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Taiwan independence movement
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| Taiwan independence movement | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Traditional Chinese | 臺灣獨立運動 or 台灣獨立運動 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 台湾独立运动 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Traditional Chinese | 臺獨 or 台獨 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 台独 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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The Taiwan independence movement is a political movement which advocates the formal declaration of Taiwan as an independent and sovereign state, as opposed to Chinese unification according to the One China policy or the status quo of co-existence in Cross-Strait relations.
Into the 21st-century, Taiwan's political status is ambiguous. China, under the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), claims the island of Taiwan as a province of the People's Republic of China (PRC). However, the de facto administration of Taiwan maintains that it is already an independent country, the Republic of China (ROC). Since 2016, the current government, led by the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has asserted that there is no need for a formal push for independence through legal means.[1] As such, the ROC consisting of Taiwan and other islands under its control exercise full autonomy in its internal governance. As of January 2024, it maintains formal diplomatic relations with 11 of the 193 United Nations member states of the United Nations and the Holy See, while the majority of countries do not officially recognize it but maintain informal relations.[2][3]
The use of "independence" for Taiwan can be ambiguous. If some supporters articulate that they agree to the independence of Taiwan, they may either be referring to the notion of formally creating an independent Taiwanese state (Republic of Taiwan) or to the notion that Taiwan has become synonymous with the current Republic of China and is already independent (as reflected in the concept of One Country on Each Side). Some supporters advocate the exclusion of Kinmen and Matsu, which are controlled by Taiwan but are located off the coast of mainland China.[4]
The Taiwan independence movement is supported by the DPP and the broader Pan-Green Coalition given the threat posed to its sovereignty, regionalist identity, liberal democratic system and human rights. Radical activists advocate the ideal goal of de-sinicization and Taiwanization of the island and society, although that sentiment is not shared by the Pan-Green establishment, which favors a more pragmatic status quo under the ROC. The movement is opposed by the Kuomintang (KMT) and the broader Pan-Blue Coalition, which seeks to retain the somewhat ambiguous status quo of the ROC under the so-called "1992 Consensus" or gradually "reunify" with mainland China at some point under a pan-Chinese identity.
The government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) opposes Taiwanese independence. The PRC believes that Taiwan and mainland China comprise two portions of a single country's territory and regards any moves toward independence as separatism. According to its own interpretation of the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration and the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, Taiwan is part of the PRC and that any moves towards independence violate the constitution of the PRC and international law. The government of the PRC has officially maintained its position of peaceful unification of Taiwan but does not rule out using military force, if necessary, to "reunify" the island should formal independence be declared.
As for the ROC, such a move could also be considered a violation of its current constitution. The process for a constitutional amendment in ROC or national territory alternation must be initiated by one-fourth (25%) of the members of the Legislative Yuan (the unicameral parliament of ROC), then voted in the Legislative Yuan with at least three-fourths (75%) members attended and by a three-fourths (75%) supermajority, then approved by majority popular vote in a referendum.
Historically, both governments have formulated a "One China" policy, whereby foreign countries may only conduct official diplomatic relations with either the PRC or the ROC, on the condition that they sever official diplomatic relations with and formal recognition of the other. The ROC's One-China policy was softened following democratization in the 1990s, and economic cooperation and people-to-people exchange were officially permitted.[5]
History
[edit]Background
[edit]Taiwan is an island in East Asia. The indigenous population, who came from nearby China, spoke Austronesian languages.[6] These aboriginal people have lived on the island for over 6000 years and, before 1620, were its only inhabitants.[7] Taiwan has been occupied by several nations, including Spain,[8] the Netherlands, Ming and Qing Dynasty China, and Japan.
After its defeat in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the KMT party, which had ruled Nationalist China since 1928, moved to Taiwan where they reigned until Chen Shui-bian of the DPP became president in 2000.[9]
Early
[edit]From a pro-independence supporter's point of view, the movement for Taiwan independence began under Qing rule in the 1680s which led to a well known the saying, "Every three years an uprising, every five years a rebellion". Taiwan Independence supporters compared Taiwan under KMT rule to South Africa under apartheid.[10]
The Taiwan independence movement under Japan was supported by Mao Zedong in the 1930s as a means of freeing Taiwan from Japanese rule.[11]
With the end of World War II in 1945, by issuing "General Order No. 1" to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, the Allies agreed that the Republic of China Army under the KMT would "temporarily occupy Taiwan, on behalf of the Allied forces."[12]
From 1928 to 1942, the CCP maintained that Taiwan was a separate nation in order to get rid of Japanese occupation of the island.[11] Mao Zedong was an early supporter of Taiwanese independence, telling Edgar Snow in the 1930s that the CCP would lend "our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence." He changed this position only after the Nationalists started claiming Taiwan with the Cairo Declaration, challenging the status of China.[13]
Martial law period
[edit]

The modern-day political movement for Taiwan independence dates back to the Japanese colonial period, but it only became a viable political force within Taiwan in the 1990s.[citation needed] Taiwanese independence was advocated periodically during the Japanese colonial period, but was suppressed by the Japanese government. These efforts were the goal of the Taiwanese Communist Party of the late 1920s. Unlike current formulations, and in line with the thinking of the Comintern, such a state would have been a proletarian one. With the end of World War II in 1945, Japanese rule ended, but the subsequent autocratic rule of the KMT later revived calls for local rule. However, it was a movement supported by the Chinese students who were born on the Island and not associated with KMT. It found its roots in the US and Japan. In the 1950s, a Republic of Taiwan Provisional Government was set up in Japan. Thomas Liao was nominally the President. At one time it held quasi-official relations with the newly independent Indonesia. This was possible mainly through the connections between Sukarno and the Provisional Government's Southeast Asian liaison, Chen Chih-hsiung, who had assisted in Indonesia's local resistance movements against Japanese rule.
After the transfer of power from Japan to the ROC, the focus of the movement was as a vehicle for discontent from the native Taiwanese against the rule of "mainlanders" (i.e. mainland Chinese-born people who fled to Taiwan with KMT in the late 1940s).[14] The February 28 Incident in 1947 and the ensuing martial law that lasted until 1987 contributed to the period of White Terror on the island, persecuting not only indigenous leftists, but liberals and democracy advocates as well.
Between 1949 and 1991, the official position[15] of the ROC government on Taiwan was that it was the legitimate government of all of China and it used this position as justification for authoritarian measures such as the refusal to vacate the seats held by delegates elected on the mainland in 1947 for the Legislative Yuan. The Taiwan independence movement intensified in response to this and presented an alternative vision of a sovereign and independent Taiwanese state. This vision was represented through a number of symbols such as the use of Taiwanese in opposition to the school-taught Mandarin Chinese.
Several scholars drafted various versions of a constitution, as both political statement or vision and as intellectual exercise. Most of these drafts favor a bicameral parliament rather than presidential system. In at least one such draft, seats in the upper house would be divided equally among Taiwan's established ethnicities. In the 1980s the Chinese Nationalist government considered publication of these ideas criminal. In the most dramatic case, it decided to arrest the pro-independence publisher Cheng Nan-jung for publishing a version in his Tang-wai magazine, Liberty Era Weekly (自由時代週刊). Rather than giving himself up, Cheng self-immolated in protest. Other campaigns and tactics toward such a State have included soliciting designs from the public for a new national flag and anthem (for example, Taiwan the Formosa). More recently the Taiwan Name Rectification Campaign (台灣正名運動) has played an active role. More traditional independence supporters, however, have criticized name rectification as merely a superficial tactic devoid of the larger vision inherent in the independence agenda.
Various overseas Taiwan independence movements, such as the Formosan Association, World United Formosans for Independence, United Young Formosans for Independence, Union for Formosa's Independence in Europe, United Formosans in America for Independence, and Committee for Human Rights in Formosa, published "The Independent Formosa" in several volumes with the publisher "Formosan Association." In "The Independent Formosa, Volumes 2–3", they tried to justify Taiwanese collaboration with Japan during World War II by saying that the "atmosphere covered the whole Japanese territories, including Korea and Formosa, and the Japanese mainlands as well", when Taiwanese publications supported Japan's "holy war", and that the people who did it were not at fault.[16][promotional source?]
The anti-communist KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek, President of the ROC on Taiwan, believed that the Americans were going to plot a coup against him in collusion with Taiwan independence activists. In 1950, Chiang Ching-kuo became director of the secret police, which he remained until 1965. Chiang also considered some people who were friends to Americans to be his enemies. An enemy of the Chiang family, Wu Kuo-chen, was kicked out of his position of governor of Taiwan by Chiang Ching-kuo and fled to America in 1953.[17] Chiang Ching-kuo, educated in the Soviet Union, initiated Soviet style military organization in the ROC Military. He reorganized and Sovietized the political officer corps, surveillance, and KMT party activities. Opposed to this was Sun Li-jen, who was educated at the American Virginia Military Institute.[18] Chiang orchestrated the controversial court-martial and arrest of General Sun Li-jen in August 1955, for plotting a coup d'état with the American CIA against his father Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT. The CIA allegedly wanted to help Sun take control of Taiwan and declare its independence.[17][19]
During the martial law era lasting until 1987, discussion of Taiwan independence was forbidden in Taiwan, at a time when recovery of the mainland and national unification were the stated goals of the ROC. During that time, many advocates of independence and other dissidents fled overseas, and carried out their advocacy work there, notably in Japan and the United States. Part of their work involved setting up think tanks, political organizations, and lobbying networks in order to influence the politics of their host countries, notably the United States, the ROC's main ally at the time, though they would not be very successful until much later. Within Taiwan, the independence movement was one of many dissident causes among the intensifying democracy movement of the 1970s, which culminated in the 1979 Kaohsiung Incident. The DPP was eventually formed to represent dissident causes.[20]
Multiparty period
[edit]After the lifting of martial law in 1987 and the acceptance of multi-party politics, the DPP became increasingly identified with Taiwan independence, which was added to its party platform in 1991. At the same time, many overseas independence advocates and organizations returned to Taiwan. For the first time, they openly promoted their cause and gradually built up political support. Many had previously fled to the US or Europe and had been on a blacklist held by the KMT, which had prevented them from returning to Taiwan. In their places of exile, they established organisations like the European Federation of Taiwanese Associations and the Formosan Association for Public Affairs.

