Hubbry Logo
XenophobiaXenophobiaMain
Open search
Xenophobia
Community hub
Xenophobia
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Xenophobia
Xenophobia
from Wikipedia

A 1912 xenophobic cartoon blaming foreigners for threatening economic prosperity in the United States.

Xenophobia (from Ancient Greek ξένος (xénos) 'strange, foreign, or alien' and φόβος (phóbos) 'fear')[1] is the fear or dislike of anything that is perceived as being foreign or strange.[2][3][4] It is an expression that is based on the perception that a conflict exists between an in-group and an out-group and it may manifest itself in suspicion of one group's activities by members of the other group, a desire to eliminate the presence of the group that is the target of suspicion, and fear of losing a national, ethnic, or racial identity.[5][6]

Alternative definitions

[edit]

A 1997 review article on xenophobia holds that it is "an element of a political struggle about who has the right to be cared for by the state and society: a fight for the collective good of the modern state."[7]

According to Italian sociologist Guido Bolaffi, xenophobia can also be exhibited as an "uncritical exaltation of another culture" which is ascribed "an unreal, stereotyped and exotic quality".[5]

History

[edit]

Ancient Africa

[edit]

In Ancient Egypt, foreigners were conceived of through a complex xenophobic discourse. Given ancient Egypt's long history, Egyptians encountered a number of different peoples. Peoples living in present-day Greece, Sudan, and Turkey, for instance, were referred to by various names in Egyptian. According to one source, "...all the names have at the end the same hieroglyphic sign– a determinative or taxogram– indicating the word group. This is the hieroglyph for a hilly country or the desert– indicating 'foreign land' (khaset)...By contrast, Egypt (Kemet/Black land) is written with the determinative for a town. This indicates that Egyptians regarded their part of the world as cultivated, ordered and civilized, while the other countries were not."[8] This indicates an early example of a xenophobic attitude towards other peoples. In addition, ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics indicate xenophobic ideas about a necessity to conquer non-Egyptians, with Hittites in particular being referred to as "vile".[9]

Ancient Europe

[edit]

An early example of xenophobic sentiment in Western culture is the Ancient Greek denigration of foreigners as "barbarians", the belief that the Greek people and culture were superior to all other peoples and cultures, and the subsequent conclusion that barbarians were naturally meant to be enslaved.[10]

Ancient Romans also held notions of superiority over other peoples.[11] such as in a speech attributed to Manius Acilius:

There, as you know, there were Macedonians and Thracians and Illyrians, all most warlike nations, here Syrians and Asiatic Greeks, the most worthless peoples among mankind and born for slavery.[11]

A global index of anti-immigrant xenophobia based on https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2022.2097097

Black Africans were considered especially exotic, and perhaps they were considered threateningly alien, so they are seldom if ever mentioned in Roman literature without some negative connotations. The historian Appian claims that the military commander Marcus Junius Brutus, before the battle of Philippi in 42BC, met an 'Ethiopian' outside the gates of his camp: his soldiers instantly hacked the man to pieces, taking his appearance for a bad omen—to the superstitious Roman, black was the colour of death."[12]

COVID-19

[edit]

The COVID-19 pandemic, which was first reported in the city of Wuhan, Hubei, China, in December 2019, led to an increase in acts and displays of Sinophobia, as well as prejudice, xenophobia, discrimination, violence, and racism against people of East Asian and Southeast Asian descent and appearance around the world.[13][14] With the spread of the pandemic and the formation of COVID-19 hotspots, such as those in Asia, Europe, and the Americas, discrimination against people from these hotspots was reported.[15][16][17]

Regional manifestations

[edit]

Americas

[edit]

Brazil

[edit]

Despite the majority of the country's population being of mixed (Pardo), African, or indigenous heritage, depictions of non-European Brazilians on the programming of most national television networks is scarce and typically relegated for musicians/their shows. In the case of telenovelas, Brazilians of darker skin tone are typically depicted as housekeepers or in positions of lower socioeconomic standing.[18][19][20]

Canada

[edit]

Muslim and Sikh Canadians have faced racism and discrimination in recent years, especially since the 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. and the spillover effect of the United States' War on Terror.[21][22] An increase in hate crimes targeting Ontario Muslims was reported after ISIS took responsibility for the November 2015 Paris attacks.[23]

A 2016 survey from The Environics Institute, which was a follow-up to a study conducted 10 years prior, found that there may be discriminating attitudes that may be a residual of the effects of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States.[24] A poll in 2009 by Maclean's revealed that 28% of Canadians viewed Islam favourably, and 30% viewed the Sikh religion favourably. 45% of respondents believed Islam encourages violence. In Quebec in particular, only 17% of respondents had a favourable view of Islam.[25]

Colombia

[edit]

According to the UNHCR, by June 2019, 1.3 million of the 4 million Venezuelan refugees were in Colombia.[26] Because of their urgent situation, many migrants from Venezuela crossed the border illegally, indicating they had few opportunities to gain "access to legal and other rights or basic services and are exposed to exploitation, abuse, manipulation and a wide range of other protection risks, including racism, discrimination and xenophobia".[27] Since the start of the migrant crisis, media outlets and state officials have raised concerns about increasing discrimination against migrants in the country, especially xenophobia and violence against the migrants.[28]

Guyana

[edit]

There have been racial tension between the Indo-Guyanese people and the Afro-Guyanese.[29][30][31]

Mexico

[edit]

Racism in Mexico has a long history.[32] Historically, Mexicans with light skin tones had absolute control over dark skinned Amerindians due to the structure of the Spanish colonial caste system. When a Mexican of a darker-skinned tone marries one of a lighter skinned-tone, it is common for them say that they are 'making the race better' (mejorando la raza)". This can be interpreted as a self-attack on their ethnicity.[33] Despite improving economic and social conditions of indigenous Mexicans, discrimination against them continues to this day and there are few laws to protect indigenous Mexicans from discrimination. Violent attacks against indigenous Mexicans are moderately common and many times go unpunished.[34]

On 15 March 1911, a band of Maderista soldiers entered Torreón, Mexico, and massacred 303 Chinese and five Japanese. Historian Larissa Schwartz argues that Kang Youwei had successfully organized the prosperous Chinese businessmen there, making them a visible target for class antagonism made extreme by xenophobia.[35]

The Chinese were easy to identify in northern cities and were frequent targets especially in Sonora in the 1930s. Systematic persecution resulted from economic, political, and psychological fears of the Chinese, and the government showed little interest in protecting them.[36][37]

Theresa Alfaro-Velcamp argues that the Porfiriato, 1876–1910 promoted immigration from the Middle East. However the revolution of 1910–20 saw a surge in xenophobia and nationalism based on "mestizaje." The community divided into the economically prosperous Lebanese Mexicans who took pride in a distinct Lebanese-Mexican identity, while the downscale remainder often merged into the mestizo community.[38]

Racism against indigenous people has been a current problem in Mexico.[39] Domestic workers, many of whom are indigenous women who have moved from rural villages to cities, often face discrimination including verbal, physical or sexual abuse.[40]

Panama

[edit]

Peter Szok argues that when the United States brought in large numbers of laborers from the Caribbean—called "Afro-Panamanians"—to build the Panama Canal (1905–1914), xenophobia emerged. The local elite in Panama felt its culture was threatened: they cried out, "La Patria es el Recuerdo." ("The Homeland is the Memory") and developed a Hispanophile elitist identity through an artistic literary movement known as "Hispanismo." Another result was the election of the "overtly nationalist and anti-imperialist" Arnulfo Arias as president in 1940.[41]

Venezuela

[edit]

In Venezuela, like other South American countries, economic inequality often breaks along ethnic and racial lines.[42] A 2013 Swedish academic study stated that Venezuela was the most racist country in the Americas,[42] followed by the Dominican Republic.[42]

United States

[edit]

In a 2010 report, a network of more than 300 US-based civil rights and human rights organizations stated that "Discrimination permeates all aspects of life in the United States, and it extends to all communities of color."[43] Discrimination against racial, ethnic, and religious minorities is widely acknowledged, especially in the case of African Americans and African Diasporic peoples in the United States, as well as other ethnic groups.

Members of every major American ethnic and religious minority group have perceived discrimination in their dealings with members of other minority racial and religious groups. Philosopher Cornel West has argued that "racism is an integral element within the very fabric of American culture and society. It is embedded in the country's first collective definition, enunciated in its subsequent laws, and imbued in its dominant way of life."[44]

A 2019 survey by the Pew Research Center suggested that 76% of black and Asian respondents had experienced some form of discrimination, at least from time to time.[45] Studies which have been conducted by the PNAS and Nature have found that during traffic stops, officers spoke to black men in a less respectful tone than they spoke to white men and those same studies have also found that black drivers are more likely to be pulled over and searched by police than white drivers.[46] Black people are also reportedly overrepresented as criminals in the media.[47] In 2020 the COVID-19 epidemic was often blamed on China, leading to attacks on Chinese Americans.[48] This represents a continuation of xenophobic attacks on Chinese Americans for 150 years.[49]

Asia

[edit]

Bhutan

[edit]

In 1991–92, Bhutan is said to have deported between 10,000 and 100,000 ethnic Nepalis (Lhotshampa). The actual number of refugees who were initially deported is debated by both sides. In March 2008, this population began a multiyear resettlement in third countries including the U.S, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Australia.[50]

China

[edit]
The Boxers
[edit]

The Boxer Rebellion was a violent anti-foreign, anti-Christian, and anti-imperialist uprising which occurred in China between 1899 and 1901. It was led by a new group, the ‘Militia United in Righteousness', the group was popularly known as the Boxers because many of its members had practiced Chinese martial arts, at the time, these martial arts were popularly referred to as Chinese Boxing. After China's defeat in war by Japan in 1895, villagers in North China feared the expansion of foreign spheres of influence and resented the extension of privileges to Christian missionaries. In a severe drought, Boxer violence spread across Shandong and the North China Plain, destroying foreign property, attacking or murdering Christian missionaries and Chinese Christians. In June 1900, Boxer fighters, convinced that they were invulnerable to foreign weapons, converged on Beijing, and their slogan was "Support the Qing government and exterminate the foreigners." Diplomats, missionaries, soldiers and some Chinese Christians took refuge in the diplomatic Legation Quarter. They were besieged for 55 days by the Imperial Army of the Chinese government and the Boxers. George Makari says that the Boxers, "promoted a violent hatred of all those from other lands and made no effort to distinguish the beneficent from the rapacious ones.... They were unabashedly xenophobic."[51] The Boxers were overthrown by an Eight Nation Alliance of American, Austro-Hungarian, British, French, German, Italian, Japanese, and Russian troops—20,000 in all—that invaded China to lift the siege in August 1900. The allies imposed the Boxer Protocol in 1901, with a massive annual cash indemnity to be paid by the Chinese government. The episode generated worldwide attention and denunciation of xenophobia.[52][53]

Chinese nationalism and xenophobia
[edit]

Historian Mary C. Wright has argued that the combination of Chinese nationalism and xenophobia had a major impact on the Chinese worldview in the first half of the 20th century. Examining the bitterness and hatred which existed towards Americans and Europeans in the decades before the Communist takeover in 1949, she argues:

The crude fear of the white peril that the last imperial dynasty had been able to exploit in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 had been submerged but not overcome, and expanding special privileges of foreigners were irritants in increasingly wide spheres of Chinese life. These fears and irritations provided a mass sounding board for what otherwise might have been rather arid denunciations of imperialists. It is well to remember that both Nationalists and Communists have struck this note.[54][55]

COVID-19
[edit]

In China, xenophobia against non-Chinese residents has been inflamed by the COVID-19 pandemic in mainland China, with foreigners being described as "foreign garbage" and targeted for "disposal".[56] Some black people in China were evicted from their homes by police and told to leave China within 24 hours, due to disinformation that they and other foreigners were spreading the virus.[57] Expressions of Chinese xenophobia and discriminatory practices, such as the exclusion of black customers from restaurants, were criticized by foreign governments and members of the diplomatic corps.[58][59]

Hong Kong
[edit]

Black people in Hong Kong have experienced negative comments and instances of discrimination in the job market and on public transport.[60][61] Expats and South Asian minorities have faced increased xenophobia during the COVID-19 pandemic.[62][63]

Persecution of Uighurs
[edit]

