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Khalistan movement
Khalistan movement
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The proposed flag of Khalistan is often used as a symbol of the Khalistan movement.[1]

The Khalistan movement is a separatist movement seeking to create a homeland for Sikhs by establishing an ethno-religious sovereign state called Khalistan[A] (lit.'land of the Khalsa') in the Punjab region.[2] The proposed boundaries of Khalistan vary between different groups; some suggest the entirety of the Sikh-majority Indian state of Punjab, while larger claims include Pakistani Punjab and other parts of North India such as Chandigarh, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh.[3]

The call for a separate Sikh state began during the 1930s, when British rule in India was nearing its end.[4] In 1940, the first explicit call for Khalistan was made in a pamphlet titled "Khalistan".[5][6] In the 1940s, a demand for a Sikh country called 'Sikhistan' arose.[7] With financial and political support from the Sikh diaspora, the movement flourished in the Indian state of Punjab – which has a Sikh-majority population – continuing through the 1970s and 1980s, and reaching its zenith in the late 1980s. The Sikh separatist leader Jagjit Singh Chohan said that during his talks with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the latter affirmed his support for the Khalistan movement in retaliation for the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, which resulted in the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan.[8]

The insurgency in Punjab started in the early 1980s after 1978 Sikh–Nirankari clash.[9][10] Several Pro-Khalistan groups were involved in the armed insurgency, including Babbar Khalsa and Khalistan Commando Force, among others.[11] In 1986, Khalistan Commando Force took responsibility for the assassination of General Arun Vaidya, in retaliation for 1984's Operation Blue Star.[12][13] By the mid-1990s, the insurgency petered out, with the last major incident being the assassination of Chief Minister Beant Singh, who was killed in a bomb blast by a member of Babbar Khalsa.[14] The movement failed to reach its objective for multiple reasons, including violent police crackdowns on separatists, factional infighting, and disillusionment from the Sikh population.[9][15]

There is some support within India and the Sikh diaspora, with yearly demonstrations in protest of those killed during Operation Blue Star.[16][17][18] In early 2018, some militant groups were arrested by police in Punjab, India.[9] Former Chief Minister of Punjab Amarinder Singh claimed that the recent extremism is backed by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and "Khalistani sympathisers" in Canada, Italy, and the UK.[19] Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar) is currently the only pro-Khalistan party recognised by the Election Commission of India. As of 2024, two seats in the Indian Parliament are held by Amritpal Singh, an incarcerated pro-Khalistan activist, and Sarabjeet Singh Khalsa, who is the son of the assassin of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.[20][21]

Pre-1950s

[edit]
Maharaja Ranjit Singh's Sikh Empire in c. 1839.

Sikhs have been concentrated in the Punjab region of South Asia.[22] Before its conquest by the British, the region around Punjab had been ruled by the confederacy of Sikh Misls in the 18th century and a Sikh Empire and kingdoms in the first half of the 19th century. The Misls ruled over the eastern Punjab from 1733 to 1799,[23] until their confederacy was unified into the Sikh Empire by Maharajah Ranjit Singh from 1799 to 1849.[24]

At the end of the Second Anglo-Sikh War in 1849, the Sikh Empire was dissolved into separate princely states and the British province of Punjab.[25] In newly conquered regions, "religio-nationalist movements emerged in response to British 'divide and rule' administrative policies, the perceived success of Christian missionaries converting Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims, and a general belief that the solution to the downfall among India's religious communities was a grassroots religious revival."[26]

As the British Empire began to dissolve in the 1930s, Sikhs made their first call for a Sikh homeland.[4] When the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League demanded Punjab be made into a Muslim state, the Akalis viewed it as an attempt to usurp a historically Sikh territory.[27][28] In response, the Sikh party Shiromani Akali Dal argued for a community that was separate from Hindus and Muslims.[29] The Akali Dal imagined Khalistan as a theocratic state led by the Maharaja of Patiala with the aid of a cabinet consisting of the representatives of other units.[30] The country would include parts of present-day Punjab, India, present-day Punjab, Pakistan (including Lahore), and the Simla Hill States.[31]

Azad Punjab, 1943

[edit]

Azad Punjab was a proposal of a redrawing of the boundaries of Punjab to excise the overwhelmingly Muslim-majority northwestern-areas west of the Jhelum river out of, which the Akali Dal claimed were not actually part of Punjab proper but had been added administratively to Punjab earlier by Maharaja Ranjit Singh.[32] The Azad Punjab proposal was a redrawing of borders in-order to demographically balance the religious make-up of the Punjab to around 40% Muslim, 40% Hindu, an 20% Sikh so that no single religious community would demographically dominate overall whilst also ensuring the Sikhs would remain the power-brokers between the equally-numbered Muslims and Hindus.[32] The Azad Punjab proposal was never intended to be a separate Sikh state.[32] The areas claimed for Azad Punjab were Ambala, Jullunder, and Lahore divisions, Lyallpur district of the Multan division, and parts of Montgomery and Multan districts.[32] However, the Azad Punjab proposal was not popular outside of the Akali Dal.[32]

Sikhistan, 1944–1946

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Sikhistan was a proposal taken up by Master Tara Singh for an "independent Sikh nation" in the 1940s.[7] In 1940, V. S. Bhatti proposed the creation of a Sikh nation called 'Sikhistan' to be led by the Maharaja of Patiala. He envisioned a "Khalistan" where the Maharaja would be aided by a cabinet comprising representatives from various federating units.[33][34][35][36] These units included the central districts of Punjab province directly administered by the British at that time, including Ludhiana, Jalandhar, Ambala, Firozpur, Amritsar, and Lahore. It also encompassed the princely states of the Cis-Sutlej region, including Patiala, Nabha, Faridkot, and Malerkotla, as well as the states in the 'Shimla Group'.

Sikhistan was further proposed in mid-1944 at the All-Parties Sikh Conference in Amritsar in-response to the C. R. formula, which the Sikhs of the Akali Dal felt betrayed by as the proposal would divide the Sikh population at the time into two halves.[32] Sikhistan differed from the Azad Punjab scheme that the Akali Dal had previously supported in 1943, as while Sikhistan demanded a separate Sikh state and was marked by a "Sikh complexion", Azad Punjab was on the other hand was a call for a more demographically religiously-balanced Punjab (albeit to still give Sikhs an upper-hand politically).[32] However, Sikhistan did not feature in the election of campaign of the Akali Dal in 1946.[32] On 22 March 1946, the Akali Dal pressed the demand for Sikhistan to the Cabinet Mission.[32] Another name used for the proposed Sikh country was Khalistan.[32]

Sikhistan was envisioned to be a Sikh federation, where regions in central and eastern Punjab with large amounts of Sikhs, alongside territory held by the Sikh-ruled princely states of Patiala, Nabha, Jind, Faridkot, Kalsia, and Kapurthala, would form a country.[32] According to Giani Kartar Singh, Sikhistan would comprise the entirety of Lahore, Karnal, Simla, Montgomery, and Lyallpur districts.[32] Meanwhile, Baldev Singh envisioned Sikhistan as comprising Ambala, Jullunder, and Lahore divisions.[32] Master Tara Singh vaguely mentioned that a future Sikhistan would reserve the right to federate with either Pakistan or India.[32] According to Tan Tai Yong, the demand for Sikhistan was a sign of the desperation of the Sikh leaders, who wanted to communicate to the British their fears of being under a "Muslim Raj" and their hope for representation in post-colonial Punjab.[32] Therefore, the Sikhs copied the Muslim League in their demand for Pakistan by making a demand for Sikhistan in-order to achieve their aims for future political representation and power, although the Sikh leaders knew the demand for Sikhistan would not be taken seriously.[32] The Cabinet Mission dismissed the Sikhistan demand as unrealistic and impossible.[32]

Partition of India, 1947

[edit]
British Punjab Province, in 1909

Before the 1947 partition of India, Sikhs were not in majority in any of the districts of pre-partition British Punjab Province other than Ludhiana (where Sikhs formed 41.6% of the population).[37] Rather, districts in the region had a majority of either the Hindus or Muslims depending on its location in the province.

British India was partitioned on a religious basis in 1947, where the Punjab province was divided between India and the newly created Pakistan. As result, a majority of Sikhs, along with the Hindus, migrated from the Pakistani region to India's Punjab, which included present-day Haryana and Himachal Pradesh. The Sikh population, which had gone as high as 19.8% in some Pakistani districts in 1941, dropped to 0.1% in Pakistan, and rose sharply in the districts assigned to India. However, they would still be a minority in the Punjab province of India, which remained a Hindu-majority province.[38][page needed]

After the Partition of India in 1947, a Sikh publication called The Liberator advocated for Khalistan, proposing that it should include East Punjab merged with the Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU), with the Maharaja of Patiala as its monarch.[39]

Sikh relationship with Punjab (via Oberoi)

[edit]
A map of the present-day Indian state of Punjab. Following the partition, East Punjab (including PEPSU) was divided in 1966 with the formation of the new states of Haryana and Himachal Pradesh as well as the current state of Punjab. Punjab is the only state in India with a majority Sikh population.

Sikh historian Harjot Singh Oberoi argues that, despite the historical linkages between Sikhs and Punjab, territory has never been a major element of Sikh self-definition. He makes the case that the attachment of Punjab with Sikhism is a recent phenomenon, stemming from the 1940s.[40] Historically, Sikhism has been pan-Indian, with the Guru Granth Sahib (the main scripture of Sikhism) drawing from works of saints in both North and South India, while several major seats in Sikhism (e.g. Takht Sri Patna Sahib in Bihar and Hazur Sahib in Maharashtra) are located outside of Punjab.[41]

Oberoi makes the case that Sikh leaders in the late 1930s and 1940s realised that the dominance of Muslims in Pakistan and of Hindus in India was imminent. To justify a separate Sikh state within the Punjab, Sikh leaders started to mobilise meta-commentaries and signs to argue that Punjab belonged to Sikhs and Sikhs belong to Punjab. This began the territorialisation of the Sikh community.[40]

This territorialisation of the Sikh community would be formalised in March 1946, when the Sikh political party of Akali Dal passed a resolution proclaiming the natural association of Punjab and the Sikh religious community.[42] Oberoi argues that despite having its beginnings in the early 20th century, Khalistan as a separatist movement was never a major issue until the late 1970s and 1980s when it began to militarise.[43]

1950s to 1970s

[edit]

There are two distinct narratives about the origins of the calls for a sovereign Khalistan. One refers to the events within India itself, while the other privileges the role of the Sikh diaspora. Both of these narratives vary in the form of governance proposed for this state (e.g. theocracy vs democracy) as well as the proposed name (i.e. Sikhistan vs Khalistan). Even the precise geographical borders of the proposed state differs among them although it was generally imagined to be carved out from one of various historical constructions of the Punjab.[44]

Emergence in India

[edit]

Established on 14 December 1920, Akali Dal was a Sikh political party that sought to form a government in Punjab.[45]

Following the 1947 independence of India, the Punjabi Suba movement, led by the Akali Dal, sought the creation of a province (suba) for Punjabi people. The Akali Dal's maximal position of demands was a sovereign state (i.e. Khalistan), while its minimal position was to have an autonomous state within India.[44] The issues raised during the Punjabi Suba movement were later used as a premise for the creation of a separate Sikh country by proponents of Khalistan.

As the religious-based partition of India led to much bloodshed, the Indian government initially rejected the demand, concerned that creating a Punjabi-majority state would effectively mean yet again creating a state based on religious grounds.[46][47]

On 7 September 1966, the Punjab Reorganisation Act was passed in Parliament, implemented with effect beginning 1 November 1966. Accordingly, Punjab was divided into the state of Punjab and Haryana, with certain areas to Himachal Pradesh. Chandigarh was made a centrally administered Union territory.[48] While the Union Government led by Indira Gandhi agreed with the creation of Punjab state but refused to make Chandigarh as its capital and also refused to make it autonomous. The outcome of the Punjabi Suba movement failed to meet demands of its leaders.[49]

Anandpur Resolution

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As Punjab and Haryana now shared the capital of Chandigarh, resentment was felt among Sikhs in Punjab.[45] Adding further grievance, a canal system was put in place over the rivers of Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej, which flowed through Punjab, in order for water to also reach Haryana and Rajasthan. As result, Punjab would only receive 23% of the water while the rest would go to the two other states. The fact that the issue would not be revisited brought on additional turmoil to Sikh resentment against Congress.[45]

The Akali Dal was defeated in the 1972 Punjab elections.[50] To regain public appeal, the party put forward the Anandpur Sahib Resolution in 1973 to demand radical devolution of power and further autonomy to Punjab.[51] The resolution document included both religious and political issues, asking for the recognition of Sikhism as a religion separate from Hinduism, as well as the transfer of Chandigarh and certain other areas to Punjab. It also demanded that power be radically devolved from the central to state governments.[52]

The document was largely forgotten for some time after its adoption until gaining attention in the following decade. In 1982, the Akali Dal and Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale joined hands to launch the Dharam Yudh Morcha in order to implement the resolution. Thousands of people joined the movement, feeling that it represented a real solution to such demands as larger shares of water for irrigation and the return of Chandigarh to Punjab.[53]

Emergence in the diaspora

[edit]

According to the 'events outside India' narrative, particularly after 1971, the notion of a sovereign and independent state of Khalistan began to get popularised among Sikhs in North America and Europe. One such account is provided by the Khalistan Council which had moorings in West London, where the Khalistan movement is said to have been launched in 1970.[44]

Davinder Singh Parmar migrated to London in 1954. According to Parmar, his first pro-Khalistan meeting was attended by less than 20 people and he was labelled as a madman, receiving only one person's support. Parmar continued his efforts despite the lack of following, eventually raising the Khalistani flag in Birmingham in the 1970s.[54] In 1969, two years after losing the Punjab Assembly elections, Indian politician Jagjit Singh Chohan moved to the United Kingdom to start his campaign for the creation of Khalistan.[55] Chohan's proposal included Punjab, Himachal, Haryana, as well as some parts of Rajasthan.[56]

Parmar and Chohan met in 1970 and formally announced the Khalistan movement at a London press conference, though being largely dismissed by the community as fanatical fringe without any support.[54]

Chohan in Pakistan and US

[edit]
Location of Nankana Sahib in Punjab, Pakistan, that was proposed as the capital of Khalistan by Z. A. Bhutto.