As the electoral success of the DPP, and later, the DPP-led Pan-Green Coalition grew in recent years, the Taiwan independence movement shifted its focus to identity politics by proposing many plans involving symbolism and social engineering. The reinterpretation of historical events such as the February 28 Incident, the use of broadcast language and mother tongue education in schools, the official name and flag of the ROC, slogans in the army, and the orientation of maps all have been issues of concern to the present-day Taiwan independence movement activists.
The movement, which peaked in the 70s through the 90s with the Taiwan literature movement and other cultural upheavals, has moderated in recent years with the assimilation of these changes. Friction between "mainlander" and "native" communities on Taiwan has decreased due to shared interests, such as increasing economic ties with mainland China, continuing threats by the PRC to invade, and doubts as to whether or not the United States would support a unilateral declaration of independence. Since the late 1990s many supporters of Taiwan independence have argued that Taiwan, as the ROC, is already independent from the mainland, making a formal declaration unnecessary. In May 1999, the DPP formalized this position in its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future".[citation needed]
Lee Teng-hui administration (1988–2000)
[edit]In 1995, Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui was given permission to speak at Cornell University about his dream of Taiwanese independence, the first time a Taiwanese leader had been allowed to visit the United States. This led to a military response from China that included buying Russian submarines and conducting missile tests near Taiwan.[21]
Chen Shui-bian administration (2000–2008)
[edit]

In February 2007, President Chen Shui-bian initiated changes to names of state-owned enterprises, and the nation's embassies and overseas representative offices. As a result, Chunghwa Post Co. (中華郵政) was renamed Taiwan Post Co. (臺灣郵政) and Chinese Petroleum Corporation (中國石油) is now called CPC Corporation, Taiwan (臺灣中油) and the signs in Taiwan's embassies now display the word "Taiwan" in brackets after "Republic of China".[24] In 2007, the Taiwan Post Co. issued stamps bearing the name "Taiwan" in remembrance of the February 28 Incident. However, the name of the post office was reverted to "Chunghwa Post Co." following the inauguration of KMT president Ma Ying-jeou in 2008.
The Pan-Blue camp voiced its opposition to the changes and the former KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou said that it would generate diplomatic troubles and cause cross-strait tensions. It also argued that without a change in the relevant legislation pertaining to state-owned enterprises, the name changes of these enterprises could not be valid. As the Pan-Blue camp held only a slim parliamentary majority throughout the administration of President Chen, the Government's motion to change the law to this effect was blocked by the opposition. Later, U.S. Department of State spokesman Sean McCormack said that the U.S. does not support administrative steps that would appear to change the status-quo by either Taipei or Beijing as threats to regional security.[25]
Former president Lee Teng-hui has stated that he never pursued Taiwanese independence. Lee views Taiwan as already an independent state, and that the call for "Taiwanese independence" could even confuse the international community by implying that Taiwan once viewed itself as part of China. From this perspective, Taiwan is independent even if it remains unable to enter the UN. Lee said the most important goals are to improve the people's livelihoods, build national consciousness, make a formal name change and draft a new constitution that reflects the present reality so that Taiwan can officially identify itself as a country.[26]
Ma Ying-jeou administration (2008–2016)
[edit]Legislative elections were held on 12 January 2008, resulting in a supermajority (86 of the 113 seats) in the legislature for the KMT and the Pan-Blue Coalition. President Chen Shui-bian's DPP was handed a heavy defeat, winning only the remaining 27 seats. The junior partner in the Pan-Green Coalition, the Taiwan Solidarity Union, won no seats.
Two months later, the election for the 12th-term President and vice-president of the Republic of China was held on Saturday, 22 March 2008.[27] KMT nominee Ma Ying-jeou won, with 58% of the vote, ending eight years of DPP rule.[28] Along with the 2008 legislative election, Ma's landslide victory brought the KMT back to power in Taiwan.
On 1 August 2008, the Board of Directors of Taiwan Post Co. resolved to reverse the name change and restored the name "Chunghwa Post".[29] The Board of Directors, as well as resolving to restore the name of the corporation, also resolved to re-hire the chief executive dismissed in 2007, and to withdraw defamation proceedings against him.[30]
On 2 September 2008, President Ma defined the relations between Taiwan and mainland China as "special", but "not that between two states" – they are relations based on two areas of one state, with Taiwan considering that state to be the ROC, and mainland China considering that state to be the PRC.[31][32]
Ma's approach with the mainland is conspicuously evasive of political negotiations that may lead to unification which is the mainland's ultimate goal. The National Unification Guidelines remain "frozen" and Ma precluded any discussion of unification during his term by his "three no's" (no unification, no independence, and no use of force).[33]
Tsai Ing-wen and Lai Ching-te administration (2016–present)
[edit]The DPP, led by Tsai Ing-wen, won a landslide victory over the KMT in 2016 and was reelected in 2020.[34][35] Her administration stated that it sought to maintain the current political status of Taiwan.[36][37] The PRC government continued to criticize the ROC government, as the DPP administration has continued to not officially recognize the 1992 Consensus and the One China policy.[38][39]
Lai Ching-te, the DPP candidate, won the presidential election in 2024. During the campaign period, Lai asserted Taiwanese sovereignty, but said a formal declaration of independence would be unnecessary and favored maintaining the status quo.[40] He also said he would be willing to work with the Chinese government, but only if they renounce any intentions to use force against Taiwan.[41][42]
Legal basis for Taiwan independence
[edit]Taiwan independence is supported by the Pan-Green Coalition in Taiwan, led by the centre-left DPP, but opposed by the Pan-Blue Coalition, led by the conservative KMT. The former coalition aims to eventually achieve full sovereign independence for Taiwan. Whereas, the latter coalition aims to improve relations with the Beijing government (PRC) — which it refers to as "mainland China" — and eventually "reunify" at some point.
Both factions have long been forced to precariously dance around the so-called "status quo" of Taiwan's political status. The DPP is unable to immediately declare independence due to pressure from the PRC and the KMT, whereas the KMT and PRC are unable to immediately achieve Chinese unification due to pressure from the DPP and its de facto allies (including the United States, Japan, and the European Union); further, the vast majority of Taiwanese as well as the KMT oppose the mainland's proposed one country, two systems solution.[43][failed verification]
The 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki and 1951 Treaty of San Francisco are often cited as the main bases for Taiwan independence in international law[44][45][46] if such things as "self-determination" and the Montevideo Convention (on the Rights and Duties of States) are to be disregarded. These two treaties are not recognized by the Beijing government and the Pan-Blue Coalition of Taiwan.
Undetermined status theory
[edit]One hypothesis as to a legal basis for an independent Taiwanese state, the theory of the undetermined status of Taiwan, posits that:
a) Japan gained sovereignty over Taiwan in 1895
b) Japan lost sovereignty over Taiwan around 1951–1952 according to the Treaty of San Francisco
c) The Treaty of San Francisco does not assign Taiwan to any power
Therefore, some activists and legal scholars hold that, legally speaking, the island of Taiwan is not an integral part of the territory of the ROC (or any other internationally recognized state); its status is more similar to a League of Nations mandate or United Nations trust territory administered by the ROC pending a final decision.
Mainland position
[edit]The PRC government regards these agreements as irrelevant to the Taiwan issue, arguing that the Treaty of Shimonoseki (being an unequal treaty) has been nullified and that the Treaty of San Francisco assigns Taiwan to China. It also cites the Potsdam Declaration and Cairo Communique as confirming Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan; inasmuch as the PRC is the internationally recognized "China", it thus posits that it is the lawful sovereign power on the island. The United Nations currently recognizes Taiwan as an integral part of China (and thus, implicitly, the PRC).
Huadu and Taidu
[edit]Within the Pan-Green Coalition of Taiwan, there are two main factions, the Huadu and Taidu. The more moderate Huadu faction, mainly located in the ruling DPP, posits Taiwan and its outlying islands are already a sovereign state under the name "Republic of China", making a formal declaration of independence unnecessary. Huadu politics is the semi-official stance of the ruling DPP under the Lai Ching-te and Tsai Ing-wen administrations.
Conversely, the more radical Taidu faction advocates a more radical departure from the status quo by making a formal declaration of independence to create a de jure "Republic of Taiwan"; advocates for a de jure Taiwanese state can be found in smaller parties in the Pan-Green coalition, such as the Taiwan Statebuilding Party and Taiwan Solidarity Union, as well as in minority elements of the ruling DPP.
The term "Taiwan independence movement" is thus somewhat imprecise inasmuch its main representative, the DPP, does not support any change in the constitutional name of the Taiwanese state for the foreseeable future; they generally view the modern ROC as synonymous with a sovereign Taiwanese state; the incumbent President of Taiwan, Lai Ching-te of the DPP, believes that "Taiwan is already a sovereign, independent country called the Republic of China".[47]
Kinmen and Matsu issue
[edit]Background
[edit]When the government of the ROC (under the KMT) was forced to retreat to Formosa and the Pescadores[48] in 1949, several Chinese (i.e. not Japanese) islands still remained under KMT control. Because the CCP never gained control of the Kinmen, Wuqiu, and Matsu Islands, they are now governed by the Republic of China on Taiwan as Kinmen County (Kinmen and Wuqiu) and Lienchiang County (Matsu) within a streamlined Fujian Province. The islands are often referred to collectively as Quemoy and Matsu[49] or as "Golden Horse".
