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Animism
Animism
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Animism (from Latin: anima meaning 'breath, spirit, life')[1][2] is the belief that places, objects, and creatures all possess a distinct spiritual essence.[3][4][5][6] Animism perceives all things—animals, plants, rocks, rivers, weather systems, human handiwork, and in some cases words—as being animated, having agency and free will.[7] Animism is used in anthropology of religion as a term for the belief system of many indigenous peoples[8] in contrast to the relatively more recent development of organized religions.[9] Animism is a metaphysical belief which focuses on the supernatural universe: specifically, on the concept of the immaterial soul.[10]

Although each culture has its own mythologies and rituals, animism is said to describe the most common, foundational thread of indigenous peoples' "spiritual" or "supernatural" perspectives. The animistic perspective is so widely held and inherent to most indigenous peoples that they often do not even have a word in their languages that corresponds to "animism" (or even "religion").[11] The term "animism" is an anthropological construct.

Largely due to such ethnolinguistic and cultural discrepancies, opinions differ on whether animism refers to an ancestral mode of experience common to indigenous peoples around the world or to a full-fledged religion in its own right. The currently accepted definition of animism was developed only in the late 19th century (1871) by Edward Tylor. It is "one of anthropology's earliest concepts, if not the first".[12]

Animism encompasses beliefs that all material phenomena have agency, that there exists no categorical distinction between the spiritual and physical world, and that soul, spirit, or sentience exists not only in humans but also in other animals, plants, rocks, geographic features (such as mountains and rivers), and other entities of the natural environment. Examples include water sprites, vegetation deities, and tree spirits, among others. Animism may further attribute a life force to abstract concepts such as words, true names, or metaphors in mythology. Some members of the non-tribal world also consider themselves animists, such as author Daniel Quinn, sculptor Lawson Oyekan, and many neopagans.[13]

Etymology

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English anthropologist Sir Edward Tylor initially wanted to describe the phenomenon as spiritualism, but he realized that it would cause confusion with the modern religion of spiritualism, which was then prevalent across Western nations.[14] He adopted the term animism from the writings of German scientist Georg Ernst Stahl,[15] who had developed the term animismus in 1708 as a biological theory that souls formed the vital principle, and that the normal phenomena of life and the abnormal phenomena of disease could be traced to spiritual causes.[16]

The origin of the word comes from the Latin word anima, which means life or soul.[17]

The first known usage in English appeared in 1819.[18]

"Old animism" definitions

[edit]

Earlier anthropological perspectives, which have since been termed the old animism, were concerned with knowledge on what is alive and what factors make something alive.[19] The old animism assumed that animists were individuals who were unable to understand the difference between persons and things.[20] Critics of the old animism have accused it of preserving "colonialist and dualistic worldviews and rhetoric".[21]

Edward Tylor's definition

[edit]
Edward Tylor developed animism as an anthropological theory.

The idea of animism was developed by anthropologist Sir Edward Tylor through his 1871 book Primitive Culture,[1] in which he defined it as "the general doctrine of souls and other spiritual beings in general". According to Tylor, animism often includes "an idea of pervading life and will in nature;"[22] a belief that natural objects other than humans have souls. This formulation was little different from that proposed by Auguste Comte as "fetishism",[23] but the terms now have distinct meanings.

For Tylor, animism represented the earliest form of religion, being situated within an evolutionary framework of religion that has developed in stages and which will ultimately lead to humanity rejecting religion altogether in favor of scientific rationality.[24] Thus, for Tylor, animism was fundamentally seen as a mistake, a basic error from which all religions grew.[24] He did not believe that animism was inherently illogical, but he suggested that it arose from early humans' dreams and visions and thus was a rational system. However, it was based on erroneous, unscientific observations about the nature of reality.[25] Stringer notes that his reading of Primitive Culture led him to believe that Tylor was far more sympathetic in regard to "primitive" populations than many of his contemporaries and that Tylor expressed no belief that there was any difference between the intellectual capabilities of "savage" people and Westerners.[4]

The idea that there had once been "one universal form of primitive religion" (whether labelled animism, totemism, or shamanism) has been dismissed as "unsophisticated" and "erroneous" by archaeologist Timothy Insoll, who stated that "it removes complexity, a precondition of religion now, in all its variants."[26]

Social evolutionist conceptions

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Tylor's definition of animism was part of a growing international debate on the nature of "primitive society" by lawyers, theologians, and philologists. The debate defined the field of research of a new science: anthropology. By the end of the 19th century, an orthodoxy on "primitive society" had emerged, but few anthropologists still would accept that definition. The "19th-century armchair anthropologists" argued that "primitive society" (an evolutionary category) was ordered by kinship and divided into exogamous descent groups related by a series of marriage exchanges. Their religion was animism, the belief that natural species and objects had souls.

With the development of private property, the descent groups were displaced by the emergence of the territorial state. These rituals and beliefs eventually evolved over time into the vast array of "developed" religions. According to Tylor, as society became more scientifically advanced, fewer members of that society would believe in animism. However, any remnant ideologies of souls or spirits, to Tylor, represented "survivals" of the original animism of early humanity.[27]

The term ["animism"] clearly began as an expression of a nest of insulting approaches to indigenous peoples and the earliest putatively religious humans. It was and sometimes remains, a colonialist slur.

Confounding animism with totemism

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In 1869 (three years after Tylor proposed his definition of animism), Edinburgh lawyer John Ferguson McLennan, argued that the animistic thinking evident in fetishism gave rise to a religion he named totemism. Primitive people believed, he argued, that they were descended from the same species as their totemic animal.[23] Subsequent debate by the "armchair anthropologists" (including J. J. Bachofen, Émile Durkheim, and Sigmund Freud) remained focused on totemism rather than animism, with few directly challenging Tylor's definition. Anthropologists "have commonly avoided the issue of animism and even the term itself, rather than revisit this prevalent notion in light of their new and rich ethnographies."[29]

According to anthropologist Tim Ingold, animism shares similarities with totemism but differs in its focus on individual spirit beings which help to perpetuate life, whereas totemism more typically holds that there is a primary source, such as the land itself or the ancestors, who provide the basis to life. Certain indigenous religious groups such as the Aboriginal Australians are more typically totemic in their worldview, whereas others like the Inuit are more typically animistic.[30]

"New animism" definitions

[edit]

Many anthropologists ceased using the term animism, deeming it to be too close to early anthropological theory and religious polemic.[21] However, the term had also been claimed by religious groups—namely, Indigenous communities and nature worshippers—who felt that it aptly described their own beliefs, and who in some cases actively identified as "animists."[31] It was thus readopted by various scholars, who began using the term in a different way,[21] placing the focus on knowing how to behave toward other beings, some of whom are not human.[19] As religious studies scholar Graham Harvey stated, while the "old animist" definition had been problematic, the term animism was nevertheless "of considerable value as a critical, academic term for a style of religious and cultural relating to the world."[32]

Hallowell and the Ojibwe

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Five Ojibwe chiefs in the 19th century. It was anthropological studies of Ojibwe religion that resulted in the development of the "new animism".

The new animism emerged largely from the publications of anthropologist Irving Hallowell, produced on the basis of his ethnographic research among the Ojibwe communities of Canada in the mid-20th century.[33] For the Ojibwe encountered by Hallowell, personhood did not require human-likeness, but rather humans were perceived as being like other persons, who for instance included rock persons and bear persons.[34] For the Ojibwe, these persons were each willful beings, who gained meaning and power through their interactions with others; through respectfully interacting with other persons, they themselves learned to "act as a person".[34]

Hallowell's approach to the understanding of Ojibwe personhood differed strongly from prior anthropological concepts of animism.[35] He emphasized the need to challenge the modernist, Western perspectives of what a person is, by entering into a dialogue with different worldwide views.[34] Hallowell's approach influenced the work of anthropologist Nurit Bird-David, who produced a scholarly article reassessing the idea of animism in 1999.[36] Seven comments from other academics were provided in the journal, debating Bird-David's ideas.[37]

Postmodern anthropology

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More recently, postmodern anthropologists are increasingly engaging with the concept of animism. Modernism is characterized by a Cartesian subject-object dualism that divides the subjective from the objective, and culture from nature. In the modernist view, animism is the inverse of scientism, and hence, is deemed inherently invalid by some anthropologists. Drawing on the work of Bruno Latour, some anthropologists question modernist assumptions and theorize that all societies continue to "animate" the world around them. In contrast to Tylor's reasoning, however, this "animism" is considered to be more than just a remnant of primitive thought. More specifically, the "animism" of modernity is characterized by humanity's "professional subcultures", as in the ability to treat the world as a detached entity within a delimited sphere of activity.

Human beings continue to create personal relationships with elements of the aforementioned objective world, such as pets, cars, or teddy bears, which are recognized as subjects. As such, these entities are "approached as communicative subjects rather than the inert objects perceived by modernists."[38] These approaches aim to avoid the modernist assumption that the environment consists of a physical world distinct from the world of humans, as well as the modernist conception of the person being composed dualistically of a body and a soul.[29]

Nurit Bird-David argues that:[29]

Positivistic ideas about the meaning of 'nature', 'life', and 'personhood' misdirected these previous attempts to understand the local concepts. Classical theoreticians (it is argued) attributed their own modernist ideas of self to 'primitive peoples' while asserting that the 'primitive peoples' read their idea of self into others!

She explains that animism is a "relational epistemology" rather than a failure of primitive reasoning. That is, self-identity among animists is based on their relationships with others, rather than any distinctive features of the "self". Instead of focusing on the essentialized, modernist self (the "individual"), persons are viewed as bundles of social relationships ("dividuals"), some of which include "superpersons" (i.e. non-humans).

Animist altar, Bozo village, Mopti, Bandiagara, Mali, in 1972

Stewart Guthrie expressed criticism of Bird-David's attitude towards animism, believing that it promulgated the view that "the world is in large measure whatever our local imagination makes it." This, he felt, would result in anthropology abandoning "the scientific project."[39]

Like Bird-David, Tim Ingold argues that animists do not see themselves as separate from their environment:[40]

Hunter-gatherers do not, as a rule, approach their environment as an external world of nature that has to be 'grasped' intellectually ... indeed the separation of mind and nature has no place in their thought and practice.

Rane Willerslev extends the argument by noting that animists reject this Cartesian dualism and that the animist self identifies with the world, "feeling at once within and apart from it so that the two glide ceaselessly in and out of each other in a sealed circuit".[41] The animist hunter is thus aware of himself as a human hunter, but, through mimicry, is able to assume the viewpoint, senses, and sensibilities of his prey, to be one with it.[42] Shamanism, in this view, is an everyday attempt to influence spirits of ancestors and animals, by mirroring their behaviors, as the hunter does its prey.