Following the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Chohan visited Pakistan as a guest of such leaders as Chaudhuri Zahoor Elahi. Visiting Nankana Sahib and several historical gurdwaras in Pakistan, Chohan utilised the opportunity to spread the notion of an independent Sikh state. Widely publicised by Pakistani press, the extensive coverage of his remarks introduced the international community, including those in India, to the demand of Khalistan for the first time. Though lacking public support, the term Khalistan became more and more recognisable.[54] According to Chohan, during a talk with Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan, Bhutto had proposed to make Nankana Sahib the capital of Khalistan.[57]

On 13 October 1971, visiting the United States at the invitation of his supporters in the Sikh diaspora, Chohan placed an advertisement in the New York Times proclaiming an independent Sikh state. Such promotion enabled him to collect millions of dollars from the diaspora,[55] eventually leading to charges in India relating to sedition and other crimes in connection with his separatist activities.

Council of Khalistan

[edit]

After returning to India in 1977, Chohan travelled to Britain in 1979. There, he would establish the Council of Khalistan,[58] declaring its formation at Anandpur Sahib on 12 April 1980. Chohan designated himself as President of the Council and Balbir Singh Sandhu as its Secretary General.

In May 1980, Chohan travelled to London to announce the formation of Khalistan. A similar announcement was made in Amritsar by Sandhu, who released stamps and currency of Khalistan. Operating from a building termed "Khalistan House", Chohan named a Cabinet and declared himself president of the "Republic of Khalistan," issuing symbolic Khalistan 'passports,' 'postage stamps,' and 'Khalistan dollars.' Moreover, embassies in Britain and other European countries were opened by Chohan.[55] It is reported that, with the support of a wealthy Californian peach magnate, Chohan opened an Ecuadorian bank account to further support his operation.[56] As well as maintaining contacts among various groups in Canada, the US, and Germany, Chohan kept in contact with the Sikh leader Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale who was campaigning for a theocratic Sikh homeland.[55]

The globalised Sikh diaspora invested efforts and resources for Khalistan, but the Khalistan movement remained nearly invisible on the global political scene until the Operation Blue Star of June 1984.[54]

Operation Blue Star and impact

[edit]

In later disclosures from former special secretary G.B.S. Sidhu of the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), the foreign-intelligence agency of India, R&AW itself helped "build the Khalistan legend," actively participating in the planning of Operation Blue Star. While posted in Ottawa, Canada in 1976 to look into the "Khalistan problem" among the Sikh diaspora, Sidhu found "nothing amiss" during the three years he was there,[59] stating that "Delhi was unnecessarily making a mountain of a molehill where none existed," that the agency created seven posts in West Europe and North America in 1981 to counter non-existent Khalistan activities, and that the deployed officers were "not always familiar with the Sikhs or the Punjab issue."[59] He described the secessionist movement as a "chimera" until the army operation, after which the insurgency would start.[59]

According to a New York Times article written just a few weeks after the operation, "Before the raid on the Golden Temple, neither the Government nor anyone else appeared to put much credence in the Khalistan movement. Mr. Bhindranwale himself said many times that he was not seeking an independent country for Sikhs, merely greater autonomy for Punjab within the Indian Union.... One possible explanation advanced for the Government's raising of the Khalistan question is that it needs to take every opportunity to justify the killing in Amritsar and the invasion of the Sikhs' holiest shrine."[60]

Khushwant Singh had written that "considerable Khalistan sentiment seems to have arisen since the raid on the temple, which many Sikhs, if not most, have taken as a deep offense to their religion and their sensibilities," referring to the drastic change in community sentiments after the army attack.[60]

Late 1970s to 1983

[edit]

Delhi Asian Games (1982)

[edit]

The Akali leaders, having planned to announce a victory for Dharam Yudh Morcha, were outraged by the changes to the agreed-upon settlement. In November 1982, Akali leader Harchand Singh Longowal announced that the party would disrupt the 9th annual Asian Games by sending groups of Akali workers to Delhi to intentionally get arrested. Following negotiations between the Akali Dal and the government failed at the last moment due to disagreements regarding the transfer of areas between Punjab and Haryana.[61]

Knowing that the Games would receive extensive coverage, Akali leaders vowed to overwhelm Delhi with a flood of protestors, aiming to heighten the perception of Sikh "plight" among the international audience.[61] A week before the Games, Bhajan Lal, Chief Minister of Haryana and member of the INC party, responded by sealing the Delhi-Punjab border,[61] and ordering all Sikh visitors travelling from to Delhi from Punjab to be frisked.[62] While such measures were seen as discriminatory and humiliating by Sikhs, they proved effective as Akali Dal could only organise small and scattered protests in Delhi. Consequently, many Sikhs who did not initially support Akalis and Bhindranwale began sympathising with the Akali Morcha.[61]

Following the conclusion of the Games, Longowal organised a convention of Sikh veterans at the Darbar Sahib. It was attended by a large number of Sikh ex-servicemen, including retd. Major General Shabeg Singh who subsequently became Bhindranwale's military advisor.[61]

1984

[edit]

Increasing militant activity

[edit]

Widespread murders by followers of Bhindranwale occurred in 1980s' Punjab. Armed Khalistani militants of this period described themselves as kharku.[63]

In 1984, there were 775 violent incidents, resulting in 298 people killed and 525 injured, during a six month period alone.[64]

Though it was common knowledge that those responsible for such bombings and murders were taking shelter in gurdwaras, the INC Government of India declared that it could not enter these places of worship, for the fear of hurting Sikh sentiments.[53] Even as detailed reports on the open shipping of arms-laden trucks were sent to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the Government choose not to take action.[53] Finally, following the murder of six Hindu bus passengers in October 1983, emergency rule was imposed in Punjab, which would continue for more than a decade.[65]

Constitutional issues

[edit]

The Akali Dal began more agitation in February 1984, protesting against Article 25, clause (2)(b), of the Indian Constitution, which ambiguously explains that "the reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina, or Buddhist religion," while also implicitly recognising Sikhism as a separate religion: "the wearing and carrying of kripans [sic] shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion."[66]: 109  Even today, this clause is deemed offensive by many religious minorities in India due to its failure to recognise such religions separately under the constitution.[66]

Members of the Akali Dal demanded that the removal of any ambiguity in the Constitution that refers to Sikhs as Hindu, as such prompts various concerns for the Sikh population, both in principle and in practice. For instance, a Sikh couple who would marry in accordance to the rites of their religion would have to register their union either under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 or the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Akalis demanded replacement of such rules with laws specific to Sikhism.

Operation Blue Star

[edit]

Operation Blue Star was an Indian military operation ordered by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, between 1 and 8 June 1984, to remove militant religious leader Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his armed followers from the buildings of the Harmandir Sahib complex (aka the Golden Temple) in Amritsar, Punjab – the most sacred site in Sikhism.[67]

In July 1983, Akali Dal President Harchand Singh Longowal had invited Bhindranwale to take up residence at the sacred temple complex,[68] which the government would allege that Bhindranwale would later make into an armoury and headquarters for his armed uprising.[69][70]

Since the inception of the Dharam Yudh Morcha to the violent events leading up to Operation Blue Star, Khalistani militants had directly killed 165 Hindus and Nirankaris, as well as 39 Sikhs opposed to Bhindranwale, while a total of 410 were killed and 1,180 injured as a result of Khalistani violence and riots.[71]

As negotiations held with Bhindranwale and his supporters proved unsuccessful, Indira Gandhi ordered the Indian Army to launch Operation Blue Star.[72] Along with the Army, the operation would involve Central Reserve Police Force, Border Security Force, and Punjab Police. Army units led by Lt. Gen. Kuldip Singh Brar (a Sikh), surrounded the temple complex on 3 June 1984. Just before the commencement of the operation, Lt. Gen. Brar addressed the soldiers:[73]

The action is not against the Sikhs or the Sikh religion; it is against terrorism. If there is anyone amongst them, who have strong religious sentiments or other reservations, and do not wish to take part in the operation he can opt out, and it will not be held against him.

— Lieutenant General Kuldip Singh Brar

However, none of the soldiers opted out, including many "Sikh officers, junior commissioned officers and other ranks."[73] Using a public address system, the Army repeatedly demanded the militants to surrender, asking them to at least allow pilgrims to leave the temple premises before commencing battle.

Nothing happened until 7:00 pm (IST).[74] The Army, equipped with tanks and heavy artillery, had grossly underestimated the firepower possessed by the militants, who attacked with anti-tank and machine-gun fire from the heavily fortified Akal Takht, and who possessed Chinese-made, rocket-propelled grenade launchers with armour-piercing capabilities. After a 24-hour shootout, the army finally wrested control of the temple complex.

Bhindranwale was killed in the operation, while many of his followers managed to escape. Army casualty figures counted 83 dead and 249 injured,[75] although Rajiv Gandhi would later admit that over 700 Indian soldiers died.[76] According to the official estimate presented by the Indian Government, the event resulted in a combined total of 493 militant and civilian casualties, as well as the apprehension of 1592 individuals.[77] Independent estimates say over 5,000 civilians and only 200 militants were killed.[78]

U.K. Foreign Secretary William Hague attributed high civilian casualties to the Indian Government's attempt at a full frontal assault on the militants, diverging from the recommendations provided by the U.K. Military.[i][ii] Opponents of Gandhi also criticised the operation for its excessive use of force. Lieutenant General Brar later stated that the Government had "no other recourse" due to a "complete breakdown" of the situation: state machinery was under the militants' control, declaration of Khalistan was imminent, and Pakistan would have come into the picture declaring its support for Khalistan.[79]

Nonetheless, the operation did not crush Khalistani militancy, as it continued.[43]

According to the Mitrokhin Archive, in 1982 the Soviets used a recruit in the New Delhi residency named "Agent S" who was close to Indira Gandhi as a major channel for providing her disinformation regarding Khalistan. Agent S provided Indira Gandhi with false documents purporting to show Pakistani involvement to create religious disturbances and allegedly initiate a Khalistan conspiracy. After Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Moscow in 1983, the Soviets persuaded him that the US was engaged in secret support for the Sikhs. By 1984, according to Mitrokhin, the disinformation the Soviets provided had influenced Indira Gandhi to pursue Operation Blue Star.[80][81][82]

Assassination of Indira Gandhi and anti-Sikh riots

[edit]
Indira Gandhi

On the morning of 31 October 1984, Indira Gandhi was assassinated in New Delhi by her two personal security guards Satwant Singh and Beant Singh, both Sikhs, in retaliation for Operation Blue Star.[43] The assassination triggered the 1984 anti-Sikh riots across North India. While the ruling party, Indian National Congress (INC), maintained that the violence was due to spontaneous riots, its critics have alleged that INC members themselves had planned a pogrom against the Sikhs.[83]

The Nanavati Commission, a special commission created to investigate the riots, concluded that INC leaders (including Jagdish Tytler, H. K. L. Bhagat, and Sajjan Kumar) had directly or indirectly taken a role in the rioting incidents.[84][85] Union Minister Kamal Nath was accused of leading riots near Rakab Ganj, but was cleared due to lack of evidence.[85] Other political parties strongly condemned the riots.[86] Two major civil-liberties organisations issued a joint report on the anti-Sikh riots, naming 16 significant politicians, 13 police officers, and 198 others, accused by survivors and eyewitnesses.[87]

1985 to present day

[edit]

1985

[edit]

Rajiv-Longowal Accord

[edit]

Many Sikh and Hindu groups, as well as organisations not affiliated to any religion, have attempted to establish peace between the Khalistan proponents and the Government of India.[citation needed] Akalis continued to witness radicalisation of Sikh politics, fearing disastrous consequences.[45] In response, President Harchand Singh Longowal reinstated the head of the Akali Dal and pushed for a peace initiative that reiterated the importance of Hindu-Sikh amity, condemning Sikh extremist violence, therefore declaring that the Akali Dal was not in favor of Khalistan.

In 1985, the Government of India attempted to seek a political solution to the grievances of the Sikhs through the Rajiv-Longowal Accord, which took place between Longowal and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The Accord – recognising the religious, territorial, and economic demands of the Sikhs that were thought to be non-negotiable under Indira Gandhi's tenure – agreed to establish commissions and independent tribunals in order to resolve the Chandigarh issue and the river dispute, laying the basis for Akali Dal's victory in the coming elections.[45]

Though providing a basis for a return to normality, Chandigarh evidently remained an issue and the agreement was denounced by Sikh militants who refused to give up the demand for an independent Khalistan. These extremists, who were left unappeased, reacted by assassinating Longowal.[70] Such behavior lead to the dismissal of negotiations, whereby both Congress and the Akali parties accused each other of aiding terrorism.[45]

The Indian Government pointed to the involvement of a "foreign hand," referring to Pakistan's abetting of the movement. Punjab noted to the Indian Government that militants were able to obtain sophisticated arms through sources outside the country and by developing links with sources within the country.[45] As such, the Government believed that large illegal flows of arms were flowing through the borders of India, with Pakistan being responsible for trafficking arms. India claimed that Pakistan provided sanctuary, arms, money, and moral support to the militants, though most of the accusations were based on circumstantial evidence.[45]

Air India Flight 182

[edit]
Irish Naval Service recovering bodies from the Air India Flight 182 bombing
The aircraft involved, VT-EFO, seen on 10 June 1985, less than two weeks before the bombing of Air India Flight 182

Air India Flight 182 was an Air India flight operating on the Montréal-London-Delhi-Bombay route. On 23 June 1985, a Boeing 747 operating on the route was blown up by a bomb mid-air off the coast of Ireland. A total of 329 people aboard were killed,[88] 268 Canadian citizens, 27 British citizens and 24 Indian citizens, including the flight crew. On the same day, an explosion due to a luggage bomb was linked to the terrorist operation and occurred at the Narita Airport in Tokyo, Japan, intended for Air India Flight 301, killing two baggage handlers. The entire event was inter-continental in scope, killing 331 people in total and affected five countries on different continents: Canada, the United Kingdom, India, Japan, and Ireland.