Historically, Kinmen County ("Quemoy") and Lienchiang County ("Matsu") served as important defensive strongholds for the KMT during the 1950–1970s, symbolizing the frontline of KMT resistance against the Communist rebellion. They represented the last MKT presence in "mainland China".[50] The islands received immense coverage from Western (especially United States) media during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954–1955 and the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958. They were very significant in the context of the Cold War, a period from 1946 until 1991 of geopolitical tension between the Eastern Bloc and the Western Bloc.
Ever since the transition into multi-party politics (i.e. "Democratization") during the 1990s, Kinmen and Lienchiang counties have now essentially developed into two electorates that can be contested through democratic elections. Currently, the two electorates are "strongholds" for the KMT,[51] due mainly to popular opinion within the electorates, rather than brute control (as in the past). The two electorates have recently developed close relations with the mainland, which lies only around 2–9 km west from the islands, whereas Taiwan lies around 166–189 km east from the islands.
Significance of Quemoy and Matsu
[edit]Quemoy and Matsu are unique and important for several reasons.
- The islands straddle the southeastern coastline of mainland China, only a few kilometers away from mainland China's Fujian Province.
- The islands are geographically defined as being part of mainland China rather than Taiwan (aka "Formosa and the Pescadores").
- The islands are defined as comprising the truncated, streamlined Fujian Province (officially "Fuchien Province") of the ROC on Taiwan.
Quemoy and Matsu in Cross-Strait relations
[edit]Reportedly, the local government of Kinmen County supports stronger business and cultural ties with mainland China, similarly to the Kuomintang, and views itself as an important proxy (representative) or nexus (focal point) for improving Cross-Strait relations (that is, in the favour of Chinese unification). In January 2001, direct travel between Kinmen County (and Lienchiang County) and mainland China re-opened under the "mini Three Links".[52] As of 2015, Kinmen has plans to become a special economic zone (SEZ), in which free trade and free investment would be allowed between it and the neighbouring mainland SEZ of Xiamen.[53] This could be accomplished in part by building a huge bridge connecting Kinmen to Xiamen, via the island of Lesser Kinmen (Lieyu);[54] a bridge has since been constructed between Greater Kinmen and Lesser Kinmen.[55] Additionally, Kinmen has plans to become a "university island".[56] In 2010, the "National Kinmen Institute of Technology" was upgraded to "National Quemoy University".[57] Kinmen County plans to establish several branches of mainland Chinese universities in Kinmen, and has bargained with the central Taiwanese (ROC) government so that universities in Kinmen don't have to be bounded by the same quotas as other Taiwanese universities in terms of admitting mainland Chinese students. In 2018, the local government of Kinmen County unveiled a new undersea pipeline linking Kinmen to mainland China, through which drinking-water can be imported.[58] This business deal caused controversy in Taiwan and resulted in a "stand-off" between Kinmen County and the Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan (ROC).[59]
Quemoy and Matsu as part of Taiwan
[edit]Within Taiwan, the radical camp believes that Kinmen County (Quemoy) and Lienchiang County (Matsu) should be abandoned from a potential independent and sovereign Taiwanese state. This view aligns with the aforementioned treaties and acts that do not define Kinmen and Matsu as being part of Taiwan. This same camp also believes that the PRC has only "allowed" the ROC to continue controlling Kinmen and Matsu in order to "tether" Taiwan to mainland China. The fact that the PRC propagandizes Kinmen and Matsu is evidence that this is true to at least a certain degree. In a hypothetical scenario where Kinmen and Matsu are abandoned by the Taiwanese state, they would likely be "ceded" to the PRC via a peace treaty, officially ending the Chinese Civil War. Many domestic and foreign defense analysts also grimly conclude that the islands could likely be easily taken by the PLA given its short distance from the mainland should the Chinese choose to do so,[60][61] and many inhabitants identify with China and would likely not resist due to their shared identity and ethnicity.[62][63]
Also within Taiwan, the moderate camp believes that Quemoy and Matsu belong to Taiwan. This camp believes that the ROC and Taiwan have become one and the same. By this logic, Taiwan effectively owns all of the same territories that the ROC is said to own. Among these territories is Quemoy and Matsu. If a potential Taiwanese state were to be created, this camp believes that the new country will actually be the successor state to the ROC, rather than an entirely new country. Therefore, if Taiwan independence were to be successfully achieved, then the islands of Quemoy and Matsu would hypothetically cease to be administered as "Fujian Province", and would instead simply be classified as "satellite islands of Taiwan" (much in the same way as Penghu).
Despite the differing views of these two camps, there is a general understanding throughout Taiwan that Quemoy and Matsu are not part of the historical region of "Taiwan", due to having never been governed under the following regimes: Dutch Formosa, Spanish Formosa, Kingdom of Tungning, Republic of Formosa, and Japanese Formosa. Additionally, Quemoy and Matsu experienced a unique history for several years as military outposts of the ROC, further separating the islands from Taiwan in terms of culture.
Positions
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The questions of independence and the island's relationship to mainland China are complex and inspire very strong emotions among Taiwanese people. There are some who continue to maintain the KMT's position, which states that the ROC is the sole legitimate government for all of China (of which they consider Taiwan to be a part), and that the aim of the government should be eventual unification of the mainland and Taiwan under the rule of the ROC. Some argue that Taiwan has been, and should continue to be, completely independent from China and should become a Taiwanese state with a distinct name. Then, there are numerous positions running the entire spectrum between these two extremes, as well as differing opinions on how best to manage either situation should it ever be realized.
On 25 October 2004, in Beijing, the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said Taiwan is "not sovereign," provoking strong comments from both the Pan-Green and Pan-Blue coalitions – but for very different reasons. From the DPP's side, President Chen declared that "Taiwan is definitely a sovereign, independent country, a great country that absolutely does not belong to the People's Republic of China". The TSU (Taiwan Solidarity Union) criticized Powell, and questioned why the US sold weapons to Taiwan if it were not a sovereign state. From the KMT, then Chairman Ma Ying-jeou announced, "the Republic of China has been a sovereign state ever since it was formed [in 1912]." The pro-unification PFP Party Chairman, James Soong, called it "Taiwan's biggest failure in diplomacy."[64]
Support for independence
[edit]
The first view considers the move for Taiwan independence as a nationalist movement. Historically, this was the view of such pro-independence groups as the Tangwai movement (which later grew into the DPP) who argued that the ROC under the KMT had been a "foreign regime" forcibly imposed on Taiwan. Since the 1990s, supporters of Taiwan independence no longer actively make this argument. Instead, the argument has been that, in order to survive the growing power of the PRC, Taiwan must view itself as a separate and distinct entity from "China." Such a change in view involves:
- removing the name of "China" from official and unofficial items in Taiwan,
- changes in history books, which now portrays Taiwan as a central entity,
- promoting the use of Hokkien Language in the government and in the education system,
- reducing economic and cultural links with mainland China,
- opposing Chinese unification regardless of China liberalizing or becoming a liberal democracy
- promoting the general thinking that Taiwan is a separate entity.
The goal of this movement is the eventual creation of a country where China is a foreign entity, and Taiwan is an internationally recognized country separate from any concept of "China." The proposed "Republic of Taiwan" will exclude areas such as Quemoy and Matsu off the coast of Fujian, and some of the islands in the South China Sea (Taiping Island, Pratas Island, Zhongzhou Reef), which historically were not part of Taiwan. Some supporters of Taiwan independence argue that the Treaty of San Francisco justifies Taiwan independence by not explicitly granting Taiwan to either the ROC or the PRC, even though neither the PRC nor the ROC government accepts such legal justification. It is also thought that if formal independence were declared, Taiwan's foreign policies would lean further towards Japan and the United States, and the desirable option of United Nations Trusteeship Council is also considered.[65]
The Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP) won a single seat in the Legislative Yuan in the 1998 legislative election. The Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) was formed in 2001, and is also supportive of independence. Though it gained more legislative support than TAIP in elections, the TSU's legislative representation has dropped over time. In 2018, political parties and organizations demanding a referendum on Taiwan's independence formed an alliance to further their objective. The Formosa Alliance was established on 7 April 2018, prompted by a sense of crisis in the face of growing pressure from China for unification. The alliance wanted to hold a referendum on Taiwan's independence in April 2019, and change the island's name from the "Republic of China" to "Taiwan," and apply for membership in the United Nations.[66] In August 2019, another party supportive of independence, the Taiwan Action Party Alliance was founded.
Support for status quo
[edit]A second view is that Taiwan is already an independent nation with the official name "Republic of China," which has been independent (i.e. de facto separate from mainland China/de jure separate from PRC) since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, when the ROC lost control of mainland China, with only Taiwan (including the Penghu islands), Kinmen (Quemoy), the Matsu Islands off the coast of Fujian Province, and some of the islands in the South China Sea remaining under its administration.[67] Although previously no major political faction adopted this pro-status quo viewpoint, because it is a "compromise" in face of PRC threats and American warnings against a unilateral declaration of independence, the DPP combined it with their traditional belief to form their latest official policy.