Ethical and ecological understanding

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Cultural ecologist and philosopher David Abram proposed an ethical and ecological understanding of animism, grounded in the phenomenology of sensory experience. In his books The Spell of the Sensuous and Becoming Animal, Abram suggests that material things are never entirely passive in our direct perceptual experience, holding rather that perceived things actively "solicit our attention" or "call our focus", coaxing the perceiving body into an ongoing participation with those things.[43][44]

In the absence of intervening technologies, he suggests that sensory experience is inherently animistic in that it discloses a material field that is animate and self-organizing from the beginning. David Abram used contemporary cognitive and natural science, as well as the perspectival worldviews of diverse indigenous oral cultures, to propose a richly pluralist and story-based cosmology in which matter is alive. He suggested that such a relational ontology is in close accord with humanity's spontaneous perceptual experience by drawing attention to the senses, and to the primacy of sensuous terrain, enjoining a more respectful and ethical relation to the more-than-human community of animals, plants, soils, mountains, waters, and weather-patterns that materially sustains humanity.[43][44]

In contrast to a long-standing tendency in the Western social sciences, which commonly provide rational explanations of animistic experience, Abram develops an animistic account of reason itself. He holds that civilised reason is sustained only by intensely animistic participation between human beings and their own written signs. For instance, as soon as someone reads letters on a page or screen, they can "see what it says"—the letters speak as much as nature spoke to pre-literate peoples. Reading can usefully be understood as an intensely concentrated form of animism, one that effectively eclipses all of the other, older, more spontaneous forms of animistic participation in which humans were once engaged.

To tell the story in this manner—to provide an animistic account of reason, rather than the other way around—is to imply that animism is the wider and more inclusive term and that oral, mimetic modes of experience still underlie, and support, all our literate and technological modes of reflection. When reflection's rootedness in such bodily, participatory modes of experience is entirely unacknowledged or unconscious, reflective reason becomes dysfunctional, unintentionally destroying the corporeal, sensuous world that sustains it.[45]

Relation to the concept of 'I-thou'

[edit]

Religious studies scholar Graham Harvey defined animism as the belief "that the world is full of persons, only some of whom are human, and that life is always lived in relationship with others."[19] He added that it is therefore "concerned with learning how to be a good person in respectful relationships with other persons."[19]

In his Handbook of Contemporary Animism (2013), Harvey identifies the animist perspective in line with Martin Buber's "I-thou" as opposed to "I-it". In such, Harvey says, the animist takes an I-thou approach to relating to the world, whereby objects and animals are treated as a "thou", rather than as an "it".[46]

Religion

[edit]
A tableau presenting figures of various cultures filling in mediator-like roles, often being termed as "shaman" in the literature

There is ongoing disagreement (and no general consensus) as to whether animism is merely a singular, broadly encompassing religious belief[47] or a worldview in and of itself, comprising many diverse mythologies found worldwide in many diverse cultures.[48][49] This also raises a controversy regarding the ethical claims animism may or may not make: whether animism ignores questions of ethics altogether;[50] or, by endowing various non-human elements of nature with spirituality or personhood,[51] it in fact promotes a complex ecological ethics.[52]

In his 1992 book entitled Columbus and Other Cannibals, American historian Jack D. Forbes wrote that the animism of native and folk religious beliefs of Africa, Asia and the Americas was synonymous with "life-ism", and that "perhaps that is what we need, 'lifeism', more respect for life, more respect for the living, more respect for all forms of life."[53] In the 2012 book The Routledge Companion to Religion and Science it is noted that "the European tradition of referring to Native world-views as forms of animism is quite correct, if understood non-reductively, since the term "animism" can literally be understood as "life-ism."[54]

Concepts

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Distinction from pantheism

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Animism is not the same as pantheism, although the two are sometimes confused. Moreover, some religions are both pantheistic and animistic. One of the main differences is that while animists believe everything to be spiritual in nature, they do not necessarily see the spiritual nature of everything in existence as being united (monism) the way pantheists do. As a result, animism puts more emphasis on the uniqueness of each individual soul. In pantheism, everything shares the same spiritual essence, rather than having distinct spirits or souls.[55][56] For example, Giordano Bruno equated the world soul with God and espoused a pantheistic animism.[57][58]

Fetishism / totemism

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In many animistic world views, the human being is often regarded as on a roughly equal footing with other animals, plants, and natural forces.[59]

African indigenous religions

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Traditional African religions: most religious traditions of Sub-Saharan Africa are basically a complex form of animism with polytheistic and shamanistic elements and ancestor worship.[60]

In West Africa, the Serer religious (A ƭat Roog) encompasses ancestor veneration (not worship) via the Pangool. The Pangool are the Serer ancestral spirits and interceders between the living and the Divine, Roog.[61][62]

In East Africa the Kerma culture display Animistic elements similar to other Traditional African religions. In contrast to the later polytheistic Napatan and Meroitic periods, the Kerma culture with displays of animals in Amulets and the esteemed antiques of Lions, appear to be an Animistic culture rather than a polytheistic culture. The Kermans likely treated Jebel Barkal as a special sacred site, and passed it on to the Kushites and Egyptians who venerated the mesa.[63]

In North Africa, the traditional Berber religion includes the traditional polytheistic, animist, and in some rare cases, shamanistic, religions of the Berber people.[citation needed]

Asian origin religions

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Ingrown sculpture of human head in a tree trunk in Laos

Indian-origin religions

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In the Indian-origin religions, namely Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism, the animistic aspects of nature worship and ecological conservation are part of the core belief system.

Matsya Purana, a Hindu text, has a Sanskrit language shloka (hymn), which explains the importance of reverence of ecology. It states: "A pond equals ten wells, a reservoir equals ten ponds, while a son equals ten reservoirs, and a tree equals ten sons."[64] Indian religions worship trees such as the Bodhi Tree and numerous superlative banyan trees, conserve the sacred groves of India, revere the rivers as sacred, and worship the mountains and their ecology.

Panchavati are the sacred trees in Indic religions, which are sacred groves containing five type of trees, usually chosen from among the Vata (Ficus benghalensis, Banyan), Ashvattha (Ficus religiosa, Peepal), Bilva (Aegle marmelos, Bengal Quince), Amalaki (Phyllanthus emblica, Indian Gooseberry, Amla), Ashoka (Saraca asoca, Ashok), Udumbara (Ficus racemosa, Cluster Fig, Gular), Nimba (Azadirachta indica, Neem) and Shami (Prosopis spicigera, Indian Mesquite).[65][66]

Thimmamma Marrimanu – the Great Banyan tree revered by the people of Indian-origin religions such as Hinduism (including Vedic, Shaivism, Dravidian Hinduism), Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism
During Vat Purnima festival, married women tie threads around a banyan tree in India.

The banyan is considered holy in several religious traditions of India. The Ficus benghalensis is the national tree of India.[67] Vat Purnima is a Hindu festival related to the banyan tree, and is observed by married women in North India and in the Western Indian states of Maharashtra, Goa, Gujarat.[68] For three days of the month of Jyeshtha in the Hindu calendar (which falls in May–June in the Gregorian calendar) married women observe a fast, tie threads around a banyan tree, and pray for the well-being of their husbands.[69] Thimmamma Marrimanu, sacred to Indian religions, has branches spread over five acres and was listed as the world's largest banyan tree in the Guinness World Records in 1989.[70][71]

In Hinduism, the leaf of the banyan tree is said to be the resting place for the god Krishna. In the Bhagavat Gita, Krishna said, "There is a banyan tree which has its roots upward and its branches down, and the Vedic hymns are its leaves. One who knows this tree is the knower of the Vedas." (Bg 15.1)

In Buddhism's Pali canon, the banyan (Pali: nigrodha)[72] is referenced numerous times.[73] Typical metaphors allude to the banyan's epiphytic nature, likening the banyan's supplanting of a host tree as comparable to the way sensual desire (kāma) overcomes humans.[74]

Mun (also known as Munism or Bongthingism) is the traditional polytheistic, animist, shamanistic, and syncretic religion of the Lepcha people.[75][76][77]

Sanamahism is an ethnic religion of the Meitei people of Kangleipak (Meitei for 'Manipur') in Northeast India. It is a polytheistic and animist religion and is named after Lainingthou Sanamahi, one of the most important deities of the Meitei faith.[78][79][80]

Chinese religions

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Shendao (Chinese: 神道; pinyin: shéndào; lit. 'the Way of the Gods') is a term originated by Chinese folk religions influenced by, Mohist, Confucian and Taoist philosophy, referring to the divine order of nature or the Wuxing.

The Shang dynasty's state religion was practiced from 1600 BCE to 1046 BCE, and was built on the idea of spiritualizing natural phenomena.

Japan and Shinto

[edit]

Shinto is the traditional Japanese folk religion and has many animist aspects. The kami (), a class of supernatural beings, are central to Shinto. All things, including natural forces and well-known geographical locations, are thought to be home to the kami. The kami are worshipped at kamidana household shrines, family shrines, and jinja public shrines.

The Ryukyuan religion of the Ryukyu Islands is distinct from Shinto, but shares similar characteristics.

Kalash people

[edit]

Kalash people of Northern Pakistan follow an ancient animistic religion identified with an ancient form of Hinduism.[81]

The Kalash (Kalasha: کالؕاشؕا, romanised: Kaḷaṣa, Devanagari: कळष), or Kalasha, are an Indo-Aryan[82] indigenous people residing in the Chitral District of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan.

They are considered unique among the people of Pakistan.[83][84][85] They are also considered to be Pakistan's smallest ethnoreligious group,[86] and traditionally practice what authors characterise as a form of animism.[87][88][89][a][90][b] During the mid-20th century an attempt was made to force a few Kalasha villages in Pakistan to convert to Islam, but the people fought the conversion and, once official pressure was removed, the vast majority resumed the practice of their own religion.[84] Nevertheless, some Kalasha have since converted to Islam, despite being shunned afterward by their community for having done so.[91]

The term is used to refer to many distinct people including the Väi, the Čima-nišei, the Vântä, plus the Ashkun- and Tregami-speakers.[84] The Kalash are considered to be an indigenous people of Asia, with their ancestors migrating to Chitral Valley from another location possibly further south,[83][92] which the Kalash call "Tsiyam" in their folk songs and epics.[93]

They claim to descend from the armies of Alexander who were left behind from his armed campaign, though no evidence exists for him to have passed the area.[94][95]

The neighbouring Nuristani people of the adjacent Nuristan (historically known as Kafiristan) province of Afghanistan once had the same culture and practised a faith very similar to that of the Kalash, differing in a few minor particulars.[96][97]

The first historically recorded Islamic invasions of their lands were by the Ghaznavids in the 11th century[98] while they themselves are first attested in 1339 during Timur's invasions.[99] Nuristan had been forcibly converted to Islam in 1895–96, although some evidence has shown the people continued to practice their customs.[100] The Kalash of Chitral have maintained their own separate cultural traditions.[101]

Korea

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Muism, the native Korean belief, has many animist aspects.[102] The various deities, called kwisin, are capable of interacting with humans and causing problems if they are not honoured appropriately.