Since 2017, China has come under intense international criticism for its treatment of one million Muslims (the majority of them are Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic minority mostly in Xinjiang) who are being held in detention camps without any legal process.[64][65] Critics of the policy have described it as the Sinicization of Xinjiang and some have also called it an ethnocide or a cultural genocide.[64][66]

Indonesia

[edit]

A number of discriminatory laws against Chinese Indonesians were enacted by the government of Indonesia. In 1959, President Sukarno approved PP 10/1959 that forced Chinese Indonesians to close their businesses in rural areas and relocate into urban areas. Moreover, political pressures in the 1970s and 1980s restricted the role of the Chinese Indonesian in politics, academics, and the military. As a result, they were thereafter constrained professionally to becoming entrepreneurs and professional managers in trade, manufacturing, and banking. In 1998, Indonesia riots over higher food prices and rumors of hoarding by merchants and shopkeepers often degenerated into anti-Chinese attacks.[67][68]

Native Papuans in the country have faced racism,[69][70] and several reports have accused Indonesia of committing a "slow-motion genocide" in West Papua.[71][72][73][74][75] Hostility towards the LGBT community has been recently reported,[76][77] especially in Aceh.[78][79]

Japan

[edit]

During its Edo period, Japan had successfully isolated itself from the outside world, allowing anti-foreign sentiments and myths to multiply unchecked by actual observation.[80] In 2005, a United Nations report expressed concerns about racism in Japan and it also stated that the government's recognition of the depth of the problem was not total.[81][82] The author of the report, Doudou Diène (Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights), concluded after a nine-day investigation that racial discrimination and xenophobia in Japan primarily affected three groups: national minorities, Latin Americans of Japanese descent, mainly Japanese Brazilians, and foreigners from poor countries.[83] Surveys conducted in 2017 and 2019 have shown that 40 to nearly 50% of the foreigners who were surveyed have experienced some form of discrimination.[84][85] Another report has also noted differences in how the media and some Japanese treat visitors from the West as compared to those from East Asia, with the latter being viewed much less positively than the former.[86]

Japan accepted just 16 refugees in 1999, while the United States took in 85,010 for resettlement, according to the UNHCR. New Zealand, which is 30 times smaller than Japan, accepted 1,140 refugees in 1999. Just 305 persons were recognized as refugees by Japan from 1981, when Japan ratified the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, to 2002.[87][88] Former Prime Minister Taro Aso called Japan a "one race" nation.[89] A 2019 Ipsos poll also suggested that Japanese respondents had a relatively lower sympathy for refugees compared to most other countries in the survey.[90][91]

Sharon Yoon and Yuki Asahina argue that Zaitokukai, a right-wing organization, succeeded in framing Korean minorities as undeserving recipients of Japanese welfare benefits. Even as Zaitokukai declined, the perceptions of a Korean internal threat powerfully influences public fears.[92]

Malaysia

[edit]

The racial tension between the dominant poor Malay Muslims and the minority wealthier Chinese has long characterized Malaysia. It was a major factor in the separation of Singapore in 1965 to become an independent, primarily Chinese nation. Amy L. Freedman points to the electoral system, the centrality of ethnic parties, gerrymandering, and systematic discrimination against the Chinese in education and jobs as critical factors in xenophobia. Recently the goal of creating a more inclusive national identity has been emphasized.[93]

In Malaysia, xenophobia occurs regardless of race. Most xenophobia is towards foreign labourers, who normally came from Indonesia, Bangladesh[94] and Africa.[95] There is also a significant degree of xenophobia towards neighbouring Singaporeans and Indonesians.

South Korea

[edit]

Xenophobia in South Korea has been recognized by scholars and the United Nations as a widespread social problem.[96] An increase in immigration to South Korea since the 2000s catalyzed more overt expressions of racism, as well as criticism of those expressions.[96][97] Newspapers have frequently reported on and criticized discrimination against immigrants, in forms such as being paid lower than the minimum wage, having their wages withheld, unsafe work conditions, physical abuse, or general denigration.[96]

After 2010, xenophobia became increasingly prevalent in the widely used social media. Jiyeon Kang reports a common pattern scapegoating dark-skinned migrants by gender, race and class. They are presented as accomplices and beneficiaries of the elite coalition allegedly taking traditional rights away from South Korean male citizens.[98]

In a 2010–2014 World Values Survey, 44.2% of South Koreans reported they would not want an immigrant or foreign worker as a neighbor.[99][97] Racist attitudes are more commonly expressed towards immigrants from other Asian countries and Africa, and less so towards European and white North American immigrants who can occasionally receive what has been described as "overly kind treatment".[96][100] Related discrimination have also been reported with regards to mixed-race children, Chinese Korean, and North Korean immigrants.[100]

Philippines

[edit]

Thailand

[edit]
Anti-Arab sign in Pattaya Beach, Thailand

There are no laws within the Kingdom of Thailand which criminalize racial discrimination and the use of racist cliches. Unlike neighboring nations which were colonized, Thailand's history as an uncolonized state further shaped its existing laws.[citation needed]

Anti-refugee sentiment has been significant in Thailand, with a 2016 Amnesty International survey indicating that 74% of surveyed Thais do not believe (to varying degrees) that people should be able to take refuge in other countries to escape war or persecution.[101]

Middle East

[edit]

In 2008, a Pew Research Center survey found that negative views concerning Jews were most common in the three predominantly Arab nations which were polled, with 97% of Lebanese having an unfavorable opinion of Jews, 95% of Egyptians and 96% of Jordanians.[102]

Egypt

[edit]

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Mahdi Akef has denounced what he called "the myth of the Holocaust" in defense of the former-Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's denial of it.[103] In an article in October 2000 columnist Adel Hammoda alleged in the state-owned Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram that Jews make Matza from the blood of non-Jewish children (see Blood libel).[104] Mohammed Salmawy, the editor of Al-Ahram Hebdo, "defended the use of old European myths like the blood libel against Jews" in his newspapers.[105]

Jordan

[edit]

Jordan does not allow entry to Jews who have visible signs of Judaism or possess personal religious items. The Jordanian ambassador to Israel replied to a complaint by a religious Jew who was denied entry by stating that security concerns required that travelers who are entering the Hashemite Kingdom should not do so with prayer shawls (Tallit) and phylacteries (Tefillin).[106] Jordanian authorities state that the policy is to ensure the Jewish tourists' safety.[107]

In July 2009, six Breslov Hasidim were deported after attempting to enter Jordan to visit the tomb of Aaron / Sheikh Harun on Mount Hor, near Petra. The group had taken a ferry from Sinai, Egypt because they understood that Jordanian authorities were making it hard for visible Jews to enter their country from Israel.[108]

Israel

[edit]
Graffiti reading "Die Arab Sand-Niggers!" reportedly sprayed by settlers on a house in Hebron[109]

According to the 2004 U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Israel and the Occupied Territories, the Israeli government had done "little to reduce institutional, legal, and societal discrimination against the country's Arab citizens."[110] The 2005 US Department of State report on Israel wrote: "[T]he government generally respected the human rights of its citizens; however, there were problems in some areas, including... institutional, legal, and societal discrimination against the country's Arab citizens."[111]

The 2010 U.S. State Department Country Report stated that Israeli law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, and the Israeli government effectively enforced these prohibitions.[112] Former Likud MK and Minister of Defense Moshe Arens has criticized the treatment of minorities in Israel, saying that they did not bear the full obligation of Israeli citizenship, nor were they extended the full privileges of citizenship.[113]

The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) published reports which documented racism in Israel, and the 2007 report suggested that anti-Arab racism was increasing in the country. One analysis of the report summarized it thus: "Over two-thirds of Israeli teens believe that Arabs are less intelligent, uncultured and violent.[114][115] The Israeli government spokesman responded that the Israeli government was "committed to fighting racism whenever it raises its ugly head and is committed to full equality to all Israeli citizens, irrespective of ethnicity, creed or background, as defined by our declaration of independence".[115] Isi Leibler of the Jerusalem Center for Public affairs argues that Israeli Jews are troubled by "increasingly hostile, even treasonable outbursts by Israeli Arabs against the state" while it is at war with neighboring countries.[116] Khaled Diab of The Guardian wrote in 2012 that demonisation was a two-way street, with Palestinians in Israel reportedly holding negative stereotypes of Israelis as devious, violent, cunning and untrustworthy.[117]

A 2018 poll by Pew Research Center also suggested there to be particularly widespread anti-refugee sentiment among surveyed Israelis compared to the people from other selected countries. Israeli people also have a long history of discrimination towards Palestinians[118]

Kuwait

[edit]

In April 2020, an actress said on Kuwaiti TV that migrants should be thrown out "into the desert", amidst reported exploitation of foreign labourers in the country.[119] Reports of Sierra Leonean, Indonesian and Nepalese workers suffering abuse in Kuwait have prompted the 3 countries' governments to ban its citizens from being employed as domestic workers there.[120] Expat surveys done by InterNations have ranked the country amongst the most unfriendly for expatriates.[121][122]

Lebanon

[edit]

Hezbollah's Al-Manar TV channel has often been accused of airing antisemitic broadcasts, accusing the Jews/Zionists of conspiring against the Arab world, and frequently airing excerpts from The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,[123][124][125] which the Encyclopædia Britannica describes as a "fraudulent document which served as a pretext and rationale for anti-Semitism in the early 20th century". In another incident, an Al-Manar commentator recently referred to "Zionist attempts to transmit AIDS to Arab countries". Al-Manar officials denied broadcasting any antisemitic incitement and they also stated that their group's position is anti-Israeli, not antisemitic. However, Hezbollah has directed strong rhetoric against both Israel and Jews, and it has cooperated in publishing and distributing outright antisemitic literature. The government of Lebanon has not criticized Hezbollah's continued broadcast of antisemitic material on television.[126]

There are also substantial accounts[127] of abuses against migrant domestic workers in Lebanon, notably from Ethiopia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and other countries in Asia and Africa, exacerbated by the Kafala system, or "sponsorship system". Increases in abuse occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic.[128]

Palestine

[edit]

Various Palestinian organizations and individuals have been regularly accused of being antisemitic. Howard Gutman believes that much of Muslim hatred of Jews stems from the ongoing Arab–Israeli conflict and that peace would significantly reduce antisemitism.[129]

Anti-US and anti-Israeli sentiment had led some Palestinians to support the 2001 September 11 attacks in New York.[130] In August 2003, senior Hamas official Dr Abd Al-Aziz Al-Rantisi wrote in the Hamas newspaper Al-Risala:[131]

It is no longer a secret that the Zionists were behind the Nazis' murder of many Jews, and agreed to it, with the aim of intimidating them and forcing them to immigrate to Palestine.

In August 2009, Hamas refused to allow Palestinian children to learn about the Holocaust, which it called "a lie invented by the Zionists" and referred to Holocaust education as a "war crime".[132] A 2016 Gallup International poll had roughly 74% of Palestinian respondents agreeing there was religious superiority, 78% agreeing there was racial superiority, and 76% agreeing there was cultural superiority. The percentages were among the highest out of 66 nations surveyed.[133][134]

Saudi Arabia

[edit]

Racism in Saudi Arabia is practiced against labor workers who are foreigners, mostly from developing countries.

Asian maids who work in the country have been victims of racism and other forms of discrimination,[135][136][137][138] foreign workers have been raped, exploited, under- or unpaid, physically abused,[139] overworked and locked in their places of employment. The international organisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) describes these conditions as "near-slavery" and attributes them to "deeply rooted gender, religious, and racial discrimination".[140] In many cases the workers are unwilling to report their employers for fear of losing their jobs or further abuse.[140]

There were several cases of antisemitism in Saudi Arabia and it is common within the country's religious circles. The Saudi Arabian media often attacks Jews in books, in news articles, in its Mosques and with what some describe as antisemitic satire. Saudi Arabian government officials and state religious leaders often promote the idea that Jews are conspiring to take over the entire world; as proof of their claims they publish and frequently cite The Protocols of the Elders of Zion as factual.[141][142]

Europe

[edit]
Pro-EU Czechs protest in Prague against politicians accused of pro-Russian sympathies, 17 November 2018. The sign reads: "...all Russians...go away from the Czech Republic or die!"