This viewpoint has not been adopted by more radical groups such as the Taiwan Solidarity Union, which favor only the view described above and are in favor of an independent Republic or State of Taiwan. In addition, many members of the Pan-Blue Coalition are rather suspicious of this view, fearing that adopting this definition of Taiwan independence is merely an insincere stealth tactical effort to advance de-sinicization and the radical view of Taiwan independence. As a result, supporters of Pan-Blue tend to make a clear distinction between Taiwan independence and Taiwan sovereignty, while supporters of Pan-Green tend to try to blur the distinction between the two.[68]
Most Taiwanese and political parties of the ROC support the status quo and recognize de facto independence through sovereign self-rule.[69] Even among those who believe Taiwan is and should remain independent, the threat of war from the PRC softens their approach, and they tend to support maintaining the status quo rather than pursuing an ideological path that could result in war with the PRC. When President Lee Teng-hui put forth the two-states policy, he received 80% support. A similar situation arose when President Chen Shui-bian declared that there was "one country on each side" of the Taiwan Strait. To this day, the parties disagree, sometimes bitterly, on such things as territory, name (ROC or Taiwan), future policies, and interpretations of history. The Pan-Blue Coalition and the PRC believe that Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian are intent on publicly promoting a moderate form of Taiwan independence in order to advance secretly deeper forms of Taiwan independence, and that they intend to use popular support on Taiwan for political separation to advance notions of cultural and economic separation.
Opposition to independence
[edit]

The third view, put forward by the government of the PRC and Nationalists of the KMT, defines Taiwan independence as "splitting Taiwan from China, causing division of the nation and the people." What the PRC claims by this statement is somewhat ambiguous according to supporters of Taiwanese independence, as some statements by the PRC seem to identify China solely and uncompromisingly with the PRC. Others propose a broader and more flexible definition suggesting that both mainland China and Taiwan are parts that form one cultural and geographic entity, although divided politically as a vestige of the Chinese Civil War. Chinese nationalists have called the Taiwan independence movement and its supporters to be hanjian (traitors).[70][71]
The KMT and the broader Pan-Blue coalition believe that China should be unified under the ROC and opposes any attempts in de-sinicization that erases any links with China. Since 2016, divisions have emerged in the coalition following electoral defeats and widespread sentiments among the Taiwanese electorate that rejects any form of unification, with pro-Beijing elements beginning to infiltrate the ranks of the coalition through the united front that advocate unification under the PRC.[72]
The PRC considers itself the sole legitimate government of all China, and the ROC to be a defunct entity replaced in the Communist revolution that succeeded in 1949. Therefore, assertions that the ROC is a sovereign state are construed as support for Taiwan independence, so are proposals to change the name of the ROC. Such a name change is met with even more disapproval since it rejects Taiwan as part of the greater China entity (as one side of a still-unresolved Chinese civil war). The ROC used to be recognized by the UN as the sole legal government of China until 1971. In that year, the UN Resolution 2758 was passed, and the PRC became recognized as the legal government of China by the UN.
The CCP classifies Taiwan independence activists as one of the Five Poisons.[73][74] In 2005, the 10th National People's Congress passed the Anti-Secession Law authorizing military force for unification.[75] In 2024, the Chinese government issued a directive to the courts stating that "diehard" independence supporters could be tried in absentia with capital punishment imposed.[76][77]
Opinion polls
[edit]Several polls have indicated an increase in support of Taiwanese independence in the three decades after 1990. In a Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF) poll conducted in June 2020, 54% of respondents supported de jure independence for Taiwan, 23.4% preferred maintaining the status quo, 12.5% favored unification with China, and 10% did not hold any particular view on the matter. This represented the highest level of support for Taiwanese independence since the survey was first conducted in 1991.[78][79] A later TPOF poll in 2022 showed similar results, as 50% said they support Taiwan independence, 11.8% were for unification, 25.7% were for maintaining status quo.[80][81] In the Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland Survey by The Election Study Center of National Chengchi University there has been a steady increase in respondents choosing "maintain the status quo and move toward independence in the future" since the survey began in 1994. However, the option "maintain the status quo indefinitely" had a similar increase in the same period and the most popular option was "maintain the status quo and decide in the future between independence or unification" every year between 1994 and 2022. The option "independence as soon as possible" never went above 10% in the same time period. "Unification as soon as possible" has been more unpopular – never going above 4.5%.[82][83][84]
| Date(s) conducted |
Polling firm |
Sample size | Margin of error | Independence[a] | Unification[b] | Status quo | No opinion | Lead |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 17–21 October 2019 | MAC[85] | 1,073 | ±2.99 pp | 27.7% | 10.3% | 56.8% | 5.2% | 29.1% |
| 21–24 November 2019 | CWM[86] | 1,073 | ±2.99 pp | 32% | 5.5% | 58.1% | 4.4% | 26.1% |
| 15–16 June 2020 | TPOF[87] | 1,074 | ±2.99 pp | 54% | 12.5% | 23.4% | 10% | 30.6% |
| 8–9 August 2022 | TPOF[88] | 1,035 | ±3.05 pp | 50% | 11.8% | 25.7% | 12.5% | 24.3% |
| Year conducted |
Sample size | Independence as soon as possible | Maintain status quo, move toward independence | Maintain status quo, decide at a later date | Maintain status quo indefinitely | Maintain status quo, move toward unification | Unification as soon as possible | No opinion |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1994 | 1,209 | 3.1% | 8.0% | 38.5% | 9.8% | 15.6% | 4.4% | 20.5% |
| 1995 | 21,402 | 3.5% | 8.1% | 26.3% | 15.6% | 19.4% | 2.3% | 26.3% |
| 1996 | 10,666 | 4.1% | 9.5% | 30.5% | 15.3% | 19.5% | 2.5% | 18.6% |
| 1997 | 3,910 | 5.7% | 11.5% | 30.5% | 16.3% | 17.3% | 3.2% | 15.4% |
| 1998 | 14,063 | 5.7% | 11.5% | 30.3% | 15.9% | 15.9% | 2.1% | 18.7% |
| 1999 | 9,273 | 4.7% | 13.6% | 30.9% | 18.8% | 15.2% | 2.2% | 15.2% |
| 2000 | 11,062 | 3.1% | 11.6% | 29.5% | 19.2% | 17.3% | 2.0% | 17.4% |
| 2001 | 10,679 | 3.7% | 10.5% | 35.9% | 16.4% | 17.5% | 2.8% | 10.5% |
| 2002 | 10,003 | 4.3% | 13.8% | 36.2% | 15.0% | 15.7% | 2.5% | 12.4% |
| 2003 | 14,247 | 6.2% | 14.5% | 35.0% | 18.0% | 11.9% | 1.8% | 12.5% |
| 2004 | 34,854 | 4.4% | 15.2% | 36.5% | 20.9% | 10.6% | 1.5% | 11.0% |
| 2005 | 7,939 | 6.1% | 14.2% | 37.3% | 19.9% | 12.3% | 1.8% | 8.5% |
| 2006 | 13,193 | 5.6% | 13.8% | 38.7% | 19.9% | 12.1% | 2.0% | 7.9% |
| 2007 | 13,910 | 7.8% | 13.7% | 36.8% | 18.4% | 10.0% | 1.9% | 11.4% |
| 2008 | 16,280 | 7.1% | 16.0% | 35.8% | 21.5% | 8.7% | 1.5% | 9.4% |
| 2009 | 20,244 | 5.8% | 15.0% | 35.1% | 26.2% | 8.5% | 1.3% | 8.1% |
| 2010 | 13,163 | 6.2% | 16.2% | 35.9% | 25.4% | 9.0% | 1.2% | 6.1% |
| 2011 | 23,779 | 4.6% | 15.6% | 33.8% | 27.4% | 8.8% | 1.5% | 8.2% |
| 2012 | 18,011 | 4.8% | 15.1% | 33.9% | 27.7% | 8.7% | 1.7% | 8.1% |
| 2013 | 13,359 | 5.7% | 17.2% | 32.6% | 26.3% | 9.2% | 1.9% | 7.2% |
| 2014 | 20,009 | 5.9% | 18.0% | 34.3% | 25.2% | 7.9% | 1.3% | 7.3% |
| 2015 | 22,509 | 4.3% | 17.9% | 34.0% | 25.4% | 8.1% | 1.5% | 8.8% |
| 2016 | 15,099 | 4.6% | 18.3% | 33.3% | 26.1% | 8.5% | 1.7% | 7.4% |
| 2017 | 13,455 | 5.1% | 17.2% | 33.1% | 25.3% | 10.1% | 2.3% | 6.9% |
| 2018 | 9,490 | 5.0% | 15.1% | 33.4% | 24.0% | 12.8% | 3.1% | 6.6% |
| 2019 | 16,276 | 5.1% | 21.8% | 29.8% | 27.8% | 7.5% | 1.4% | 6.5% |
| 2020 | 11,490 | 6.6% | 25.8% | 28.8% | 25.5% | 5.6% | 1.0% | 6.8% |
| 2021 | 12,026 | 6.0% | 25.1% | 28.4% | 27.3% | 6.0% | 1.4% | 5.8% |
| 2022 | 12,173 | 5.2% | 24.4% | 27.7% | 29.4% | 5.9% | 1.3% | 6.0% |
| 2023 | 14,933 | 3.8% | 21.5% | 27.9% | 33.2% | 6.2% | 1.2% | 6.2% |
| 2024/06 | 6,151 | 3.8% | 22.4% | 27.3% | 33.6% | 5.5% | 1.1% | 6.3% |
See also
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ Includes respondents who answered that they would like the ROC government to maintain the status quo at present but eventually work towards independence.
- ^ Includes respondents who answered that they would like the ROC government to maintain the status quo at present but eventually work towards unification with China.
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- ^ "Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland(1994/12~2024/12)".