A 1922 photograph of an Itneg priestess in the Philippines making an offering to an apdel, a guardian anito spirit of her village that reside in the water-worn stones known as pinaing[103]

Philippines indigenous religions

[edit]

In the indigenous Philippine folk religions, pre-colonial religions of Philippines and Philippine mythology, animism is part of their core beliefs as demonstrated by the belief in Anito, Diwata and Bathala as well as their conservation and veneration of sacred Indigenous Philippine shrines, forests, mountains and sacred grounds.[104][105][106] In ancient Philippine animism, Diwata or Diwatas in plural is a broad, gender-neutral term for supernatural beings, including gods, goddesses, fairies, nature spirits, and celestial entities. Rooted in Hindu-Buddhist influences, the word originally meant "celestial being" or "descent" in Sanskrit word devata (deity).[107][108] In modern Filipino culture, Diwata is often interpreted and linked to fairies, muses, nymphs, or even dryads.[109][110][111]

Anito are the wooden statues and ancestor spirits in the various indigenous shamanistic folk religions of the Philippines, led by female or feminized male shamans known as babaylan. It includes belief in a spirit world existing alongside and interacting with the material world, as well as the belief that everything has a spirit, from rocks and trees to animals and humans to natural phenomena.[112][113]

In indigenous Filipino belief, the Bathala is the omnipotent deity which was derived from Sanskrit word for the Hindu supreme deity bhattara,[114][115] as one of the ten avatars of the Hindu god Vishnu.[116][117] The omnipotent Bathala also presides over the spirits of ancestors called Anito.[118][119][120][121] Anitos serve as intermediaries between mortals and the divine, such as Agni (Hindu) who holds the access to divine realms; for this reason they are invoked first and are the first to receive offerings, regardless of the deity the worshipper wants to pray to.[122][123]

Abrahamic religions

[edit]

Animism also has influences in Abrahamic religions.

The Old Testament and the Wisdom literature preach the omnipresence of God (Jeremiah 23:24; Proverbs 15:3; 1 Kings 8:27), and God is bodily present in the incarnation of his Son, Jesus Christ. (Gospel of John 1:14, Colossians 2:9).[124] Animism is not peripheral to Christian identity but is its nurturing home ground, its axis mundi. In addition to the conceptual work the term animism performs, it provides insight into the relational character and common personhood of material existence.[3]

The Christian spiritual mapping movement is based upon a similar worldview to that of animism. It involves researching and mapping the spiritual and social history of an area in order to determine the demon (territorial spirit) controlling an area and preventing evangelism, so that the demon can be defeated through spiritual warfare prayer and rituals. Both posit that an invisible spirit world is active and that it can be interacted with or controlled, with the Christian belief that such power to control the spirit world comes from God rather than being inherent to objects or places. "The animist believes that rituals and objects contain spiritual power, whereas a Christian believes that rituals and objects may convey power. Animists seek to manipulate power, whereas Christians seek to submit to God and to learn to work with his power."[125]

With rising awareness of ecological preservation, recently theologians like Mark I. Wallace argue for animistic Christianity with a biocentric approach that understands God being present in all earthly objects, such as animals, trees, and rocks.[126]

Pre-Islamic Arab religion

[edit]

Pre-Islamic Arab religion can refer to the traditional polytheistic, animist, and in some rare cases, shamanistic, religions of the peoples of the Arabian Peninsula. The belief in jinn, invisible entities akin to spirits in the Western sense dominant in the Arab religious systems, hardly fit the description of Animism in a strict sense. The jinn are considered to be analogous to the human soul by living lives like that of humans, but they are not exactly like human souls neither are they spirits of the dead.[127]: 49  It is unclear if belief in jinn derived from nomadic or sedentary populations.[127]: 51 

Paganism

[edit]

Animism has been identified as a foundational element in the development of many ancient and modern pagan religious traditions. As one of the earliest spiritual worldviews, animism is characterized by the belief that elements of the natural world—including animals, plants, geographical features, and weather systems—possess spirit or agency. Scholars have noted that this perspective influenced the cosmologies of numerous pre-modern societies and contributed to the development of polytheistic and nature-based religious systems that are now categorized as Pagan traditions.

Ancient paganism with animist roots

[edit]

In various ancient cultures, such as those of the Celts, Norse, Greeks, Romans, and Slavs, religious beliefs often incorporated elements now associated with animism. Natural features were frequently regarded as sacred or inhabited by spiritual beings. Deities were often linked to specific rivers, trees, mountains, or celestial bodies. According to historian Ronald Hutton, nature in these contexts was not only revered but considered to be "alive and participatory" in religious life.[128]

While these societies developed organized pantheons and mythological systems, many retained a view of the natural world that reflected animistic thought. Practices such as offering rituals at springs, maintaining sacred groves, or acknowledging local land spirits illustrate the integration of animistic concepts within broader polytheistic frameworks.[129]

Continuity in folk religion

[edit]

Following the spread of monotheistic religions, especially Christianity, across much of Europe, many animistic and Pagan practices were suppressed or reinterpreted. Nevertheless, aspects of animistic belief persisted through folk religion, particularly in rural communities. Customs such as venerating household spirits, seasonal festivals tied to agricultural cycles, and the personification of natural phenomena continued in modified forms. For example, certain wells and springs that were originally associated with local deities came to be associated with Christian saints, suggesting a degree of continuity between animistic and Christian devotional practices.[130]

These continuities were often preserved through oral traditions, local rituals, and folk customs, contributing to the survival of animistic perspectives beyond their original religious contexts.

Revival and modern pagan movements

[edit]

The 19th and 20th centuries saw renewed interest in pre-Christian religions and folklore, influenced by Romanticism, antiquarian studies, and the emergence of national identities. This cultural movement laid the groundwork for contemporary Pagan traditions, such as Wicca, Druidry, and Heathenry, which often draw upon animistic concepts.[131]

Some scholars and practitioners of modern Paganism incorporate animism into their religious frameworks. Graham Harvey has noted that contemporary Pagan worldviews frequently emphasize relationality and agency within the natural world, viewing humans as part of a larger network of sentient beings.[130] In Wiccan and other Pagan rituals, for example, elements such as earth, air, fire, and water are invoked not only symbolically but as active, spiritually significant forces. This approach reflects an animistic orientation toward the environment.

Contemporary interpretations

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In recent decades, animism has been reimagined in both academic and spiritual circles. Rather than viewing it simply as a set of beliefs, many modern interpretations understand animism as a relational ontology—a way of being that centers on relationships and mutual respect between humans and non-human entities. This approach presents animism as a legitimate and coherent worldview, one that offers an alternative to Cartesian dualism and materialist perspectives by emphasizing connection over separation.

Emma Restall Orr, a British author and Druidic practitioner, has argued that animism provides a philosophical basis for environmental ethics and personal spirituality within contemporary Paganism.[132] Similarly, Sabina Magliocco has documented the presence of animistic themes in American Neo-Pagan practices, including rituals, festivals, and magical systems.[133]

Contemporary expressions of animism often align with ecological values, highlighting themes like sustainability, interdependence, and a deep respect for the natural world. Within this context, animism is no longer seen as outdated or primitive, but as a meaningful way for people to engage with both their environment and the spiritual forces they perceive within it. The New Age movement, for instance, often incorporates animistic elements, such as beliefs in nature spirits and energetic connections with the Earth.[134]

In recent years, animism has also found a place within emerging spiritual paths. Many neopagan groups—including Eco-pagans—identify as animists, expressing reverence for the web of life and the unseen presences they believe share the world and cosmos with humanity.[135]

Shamanism

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A shaman is a person regarded as having access to, and influence in, the world of benevolent and malevolent spirits, who typically enters into a trance state during a ritual, and practices divination and healing.[136]

According to Mircea Eliade, shamanism encompasses the premise that shamans are intermediaries or messengers between the human world and the spirit worlds. Shamans are said to treat ailments and illnesses by mending the soul. Alleviating traumas affecting the soul or spirit restores the physical body of the individual to balance and wholeness. The shaman also enters supernatural realms or dimensions to obtain solutions to problems afflicting the community. Shamans may visit other worlds or dimensions to bring guidance to misguided souls and to ameliorate illnesses of the human soul caused by foreign elements. The shaman operates primarily within the spiritual world, which in turn affects the human world. The restoration of balance results in the elimination of the ailment.[137]

Abram, however, articulates a less supernatural and much more ecological understanding of the shaman's role than that propounded by Eliade. Drawing upon his own field research in Indonesia, Nepal, and the Americas, Abram suggests that in animistic cultures, the shaman functions primarily as an intermediary between the human community and the more-than-human community of active agencies—the local animals, plants, and landforms (mountains, rivers, forests, winds, and weather patterns, all of which are felt to have their own specific sentience). Hence, the shaman's ability to heal individual instances of disease (or imbalance) within the human community is a byproduct of their more continual practice of balancing the reciprocity between the human community and the wider collective of animate beings in which that community is embedded.[138]

Animist life

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Non-human animals

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Animism entails the belief that all living things have a soul, and thus, a central concern of animist thought surrounds how animals can be eaten, or otherwise used for humans' subsistence needs.[139] The actions of non-human animals are viewed as "intentional, planned and purposive",[140] and they are understood to be persons, as they are both alive, and communicate with others.[141]

In animist worldviews, non-human animals are understood to participate in kinship systems and ceremonies with humans, as well as having their own kinship systems and ceremonies.[142] Graham Harvey cited an example of an animist understanding of animal behavior that occurred at a powwow held by the Conne River Mi'kmaq in 1996; an eagle flew over the proceedings, circling over the central drum group. The assembled participants called out kitpu ('eagle'), conveying welcome to the bird and expressing pleasure at its beauty, and they later articulated the view that the eagle's actions reflected its approval of the event, and the Mi'kmaq's return to traditional spiritual practices.[143]

In animism, rituals are performed to maintain relationships between humans and spirits. Indigenous peoples often perform these rituals to appease the spirits and request their assistance during activities such as hunting and healing. In the Arctic region, certain rituals are common before the hunt as a means to show respect for the spirits of animals.[144]

Flora

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Some animists also view plant and fungi life as persons and interact with them accordingly.[145] The most common encounter between humans and these plant and fungi persons is with the former's collection of the latter for food, and for animists, this interaction typically has to be carried out respectfully.[146] Harvey cited the example of Māori communities in New Zealand, who often offer karakia invocations to sweet potatoes as they dig up the latter. While doing so, there is an awareness of a kinship relationship between the Māori and the sweet potatoes, with both understood as having arrived in Aotearoa together in the same canoes.[146]

In other instances, animists believe that interaction with plant and fungi persons can result in the communication of things unknown or even otherwise unknowable.[145] Among some modern Pagans, for instance, relationships are cultivated with specific trees, who are understood to bestow knowledge or physical gifts, such as flowers, sap, or wood that can be used as firewood or to fashion into a wand; in return, these Pagans give offerings to the tree itself, which can come in the form of libations of mead or ale, a drop of blood from a finger, or a strand of wool.[147]

The elements

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Various animistic cultures also comprehend stones as persons.[148] Discussing ethnographic work conducted among the Ojibwe, Harvey noted that their society generally conceived of stones as being inanimate, but with two notable exceptions: the stones of the Bell Rocks and those stones which are situated beneath trees struck by lightning, which were understood to have become Thunderers themselves.[149] The Ojibwe conceived of weather as being capable of having personhood, with storms being conceived of as persons known as 'Thunderers' whose sounds conveyed communications and who engaged in seasonal conflict over the lakes and forests, throwing lightning at lake monsters.[149] Wind, similarly, can be conceived as a person in animistic thought.[150]

The importance of place is also a recurring element of animism, with some places being understood to be persons in their own right.[151]

Spirits

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Animism can also entail relationships being established with non-corporeal spirit entities.[152]

Other usage

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Psychology

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From his studies into child development, Jean Piaget suggested that children were born with an innate animist worldview in which they anthropomorphized inanimate objects and that it was only later that they grew out of this belief.[153] Conversely, from her ethnographic research, Margaret Mead argued the opposite, believing that children were not born with an animist worldview but that they became acculturated to such beliefs as they were educated by their society.[153]

Stewart Guthrie saw animism—or "attribution" as he preferred it—as an evolutionary strategy to aid survival. He argued that both humans and other animal species view inanimate objects as potentially alive as a means of being constantly on guard against potential threats.[154] His suggested explanation, however, did not deal with the question of why such a belief became central to the religion.[155] In 2000, Guthrie suggested that the "most widespread" concept of animism was that it was the "attribution of spirits to natural phenomena such as stones and trees."[156]

Attempts to reconcile with science

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In the early 20th century, William McDougall defended a form of animism in his book Body and Mind: A History and Defence of Animism (1911).

