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Middle East and North Africa
Middle East and North Africa
Middle East and North Africa
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Middle East and North Africa
West Asia and North Africa
How often countries/territories are included in MENA/WANA definitions:
  Usually included
  Often included
  Less commonly included
Area12,251,418 km2 (4,730,299 sq mi)[note 1]
Population589,303,895[note 2]
DemonymMiddle Easterner and North African
West Asian and North African
Countries
LanguagesArabic, Persian, Turkish, Kurdish, Hebrew, Berber, Coptic, Azerbaijani, Georgian, Armenian
Time zonesUTC+01:00 to UTC+04:00
Largest cities
Largest cities

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), also referred to as West Asia and North Africa (WANA)[1] or South West Asia and North Africa (SWANA),[2][3] is a geographic region which comprises the Middle East (also called West Asia) and North Africa together. It exists as an alternative to the concept of the Greater Middle East, which comprises the bulk of the Muslim world. The region has no standardized definition and groupings may vary, but the term typically includes countries like Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

As a regional identifier, the term "MENA" is often used in academia, military planning, disaster relief, media planning (as a broadcast region), and business writing.[4][5] Moreover, it shares a number of cultural, economic, and environmental similarities across the countries that it spans; for example, some of the most extreme impacts of climate change will be felt in MENA.

Some related terms have a wider definition than MENA, such as MENASA (lit. 'Middle East and North Africa and South Asia') or MENAP (lit. 'Middle East and North Africa and Afghanistan and Pakistan').[6] The term MENAT explicitly includes Turkey, which is usually excluded from some MENA definitions, even though Turkey is almost always considered part of the Middle East proper. Ultimately, MENA can be considered as a grouping scheme that brings together most of the Arab League and variously includes their neighbors, like Iran, Turkey, Israel, Cyprus, the Caucasian countries, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Malta, and a few others.

Definitions

[edit]

The Middle East and North Africa has no standardized definition; different organizations define the region as consisting of different territories, or do not define it as a region at all.

Variations on definitions of the Middle East and North Africa region.
  Traditional definition of the Middle East
  Greater Middle East (2004 U.S. Government paper)[7]
  Areas pundits sometimes associated with the Middle East around 2004[7]

United Nations

[edit]
The MENA region as defined by the World Bank (2003)[8][9]
The MENA region as defined by UNAIDS, which includes Sudan and Somalia, but excludes Israel, Palestine and Malta[10]
The MENA region as defined by the IMF (2003), which includes Afghanistan, Mauritania, Pakistan, Palestine, Sudan and Somalia, but excludes Israel and Malta[11]

There is no MENA region amongst the United Nations Regional Groups, nor in the United Nations geoscheme used by the UNSD (though the latter does feature two subregions called 'Western Asia' and 'Northern Africa', see WANA). Some agencies and programmes of the United Nations do define the MENA region, but their definitions may contradict each other, and sometimes only apply to specific studies or reports.

  • A 2003 World Bank study stated: "In World Bank geographic classification, the following 21 countries or territories constitute the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region: six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates [UAE]), and 15 other countries or territories: Algeria, Djibouti, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, the Republic of Yemen, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and West Bank and Gaza."[8]: 20  As of January 2021, the World Bank website groups the same set of 21 countries/territories as MENA: "Algeria; Bahrain; Djibouti; Egypt, Arab Rep.; Iran, Islamic Rep.; Iraq; Israel; Jordan; Kuwait; Lebanon; Libya; Malta; Morocco; Oman; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; Syrian Arab Republic; Tunisia; United Arab Emirates; West Bank and Gaza; Yemen, Rep..".[9]
  • A 2010 UNHCR report stated: "For the purposes of this study, the MENA region has been defined as comprising of the following 18 countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen."[12]: 2 
  • A 2015 FAO report stated: "The 21 MENA countries are Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen."[13]
  • The UNAIDS regional classification of the Middle East and North Africa region "includes 20 countries/territories: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen", according to a 2019 UNICEF report.[10]: 11 
  • As of January 2021, the UNICEF website groups the following set of 20 countries as MENA: "Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen."[14]
  • Working for the International Monetary Fund (IMF), economists Hamid Reza Davoodi and George T. Abed wrote in 2003: "The MENA region comprises the Arab States in the Middle East and North Africa—Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen—plus the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, the West Bank and Gaza." The authors emphasise that these "24 MENA countries (...) are grouped together for analytical purposes only." Although they allegedly "share common challenges and cultural links distinct from neighbouring economies" such as Israel and Turkey, and Islam is the dominant religion and Arabic the principal language, there are "sizable religious minority groups" and "significant linguistic diversities" in the MENA region, with Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan not having Arabic as the majority language.[11]
MENA definitions by United Nations agencies and programmes
Country or
territory		 World Bank
MENA 2003[8][9]		 FAO
MENA 2015[13]		 UNAIDS
MENA 2019[10]		 UNICEF
MENA 2021[14]		 UNHCR
MENA 2010[12]		 IMF
MENA 2003[11]		 UNSD
WA+NA[15]
Afghanistan No No No No No Yes No
Algeria Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Armenia No No No No No No Yes
Azerbaijan No No No No No No Yes
Bahrain Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cyprus No No No No No No Yes
Djibouti Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Egypt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Georgia No No No No No No Yes
Iran Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Iraq Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Israel Yes Yes No No No No Yes
Jordan Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kuwait Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lebanon Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Libya Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Malta Yes No No No Yes No No
Mauritania No No No No Yes Yes No
Morocco Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Oman Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pakistan No No No No No Yes No
Palestine* Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Qatar Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Saudi Arabia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Somalia No No Yes No No Yes No
Sudan No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Syria Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tunisia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Turkey No No No No No No Yes
United Arab Emirates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Western Sahara Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Yes
Yemen Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
*Also called State of Palestine, (Occupied) Palestinian Territories, Palestinian Authority, or West Bank and Gaza (Strip).