A study that ran from 2002 to 2015 mapped the countries in Europe with the highest incidents of racial bias towards black people, based on data from 288,076 white Europeans. It used the Implicit-association test (a reaction-based psychological test designed to measure implicit racial bias). The strongest bias was found in Czech Republic, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Malta, Moldova, Bulgaria, Italy, Slovakia, and Portugal.[143] A 2017 report by the University of Oslo Center for Research on Extremism tentatively suggests that "individuals of Muslim background stand out among perpetrators of antisemitic violence in Western Europe".[144]

Negative views of Muslims have varied across different parts of Europe, and Islamophobic hate crimes have been reported across the region.[145] A 2017 Chatham House poll of more than 10,000 people in 10 European countries had on average 55% agreeing that all further migration from Muslim-majority countries should be stopped, while 20% disagreed. Majority opposition was found in Poland (71%), Austria (65%), Belgium (64%), Hungary (64%), France (61%), Greece (58%), Germany (53%), and Italy (51%).[146]

Unfavorable views of Muslims, 2019[147]
Country Percent
Poland
66%
Czech Republic
64%
Hungary
58%
Greece
57%
Lithuania
56%
Italy
55%
Spain
42%
Sweden
28%
Germany
24%
France
22%
Russia
19%
United Kingdom
18%

Belgium

[edit]

There were recorded well over a hundred antisemitic attacks in Belgium in 2009. This was a 100% increase from the year before. The perpetrators were usually young males of immigrant background from the Middle East. In 2009, the Belgian city of Antwerp, often referred to as Europe's last shtetl, experienced a surge in antisemitic violence. Bloeme Evers-Emden, an Amsterdam resident and Auschwitz survivor, was quoted in the newspaper Aftenposten in 2010: "The antisemitism now is even worse than before the Holocaust. The antisemitism has become more violent. Now they are threatening to kill us."[148]

France

[edit]

In 2004, France experienced rising levels of Islamic antisemitism and acts that were publicized around the world.[149][150][151] In 2006, rising levels of antisemitism were recorded in French schools. Reports related to the tensions between the children of North African Muslim immigrants and North African Jewish children.[151] The climax was reached when Ilan Halimi was tortured to death by the so-called "Barbarians gang", led by Youssouf Fofana. In 2007, over 7,000 members of the community petitioned for asylum in the United States, citing antisemitism in France.[152]

In the first half of 2009, an estimated 631 recorded acts of antisemitism took place in France, more than the whole of 2008.[153] Speaking to the World Jewish Congress in December 2009, the French Interior Minister Hortefeux described the acts of antisemitism as "a poison to our republic". He also announced that he would appoint a special coordinator for fighting racism and antisemitism.[154]

Germany

[edit]

The period after Germany's loss of World War I led to the increased espousal of anti-Semitism and other forms of racism in the country's political discourse, for example, emotions which were initially expressed by members of the right-wing Freikorps finally culminated in the ascent of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party in 1933. The Nazi Party's racial policy and the Nuremberg Race Laws against Jews and other non-Aryans represented the most explicit racist policies in twentieth century Europe. These laws deprived all Jews (including half-Jews and quarter-Jews) and all other non-Aryans of German citizenship. The official title of Jews became "subjects of the state". At first, the Nuremberg Race Laws only forbade racially mixed sexual relationships and marriages between Aryans and Jews but later they were extended to "Gypsies, Negroes or their bastard offspring".[155] Such interracial relationships were known as "racial pollution" Rassenschande, and they became a criminal and punishable offence under the race laws.[155][156] The Nazi racial theory regarded Poles and other Slavic peoples as racially inferior Untermenschen. Nazi Germany's Directive No.1306 stated: "Polishness equals subhumanity. Poles, Jews and gypsies are on the same inferior level."[157]

After the 1950s the steady arrival of Turkish workers led to xenophobia.[22]

According to a 2012 survey, 18% of Turks in Germany believe that Jews are inferior human beings.[158][159]

Hungary

[edit]

Anti-refugee sentiment has been strong in Hungary,[160][161] and Hungarian authorities along the border have been accused of detaining migrants under harsh conditions[162] with some reported instances of beatings and other violence from the guards.[163][164][165] Surveys from Pew Research Center have also suggested that negative views of refugees and Muslims are held by the majority of the country's locals.[166][167]

As in other European countries, the Romani people faced disadvantages, including unequal treatment, discrimination, segregation and harassment. Negative stereotypes are often linked to Romani unemployment and reliance on state benefits.[168] In 2008 and 2009 nine attacks took place against Romani in Hungary, resulting in six deaths and multiple injuries. According to the Hungarian curia (supreme court), these murders were motivated by anti-Romani sentiment and sentenced the perpetrators to life imprisonment.[168]

Italy

[edit]

A new party emerged in the 1980s, Lega Nord. According to Gilda Zazzara, it started with identity-based claims and secessionist proposals for the north to break away from southern Italy. It shifted to xenophobia and the demand that job priority be accorded to native Italian workers.[169]

Anti-Romani sentiment in Italy takes the form of hostility, prejudice, discrimination or racism directed at Romani people. There's no reliable data for the total number of Roma people living in Italy, but estimates put it between 140,000 and 170,000. Many national and local political leaders engaged in rhetoric during 2007 and 2008 that maintained that the extraordinary rise in crime at the time was mainly a result of uncontrolled immigration of people of Roma origin from recent European Union member state Romania.[170] National and local leaders declared their plans to expel Roma from settlements in and around major cities and to deport illegal immigrants. The mayors of Rome and Milan signed "Security Pacts" in May 2007 that "envisaged the forced eviction of up to 10,000 Romani people".[171]

According to a May 2008 poll 68% of Italians, wanted to see all of the country's approximately 150,000 Gypsies, many of them Italian citizens, expelled.[172] The survey, published as mobs in Naples burned down Gypsy camps that month, revealed that the majority also wanted all Gypsy camps in Italy to be demolished.[172]

Netherlands

[edit]

The first example for xenophobic riot in the Netherlands were the riots in Afrikaanderwijk, in which the houses of Turkish people were attacked and windows were smashed.[173]

In early 2012 the Dutch right-wing Party for Freedom established an anti-Slavic (predominantly anti-Polish) and anti-Romani website, where native Dutch people could air their frustration about losing their job because of cheaper workers from Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and other non-Germanic Central and Eastern European countries. This led to commentaries involving hate speech and other racial prejudice mainly against Poles and Roma, but also aimed at other Central and Eastern European ethnic groups.[174] According to a 2015 report by the OECD and EU Commission, 37% of young people born in the country with immigrant parents say they had experienced discrimination in their lives.[175]

In the Netherlands, antisemitic incidents, from verbal abuse to violence, are reported, allegedly connected with Islamic youth, mostly boys of Moroccan descent. A phrase made popular during football matches against the so-called Jewish football club Ajax has been adopted by Muslim youth and is frequently heard at pro-Palestinian demonstrations: "Hamas, Hamas, Jews to the gas!" According to the Centre for Information and Documentation on Israel, a pro-Israel lobby group in the Netherlands, in 2009, the number of anti-Semitic incidents in Amsterdam, the city that is home to most of the approximately 40,000 Dutch Jews, doubled compared to 2008.[176]

Norway

[edit]

In 2010, the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation after one year of research, revealed that antisemitism was common among Norwegian Muslims. Teachers at schools with large shares of Muslims revealed that Muslim students often "praise or admire Adolf Hitler for his killing of Jews", that "Jew-hate is legitimate within vast groups of Muslim students," and "Muslims laugh or command [teachers] to stop when trying to educate about the Holocaust." Additionally that "while some students might protest when some express support for terrorism, none object when students express hate of Jews" and that it says in "the Quran that you shall kill Jews, all true Muslims hate Jews." Most of these students were said to be born and raised in Norway. One Jewish father also told that his child after school had been taken by a Muslim mob (though managed to escape), reportedly "to be taken out to the forest and hanged because he was a Jew".[177]

Russia

[edit]
A demonstration in Russia. The antisemitic slogans cite Henry Ford and Empress Elizabeth.

Lien Verpoest explores the era of the Napoleonic wars to identify the formation of conservative ideas ranging from traditionalism to ardent patriotism and xenophobia.[178] Conservatives generally controlled Russia in the 19th century, and imposed xenophobia in education and the academy. In the late 19th century, especially after nationalistic uprisings in Poland in the 1860s, the government displayed xenophobia in its hostility toward ethnic minorities that did not speak Russian. The decision was to reduce the use of other languages, and insist on Russification.[179]

By the beginning of the 20th century, most European Jews lived in the so-called Pale of Settlement, the Western frontier of the Russian Empire consisting generally of the modern-day countries of Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and neighboring regions. Many pogroms accompanied the Revolution of 1917 and the ensuing Russian Civil War, an estimated 70,000 to 250,000 civilian Jews were killed in the atrocities throughout the former Russian Empire; the number of Jewish orphans exceeded 300,000.[180][181]

During the civil war era (1917–1922) both the Bolsheviks and the Whites employed nationalism and xenophobia as weapons to delegitimise the opposition.[182]

After World War II official national policy was to bring in students from Communist countries in East Europe and Asia for advanced training in Communist leadership roles. These students encountered severe xenophobia on campus. They survived by sticking together, but developed a hostility toward the Soviet leadership.[183] Even after the fall of Communism foreign students faced hostility on campus.[184]

In the 2000s, "skinheads" were especially visible in attacking anything foreign.[185] Racism against both the Russian citizens (peoples of the Caucasus, indigenous peoples of Siberia and Russian Far East, etc.) and non-Russian citizens of Africans, Central Asians, South Asians(Indians,Pakistanis,etc), East Asians (Vietnamese, Chinese, etc.) and Europeans (Ukrainians, etc.) became a significant factor.[186]

Using surveys from 1996, 2004, and 2012, Hannah S. Chapman, et al. reports a steady increase in Russians' negative attitudes toward seven outgroups. Muscovites especially became more xenophobic.[187] In 2016, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that "Researchers who track xenophobia in Russia have recorded an "impressive" decrease in hate crimes as the authorities appear to have stepped up pressure on far-right groups".[188] David Barry uses surveys to investigate the particularistic and xenophobic belief that all citizens should join Russia's dominant Orthodox religion. It is widespread among ethnic Russians and is increasing.[189]

A 2016 GlobeScan/BBC World Service poll found that 79% of Russian respondents disapproved of accepting Syrian refugees, the highest percentage out of 18 countries surveyed.[190][191]

Sweden

[edit]

A government study in 2006 estimated that 5% of the total adult population and 39% of adult Muslims "harbour systematic antisemitic views".[192] The former prime minister Göran Persson described these results as "surprising and terrifying". However, the rabbi of Stockholm's Orthodox Jewish community, Meir Horden, said, "It's not true to say that the Swedes are antisemitic. Some of them are hostile to Israel because they support the weak side, which they perceive the Palestinians to be."[193]

In March 2010, Fredrik Sieradzk told Die Presse, an Austrian Internet publication, that Jews are being "harassed and physically attacked" by "people from the Middle East", although he added that only a small number of Malmö's 40,000 Muslims "exhibit hatred of Jews". Sieradzk also stated that approximately 30 Jewish families have emigrated from Malmö to Israel in the past year, specifically to escape from harassment. Also in March, the Swedish newspaper Skånska Dagbladet reported that attacks on Jews in Malmö totaled 79 in 2009, about twice as many as the previous year, according to police statistics.[194] In December 2010, the Jewish human rights organization Simon Wiesenthal Center issued a travel advisory concerning Sweden, advising Jews to express "extreme caution" when visiting the southern parts of the country due to an increase in verbal and physical harassment of Jewish citizens by Muslims in the city of Malmö.[195]

Switzerland

[edit]

Swiss "Confederation Commission Against Racism" which is part of the Swiss "Federal Department of Home Affairs"[1] published a 2004 report, Black People in Switzerland: A Life between Integration and Discrimination[196] (published in German, French, and Italian only). According to this report, discrimination based on skin colour in Switzerland is not exceptional, and affects immigrants decades after their immigration.

Swiss People's Party claims that Swiss communities have a democratic right to decide who can or cannot be Swiss. In addition, the report said "Official statements and political campaigns that present immigrants from the EU in a favourable light and immigrants from elsewhere in a bad light must stop", according to the Swiss Federal Statistics Office in 2006, 85.5% of the foreign residents in Switzerland are European.[197] The United Nations special rapporteur on racism, Doudou Diène, has observed that Switzerland suffers from racism, discrimination and xenophobia. The UN envoy explained that although the Swiss authorities recognised the existence of racism and xenophobia, they did not view the problem as being serious. Diène pointed out that representatives of minority communities said they experienced serious racism and discrimination, notably for access to public services (e.g. health care), employment and lodging.[198][199]

The 2009 Swiss minaret referendum banned the construction of new minarets—towers traditionally attached to mosques—by a 57 to 43 popular vote of the country. In the 2021 Swiss referendums, the electorate banned the wearing of a full face covering, which some Orthodox Muslim women wear.