Further reading
[edit]- Bush, R. & O'Hanlon, M. (2007). A War Like No Other: The Truth About China's Challenge to America. Wiley. ISBN 0-471-98677-1
- Bush, R. (2006). Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-1290-1
- Carpenter, T. (2006). America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 1-4039-6841-1
- Cole, B. (2006). Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects. Routledge. ISBN 0-415-36581-3
- Copper, J. (2006). Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan. Praeger Security International General Interest. ISBN 0-275-98888-0
- Federation of American Scientists et al. (2006). Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning Archived 28 April 2011 at the Wayback Machine
- Gill, B. (2007). Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-3146-9
- Manthorpe, Jonathan (2008). Forbidden Nation: a History of Taiwan. Palgrave MacMillan. ISBN 1-4039-6981-7
- Shi, Ming (1986). Taiwan's 400 Year History: The Origins and Continuing Development of the Taiwanese Society and People. Washington, D.C.: Taiwanese Cultural Grassroots Association. ISBN 9780939367009.
- Shirk, S. (2007). China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-530609-0
- Tsang, S. (2006). If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics. Routledge. ISBN 0-415-40785-0
- Tucker, N.B. (2005). Dangerous Strait: the U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-13564-5
Taiwan independence movement
View on GrokipediaHistorical Development
Origins and Pre-Democratic Roots
The roots of the Taiwan independence movement trace back to the Japanese colonial period (1895–1945), during which Taiwanese elites, educated under Japanese rule, began articulating ideas of self-determination and home rule. In the 1920s, organizations like the Taiwan Cultural Association promoted cultural revival and political reforms, drawing on Taishō democracy and emerging Taiwanese consciousness to petition for greater autonomy within the empire, distinct from full independence demands seen elsewhere.[12][2] These efforts laid early groundwork for a separate Taiwanese identity, influenced by resistance to assimilation policies like kōminka, though outright independence advocacy remained limited amid suppression.[13] Following retrocession to the Republic of China on October 25, 1945, initial optimism among Taiwanese for self-governance under Kuomintang (KMT) rule quickly eroded due to administrative corruption, economic mismanagement, and cultural impositions by mainland officials. Hyperinflation exceeding 3,000% by 1949 and monopolistic controls exacerbated grievances, fostering perceptions of exploitation by the incoming regime.[14] The 228 Incident of February 28, 1947, crystallized these tensions: a dispute over a tobacco sales agent's beating of a vendor sparked protests, met with KMT military crackdown that killed an estimated 10,000 to 28,000 civilians, targeting intellectuals and elites.[15][16] This massacre, remembered as a foundational trauma, spurred underground networks and exile groups advocating Taiwan's separation from Chinese governance, constructing a narrative of distinct native identity against "outer province" domination. Early theorists like Joshua Wen-Kwei Liao (1905–1952), active in the 1920s–1940s, rejected both Japanese and Chinese sovereignty, proposing an independent republic based on Taiwan's unique history and multi-ethnic composition.[17][18] Such ideas persisted covertly after the KMT's 1949 retreat to Taiwan, amid martial law, fueling the movement's ideological foundations despite repression.[19]Martial Law Period (1949–1987)
Following the retreat of the Kuomintang (KMT) government to Taiwan after its defeat in the Chinese Civil War, martial law was declared on May 19, 1949, and took effect the next day, initiating a 38-year period of authoritarian control that lasted until July 15, 1987.[20][21] This era, known as the White Terror, saw the KMT rigorously suppress any advocacy for Taiwan independence, equating it with sedition and treason against the Republic of China's (ROC) constitutional claim to sovereignty over the entire Chinese mainland.[20][21] Public discussion of independence was forbidden, and the regime promoted a unified Chinese national identity through education, media control, and cultural policies that marginalized native Taiwanese (benshengren) heritage in favor of Mandarin-centric assimilation.[20] Political offenses under the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion enabled mass arrests, with estimates of 140,000 to 200,000 individuals detained and 18,000 to 28,000 executed or otherwise killed for perceived disloyalty, including independence sympathies often conflated with communism.[22][23] Domestically, independence sentiments persisted underground among intellectuals and dissidents resentful of KMT dominance, but overt activities were rare due to severe reprisals. A pivotal domestic act occurred in 1964 when political scientist Peng Ming-min and associates drafted the "Taiwan People's Manifesto for Self-Salvation," explicitly calling for Taiwan's separation from China and democratic self-determination; Peng was arrested, imprisoned until 1965, and placed under house arrest before escaping to Japan in 1970 disguised as a tourist.[24][25] Such manifestos highlighted grievances over KMT authoritarianism and economic favoritism toward mainlanders (waishengren), but most proponents operated in secrecy to avoid the Taiwan Garrison Command's surveillance and punitive measures.[21] Exile communities abroad provided a safer venue for organized advocacy, with Taiwanese students and professionals in the United States, Japan, and Europe forming early groups from the 1950s onward to publicize repression and promote self-rule.[26] The World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) coalesced in 1970, merging organizations from Japan, the US, Canada, and Europe to advocate establishing an independent Republic of Taiwan, conducting lobbying, publications, and protests against KMT policies.[27][28] Notable actions included a 1970 assassination attempt on KMT leader Chiang Ching-kuo in a New York hotel by two Formosan activists, underscoring the movement's desperation amid domestic crackdowns.[29] By the late 1970s, accumulating international isolation—such as the US shifting recognition to the People's Republic of China in 1979—fueled domestic dissent, culminating in the Kaohsiung Incident on December 10, 1979. Organized by dangwai opposition figures as a Human Rights Day rally, the event demanded press freedom and assembly rights but drew independence sympathizers; authorities' violent suppression led to over 100 arrests, including leaders like Shih Ming-teh, whose public trials exposed regime abuses and inspired broader calls for reform.[30][31] While not explicitly an independence uprising, it amplified underground networks and shifted focus toward democratization as a prerequisite for addressing sovereignty questions.[30]Transition to Democracy (1987–2000)
The termination of martial law on July 15, 1987, after 38 years of enforcement under the Kuomintang (KMT) regime, marked a pivotal liberalization that enabled the open organization of opposition groups advocating for Taiwan's distinct identity and potential independence.[32][33] This decree, imposed since 1949 to suppress dissent including pro-independence sentiments, had criminalized activities perceived as threats to national security, such as calls for self-determination by native Taiwanese.[34] Its lifting, alongside the repeal of bans on new political parties and publications, facilitated the formal legalization of groups previously operating underground or as the tangwai (non-KMT) alliance.[33] Preceding this by nearly a year, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was established on September 28, 1986, by 135 dissidents at Taipei's Grand Hotel, defying existing prohibitions and drawing from human rights activists, defense lawyers, and tangwai figures who prioritized ethnic Taiwanese self-determination, democratic reforms, and an end to one-party rule.[35][36] The party's platform explicitly supported federalism or independence as options for Taiwan's future, contrasting the KMT's emphasis on eventual unification with mainland China, and it quickly became a vehicle for independence advocacy amid suppressed native Taiwanese grievances from events like the 1947 228 Incident.[35] Although initially illegal, the DPP's formation pressured the KMT toward concessions, with full legalization following the 1989 Civic Organizations Law, allowing it to contest elections and amplify pro-independence discourse.[37] Chiang Ching-kuo's death on January 13, 1988, elevated Vice President Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese agronomist, to the presidency, initiating a phase of "Taiwanization" that reshaped KMT policies and indirectly bolstered independence currents.[32] Lee accelerated democratization by retiring aging KMT legislators elected in 1947 from mainland constituencies, promoting local Taiwanese officials, and fostering civic education emphasizing Taiwan's separate historical trajectory from China.[38] These reforms, while maintaining KMT dominance, eroded the party's mainland-centric ideology, enabling public debate on sovereignty and identity; Lee's administration viewed Taiwan as a distinct entity, with policies like educational curricula highlighting indigenous and Japanese colonial influences over Chinese narratives.[38] The period culminated in Taiwan's first direct presidential election on March 23, 1996, where Lee secured 54% of the vote (5.85 million ballots) against fragmented opposition, including DPP candidate Peng Ming-min's 21% advocating explicit independence.[39][40] Held amid the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis—triggered by China's missile tests protesting Lee's U.S. visit—the vote affirmed democratic consolidation and rejected Beijing's intimidation, with turnout exceeding 76% signaling robust civic engagement.[40] By 2000, cumulative reforms enabled the DPP's Chen Shui-bian to win the presidency on March 18 with 39.3% in a three-way race, marking the first partisan turnover and validating independence-leaning platforms as viable, though Chen pledged to maintain the status quo to avert conflict.[41] This transition empowered pro-independence forces by institutionalizing electoral competition, yet entrenched divisions, as KMT hardliners decried it as a drift from anti-communist orthodoxy.[38]Post-2000 Administrations and Policy Shifts