Other definitions

[edit]

Historians Michael Dumper and Bruce Stanley stated in 2007: 'For the purposes of this volume, the editors have generally chosen to define the MENA region as stretching from Morocco to Iran and from Turkey to the Horn of Africa. This definition thus includes the twenty-two countries of the Arab League (including the Palestinian Authority enclaves in the West Bank and Gaza Strip), Turkey, Israel, Iran, and Cyprus.' They stressed, however, how controversial and problematic this definition is, and that other choices could also have been made according to various criteria.[16]

For its December 2012 global religion survey, the Pew Research Center grouped 20 countries and territories as 'the Middle East and North Africa', namely: 'Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, the Palestinian territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Western Sahara and Yemen.'[17]

For the Global Peace Index 2020, the Institute for Economics & Peace defined the MENA region as containing 20 countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.[18]

WANA

[edit]
Western Asia and Northern Africa according to the UN political statistics geoscheme[15]

Due to the geographic ambiguity and Eurocentric nature of the term "Middle East", some people, especially in sciences such as agriculture and climatology, prefer to use other terms like "WANA" (West Asia and North Africa)[19] or the less common NAWA (North Africa-West Asia).[20] Usage of the term WANA has also been advanced by postcolonial studies.[21]

The United Nations geoscheme used by the UN Statistics Division for its specific political geography statistics needs, does not define a single WANA region, but it does feature two subregions called Western Asia and Northern Africa, respectively:[15]

  • Western Asia (18): Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.
  • Northern Africa (7): Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Western Sahara.
The WANA region according to ICARDA (2011)[22]

In a 1995 publication, the then-Aleppo-based International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) defined its West Asia/North Africa (WANA) region as 25 countries, including: 'Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen.'[23] It noted that CGIAR's Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) excluded Ethiopia, Sudan and Pakistan from its 1992 WANA definition, but otherwise listed the same countries.[23] In a 2011 study, ICARDA stated 27 countries/territories: 'The WANA region includes: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gaza Strip, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.'[22]

WANA definitions by (mostly agricultural) organisations
Country or
territory		 CGIAR
WANA 1992[23]		 ICARDA
WANA 1995[23]		 ICARDA
WANA 2011[22]
Afghanistan Yes Yes Yes
Algeria Yes Yes Yes
Armenia No No No
Azerbaijan No No No
Bahrain Unclear Unclear Yes
Cyprus No No No
Djibouti Unclear Unclear Yes
Egypt Yes Yes Yes
Eritrea No Probably Yes
Ethiopia No Yes Yes
Georgia No No No
Iran Yes Yes Yes
Iraq Yes Yes Yes
Israel Unclear Unclear No
Jordan Yes Yes Yes
Kuwait Yes Yes Yes
Lebanon Yes Yes Yes
Libya Yes Yes Yes
Mauritania Unclear Unclear Yes
Morocco Yes Yes Yes
Oman Yes Yes Yes
Palestine* Unclear Unclear Partial
Pakistan No Yes Yes
Qatar Yes Yes Yes
Saudi Arabia Yes Yes Yes
Somalia Unclear Unclear Yes
Sudan No Yes Yes
Syria Yes Yes Yes
Tunisia Yes Yes Yes
Turkey Yes Yes Yes
United Arab Emirates Unclear Unclear Yes
Western Sahara Unclear Unclear Unclear
Yemen Yes Yes Yes

*Also called State of Palestine, or West Bank and Gaza (Strip).