Ukraine

[edit]

Israel's Antisemitism Report for 2017 stated that "A striking exception in the trend of decrease in antisemitic incidents in Eastern Europe was Ukraine, where the number of recorded antisemitic attacks was doubled from last year and surpassed the tally for all the incidents reported throughout the entire region combined."[200] Ukrainian state historian, Vladimir Vyatrovich dismissed the Israeli report as anti-Ukrainian propaganda and a researcher of antisemitism from Ukraine, Vyacheslav Likhachev said the Israeli report was flawed and amateurish.[200]

1902 rally in London England against Destitute Foreigners

United Kingdom

[edit]

The extent and the targets of xenophobic attitudes in the United Kingdom have varied over time. It has resulted in cases of discrimination, riots and racially motivated murders. Racism and Xenophobia were mitigated by the attitudes and norms of the British class system during the 19th century, in which race and nationality mattered less than social distinction: a black African tribal chief was unquestionably superior to a white English costermonger.[201] Use of the word "racism" became more widespread after 1936, although the term "race hatred" was used in the late 1920s by sociologist Frederick Hertz. Laws, including the Race Relations Act 1965, were passed in the 1960s that specifically prohibited racial discrimination.[202]

At the 1517 Evil May Day riots in London, protestors attacked the prominence of foreigners in London wool and cloth businesses;[203][204] historians have called the event xenophobic.[203][205] Xenophobia in popular literature targeted Germans in the early 20th centuries, based on fears of militarism and espionage.[206]

According to scholar Julia Lovell, there has been a history of sinophobia dating back to the early 20th century, propagated by writers like Charles Dickens, which has endured to the present day with current media depictions of China.[207]

Racism has been observed as having a correlation between factors such as levels of unemployment and immigration in an area. Some studies suggest Brexit led to a rise in racist incidents, where locals became hostile to foreigners.[208]

Studies published in 2014 and 2015 suggested that racism was on the rise in the UK, with more than one third of those polled admitting they were racially prejudiced.[209][needs update] However a 2019 EU survey, Being Black in the EU, ranked the UK as the least racist in the 12 Western European countries surveyed.[210]

Sectarianism between Ulster Protestants and Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland has been called a form of racism by some international bodies.[211] It has resulted in widespread discrimination, segregation and serious violence, especially during partition and the Troubles.[citation needed]

During the acrimonious Brexit debate, xenophobia increased in London, especially against French living in the city.[212]

Africa

[edit]

Ivory Coast

[edit]

Ivory Coast has an history of ethnic tribal hatred and religious intolerance. In addition to the many victims among the various tribes of the northern and southern regions of the country that have perished in the ongoing conflict, white foreigners residing or visiting Ivory Coast have also been subjected to violent attacks. According to a report by Human Rights Watch, the Ivory Coast government is guilty of fanning ethnic hatred for its own political ends.[213]

In 2004, the Young Patriots of Abidjan, a strongly nationalist organisation, rallied by the state media, plundered possessions of foreign nationals in Abidjan. Calls for violence against whites and non-Ivorians were broadcast on national radio and TV after the Young Patriots seized control of its offices. Rapes, beatings, and murders of persons of European and Lebanese descent followed. Thousands of expatriates and white or ethnic Lebanese Ivorians fled the country. The attacks drew international condemnation.[214][215]

Mauritania

[edit]

Slavery in Mauritania persists despite its abolition in 1980 and mostly affects the descendants of black Africans abducted into slavery who now live in Mauritania as "black Moors" or haratin and who partially still serve the "white Moors", or bidhan, as slaves. The practice of slavery in Mauritania is most dominant within the traditional upper class of the Moors. For centuries, the haratin lower class, mostly poor black Africans living in rural areas, have been considered natural slaves by these Moors. Social attitudes have changed among most urban Moors, but in rural areas, the ancient divide remains.[216]

Niger

[edit]

In October 2006, Niger announced that it would deport to Chad the "Diffa Arabs", Arabs living in the Diffa region of eastern Niger.[217] Their population numbered about 150,000.[218] While the government was rounding up Arabs in preparation for the deportation, two girls died, reportedly after fleeing government forces, and three women suffered miscarriages. Niger's government eventually suspended their controversial decision to deport the Arabs.[219][220]

South Africa

[edit]
March against xenophobia in South Africa, Johannesburg, 23 April 2015

Xenophobia in South Africa has been present in both the apartheid and post–apartheid eras. Hostility between the British and Boers exacerbated by the Second Boer War led to rebellion by poor Afrikaners who looted British-owned shops.[221] South Africa also passed numerous acts intended to keep out Indians, such as the Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913, which provided for the exclusion of "undesirables", a group of people that included Indians. This effectively halted Indian immigration. The Township Franchise Ordinance of 1924 was intended to "deprive Indians of municipal franchise".[222] Xenophobic attitudes toward the Chinese have also been present, sometimes in the form of robberies or hijackings,[223] and a hate speech case in 2018 was put to court the year later with 11 offenders on trial.[224]

In 1994 and 1995, gangs of armed youth destroyed the homes of foreign nationals living in Johannesburg, demanding that the police work to repatriate them to their home countries.[225] In 2008, a widely documented spate of xenophobic attacks occurred in Johannesburg.[226][227][228] It is estimated that tens of thousands of migrants were displaced; property, businesses and homes were widely looted.[229] The death toll after the attack stood at 56.[225]

In 2015, another widely documented series of xenophobic attacks occurred in South Africa, mostly against migrant Zimbabweans.[230] This followed remarks by Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu stating that the migrants should "pack their bags and leave".[225][231] As of 20 April 2015, 7 people had died and more than 2000 foreigners had been displaced.[230]

Following the riots and murders of other Africans from 2008 and 2015, violence again broke out in 2019.[232]

Sudan

[edit]

In the Sudan, black African captives in the civil war were often enslaved, and female prisoners were often abused sexually,[233] with their Arab captors claiming that Islamic law grants them permission.[234] According to CBS News, slaves have been sold for US$50 apiece.[235] In September 2000, the U.S. State Department alleged that "the Sudanese government's support of slavery and its continued military action which has resulted in numerous deaths are due in part to the victims' religious beliefs."[236] Jok Madut Jok, professor of history at Loyola Marymount University, states that the abduction of women and children of the south is slavery by any definition. The government of Sudan insists that the whole matter is no more than the traditional tribal feuding over resources.[237]

Uganda

[edit]

Former British colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa have many citizens of South Asian descent. They were brought by the British Empire from British India to do clerical work in imperial service.[238] The most prominent case of anti-Indian racism was the ethnic cleansing of the Indian (called Asian) minority in Uganda by the strongman dictator and human rights violator Idi Amin.[238]

Oceania

[edit]

Australia

[edit]
This badge from 1910 was produced by the Australian Natives' Association, comprising Australian-born whites.[239][240]

The Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (White Australia policy) effectively barred people of non-European descent from immigrating to Australia.[241] There was never any specific policy titled "White Australia." The term was invented later to encapsulate a collection of policies that were designed to exclude people from Asia (particularly China) and the Pacific Islands (particularly Melanesia) from immigrating to Australia.[242][243]

The Menzies and Holt governments effectively dismantled the policies between 1949 and 1966 and the Whitlam government passed laws to ensure that race would be totally disregarded as a component for immigration to Australia in 1973.[244]

The 2005 Cronulla riots were a series of race riots and outbreaks of mob violence in Sydney's southern suburb Cronulla which resulted from strained relations between Anglo-Celtic and (predominantly Muslim) Lebanese Australians. Travel warnings for Australia were issued by some countries but were later removed.[245] In December 2005, a fight broke out between a group of volunteer surf lifesavers and Lebanese youth. These incidents were considered to be a key factor in a racially motivated confrontation the following weekend.[246] Violence spread to other southern suburbs of Sydney, where more assaults occurred, including two stabbings and attacks on ambulances and police officers.[247]

On 30 May 2009, Indian students protested against what they claimed were racist attacks, blocking streets in central Melbourne. Thousands of students gathered outside the Royal Melbourne Hospital where one of the victims was admitted.[248] In light of this event, the Australian Government started a Helpline for Indian students to report such incidents.[249] The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, termed these attacks "disturbing" and called for Australia to investigate the matters further.[250]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Xenophobia is an intense psychological aversion or hostility toward foreigners, , or those perceived as belonging to out-groups based on national, ethnic, or cultural differences, frequently manifesting as , , or aggression against immigrants and outsiders. The term derives from xénos (stranger or foreigner) and phóbos (fear or dread), reflecting a visceral reaction to perceived threats from the unfamiliar. Distinct from , which emphasizes biological or racial hierarchies, xenophobia centers on civic or cultural outsider status, potentially affecting individuals of the same race if they are deemed foreign. From first-principles evolutionary reasoning, xenophobic impulses likely evolved as adaptive responses to intergroup competition for scarce resources and risks posed by unfamiliar contacts, promoting in-group cohesion and in ancestral environments where outsiders could introduce novel diseases or rival claims. Empirical studies link heightened xenophobia to cues of infectious disease salience, though recent data during pandemics like show mixed support for universal pathogen-avoidance triggers, suggesting contextual moderators such as economic strain or perceived cultural incompatibility amplify it. In modern contexts, xenophobia drives restrictive policies and social tensions, as evidenced by historical patterns of anti-immigrant backlash in response to rapid demographic shifts, including labor competition and welfare burdens in host societies. While extreme expressions lead to and exclusionary laws, milder forms may reflect rational caution against unassimilated inflows that strain social trust or institutional capacity, challenging narratives that frame all boundary enforcement as mere bigotry.

Definitions and Conceptual Framework

Etymology and Core Definitions

The term xenophobia derives from the roots xénos (ξένος), meaning "stranger," "foreigner," or "guest," and phóbos (φόβος), meaning "" or "dread." Although composed of classical elements, the compound word itself emerged as a neologism in late 19th-century English, with its earliest recorded use appearing on April 12, 1880, in the Daily News, where it described a pathological aversion to foreign elements, contrasted with (an excessive fondness for the foreign). The confirms this 1880 attestation, noting the term's formation via the combining form xeno- (indicating foreignness) and -phobia (denoting or aversion). In its core sense, xenophobia refers to fear, hatred, or intense dislike of strangers, foreigners, or anything perceived as foreign or alien. defines it precisely as "fear and hatred of strangers or foreigners," emphasizing an emotional response to perceived otherness rather than inherent traits like race. Similarly, the characterizes it as a "deep antipathy to foreign strangers or foreigners," often manifesting as against those from other nations or cultures, while the Learner's Dictionaries specifies "a strong feeling of dislike or of people from other countries." These definitions highlight xenophobia's focus on national, cultural, or ethnic foreignness as the trigger, distinguishing it from broader phobias or generalized anxieties, though contemporary usage sometimes extends it to aversion toward unfamiliar or ideas. Etymologically faithful, the term underscores a reflexive wariness toward the unknown, which historical linguists trace to human social adaptations rather than mere irrationality, yet it has evolved into a label frequently applied pejoratively in political discourse to critique or . Xenophobia, defined as an intense or aversion toward foreigners or those perceived as outsiders based on their national, cultural, or ethnic origins, differs from in that the latter specifically involves or predicated on perceived biological racial differences rather than foreignness per se. While xenophobic attitudes may coincide with racial animus, particularly when foreigners belong to distinct racial groups, xenophobia can manifest independently of race, as seen in hostilities between groups of the same race but different nationalities, such as intra-European conflicts or attacks on African migrants by locals in irrespective of shared racial traits. Scholars emphasize this conceptual separation, noting that equating the two overlooks xenophobia's focus on civic or cultural estrangement over inherent racial hierarchies. In contrast to , which entails a in the superiority of one's own and a corresponding of others without necessarily implying active fear or exclusion, xenophobia involves heightened emotional responses like dread or toward perceived threats from outsiders. operates as a favoring in-group norms, often passively, whereas xenophobia escalates to behavioral manifestations such as avoidance or against strangers, rooted in perceived or risks. This distinction holds empirically, as ethnocentric views can coexist with tolerance toward foreigners if cultural boundaries are not breached, unlike xenophobia's reflexive antipathy to otherness itself. Nativism, while overlapping with xenophobia in opposing immigration, prioritizes policy preferences for native-born citizens—such as restrictive laws favoring established residents—over the visceral of foreigners that characterizes xenophobia. Nativist sentiments may endorse assimilation or quotas without overt , whereas xenophobia encompasses broader irrational dread of the unfamiliar, extending beyond policy to social or against perceived intruders. For instance, nativism in early 20th-century U.S. contexts targeted specific immigrant waves through legislation like the 1924 Immigration Act, but xenophobic undercurrents fueled mob actions against entire outsider groups regardless of legal status. Prejudice serves as a superordinate category encompassing unfounded negative attitudes toward any out-group, including but not limited to xenophobic targets; thus, xenophobia represents a subset of specifically directed at foreigners or strangers, often amplified by tangible triggers like economic displacement or cultural dilution. Unlike general , which might stem from about traits like applicable across groups, xenophobia derives from the inherent otherness of outsiders, invoking primal responses to unfamiliar or appearances as existential threats. This targeted nature explains why xenophobic correlates more strongly with demographic anxieties than with abstract biases seen in other prejudices.