The main suspects in the bombing were members of a Sikh separatist group called the Babbar Khalsa, and other related groups who were at the time agitating for a separate Sikh state of Khalistan in Punjab, India. In September 2007, the Canadian Commission of Inquiry investigated reports, initially disclosed in the Indian investigative news magazine Tehelka,[89] that a hitherto unnamed person, Lakhbir Singh Rode, had masterminded the explosions. However, in conclusion two separate Canadian inquiries officially determined that the mastermind behind the terrorist operation was in fact the Canadian, Talwinder Singh Parmar.[90]

Several men were arrested and tried for the Air India bombing. Inderjit Singh Reyat, a Canadian national and member of the International Sikh Youth Federation who pleaded guilty in 2003 to manslaughter, was the only person convicted in the case.[91][92] He was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for assembling the bombs that exploded on board Air India Flight 182 and at Narita Airport.[93]

Late 1980s

[edit]

In 1986, when the insurgency was at its peak, the Golden Temple was again occupied by militants belonging to the All India Sikh Students Federation and Damdami Taksal. The militants called an assembly (Sarbat Khalsa) and, on 26 January, they passed a resolution (gurmattā) in favour of the creation of Khalistan.[94] However, only the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC) had the authority to appoint the jathedar, the supreme religio-temporal seat of the Sikhs. The militants thus dissolved the SGPC and appointed their own jathedar, who turned out to refuse their bidding as well. Militant leader Gurbachan Singh Manochahal thereby appointed himself by force.[15]

On 29 April 1986, an assembly of separatist Sikhs at the Akal Takht made a declaration of an independent state of Khalistan,[95] and a number of rebel militant groups in favour of Khalistan subsequently waged a major insurgency against the Government of India. A decade of violence and conflict in Punjab would follow before a return to normality in the region. This period of insurgency saw clashes of Sikh militants with the police, as well as with the Nirankaris, a mystical Sikh sect who are less conservative in their aims to reform Sikhism.[96]

The Khalistani militant activities manifested in the form of several attacks, such as the 1987 massacre of 32 Hindu bus passengers near Lalru, and the 1991 killing of 80 train passengers in Ludhiana.[97] Such activities continued on into the 1990s as the perpetrators of the 1984 riots remained unpunished, while many Sikhs also felt that they were being discriminated against and that their religious rights were being suppressed.[98]

In the parliamentary elections of 1989, Sikh separatist representatives were victorious in 10 of Punjab's 13 national seats and had the most popular support.[99][need quotation to verify] The Congress cancelled those elections and instead hosted a Khaki election. The separatists boycotted the poll. The voter turnout was 24%. The Congress won this election and used it to further its anti-separatist campaign. Most of the separatist leadership was wiped out and the moderates were suppressed by end of 1993.[100][need quotation to verify]

1990s

[edit]

Indian security forces suppressed the insurgency in the early 1990s, while Sikh political groups such as the Khalsa Raj Party and SAD (A) continued to pursue an independent Khalistan through non-violent means.[101][102][103] Whereas to take iron from the terrorists in the village Bhikhiwind, district Tarn Taran 'Sandhu' family fought everyday like the last day and defeated terrorists several times. One such incident was on 30 September 1990, when about 200 terrorists attacked Balwinder Singh's house. In retaliation, the Sandhu family using weapons provided by state police killed several and compiled the rest of the terrorists to run away. The Family awarded the Shaurya Chakra to show most conspicuous bravery, indomitable courage.[104]

In August 1991, Julio Ribeiro, then-Indian Ambassador to Romania, was attacked and wounded at Bucharest in an assassination attempt by gunmen identified as Punjabi Sikhs.[105][98] Sikh groups also claimed responsibility for the 1991 kidnapping of Liviu Radu, the Romanian chargé d'affaires in New Delhi. This appeared to be in retaliation for Romanian arrests of Khalistan Liberation Force members suspected of the attempted assassination of Ribeiro.[98][106] Radu was released unharmed after Sikh politicians criticised the action.[107]

In October 1991, the New York Times reported that violence had increased sharply in the months leading up to the kidnapping, with Indian security forces or Sikh militants killing 20 or more people per day, and that the militants had been "gunning down" family members of police officers.[98] Scholar Ian Talbot states that all sides, including the Indian Army, police and the militants, committed crimes like murder, rape and torture.[108]

From 24 January 1993 to 4 August 1993, Khalistan was a member of the NGO Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. The membership was permanently suspended on 22 January 1995.[109]

On 31 August 1995, Chief Minister Beant Singh was killed in a suicide bombing, for which the pro-Khalistan group Babbar Khalsa claimed responsibility. Security authorities, however, reported the group's involvement to be doubtful.[110] A 2006 press release by the Embassy of the United States in New Delhi indicated that the responsible organisation was the Khalistan Commando Force.[111]

While the militants enjoyed some support among Sikh separatists in the earlier period, this support gradually disappeared.[112] The insurgency weakened the Punjab economy and led to an increase in violence in the state. With dwindling support and increasingly-effective Indian security troops eliminating anti-state combatants, Sikh militancy effectively ended by the early 1990s.[113]

2000s

[edit]

Retribution

[edit]

There have been serious charges levelled by human rights activists against Indian Security forces (headed by Sikh police officer, K. P. S. Gill), claiming that thousands of suspects were killed in staged shootouts and thousands of bodies were cremated/disposed of without proper identification or post-mortems.[114][115][116][117] Human Rights Watch reported that, since 1984, government forces had resorted to widespread human rights violations to fight the militants, including: arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention without trial, torture, and summary executions of civilians and suspected militants. Family members were frequently detained and tortured to reveal the whereabouts of relatives sought by the police.[118][119] Amnesty International has alleged several cases of disappearances, torture, rape, and unlawful detentions by the police during the Punjab insurgency, for which 75–100 police officers had been convicted by December 2002.[120]

2010s

[edit]

Activities in the 2010s by Khalistani militants include the Tarn Taran blast, in which a police crackdown arrested 4 terrorists, one of whom revealed they were ordered by Sikhs for Justice to kill multiple Dera leaders in India.[121][122] Pro-Khalistan organisations such as Dal Khalsa are also active outside India, supported by a section of the Sikh diaspora.[123] As of 25 December, there also have been inputs by multiple agencies about a possible attack in Punjab by Babbar Khalsa and Khalistan Zindabad Force, according to Indian Media sources, are allegedly in contact with their Pakistani handlers and are trying to smuggle arms across the border.[124][125]

In November 2015, a congregation of the Sikh community (i.e. a Sarbat Khalsa) was called in response to recent unrest in the Punjab region. The Sarbat Khalsa adopted 13 resolutions to strengthen Sikh institutions and traditions. The 12th resolution reaffirmed the resolutions adopted by the Sarbat Khalsa in 1986, including the declaration of the sovereign state of Khalistan.[126]

Moreover, signs in favour of Khalistan were raised when SAD (Amritsar) President Simranjeet Singh Mann met with Surat Singh Khalsa, who was admitted to Dayanand Medical College & Hospital (DMCH). While Mann was arguing with ACP Satish Malhotra, supporters standing at the main gate of DMCH raised Khalistan signs in the presence of heavy police force. After a confrontation with the police authorities that lasted about 15–20 minutes, Mann was allowed to meet Khalsa along with ADCP Paramjeet Singh Pannu.[127]

Maintaining persistent connection their culture and religion, the Sikh diaspora outside India is seen increasingly supporting the movement by means of financial support, propaganda and political lobbying in the countries they reside and taking a prominent role in driving the movement. Emboldened by expansive political and financial ties, the Diaspora has used gurudwaras, among other available establishments as such, to disperse financial and diplomatic aid to the movement in Punjab and modern communication modes such as the internet and social media to rally support for it.[128]

Recently, many signs have been raised in several places in support of the Khalistan movement, although the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) reports that Sikhs who support Khalistan may themselves be detained and tortured.[129] Notably, on the 31st anniversary of Operation Bluestar, pro-Khalistan signs were raised in Punjab, resulting in 25 Sikh youths being detained by police.[130] Pro-Khalistan signs were also raised during a function of Punjabi Chief Minister Parkash Singh Badal. Two members of SAD-A, identified as Sarup Singh Sandha and Rajindr Singh Channa, raised pro-Khalistan and anti-Badal signs during the chief minister's speech.[131]

In retrospect, the Khalistan movement has failed to reach its objectives in India due to several reasons:

  • Heavy Police crackdown on the separatists under the leadership of Punjab Police chief KPS Gill.[9] Several militant leaders were killed and others surrendered and rehabilitated.[15]
  • Gill credits the decline to change in the policies by adding provision for an adequate number of police and security forces to deal with the militancy. The clear political will from the government without any interference.[15]
  • Lack of a clear political concept of 'Khalistan' even to the extremist supporters. As per Kumar (1997), the name which was wishful thinking only represented their revulsion against the Indian establishment and did not find any alternative to it.[132]
  • In the later stages of the movement, militants lacked an ideological motivation.[15]
  • The entry of criminals and government loyalists into its ranks further divided the groups.[15]
  • Loss of sympathy and support from the Sikh population of Punjab.[15]
  • The divisions among the Sikhs also undermined this movement. According to Pettigrew non-Jat urban Sikhs did not want to live in a country of "Jatistan."[133][134] Further division was caused as the people in the region traditionally preferred police and military service as career options. The Punjab Police had a majority of Jat Sikhs and the conflict was referred as "Jat against Jat" by Police Chief Gill.[15]
  • Moderate factions of Akali Dal led by Prakash Singh Badal reclaimed the political positions in the state through all three assembly (namely parliamentary) and SGPC elections. The dominance of traditional political parties was reasserted over the militant-associated factions.[135]
  • The increased vigilance by security forces in the region against rise of separatist elements.[136]
  • The confidence building measures adopted by the Sikh community helped in rooting out the Khalistan movement.[136]

Simrat Dhillon (2007), writing for the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, noted that while a few groups continued to fight, "the movement has lost its popular support both in India and within the Diaspora community."[137]

2020s

[edit]

In 2021, the secessionist group, Sikhs for Justice (SFJ), began an unofficial, non binding, ongoing "referendum" regarding the potential creation of a Khalistan state which would include the entire states of Punjab, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh, and several districts of other Indian states. Numerous referendum votes have been held in various locations including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Italy, England, and the United States. Hundreds of thousands of Sikhs have partaken in these votes according to various news reports.

During a Khalistan referendum vote held in Melbourne, Australia in January 2023, two separate brawls broke out between Khalistan supporters and pro-India demonstrators, leading to two people being injured and two Sikh men being arrested. Victoria Police issued statements afterwards: “During the fight, flag poles were used by several men as weapons which caused physical injuries to multiple victims in which two victims were treated at the scene by paramedics” and “As a result of each incident a 34-year-old man and a 39-year-old man were arrested, and each issued with a penalty notice for riotous behaviour.” Australia's High Commissioner to India Barry O'Farrell condemned the incident.[138][139][140]

In February 2022, Deepak Punj, a Brampton radio host and a vocal critic of the Khalistan movement, was assaulted by three belligerent men who warned him "against speaking about Deep Sidhu and Khalistan". In a statement to The Globe and Mail, Punj claimed "one of them pulled a gun on me, and the other hit me on the head with a beer bottle". Brampton Mayor Patrick Brown condemned the attack, stating "no one in the media should face violence or intimidation." Peel Police subsequently launched an investigation.[141]

In August 2022, Amritpal Singh, a self styled radical[145] Indian preacher, came to prominence after being appointed as the head of Waris Punjab De (a Sikh political organisation which lent support to pro-Khalistan figures and groups) immediately after Deep Sidhu's death (a succession described as illegitimate by the relatives and some associates of Sidhu).[146][147][148][149] He subsequently embarked on a campaign and numerous preaching tours advocating for the creation of Khalistan and for Sikhs to receive baptism, imbibe religious austerities, and to shun drugs and other vices.[150][151] He glorified the use of violence and weapons during public events.[152] On 18 March 2023, Indian authorities initiated a crackdown on Waris Punjab De, alleging the organisation's involvement in attempted murder, attacks on police personnel, and spreading disharmony in Punjab.[153] An extensive manhunt for Singh ensued, who absconded and managed to evade police capture for 35 days. He was arrested on 23 April 2023.[154]