Other terms and definitions

[edit]
Greater Middle East

In a preparatory working paper for the June 2004 G8 Summit, the U.S. government (at the end of the George W. Bush administration's first term) defined the Greater Middle East as including the Arab states, Israel, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.[7]

MENAP

From April 2013, the International Monetary Fund started using a new analytical region called MENAP (Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan), which adds Afghanistan and Pakistan to MENA countries.[24] Now MENAP is a prominent economic grouping in IMF reports.[25][26]

MENASA

MENASA refers to the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia region.[27] Its usage consists of the region of MENA together with South Asia, with Dubai chosen by the United Nations as the data hub for the region.[6] In some contexts, specifically the Lauder Institute at the University of Pennsylvania, the region is abbreviated as SAMENA instead of the more common MENASA.

MENAT

The term MENAT (Middle East, North Africa, and Turkey) has been used to include Turkey in the list of MENA countries.[28][29]

Near East
See also: Near East § Table of near eastern countries recognized by some agencies

The term Near East was commonly used before the term Middle East was coined by the British in the early 20th century. The term Ancient Near East is commonly used by scholars for the region in antiquity. Some organisations and scholars insist on still using 'Near East' today, with some including North Africa, but definitions range widely and there is no consensus on its geographical application.

EMME

EMME refers to a grouping of 18 nations situated in and around the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. The 18 nations in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East are: Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.[30]

Geography

[edit]

Climate change

[edit]
This section is an excerpt from Climate change in the Middle East and North Africa.[edit]
Climate classification maps for the Middle East at present (top) and predicted for North Africa for 2071–2100 under the most intense climate change scenario (bottom). Mid-range scenarios are currently considered more likely.[31][32][33]

In 2018, the MENA region emitted 3.2 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide and produced 8.7% of global greenhouse gas emissions (GHG)[34] despite making up only 6% of the global population.[35] These emissions are mostly from the energy sector,[36] an integral component of many Middle Eastern and North African economies due to the extensive oil and natural gas reserves that are found within the region.[37][38] The Middle East region is one of the most vulnerable to climate change. The impacts include increase in drought conditions, aridity, heatwaves and sea level rise.

Sharp global temperature and sea level changes, shifting precipitation patterns and increased frequency of extreme weather events are some of the main impacts of climate change as identified by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).[39] The MENA region is especially vulnerable to such impacts due to its arid and semi-arid environment, facing climatic challenges such as low rainfall, high temperatures and dry soil.[39][40] The climatic conditions that foster such challenges for MENA are projected by the IPCC to worsen throughout the 21st century.[39] If greenhouse gas emissions are not significantly reduced, part of the MENA region risks becoming uninhabitable before the year 2100.[41][42][43]

Climate change is expected to put significant strain on already scarce water and agricultural resources within the MENA region, threatening the national security and political stability of all included countries.[44] Over 60 percent of the region's population lives in high and very high water-stressed areas compared to the global average of 35 percent.[45] This has prompted some MENA countries to engage with the issue of climate change on an international level through environmental accords such as the Paris Agreement. Law and policy are also being established on a national level amongst MENA countries, with a focus on the development of renewable energies.[46]

Politics

[edit]

Stability and instability in the region

[edit]
See also: Democracy in the Middle East and North Africa, Water politics in the Middle East, and Middle East and globalization

In its Global Peace Index 2020, the Institute for Economics & Peace stated that 'the Middle East and North Africa remains the world's least peaceful region, despite improvements for 11 countries'.[18] According to an in-depth multi-part study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published in April 2016, the factors shaping the MENA region are exceedingly complex, and it is difficult to find 'any overall model that fits the different variables involved'. It found that there were 'deep structural causes of violence and instability'. Wars and upheavals are partly 'shaped by the major tribal, ethnic, sectarian, and regional differences', by 'demographic, economic, and security trends', and by 'quality of governance, internal security system, justice systems, and [social] progress.' In some countries, the necessary societal factors for successful democratic change (often championed by some in the region and in the West to address various issues) are absent, and political revolutions may not always lead to more stability, nor solve the underlying problems in a given MENA country. However, it also found that 'the majority of MENA nations have remained relatively stable and continue to make progress'.[47]

Armed conflicts

[edit]
See also: List of modern conflicts in the Middle East, List of modern conflicts in North Africa, List of Middle East peace proposals, United States foreign policy in the Middle East, British foreign policy in the Middle East, and Soviet Middle Eastern foreign policy during the Cold War