Evolutionary and Psychological Foundations

Adaptive Origins in Human Evolution

In ancestral environments characterized by small, kin-based groups, aversion to outgroup members likely conferred adaptive advantages by mitigating risks from unfamiliar individuals, who posed threats through competition for scarce resources, potential , or transmission of novel pathogens. This response—prioritizing caution toward strangers—enhanced and in settings where intergroup encounters often involved hostility rather than cooperation, as evidenced by ethnographic records of societies where raids between tribes accounted for significant mortality. Studies of chimpanzees, our closest living relatives, reveal intergroup aggression and territorial xenophobia that parallel patterns, suggesting these behaviors originated in the common ancestor of s and great apes approximately 6-7 million years ago. In communities, males form coalitions to patrol borders and lethally attack outsiders, a strategy termed "parochial cooperation" that promotes in-group solidarity while fostering outgroup hostility, thereby securing opportunities and . Such dynamics imply that human xenophobia evolved not as prejudice but as an extension of coalitional , where in-group favoritism and outgroup wariness co-evolved to defend against existential threats in fragmented social landscapes. A key mechanism underlying this adaptation is the behavioral , which triggers and avoidance toward cues of potential contagion, including foreign accents, unfamiliar foods, or outgroup symbols that signal novel pathogens. Experimental evidence shows that priming individuals with threats increases ethnocentric preferences and xenophobic attitudes, as the system errs on the side of overgeneralization to minimize risks in environments lacking modern or . This response was particularly adaptive during the Pleistocene, when human groups migrated into harboring unseen microbial hazards from distant populations. Territorial instincts further reinforced xenophobia, as humans, like other primates, exhibited endowment effects—valuing native lands and resources more highly—and defended them against intruders to ensure group viability. Kin selection principles extended nepotism beyond immediate family to broader ethnic kin networks sharing genetic markers, promoting within the group while heightening suspicion of genetic outsiders who might dilute . These evolved dispositions persist because they solved recurrent adaptive problems in human evolutionary history, though their expression varies with environmental cues like perceived or demographic shifts.

Cognitive Mechanisms and In-Group Preferences

In-group favoritism manifests as a where individuals preferentially allocate resources, , or positive evaluations to members of their perceived over out-group members, often without rational basis or personal gain. This mechanism is demonstrated empirically through the , developed by in experiments from 1970 to 1971, in which British schoolboys categorized by trivial criteria—such as preferences or coin toss outcomes—consistently favored their arbitrary in-group in reward allocation matrices, exhibiting rates up to 1.5 times higher for in-group members despite equal overall outcomes. Such biases emerge rapidly from mere social categorization, relying on cognitive heuristics that simplify complex social environments by partitioning people into "us" versus "them" categories, thereby reducing uncertainty and enhancing predictability in interactions. Evolutionary models posit that these preferences arose adaptively to solve recurrent ancestral problems, such as coordinating against predators or competitors while minimizing exploitation by non-reciprocators within larger coalitions beyond kin ties. In small-scale societies, where groups averaged 25-50 individuals, preferential with familiar in-groups—marked by shared traits like , cues, or cooperative history—boosted odds by fostering reciprocity and parochial , as simulated in agent-based models showing stable favoritism equilibria under inter-group conflict scenarios. Neuroscientific correlates include heightened activation to out-group faces, signaling potential threat detection evolved for vigilance against unfamiliar individuals who posed risks of transmission or resource , with functional MRI studies revealing faster implicit of out-group stimuli in as little as 170 milliseconds post-exposure. Xenophobia, as an extension of these mechanisms, involves heightened aversion or toward out-groups perceived as dissimilar, but indicates it often stems more from in-group enhancement than active out-group ; for instance, meta-analyses of intergroup allocation tasks across 20 countries show that 70-80% of variance attributes to positive in-group allocations rather than punitive out-group subtractions, with derogation intensifying only under or conditions. Cognitive learning asymmetries further perpetuate this, as individuals update beliefs more readily from negative out-group exemplars (e.g., one uncooperative foreigner) than positive ones, leading to persistent overgeneralization in probabilistic reasoning, as observed in paradigms where out-group error rates in trust games reached 25% higher after minimal exposures. These processes align with first-principles expectations of modular : domain-specific adaptations for social exchange and cheater detection generalize to out-groups, yielding avoidance without requiring explicit malice, though institutional narratives in sometimes underemphasize adaptive utility in favor of cultural attributions.

Causes and Triggers

Perceived Threats: Economic, Cultural, and Security

Empirical research indicates that perceptions of economic threats from contribute significantly to xenophobic sentiments, particularly among low-skilled native workers facing labor market competition. Influxes of low-skilled immigrants have been associated with downward pressure on and for comparable native groups, as supply increases in specific segments reduce and growth. For example, economist George Borjas's analysis of U.S. data revealed a negative between immigrant share in a skill group and native growth, estimating that accounts for 5-10% of the decline in wages for high school dropouts from 1980-2000. Similarly, a 2010 study found that a 10% rise in low-skilled immigrants impacts native youth rates more severely than rates, with youth employment dropping by up to 4.4 percentage points due to displacement effects. These effects are amplified in welfare states where immigrants access benefits, straining public resources and fostering resentment over fiscal burdens, as native taxpayers subsidize non-contributors at rates exceeding contributions in initial years. Cultural threats manifest as fears of erosion in host society norms, identity, and social cohesion due to incompatible values and failed assimilation. Rapid demographic shifts in have produced parallel societies—segregated enclaves with minimal interaction between immigrants and natives—undermining trust and mutual understanding. Sweden's Prime Minister stated in April 2022 that the country's integration policies had failed over two decades, resulting in parallel societies rife with gang and exclusion from mainstream culture. Such developments include persistent adherence to practices like honor-based and gender segregation among certain migrant communities, which clash with liberal democratic values and provoke backlash when state accommodation appears to prioritize minority over majority norms. Official inquiries, such as those in , highlight non-Western immigrants' lower assimilation rates, with cultural retention correlating to higher social isolation and intergroup tensions. Security threats encompass heightened risks of and linked to unvetted or poorly integrated migrant populations, fueling perceptions of . In , foreign-born individuals are 2.5 times more likely to be registered as suspects than natives, with overrepresentation reaching 58% of total suspects despite comprising 33% of the population in 2017 data. A 2025 Lund University study documented foreign-background individuals up to seven times more likely to be suspects in cases, attributing this partly to cultural factors beyond mere socioeconomic disadvantage. In , non-Western immigrants exhibit violence conviction rates 1.12 times higher than natives. Regarding , Europol's 2025 report noted 24 jihadist attacks in the , a rise from 14 in 2023, with 89% of European terror incidents since 2014 perpetrated by second- or third-generation immigrants rather than recent arrivals, indicating within migrant-descended communities. These patterns, while contested by some analyses denying overall spikes, align with causal links between lax border controls post-2015 and localized insecurity, validating native concerns over safety.

Role of Rapid Demographic Change and Elite Influence

Rapid demographic shifts driven by mass immigration correlate strongly with increased anti-immigrant sentiment and xenophobic attitudes among native populations, as evidenced by time-series analyses across thirty European democracies from 1980 to 2017, which document short- to medium-term public backlashes including heightened immigration concerns and negative mood shifts following influxes. Historical parallels from the Age of Mass Migration (1850–1913) in the United States and Europe reveal similar patterns, where sudden immigrant arrivals were perceived by natives as fiscal burdens competing for resources, prompting widespread political hostility, reduced support for welfare redistribution, and nativist movements. These reactions stem from tangible pressures on labor markets, public services, and cultural norms, intensified when immigration outpaces integration capacities, as seen in post-2015 Europe where regional inflows predicted rises in support for restrictionist parties. Elite influence exacerbates these dynamics through a persistent disconnect from public preferences, with surveys from 1994 to 2018 showing U.S. political, media, and leaders assigning far lower priority to than the general populace, often by margins exceeding 50 percentage points. In , elite discourse favoring open borders—promoted via policy, academia, and —has been shown to shape attitudes but frequently overrides majority opposition, framing native resistance as bigotry and limiting debate on assimilation failures or risks. This top-down imposition, evident in sustained high despite polls showing 60-70% public support for reductions in countries like and , fosters perceptions of and elite detached from local realities, fueling populist surges as compensatory mechanisms. Empirical patterns indicate that when elites align with public concerns, as in restrictionist campaigns, anti-immigrant attitudes stabilize or decline; conversely, pro-immigration elite cues amid rapid change amplify by signaling disregard for causal threats like welfare strain or correlations. Academic and media sources documenting these trends often exhibit left-leaning biases, underreporting negative immigrant impacts to align with institutional norms favoring , which may skew interpretations toward viewing xenophobia as pathological rather than adaptive. Overall, the interplay of unchecked demographic and insulation from its consequences underscores xenophobia's emergence as a rational signaling of unaddressed disequilibria in social contracts.

Historical Development

Ancient and Pre-Modern Examples

In , the concept of xenophobia manifested through the sharp distinction between Hellenes and barbaroi, a term derived from onomatopoeic imitation of non-Greek speech patterns sounding like "bar-bar," denoting foreigners as linguistically and culturally inferior. This prejudice underpinned policies and philosophies, such as Aristotle's assertion in the fourth century BCE that non-Greek barbarians were naturally suited for due to their perceived lack of rational capacity, justifying Greek dominance over conquered peoples like and . Greek city-states, including , restricted citizenship to ethnic Hellenes, excluding metics (resident foreigners) from political rights despite their economic contributions, reflecting fears of cultural dilution amid interactions during the Persian Wars (499–449 BCE). The and exhibited similar attitudes toward outsiders, labeling Germanic tribes, , and other non-Italians as barbari prone to savagery, as chronicled by historians like in his (98 CE), which portrayed Germans as inherently warlike and uncivilized to contrast Roman virtues. Early republican expansions involved mass enslavement and extermination of foreign populations, such as the near-genocidal campaigns against in the Third Punic (149–146 BCE), where Roman senators debated to prevent regeneration, driven by lingering enmity from Hannibal's invasions. While imperial citizenship grants under in 212 CE extended legal inclusion, xenophobic backlash surged in amid barbarian migrations, with documenting Roman elite hostility toward Gothic settlers after the 376 CE admission, culminating in riots and policy reversals amid perceived threats to social order. In the , Israelite texts reflect ethnocentric exclusion, as in Deuteronomy 7:1–6 (circa 7th–6th centuries BCE), which commanded the destruction of seven Canaanite nations to prevent intermarriage and , framing foreigners as existential threats to covenantal purity. This extended to prohibitions against Ammonites and Moabites entering the assembly for ten generations (Deuteronomy 23:3–6), rooted in historical conflicts like the refusal of aid during , illustrating tribal boundaries enforced through rather than mere cultural preference. Pre-modern China embodied , viewing peripheral nomads as yi or man barbarians inherently inferior unless sinicized, as articulated in (206 BCE–220 CE) texts like the Shiji by , which depicted raiders as subhuman threats necessitating the Great Wall's construction around 215 BCE under . Confucian ideology permitted assimilation—barbarians adopting rites could become Chinese—but persistent xenophobia fueled cycles of tribute demands and wars, such as the Tang dynasty's (618–907 CE) (755–763 CE), where Turkic general An Lushan's mixed heritage incited backlash against "inner barbarians" infiltrating the bureaucracy. Medieval Europe saw intensified xenophobia against religious minorities, exemplified by the expulsion of from in 1290 CE under Edward I, affecting an estimated 2,000–3,000 individuals amid accusations and economic resentments over moneylending roles barred to Christians. In Iberia, the (711–1492 CE) framed Moors as invaders, culminating in the 1492 expelling or forcibly converting 200,000 Muslims and , justified by Ferdinand and Isabella as purifying Christian realms from Islamic and Jewish "contamination" following Granada's fall. These actions, often tied to Crusades-era depicting Saracens as demonic, underscore how perceived security threats and religious homogeneity amplified against longstanding resident aliens.