Numerous protests, particularly among diaspora Sikhs, occurred in the aftermath of the Indian police's manhunt for Singh. While many transpired without incident, numerous violent attacks were reported in various locations. A mob of protesters attacked the Indian consulate in San Francisco, another mob attacked the Indian High Commission office in London and attempted to pull down the Indian flag off a pole, broke windows, and inflicted minor injuries on security staff.[155][156][157] The NIA claimed that a group of protesters in San Francisco were exhorted to kill all representatives of the Indian government.[158] On 21 March 2023, two men poured flammable material in the entrance of the consulate and attempted to set the San Francisco consulate on fire.[159] In Washington, Khalistan supporters verbally intimidated and physically assaulted an Indian journalist covering the protests.[160] In a Surrey protest, Sameer Kaushal, a journalist, was allegedly assaulted and harassed by Khalistan supporters.[161] In the aftermath of the Surrey protest, Surrey RCMP spokesperson Cpl. Vanessa Munn confirmed police were investigating alleged assault involving a different victim and that the RCMP was seeking witnesses and video evidence. She stated “There is an assault investigation into the assault of one person who was in the crowd and did appear to be swarmed and assaulted by multiple people”.[162] The Indian Ambassador to the US Taranjit Singh Sandhu was threatened with assassination by Khalistanis.[163]

On 18 June 2023, Hardeep Singh Nijjar was shot dead in the parking lot of a Sikh temple in Surrey, British Columbia. Nijjar was allegedly the head of two pro-Khalistan organisations in Canada, and had been accused by the Indian Government of orchestrating targeted killings in India, for which it unsuccessfully sought his extradition.[164]

On 2 July 2023, Khalistani supporters set the Indian consulate in San Francisco on fire.[165] The arson attempt was promptly suppressed by the San Francisco Fire Department, resulting in limited damage to the building and no injuries to the staffers present.[166] The incident was condemned by the State Department's spokesman Matthew Miller.[167] A video of the incident was released on Twitter by Khalistani supporters, suggesting the attack was retaliation for the recent death of Hardeep Singh Nijjar.[166] Nijjar's death sparked protests among sections of the Sikh diaspora; posters promoting these events alleged that Indian diplomats played a role in the death. The posters were condemned by Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Melanie Joly who assured the safety of Indian diplomats and buildings.[168]

According to a Globe and Mail report published one year after Nijjar's death, some Canadian security officials did not believe there was sufficient evidence to arrest Nijjar, and accused Indian intelligence officials of "having a reputation for torqueing evidence to fit with political objectives". However, the report also stated that interviews with Nijjar's associates and his own disclosures, revealed that "he was steeped in Sikh extremism", made speeches calling for violence against Indian adversaries, had relations with the architects of the 1995 assassination of Punjab's chief minister Beant Singh, was photographed in Pakistan with an AK-47 and had a close relationship with Jagtar Singh Tara — head of the Babbar Khalsa International and other militant outfits, had "underworld associates" and relations with members of the Khalistan Tiger Force, and led several men in weapons, GPS, and target practice in Lower Mainland BC.[169]

On 1 September 2024, the organisation, Sikhs for Justice, held a rally in Toronto. Floats within the parade glorified Dilawar Singh Babbar, a suicide bomber affiliated with Babbar Khalsa International (a banned organisation in Canada), who killed former Punjab chief minister Beant Singh and numerous other bystanders. A sign at the rally read "Beanta Bombed to Death". SFJ described Babbar as a "human bomb". SFJ's general counsel in a statement said:"We are all offspring of Dilawar. At that time in 1995, the choice of weapon was a bomb, but we have choice of ballot today.” Some attendees chanted "Kill India" at the rally.[170][171]

In October 2024, Rishi Nagar, a Canadian radio host of Calgary Red FM, reported on an incident at Gurdwara Dashmesh Culture Centre, a Sikh temple in Calgary, in which two men were arrested on various firearms related charges, including unauthorised possession of a firearm and pointing a firearm; multiple guns were seized by the police at the site. Following the report, Nagar was assaulted by two men. The attack left Nagar with severe injuries to his eye. Nagar attributed the assault to Khalistani elements stating “The pro-Khalistan people attacked me” [citation needed]. Calgary Police's Staff Sergeant John Guigon described the assault as “particularly troubling to us when a member of the media gets attacked in a democracy”.[178][179][180] Calgary Red FM stated that Nagar "faced some blowback for his opposition to the Khalistan movement".[181] Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre and Alberta premier Danielle Smith condemned the attack.[182]

Chandra Arya, a Canadian Liberal MP, denounced attacks on journalists perpetrated by Khalistan supporters. In the House of Commons, he criticised the attacks on Nagar, Punj, and Kaushal. Arya further stated “I call on law enforcement agencies to take notice of Khalistani extremism with all seriousness it deserves.” Mocha Bezirgan, a journalist, has also received death threats for his coverage on Khalistani extremism.[183]

In November 2024, Khalistani demonstrators attacked people outside the Hindu Sabha Mandir in Brampton with flag poles and sticks. In a video circulated in social media, individuals holding pro-Khalistan flags were seen running into the temple property and striking people within their vicinity.[184] Justin Trudeau, Pierre Poilievre, and Jagmeet Singh, along with other Canadian politicians, condemned the incident.[185] As a result of the violence, Brampton Mayor Patrick Brown announced he that he intended to introduce a motion at city council to prohibit protests outside places of worship in Brampton.[186] An off duty Peel Police sergeant Harinder Sohi was suspended from duty for participating in the protest. Sohi was filmed holding a Khalistan flag outside the temple.[187][188][189] In another social media post, a police officer was seen charging at a temple-goer and punching him, seemingly without provocation. The Toronto Star reached out to Peel Police who claimed they were aware of the video and "looking into it".[190][191] Prior to the melee at the temple, the Indian consulate announced a visit to the temple to assist elderly members of the Indian diaspora with their pensions and to them issue life certificates.[192][193] Most beneficiaries of the consular service were Sikh diaspora members.[194] Sikhs for Justice subsequently began a protest, alleging the Indian consulate intended to spy on Sikhs and collect intelligence on the separatist movement.[195] Inderjeet Singh Gosal, Sikhs for Justice Khalistan Referendum co-ordinator for Canada, who organised the protest stated: "This is not a Hindu and Sikh battle. This is strictly Sikhs versus the Indian government [...] Any place they (consular officials) go, we’ve been protesting there."[196] Gosal was arrested on 8 November 2024 and charged with assault with a weapon.[197][198] On September 23, 2025, Canadian authorities arrested Inderjeet Singh Gosal for firearims charges.[199][200]

Electoral performance of pro-Khalistan parties and candidates
[edit]

In the 2022 Punjab Legislative Assembly election, the Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar), a splinter group of the Shiromani Akali Dal, and the only pro Khalistan party in India,[201] contested 81 out of the 117 seats in the Punjab Legislative Assembly and received 386,176 votes or 2.48% of the vote share. SAD(A) received 49,260 votes (0.3% of the vote share) in the 2017 Legislative Assembly election.

Simranjit Singh Mann, head of the SAD(A), won the Sangrur Lok Sabha by-election held in June 2022, receiving 253,154 votes in the constituency or 35.61% of the vote share. However, Mann went on to lose the 2024 Sangrur Lok Sabha election, receiving 187,246 votes or 18.55% of the vote share.

In the 2024 Indian general election in Punjab, thirteen parliamentary constituencies were contested. Two MP candidates associated with the Khalistan movement, Amritpal Singh and Sarabjeet Singh Khalsa,[202] won in their respective constituencies and were subsequently elected as Indian Members of Parliament.[203] SAD(A) ran candidates in 12 out of 13 constituencies, but did not win any race. They received over 500,000 votes in the election.

Electoral performance of pro Khalistan candidates/parties in the 2024 Indian general election in Punjab
Candidate/Party Affiliation Constituency Won/Lost Votes % Notes
Amritpal Singh Independent Khadoor Sahib Won 404,430[204] 38.62 Incarcerated pro-Khalistan activist.[202]
Sarabjeet Singh Khalsa Independent Faridkot Won 298,062[204] 29.38 Son of the assassin of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.[205]
Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar) Contested 12 out of the 13 parliamentary constituencies Lost in all 12 constituencies 517,024[204] ~3.82% of total vote share Only pro-Khalistan party in India.[201]
Total vote count of pro-Khalistan candidates 1,219,516
Total votes in general election ~13,530,000
% of vote ~9%

Militancy

[edit]

During the late 1980s and the early 1990s, there was a dramatic rise in radical state militancy in Punjab. The 1984 military Operation Blue Star in the Golden Temple in Amritsar offended many Sikhs.[206] The separatists used this event, as well as the following 1984 anti-Sikh riots, to claim that the interest of Sikhs was not safe in India and to foster the spread of militancy among Sikhs in Punjab. Some sections of the Sikh diaspora also began join the separatists with financial and diplomatic support.[43]

A section of Sikhs turned to militancy in Punjab and several Sikh militant outfits proliferated in the 1980s and 1990s.[40] Some militant groups aimed to create an independent state through acts of violence directed at members of the Indian government, army, or forces. A large numbers of Sikhs condemned the actions of the militants.[207] According to anthropological analysis, one reason young men had for joining militant and other religious nationalist groups was for fun, excitement, and expressions of masculinity. Puri, Judge, and Sekhon (1999) suggest that illiterate/under-educated young men, lacking enough job prospects, had joined pro-Khalistan militant groups for the primary purpose of "fun."[208] They mention that the pursuit of Khalistan itself was the motivation for only 5% of "militants."[135][208]

Militant groups

[edit]

There are several militant Sikh groups, such as the Khalistan Council, that are currently functional and provides organisation and guidance to the Sikh community. Multiple groups are organised across the world, coordinating their military efforts for Khalistan. Such groups were most active in 1980s and early 1990s, and have since receded in activity. These groups are largely defunct in India but they still have a political presence among the Sikh diaspora, especially in countries such as Pakistan where they are not proscribed by law.[209]

Most of these outfits were crushed by 1993 during the counter-insurgency operations. In recent years, active groups have included Babbar Khalsa, International Sikh Youth Federation, Dal Khalsa, and Bhindranwale Tiger Force. An unknown group before then, the Shaheed Khalsa Force claimed credit for the marketplace bombings in New Delhi in 1997. The group has never been heard of since.

Major pro-Khalistan militant outfits include:

Abatement

[edit]

The U.S. Department of State found that Sikh extremism had decreased significantly from 1992 to 1997, although a 1997 report noted that "Sikh militant cells are active internationally and extremists gather funds from overseas Sikh communities."[225]

In 1999, Kuldip Nayar, writing for Rediff.com, stated in an article, titled "It is fundamentalism again", that the Sikh "masses" had rejected terrorists.[226] By 2001, Sikh extremism and the demand for Khalistan had all but abated.[iii]

Reported in his paper, titled "From Bhindranwale to Bin Laden: Understanding Religious Violence", Director Mark Juergensmeyer of the Orfalea Centre for Global & International Studies, UCSB, interviewed a militant who said that "the movement is over," as many of his colleagues had been killed, imprisoned, or driven into hiding, and because public support was gone.[227]

Outside of India

[edit]

Operation Blue Star and its violent aftermaths popularised the demand for Khalistan among many Sikhs dispersed globally.[228] Involvement of sections of Sikh diaspora turned out to be important for the movement as it provided the diplomatic and financial support. It also enabled Pakistan to become involved in the fueling of the movement. Sikhs in UK, Canada and USA arranged for cadres to travel to Pakistan for military and financial assistance. Some Sikh groups abroad even declared themselves as the Khalistani government in exile.[43]

Sikh places of worship, gurdwaras, provided the geographic and institutional coordination for the Sikh community. Sikh political factions have used the gurdwaras as a forum for political organisation. The gurdwaras sometimes served as the site for mobilisation of diaspora for Khalistan movement directly by raising funds. Indirect mobilisation was sometimes provided by promoting a stylised version of conflict and Sikh history. The rooms in some gurdwara exhibit pictures of Khalistani leaders along with paintings of martyrs from Sikh history.[229]

Gurdwaras also host speakers and musical groups that promote and encourage the movement. Among the diasporas, Khalistan issue has been a divisive issue within gurdwaras. These factions have fought over the control of gurdwaras and their political and financial resources. The fights between pro and anti-Khalistan factions over gurdwaras often included violent acts and bloodshed as reported from UK and North America. The gurdwaras with Khalistani leadership allegedly funnel the collected funds into activities supporting the movement.[229]

Different groups of Sikhs in the diaspora organize the convention of international meetings to facilitate communication and establish organisational order. In April 1981 the first "International Convention of Sikhs," was held in New York and was attended by some 200 delegates. In April 1987 the third convention was held in Slough, Berkshire where the Khalistan issue was addressed. This meeting's objective was to "build unity in the Khalistan movement."[229]

All these factors further strengthened the emerging nationalism among Sikhs. Sikh organisations launched many fund-raising efforts that were used for several purposes. After 1984 one of the objectives was the promotion of the Sikh version of "ethnonational history" and the relationship with the Indian state. The Sikh diaspora also increased their efforts to build institutions to maintain and propagate their ethnonational heritage. A major objective of these educational efforts was to publicise a different face to the non-Sikh international community who regarded the Sikhs as "terrorists".[230]

In 1993, Khalistan was briefly admitted in the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, but was suspended in a few months. The membership suspension was made permanent on 22 January 1995.[231][232]

Edward T.G. Anderson, an associate professor in history, describes the Khalistan movement outside India as follows:[233]

One example is the Khalistan movement, a separatist struggle for Sikh self-determination in Punjab, which in the diaspora has manifested in highly conspicuous and provocative protests, pugnacious rhetoric, violent tensions between different South Asian communities, and 'long-distance' support for militant secessionists.