During and after the decolonisation of Africa and Asia in the 20th century, many different armed conflicts have occurred in the MENA region, including but not limited to the Rif War; the Iraqi–Kurdish conflict; the Arab–Israeli conflict; the Western Sahara conflict; the Lebanese Civil War; the Kurdish–Turkish conflict (1978–present); the Iranian Revolution; the Iran–Iraq War; Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict; the Berber Spring; the Toyota War; the Invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War; the Algerian Civil War; the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War; the rise of terrorism and anti-terrorist actions; the U.S.-led intervention of Iraq in 2003 and subsequent Iraq War. The Arab Spring (2010–2011) led to the Tunisian Revolution, the Egyptian revolution of 2011 and Egyptian Crisis (2011–2014), while also sparking war throughout the region such as the Syrian Civil War, the Libyan Civil War, the Yemeni Civil War and the Iraqi war against ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant).[citation needed] During the Sudanese Revolution, months of protests and a military coup led to the fall of Omar al-Bashir's regime and the initiation of the 2019–2022 Sudanese transition to democracy and the Sudanese peace process.[48]

Economy and education

[edit]
See also: Economy of the Middle East and Economy of Africa

The MENA region has vast reserves of petroleum and natural gas that make it a vital source of global economic stability. According to the Oil and Gas Journal (January 1, 2009), the MENA region has 60% of the world's oil reserves (810.98 billion barrels (128.936 km3)) and 45% of the world's natural gas reserves ( 2,868,886 billion cubic feet (81,237.8 km3) ).[49]

As of 2023, 7 of the 13 OPEC nations are within the MENA region.[citation needed]

According to Pew Research Center's 2016 "Religion and Education Around the World" study, 40% of the adult population in MENA had completed less than a year of primary school. The fraction was higher for women, of whom half had been to school for less than a year.[50]

Investment also flows from the Middle East into North Africa, with research finding that bilateral trade between the United Arab Emirates and Africa had increased by more than 38% in the two years to the end of 2023.[51]

Demographics

[edit]
This section is an excerpt from Demographics of the Middle East and North Africa.[edit]

The demographics of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region show a highly populated, culturally diverse region spanning three continents. As of 2023, the population was around 501 million.[52] The class, cultural, ethnic, governmental, linguistic and religious make-up of the region is highly variable.

Debates on which countries should be included in the Middle East are wide-ranging.[53] The Greater Middle East and North Africa region can include the Caucasus, Cyprus, Afghanistan, and several sub-Saharan African states due to various social, religious and historic ties. The most commonly accepted countries in the MENA region are included on this page.

Culture

[edit]
See also: Culture of North Africa and Etiquette in the Middle East

Human rights

[edit]
See also: Human rights in the Middle East and Human rights in Africa § North Africa

Religion

[edit]
See also: Religion in the Middle East and Religion in Africa

Islam is by far the dominant religion in nearly all of the MENA territories; 91.2% of the population is Muslim. The Middle East–North Africa region comprises 20 countries and territories with an estimated Muslim population of 315 million or about 23% of the world's Muslim population.[54] The term "MENA" is often defined in part in relation to majority-Muslim countries located in the region, although several nations in the region are not Muslim-dominated.[55] Major non-Islamic religions native here are Christianity, Judaism, Yazidism, Druzeism, African folk religions, Berberism and other Arab paganism.[citation needed]

Migrant population, mostly within the Gulf nations, practice mostly the beliefs they follow to, such as Buddhism and Hinduism among South Asian, East Asian and Southeast Asian migrants.[56][57]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Middle East and North Africa

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Middle East and (MENA) constitutes a transcontinental geopolitical spanning and Western , generally including around 20 countries from westward to eastward, such as , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , the , and , though exact compositions vary by institutional definitions like those of the World Bank. This area, covering roughly 12 million square kilometers, houses over 500 million inhabitants and serves as the historical cradle of major ancient civilizations, including and , where innovations in writing, , and first emerged. It is also the origin of the —, Christianity, and Islam—which have profoundly influenced global culture, law, and conflict dynamics. Economically, MENA commands substantial global oil and reserves, accounting for a significant share of world energy production and exports, which has fueled rapid development in resource-dependent states but also engendered the "" of economic volatility, corruption, and underdiversification. The exhibits stark disparities, with the wealthiest 10% capturing nearly 57% of national income while the bottom half receives just 9%, compounded by high rates exceeding 25% in many countries and limited job creation amid a burgeoning working-age projected to grow by 40% over the next quarter-century. Politically, MENA features a mix of absolute monarchies, republics, and hybrid regimes, many marked by authoritarian consolidation, sectarian divisions between Sunni and Shia majorities, and ethnic tensions involving , Persians, Kurds, Berbers, and others; post-colonial independence has been overshadowed by interstate wars, civil conflicts, and non-state actors like jihadist groups exploiting governance failures and ideological vacuums. Defining achievements include ancient scholarly contributions to mathematics, astronomy, and medicine during Islamic Golden Age eras, alongside modern feats like rapid urbanization in Gulf states, yet persistent controversies revolve around territorial disputes, such as the Israeli-Palestinian impasse rooted in competing national claims, Iranian proxy expansions, and Yemen's humanitarian crises, which underscore causal links between weak institutions, demographic pressures, and external interventions in perpetuating instability.