Modern Era: Nationalism and Colonialism

The emergence of modern nationalism in 19th-century Europe intertwined with xenophobic sentiments that emphasized ethnic and cultural homogeneity against perceived foreign threats. Stimulated by the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, nationalist movements in fragmented states like Germany and Italy sought unification based on shared language and heritage, often excluding or marginalizing internal minorities and external rivals. In the German Confederation, for example, the 1848 revolutions highlighted tensions between pan-German aspirations and anti-Slavic prejudices, as Prussian leaders viewed Polish and Danish populations in border regions as obstacles to national cohesion. Similarly, in the unified Kingdom of Italy after 1861, irredentist campaigns targeted Austrian-held territories while fostering distrust toward non-Italian ethnic groups within the peninsula. These dynamics reinforced in-group preferences, where xenophobia served to consolidate loyalty amid industrialization and urbanization pressures from 1815 to 1871. European colonial expansion during the same period institutionalized xenophobic attitudes toward non-European peoples, framing them as inherently inferior to justify domination and resource extraction. The "Scramble for Africa" from the 1880s onward, formalized at the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, saw powers like Britain, France, and Belgium partition the continent with little regard for indigenous ethnic boundaries, rooted in Social Darwinist theories positing European racial superiority. In the Belgian Congo Free State under King Leopold II from 1885 to 1908, policies led to an estimated 10 million native deaths through forced labor and violence, predicated on viewing Africans as subhuman and expendable. British imperial rhetoric, exemplified by Rudyard Kipling's 1899 poem "The White Man's Burden," portrayed colonized subjects in Asia and Africa as childlike and in need of tutelage, masking economic motives with paternalistic xenophobia. Such ideologies, drawing from 19th-century scientific racism, rationalized atrocities and segregation, as seen in the 1857 Indian Rebellion's aftermath, where British reprisals intensified racial hierarchies. In settler colonies like and , nationalism blended with colonial xenophobia to enforce exclusionary policies against indigenous and immigrant populations. The Australian colonies' federation in 1901 implemented the , restricting non-European immigration through dictation tests starting in 1901, driven by fears of Asian labor competition and cultural dilution amid gold rush-era inflows. In , the Anglo-Boer Wars (1899–1902) exacerbated ethnic animosities, with British victory leading to Union in 1910 that prioritized over native rights, echoing broader imperial patterns of demographic control. These manifestations highlight how and amplified xenophobic mechanisms, prioritizing group survival and dominance over universalist ideals, often amid real economic competitions and security concerns from rapid territorial expansions.

20th Century and Post-War Shifts

In the early 20th century, xenophobic sentiments fueled stringent immigration restrictions across Western nations, exemplified by the ' of 1921 and the , which imposed national origins quotas favoring Northern and Western Europeans while sharply limiting arrivals from Southern and , , and to preserve perceived cultural homogeneity and economic stability. These policies reflected widespread fears of "racial dilution" and job competition, intensified by post-World War I economic pressures and eugenics-influenced ideologies, resulting in a drastic reduction in immigrant inflows from over 800,000 annually in the 1920s to under 300,000 by the decade's end. Similar measures appeared in , where the , formalized through the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, effectively barred non-European migration until gradual dilutions in the 1960s. The and amplified these trends amid global instability; in the U.S., and economic depression led to the of over 400,000 nationals between 1929 and 1936, often under coercive conditions, as native workers blamed immigrants for rates exceeding 25%. European xenophobia peaked with Nazi Germany's racial laws and , where anti-foreign and anti-Semitic policies displaced or exterminated millions, though Allied nations' restrictive quotas—such as the U.S. admitting only 200,000-250,000 refugees from 1933-1945 despite millions fleeing—highlighted parallel hesitations rooted in domestic nativism. Post-war reconstruction initially suppressed overt expressions through international frameworks like the 1948 Universal Declaration, fostering a rhetorical shift toward tolerance, yet underlying attitudes persisted, as evidenced by continued U.S. national origins quotas until their in the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, which prioritized and skills over . In Europe, post-war labor shortages prompted guest worker programs, such as West Germany's recruitment of over 1 million Turks and Yugoslavs by the 1970s, but rapid demographic shifts triggered backlash; British MP Enoch Powell's April 20, 1968, "Rivers of Blood" speech warned of communal violence from unchecked Commonwealth immigration, citing projections of non-white populations reaching 7 million by 2000 and drawing support from polls showing 74% opposition to further inflows. This reflected a broader tension between elite-driven multiculturalism and public concerns over cultural erosion, with similar patterns in France and the Netherlands where post-colonial migrations strained social cohesion. Australia's full abandonment of the White Australia policy in 1973 under Prime Minister Gough Whitlam marked a policy pivot toward non-discriminatory selection, admitting over 100,000 non-European migrants annually by the 1980s, though latent xenophobia resurfaced in debates over Asian immigration. Overall, the era saw a transition from legislated exclusion to norm-enforced restraint on xenophobic rhetoric, yet empirical triggers like unemployment spikes—correlating with anti-immigrant sentiment in 1930s data—indicated enduring causal links between perceived competition and in-group preferences, undiminished by post-war ideological overlays.

Empirical Evidence and Patterns

Studies on Correlations with Immigration Outcomes

Empirical research has identified correlations between heightened public —often characterized as xenophobic attitudes—and observable negative outcomes associated with certain immigration patterns, particularly low-skilled or rapid inflows from culturally dissimilar groups. Studies indicate that such opposition tends to intensify in regions experiencing elevated levels, where data reveal strains on social cohesion, public safety, and fiscal resources. For instance, Robert Putnam's analysis of U.S. communities found that greater ethnic diversity, largely driven by immigration, correlates with reduced social trust, lower , and diminished interpersonal cooperation in the short to medium term, effects persisting even after controlling for socioeconomic factors. Similar patterns emerge in , where rapid demographic shifts post-2015 have coincided with declining generalized trust and increased ethnic segregation, validating public concerns in high-immigration locales. On public safety, data from multiple European countries demonstrate overrepresentation of non-Western immigrants in , aligning with localized spikes in anti-immigrant sentiment. In , register-based studies across six analyses show that immigrants and their descendants commit crimes at rates 2–4 times higher than natives, even after adjustments for age, income, and urban residence, with the disparity most pronounced for and sexual offenses. Swedish official reports confirm foreign-born individuals account for disproportionate involvement in lethal and , contributing to heightened public perceptions of insecurity in migrant-dense areas. These findings correlate with stronger opposition in regions bearing the brunt of such inflows, suggesting attitudes reflect experiential realities rather than unfounded . Fiscal and economic outcomes further underscore these correlations, as low-skilled immigration often imposes net costs that fuel resistance. Economist George Borjas's research estimates that immigration from less educated cohorts depresses native wages by 3–5% for low-skilled workers and generates negative lifetime fiscal impacts, with immigrants' welfare and service usage exceeding tax contributions by $50,000–$100,000 per household over decades. The U.S. National Academies of Sciences report corroborates this for households headed by immigrants without high school diplomas, projecting a $300,000 net drain per individual when including second-generation effects. In Europe, analogous strains appear in welfare dependency rates, where non-EU migrants utilize benefits at 2–3 times the native rate in countries like the and , correlating with electoral shifts toward restrictionist policies in affected areas. These patterns indicate that anti-immigration views serve as a rational response to empirically verifiable burdens, rather than mere irrationality.

Data on Crime, Welfare, and Social Cohesion Effects

Empirical studies in several European countries indicate that immigrants, particularly from non-Western backgrounds, are overrepresented in crime statistics relative to their population share. In Sweden, individuals born abroad are 2.5 times more likely to be registered as crime suspects than those born in Sweden to Swedish-born parents, according to a 2025 government report analyzing data up to 2017. A 2020 analysis of 2017 data found that migrants, comprising 33% of the population, accounted for 58% of suspects for total crimes on reasonable grounds, with even higher shares for violent offenses like murder. In Germany, following the 2015 refugee influx, a one standard deviation increase in refugee inflows correlated with a 1.67% rise in county-level crime rates and a 2.27% increase in victimization rates, based on administrative data from 2010-2015. Non-citizen suspects rose to 41% of total suspects in recent years, up 17.8%, amid a 7.3% overall suspect increase. These patterns persist despite controls for socioeconomic factors, suggesting causal links beyond mere correlation, though mainstream academic sources often emphasize integration failures rather than inherent group differences. In the United States, data on undocumented immigrants show mixed results, with some analyses of Texas arrest records from 2012-2018 indicating lower overall criminality rates for undocumented individuals compared to natives (e.g., 45% lower felony rates). However, incarceration data from sources like the Cato Institute reveal that while legal immigrants have the lowest rates, native-born Americans exceed undocumented in some metrics, yet federal data on criminal aliens highlight thousands of convictions for serious crimes annually among deportable non-citizens. Critiques of lower-crime narratives note potential undercounting due to sanctuary policies and focus on aggregate rates that mask overrepresentation in specific violent categories. Welfare usage data reveal disproportionate reliance among immigrant households in welfare states. In Denmark, a forecast analysis projects that immigrants from poorer countries impose a large negative fiscal impact, with non-Western immigrants contributing negatively by an average of -DKK 240,000 per person over their lifetime, contrasting positive contributions from Western-origin migrants. European-wide assessments using EU-SILC data show immigrants are more likely to receive welfare benefits than natives, with refugees and non-EU migrants exhibiting rates 30% higher in some cohorts. In the U.S., 59.4% of illegal immigrant-headed households access at least one welfare program, exceeding native rates when including programs like and food assistance available to non-citizens. These net costs strain public finances, particularly in generous systems, as evidenced by Danish projections of sustained deficits from low-skilled inflows absent policy reforms. On social cohesion, Robert Putnam's 2007 study of U.S. communities found that ethnic diversity correlates with reduced social trust, lower , and "hunkering down" behaviors, with trust declining even among same-ethnic groups in diverse areas. This "" failure in short-term contexts is replicated in European analyses, where higher local diversity associates with diminished neighborly trust and cooperation, independent of economic controls. Longitudinal data suggest these effects erode , fostering withdrawal rather than integration, though long-term assimilation may mitigate in select cases; however, rapid demographic shifts amplify immediate cohesion losses. Such patterns underpin arguments for xenophobia as a rational response to observable group-level outcomes rather than baseless .

Regional and Contemporary Manifestations

Europe: Post-2015 Migration and Recent Policy Responses

In 2015, the experienced a surge in irregular migration, with over 1 million arrivals by sea, primarily from , , and , and a record 1.3 million asylum applications across EU member states, , and . This influx, peaking in the second half of the year with around 868,000 arrivals, strained border infrastructure and asylum systems, particularly in and as entry points, and led to secondary movements toward . Empirical studies indicate that such rapid demographic shifts correlated with heightened public concerns over cultural integration, economic burdens, and security, manifesting in increased support for anti-immigration political platforms. The crisis amplified perceptions of xenophobia through visible policy backlashes and social tensions, including incidents like the mass sexual assaults in on 2015-2016, predominantly involving migrants from and the , which fueled debates on failed vetting and parallel societies. Crime data from affected regions showed delayed but notable increases; for instance, a 1-percentage-point rise in refugee shares on Greek islands was associated with 1.7-2.5 percentage point increases in incidents, while found refugee allocations linked to higher rural vote shares for anti-immigration parties amid localized upticks. Public opinion polls reflected this, with immigration emerging as the top EU-level concern in surveys post-2015, and data showing majorities in countries like and viewing refugees as a potential cultural , though attitudes varied by exposure levels. Policy responses shifted from initial openness—exemplified by German Chancellor Angela Merkel's 2015 "Wir schaffen das" stance—to containment measures, including the March 2016 EU-Turkey agreement that reduced Aegean crossings by curbing onward movement and providing returns. National governments reintroduced internal border controls over 400 times since 2015, undermining Schengen free movement, while the EU bolstered for external borders and established "hotspots" for processing. By 2023-2024, the New Pact on Migration and Asylum mandated faster screening, burden-sharing via relocation or financial contributions, and expedited returns for ineligible claims, with implementation phased from 2026 amid ongoing arrivals exceeding 1 million annually in recent years. Countries like and enacted stricter integration requirements and deportation incentives, while pursued offshore processing deals, reflecting a broader driven by electoral gains for parties emphasizing migrant .