The election of Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as president on March 18, 2000, marked the first transfer of power from the Kuomintang (KMT) to an opposition party, reflecting growing domestic support for policies emphasizing Taiwanese identity over unification with China.[42] Chen, known for his advocacy of Taiwan independence prior to office, moderated his stance upon inauguration by pledging adherence to the "four noes" policy—no declaration of independence, no change to the national title, no inclusion of independence in the constitution, and no promotion of separatism—while pursuing incremental steps to assert Taiwan's distinct status, such as proposing constitutional reforms and a 2003 referendum law allowing votes on independence if China attacked.[43] These actions, including bids for United Nations membership under the name "Taiwan" in 2007 and 2008, heightened tensions with Beijing, which viewed them as de facto moves toward separation, prompting increased military threats; however, Chen refrained from formal independence due to Taiwan's military inferiority and U.S. warnings against destabilizing the status quo.[42][44] The 2008 presidential victory of KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou shifted policy toward cross-strait engagement, predicated on the "1992 Consensus"—an ambiguous understanding of "one China" with differing interpretations—leading to resumed dialogue, the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) on June 29, 2010, and over 40 agreements reducing economic barriers with China.[45] Ma's administration explicitly pledged no pursuit of independence in exchange for China's non-use of force, fostering a period of stabilized relations with increased trade (reaching $200 billion annually by 2016) and tourism, but this rapprochement faced backlash from pro-independence groups, culminating in the 2014 Sunflower Movement, where students occupied the legislature for 24 days to protest the unratified Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement, arguing it eroded Taiwan's autonomy and facilitated Chinese political influence.[46][47] Critics within Taiwan, including DPP leaders, contended that Ma's policies prioritized economic ties over sovereignty safeguards, though empirical data showed no territorial concessions and a temporary decline in Chinese military incursions.[45] DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen's landslide win on January 16, 2016, reversed Ma's trajectory by rejecting the 1992 Consensus, framing Taiwan's identity as rooted in democratic self-determination rather than historical ties to China, while upholding the status quo of neither formal independence nor unification.[48] Tsai's government bolstered defense spending to 2.4% of GDP by 2022, expanded alliances with the U.S. (including $18 billion in arms sales from 2016–2024), and promoted "New Southbound Policy" diversification away from China-dependent trade, prompting Beijing to escalate "gray zone" coercion such as daily military flights into Taiwan's air defense zone (over 1,700 incursions in 2022 alone).[49] Her successor, Lai Ching-te, inaugurated on May 20, 2024, after winning 40% of the vote on January 13, 2024, continued this approach, emphasizing sovereignty in his inaugural address (invoking it seven times) and rejecting China's territorial claims, which Beijing labeled as separatist provocations leading to intensified drills simulating blockades.[49][50] Lai's administration has maintained Tsai's pragmatic restraint on de jure independence to avoid escalation, focusing instead on resilience through asymmetric warfare capabilities and international partnerships, amid polls showing 80–90% public preference for the status quo over unification or declaration.[48]Legal and Historical Foundations
Sovereignty Claims and Undetermined Status Theory
The Taiwan independence movement bases its sovereignty claims on the assertion that the Republic of China (ROC) exercises effective governance and control over Taiwan proper, the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, Matsu, and other offshore territories, constituting a distinct political entity separate from the People's Republic of China (PRC). Advocates maintain that this de facto sovereignty, maintained since the ROC's retreat to Taiwan in 1949, aligns with principles of effective occupation and the self-determination rights of Taiwan's 23 million residents, who have not consented to unification with the PRC. The ROC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has rebutted PRC assertions by emphasizing that the PRC has never governed Taiwan and lacks legitimate claims, positioning the ROC as the continuing sovereign authority over its controlled territories.[51] Central to these claims is the undetermined status theory, which argues that Taiwan's international legal status remains unresolved due to ambiguities in post-World War II arrangements. Under this view, Japan's formal renunciation of Taiwan (Formosa) and the Penghu Islands in Article 2(b) of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty did not transfer sovereignty to any specific successor, as the ROC was excluded from the treaty negotiations and the document explicitly avoided designating a recipient. The 1943 Cairo Declaration and 1945 Potsdam Proclamation, often cited by the PRC as intending restoration to "China," are regarded as non-binding political intentions rather than enforceable treaties, lacking ratification or precise legal effect under international law.[52][53] The 1952 Treaty of Taipei between the ROC and Japan further complicated matters by having Japan recognize ROC sovereignty over Taiwan without explicitly ceding it, leaving the island in a state of interim status pending formal determination. Proponents of the theory, including legal scholars and elements within the independence movement, contend this vacuum allows Taiwan's population to determine its future status through democratic processes, rather than inheriting PRC claims based on historical assertions of Chinese suzerainty, which lack consistent empirical control prior to 1945.[54][55] The United States has referenced this undetermined framework in its policy, with the American Institute in Taiwan stating in September 2025 that World War II-era documents do not confer sovereignty over Taiwan to the PRC, preserving strategic ambiguity to deter unilateral changes. This position underscores the theory's role in supporting Taiwan's separate status, though critics, including PRC officials, dismiss it as a fabricated excuse to evade "one China" realities, citing UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971) as affirming PRC representation without addressing territorial disposition. Independence advocates counter that such resolutions address seating rights, not sovereignty transfer, reinforcing the empirical reality of Taiwan's autonomous governance.[56][52]PRC's Territorial Assertions and One China Policy
The People's Republic of China (PRC) maintains that Taiwan is an inalienable part of its territory, constituting a province under its sovereignty, a position codified in its constitution and reiterated in official documents. This assertion traces its historical basis to claims of continuous Chinese sovereignty over the island since ancient dynasties, with Taiwan formalized as China's 20th province in 1885 under the Qing Dynasty, before its cession to Japan in 1895 via the Treaty of Shimonoseki and purported return to China following Japan's defeat in 1945 as per the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation.[57] The PRC views the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949) as suspending but not extinguishing this sovereignty, with the retreat of Republic of China (ROC) forces to Taiwan in 1949 representing internal division rather than legitimate separation.[58] Central to these territorial claims is the One China principle, which holds that there is only one sovereign China in the world, Taiwan is part of China, and the PRC government is the sole legal representative of China's sovereignty.[59] This principle, distinct from the "One China policy" adopted by entities like the United States—which acknowledges but does not necessarily endorse PRC sovereignty over Taiwan—serves as the foundational policy for PRC cross-strait relations.[48] The PRC enforces this through diplomatic pressure, securing recognition from 119 UN member states as of 2025 that affirm its sovereignty over Taiwan, often via joint communiqués or trade agreements conditioning economic ties on adherence to the principle.[60] Legally, the PRC's assertions are enshrined in the 2005 Anti-Secession Law, enacted by the National People's Congress on March 14, 2005, which explicitly opposes "Taiwan's secession from China" and authorizes the state to employ "non-peaceful means and other necessary measures" if Taiwan declares independence, if "major incidents" threatening secession occur, or if peaceful reunification becomes impossible.[61] This law builds on Article 4 of the PRC Constitution (amended 2004), affirming Taiwan as part of Chinese territory. The 2022 white paper "The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era," released August 10, 2022, by the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, reinforces these claims by framing reunification as essential to national rejuvenation, rejecting any notion of Taiwan's separate status and warning against "Taiwan independence" forces as obstacles to peace.[62][59] These documents collectively position independence movements as existential threats, justifying potential military action to preserve territorial integrity.Role of Kinmen, Matsu, and Offshore Islands
Kinmen, Matsu, and other offshore islands such as Wuqiu, administered by the Republic of China (ROC) since the Chinese Civil War, hold distinct historical and legal status compared to the main island of Taiwan and Penghu. Unlike Taiwan proper, which was ceded to Japan in 1895 under the Treaty of Shimonoseki and retroceded to the ROC in 1945, these islands remained part of Fujian Province under ROC control throughout the Japanese colonial period and were never incorporated into the Japanese-administered Taiwan.[63] Their retention by ROC forces followed successful defenses against People's Liberation Army (PLA) invasions, including the Battle of Guningtou in October 1949 on Kinmen and subsequent Taiwan Strait Crises in 1954–1955 and 1958, during which PRC shelling targeted these positions but failed to dislodge ROC garrisons.[64] This history underscores their role as forward ROC positions in the Taiwan Strait, providing early warning and denying PRC staging areas for potential amphibious operations against Taiwan.[65] In the context of Taiwan independence advocacy, these islands complicate territorial definitions, as some pro-independence proponents argue for excluding them from a hypothetical independent "Republic of Taiwan" to align with a sovereignty claim rooted in the post-World War II status of Japanese-era Taiwan, excluding Fujian-adjacent enclaves.[63] Kinmen, located approximately 10 kilometers from Xiamen in Fujian, and Matsu, similarly proximate, feature populations with strong familial, cultural, and economic ties to the mainland, fostering sentiments more aligned with cross-strait integration than separation. Local political dynamics reflect this, with Kinmen consistently serving as a stronghold for the Kuomintang (KMT) and pan-Blue forces favoring status quo or eventual unification; in the 2020 presidential election, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Tsai Ing-wen received only 21.77% in Kinmen and 19.81% in Matsu, compared to higher national support.[66][67] Economic initiatives, such as Kinmen's direct trade and tourism links with mainland China since the 1990s and a 2015 water supply pipeline from Fujian, further embed these islands in PRC-influenced networks, potentially undermining independence narratives centered on Taiwan's distinct identity.[68] Legally, the islands' status amplifies ambiguities in ROC-PRC sovereignty disputes and international commitments. The United States' Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 explicitly defines "Taiwan" as encompassing the main island and Penghu but omits Kinmen and Matsu, reflecting historical U.S. policy since the 1950s to avoid automatic defense obligations for these outlying areas during crises.[69] This exclusion has fueled PRC gray-zone tactics, including increased maritime incursions and incidents like the February 2024 sinking of a Kinmen fishing vessel by PRC coast guard, interpreted as efforts to erode ROC control without triggering full-scale conflict over Taiwan proper.[70] Independence advocates view the islands as potential flashpoints or bargaining chips, where PRC seizure could normalize aggression short of invading Taiwan, yet their integration into ROC administration—evidenced by inclusion in national elections and defense—ties their fate to broader de jure independence debates, challenging proposals to detach them without risking perceived abandonment.[71]Ideological Frameworks
Concepts of Taidu (Taiwan Independence) and Huadu (Chinese Unification)