Definitions and Scope

Standard Definitions and Boundaries

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) denotes a transcontinental region encompassing southwestern and northern , primarily defined by geopolitical, economic, and cultural criteria rather than strict geographical continuity. Standard definitions emphasize countries sharing historical ties to Islamic civilization, Arab cultural influence, and significant hydrocarbon resources, extending from Morocco's Atlantic coast westward to Iran's eastern borders with and . This delineation typically excludes south of the Desert and European territories like or , focusing instead on the , Nile Valley, , and . A commonly adopted list, as utilized in World Bank trade and economic analyses, comprises 20 countries and territories: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , and the Palestinian territories ( and Gaza). These boundaries align with the Arab League's core geographic members in and , augmented by non-Arab states like and due to their integral roles in regional politics, security dynamics, and energy markets. The region's northern limit generally follows the Mediterranean and littorals up to but excluding Anatolia's interior, while the southern boundary traces the transition and coastlines.
Country/TerritorySubregion
()
( )
(Persian Plateau)
()
()
()
()
()
()
()
()
Palestinian territories ()
This classification facilitates analysis of shared challenges like , demographic pressures, and geopolitical tensions, though institutional variations—such as the ' agency-specific scopes—may incorporate or exclude peripheral states like or based on developmental or statistical needs.

Variations, Criticisms, and Alternative Terms

The term Middle East and North Africa (MENA) lacks a standardized , leading to variations in the countries and territories included depending on the context or institution. For instance, the (IMF) defines MENA as extending from the Atlantic coast of to the borders of and , using the acronym MENAP (Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan) for this broader grouping encompassing a broad swath of 22 countries focused on economic analysis. In contrast, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) limits MENA to the area from to , aligning with Arab-majority states and adjacent neighbors for regional development purposes. These discrepancies often arise over peripheral states: and are sometimes included due to geographic proximity and historical ties but excluded in Arab-centric definitions; and may be added for North African continuity, while is occasionally incorporated in security-focused scopes but rarely in standard MENA frameworks. Criticisms of the MENA designation center on its Eurocentric origins and imposed nature, tracing back to 19th- and early 20th-century Western geopolitical that viewed the region from a European vantage point, rendering "Middle East" relative to or rather than local perspectives. Scholars argue this framing perpetuates colonial legacies by homogenizing diverse ethnic, linguistic, and cultural groups—such as , , Turks, , and —under a single umbrella, obscuring indigenous identities and internal divisions like sectarian or tribal affiliations that drive regional dynamics. In policy contexts, such as U.S. categories, adding a MENA racial has been faulted for potentially exacerbating by essentializing identities and overlooking non-Arab minorities, with empirical data showing limited intra-regional that undermines the region's coherence as a unified bloc. These critiques, often amplified in academic discourse influenced by postcolonial theory, highlight how MENA prioritizes Western analytical convenience over causal factors like shared Islamic heritage or Ottoman historical unity, though defenders note its practical utility for tracking oil economies and migration patterns. Alternative terms have emerged to address these issues, emphasizing geographic neutrality or cultural specificity. West Asia and North Africa (WANA) repositions the area without the "Middle East" qualifier, aiming to decenter European biases and better reflect latitudes from the Atlantic to the . Southwest Asia and North Africa (SWANA) extends this by incorporating "Southwest Asia" for precision in global , gaining traction in diaspora communities and cultural studies to highlight non-Arab elements like and the . Other proposals include "" or "Arab Homeland" (al-Watan al-Arabi), which confine the scope to Arabic-speaking states of the , excluding non-Arab powers like and while emphasizing pan-Arabist ideals from the mid-20th century. Subregional Arabic terms such as Mashreq (the and ) or Khaleej (Gulf states) offer finer granularity but lack comprehensive coverage, whereas "" has been used in U.S. policy since the early 2000s to include for broader strategic aims. Despite these options, MENA persists in international organizations due to its established data comparability, though shifts toward WANA or SWANA reflect ongoing efforts to align with empirical regional fault lines rather than outdated imperial constructs.