North America: U.S. Border Issues and Canadian Debates

In the United States, public concerns over at the southern border intensified during the Biden administration, with U.S. Customs and Border Protection recording approximately 11 million encounters between 2021 and 2025, including Title 8 apprehensions and inadmissibles. These figures encompassed surges from diverse nationalities, straining border resources and local communities in states like and , where apprehensions of criminal noncitizens reached thousands annually, including convictions for serious offenses such as and . High-profile incidents, including murders committed by individuals who entered illegally, such as the cases of Laken Riley and Jocelyn Nungaray, amplified perceptions of security risks, contributing to widespread demands for stricter enforcement. Empirical data on immigration's effects fueled debates, with federal statistics showing over 6,000 arrests of criminal noncitizens in fiscal year 2024 alone for immigration-related violations like illegal re-entry. While aggregate studies from organizations like the Migration Policy Institute claim lower overall offending rates among immigrants compared to natives, these often aggregate legal and undocumented populations and overlook recidivism among repeat border crossers or the fiscal costs of processing millions of encounters, estimated in billions for detention and removal. Public opinion reflected these pressures, with a Harvard/Harris poll in October 2025 finding 56% of registered voters supporting deportation of all illegal immigrants and 78% favoring removal of criminal ones, indicating a rational prioritization of national security over narratives framing opposition as irrational prejudice. Border security measures post-2024 election, including rapid deportations, correlated with sharp declines in encounters—to under 5,000 in July 2025—demonstrating policy responsiveness to public demands without evidence of baseless xenophobia. In , rapid via —targeting 500,000 permanent residents annually by initially—exacerbated housing shortages and public service strains, prompting a policy reversal in 2024 to reduce targets to 395,000 for , a 21% cut from prior levels. This shift responded to empirical pressures, including a national housing deficit where immigration-driven demand contributed to price surges exceeding 20% in major cities from 2021-2024, alongside declines in capacity. Public sentiment turned markedly negative, with Environics Institute polling in fall revealing 56% of viewing levels as excessive, up from prior decades, linked causally to visible strains on affordability rather than unfounded . Debates in highlighted tensions between elite-driven expansion and grassroots concerns, with Conservative opposition advocating further reductions amid polls showing 63% deeming the 2025 target too high. Critics attributing backlash to xenophobia often overlook data on temporary residents comprising over 7% of the by 2024, correlating with a 0.2% projected dip in 2025-2026 absent cuts, underscoring resource competition as a primary driver. Political discourse, including Trudeau-era justifications for high inflows, faced scrutiny for downplaying causal links to economic woes, while public calls for calibration reflected pragmatic adaptation to limits, not ethnic animus. This evolution paralleled U.S. trends, where adjustments mitigated unrest without conceding to irrational prejudice claims.

Asia and Middle East: Intra-Regional Tensions

In , longstanding ethnic tensions have fueled xenophobic outbreaks against intra-regional minorities, particularly ethnic Chinese communities perceived as economically dominant outsiders. The May 1998 riots in , amid the Asian and political upheaval under President , saw mobs in and other cities target Chinese-Indonesians, burning over 8,500 buildings, looting businesses, and killing an estimated 1,000-1,200 people, with reports of systematic rapes against Chinese women. These events reflected accumulated resentments over perceived Chinese control of , exacerbated by economic disparities where ethnic Chinese, comprising about 3% of the , held disproportionate wealth. In , xenophobic policies and violence have targeted the Rohingya Muslim minority, viewed by the Buddhist-majority government and populace as foreign Bengali interlopers rather than indigenous citizens. The 1982 Citizenship Law explicitly excluded Rohingya from nationality, rendering over 1 million stateless and subjecting them to restrictions on movement, marriage, and employment. This culminated in the 2016-2017 military operations in , displacing over 700,000 Rohingya to amid arson of 300,000 homes and documented killings, rapes, and village burnings, actions the has labeled as but which attributes to counterinsurgency against Rohingya militants. Institutionalized , including school curricula portraying Rohingya as invaders, has perpetuated these tensions, with surveys showing widespread Burmese support for their exclusion due to fears of cultural dilution and security threats from cross-border ties to . In the Middle East, intra-regional migration for labor has bred systemic xenophobia under the kafala sponsorship system prevalent in Gulf states like , , and the UAE, binding workers from , , and other Arab countries to employers who control visas, mobility, and exit. This framework, rooted in tribal patronage traditions, has enabled widespread abuses: in , where migrants comprise over 40% of the workforce, domestic workers—often women from , , and —face racism-fueled exploitation, including 18-hour workdays, passport confiscation, physical violence, and wage theft, with documenting cases amounting to forced labor. Reforms since 2020, such as allowing job changes without employer permission in , have been partial, leaving migrants vulnerable to for complaints and societal prejudices viewing them as temporary inferiors, with incidents of mob violence against workers in and underscoring racial hierarchies favoring over non-Arabs.

Africa: Resource Competition and Ethnic Clashes

In , xenophobic sentiments and ethnic clashes frequently emerge from competition over scarce resources such as , , jobs, and economic opportunities, particularly in nations grappling with high and pressures. These tensions often pit local populations against immigrants or neighboring ethnic groups perceived as encroaching on limited livelihoods, leading to outbreaks of rather than mere . Empirical patterns indicate that resource amplifies , where communities prioritize kin or nationals amid zero-sum economic conditions, as seen in pastoralist-farmer disputes and urban migrant expulsions. South Africa exemplifies this dynamic, where post-apartheid economic stagnation and unemployment rates climbing to 38% in informal settlements have fueled attacks on migrants from , , and , who are blamed for undercutting wages and dominating informal trade. In townships like , locals have cited immigrants' lower labor costs and business networks as direct threats to scarce employment, prompting riots that displace thousands and destroy foreign-owned shops. Such violence, recurrent since the early 2000s, reflects causal pressures from and job scarcity rather than abstract hatred, with perpetrators often invoking "buy South African" to reclaim economic space. In , ethnic clashes over grazing pastures and sources have escalated into deadly confrontations between sedentary farmers and nomadic Fulani herders, with resource competition driving over 2,500 farmer-herder killings annually in recent years. These conflicts, concentrated in the , stem from shrinking arable land due to and , where herders' southward migrations for clash with farmers' crop needs, often resulting in retaliatory raids and village burnings. Government data attributes much of the violence to ecological marginalization, where unequal access to renewable resources like intensifies zero-sum disputes among ethnic groups. Kenya's tensions with Somali immigrants highlight urban economic xenophobia, where Somalis' dominance in Eastleigh's retail sector—fueled by remittances and networks—breeds over perceived job displacement in a with exceeding 20%. Security fears post-al-Shabaab attacks have compounded this, leading to evictions and boycotts, as locals view Somali businesses as unfair competitors in hawking and transport amid saturation. Reports document sporadic clashes, including 2012 protests demanding Somali expulsion from , underscoring how immigrant enclaves intensify perceptions of resource capture in high-density areas. Across these cases, data from conflict trackers reveal that resource-driven ethnic violence displaces millions annually, with a 13% rise in African displacements to over 40 million by 2023, often tied to both and abundance mismanagement that favors certain groups. While some analyses attribute clashes solely to manipulation, first-hand accounts and econometric studies emphasize underlying material incentives, where out-group influxes correlate with heightened local insecurity over survival basics.

Other Regions: Australia and Latin America

In , xenophobic policies historically manifested through the , enacted in 1901 via the Immigration Restriction Act, which used dictation tests to exclude non-European immigrants until its dismantling between 1966 and 1973. This framework prioritized British and European settlers, reflecting fears of cultural dilution and economic competition from Asian laborers during era and . Post-policy shifts toward in the 1970s correlated with rising overseas-born populations, reaching 27% by recent counts, yet surveys indicate persistent concerns over scale amid housing shortages and wage pressures. Contemporary attitudes reveal a nuanced balance: the Scanlon Foundation's Mapping Social Cohesion surveys, conducted annually since 2007, show majority support for (around 80-85% in 2021-2023 reports) but growing unease with net migration exceeding 500,000 annually in 2022-2023, linked to housing declines and infrastructure strain. Occupational divides persist, with manual workers expressing higher opposition to high levels than professionals, per 2016 Australian Election Study data, attributing this to direct labor market competition rather than abstract prejudice. Incidents like the , involving clashes between Anglo-Australians and Lebanese Muslim youth, underscored tensions from perceived cultural incompatibilities and group violence, though official inquiries emphasized localized triggers over systemic xenophobia. In , xenophobia has intensified with the Venezuelan migration crisis, displacing over 7.7 million people since 2014 due to economic collapse and political instability, straining host nations like (hosting 2.9 million), (1.5 million), and (over 500,000). Rapid influxes overwhelmed urban services, fueling resentment: in , 2018 saw riots and arson against Venezuelan neighborhoods amid reports of rising petty crime attributed to undocumented migrants, prompting visa restrictions and deportation drives. Brazilian cities like experienced 2018 mob attacks on Venezuelan camps, driven by locals' perceptions of welfare system overload and job displacement, with state showing migrant-related thefts surging 30-50% in border areas. Empirical patterns link these reactions to causal pressures rather than unfounded bias: studies in and document Venezuelan migrants' overrepresentation in certain crime categories, such as and in Caracas-style gangs, correlating with local backlash, though amplify rather than local contacts driving anti-migrant sentiment. In and , initial open-border policies reversed by 2019-2021 with tightened regulations, as public opinion polls (e.g., Latinobarómetro) showed approval for Venezuelan inflows dropping from 60% to under 30% amid economic downturns exacerbated by and migrant competition for informal sector jobs. Intra-regional historical tensions, like Argentine discrimination against Bolivian and Paraguayan laborers since the , similarly stem from resource scarcity in and , with no of prejudice but rather responses to verifiable wage suppression and slum proliferation. Policies emphasizing integration, such as Colombia's 2021 regularization statute granting work rights to 1.8 million , have mitigated some violence but not underlying cohesion strains from cultural and linguistic divides.

Debates and Controversies

Rational Xenophobia vs. Irrational Prejudice

Rational xenophobia refers to a cautious stance toward out-groups grounded in of potential threats, such as elevated risks of conflict, transmission, or , whereas irrational involves unfounded generalizations or detached from observable patterns. From an evolutionary perspective, and wariness of outsiders conferred advantages by fostering within kin or tribal units while minimizing vulnerabilities to inter-group raids, exposure from unfamiliar carriers, or exploitation by non-reciprocators. This adaptive mechanism is evident in behaviors, including territorial aggression toward outsiders, which parallels human patterns of parochial where loyalty to one's group enhances collective fitness against external rivals. In contemporary settings, rational xenophobia manifests as toward mass from culturally dissimilar or high-risk populations when data reveal adverse outcomes, distinguishing it from blanket animus. For instance, Robert Putnam's analysis of U.S. communities found that ethnic diversity correlates with diminished , including lower interpersonal trust, reduced , and heightened isolation ("hunkering down"), effects persisting even after controlling for socioeconomic factors. Similar patterns emerge in , where rapid influxes of refugees have been causally linked to subsequent rises in and violent crimes, as seen in large-scale displacements analyzed across multiple countries. Cross-national studies of nations from 1988 to 2018 further indicate positive associations between levels and rates of and , particularly in high-immigration EU states. These correlations justify prudent boundaries, as unchecked openness can erode social cohesion without reciprocal assimilation, contrasting with irrational that ignores such evidence in favor of ideological denial. The line between rational caution and irrational lies in proportionality: the former responds to verifiable disparities, such as overrepresentation of certain immigrant cohorts in or criminality, prompting policy adjustments like selective vetting, while the latter fixates on immutable traits absent causal links. Academic critiques highlight how often pathologizes group loyalty as mere "," overlooking ideologically rational bases rooted in statistical realities, such as differential group behaviors in competitive environments. Evolutionarily stable in-group preferences prioritize verifiable reciprocity over abstract , as extended indiscriminately to non-cooperators undermines the host society's long-term viability. Thus, dismissing xenophobia wholesale risks conflating adaptive realism with bigotry, potentially amplifying societal costs through naive openness.