Physicist Nick Herbert has argued for "quantum animism" in which the mind permeates the world at every level:

The quantum consciousness assumption, which amounts to a kind of "quantum animism" likewise asserts that consciousness is an integral part of the physical world, not an emergent property of special biological or computational systems. Since everything in the world is on some level a quantum system, this assumption requires that everything be conscious on that level. If the world is truly quantum animated, then there is an immense amount of invisible inner experience going on all around us that is presently inaccessible to humans, because our own inner lives are imprisoned inside a small quantum system, isolated deep in the meat of an animal brain.[157]

Werner Krieglstein wrote regarding his quantum Animism:

Herbert's quantum Animism differs from traditional Animism in that it avoids assuming a dualistic model of mind and matter. Traditional dualism assumes that some kind of spirit inhabits a body and makes it move, a ghost in the machine. Herbert's quantum Animism presents the idea that every natural system has an inner life, a conscious center, from which it directs and observes its action.[158]

In Error and Loss: A Licence to Enchantment,[159] Ashley Curtis (2018) has argued that the Cartesian idea of an experiencing subject facing off with an inert physical world is incoherent at its very foundation and that this incoherence is consistent with rather than belied by Darwinism. Human reason (and its rigorous extension in the natural sciences) fits an evolutionary niche just as echolocation does for bats and infrared vision does for pit vipers, and is epistemologically on a par with, rather than superior to, such capabilities. The meaning or aliveness of the "objects" we encounter, rocks, trees, rivers, and other animals, thus depends for its validity not on a detached cognitive judgment, but purely on the quality of our experience. The animist experience, or the wolf's or raven's experience, thus become licensed as equally valid worldviews to the modern western scientific one; they are indeed more valid, since they are not plagued with the incoherence that inevitably arises when "objective existence" is separated from "subjective experience."

Socio-political impact

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Harvey opined that animism's views on personhood represented a radical challenge to the dominant perspectives of modernity, because it accords "intelligence, rationality, consciousness, volition, agency, intentionality, language, and desire" to non-humans.[160] Similarly, it challenges the view of human uniqueness that is prevalent in both Abrahamic religions and Western rationalism.[161]

Art and literature

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Animist beliefs can also be expressed through artwork.[162] For instance, among the Māori communities of New Zealand, there is an acknowledgement that creating art through carving wood or stone entails violence against the wood or stone person and that the persons who are damaged therefore have to be placated and respected during the process; any excess or waste from the creation of the artwork is returned to the land, while the artwork itself is treated with particular respect.[163] Harvey, therefore, argued that the creation of art among the Māori was not about creating an inanimate object for display, but rather a transformation of different persons within a relationship.[164]

Harvey expressed the view that animist worldviews were present in various works of literature, citing such examples as the writings of Alan Garner, Leslie Silko, Barbara Kingsolver, Alice Walker, Daniel Quinn, Linda Hogan, David Abram, Patricia Grace, Chinua Achebe, Ursula Le Guin, Louise Erdrich, and Marge Piercy.[165]

Animist worldviews have also been identified in the animated films of Hayao Miyazaki.[166][167][168][169]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Animism is a system attributing spiritual essences, agency, or to non-human entities including animals, plants, natural phenomena, and inanimate objects, often viewing the world as permeated by intentional forces akin to human minds. The concept was formalized by anthropologist in his 1871 book Primitive Culture, defining animism as "the in spiritual beings" and proposing it as the origin of through the extension of soul concepts from humans to natural elements. Tylor's evolutionary framework portrayed animism as a rudimentary stage supplanted by higher s, a view rooted in 19th-century comparative data from indigenous societies but critiqued for imposing unilinear progress on diverse cosmologies. In empirical observations of and indigenous groups, animism manifests as ascriptions of to environmental features, fostering practices like offerings to spirits in rocks or trees to ensure reciprocity and ecological balance. Modern anthropological perspectives, diverging from Tylor's , reconceptualize animism as relational ontologies where non-humans share interiorities or perspectives with humans, as in Philippe Descola's typology of animist worlds emphasizing shared subjectivity across beings, or Eduardo Viveiros de Castro's highlighting species-specific viewpoints in Amazonian cultures. These frameworks, drawn from ethnographic fieldwork, underscore animism's role in causal understandings of events through spirit interactions rather than mechanistic isolation, challenging Western dualisms of and culture. Defining characteristics include shamanic with spirits, of environmental agents, and a integrating via unseen influences, prevalent in traditions from Siberian Tungus to Native American tribes. Controversies persist over whether animism constitutes a universal cognitive predisposition or culturally specific response to ecological interdependence, with some suggesting limited to small-scale societies.

Conceptual Foundations

Etymology and Terminology

The term animism originates from the Latin anima, meaning "breath," "soul," or "life," reflecting the concept of a vital force or spiritual essence attributed to objects and phenomena. This etymological root traces back to the Proto-Indo-European h₂en-, denoting "to breathe" or "to blow," underscoring an ancient association between breath and animate existence. In its modern anthropological context, animism was coined by Edward Burnett Tylor in his 1871 publication Primitive Culture, where he defined it as "a belief in spiritual beings" constituting the foundation of religion, extending to the idea that non-human entities possess souls akin to human ones. Tylor adapted the term from earlier philosophical usage by Georg Ernst Stahl, a 17th-18th century German chemist who employed Animismus around 1708 to describe a vitalistic principle animating organic bodies, contrasting mechanistic physiology by positing an immaterial soul as the cause of life processes. Terminologically, animism has been distinguished from related concepts such as , which posits inherent life in all matter without discrete spirits, and , emphasizing a non-material life force but not necessarily individualized souls. Tylor's formulation emphasized empirical attribution of agency to natural elements through dreams, visions, and death experiences, leading to pervasive soul beliefs, whereas Stahl's usage was confined to biological . Contemporary terminology often broadens animism to include relational ontologies where non-humans are treated as persons with , though this diverges from Tylor's original soul-centric .

Classical Definitions

The term animism entered anthropological discourse primarily through 's Primitive Culture (1871), where he defined it as "the belief in spiritual beings" constituting the minimal essence of . Tylor argued this belief originated from early humans' observations of dreams, trances, shadows, and , leading to the inference that a separable or spirit animates living beings and persists beyond , extending such agency to inanimate objects and natural forces to explain phenomena like storms or plant growth. He positioned animism as the primordial stage of religious evolution, preceding and , based on comparative analysis of global ethnographic reports from missionaries and explorers documenting indigenous practices. Tylor's emphasized two core tenets: the attribution of to humans (anthropopsychism) and the extension of similar spiritual essences to animals, , and objects (physicopsychism), distinguishing it from mere by requiring intentional spiritual agency rather than arbitrary magical potency. This definition drew on empirical data from non-Western societies, such as Australian Aboriginal accounts of dreamtime spirits or African tribal rituals invoking ancestral shades, which Tylor interpreted as evidence of universal cognitive origins in rudimentary philosophy. Critics within later noted Tylor's reliance on second-hand traveler accounts prone to cultural misinterpretation, yet his framework endured as the benchmark for classical animism until mid-20th-century revisions. Pre-Tylorian usages of "animism" appeared sporadically, such as in 18th-century vitalist philosophy by , who applied it to a life-force animating , but lacked the religious or ethnographic scope Tylor provided. In , earlier thinkers like in The Natural History of Religion (1757) described primitive polydaemonism—belief in myriad minor deities influencing nature—as akin to animistic attribution, though without formalizing the term. These antecedents informed Tylor's synthesis, grounding animism in from observable human psychology rather than theological .

Contemporary Reinterpretations

In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, anthropologists reconceptualized animism away from Tylor's 19th-century framework of belief in pervasive spirits toward relational ontologies emphasizing and interaction across human and non-human entities. Nurit Bird-David's 1999 analysis of Nayaka foragers in portrayed animism as a "relational ," where the environment comprises "giving persons" known through ongoing relatedness rather than imputed souls or agency. This view posits that emerges from practical engagements, such as or gathering, rather than doctrinal assertions about hidden essences. Graham Harvey advanced this in his 2005 book Animism: Respecting the Living World, defining new animism as the practice of recognizing diverse persons in the world—trees, animals, rivers—and cultivating reciprocal relationships through attention, offerings, and ethical conduct. Drawing on ethnographic accounts from Native American, Maori, and Aboriginal Australian contexts, Harvey emphasized behavioral respect over cognitive belief, arguing that animists navigate life via "if this, then that" attuned to others' responses. This reinterpretation critiques anthropocentric , framing animism as a of mutual dependence observable in rituals like eco-pagan offerings or indigenous land stewardship. Philippe Descola's ontological , outlined in Beyond Nature and Culture (originally 2005, English 2013), classifies animism as a schema where non-humans share humans' interiority (intentions, emotions) despite differing physical forms, prevalent among Amazonian and Melanesian groups. Descola's model contrasts this with naturalism's physical continuity but psychic discontinuity, using cross-cultural data to dismantle the universal nature/culture binary and highlight how animist schemas sustain social continuity with the environment. Eduardo Kohn's 2013 How Forests Think, based on four years among Ecuador's Runa, extends this by applying Peircean : forests "think" through signs interpreted across , as when animals deceive or reveal via tracks and scents, enabling an "beyond the ." Kohn's approach, grounded in Amazonian practices like shamanic interpretation of animal signs, underscores causal chains of representation where non-humans influence human action without reducing to metaphor. These reinterpretations intersect with ecological philosophy, where animism informs critiques of extractive by stressing interconnected agency; for example, scholars link it to that treat ecosystems as responsive networks, countering reductionist with empirically observed indigenous adaptations to habitat variability. However, critics note a potential double-bind: new animism challenges modernist binaries yet relies on them for contrast, risking projection of Western ecological anxieties onto ethnographic data without fully reckoning with materialist explanations for observed behaviors. Despite such tensions, the framework has influenced fields like and conservation, promoting policies that incorporate local relational knowledge, as in participatory projects documented since the . Animism differs from in its attribution of distinct, individualized spiritual essences or souls to specific entities such as , , rocks, and natural phenomena, rather than viewing the universe as a singular, undifferentiated divine substance or energy. In , all existence shares an identical spiritual essence without separate personalities or agencies, emphasizing unity over multiplicity of spirits. This distinction underscores animism's relational , where entities possess unique capacities for interaction, reciprocity, and influence, as opposed to 's holistic, impersonal . Unlike , which centers on a structured pantheon of anthropomorphic deities with defined hierarchies, domains, and human-like narratives—often involving creation myths and moral codes—animism lacks such centralized gods and instead distributes spiritual agency across myriad non-hierarchical entities inherent in the natural world. Polytheistic systems typically feature temples, priesthoods, and rituals directed at specific high gods or intermediaries, whereas animistic practices involve direct, localized engagements with spirits of locales, objects, or beings without formalized . For instance, while polytheism may personify natural forces as named deities like controlling thunder, animism attributes intrinsic vitality to the forces themselves, independent of overarching divine narratives. Animism is broader than totemism, which specifically involves beliefs in spiritual ties between human clans and particular , , or natural symbols serving as totems, often representing ancestral guardians or group identities within a . Totemism functions as a subset or cultural expression of animistic principles, focusing on emblematic relationships and taboos rather than the universal imputation of spirits to all matter; animism extends agency to non-totemic elements without requiring clan-based symbolism. Scholarly analyses note totemism's emphasis on social cohesion through observance of totems, contrasting with animism's pervasive, non-exclusive spiritual animation of the environment. Shamanism represents a practitioner-mediated interaction with the spirit world, often presupposing animistic beliefs but defined by techniques such as , soul-flight, or rituals performed by shamans as intermediaries. While animism constitutes the foundational worldview of spirits inhabiting and influencing the material realm, shamanism is an operational system for navigating that realm, not equivalent to the belief itself; not all animistic societies feature shamans, and shamanic practices can occur in non-animistic contexts. This separation highlights animism as an ontological stance—positing spiritual presence in —versus shamanism's epistemological and practical methods for spirit communication. Animism also contrasts with panpsychism, a philosophical position asserting that or mind-like properties are fundamental and ubiquitous in all matter, from particles to organisms, without invoking spirits or relational . Panpsychism, rooted in Western metaphysics (e.g., as articulated by thinkers like in the ), seeks to resolve the through proto-mental attributes inherent in physics, lacking animism's emphasis on interactive, often personalized spiritual agencies responsive to human actions. Empirical studies in differentiate animism's culturally embedded attributions of and vitality—evident in societies since at least 40,000 BCE—from panpsychism's abstract, non-spiritual .