Historical Overview

Ancient Civilizations and Pre-Islamic Empires

The region encompassing modern-day , , and parts of Turkey and hosted the earliest known urban civilizations in , where settled agriculture and writing systems emerged along the and rivers around 3500 BC. The Sumerians, in southern , developed independent city-states such as and by approximately 4000–3000 BC, introducing script, ziggurats, and wheeled vehicles. These innovations facilitated , , and monumental architecture, with the under Sargon the Great unifying much of the region from 2334–2154 BC, marking the first known empire. Subsequent Mesopotamian powers included the Babylonian Empire, which flourished under from 1792–1750 BC and codified one of the earliest legal systems, and the Assyrian Empire, which expanded aggressively from the , peaking in the Neo-Assyrian period (911–609 BC) with conquests extending to and . The , under (605–562 BC), rebuilt and destroyed Jerusalem's Temple in 587 BC, before falling to Persian forces in 539 BC. These empires relied on for surplus , supporting populations of hundreds of thousands, though from salinization contributed to periodic declines. In parallel, along the River developed one of the longest-lasting civilizations, with unification under the First Dynasty around 3100 BC following the Predynastic period (c. 4400–3000 BC). (c. 2686–2181 BC) saw construction, including the built c. 2580–2560 BC for , reflecting centralized pharaonic authority and Nile-dependent agriculture. Intermediate periods of fragmentation alternated with reunifications, such as the Middle Kingdom (c. 2050–1710 BC), known for literary and advances, and the New Kingdom (c. 1550–1070 BC), during which pharaohs like Ramses II expanded into the and built vast temples at and . Egyptian society emphasized divine kingship, mummification, and hieroglyphic writing, sustaining continuity until conquest by in 525 BC and later under in 332 BC. Anatolia, modern Turkey, hosted the Hittite Empire, which rose around 1650 BC and dominated from its capital at Hattusa, employing iron weapons and chariots to challenge Egyptian and Mesopotamian powers, including a stalemate at the in 1274 BC. The empire collapsed c. 1200–1180 BC amid invasions, droughts, and internal strife, contributing to broader disruptions. In the , Phoenician city-states like Tyre, , and thrived from c. 1500–300 BC as maritime traders, inventing an alphabetic script around 1200 BC that influenced Greek and Latin writing, and establishing colonies including in 814 BC. Their purple dye production and cedar exports fueled commerce across the Mediterranean until absorption by Persian and Hellenistic empires. Persian empires dominated pre-Islamic Iran and beyond, with the founded by in 550 BC, conquering from the Indus to the Mediterranean by 539 BC through administrative satrapies and the Royal Road infrastructure. Successors included the (247 BC–224 AD), which resisted Roman expansion at battles like Carrhae in 53 BC, and the Sassanid Empire (224–651 AD), which promoted , built fire temples, and clashed with over the . In , , a Phoenician offshoot, grew into a thalassocratic power by the , controlling trade routes and western Mediterranean territories until defeated by in the Third Punic War, ending in 146 BC with the city's destruction. These civilizations laid foundations for , writing, astronomy, and statecraft, influencing subsequent Islamic and European developments through preserved texts and engineering.