— Edward T.G. Anderson, Hindu Nationalism in the Indian Diaspora, Oxford University Press (2024)

Pakistan

[edit]

Pakistan has long aspired to dismember India through its Bleed India strategy. Even before the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then a member of the military regime of General Yahya Khan, stated, "Once the back of Indian forces is broken in the east, Pakistan should occupy the whole of Eastern India and make it a permanent part of East Pakistan.... Kashmir should be taken at any price, even the Sikh Punjab and turned into Khalistan."[234]

The Sikh separatist leader Jagjit Singh Chohan said that during his talks with Pakistani prime minister that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto affirmed "we'll help you and make it the capital of Khalistan"; Bhutto wanted revenge over Bangladesh.[57]

General Zia-ul Haq, who succeeded Bhutto as the Head of State, attempted to reverse the traditional antipathy between Sikhs and Muslims arising from the partition violence by restoring Sikh shrines in Pakistan and opening them for Sikh pilgrimage. The expatriate Sikhs from England and North America that visited these shrines were at the forefront of the calls for Khalistan. During the pilgrims' stay in Pakistan, the Sikhs were exposed to Khalistani propaganda, which would not be openly possible in India.[235][236][209]

The ISI chief, General Abdul Rahman, opened a cell within ISI with the objective of supporting the "[Sikhs']...freedom struggle against India". Rahman's colleagues in ISI took pride in the fact that "the Sikhs were able to set the whole province on fire. They knew who to kill, where to plant a bomb and which office to target." General Hamid Gul argued that keeping Punjab destabilised was equivalent to the Pakistan Army having an extra division at no cost. Zia-ul Haq, on the other hand, consistently practised the art of plausible denial.[235][236] The Khalistan movement was brought to a decline only after India fenced off a part of the Punjab border with Pakistan and the Benazir Bhutto government agreed to joint patrols of the border by Indian and Pakistani troops.[237]

In 2006, an American court convicted Khalid Awan, a Muslim and Canadian of Pakistani descent, of "supporting terrorism" by providing money and financial services to the Khalistan Commando Force chief Paramjit Singh Panjwar in Pakistan.[111] KCF members had carried out deadly attacks against Indian civilians causing thousands of deaths. Awan frequently travelled to Pakistan and was alleged by the U.S. officials to have links to Sikh and Muslim extremists, as well as Pakistani intelligence.[238]

In 2008, India's Intelligence Bureau indicated that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence organisation was trying to revive Sikh militancy.[239]

United States

[edit]

The New York Times reported in June 1984 that Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi conveyed to Helmut Schmidt and Willy Brandt, both of them being former Chancellors of West Germany, that United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was involved in causing unrest in Punjab. It also reported that The Indian Express quoted anonymous officials from India's intelligence establishment as saying that the CIA "masterminded" a plan to support the acolytes of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, who died during Operation Blue Star, by smuggling weapons for them through Pakistan.[240] The United States embassy denied this report's findings.[240]

According to B. Raman, former Additional Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat of India and a senior official of the Research and Analysis Wing, the United States initiated a plan in complicity with Pakistan's General Yahya Khan in 1971 to support an insurgency for Khalistan in Punjab.[241][242]

In 2023, the United States alleged a plot by the Indian government to assassinate the New York–based Sikh separatist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, a spokesperson for the pro-Khalistan group Sikhs for Justice. On November 29, 2023, an Indian government employee was the target of an indictment in New York for their alleged role in the assassination plot.[243]

Canada

[edit]

Immediately after Operation Blue Star, authorities were unprepared for how quickly extremism spread and gained support in Canada, with extremists "...threatening to kill thousands of Hindus by a number of means, including blowing up Air India flights."[244][245] Canadian Member of Parliament Ujjal Dosanjh, a moderate Sikh, stated that he and others who spoke out against Sikh extremism in the 1980s faced a "reign of terror".[246]

On 18 November 1998, the Canada-based Sikh journalist Tara Singh Hayer was gunned down by suspected Khalistani militants. The publisher of the Indo-Canadian Times, a Canadian Sikh and once-vocal advocate of the armed struggle for Khalistan, he had criticised the bombing of Air India Flight 182, and was to testify about a conversation he overheard concerning the bombing.[247][248] On 24 January 1995,[249] Tarsem Singh Purewal, editor of Britain's Punjabi-language weekly Des Pardes, was killed as he was closing his office in Southall. There is speculation that the murder was related to Sikh extremism, which Purewal may have been investigating. Another theory is that he was killed in retaliation for revealing the identity of a young rape victim.[250][251]

Terry Milewski reported in a 2007 documentary for the CBC that a minority within Canada's Sikh community was gaining political influence even while publicly supporting terrorist acts in the struggle for an independent Sikh state.[212] In response, the World Sikh Organization of Canada (WSO), a Canadian Sikh human rights group that opposes violence and extremism,[252] sued the CBC for "defamation, slander, and libel", alleging that Milewski linked it to terrorism and damaged the reputation of the WSO within the Sikh community.[253] In 2015, however, the WSO unconditionally abandoned "any and all claims" made in its lawsuit.

Canadian journalist Kim Bolan has written extensively on Sikh extremism. Speaking at the Fraser Institute in 2007, she reported that she still received death threats over her coverage of the 1985 Air India bombing.[254]

In 2008, a CBC report stated that "a disturbing brand of extremist politics has surfaced" at some of the Vaisakhi and the Buddhist Vesak parades in Canada,[212] and The Trumpet agreed with the CBC assessment.[255] Two leading Canadian Sikh politicians refused to attend the parade in Surrey, saying it was a glorification of terrorism.[212] In 2008, Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, expressed his concern that there might be a resurgence of Sikh extremism.[256][257]

There has been some controversy over Canada's response to the Khalistan movement. After Amarinder Singh's refusal to meet Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in 2017, calling him a "Khalistani sympathiser", Singh ultimately met with Trudeau on 22 February 2018 over the issue.[258] Trudeau assured Singh that his country would not support the revival of the separatist movement.[259][10][260] Shiromani Akali Dal President Sukhbir Badal was quoted saying Khalistan is "no issue, either in Canada or in Punjab".[261]

A 2020 report by Canadian ex-journalist Terry Milewski criticised the Khalistan movement as driven by the Pakistani government, and as a threat to Canadian interests.[262]

In September 2023, while speaking to the Canadian parliament, Justin Trudeau accused India of being involved in the slaying of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a prominent advocate of the Khalistan separatist movement who had been killed by masked gunmen in Surrey, British Columbia.[263] Although Nijjar had been accused by India of having links to terrorism, India denied any involvement in his death. A subsequent diplomatic row followed, with both countries expelling multiple diplomatic staff in 2023 and 2024.[263][264] Canada has not shared evidence of Indian involvement in the killing of Nijar, citing the need to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods.[265][263]

United Kingdom

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In February 2008, BBC Radio 4 reported that the Chief of the Punjab Police, NPS Aulakh, alleged that militant groups were receiving money from the British Sikh community.[266] The same report included statements that although the Sikh militant groups were poorly equipped and staffed, intelligence reports and interrogations indicated that Babbar Khalsa was sending its recruits to the same terrorist training camps in Pakistan used by Al Qaeda.[267]

Lord Bassam of Brighton, then Home Office minister, stated that International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF) members working from the UK had committed "assassinations, bombings, and kidnappings" and were a "threat to national security."[91] The ISYF is listed in the UK as a "Proscribed Terrorist Group"[213] but it has not been included in the list of terrorist organisations by the United States Department of State.[268] It was also added to the US Treasury Department terrorism list on 27 June 2002.[269]

Andrew Gilligan, reporting for the London Evening Standard, stated that the Sikh Federation (UK) is the "successor" of the ISYF, and that its executive committee, objectives, and senior members ... are largely the same.[91][270] The Vancouver Sun reported in February 2008 that Dabinderjit Singh was campaigning to have both the Babbar Khalsa and International Sikh Youth Federation de-listed as terrorist organisations.[271] It also stated of Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day that "he has not been approached by anyone lobbying to delist the banned groups". Day is also quoted as saying "The decision to list organisations such as Babbar Khalsa, Babbar Khalsa International, and the International Sikh Youth Federation as terrorist entities under the Criminal Code is intended to protect Canada and Canadians from terrorism."[271] There are claims of funding from Sikhs outside India to attract young people into these pro-Khalistan militant groups.[272]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Khalistan movement is a Sikh separatist campaign originating in the mid-20th century that seeks to establish an independent ethno-religious state called Khalistan, encompassing the Punjab region and adjacent territories primarily in present-day India. It arose from post-independence Sikh grievances over linguistic reorganization, river water sharing, and perceived cultural marginalization, but evolved into a militant insurgency in the 1970s and 1980s under leaders like Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, who advocated armed resistance against the Indian state. The movement's peak involved widespread violence, including targeted killings of civilians, security forces, and moderate Sikhs, with estimates of over 20,000 deaths during the Punjab insurgency from 1984 to 1993. Pivotal events included in June 1984, an Indian military assault on the complex in to dislodge armed militants, which resulted in hundreds of casualties and desecration of the Sikh holy site, followed by the assassination of Prime Minister by her Sikh bodyguards and subsequent anti-Sikh riots that killed thousands. The Khalistanis' international notoriety intensified with the 1985 bombing of off the coast of , killing all 329 aboard in the deadliest aviation terrorist act until 2001, attributed to Canadian-based Sikh extremists. The Indian government's counterinsurgency, involving direct action by Punjab Police under leaders like , effectively dismantled the militant infrastructure by the mid-1990s, restoring stability to at the cost of allegations of abuses and extrajudicial killings. Today, active support for Khalistan has waned domestically among Punjab's Sikh majority, who prioritize economic integration within , but persists in the , particularly in , the , and the , where groups like organize non-binding referendums and protests, often funded externally and linked to sporadic transnational plots. This diaspora activism has strained diplomatic ties, notably between and , amid accusations of state-sponsored and inadequate host-country controls on terrorist glorification.

Historical Origins

Pre-independence Proposals

The earliest documented proposal for a sovereign Sikh state emerged in March 1940, when Dr. Vir Singh Bhatti, a physician from , published a titled Khalistan, coining the term to advocate for an independent Sikh homeland as a buffer between a potential Muslim and Hindu- . This idea was formulated in direct response to the All-India Muslim League's of the previous month, which demanded autonomous Muslim- states, heightening Sikh concerns over their demographic minority status—comprising roughly 13% of Punjab's population—and vulnerability to absorption into a Pakistan-dominated where held a slim of about 55%. Bhatti's emphasized Sikh to preserve religious and cultural , drawing on historical precedents like the under Maharaja (1799–1839), though it garnered limited immediate traction beyond intellectual circles. In 1943, the (SAD), the primary Sikh political organization, advanced the "Azad Punjab" scheme under Master Tara Singh's leadership to counterbalance growing demands for . Elaborated at an SAD meeting on June 5, 1943, the proposal sought to detach Muslim-majority districts from , creating a reconfigured province—termed Azad (Independent) —spanning areas from the to the River, where and together would form a majority and could exert significant influence without formal independence. This was not an outright call for secession but for territorial adjustment to ensure Sikh political weight, reflecting pragmatic negotiations amid British wartime policies and the ' loyalty during , which had bolstered their claims for safeguards. Internal Sikh opposition arose, with factions like the Rawalpindi Akali Dal criticizing it as insufficiently ambitious, leading to conferences such as the one at Panja Sahib in August 1943 denouncing the scheme. By March 1946, amid escalating partition talks and the Cabinet Mission's arrival, the SAD escalated its stance with a formal resolution endorsing a distinct Sikh state, asserting that Punjab's sacred sites and Sikh interests required separation from both and to avoid domination. This demand, reiterated in memoranda to British authorities, conditioned Sikh acceptance of any partition on securing a viable , with Master Tara Singh warning of non-cooperation otherwise. However, lacked contiguous majority districts—concentrated instead in central Punjab's canal colonies—and British policy prioritized stabilizing the transfer of power, rendering independent statehood unfeasible despite negotiations where figures like reportedly entertained Sikh autonomy within . These proposals underscored Sikh fears of marginalization but ultimately yielded to the Radcliffe Line's division of in August 1947, displacing over 2 million from western areas.

Post-Partition Grievances

The partition of in August 1947 divided the province between and along religious lines, resulting in the allocation of significant Sikh-populated territories and historical sites, such as , to , which prompted the mass exodus of approximately 2.5 million and from to amid widespread that claimed between 200,000 and 2 million lives overall. This demographic upheaval left as a minority in the newly formed , comprising about 33% of its population, exacerbating feelings of loss for their fragmented heartland and ancestral lands. Sikhs had advocated for an independent state or autonomous region during partition negotiations, proposing schemes like "Azad Punjab" or "Sikhistan," but internal disunity among Sikh leaders, reliance on the despite unfulfilled promises, and their minority status—lacking a majority in any district—prevented success, leading to perceptions of betrayal by allies who prioritized Hindu-majority interests. The Indian Constitution of 1950 further entrenched grievances through Article 25(2)(b), which subsumed under for purposes like temple management and personal laws, effectively denying Sikhs a distinct ; two Sikh members of the refused to sign the draft in protest. Politically, demands by the for safeguards, including a Sikh-majority and in legislatures, were rejected by the central government under , whose 1946 assurances of autonomy went unheeded. Linguistically, East Punjab's inclusion of Hindi-speaking and hilly areas diluted Punjabi influence, with Punjabi denied official status and discouraged in 1951 and 1961 censuses, fueling the Punjabi Suba agitation from the early 1950s for a Punjabi-speaking state—a demand conceded only partially in the 1966 reorganization, which transferred territories to and left as a shared capital. These unresolved issues, compounded by economic resettlement challenges from lost properties, sowed seeds of alienation, though violence remained limited until the 1970s as the government made incremental concessions.

