party rhetoric linking Turkish communities to Erdogan's influence, though underreport due to victim reluctance. Western media coverage frequently conflated such acts with broader Islamophobia post-2020s migration debates and Turkey's NATO vetoes (e.g., over Sweden's accession), portraying Turkish expatriates as extensions of Ankara's authoritarianism rather than integrated citizens, thus sustaining prejudice cycles. These patterns reflect causal links between geopolitical frictions and localized hostility, with institutional biases in European reporting—often downplaying host-country radicalism—exacerbating perceptions of Turks as perpetual outsiders.

Cultural and Media Expressions

Linguistic Derogations Across Languages

In European languages, the term "Turk" historically acquired pejorative connotations akin to "barbarian," "heathen," or "savage," largely due to the Ottoman Empire's military expansions, slave raids, and religious conflicts from the 14th to 18th centuries, which framed Turks as existential threats to Christendom. This semantic shift is evident in English, where by the late 16th century, "Turk" denoted a fierce or unrefined individual, as in phrases like "to play the Turk" implying violent or tyrannical behavior, a usage persisting into the 19th century. Similar extensions occurred in other Western languages, such as French "turc" evoking brutality and German "Türke" implying uncivilized aggression, reinforced by events like the 1683 Siege of Vienna. In Balkan languages, shaped by five centuries of Ottoman domination, Turkish-derived loanwords often carried derogatory undertones reflecting subjugation and cultural resentment; for instance, Bulgarian incorporates pejorative Ottoman Turkish terms like those denoting authority figures (e.g., "aga" twisted into insults for oppressors), mirroring collective trauma from devshirme conscriptions and janissary rule. Greek usage similarly loaded "Tourkos" with negative historical baggage, associating it with invaders during the 1453 Fall of Constantinople and subsequent suppressions, though specific slurs like "Tourkalas" (a mocking variant for males) emerged in folk contexts. These linguistic residues persist in idioms equating Turkishness with treachery or backwardness. Modern contexts yield targeted ethnic slurs amid immigration and geopolitical tensions. In Germany, where Turkish guest workers arrived en masse from 1961, terms like "Kameltreiber" (camel drivers) have been deployed against Turkish communities, as in a 2018 incident where an Alternative for Germany (AfD) lawmaker's remark prompted lawsuits from affected groups, highlighting stereotypes of otherness. In Iran, "Türk-i hâr" (donkey Turk) serves as a racial insult against Turkic Azerbaijanis, invoking perceived stupidity and rooted in pre-modern ethnic hierarchies exacerbated by 20th-century nationalism. Such terms underscore how historical animosities evolve into contemporary verbal weapons, often amplified in diaspora settings or online discourse.

Film, Literature, and Propaganda Depictions

In 15th- and 16th-century European literature, anti-Turkish works proliferated amid Ottoman expansions, portraying sultans as tyrannical figures akin to ancient conquerors such as and , drawing on Greek refugee accounts and classical analogies to demonize the "Turkish threat." These texts, often propagandistic, framed the Ottomans as existential foes to Christendom, reinforcing religious and cultural othering. During the 19th century, Romantic amplified anti-Turkish motifs, particularly through philhellenism supporting Greek independence; Lord Byron's 1823 death fighting Ottoman forces in Greece triggered widespread European outrage, inspiring works that vilified Turks as barbaric oppressors. Similarly, in Habsburg domains, and depicted Turks as perpetual invaders, aligning state and ecclesiastical interests against Ottoman resurgence. Artistic propaganda peaked during conflicts like the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War, with paintings such as Konstantin Makovsky's The Bulgarian Martyresses (1877) graphically illustrating purported Ottoman atrocities against Bulgarian civilians, galvanizing public support for Russian military action and perpetuating the "terrible Turk" archetype. European posters from the 1683 Siege of Vienna onward similarly exaggerated Turkish brutality toward civilians, embedding visceral anti-Ottoman imagery in collective memory. In 20th-century Western cinema, Turks frequently appeared as villains embodying the enduring "terrible Turk" myth—lustful, cruel, and despotic—rooted in historical Orientalist tropes rather than contemporary realities, as seen in Hollywood's recurrent casting of Ottoman-era figures as antagonists in epics about imperial clashes. World War I-era propaganda, including British publications like the 1916 Bryce Report, further entrenched literary depictions of Turks as systematic perpetrators of civilian massacres, though such accounts were later critiqued for selective sourcing amid wartime exigencies. These representations, while diminishing post-Ottoman collapse, persisted in framing Turkish identity through lenses of historical enmity.

Modern Online and Political Rhetoric

In online spaces, particularly far-right forums such as 4chan's /pol/ board and Reddit communities like r/HistoryMemes, the "remove kebab" meme has emerged as a recurrent symbol of anti-Turkish hostility, originating from a 2006 Serbian parody video mocking Ottoman rule and evolving into a chant glorifying historical European victories over Turkish forces. This phrase, often paired with imagery of military conquests, invokes Ottoman-era grievances and extends to contemporary criticisms of Turkish immigration, Islamism, and perceived cultural incompatibility, with usage spiking during events like Balkan conflicts or migration debates. Its deployment in gaming contexts, such as Europa Universalis IV where "removing kebab" denotes defeating the Ottoman Empire, further embeds the rhetoric in digital subcultures, blending historical revisionism with xenophobic humor. Such online expressions frequently intersect with real-world incidents, amplifying sentiment through viral copypastas and hashtags that attribute modern issues like terrorism or economic strain to Turkish ethnicity rather than policy. Discussions on platforms like highlight user complaints about pervasive anti-Turkish including denial of Turkish historical achievements or blanket attributions of Ottoman atrocities to contemporary Turks. In Balkan-focused online communities, rhetoric ties anti-Turkish views to ongoing geopolitical tensions, such as Cyprus disputes or Azerbaijan-Armenia clashes, where Turkish support for Baku elicits accusations of neo-imperialism. In political discourse, European far-right figures have incorporated anti-Turkish elements into platforms emphasizing sovereignty and migration control. Dutch politician Geert Wilders, leader of the Party for Freedom, stated in 2015 that Turks "are not welcome here" and would "never join the EU," framing Turkish integration as a cultural threat amid debates over dual citizenship and Erdogan's influence on diaspora voters. In 2021, Wilders labeled President Erdogan a "terrorist" and called for expelling the Turkish ambassador following Ankara's objections to Dutch cartoons, rhetoric that resonated with voters concerned about Turkish political campaigning in Europe. Similarly, the rise of Austria's Freedom Party (FPÖ) in 2024 elections alarmed Turkish communities, with the party's anti-immigration stance interpreted as targeting the approximately 120,000 Turkish-Austrians through promises of stricter citizenship rules and deportation priorities. Greek political rhetoric often sustains anti-Turkish narratives as a unifying domestic tool, with leaders invoking historical enmities and Aegean disputes to deflect internal challenges, as noted in analyses of public opinion shifts from 2021-2023 where mutual distrust peaked at over 80% on both sides. This includes portrayals of Turkey as an existential threat in election cycles, exacerbating online echo chambers where ethnic slurs revive Ottoman-era stereotypes. In Germany, Alternative for Germany (AfD) gains in 2025 state elections heightened diaspora fears, with party rhetoric on "parallel societies" implicitly critiquing Turkish enclaves despite focusing broadly on Islam. These instances reflect causal links between policy grievances—such as Erdogan's foreign interventions—and ethnic generalizations, though mainstream outlets often frame them as anti-government rather than anti-Turkish, potentially understating the latter due to institutional sensitivities toward multiculturalism.

References

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