Rise of Islam, Caliphates, and Medieval Developments

originated in the during the early 7th century CE, with ibn Abdullah receiving revelations from 610 CE onward, culminating in the Hijra to in 622 CE, which marks the start of the . By 's death in 632 CE, he had unified much of Arabia under through military campaigns against tribal and Byzantine-Sassanian influences, establishing a theocratic polity centered on , sharia-based governance, and as expansionist doctrine. The (632–661 CE), led by the first four successors—, ibn al-Khattab, ibn Affan, and ibn Abi Talib—oversaw rapid conquests that incorporated the Middle East and North Africa into the Islamic domain. Under (r. 634–644 CE), Muslim armies defeated Byzantine forces at Yarmouk (636 CE) and Sassanid Persians at Qadisiyyah (636–637 CE), securing , , , and by 642 CE, with further advances into and Persia. These victories, driven by tribal Arab cavalry and religious zeal, dismantled exhausted imperial structures, imposing Islam's poll tax () on non-Muslims as dhimmis while allowing limited autonomy, which facilitated administrative continuity but sowed seeds of later conversions through socioeconomic pressures. The (661–750 CE), founded by after the civil war, shifted the capital to and prioritized Arab elite dominance, extending the empire to (conquering by 670 CE and by 711 CE), , and . Administrative innovations included standardized coinage under Abd al-Malik (r. 685–705 CE) and a postal system (barid), promoting trade and , whereby supplanted local languages like Coptic and Pahlavi in governance. However, favoritism toward Arabs fueled resentment among mawali (non-Arab converts), contributing to the Abbasid Revolution in 750 CE, which massacred most Umayyads and ended their rule. The (750–1258 CE), with as its capital from 762 CE, marked a cosmopolitan shift, incorporating Persian bureaucracy and translating Greek, Indian, and Syriac texts into Arabic, fostering what is termed the . (r. 786–809 CE) and (r. 813–833 CE) patronized the , yielding advances such as al-Khwarizmi's algebra (c. 820 CE) and Ibn Sina's (c. 1025 CE), which synthesized Hellenistic and empirical knowledge. Philosophical rationalism, exemplified by and , engaged Aristotelian logic, though tensions with orthodox theologians like (d. 1111 CE) emphasized , potentially curbing later inquiry. The caliphate fragmented amid Buyid and Seljuk Turkic incursions from the , culminating in the Mongol sack of in 1258 CE, which killed Caliph and destroyed libraries, accelerating decline. Medieval developments in the Middle East and North Africa under these caliphates entrenched as the dominant faith, with conversions rising from incentives like tax exemptions and social integration, transforming diverse Zoroastrian, Christian, and Berber populations into majority-Muslim societies by the . Architectural feats, such as the in (715 CE) and Great Mosque of Cordoba (785 CE), symbolized cultural synthesis, while agricultural innovations like qanats and crops from conquests boosted productivity. Yet, causal factors in stagnation post-12th century included rigid curricula prioritizing over and sectarian strife (Sunni-Shia, e.g., Fatimid rivalry in 909–1171 CE), contrasting earlier pragmatic adaptations. These eras unified MENA under Arabic-Islamic norms, influencing enduring tribal, legal, and economic structures despite later fractures.

Ottoman Rule, Colonialism, and 20th-Century Transitions

The consolidated control over core Middle Eastern territories following Sultan Selim I's defeat of the in 1516–1517, incorporating , , , and the Arabian Hijaz into its domains as provinces governed by appointed administrators and local elites under the sultan's . By the mid-16th century, under Suleiman I (r. 1520–1566), the empire administered a multi-ethnic administrative system featuring the levy for troops and the millet framework for religious communities, extending nominal authority over North African regencies like , , and Tripoli through tribute and naval alliances against European powers. This structure facilitated trade along caravan routes and the but increasingly strained under fiscal decentralization, as provincial governors (ayan) amassed autonomous power in regions like and by the 18th century. Ottoman rule persisted amid gradual erosion from internal stagnation and external pressures, including Russian incursions in the and Egyptian semi-independence under after his 1805 ascension and 1811 massacre of the Mamluks. Reforms like the (1839–1876) aimed to centralize administration and modernize the military, yet fueled ethnic resentments, exemplified by the 1860 Druze-Maronite clashes in and the 1876 Bulgarian uprising, which presaged Balkan losses formalized in the 1878 . In the Arab provinces, early stirrings of cultural revival during the 19th-century —driven by intellectuals like —challenged Ottoman Turkish dominance, laying groundwork for Arabist sentiments that intensified under the Young Turk after the 1908 revolution. World War I marked the empire's collapse in the region: aligning with the in November 1914, the Ottomans faced the launched by Sharif Hussein of in June 1916, backed by British promises of independence via the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence (1915–1916), though contradicted by the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916 dividing Ottoman lands between Britain and . The on October 30, 1918, ended hostilities, leading to Allied occupation and the empire's partition under the 1920 , which ceded Arab territories to mandates: Britain received , , and Transjordan in 1920, while took and , suppressing Faisal I's short-lived in July 1920. These mandates, intended as temporary tutelages, entrenched European administration, with Britain installing Hashemite rulers in (1921) and Transjordan (1923) amid revolts like the 1920 Iraqi uprising suppressed by aerial bombardment. In , Ottoman influence waned earlier due to European encroachments: seized in 1830, completing conquest by 1847; invaded in 1911, facing Sanusi resistance until 1931; Britain occupied in 1882 after the , formalizing a in 1914. fell under French in 1881, and was divided into French and Spanish zones by the 1912 Treaty of Fez, sparking Rif Rebellion (1921–1926). Colonial borders, often drawn arbitrarily—such as 's bifurcation of greater into sectarian states—exacerbated tribal and confessional tensions, prioritizing resource extraction like Algerian phosphates and Iraqi oil discovered in 1927. Twentieth-century transitions accelerated post-World War II as imperial exhaustion and U.S.-Soviet pressures eroded European hold: gained independence in 1943 via Free French proclamation, followed by in April 1946 after French troop withdrawal; achieved formal in 1932 but under British treaty influence until the 1958 ; formalized independence in 1946, retaining British subsidies. , under Italian colonization since 1911, transitioned via UN trusteeship to independence in 1951 under King Idris; and followed in 1956 amid nationalist insurgencies led by and the , respectively. Algeria's protracted war (1954–1962) against France, involving over 1 million casualties, culminated in Evian Accords independence under the FLN; Egypt's 1952 Free Officers coup ended monarchy, nationalizing the in 1956 and asserting republican . , crystallized in figures like and the founded in 1947, drove state formation but often prioritized unitary ideologies over ethnic pluralism, contributing to instabilities like the and 1961 annexation attempt by . These shifts forged modern MENA states with borders largely inherited from mandates, fostering enduring disputes over resources and identities.