Ideological Foundations

Core Demands and Anandpur Sahib Resolution

The core demands of the Khalistan movement revolve around creating an independent sovereign state for , termed Khalistan, primarily in the Sikh-majority region of , focusing on areas there rather than typically claiming territories in such as around Kartarpur Sahib—attributed to the Muslim-majority demographics in Pakistani Punjab, the movement's origins in post-independence Indian grievances, and practical considerations avoiding conflict with alleged external supporters like Pakistan—and potentially extending to Sikh-majority areas in neighboring states, to protect Sikh religious practices, , and political from assimilation into the Hindu-majority Indian . These demands gained traction amid post-independence grievances over 's linguistic and territorial reorganization, uneven resource distribution, and central government interventions perceived as undermining Sikh interests. The served as a foundational articulation of many underlying grievances, though initially framed as a call for enhanced rather than outright secession. Adopted by the on October 16-17, 1973, at during its general body meeting, the resolution outlined demands to restructure center-state relations, limiting New Delhi's authority to defense, foreign affairs, communications, and currency while devolving control over agriculture, industry, education, and irrigation to states like . Politically, it demanded Chandigarh be declared Punjab's exclusive capital, the transfer of Punjabi-speaking areas from and to Punjab, and safeguards for through democratic . Economically, the resolution advocated Punjab's full control over its river waters from the , Beas, and Ravi systems, equitable resource sharing, dominance in basic industries, private sector encouragement for consumer goods, and policies supporting farmers via land reforms and . Religiously and socially, it emphasized the preservation of Sikh gurdwaras, broadcast of on , and promotion of Punjabi in script, while calling for measures to address disparities among . Militarily, demands included reorganizing the to form Sikh-majority division-sized units, reducing troop concentrations in , and ensuring proportional Sikh recruitment to protect community interests. A revised and expanded version, incorporating additional economic and federalist clauses, was ratified by the at the All-India Akali Conference in on October 28-29, 1978. The Akali leadership consistently positioned the resolution as compatible with India's unity, rejecting separatist interpretations, yet radicals later repurposed its provisions to legitimize Khalistan aspirations, viewing unfulfilled demands as evidence of systemic .

Key Proponents and Rationales

Jagjit Singh Chohan emerged as a primary ideological proponent of Khalistan in the early 1970s, establishing a in and issuing symbolic Khalistani passports and currency to assert sovereignty for in the region. Chohan, a former Indian civil servant, rationalized the movement on grounds of Sikh historical independence under the (1799–1849) and post-Partition grievances, including the division of in 1947 that left as a minority in both and , alongside perceived economic marginalization where Punjab's agricultural surplus subsidized other states without proportional returns. He argued that integration into Hindu-majority threatened Sikh religious and cultural distinctiveness, advocating an ethno-religious state governed by Sikh principles to preserve identity and prevent assimilation. The 1973 Anandpur Sahib Resolution, adopted by the , provided a foundational rationale through demands for 's autonomy, including exclusive control over river waters from the Ravi-Beas system (disputed since the 1955 reorganization that allocated 70% of 's waters to non-riparian states), the transfer of as 's sole capital, and safeguards against central interference in Sikh religious institutions. While not explicitly calling for , proponents like Chohan interpreted these as precursors to Khalistan, citing unfulfilled promises from India's 1947 assurances of regional autonomy and data showing 's per capita income at 15% above national average in 1971 yet facing fiscal extraction via food procurement at below-market prices. This reflected broader Sikh rationales rooted in causal factors like demographic dilution—Sikhs comprising 2% of India's population but concentrated in —and fears of cultural erosion amid policies perceived as favoring and Hindu symbols over Punjabi and Sikh ones. Other early advocates, such as Davinder Singh Parmar, who organized pro-Khalistan meetings in the UK from the 1950s, emphasized as a response to systemic underrepresentation, with Sikhs holding only 2 of 27 cabinet posts in Indira Gandhi's 1971 government despite their military contributions (over 75% of India's officer cadre in some units). These rationales prioritized empirical Sikh overrepresentation in India's defense (8% of armed forces despite 2% population) contrasted with political exclusion, framing Khalistan as a pragmatic safeguard against potential majoritarian dominance rather than mere .

Rise of Militancy

Emergence in the 1970s

The Khalistan movement's militant phase emerged in the 1970s against a backdrop of unresolved post-Partition grievances and perceived central government overreach in Punjab. After the 1966 Punjab Reorganisation Act, which created a Punjabi-speaking state but withheld Chandigarh as the capital and allocated river waters in ways Sikhs viewed as discriminatory, political demands escalated. The Shiromani Akali Dal, representing mainstream Sikh interests, faced repeated frustrations in negotiations with New Delhi, leading fringe elements to question federalism's viability. By the mid-1970s, economic strains from the Green Revolution—such as groundwater depletion and indebtedness among small farmers—compounded cultural anxieties over Sikh identity dilution in a Hindu-majority India. The Indian government's declaration of rule on June 25, 1975, under Prime Minister accelerated radicalization by suspending , censoring media, and arresting over 40,000 , including Akali Dal leaders like . This crackdown, lasting until March 21, 1977, was seen by many as targeted , eroding trust in democratic institutions and pushing toward extralegal resistance. Post-Emergency elections in 1977 briefly empowered an Akali-Janata coalition in Punjab, but its inability to secure concessions—amid interference—deepened divisions, with radicals decrying moderate leadership as compromised. Parallel diaspora activism provided organizational and rhetorical fuel. Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan, operating from the , advertised Khalistan's "declaration of independence" in in 1971 and established a provisional , soliciting funds and diplomatic backing from Sikh expatriates in and . These efforts, though marginal in India initially, legitimized separatist rhetoric. The decade's militancy crystallized with the founding of Dal Khalsa on August 6, 1978, by Sikh intellectuals and ex-Akali members in ; explicitly demanding Khalistan as a sovereign theocratic state, the group rejected electoral politics for confrontation, drawing inspiration from global insurgencies and foreshadowing armed escalation.

Role of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale

, born Jarnail Singh Brar on June 2, 1947, in Rode village, , , emerged as a prominent Sikh religious leader following his appointment as head of the , a traditional Sikh seminary emphasizing scriptural study and martial training, on August 25, 1977. He succeeded Kartar Singh Khalsa, who died amid a leadership schism within the Taksal, and quickly gained a following through itinerant preaching that stressed Sikh moral regeneration, opposition to alcohol and tobacco use, and resistance to perceived encroachments on Sikh religious autonomy by the Indian central government under the Congress party. Bhindranwale's rhetoric intensified after the 1978 clash between orthodox Sikhs and Nirankaris in , where 13 Sikhs were killed, positioning him as a defender against heterodox groups and state favoritism toward them, though he did not directly incite the violence. Bhindranwale's involvement deepened with Punjab's political grievances, including demands in the 1973 for greater Sikh control over Punjab's waters, return of as the state capital, and decentralization to counter federal overreach. Initially aligned with the , he criticized Congress interference, such as the 1981 arrest of , son of Akali leader , which fueled perceptions of targeted persecution. In 1981, Bhindranwale himself was arrested in connection with the murder of Hindu newspaper editor but was acquitted for lack of evidence, an event that bolstered his image among as a victim of fabricated charges while alienating him further from secular authorities. His acquittal coincided with rising communal tensions, as he began advocating kirpan-wearing and self-defense training, framing Sikh readiness as a response to existential threats rather than aggression. By 1982, Bhindranwale co-launched the on August 4 with the Akali Dal, a campaign of to enforce the through mass arrests and protests at the in . Over 20,000 Akali workers, including , courted arrest initially, but Bhindranwale's participation shifted the tone toward confrontation, with his followers refusing to disband and instead declaring a "" against government policies like river water diversion from Punjab's and . He relocated permanently to the complex in early 1983, fortifying the with armed cadres and providing sanctuary to Sikh militants evading police, including those accused in over 50 killings by mid-1983, which transformed the site into a base for low-level . This militarization, justified by Bhindranwale as defensive amid alleged state atrocities like extra-judicial killings, escalated the movement from political agitation to armed resistance, drawing in youth radicalized by his sermons equating compromise with surrender. Regarding Khalistan, an independent Sikh state, Bhindranwale's position remained ambiguous and noncommittal in recorded statements; he emphasized implementation of the Anandpur Resolution for autonomy within , stating in speeches that Sikhs sought neither nor subjugation but dignity, and that Khalistan would be accepted only if offered by the government as a solution to oppression. However, his actions—harboring fugitives, endorsing retaliatory violence, and in a February 1983 address calling Sikhs "slaves" under Hindu-majority rule—catalyzed separatist sentiment, posthumously elevating him as a for Khalistani militants after his death on June 6, 1984, during , where Indian forces stormed the fortified complex to neutralize him and approximately 200-1,500 armed followers. While government-aligned sources, often reflecting narratives, labeled him a terrorist responsible for inciting over 100 assassinations, Sikh traditionalist accounts portray his resistance as proportionate to systemic , such as rigged elections and economic marginalization in ; causal analysis reveals his charisma exploited genuine Sikh insecurities but precipitated a that claimed thousands of lives by the .

Pivotal Events of 1984

Operation Blue Star

Operation Blue Star was an Indian Army operation launched on June 3, 1984, to dislodge Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, the leader of the Damdami Taksal, and his armed associates from the Akal Takht within the Harmandir Sahib (Golden Temple) complex in Amritsar, Punjab. Bhindranwale had relocated to the complex in 1982 amid escalating tensions over Sikh grievances, including demands for greater autonomy outlined in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, and had fortified positions with stockpiled weapons supplied through smuggling networks, turning the site into a militant stronghold for Khalistan separatist activities. Ordered by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi after failed negotiations and intelligence reports of planned attacks on security forces, the operation involved sealing Punjab under curfew on June 2, deploying over 100,000 troops, and surrounding 40 other gurdwaras to prevent militant reinforcements. The assault intensified on June 5, with infantry advances met by heavy militant fire from machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and anti-tank weapons orchestrated by former , who had defected to train the defenders. Tanks from the 16th Cavalry Regiment were deployed after nightfall to breach fortified positions, leading to prolonged close-quarters combat that continued through June 6; Bhindranwale and several key associates, including , were killed in the during this phase. The operation extended to June 10 to clear remaining pockets in the complex and other sites, with the army facing unexpected resistance due to the militants' preparations, which included booby-trapped buildings and sniper positions. Official Indian government reports listed 83 army personnel killed and 248 wounded, alongside 492 militants and civilians killed, 1,592 surrendered, and 86 wounded, attributing most deaths to armed combatants. However, organizations and Sikh accounts estimate total casualties at 3,000 to 7,000, including pilgrims present for the martyrdom anniversary of Dev, arguing that the timing maximized civilian exposure and that official figures undercounted deaths from crossfire, artillery, and post-operation detentions. The sustained severe structural damage from tank shells and gunfire, while the Sikh Reference Library housing historical manuscripts was incinerated, actions criticized as despite army claims of restraint to preserve sacred structures. The operation's use of heavy armor in a religious site, combined with prior media blackouts and civilian hardships under , fueled perceptions among of deliberate provocation, intensifying Khalistan militancy by portraying it as a defensive response to state rather than mere . Recovered arms included over 60 rifles, machine guns, and grenades, validating concerns of an armed , though critics from groups contend the government's escalation ignored underlying political demands, prioritizing military solution over dialogue.

Indira Gandhi Assassination and Anti-Sikh Riots

On October 31, 1984, Indian Prime Minister was assassinated at her official residence in by two of her Sikh bodyguards, Beant Singh and , who fired over 30 rounds from close range, citing retaliation for , the June 1984 military assault on the in that killed hundreds of Sikh militants and civilians. Beant Singh was killed by other guards immediately after the attack, while was arrested, convicted, and executed in 1989. The assassination triggered widespread outrage, with Gandhi's son Rajiv immediately assuming the premiership amid reports of premeditated anger among security personnel over the perceived desecration of Sikh holy sites. The killing sparked organized anti-Sikh riots across northern , particularly in , beginning the same day and intensifying over the next three days until November 3, 1984, as mobs targeted Sikh neighborhoods, gurdwaras, and businesses in reprisal for the prime minister's death. Official figures from the report 2,146 killed in alone, alongside 586 injuries and extensive property destruction, though independent estimates place the national death toll between 3,000 and 8,000, with widespread rapes, burnings, and lootings documented in eyewitness accounts. Evidence indicates significant involvement by members of the ruling Party, including local leaders who allegedly distributed voter lists to identify Sikh homes, provided kerosene for , and incited crowds with inflammatory speeches, while police often stood by or participated in the rather than intervening. The government's delayed response included deploying the army only after 72 hours of unchecked pogroms, fueling accusations of complicity; subsequent inquiries, such as those leading to the 2018 life imprisonment of MP for instigating killings, highlighted systemic failures in protection and prosecution. These events, described by as abuses with , exacerbated Sikh alienation and perceptions of state-sponsored retribution, though official narratives framed them as spontaneous communal clashes.

Insurgency and Violence (1985-1990s)

Militant Groups and Tactics

The Khalistan insurgency in Punjab from 1985 to the 1990s was primarily conducted by fragmented Sikh militant organizations employing guerrilla tactics aimed at destabilizing Indian authority and establishing an independent Sikh state. Key groups included Babbar Khalsa International (BKI), founded in 1978 by Talwinder Singh Parmar, Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), established in 1986 by Manbir Singh Chaheru, and Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF), formed in 1986 under Aroor Singh. These outfits, designated as terrorist organizations by the Indian government, operated with support from overseas Sikh diaspora networks and alleged Pakistani intelligence backing for arms smuggling. Militants utilized strategies, including ambushes on police and convoys using automatic weapons like AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades, targeted assassinations of politicians, security personnel, and perceived collaborators—often moderate labeled as "informers"—and rackets imposing "taxes" on rural businesses to fund operations estimated at millions of rupees annually. To escalate communal tensions, groups orchestrated massacres on buses and trains selectively killing Hindu passengers, such as the by KCF claiming 72 lives, and bombings in urban areas to provoke Hindu exodus from and reprisals against elsewhere in . Prominent among tactics was the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suitcase bombs, exemplified by BKI's orchestration of the bombing on June 23, 1985, where a Narita-bound flight exploded off Ireland's coast, killing all 329 aboard—mostly Canadian —in the deadliest aviation terror incident until 9/11; Canadian courts convicted Inderjit Singh Reyat for bomb construction, linking it directly to BKI leadership. KCF specialized in commando-style raids on police stations, seizing arms caches, while KLF focused on infiltrating villages for recruitment and enforcing parallel "Khalistan courts" to punish dissenters through beheadings or shootings. These methods resulted in over 20,000 deaths during the peak years, with militants killing more than security forces to eliminate opposition and consolidate control in rural strongholds.