Historical Origins and Development

Pre-Modern Cognitive Roots

The cognitive foundations of animism lie in evolved human predispositions to detect agency in ambiguous environmental stimuli, a trait that conferred survival advantages in pre-modern ancestral environments. Early humans, navigating Pleistocene landscapes fraught with predators and unseen threats, benefited from a favoring false positives in agency attribution over false negatives, as mistaking a predator for an inert object could prove fatal while the reverse error incurred minimal cost. This mechanism, termed the hyperactive agency detection device (HADD), operates as an innate module prompting the inference of intentional agents behind natural phenomena, such as rustling leaves or sudden winds, thereby fostering perceptions of spirits or animate forces indwelling non-human entities. Phylogenetic analyses of 33 societies, representing diverse global lineages, indicate animism as the most ancient religious trait, with a proportional likelihood of 0.99 (p < 0.05) that it characterized the last common ancestor of these groups, predating beliefs in or . Such universality underscores animism's emergence from core cognitive capacities like —originally adapted for social inference among conspecifics—extended heuristically to the broader environment, enabling early humans to interpret ecological patterns through . This predisposition aligns with anthropomorphic projections, where human-like qualities are ascribed to animals, plants, and landscapes, as articulated by anthropologist , who argued that "it is better for a hiker to perceive a as a than to mistake a for a ." Developmental psychology further evidences these roots, with children under seven frequently exhibiting animistic reasoning by attributing or to inanimate objects, a pattern that diminishes with accumulated empirical experience but reflects default cognitive settings retained from pre-modern . In pre-literate societies, this integrated with practical and predation avoidance, yielding adaptive behaviors like rituals to appease perceived natural agents, without necessitating cultural transmission beyond intuitive . Critiques of HADD emphasize its lack of direct neurophysiological proof, yet ethnographic data and evolutionary modeling consistently support its role in animism's persistence across isolated indigenous groups until recent centuries.

19th-Century Anthropological Formulations

In 1871, British anthropologist published Primitive Culture, in which he coined the term "animism" to characterize the earliest stage of religious belief among so-called primitive societies. Tylor defined animism as "the belief in spiritual beings," arguing that it represented the minimal and originated from prehistoric humans' rudimentary explanations for phenomena such as dreams, , shadows, and reflections. He proposed that individuals inferred the existence of a soul or anima—a subtle, breath-like essence separable from the body—through on and visions, extending this notion to attribute similar spirits to animals, , natural forces, and inanimate objects. Tylor's evolutionary framework positioned animism as the foundational "low" culture from which and developed through intellectual progression, supported by comparative evidence from global ethnographies, missionary reports, and ancient texts. He contended that savages universally ascribed agency and to non-human entities, viewing the world as populated by myriad spirits requiring or manipulation, a view he substantiated with examples like Native American beliefs and African fetishism. This formulation, derived largely from secondary sources rather than fieldwork, emphasized animism's rationality as a survival of prehistoric rather than mere . While Tylor's theory dominated 19th-century anthropology, contemporaries like incorporated similar ideas into their own evolutionary schemes, suggesting ancestor worship as a key mechanism for animistic beliefs in personalized spirits. Spencer's 1876 Principles of Sociology paralleled Tylor by tracing to ancestor veneration, where deceased kin's souls were imagined persisting and influencing the living, gradually populating nature with spiritual entities. These armchair formulations reflected the era's unilinear evolutionary paradigm, prioritizing cross-cultural patterns over contextual variability and often interpreting indigenous practices through a lens of progressive human development.

20th-Century Shifts and Critiques

In the early , anthropologists associated with functionalism and structural-functionalism, such as and A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, critiqued Edward Tylor's 19th-century formulation of animism as an intellectualist error theory rooted in primitive reasoning. They argued that Tylor's model overemphasized cognitive beliefs in souls and spirits as explanatory for natural phenomena, neglecting the social functions of such practices in maintaining group cohesion and order. Malinowski's fieldwork among the Trobriand Islanders, documented in the 1920s, portrayed and attributions as pragmatic responses to uncertainty rather than speculative , undermining animism's status as a foundational "stage" in religious . Evans-Pritchard's 1965 work Theories of Primitive Religion further dismantled Tylor's by asserting that non-Western peoples do not engage in the abstract, error-prone theorizing Tylor imputed to them; instead, their cosmologies reflect experiential and moral frameworks inseparable from daily life. He contended that animistic attributions arise from lived interactions rather than deductive logic akin to European , challenging the evolutionary unilinearism that positioned animism as inferior. , in structuralist analyses from the onward, shifted focus from soul-beliefs to mythic structures and binary oppositions (e.g., nature/), viewing animism not as a distinct but as embedded in cognitive universals of classification, thus diluting its explanatory primacy. Mid-century ethnographies, such as Irving Hallowell's 1960 study of Ojibwa ontology, began reconceptualizing animism through the lens of "other-than-human persons," emphasizing relational personhood extended to animals and landscapes based on observed agency rather than imputed souls. This laid groundwork for late-20th-century "new animism," articulated by Nurit Bird-David in her 1999 article "'Animism' Revisited," which reframed animism as a relational epistemology where non-human entities are treated as persons-in-relationship, divesting it of Tylor's supernaturalist baggage. Bird-David critiqued prior models for projecting individualistic Western ontologies onto hunter-gatherer societies, arguing instead that animistic perception derives from participatory engagement, as evidenced in Nayaka foraging practices where animals reveal themselves as kin through sharing and reciprocity. Philippe Descola's ontological , developed in works like In the of (1994), distinguished animism as one of four modes of identification (alongside naturalism, totemism, and analogism), wherein non-humans share human-like interiority but differ in physicality, supported by Amazonian ethnographic showing continuity between human and animal perspectives. This shift portrayed animism not as cognitive fallacy but as a viable challenging Western nature/ dualism, though critics like David Chidester noted risks of romanticizing indigenous systems amid decolonial rhetoric. Overall, these developments marked animism's transition from a deprecated "primitive" relic to a lens for critiquing anthropocentric , with empirical grounding in fieldwork revealing patterned variations in agency attribution.

Manifestations Across Cultures

In Indigenous and Tribal Societies

In many indigenous and tribal societies, animism manifests as the attribution of spiritual essences or agency to non-human elements such as animals, plants, rivers, and rocks, influencing daily interactions, rituals, and social structures. This worldview often integrates ancestor veneration and nature spirits, where physical and spiritual realms interconnect causally through offerings and ceremonies to maintain harmony or avert misfortune. Empirical observations from ethnographic studies document these practices persisting among groups like the Dogon in , who engage in rituals honoring souls in natural objects to ensure communal well-being. Among Native American tribes, such as those in the Southeast, animism involves recognizing spiritual essences in animals, , and landscapes, prompting practices like respectful hunting rituals to reciprocate with prey spirits and sustain balance. The , for instance, perceive the universe as alive with interconnected spirits, leading to ceremonies that invoke agency in natural phenomena for guidance or healing. These beliefs foster empirical adaptations, such as sustainable resource use tied to spiritual accountability, as evidenced in tribal narratives emphasizing moral . In Siberian indigenous groups, animism intertwines with , where shamans mediate between human communities and spirits inhabiting forests, animals, and celestial bodies through trance-induced rituals and sacrifices. Ethnographic accounts from the Evenki and Yakut detail concepts extending to life forces in prey animals, influencing taboos and post-kill offerings to prevent spiritual retaliation. Similarly, in Amazonian tribes like the Guajá, animistic ontologies order pet-keeping and avoidance of literal despite mythic narratives, reflecting causal beliefs in spirit-human relations. African tribal societies, including the Yoruba and various Bantu groups, exhibit animism through ubiquitous spirits in phenomena like trees and water bodies, with rituals such as libations or dances to appease them and ensure or . These practices, rooted in observed causal links between spiritual neglect and environmental disruptions, persist alongside monotheistic elements in some contexts, as reported in field studies from sub-Saharan regions.

In Major Religious Traditions

, the indigenous religion of , exemplifies animistic principles within a major East Asian tradition, positing that —supernatural spirits or essences—inhabit natural phenomena, objects, and ancestors, fostering rituals to maintain harmony with these entities. This belief system, dating back to prehistoric practices around 14,000–300 BCE in the Jomon period, attributes agency to mountains, rivers, trees, and animals, with over 80,000 shrines dedicated to specific as of 2023. Unlike monotheistic faiths, lacks a central scripture or founder, emphasizing experiential purity and seasonal festivals like matsuri to honor these pervasive spirits. In , animistic elements manifest in the veneration of natural features and deities residing within them, such as sacred rivers like the , considered embodiments of the goddess Ganga, or tulsi plants worshipped daily by over 1 billion adherents as manifestations of . Texts like the (c. 1500–1200 BCE) describe nature spirits (e.g., as storm deities) and rituals deifying elements, reflecting pre-Vedic animistic substrates integrated into Vedic . Tribal communities, comprising about 8.6% of India's 1.4 billion population per the 2011 census, retain explicit animism, often syncretized with Hindu pantheons, as seen in offerings to village deities or sacred groves (devrais). This persistence underscores causal links between ecological dependence and spirit attribution, though orthodox prioritizes abstract over localized animas. Taoism incorporates animistic motifs through the concept of as animating life force pervading all matter, with practices invoking nature spirits (shen) and immortals tied to landscapes, as in geomancy established by the (206 BCE–220 CE). Folk Taoism, practiced by millions in alongside , involves rituals for mountain gods and river dragons, echoing hylozoistic roots where matter is inherently vital. Similarly, popular in absorbs animism via guardian spirits (e.g., Japanese yokai or Chinese gui) and nature bodhisattvas, as in Japan's syncretic Shinto-Buddhist traditions where over 90% of funerals blend worship with Buddhist rites per 2020 surveys. African traditional religions, adhered to by approximately 100 million people across the continent as of 2020 estimates, form a core animistic framework emphasizing spirits (orishas, abosom) in ancestors, animals, and landscapes, with practices like Yoruba divination tracing to 500 BCE. These systems, influential in diaspora faiths like Vodou (affecting 60 million practitioners), coexist or syncretize with and —e.g., 45% of sub-Saharan Africans blend ancestral with per Pew Research 2010 data—yet official Abrahamic doctrines reject spirit indwelling in creation, viewing it as . In , animistic residues appear in folk customs, such as saint paralleling spirit mediation or talismans against , but doctrinal purity demands exclusive divine agency, as articulated in 112 (c. 610–632 CE) or Christian creeds like (451 CE).