Political and Media Weaponization of the Term

The term "xenophobia" is frequently invoked by politicians and media outlets to pathologize opposition to mass , portraying legitimate concerns over resource strain, cultural integration, and as irrational rather than preferences. This rhetorical strategy, observed across Western democracies since the , equates skepticism toward unchecked inflows with hatred of foreigners, thereby shifting focus from data on outcomes—like elevated welfare costs or correlations documented in host countries—to attacks. Critics argue this deployment dilutes the term's meaning, originally denoting unfounded fear of the unfamiliar, into a catch-all slur that insulates pro-migration agendas from . In the 2016 , Remain campaigners and subsequent media coverage routinely labeled Leave voters as xenophobic, despite surveys indicating primary motivations centered on regaining and curbing net migration above 300,000 annually, levels sustained from 2010 to 2015. High-profile figures, including then-Prime Minister , warned that voting Leave would unleash xenophobia, a prediction echoed in outlets like , which documented a purported "frenzy of " post-vote, conflating isolated incidents with broader voter intent. Yet, analysis of voter demographics revealed that many Leave supporters, including immigrants and ethnic minorities, prioritized economic control over EU directives, suggesting the label served more to delegitimize democratic outcomes than to reflect causal . This pattern persisted, with accusations peaking in the days following the June 23, 2016, vote, as young Leave advocates reported online branding their economic arguments as veiled . Similarly, during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, Donald Trump's proposals for border security enhancements and temporary travel restrictions from high-risk nations prompted widespread media designations of xenophobia, with outlets like Vox framing his support base as driven by "irrational" anti-immigrant sentiment rather than responses to record border encounters exceeding 1.6 million in 2016. Senator , a Republican rival, explicitly called Trump a "xenophobic" bigot on , 2015, amplifying a adopted by mainstream commentators to equate enforcement advocacy with bigotry. Such labeling, often from sources exhibiting systemic progressive bias, avoided engaging metrics like the Federation for American Immigration Reform's estimates of $116 billion in annual net fiscal costs from in 2016, instead prioritizing emotive dismissal. Author Douglas Murray has critiqued this tactic, noting in his 2017 analysis that discussing immigration's downsides—such as parallel societies in European cities with over 50% foreign-born populations in districts like parts of , —invariably elicits charges of xenophobia, intolerance, or , effectively silencing causal discourse on integration failures. This weaponization extends to academia and NGOs, where terms like "nativism" or "xenophobia" are applied to any preference for measured inflows, as seen in coverage of populist rises in and post-2015 migrant surge, where leaders like faced EU rebukes for policies mirroring voter majorities favoring caps amid 1.8 million asylum claims continent-wide that year. Empirical pushback highlights that such accusations correlate with suppressed debate, as polls, like those from 2023 showing 60% of Britons viewing immigration levels as too high, reflect pragmatic realism over phobia.

Critiques of Overpathologizing In-Group Loyalty

Critics contend that equating in-group loyalty with xenophobia pathologizes an evolved essential for human survival and cooperation. Evolutionary models demonstrate that , defined as preferential cooperation with fellow group members over outsiders, promotes group cohesion and in resource-scarce environments. This trait likely originated in small bands, where loyalty to kin and allies enhanced reproductive success through mechanisms like and , as formalized by in 1964. Pathologizing such preferences overlooks their adaptive value, treating a neutral or beneficial orientation as a disorder akin to irrational . Empirical evidence from comparative reinforces this view, showing that xenophobic tendencies—manifesting as aggression toward out-groups—emerged in chimpanzees as an extension of coalitional , fostering in-group against threats. In humans, similar patterns persist, with genetic similarity theory positing that ethnic extends kin to larger groups, explaining and as scaled-up tribal loyalties rather than aberrations. For instance, studies indicate that moderate correlates with higher social trust and lower internal conflict in homogeneous societies, contrasting with diversity-induced erosion of documented by Robert Putnam in 2007. These findings challenge narratives framing in-group preference as inherently maladaptive, suggesting instead that unchecked out-group openness historically invited exploitation or disease transmission, as per the behavioral hypothesis. The tendency to overpathologize in-group often stems from post-World War II academic frameworks, which associated with and thus stigmatized it wholesale, despite distinctions between defensive and aggressive . Sources in mainstream and , frequently influenced by egalitarian ideologies, underemphasize evolutionary in favor of cultural constructivism, leading to biased portrayals that equate any border enforcement or cultural preservation with . This selective framing ignores causal realities, such as how rapid demographic shifts strain —evidenced by Putnam's showing a 10-20% drop in trust amid ethnic diversity—while privileging abstract over empirical outcomes. Rigorous analysis reveals that balanced in-group correlates with societal stability, as in Japan's low policy yielding homicide rates of 0.2 per 100,000 in 2023, versus higher multiculturalism-linked tensions elsewhere. Proponents of this argue for destigmatizing in-group orientations to inform , positing that suppressing them fosters or cultural erosion without addressing root causes like mismatched group sizes in modern states. While extreme manifestations warrant scrutiny, blanket pathologization dismisses first-principles of human , potentially undermining adaptive responses to real intergroup risks.

Societal Impacts and Policy Implications

Potential Benefits: Cultural Preservation and Security

Xenophobic inclinations towards outsiders may contribute to cultural preservation by underpinning policies that restrict from culturally distant groups, thereby sustaining ethnic homogeneity and the continuity of shared norms and values. Societies characterized by high ethnic uniformity exhibit stronger social cohesion, as homogeneity reduces cultural friction and facilitates mutual understanding and trust. For example, Japan's longstanding emphasis on cultural uniformity, reinforced by stringent immigration controls, has preserved distinct traditions such as communal harmony (wa) and low , fostering a society where group-oriented behaviors predominate over . Evolutionary psychology posits that such , akin to xenophobia, emerged as an adaptive trait to prioritize and cultural within kin-like groups, enabling the stable transmission of behavioral norms over millennia. Empirical evidence links ethnic homogeneity to enhanced , countering the dilutive effects of rapid diversity increases. Political scientist Robert Putnam's 2007 study "" analyzed U.S. communities and concluded that ethnic diversity inversely correlates with interpersonal trust, civic participation, and neighborly bonds, with residents in diverse areas "hunkering down" in . This pattern holds across contexts: meta-analyses of European and U.S. data reveal a consistent negative association between local ethnic diversity and social cohesion metrics, including attitudes toward neighbors and community volunteering. In homogeneous settings, shared cultural references minimize misunderstandings, bolstering collective identity and resilience against external influences that could erode indigenous practices. On security grounds, xenophobia serves as a for detection, prompting defenses against infiltration by incompatible elements that elevate risks of or . Mathematical models of group demonstrate that in-group stabilizes equilibria by discriminating against potential free-riders or antagonists from out-groups. Japan's demographic homogeneity, with foreign residents comprising under 2% of the as of 2023, aligns with exceptionally low ; its intentional rate was 0.23 per 100,000 in 2022, far below the global average and reflective of tight social controls enabled by cultural uniformity. Conversely, high-immigration European nations like show stark immigrant overrepresentation in crime: foreign-born individuals are 2.5 times more likely to be crime suspects overall, rising to fivefold for and sevenfold for convictions among certain migrant cohorts. Such disparities, often downplayed in mainstream analyses due to institutional reluctance to highlight ethnic factors, underscore how xenophobia-driven selectivity in entry can avert spikes in group-based conflicts or imported criminal networks, prioritizing host safety. These benefits manifest most acutely in contexts where rapid influxes overwhelm assimilation capacities, as homogeneity mitigates "ethnic threat" perceptions that otherwise erode public safety feelings and institutional trust. While critics attribute cohesion gains to other variables like economic prosperity, cross-national comparisons—such as Japan's sustained low disorder versus diverse urban centers with elevated tensions—affirm homogeneity's causal role in stabilizing societies against both internal fragmentation and external perils.

Drawbacks: Violence and Economic Disruptions

Xenophobic violence has manifested in deadly outbreaks targeting perceived outsiders, often escalating from tensions over resource competition. In , the May riots began in township and spread nationwide, resulting in 62 deaths, hundreds injured, and over 100,000 people displaced, primarily foreign nationals from other African countries whose businesses and homes were looted and destroyed. Similar patterns recurred in 2015 and 2019, with attacks on migrant entrepreneurs leading to further fatalities and mass displacements, underscoring how xenophobic mobilization can rapidly devolve into widespread disorder. These violent episodes inflict direct economic disruptions through property destruction and business closures, particularly in informal sectors dominated by immigrants. The 2008 South African alone involved the ransacking of migrant-owned shops and spaza stores, contributing to immediate losses in trade and livelihoods, while subsequent waves have cumulatively looted over 5,000 businesses since 2008. In , the May 1998 anti-Chinese riots—triggered amid economic turmoil but directed at ethnic Chinese merchants who controlled much of the retail economy—caused around 1,200 deaths, the incineration of 8,500 buildings and vehicles, and accelerated , deepening the Asian by eroding investor confidence and disrupting supply chains. Longer-term effects include deterred and strained regional trade, as repetitive xenophobic attacks signal instability to potential economic partners. Studies on South Africa's outbreaks indicate that such violence reduces future inflows of capital and skilled migrants, hindering growth in sectors like and retail where immigrants fill labor gaps. This pattern illustrates how xenophobia, by prioritizing exclusion over cooperation, generates self-inflicted economic costs beyond immediate chaos, including lost from displaced workers and heightened expenditures.

Evidence-Based Policy Responses

Strict immigration controls that align inflows with economic absorption capacity have demonstrated effectiveness in mitigating public backlash associated with xenophobia. In the United States, a Gallup survey conducted in July 2025 reported that the percentage of Americans favoring reduced fell to 30%—nearly half the prior peak—coinciding with a 55% drop in migrant encounters at the southern border from December 2023 highs, suggesting that managed borders alleviate perceptions of overwhelm. Similarly, historical data from indicate that periods of lower net migration correlate with stabilized or declining support for anti-immigrant parties; for example, post-2015 restrictions in under the 2016 asylum cap reduced net inflows by over 400,000 annually, tempering AfD party gains in subsequent regional elections from 2017 to 2021. Civic integration mandates, including compulsory language training and cultural orientation, provide empirical grounds for reducing intergroup tensions by fostering mutual understanding and employability. A longitudinal analysis of 23 European countries from 1980 to 2010 found that robust integration policies—such as Denmark's 2010 model requiring 37 hours of Danish classes and value-based oaths—were associated with a 10-15% lower incidence of anti-immigrant attitudes compared to lax multiculturalism approaches, as measured by European Social Survey data on perceived cultural threats. In the Netherlands, the 2006 civic integration exam for family migrants correlated with a 20% rise in employment rates among non-Western immigrants by 2015, diminishing native resentment over welfare dependency per Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics labor reports. These outcomes stem from causal mechanisms where skill alignment reduces zero-sum economic perceptions, though academic studies often underemphasize enforcement failures in high-volume contexts due to institutional preferences for open policies. Intergroup contact interventions, when structured with equal-status cooperation, yield modest prejudice reductions per meta-analytic evidence, but require selectivity to avoid backlash. A 2023 study testing the across diverse samples confirmed that frequent, voluntary interactions lowered xenophobic attitudes by an average standardized of 0.25, moderated by shared socio-political values; unstructured exposure, as in rapid urban influxes, showed null or reverse effects. Programs like Germany's 2016-2020 "Democracy Lives!" initiative, pairing refugees with locals in joint community projects, reported a 12% drop in local hostility surveys, attributable to demonstrated reciprocity rather than mere proximity. Critically, such efforts falter without prior vetting for compatibility, as evidenced by null findings in high-conflict settings like Africa's xenophobic outbreaks despite contact promotion. Economic safeguards, such as wage floors for low-skilled sectors and targeted job training, address competition-driven xenophobia with quantifiable impacts. In the UK, the 2010-2016 minimum wage hikes and apprenticeships for natives in immigrant-heavy industries like reduced reported job displacement fears by 8-10% in British Household , correlating with stabilized anti-EU migration sentiment pre-Brexit. These policies prioritize causal realism by decoupling from labor market strain, contrasting with unsubstantiated diversity quotas that surveys link to heightened identity threats among lower-income groups. Overall, successful responses integrate restriction, assimilation, and reciprocity, validated by cross-national regressions showing 15-20% variance in xenophobic attitudes explained by policy stringency indices from the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX).

References

Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.