Major Incidents and Counteroperations

On June 23, 1985, Khalistani militants orchestrated the bombing of Air India Flight 182, en route from Montreal to Delhi, which exploded off the coast of Ireland, killing all 329 people on board, including 268 Canadian citizens. The attack, planned and executed primarily from Canada, involved a suitcase bomb linked to Babbar Khalsa International, with Talwinder Singh Parmar as a key figure; it remains Canada's deadliest terrorist incident. Subsequent years saw a pattern of targeted violence against civilians and moderates opposing separatism. On August 20, 1985, Harchand Singh Longowal, the Akali Dal leader who had negotiated the Punjab Accord with Indira Gandhi's successor, was assassinated by Khalistani gunmen in Sherkot village, , undermining peace efforts. Bus massacres became a hallmark tactic, exemplified by the July 6, 1987, Lalru incident near , where militants from the stopped a bus carrying Hindu pilgrims and executed 38 passengers, injuring over 20 others. Such attacks, numbering dozens throughout the late , aimed to terrorize non-Sikh populations and provoke communal strife, resulting in hundreds of civilian deaths annually. Indian counteroperations intensified from the late 1980s, led by Punjab Police under Director General K.P.S. Gill, appointed in 1988. Gill's strategy emphasized human intelligence networks, cash rewards for militants' capture or elimination, and proactive raids, dismantling command structures of groups like and ; between 1988 and 1993, over 10,000 militants were neutralized, correlating with a sharp decline in violence from peak levels exceeding 5,000 deaths in 1991. Operations often involved special units conducting cordon-and-search missions in rural hideouts, though fragmented militant factions and alleged Pakistani support prolonged resistance. These efforts drew international scrutiny for alleged human rights violations, including extrajudicial executions, , and enforced disappearances of suspected sympathizers, with organizations like documenting thousands of cases amid the counterinsurgency's intensity. Punjab authorities maintained such measures were necessary to combat militants who operated via , kidnappings, and reprisal killings against , estimating over 20,000 total insurgency-related deaths by the mid-1990s. By , coordinated police actions had confined surviving militants to border areas, paving the way for the movement's abatement.

Decline of the Movement

Abatement in the Late 1990s

By the late 1990s, the Khalistan insurgency in had largely abated, with militant operations reduced to sporadic remnants after the systematic dismantling of their networks in the preceding decade. Police forces, building on strategies initiated under Director General K.P.S. Gill in the early 1990s, conducted targeted operations that eliminated or forced the surrender of surviving commanders, fracturing groups such as the and International. This phase followed peak violence in 1991, when over 5,000 fatalities were recorded, transitioning to minimal incidents by 1997–1999 as public support for militancy eroded amid economic recovery and fatigue from prolonged conflict. Key events underscored the movement's collapse, including the August 31, 1995, suicide bombing of Beant by militants, which, while a high-profile strike, prompted intensified crackdowns that neutralized subsequent threats without reigniting widespread unrest. Remaining militants increasingly operated from exile or faced internal betrayals, with surrenders accelerating after 1996 as incentives and programs drew in over 1,000 operatives by decade's end. Assessments from security analysts noted that by 1998, recorded fewer than 100 terrorism-related deaths annually, compared to thousands earlier, reflecting the causal impact of and informant networks that disrupted arms supplies and financing. The abatement was not without controversy, as counter-operations involved expanded reward systems for eliminations, leading to documented extrajudicial actions that, while effective in breaking resistance, drew criticism for human rights violations from groups like . Nonetheless, empirical trends confirmed the insurgency's effective end, with the state achieving sustained normalcy by , shifting focus from armed to political integration within . This decline stemmed from the militants' failure to sustain popular mobilization, as rural Sikh communities prioritized stability over ethno-religious demands amid improved governance and agricultural prosperity.

Factors Leading to Suppression

The suppression of the Khalistan insurgency in during the early 1990s stemmed primarily from a robust, police-led strategy under , who served in the role from May 1988 to December 1990 and again from November 1991 to December 1995. professionalized the Police by expanding its strength to approximately 60,000 personnel, equipping them with advanced weaponry such as light machine guns and self-loading rifles, and prioritizing intelligence-driven operations over reliance on the army. Tactics included cordon-and-search missions covering thousands of villages, the establishment of 1,075 village defense committees arming over 15,000 volunteers by 1992, and "Operation Night Dominance" involving senior-led nighttime patrols to disrupt militant ambushes. These efforts resulted in the neutralization of 5,408 militants between 1990 and 1993, including 139 hardcore terrorists and multiple group chiefs in 1992 alone, alongside 916 surrenders by 1993. Operations like Black Thunder in May 1988 cleared militant sanctuaries in the complex with minimal casualties, preventing gurdwaras from serving as safe havens. A critical factor was the erosion of public support for the militants, driven by their shift toward criminal , indiscriminate killings of civilians—including , lower-caste , and moderate —and internal factional that alienated the Sikh peasantry. Incidents such as the June 1989 attempted bus hijacking met with civilian resistance, signaling widespread disillusionment and contributing to militant demoralization. This loss of legitimacy manifested in high during the February 1992 state elections—despite militant boycotts and threats—and 82% participation in the 1993 panchayat polls, restoring democratic governance under Beant Singh and undermining the insurgents' narrative of state oppression. Civilian fatalities, which peaked at 2,591 in 1991, plummeted to 48 by 1993, reflecting both operational successes and reduced militant capacity. The decapitation of militant leadership and fragmentation of groups like the further accelerated the decline, as targeted killings and captures depleted command structures without effective replacements emerging. By late , the insurgency's core infrastructure had collapsed, with violence shifting from rural dominance to sporadic urban attempts that swiftly contained. shifts away from political appeasement toward non-interference in police operations ensured sustained pressure, marking the effective end of organized Khalistani militancy in by 1995.

International and Diaspora Involvement

Support from Sikh Diaspora

The , numbering over 1 million in countries such as , the , the , and , has historically provided financial and diplomatic backing to Khalistan separatists, particularly during the Punjab insurgency of the 1980s and 1990s. Emigré Sikhs contributed funds raised through gurdwaras, cultural events, and direct donations to arm militants in , sustaining operations amid domestic suppression; this external support prolonged the conflict by enabling arms procurement and dissemination. Such financing often flowed through informal networks, with Canadian and UK-based groups channeling resources to factions like , despite lacking broad community consensus. In the post-insurgency era, diaspora activism shifted toward non-violent advocacy, exemplified by organizations like (SFJ), which launched a global "" campaign in 2020 to gauge support for independence via symbolic votes among overseas Sikhs. Voting commenced on October 31, 2021, in , followed by events in , , , , and the , including a March 2024 poll in , where participants affirmed aspirations. SFJ, designated an unlawful association by in 2019, frames the referendum as a democratic exercise but has faced accusations of inflating turnout and promoting secessionist narratives detached from Punjab's ground realities. Financial concerns persist, with Canada's 2025 finance ministry report highlighting Khalistani extremists' access to domestic fundraising via charities and remittances, posing risks. Diaspora protests, such as annual commemorations and demonstrations against perceived Indian repression, amplify visibility but represent a minority viewpoint, as mainstream Sikh bodies like the often prioritize integration over . This external advocacy has strained bilateral ties, notably India-Canada relations, amid allegations of unchecked extremist networking in gurdwaras and events.

Alleged Pakistani and Other Foreign Roles

Indian intelligence agencies have alleged that Pakistan's orchestrated support for Sikh militants during the of the 1980s and early 1990s, including the provision of arms, training, and funding to destabilize in retaliation for regional conflicts. Reports from the period indicate that ISI facilitated the transit of militants across the India-Pakistan border and transferred funds to groups such as the and , enabling attacks that contributed to over 20,000 deaths in . Captured militants and intercepted communications provided evidence of training camps in , where Sikh extremists underwent instruction in guerrilla tactics, weapons handling, and explosives alongside Kashmiri insurgents, starting as early as the mid-1980s. Weapons recovered from militants, including rifles and rocket-propelled grenades traced to Pakistani military stockpiles, were cited in Indian assessments as direct imports funneled through ISI networks. has consistently denied these claims, attributing them to Indian propaganda, though declassified U.S. analyses acknowledged ISI's role in aiding non-Islamist separatists like Khalistani groups as part of broader proxy strategies. Post-insurgency, allegations persisted into the 2000s and , with ISI reportedly offering sanctuary to fugitive leaders and coordinating with diaspora networks for low-level agitation, including joint activities with pro-Kashmir elements in Western countries. Indian reports linked ISI to specific figures, such as the provision of logistical aid to operatives operating from until arrests in the early . Beyond , no major foreign state has been credibly documented as providing direct material support to the Khalistan movement; involvement from other governments appears limited to inadvertent hosting in countries with large Sikh diasporas, such as and the , where militants evaded amid legal protections for political . Isolated claims of indirect Chinese interest in the 1970s-1980s for anti-India leverage lack substantiation beyond speculative Sikh separatist appeals for recognition. These diaspora-based sustainments, rather than state sponsorship, prolonged fringe advocacy after the core militancy waned.

Activities in Key Countries

In Canada, which hosts the largest outside with over 770,000 as of the 2021 , pro-Khalistan groups have organized referendums on Punjab's , including votes in and in 2022 and 2023 coordinated by (SFJ), drawing thousands of participants despite Indian government designations of SFJ as a terrorist entity. These activities escalated after the June 2023 killing of , a designated terrorist by and SFJ leader, prompting Canadian Prime Minister to allege credible intelligence of involvement, leading to diplomatic expulsions and heightened scrutiny of Khalistani extremism, though Canadian authorities have not designated major pro-Khalistan groups as terrorist organizations. Pro-Khalistan elements have also used gurdwaras for rallies glorifying militants like and funding drives, contributing to communal tensions with Hindu and other Indian communities in cities like and . In the United Kingdom, organizations such as the Sikh Federation UK (SFUK) and SFJ have staged protests advocating Khalistan, including disruptions during Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar's March 2025 visit and annual marches in featuring effigies of Indian leaders. The government, under in 2024, established a to investigate and seize over 300 bank accounts linked to Khalistan funding networks, reflecting concerns over extremist propagation via gurdwaras and , where groups like the supporters have commemorated events tied to 1980s violence. Historical ties trace to 1980s groups like the , founded in Britain, which facilitated arms and propaganda flows to insurgents, though current activities focus more on and non-violent claims. The has seen SFJ, headquartered in New York and led by since 2009, conduct non-binding "Khalistan referendums" in cities like Sacramento in 2024, aiming to gauge support for amid allegations of Indian transnational repression, including a foiled Pannun plot charged in 2023. SFJ's campaigns include online advocacy and events on the , such as an August 2025 gathering with prayers for political figures, positioning Khalistan as a issue comparable to or referendums. U.S. authorities have monitored these as protected speech but noted intelligence-sharing with on Pakistan-backed Khalistani militancy, with limited domestic designations despite Indian requests. Australia's Sikh community, numbering around 210,000 per the 2021 census, has witnessed Khalistani disruptions at Indian consular events, such as the August 2025 Independence Day flag-hoisting in where protesters tore flags and clashed with attendees, alongside temple vandalism in linked to separatist graffiti. SFJ has extended referendum drives here, contributing to brawls like the January 2023 Sydney incident injuring participants, prompting Australian concerns over foreign interference after reports of Indian spies targeting Khalistani networks in 2024. Tensions reflect broader diaspora dynamics, with police noting rising hate crimes tied to Khalistani against Hindu sites.

Recent Developments (2000s-Present)

Period of Relative Dormancy

Following the effective suppression of the Khalistan insurgency by Indian security forces in the mid-1990s, particularly under Punjab Police chief K.P.S. Gill, overt militant activities within Punjab and India largely ceased, ushering in a period of relative dormancy for the movement from the early 2000s through the mid-2010s. The decade-long campaign of violence, which claimed an estimated 25,000 lives—predominantly Sikhs targeted by militants for perceived collaboration with the state—had exhausted public support, as communities grew weary of the economic disruption, targeted killings, and internal divisions it wrought. The lack of current acceptance for the Khalistan movement in India, particularly among Punjab's Sikh population, stems from economic prosperity and integration within India, stability following the suppression of the insurgency, and lingering trauma from the violence of the 1980s and 1990s, leading to prioritization of development over separatism. With militant networks dismantled through intelligence-led operations and surrenders, no sustained armed campaigns reemerged in Punjab, where separatist sentiment waned amid restored normalcy, including regular elections and agricultural recovery. In , political grievances among shifted toward mainstream channels, with parties like the (SAD) incorporating demands for greater autonomy and cultural recognition—such as river water sharing and Chandigarh's status—without endorsing . SAD, once loosely associated with hardline elements, allied with the (BJP) in coalitions, prioritizing development over separatism; Punjab's economy grew at an average of 5-6% annually in the , driven by remittances from diaspora and gains, further diluting radical appeals. Sporadic low-level threats persisted, including arrests of individuals linked to banned groups like International in the early , but these lacked the scale or coordination of prior decades, reflecting fragmented remnants rather than resurgence. While dormant domestically, the ideology survived in exile among Sikh diaspora communities in Canada, the UK, and the US, where it manifested in non-violent advocacy like symbolic referendums organized by groups such as Sikhs for Justice starting in 2012, rather than operational militancy. Indian authorities maintained vigilance through surveillance and occasional extraditions, but the absence of major incidents in Punjab underscored the movement's diminished operational capacity on the ground, with youth aspirations turning toward education, migration, and entrepreneurship over armed struggle. This phase allowed Punjab to reintegrate into India's federal framework, though underlying resentments from the 1980s-1990s violence lingered in some narratives.