In Folk and Pagan Practices

In traditional Slavic folk practices, were believed to be inhabited by the domovoi, a protective spirit associated with the or , tasked with safeguarding the family, , and property from harm. This entity, often depicted as a small, bearded old man, demanded respect through nightly offerings of food or ; neglect could result in mischief like lost tools or sick animals, while proper veneration ensured prosperity and warned of dangers via noises or apparitions. Similar animistic motifs appear in other Eastern European traditions, where female counterparts like the influenced domestic harmony, juxtaposed against the domovoi in a dualistic dynamic. These beliefs, rooted in pre-Christian agrarian life, persisted into the 19th and early 20th centuries in rural areas, blending with Orthodox Christianity through rituals like leaving bread for the spirit on feast days. In Germanic and Norse folk traditions, animism centered on , spirits embodying specific natural features such as mountains, rivers, or fields, which held sway over local prosperity and required offerings or avoidance of to prevent calamity. Historical accounts, including Icelandic sagas from the 13th century, describe these entities protesting intrusions, as in the legend of Thor's ram-horned guardians opposing a dragon-prowed ship's approach, leading to navigational failures until the figurehead was removed. Celtic folk practices echoed this through reverence for fairy-like beings tied to groves, wells, and stones, where offerings of milk or cloth appeased spirits believed to control fertility and weather; such customs endured and into the 19th century, despite ecclesiastical suppression. Contemporary pagan movements, including Ásatrú and , explicitly revive animistic elements by attributing agency and consciousness to landscapes, trees, and stones, fostering rituals like land blessings or invocations to cultivate reciprocal relationships with non-human entities. Practitioners often draw from reconstructed sources, viewing animism as foundational to polytheistic frameworks where gods coexist with localized spirits, as evidenced in blots (sacrificial rites) honoring for ecological balance. This integration, prominent since the neopagan resurgence, emphasizes direct experiential engagement over doctrinal texts, with surveys of U.S. pagans in 2014 indicating over 70% endorsing animistic views of nature's inherent spirituality.

Core Elements of Animist Worldviews

Attribution of Spirits and Agency

Animist worldviews fundamentally involve the attribution of spirits—understood as animating essences or souls—to non-human entities, granting them agency and comparable to humans. This extends beyond mere symbolism to a relational where animals, , rocks, rivers, and artifacts are perceived as intentional actors capable of perception, emotion, and influence over events. Ethnographic observations document this across diverse societies, where such entities are not passive objects but active participants in social and ecological dynamics. Agency attribution manifests in practices like offerings or negotiations with these spirits to avert misfortune or secure , reflecting a incorporating non-material influences. For example, in Amazonian indigenous groups, animals and embody predatory or protective spirits that demand reciprocity in or gathering, shaping resource use and taboos. Similarly, among the Sami of , non-human beings such as or landscapes are inter-subjective persons engaging in mutual relations, influencing human decisions through perceived intentions. These beliefs drive observable behaviors, such as rituals to appease river spirits before crossings, evidenced in field studies from the early onward. Critiques of early formulations, like Edward Tylor's 1871 characterization of animism as a primitive in universal souls derived from dreams and analogies, highlight a Western bias toward intellectualism over lived relationality. Contemporary emphasizes participatory sensing over speculative psychology, noting that agency attribution fosters ecological attunement, as seen in societies where tracking animal "minds" enhances survival without implying literal supernaturalism. However, source biases in academic reporting, often from secular Western perspectives, may understate the experiential validity reported by practitioners, privileging reductive explanations.

Interactions with Non-Human Entities

In animist practices, interactions with non-human entities such as animals, plants, rocks, and natural phenomena occur through rituals that establish reciprocity and mutual respect. These entities are attributed with , , and the capacity for response, prompting humans to engage them via offerings, taboos, and communicative acts to secure benefits like successful hunts or fertile lands. Ethnographic accounts from indigenous groups document offerings of , alcohol, or leaves to mountain spirits () in the Southern to ensure safe passage over passes, reflecting a pragmatic exchange where humans acknowledge the entities' agency to avert harm or gain favor. Shamans serve as intermediaries, entering altered states of consciousness via drumming, chanting, or entheogens to communicate with spirits inhabiting animals or landscapes, negotiating permissions for resource use or diagnosing illnesses attributed to offended entities. For instance, among some Siberian and Amazonian groups, shamans converse with animal masters—spiritual overseers of species—to release prey souls after kills, maintaining balance through rituals that repay the taken life with songs or tobacco smoke. Such interactions emphasize causality: failure to perform rites risks retaliation, like poor yields or misfortune, as reported in field studies of hunter-gatherer societies. Taboos reinforce these engagements, prohibiting waste of parts or arbitrary felling to honor the within non-humans, fostering conservation-like behaviors observed empirically in animist communities. In Southeast Asian contexts, potent places like caves or s receive dialogues and libations, humanizing interactions where locals impute interior lives to these sites, treating them as relational partners rather than inert objects. These practices, while varying culturally, consistently prioritize empirical outcomes—such as ecological or communal well-being—over abstract doctrine, with shamans' efficacy gauged by tangible results like healed patients or bountiful harvests.

Cosmological and Ethical Structures

Animist cosmologies conceive the as a relational comprising diverse persons—entities with agency, , and social capacities—extending to humans, animals, plants, landscapes, and objects. This framework rejects sharp dichotomies between natural and realms, positing instead a pervasive of where or spiritual essences ensure continuity amid bodily discontinuities. For instance, among Yukaghir and Eveny peoples, beings possess multiple enabling kinship-like bonds across , framing the as a dynamic web sustained by mutual perceptions and interactions. Ethical structures emerge directly from this cosmological relationality, emphasizing reciprocity as the mechanism for harmonious coexistence among persons. Humans incur obligations to agency through rituals of , offerings, or placation, as seen in Eveny hunters pleading with animal spirits post-kill or Waorani shamans nurturing entities. Such practices acknowledge the sovereignty of other persons, balancing use with to prevent relational rupture. Taboos function as prohibitive norms to safeguard these relations, imposing restrictions on actions that risk offending spirits or disrupting cosmic balance, such as avoiding sacred sites or mishandling prey. Among Yup’ik communities, post-event waterfront avoidance exemplifies spatial taboos tied to conscious places, while Nenets restrictions on hearth interactions enforce gendered ethical boundaries. These mechanisms, rooted in causal recognition of spirit agency rather than abstract morality, prioritize avoidance of harm through empirical caution derived from observed consequences in relational dynamics.

Scientific and Empirical Perspectives

Psychological Mechanisms

Psychological mechanisms contributing to animistic beliefs primarily involve innate cognitive tendencies toward agency detection and , which predispose individuals to attribute , life, or mental states to non-human entities. These processes are thought to arise from adaptive evolutionary pressures, where over-attributing agency—such as interpreting environmental ambiguities as purposeful actions—enhanced survival by minimizing the risk of overlooking threats like predators. For instance, the hyperactive agency detection device (HADD), a concept developed in , posits an evolved cognitive module that hyperactively infers agents in ambiguous stimuli, potentially leading to perceptions of spirits or agency in natural phenomena. This mechanism is hypothesized to explain the ubiquity of animistic cognition across cultures, as false positives in agency detection carry lower costs than false negatives in ancestral environments. Distinctions exist between animism—perceiving objects as alive—and , which further endows them with human-like mental states or intentions, often building on (ToM) faculties that enable attribution of beliefs and desires to others. , an evolved system, can extend erroneously to inanimate or non-human entities, fostering animistic worldviews where rivers, rocks, or tools are seen as possessing volition or responsiveness. Empirical studies demonstrate this extension: for example, individuals with stronger ToM tendencies exhibit higher rates of anthropomorphic projections onto artifacts or animals, correlating with animistic interpretations. Such mechanisms are not mere errors but functional heuristics, as evidenced by data showing overlapping neural activations in brain regions like the during both human ToM tasks and perceptions of agency in non-social stimuli. Developmental psychology reveals animism as a default cognitive stage in children, who routinely ascribe life and to motionless objects, such as believing the sun follows them or that clouds are alive—a pattern documented in longitudinal studies from the early onward. Jean Piaget's observations in the indicated that preoperational children (ages 2-7) exhibit peak animistic thinking, gradually declining with logical development, though remnants persist into adulthood under or emotional salience. research supports this as a psychological universal rather than culturally induced, with similar patterns in diverse populations, suggesting underlying over learned belief. However, critiques of HADD-like models argue for insufficient direct empirical validation, attributing animistic tendencies more to cultural reinforcement or perceptual biases like than a dedicated hyperactive device. Animistic thinking also manifests in pathological or heightened forms, such as dereistic cognition in certain psychiatric conditions, where impaired reality testing amplifies attribution of agency to inert objects, blurring boundaries between and environment. Experimental paradigms, including those manipulating perceptual cues, confirm that priming for animism increases superstitious behaviors and perceived object , underscoring its in broader magical thinking circuits. Overall, these mechanisms highlight animism not as but as an emergent property of optimized for social and survival demands in pre-modern contexts, with modern secular equivalents in phenomena like theories or environmental .

Evolutionary Adaptations

The tendency to attribute agency to entities, a hallmark of animism, is hypothesized to stem from an evolved cognitive mechanism known as the hyperactive agency detection device (HADD), which prompts humans to infer intentional action behind ambiguous environmental cues such as unexpected movements or . This perceptual bias likely developed in ancestral environments where rapid detection of predators, prey, or social competitors enhanced survival odds, as failing to recognize a genuine agent could prove fatal while erroneous attributions incurred lower costs. from perceptual experiments indicates that humans exhibit heightened sensitivity to potential agency, particularly in dynamic stimuli like trajectories defying inertial motion, prioritizing dorsal stream processing of movement over static feature recognition—a aligned with evolutionary pressures favoring vigilance in or contexts. Underpinning this is , which posits that favors cognitive asymmetries minimizing high-stakes errors; in agency detection, the adaptive errs toward over-attribution (e.g., interpreting rustling foliage as an ) rather than under-detection, as the former's fitness penalty pales against the latter's lethal risks in Pleistocene habitats. Studies in threatening scenarios confirm this, revealing participants' lowered thresholds for inferring agency—such as perceiving human-like in neutral animations—compared to safe conditions, suggesting an innate calibration tuned by ancestral selection for threat hypersensitivity. Animism, in this framework, represents a byproduct of these mechanisms rather than a directly selected trait, with recurrent false positives fostering culturally transmitted beliefs in indwelling spirits or souls within animals, plants, and landscapes. Anthropologist Stewart Guthrie extends this to argue that animistic perceptions arise from anthropomorphic over-interpretation, an extension of agency detection observable even in non-human primates, where pattern-seeking yields illusory organization in random events. While not conferring direct survival benefits, such beliefs may have indirectly stabilized group cohesion or environmental predictability in small-scale societies, though primary evidence ties their origins to domain-general adaptations for agent vigilance rather than specialized religious modules. Cognitive science of religion models, drawing on developmental psychology, further show these traits manifesting early in childhood, with children predisposed to agent attribution in natural phenomena, reinforcing the evolutionary continuity from perceptual heuristics to mature animistic ontologies.