The concept of taidu, or Taiwan independence, centers on the establishment of a sovereign state explicitly named the Republic of Taiwan, distinct from any historical or legal ties to the Chinese mainland. Proponents argue for a new constitution that would dissolve the current Republic of China (ROC) framework, remove references to a unified China, and affirm Taiwan's islands as a separate nation with no claim over continental territories.[72] This approach seeks to formalize de jure independence to counter the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s territorial assertions, though it risks provoking military escalation, as Beijing interprets such changes as crossing a red line toward separatism.[73] In Taiwanese politics, taidu is associated with deep-green factions, emphasizing Taiwanese identity over Chinese heritage, but it remains politically marginal due to widespread preference for the status quo, with polls showing only about 5-10% support for immediate declaration.[74] In contrast, huadu, or Republic of China independence, posits Taiwan and its outlying islands as the continuing sovereign territory of the ROC, which claims legitimacy as the original government of all China following the 1949 Chinese Civil War, while rejecting subordination to the PRC.[75] This ideology maintains the ROC's name, symbols, and constitutional continuity to preserve legal continuity and international ambiguity, avoiding provocative name changes that could invite PRC invasion, yet asserts de facto separation through democratic governance and military self-defense.[76] Huadu aligns with lighter-green and centrist positions, including elements of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), framing Taiwan's ROC as already independent without needing radical reform, and it underpins the status quo favored by over 80% of Taiwanese per recurring surveys.[5] The notion of huadu as tied to Chinese unification misaligns with its core tenets, which prioritize ROC sovereignty against PRC absorption; true unification advocacy in Taiwan, often termed tongyi, envisions eventual merger under a democratized China but garners minimal support amid PRC authoritarianism, with less than 10% of Taiwanese endorsing it in 2024 polls.[5] PRC-promoted unification follows a "one country, two systems" model, promising autonomy akin to Hong Kong's pre-2019 status, but empirical erosion of Hong Kong's freedoms—evidenced by the 2020 National Security Law's suppression of dissent—has delegitimized this framework for most Taiwanese, reinforcing resistance rooted in causal divergences in political systems and values.[73] Both taidu and huadu thus embody rejection of unification, differing primarily in symbolic de-Chinalization versus preservation of ROC claims for pragmatic deterrence.[74]De Facto Independence Under Status Quo
The Republic of China (ROC) administers Taiwan and associated islands as a sovereign entity with full control over its internal affairs, including a presidential system elected by universal suffrage, a unicameral legislature, and an independent judiciary, operating separately from the People's Republic of China (PRC) since the ROC government's relocation to Taiwan in 1949.[77] This structure enables de facto independence, characterized by autonomous policymaking, law enforcement, and public administration without interference from Beijing.[78] Taiwan maintains economic sovereignty through its own currency, the New Taiwan Dollar, and participation in global trade as the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu in the World Trade Organization since 2002, alongside memberships in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and Asian Development Bank under the designation "Chinese Taipei."[79] These arrangements facilitate independent trade policies and tariff-setting, supporting a market economy with significant exports in semiconductors and electronics, distinct from PRC economic controls.[80] Militarily, Taiwan fields the Republic of China Armed Forces, comprising approximately 215,000 active personnel as of 2023, focused on asymmetric defense capabilities against potential PRC aggression, with mandatory conscription extended to one year in 2024 to bolster deterrence under the status quo.[5] The status quo policy, articulated by successive ROC leaders from Lee Teng-hui onward, preserves this autonomy by forgoing formal independence declarations that could provoke PRC invasion, while rejecting unification, thereby sustaining de facto separation amid cross-strait tensions.[73] Over 80% of Taiwanese endorse maintaining this indefinite status quo, viewing it as equivalent to effective independence without the risks of constitutional changes.[5][81]Domestic Political Positions
Pro-Independence Advocates and DPP Influence
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), founded on September 28, 1986, by dissidents opposing the Kuomintang's authoritarian rule, has positioned itself as the primary political force advocating for Taiwan's distinct identity and self-determination.[35] Its early platform emphasized ethnic Taiwanese rights, democratic reforms, and opposition to unification with mainland China under the Chinese Communist Party, drawing from movements like the Dangwai coalition that challenged one-party rule.[35] Under DPP leadership, pro-independence sentiments gained institutional traction through electoral victories and policy shifts. Chen Shui-bian, the party's first president from 2000 to 2008, pursued initiatives like renaming state institutions to highlight "Taiwan" over "China," such as the 2003 push to alter the national title, though constrained by legislative opposition and international pressures.[37] Tsai Ing-wen, president from 2016 to 2024, moderated overt independence rhetoric to preserve the status quo while bolstering defense spending—which rose from 2.1% of GDP in 2016 to 2.5% by 2023—and fostering cultural policies affirming Taiwanese sovereignty, including education reforms emphasizing local history over Chinese-centric narratives.[82] Lai Ching-te, elected president on January 13, 2024, with 40.05% of the vote, continued this trajectory in his May 20, 2024, inauguration speech, asserting the Republic of China's sovereignty over Taiwan without mentioning the People's Republic of China, signaling continuity in resisting unification claims.[83] The DPP's third consecutive presidential win marked a historic milestone, reflecting its influence in mobilizing younger voters prioritizing Taiwan's de facto autonomy.[84] Beyond the DPP, pro-independence advocates include allied groups and figures amplifying separatist goals. The Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), founded in 2001 by former President Lee Teng-hui after his KMT split, explicitly endorses formal independence and has allied with the DPP in the Pan-Green coalition to advocate constitutional reforms for a "Republic of Taiwan."[37] Overseas organizations like the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), established in 1982, lobby U.S. policymakers for Taiwan's international recognition, organizing congressional briefings and resolutions supporting self-determination since the 1980s.[85] The World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI), active since 1970, coordinates global Taiwanese diaspora efforts for sovereignty, though its influence remains marginal compared to DPP's domestic dominance.[86] Smaller parties like the Taiwan Statebuilding Party have pushed for referendums on independence, as seen in 2025 commemorations of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, highlighting unresolved sovereignty.[87] The DPP's governance has empirically shifted public discourse toward independence, with policies like the 2017 same-sex marriage legalization and indigenous rights expansions reinforcing a pluralistic Taiwanese national identity distinct from Chinese unification narratives. However, pragmatic constraints—evident in the party's avoidance of provocative referendums post-2008 setbacks—demonstrate a calculated balance between advocacy and cross-strait stability, as mainland military exercises intensified under DPP rule, with over 1,700 PLA aircraft incursions into Taiwan's air defense zone by 2023.[82] This influence persists despite legislative minorities, as the DPP retained 51 of 113 seats in the 2024 elections, enabling veto-proof majorities on key defense bills.[88]Status Quo Maintainers
The status quo position in Taiwan's political discourse prioritizes preserving the existing arrangement of de facto sovereignty—characterized by Taiwan's independent governance, military, economy, and international participation under the Republic of China (ROC) framework—without formal declarations of independence or unification with the People's Republic of China (PRC). This stance avoids provocative actions that could escalate cross-strait tensions, emphasizing stability, economic ties, and deterrence through ambiguity rather than resolution. Proponents argue that the current setup, in place since the ROC's retreat to Taiwan in 1949, functions as effective independence in practice, rendering formal changes unnecessary and risky.[81][89] Public opinion polls consistently demonstrate overwhelming support for this position, reflecting a pragmatic consensus that transcends ideological divides. According to surveys by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University (NCCU), between 80% and 90% of respondents favor some form of status quo maintenance as of mid-2023, with approximately 28-30% explicitly preferring to maintain it indefinitely and another 50% opting to defer decisions on future status. This preference has remained stable over decades, even amid PRC military pressures, as Taiwanese prioritize peace and prosperity over ideological endpoints; for instance, support for immediate independence hovers below 6%, while unification garners under 2%. The Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation's February 2025 poll, while showing higher independence identification (51.8%), still aligns with status quo as the operational default, with only 13.3% favoring unification.[90][9][91] Politically, status quo maintainers include centrist and pragmatic elements, particularly the Taiwan People's Party (TPP), founded in 2019 by Ko Wen-je, which appeals to voters disillusioned with the binary of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Kuomintang (KMT). The TPP advocates ambiguity on cross-strait issues, rejecting both formal independence—which it views as destabilizing—and the KMT's endorsement of the 1992 Consensus, instead promoting economic engagement with the PRC while bolstering defenses and U.S. ties. TPP supporters exhibit balanced views, with 30% favoring status quo in recent polls, compared to higher independence leanings among DPP backers. This party captured 26% of the presidential vote in January 2024, signaling the viability of non-ideological platforms focused on indefinite stability. Moderate factions within the major parties also align here, such as business-oriented KMT elements wary of trade disruptions and DPP realists like former President Tsai Ing-wen, who framed Taiwan's sovereignty as already realized under the status quo during her 2016-2024 tenure.[91][92][11] Critics from the PRC perspective, including state media, contend that status quo adherence by Taiwanese leaders effectively constitutes "de-sinicization" and gradual independence, justifying military exercises to enforce unification claims. However, empirical data on Taiwanese attitudes underscores causal realism: fear of PRC invasion, rooted in events like the 2022-2025 military drills, reinforces status quo support, as economic interdependence (e.g., Taiwan's 40% export reliance on China as of 2023) incentivizes caution without conceding sovereignty. This position's durability stems from its alignment with first-hand experiences of democratic self-rule since martial law's end in 1987, rather than abstract unification ideals.[93][5]Unification Proponents and KMT Perspectives