Resurgence Attempts and 2023-2025 Events

In early 2023, , a 30-year-old self-styled Sikh and head of the organization, emerged as a prominent figure advocating for Khalistan independence, drawing parallels to by promoting armed resistance and criticizing Punjab's drug issues as evidence of state neglect. His activities, including public rallies and calls for a separate Sikh , prompted Indian authorities to launch a manhunt on March 18, 2023, resulting in over 100 arrests of associates and the imposition of internet blackouts in districts to curb mobilization. Singh evaded capture for a month before his arrest on April 23, 2023, in Rode village, , , under the Act, which allows detention without trial for up to two years. Despite his detention, Singh won a parliamentary seat from Khadoor as an independent candidate in the 2024 Indian general elections, later announcing plans in January 2025 to form a new from jail, signaling persistent but contained separatist organizing within . These events represented a localized resurgence attempt in , though public support remained marginal, with Punjab police reporting no widespread violence or territorial control by militants post-arrest. Internationally, the killing of , a Canadian Sikh temple leader and designated terrorist by for alleged involvement in arms smuggling and plots against Indian officials, on June 18, 2023, outside a in , escalated diplomatic frictions. Canadian Prime Minister stated on September 18, 2023, that intelligence indicated potential links to Indian agents, prompting to reject the claims as unsubstantiated and accuse of sheltering extremists who glorify violence, including past Air bombings. Tensions intensified with mutual expulsions of diplomats: expelled an Indian official in October 2023, followed by 's recall of its ; by October 2024, expelled six Indian diplomats amid charges against three Indian nationals for the killing, while denied state involvement and criticized 's lax extradition policies for 20-odd Khalistani fugitives. In parallel, U.S. indictments in November 2023 revealed an alleged Indian government employee's plot to assassinate , a U.S.-based leader pushing non-binding Khalistan referendums, further highlighting diaspora-targeted operations but with maintaining these targeted criminals, not civilians. Diaspora activism persisted through Sikhs for Justice's "Khalistan Referendum" campaign, conducting symbolic votes in cities like Melbourne (2023, over 100,000 participants claimed) and planning an Ottawa event for November 23, 2025, which Indian officials decried as provocative and disruptive to bilateral ties. Canadian security reports in 2025 confirmed Khalistani extremists' involvement in planning violence against India from Canadian soil, including financial networks supporting groups like Babbar Khalsa, though no major attacks materialized in 2024. In Canada, 24 documented incidents of Khalistani actions from 2018-2025 included flag desecrations and threats, often tied to anti-India protests, contributing to eroded trust; post-2025 federal elections, some Indian observers noted a perceived setback for pro-Khalistan elements due to shifting political dynamics. Overall, these efforts yielded heightened visibility abroad but minimal traction in Punjab, where economic integration and security measures suppressed domestic revival, with Indian intelligence attributing external amplification to state actors like Pakistan. In January 2026, the Baku Initiative Group hosted an international conference in Baku, Azerbaijan, titled "Racism and Violence Against Sikhs and Other Minorities in India," attended by representatives from Sikh Federation International from Canada and the UK, as well as a Pakistani provincial minister. Discussions focused on alleged racism and violence against Sikhs in India, with calls for United Nations investigations.

Criticisms and Controversies

Indian Government and Mainstream Sikh Views

The Indian government has consistently classified the Khalistan movement as a separatist posing a direct threat to national and , associating it with terrorist activities including bombings, assassinations, and cross-border militancy. Following the violent phase of the and , which resulted in over 20,000 deaths according to official estimates, authorities enacted laws such as the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act in 1985 to curb militant groups, banning outfits like the and . In recent years, the Ministry of External Affairs has protested international events featuring Khalistani slogans, such as those at Canadian gatherings in , arguing they enable extremism and networks. The government maintains that the movement's diaspora elements exploit democratic freedoms abroad to fund and propagate violence, as evidenced by extradition requests for figures like , accused of leading the . Mainstream Sikh organizations and leaders in India, including the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC) and , have largely distanced themselves from separatist demands, emphasizing Sikh integration within 's secular framework while condemning the violence associated with Khalistani militancy. Although occasional rhetorical endorsements of Khalistan have surfaced—such as acting Giani Harpreet Singh's 2020 statement that "all want Khalistan" if offered by the government—these are framed conditionally and do not reflect institutional policy, with clarifying that Sikh identity transcends separatism. Surveys and reports indicate negligible support among Punjab's Sikh population, estimated at under 5% in localized areas like , with residents prioritizing economic recovery over revival of 1980s-era unrest. Mainstream political parties in Punjab, including Sikh-led ones like the , denounce separatism as detrimental to community welfare, attributing past militancy to external provocations rather than genuine grassroots demand. This consensus views the movement as a fringe phenomenon that tarnishes Sikh contributions to 's armed forces and agriculture, fostering divisions exploited by foreign actors.

Pro-Separatist Perspectives

Proponents of the Khalistan movement assert that form a distinct ethno-religious nation entitled to , drawing on the historical of the under Maharaja , which from 1799 to 1849 encompassed and extended into parts of modern-day , , and northern before British conquest. They argue that Sikh identity, forged through the Khalsa's martial traditions in the 15th-18th centuries in , warrants an independent to preserve religious, cultural, and linguistic distinctiveness, including the script for Punjabi, against perceived assimilation into Hindu-majority . Organizations like (SFJ) frame Khalistan as a rightful reclamation of the historic Sikh , divided during the 1947 partition, and invoke the of 1973—originally demanding greater autonomy and federal restructuring—as a foundational call for Sikh political self-rule, though mainstream Akali Dal leaders reject separatist readings. Central grievances include post-independence economic exploitation of as India's "breadbasket," where the of the 1960s-1970s boosted food production but saddled Sikh peasants with debt amid rising input costs and insufficient state support, exacerbating farmer suicides and resource depletion. Separatists cite the diversion of 's river waters to non-riparian states under inter-state agreements, reducing agricultural viability, and deliberate demographic shifts through resettlement of non-Sikhs to dilute the Sikh majority in , estimated at 58% in the 2011 census. These are portrayed as deliberate marginalization, compounded by unfulfilled Congress party promises of during Punjab's linguistic reorganization in 1966, which proponents claim fostered resentment and justified demands for as a remedy for political disenfranchisement. The 1984 Operation Blue Star, involving the Indian army's assault on the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar to dislodge militants, resulted in 1,600 to 6,000 deaths and extensive damage to the Sikh faith's holiest site, which separatists describe as a genocidal attack on Sikh sovereignty and , galvanizing the push. This was followed by anti-Sikh riots in Delhi and elsewhere after Indira Gandhi's assassination on October 31, 1984, killing between 3,000 and 17,000 Sikhs, with claims of state complicity or police inaction evidencing systemic persecution akin to pogroms. During the subsequent counter-insurgency in the late 1980s-1990s, separatists allege thousands of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances—estimated at over 25,000 by some advocacy groups—targeting Sikh youth, framing these as evidence of Indian to suppress legitimate aspirations. In contemporary advocacy, figures like SFJ leader and the late emphasize non-violent referendums since 2021 in diaspora hubs like , the , and the , gathering votes for Khalistan to assert Sikh under international norms, with over 100,000 participants reported in events by 2023. Proponents view these as peaceful exercises exposing India's "occupation" of and call for UN recognition, arguing that ongoing issues like drug epidemics in Punjab—linked to 16,000+ deaths since 2000—and farmer protests against agricultural laws in 2020-2021 underscore persistent neglect and validate the sovereign state as the only path to Sikh prosperity and security.

Human Rights Abuses by Militants and State Responses

Khalistani militants perpetrated widespread abuses during the Punjab insurgency from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, including targeted killings of civilians, massacres, bombings, and assassinations of political figures and moderate . Groups such as the and were responsible for selective murders of Hindus to incite communal violence, as well as attacks on buses and trains carrying non-Sikh passengers; for instance, in July 1986, militants gunned down 15 Hindu passengers in the Muktsar bus massacre. In another incident, militants killed 125 men, women, and children on two trains in 1991. The most notorious act was the June 23, 1985, bombing of off the coast of , which killed all 329 passengers and crew, mostly Canadian citizens of Indian origin, attributed to operatives seeking revenge for . documented these militants' massacres of civilians and attacks on Hindu and moderate Sikh targets, estimating thousands of non-combatant deaths attributable to separatist violence amid the broader conflict that claimed over 11,000 lives total. In response, the Indian state launched military and police operations to suppress the insurgency, beginning with in June 1984, a military assault on the complex in to remove and armed militants, resulting in official figures of 554 militants and civilians killed alongside 83 army personnel, though eyewitness accounts suggest higher civilian casualties potentially reaching thousands. Subsequent counter-insurgency efforts by the Punjab Police from 1984 to 1995 involved allegations of extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, and torture, with reporting systematic abuses including staged "encounter" killings where suspects were summarily executed and labeled as militants. Amnesty International highlighted the misuse of laws like the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act to justify arbitrary detentions and deaths in custody, documenting cases where detainees were tortured or disappeared. Reports estimate over 8,000 cases of extrajudicial killings and disappearances by security forces during this period, often targeting suspected sympathizers without due process, though these actions occurred in the context of combating militant groups responsible for civilian atrocities. Both and noted a pattern of impunity for perpetrators on the state side, with rare prosecutions despite evidence from survivor testimonies and cremation records. The interplay of militant terror and state countermeasures exacerbated human rights violations, with militants' communal targeting fueling cycles of retaliation and police excesses enabling unchecked abuses; however, independent analyses affirm that separatist violence initiated much of the civilian toll, while state operations, though effective in dismantling networks by the mid-1990s, failed to adhere to legal standards in numerous documented instances. Efforts to address these legacies, such as inquiries into disappearances, have been limited, with advocacy groups like Ensaaf compiling data on "illegal cremations" to quantify unacknowledged executions.

Legacy and Impact

Casualties, Economic Consequences, and Punjab's Recovery

The Khalistan-related insurgency in , peaking from the mid-1980s to the mid-, resulted in over 20,000 deaths between 1978 and 1993, encompassing civilians targeted by militants, security personnel in operations, and militants killed in encounters. Estimates vary due to incomplete records and disputed attributions, with organizations documenting thousands of extrajudicial killings and disappearances by state forces alongside militant violence against non-combatants, including targeted assassinations of and moderate . Civilian deaths surged in the early as militants imposed parallel through and killings, while police operations intensified, contributing to a cycle of reprisals that eroded community trust. The economic fallout was profound, primarily striking Punjab's agriculture-dependent , which accounted for over 50% of and output pre-insurgency. Militant activities, including kidnappings, bombings of , and threats to landowners, deterred investments in , machinery, and fertilizers, causing agricultural growth to decelerate from an average of 5.15% annually in the 1980s to 2.16% in the . Farmers reduced expenditures on long-term assets and hired fewer permanent laborers, opting for short-term contracts amid , which compounded losses and rural . Industrial development stalled due to disrupted supply chains and , with small-scale —already nascent—facing and labor shortages, exacerbating migration of skilled workers abroad. Punjab's recovery commenced after militancy waned around , with violence incidents dropping sharply and enabling restored agricultural operations and rebuilding. State investments in roads, , and policing facilitated a rebound in output, though structural rigidities like over-reliance on water-intensive crops limited sustained high growth. By the early , per capita income recovered to above-national averages, bolstered by remittances from , but the state has since faced deceleration, with agricultural growth averaging 1.9% in the amid depletion and debt accumulation, highlighting incomplete diversification from insurgency-era disruptions. Overall, the period's legacy includes persistent rural distress, yet achieved relative stability without reverting to widespread violence.

Divisions Within the Sikh Community and Broader Implications

The Khalistan movement has engendered significant divisions within the , pitting a fringe advocating against the mainstream majority that prioritizes integration within . In , where Sikhs constitute approximately 58% of the population, support for Khalistan remains negligible, largely due to the widespread trauma from the 1980s-1990s that resulted in over 20,000 deaths and economic disruption. Local sentiments, as reflected in discussions and electoral outcomes, indicate that most Punjabis associate the movement with past violence rather than viable , with overt advocacy risking social ostracism or legal repercussions. In contrast, pockets of support persist among Sikh diaspora communities in , the , and the , where estimates suggest less than 3% active backing, often amplified by organized referendums and protests disconnected from Punjab's realities. These groups, comprising second- or third-generation migrants, frame Khalistan as a symbol of cultural preservation amid perceived , yet they represent a vocal minority that alienates moderate focused on religious and economic priorities. Even Sikh religious authorities exhibit ambivalence: while the has occasionally echoed aspirational rhetoric—such as an acting Jathedar's 2020 statement that "all want Khalistan" if offered—it has also clarified that Sikh identity transcends , underscoring internal leadership fractures. These fissures have broader implications for Sikh cohesion and global standing. The movement's association with has stigmatized the community, fostering distrust between Indian Sikhs—who benefit from via parties like the Akali Dal—and elements perceived as radicalized, thereby weakening unified advocacy on issues like riot accountability. It exacerbates India- tensions, as seen in recent diplomatic strains with over alleged militant safe havens, and invites external exploitation, including historical Pakistani support for insurgents to destabilize . Ultimately, the Khalistan pursuit fragments Sikh political influence, diverting focus from shared goals like management and toward an unattainable ethno-state, while reinforcing narratives of perpetual grievance over empirical progress in post-militancy .

References

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