Conflicts with Modern Science

Animism's attribution of spiritual agency, consciousness, and intentionality to non-human entities such as rocks, rivers, and directly conflicts with the materialist of modern , which explains all observable phenomena through physical laws and processes without immaterial forces. Scientific methodologies, rooted in empirical observation and repeatability, find no evidence for the spiritual cores or human-like abilities animism posits; for instance, physics describes the of inanimate objects via deterministic equations like (formulated in 1687), rendering superfluous any invocation of resident spirits to account for their movements or interactions. Specific claims in animism about the capacities of natural entities are empirically contradicted by scientific findings. Animists may assert that plants possess communicative or healing intentions beyond biochemical reactions, yet botanical and pharmacological research demonstrates plant responses as results of chemical signaling and environmental stimuli, with many traditional animist remedies failing rigorous double-blind trials or proving toxic upon analysis—e.g., certain tribal plant uses lack active compounds verifiable by spectroscopy. Similarly, rocks and geological formations, treated as relational agents in some animist practices, exhibit no responsiveness or agency under experimental conditions, behaving solely as inert aggregates of minerals subject to erosion and tectonic forces. Animals, while displaying complex behaviors, are understood through ethology and neuroscience as products of neural circuitry and evolutionary pressures, not indwelling souls; studies since Konrad Lorenz's work in the 1930s show instinctual patterns explainable by genetics and conditioning without supernatural personhood. Epistemologically, animism resists falsification, a cornerstone of scientific validity as articulated by Karl Popper in his 1934 Logik der Forschung, where theories must permit empirical refutation to qualify as scientific. Animist explanations for events—like attributing crop failure to offended land spirits—can accommodate any evidence by ad hoc appeals to unseen appeasements, lacking predictive power or testability; in contrast, agricultural science employs soil chemistry and meteorology to forecast yields with quantifiable accuracy, as validated by global data from the Food and Agriculture Organization since 1945. This unfalsifiability aligns animism with rejected doctrines like vitalism, discredited by Friedrich Wöhler's 1828 synthesis of urea from inorganic compounds, proving organic life arises from physical mechanisms alone, not elusive vital forces akin to animist essences. In domains like and , animist causal attributions yield to evidence-based alternatives. Traditional animist , invoking spirit negotiations, shows no superior outcomes to sham treatments in meta-analyses of indigenous practices, where efficacy traces to effects or incidental bioactive agents rather than metaphysical intervention; germ , established by Louis Pasteur's experiments in the 1860s, supplants spirit-possession models of disease with microbial causation, enabling vaccines that have eradicated by 1980. Ecologically, animist taboos may coincidentally preserve resources, but predictive conservation relies on models, not reciprocal spirit relations, as demonstrated by successful via quantitative since Aldo Leopold's 1949 A Sand County Almanac. These discrepancies highlight science's causal realism—prioritizing verifiable mechanisms—over animism's intuitive, non-empirical .

Philosophical Implications

Ontological Debates

Animist ontologies posit that non-human entities, including animals, , and inanimate objects, possess interiority—such as intentions, emotions, or agency—comparable to subjectivity, challenging the Western naturalist where interiority is confined to biological brains and physicality is across entities. This framework inverts the nature-culture dualism prevalent in modern , attributing social and capacities to the environment rather than viewing it as inert mechanism. Anthropologist classifies animism as one of four universal ontologies, alongside naturalism, totemism, and analogism, where differences lie in physical forms but not in shared psychic unity, enabling rituals that treat rivers or stones as persons with reciprocal obligations. A central debate concerns perspectivism, advanced by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro among Amazonian groups, which holds that non-humans perceive themselves as human-like subjects within their own bodily predicates, implying a multinaturalist reality where perspectives vary while subjectivity remains constant, rather than Descola's emphasis on human projection of interiority onto others. This "ontological turn" in anthropology treats animist worldviews as ontologically valid alternatives to scientific materialism, not mere epistemologies or illusions, fostering debates on whether such systems describe actual causal structures or culturally specific constructs. Critics argue this relativism overlooks empirical disconfirmation, as no verifiable evidence supports non-physical spirits or agency independent of neurobiological or physical processes, reducing animist attributions to adaptive heuristics rather than ontological truths. Materialist perspectives further contend that animist ontologies conflict with established physics and , where causality arises from particulate interactions without requiring immaterial , as Tylor's 1871 formulation of animism as in pervasive spirits lacks substantiation beyond ethnographic reports prone to interpretive bias in academic . Proponents of the counter that dismissing animism as error imposes a hegemonic naturalism, yet this invites scrutiny of source credibility, given anthropology's historical tendency to privilege indigenous narratives over falsifiable mechanisms, potentially confounding descriptive with prescriptive reality. Empirical studies in , such as those on , suggest animist extensions of agency reflect universal psychological predispositions rather than distinct modes of being, bridging but not validating ontological claims.

Relations to Pantheism and Panpsychism

Animism shares conceptual overlaps with in attributing some form of mentality or experiential capacity to non-human entities, yet diverges in the nature and scope of that attribution. posits that or mind-like properties are fundamental features of all , present even in basic particles, which combine to form higher-level minds in complex systems. In contrast, traditional animism, as described in anthropological accounts, endows objects, animals, and natural phenomena with distinct, person-like spirits or souls possessing agency, , and often social relations akin to human persons, rather than mere proto-consciousness. This distinction highlights animism's emphasis on relational, culturally embedded spirits over 's more ontologically minimalist view of ubiquitous but non-anthropomorphic mind. Philosophers have noted that contemporary "new animism," which reframes spirits as perspectival or relational agencies rather than supernatural essences, approaches panpsychist ideas by challenging human exceptionalism in cognition and experience. For instance, proponents argue that animist ontologies align with panpsychism's rejection of emergentism—the idea that mind arises solely from physical complexity—favoring instead a distributed, inherent mentality in the world. However, animism typically retains a pluralistic worldview of interacting entities with moral and reciprocal demands, whereas panpsychism remains neutral on ethical or spiritual implications, focusing on solving the "hard problem" of consciousness without invoking discrete souls. Relations to involve a shared , where divinity or sacredness inheres in the natural world rather than transcending it, but animism prioritizes multiplicity over pantheism's monistic unity. identifies the itself as divine, equating God with the totality of existence in a holistic, often impersonal manner, as articulated by thinkers like Spinoza. Animism, by comparison, populates the world with diverse, autonomous spirits—such as those in rivers or stones—that demand negotiation and reciprocity, fostering a relational ethic absent in strict pantheism's emphasis on oneness. Some modern syntheses, like animistic pantheism, blend these by viewing the unified divine as manifesting through individuated spirits, though this risks diluting animism's emphasis on localized agency for pantheism's cosmic identity. These intersections underscore ongoing debates in and , where animism's experiential roots inform critiques of both panpsychism's abstraction and pantheism's depersonalization.

Critiques of Ethical and Ecological Claims

Critiques of animism's ecological claims often center on the empirical record of societies practicing it, challenging the assertion that attributing agency to entities inherently promotes . Shepard Krech III argues in The Ecological Indian: Myth and History (1999) that North American indigenous groups, many with animistic worldviews, frequently overhunted species such as the —reducing herds from an estimated 30-60 million in the early 1800s to fewer than 1,000 by 1889 through combined indigenous and European practices—and contributed to the depletion of passenger pigeons via mass communal hunts that predated European contact. Similarly, Iroquois agricultural expansion led to widespread in the Northeast, altering landscapes through controlled burns and clearing that mirrored exploitative patterns seen in non-animistic contexts. Further examples include the of , whose animistic reverence for ancestral spirits and natural forces coincided with near-total by the 17th century, triggering , resource scarcity, and , as evidenced by pollen records and archaeological data showing palm loss from for canoes, statues, and . In the Amazon, animistic indigenous groups have participated in and , contributing to localized habitat loss, while African animist tribes historically overhunted for , depleting populations before colonial intensification. These cases indicate that animistic beliefs do not causally prevent degradation; , where observed, stems more from low population densities and practical adaptations than from spiritual attributions, as in traditional societies often amplified resource strain. Philosophically, animism's ethical framework—positing moral obligations to non-human "persons" based on imputed agency—lacks grounding in verifiable sentience or reciprocity, rendering it vulnerable to arbitrariness. Without empirical evidence for spirits or consciousness in entities like rocks or rivers, such ethics risk equating human welfare with inanimate processes, potentially obstructing rational interventions like pest control or infrastructure development essential for human flourishing. Critics contend this relational ontology fosters superstition over causal analysis, as seen in rituals diverting attention from ecological drivers like overharvesting, and offers no universal principles to adjudicate conflicts, such as prioritizing endangered species over human needs. Recent analyses affirm scant evidence linking animistic nature religions, like , to superior sustainability outcomes amid modern pressures, underscoring that ethical claims project ideals onto unproven metaphysics rather than deriving from observable harms or benefits.

Modern Applications and Revivals

In Environmental and Ecological Discourses

In contemporary environmental discourses, animism is often invoked through the lens of "neo-animism" or "new animism," which posits that non-human entities possess agency and relational , challenging the Cartesian subject-object divide between humans and nature. This perspective draws from anthropological reinterpretations of indigenous ontologies, arguing that attributing vitality to landscapes, animals, and objects fosters ecological reciprocity and counters anthropocentric exploitation. Proponents, such as Graham Harvey, frame animism as a participatory where humans engage environments as co-actors rather than passive resources, influencing movements like since the 1980s Earth First! founding. Within ecological applications, neo-animism informs by rejecting human-nature dualism, proposing ontological shifts to include non-humans as actors in value co-creation and resource circulation. For instance, methodological animism advocates treating natures as quasi-subjects with rights or gift-based exchanges, aiming to deepen relational ethics in the . In circles, animistic relationality aligns with biocentric principles, emphasizing intrinsic value in all life forms to promote preservation over utilitarian management. However, these integrations often stem from academic ontologies rather than widespread practice, with influences seen in ecofeminist and critiques of industrial modernity. Empirical assessments of animism's environmental impacts remain limited, with correlational studies suggesting anthropomorphic perceptions of nature—akin to animistic attribution—may boost pro-environmental behaviors, such as during the when viewing as a maternal correlated with support. Yet, causal evidence linking animistic worldviews to superior ecological outcomes is scarce; historical indigenous animistic societies exhibited varied , including overhunting or in cases like pre-colonial Amazonian groups, undermining claims of inherent harmony. Critiques highlight that while animism contests inert environmental models, its revival in Western risks romanticizing non-modern ontologies without addressing technological or economic drivers of degradation, potentially prioritizing perceptual shifts over verifiable interventions. Academic enthusiasm for animism, often embedded in institutions favoring anti-capitalist narratives, may overstate its pragmatic utility against data-driven conservation strategies.