The Kuomintang (KMT), founded in 1919 by Sun Yat-sen and historically the ruling party of the Republic of China (ROC), maintains that the ROC constitutes the legitimate government of all China, encompassing both Taiwan and the mainland. This position, rooted in the party's adherence to the Three Principles of the People—nationalism, democracy, and livelihood—envisions eventual peaceful reunification under a democratic framework rather than under the People's Republic of China (PRC) system.[94] The KMT opposes formal Taiwan independence, viewing it as a threat to ROC sovereignty and a catalyst for conflict, while prioritizing cross-strait dialogue to preserve the status quo.[95] Under former President Ma Ying-jeou (2008–2016), the KMT pursued policies of economic engagement with the PRC, including the 2010 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which reduced tariffs on over 500 items and boosted bilateral trade to $200 billion by 2015. Ma advocated for "peaceful and democratic unification," emphasizing mutual non-renunciation of force and no formal independence pledges, as reiterated in his June 27, 2025, speech at Peking University.[96] [97] These efforts were framed as stabilizing measures to avert military escalation, drawing on shared cultural and historical ties dating to the ROC's retreat to Taiwan in 1949 after the Chinese Civil War.[98] Current KMT leadership, including Chairman Eric Chu until October 2025 and successor Cheng Li-wun elected on October 18, 2025, upholds the 1992 Consensus—one China with respective interpretations—as a basis for dialogue, rejecting PRC demands for explicit subordination.[99] [100] Pro-unification proponents within the KMT argue that sustained engagement fosters economic interdependence—Taiwan's exports to the PRC reached 42% of total exports in 2023—and leverages shared ethnic Chinese heritage to promote long-term harmony, provided the mainland democratizes.[101] However, with public support for immediate unification below 2% in recent polls, the party pragmatically focuses on deterrence through alliances like the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act while critiquing DPP policies as provocative.[101] [102] This stance reflects adaptation to empirical realities, where forced unification risks devastating economic and military costs, estimated at over 10% of Taiwan's GDP in potential conflict scenarios.[5] KMT perspectives emphasize causal links between de-escalation and prosperity, positing that PRC coercion, such as 2023 military drills involving over 100 aircraft, underscores the need for reciprocal restraint rather than independence declarations that could invite invasion.[103] Party documents assert that true unification requires PRC alignment with ROC democratic norms, a condition unmet since the 1949 divergence, thereby justifying indefinite status quo maintenance.[104] Critics within Taiwan note the KMT's evolution from overt reunification advocacy to civic nationalism, yet the core rejection of separatism persists to safeguard ROC constitutional claims over the mainland.[103]International Dimensions
United States Policy and Ambiguities
The United States maintains a "one China" policy, recognizing the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legal government of China while acknowledging, but not endorsing, the PRC's position that Taiwan is part of China.[105] This framework stems from three joint U.S.-PRC communiqués: the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, which noted the U.S. awareness of both sides of the Taiwan Strait's view of one China; the 1979 communiqué on normalizing relations, severing formal ties with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan; and the 1982 communiqué addressing arms sales to Taiwan, committing to reduce such sales over time.[106][107] Accompanying these are the "Six Assurances" provided to Taiwan in 1982, reaffirming no U.S. mediation between Taiwan and the PRC, no pressure on Taiwan to enter negotiations, and continued arms provision for self-defense.[108] Enacted in 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) codifies U.S. commitments to Taiwan's security, mandating that the U.S. provide defensive arms and maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion altering Taiwan's security.[109] The TRA operates through unofficial channels via the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), enabling robust economic, cultural, and security ties without formal diplomatic recognition.[108] U.S. policy explicitly opposes formal Taiwan independence, viewing it as a potential trigger for PRC aggression that could destabilize the region; this stance persisted through a February 2025 State Department website update removing prior phrasing of "does not support" independence, which officials clarified did not alter underlying policy.[110] Central to U.S. approach is "strategic ambiguity," a deliberate policy neither confirming nor denying military intervention in a PRC-Taiwan conflict, aimed at deterring Beijing from invasion while discouraging Taipei from declaring independence.[111] This ambiguity has sustained cross-Strait peace since the 1979 shift in recognition, though critics argue it erodes deterrence amid PRC military buildup.[112] Implementation includes consistent arms sales—totaling over $20 billion under the Biden administration from 2021 to 2025—and high-level engagements, such as House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's August 2022 Taiwan visit, which prompted PRC military exercises but reaffirmed U.S. traversal of the Taiwan Strait.[109][113] Ambiguities arise in rhetorical shifts versus doctrinal consistency. President Biden stated in October 2021, May 2022, and September 2022 that the U.S. would defend Taiwan against a Chinese "unprecedented attack," departing from scripted ambiguity, though White House officials repeatedly clarified no policy change from strategic ambiguity.[114][115] The administration emphasized opposition to unilateral status quo alterations by any party, balancing support for Taiwan's de facto autonomy—evident in $18 billion in arms notifications since 2020—with restraint against provocative moves toward independence.[116] In October 2025, incoming Secretary of State Marco Rubio reiterated no U.S. policy shift on Taiwan for PRC concessions, underscoring continuity amid election-year pressures.[117] These tensions reflect causal trade-offs: ambiguity preserves flexibility but risks miscalculation, as PRC forces conducted over 1,700 warplane incursions into Taiwan's air defense zone in 2024 alone.[109]Positions of Japan, EU, and Other Regional Actors
Japan maintains a policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan's status, adhering to the one-China principle while fostering robust unofficial economic, cultural, and security ties with Taiwan. Japanese officials have emphasized that stability in the Taiwan Strait is essential to Japan's security, with former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba stating in 2021 that "a Taiwan contingency is a Japanese contingency," reflecting concerns over potential Chinese aggression disrupting regional supply chains and territorial proximity. However, Japan does not endorse formal Taiwanese independence, as evidenced by its opposition to actions that could provoke Beijing, and Chinese authorities have repeatedly urged Tokyo to avoid signaling support for separatist forces. In practice, Japan has deepened defense cooperation indirectly through U.S. alliances and joint exercises, prioritizing the status quo to deter escalation without recognizing Taiwan's sovereignty claims. The European Union officially upholds the one-China policy, recognizing the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China and refraining from support for Taiwanese independence. EU Ambassador to China Jorge Toledo Albiñana affirmed in July 2022 that the bloc does not back independence but favors "peaceful reunification," aligning with diplomatic caution to preserve trade relations with Beijing amid economic dependencies. Nonetheless, the European Parliament has passed resolutions advocating stronger EU-Taiwan economic ties and Taiwan's participation in international organizations, driven by shared democratic values and supply chain vulnerabilities, as seen in a 2023 resolution highlighting Taiwan's semiconductor role. This duality reflects internal divisions, with member states like Lithuania expanding bilateral ties despite PRC pressure, but the EU as a whole prioritizes de-escalation and status quo maintenance over any shift toward independence advocacy. Among other regional actors, Australia views Taiwan Strait stability as critical to its security interests, integrating Taiwan contingencies into defense planning via AUKUS and enhanced U.S. alliances, though it officially supports the status quo without endorsing independence. South Korea adopts a cautious stance, balancing North Korean threats with economic reliance on China, offering potential logistical support in a crisis but avoiding direct commitments to independence due to fears of Beijing's retaliation. The Philippines has positioned itself as a forward hub for allied deterrence, expanding U.S. access to bases near Taiwan under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement and conducting joint patrols amid South China Sea disputes, yet maintains no formal support for independence to navigate ASEAN neutrality. India adheres strictly to its one-China policy with no recognition of Taiwan's sovereignty, as reaffirmed by the Ministry of External Affairs in August 2025, while pragmatically growing economic and technological ties through representative offices. ASEAN nations broadly favor the status quo, with frontline states like Vietnam and Indonesia prioritizing maritime dispute resolutions with China over Taiwan's political status, eschewing independence rhetoric to avoid intra-regional fractures.PRC Responses and Military Posturing
The People's Republic of China (PRC) has codified its opposition to Taiwan independence through the Anti-Secession Law, enacted on March 14, 2005, which authorizes the state to employ "non-peaceful means" if Taiwan secedes from China, if "Taiwan independence" forces create facts of separation, or in the event of major incidents leading to secession.[118] This legislation frames independence efforts as existential threats to national unity, justifying potential military action while prioritizing peaceful reunification under specified conditions.[119] PRC leaders, including President Xi Jinping, have consistently reiterated that Taiwan independence constitutes secession and will face resolute countermeasures. In October 2022, Xi stated that China "will never renounce the right to use force" over Taiwan but seeks peaceful resolution.[120] This stance intensified in 2025, with Xi urging the nation on September 30 to "firmly oppose Taiwan independence separatist activities" and external interference during his National Day address.[121] Xi has also sought international alignment against independence, emphasizing that upholding the "one China principle" requires opposing Taiwanese independence.[122] Military posturing has escalated as a deterrent, with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) normalizing frequent incursions into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Incursions rose from 381–390 aircraft in 2020 to 972 in 2021, 1,738 in 2022, 1,703 in 2023, and 3,615 in 2024.[123] From January to September 2025, over 4,000 incursions were recorded, exceeding the prior year's pace.[124] These operations, often exceeding 200 per month by 2025, degrade Taiwan's response capacity and signal readiness without direct confrontation.[125] Large-scale exercises frequently respond to perceived independence provocations. Following Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te's May 2024 inauguration, the PLA launched "Joint Sword-2024A" on May 23–24, involving aircraft, ships, and simulated blockades around Taiwan and outlying islands to punish "separatist acts."[126] In October 2024, after Lai's National Day speech, "Joint Sword-2024B" encircled Taiwan with 153 aircraft and 17 warships, practicing sea assaults and anti-submarine operations as a "stern warning" to independence forces.[127] Similar drills in April 2025 targeted "separatist forces," incorporating joint combat readiness to the west and southwest of Taiwan.[128] These maneuvers simulate invasion phases, including long-range strikes and amphibious assaults, while integrating coast guard elements for gray-zone coercion.[129]| Year | PLA Aircraft Incursions into Taiwan ADIZ |
|---|---|
| 2020 | 381–390 |
| 2021 | 972 |
| 2022 | 1,738 |
| 2023 | 1,703 |
| 2024 | 3,615 |