In Psychology and Therapeutic Practices

Therapeutic animism integrates animist beliefs in the inherent vitality of non-human entities with structured counseling frameworks, such as and , to address through reconnection to and spiritual dimensions. This approach emphasizes decolonizing by drawing on indigenous-inspired practices like eco-spiritual rituals and ancestral healing, aiming to restore balance disrupted by modern disconnection. Proponents describe outcomes including enhanced clarity, joy, and release from maladaptive patterns, though these rest on practitioner reports rather than controlled studies. Animist reframes psychological phenomena like trauma, attachment disorders, and through lenses of bonds, spirit contact, and intervention, positioning as often stemming from severed relations with ancestors or the more-than-human world. Courses and trainings in this domain teach integration of arts with psychological tools to facilitate cultural and ecological , critiquing reductionist Western models for overlooking animist epistemologies. Such methods target empowerment by addressing "colonialist legacies" in , including reinterpreting dissociation as soul loss amenable to ceremonial repair. Shamanic counseling, rooted in animist ontologies, employs trance induction via breathwork, , and journeying to alternate realms for retrieving lost or negotiating with spiritual allies. These techniques purportedly alleviate symptoms of depression, anxiety, and trauma by restoring wholeness and community ties, with references to supporting ' role in shifts. In ecopsychological variants, animism manifests as attributing soul-like qualities to natural phenomena to bridge human-earth alienation, using urban-adapted practices for self-healing. Empirical backing for animism-specific interventions remains sparse, contrasting with evidence for broader ecotherapy effects like reduced depression (71% improvement post-nature walks versus 45% in urban settings) and stress recovery via natural stimuli. Studies link nature exposure to lower anxiety and ADHD symptoms in children, but attribute gains to sensory and attentional restoration rather than animistic engagement. In psychedelics research, induced animistic perceptions correlate with relational insights, yet causality to therapeutic efficacy requires further verification beyond anecdotal or preliminary findings. Mainstream psychology often views persistent animism as akin to dereistic thinking, potentially signaling impaired reality testing in clinical contexts.

Socio-Political and Cultural Impacts

![Hombres ojibwe.jpg][float-right] Animistic beliefs have historically structured social hierarchies and governance in many indigenous societies by positing spiritual interconnections between humans, animals, and landscapes, which often dictate rituals for communal harmony and . Among Native American groups like the , these beliefs manifest in practices such as vision quests and seasonal ceremonies that reinforce kinship ties and , though empirical evidence of sustained varies, with some communities experiencing prior to external influences. In Southeast Asian contexts, animism integrates with political ecologies, where peasants negotiate with spirits to adapt to economic changes, sometimes enabling resilience against state interventions but also perpetuating vulnerabilities through superstitious constraints on innovation. Culturally, animism permeates artistic expressions and across civilizations, from ancient Egyptian depictions of animal-headed deities to Siberian shamanic narratives that encode moral lessons through spirit interactions, fostering but occasionally stifling individual agency via fear of retribution. Historical declines in animistic rituals, accelerated by European starting in the , labeled such practices as pagan, leading to cultural erosion and social fragmentation in groups like Nepalese indigenous communities. Negative socio-political effects include conflicts arising from attributions of misfortune to malevolent spirits, as seen in accusations of sorcery that have fueled witch hunts and intergroup violence in animist-dominated regions of and as late as the 21st century. In modern politics, animism has been invoked to bolster indigenous sovereignty claims over ancestral lands, as in cases where spiritual personhood of natural features underpins legal arguments against development, notably in Canadian and Australian courts since the . Neo-animist frameworks propose rejecting anthropocentric dichotomies to advance , yet critics note scant causal evidence linking such ontologies to superior policy outcomes compared to evidence-based . Culturally, revivals in Western contexts face , with practitioners encountering marginalization akin to historical suppressions, highlighting tensions between traditional worldviews and secular .

Criticisms and Controversies

Rationalist and Progress-Oriented Critiques

Rationalist critiques of animism frame it as a rudimentary explanatory framework that attributes agency and to inanimate objects and natural phenomena without empirical validation, thereby obstructing the development of mechanistic understandings of . In the , anthropologist described animism in Primitive Culture (1871) as originating from primitive humans' , visions, and death as evidence of souls inhabiting all things, positing it as the earliest stage of religious evolution destined to yield to and, ultimately, scientific . This evolutionary schema implies animism's inherent inferiority, as it relies on untestable spiritual hypotheses rather than observable, repeatable evidence. Enlightenment thinkers advanced similar objections by advocating —the systematic elimination of animistic elements from worldview to favor rational mastery over nature. Sociologist later formalized this in his 1917 lecture "," arguing that the rationalization process inherent to eradicates magical thinking, including animism's imputation of spirits to the world, replacing it with calculable, impersonal forces amenable to scientific control. Such critiques highlight animism's incompatibility with Newtonian physics and emerging materialist paradigms, which demand explanations grounded in verifiable laws rather than anthropomorphic projections. Progress-oriented critiques emphasize animism's practical impediments to technological and societal advancement, as belief in sentient non-humans fosters reluctance toward interventionist practices like industrialization or . For instance, animistic ontologies can prioritize appeasement of natural "persons" over empirical problem-solving, correlating with slower adoption of innovations in regions where such beliefs predominate; ethnographic studies note that attributing failures to ancestral spirits, rather than deficiencies or pathogens, delays agricultural reforms. In medical contexts, reliance on shamanic interventions invoking spirit causation undermines evidence-based treatments, as documented in analyses of traditional systems where animistic explanations resist integration with germ theory or . These perspectives argue that transcending animism enables causal realism—identifying manipulable mechanisms for flourishing—over passive coexistence with purportedly autonomous entities.

Empirical and Verifiability Challenges

Animistic beliefs posit that non-human entities, such as rocks, rivers, or animals, possess inherent spiritual agency or consciousness independent of observable physical processes, a claim that fundamentally evades empirical verification due to the immaterial nature of the attributed essences. Scientific methodologies demand testable predictions and falsifiable hypotheses, as articulated by Karl Popper's criterion in (1934), yet animistic assertions lack mechanisms for empirical disconfirmation, such as measurable interactions between purported spirits and material phenomena that could be isolated in controlled conditions. For instance, attributions of illness or environmental events to spiritual causation have been supplanted by verifiable naturalistic explanations, including microbial theories validated through experiments by in the 1880s, rendering spirit-based accounts redundant without independent evidential support. Attempts to empirically assess animistic practices, such as shamanic rituals involving states or plant-based visions, yield data interpretable through neuroscientific and psychological lenses rather than validation. studies, for example, correlate reported spirit encounters with altered brain activity induced by endogenous neurotransmitters or psychedelics like those in , as documented in on serotonin receptor since the , without necessitating non-physical agents. Ethnographic observations of animistic societies provide descriptive accounts of behaviors and worldviews but fail to substantiate ontological claims, as cultural persistence does not equate to factual accuracy; widespread consensus among materialist frameworks aligns observed outcomes with physical causality, undermining animism's probabilistic standing under Bayesian epistemic standards. Philosophical critiques from highlight the interaction problem: even if spiritual essences exist, no empirical protocol demonstrates causal influence on physical events without invoking unfalsifiable ad hoc adjustments, akin to challenges in dualist philosophies critiqued since Gilbert Ryle's (1949). While some anthropological reinterpretations frame animism as relational perception rather than literal , this semantic shift does not resolve verifiability deficits, as subjective relational experiences remain prone to cognitive biases like , empirically linked to evolutionary adaptations for agency detection in ambiguous stimuli, as evidenced in studies since the 1940s. Consequently, animism endures as a verifiable in practice but not in its core metaphysical propositions, with scientific progress consistently favoring parsimonious, evidence-based alternatives over spirit hypotheses.

Debates on Cultural Relativism

Cultural relativism, as applied to animism, emerged in early 20th-century anthropology to counter evolutionary frameworks that positioned animistic beliefs as primitive stages toward monotheism or rationality, insisting instead that such worldviews be evaluated within their sociocultural contexts without universal judgment. Pioneered by figures like Franz Boas, this approach treated animism—beliefs in spirits inhabiting non-human entities—as valid expressions of cultural logic rather than errors, emphasizing descriptive relativism to avoid ethnocentrism. However, this stance faced pushback for potentially insulating unverifiable claims from empirical scrutiny, as animistic ontologies often posit causal agencies (e.g., ancestral spirits influencing natural events) that contradict observable mechanisms like physics or biology. Contemporary debates intensified with the "ontological turn" in anthropology during the late 1990s and 2000s, where animism intersects with perspectivism and multinaturalism, extending relativism beyond beliefs to rival realities. Eduardo Viveiros de Castro's perspectivism, drawn from Amazonian indigenous cosmologies, posits that non-human beings (animals, plants) perceive themselves as human subjects with equivalent agency, differing only in bodily dispositions that alter how the world appears—thus inverting Western naturalism's singular physical nature and cultural multiplicity. Philippe Descola's typology similarly frames animism as a "mono-culture, multi-nature" ontology, where shared interiority (souls or intentions) unites humans and non-humans across diverse physical forms, challenging the universality of scientific materialism. Proponents view this as liberating cultural critique, decentering anthropocentric and Eurocentric assumptions to affirm indigenous knowledges as co-equal epistemes. Critics contend that such ontological dissolves shared evidentiary grounds, rendering dialogue impossible and privileging interpretive symmetry over causal realism. For instance, Laura Rival argues that perspectivist models neglect biological autonomies and ecological interdependencies, anthropomorphizing non-humans while sidelining empirical data on evolutionary continuities that unify life forms under testable laws. Dimitrios Karadimas highlights the risk of projecting human relational logics onto non-humans without accessing their purported interiorities, fostering a form of uncritical affirmation akin to affirmatory cultural critique rather than rigorous analysis. From a truth-seeking standpoint, these approaches encounter verifiability issues: animistic claims of spiritual causation, relativized as alternative ontologies, lack falsifiable predictions and correlate with practices (e.g., sacrifices or spirit-mediated healing) that empirical studies show yield outcomes no better than or worse than evidence-based interventions. Moreover, normative here impedes ethical assessments; if ontologies are incommensurable, practices rooted in animism—such as attributing misfortunes to malevolent spirits leading to social —evade universal critiques, echoing broader 's failure to condemn harms like honor killings when culturally embedded. Defenders of moderated relativism, like Ernst Halbmayer, propose "multiversal" frameworks among Carib groups, where co-existing worlds allow relational engagement without full ontological rupture, bridging and ecological realism. Yet, persistent tensions arise in applied contexts, such as , where relativizing animistic land-spirit beliefs can romanticize indigenous stewardship while overlooking data-driven conservation needs, or in advocacy, where suspending judgment on animism-linked gender hierarchies (e.g., spirit possession rituals disproportionately affecting women) prioritizes cultural preservation over individual agency. Ultimately, these debates underscore a core : while descriptive illuminates animism's adaptive roles in social cohesion, prescriptive variants falter against first-principles that operates via invariant causal structures, not culturally variable essences, demanding selective over blanket tolerance.

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