Post-Independence Era, Pan-Arabism, and Contemporary Conflicts

Following the dismantling of Ottoman territories after and the subsequent mandates under British and French administration, most Middle Eastern and North African states achieved formal between the 1940s and 1960s. declared independence from on November 22, 1943, followed by on April 17, 1946, after protests against slow French withdrawal. gained independence from Britain on May 25, 1946, while Egypt's nominal independence dated to February 28, 1922, though full sovereignty emerged after the 1952 revolution. became independent on December 24, 1951, under UN auspices; on January 1, 1956; and on March 2 and March 20, 1956, respectively, from ; and after a protracted , on July 5, 1962. Gulf monarchies followed, with Kuwait's independence from Britain on June 19, 1961, and the ' formation on December 2, 1971. Post-independence governments often consolidated power through military coups or one-party rule, as in Egypt under (1954–1970), under Ba'athist regimes from 1968, and from 1963, prioritizing state-building amid ethnic and sectarian divisions. Oil discoveries, particularly in the Gulf from the 1930s onward, fueled but entrenched rentier states dependent on hydrocarbon exports, exacerbating inequalities and enabling . , an ideology advocating political, cultural, and economic unity among Arab peoples to counter Western imperialism and , gained prominence in the mid-20th century, rooted in earlier thinkers like but propelled by Nasser's leadership after the 1952 Egyptian revolution. It manifested in the formation of the in 1945 and culminated in the short-lived (UAR) uniting and from February 1958 to September 1961, driven by Ba'athist ideals of secular and anti-colonialism. Leaders like Nasser promoted it through radio broadcasts and support for independence movements, influencing coups in (1958) and contributing to the 1967 alliance against . The ideology's appeal waned after Israel's decisive victory in that war, which humiliated Arab armies— lost the , the , and the —exposing military weaknesses and fostering disillusionment. Further decline stemmed from failed unity experiments, the rise of Islamist movements, sectarian tensions (e.g., Sunni-Shi'a divides), and state nationalisms prioritized by regimes like Saddam Hussein's and Hafiz al-Assad's , rendering marginal by the 1980s. Contemporary conflicts in the region have shifted from interstate wars to protracted intra-state and proxy struggles, often intertwined with resource competition, sectarianism, and external interventions. The Arab-Israeli wars defined early post-independence tensions: the 1948 war followed Israel's declaration on May 14, displacing over 700,000 Palestinians in what Arabs call the Nakba; the 1956 saw Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of ; the 1967 war lasted six days with Israel capturing key territories; and the 1973 involved Egyptian and Syrian attacks, resulting in 20,000 Arab and 2,600 Israeli deaths. Later conflicts included the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), killing an estimated 500,000–1 million; the 1990–1991 , where 's invasion of prompted a U.S.-led coalition expelling Iraqi forces; and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, leading to sectarian and over 200,000 civilian deaths by 2011. The 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, sparked by 's Jasmine Revolution on December 17, 2010, toppled leaders in , , and but yielded mixed outcomes: transitioned to democracy, albeit unstable; reverted to military rule under after 2013; fragmented into post-Gaddafi's death on October 20, 2011; and Syria's protests escalated into . The , beginning with March 2011 protests against , evolved into a multi-faction conflict involving rebels, , (declaring a in 2014), and foreign powers— and backing Assad, and the U.S. supporting opposition—causing over 500,000 deaths and displacing 13 million by 2024. Assad's regime collapsed on December 8, 2024, after a rebel offensive led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham captured . Yemen's civil war, ignited in 2014 by Houthi rebels seizing Sana'a, prompted Saudi-led intervention in 2015 against the Iran-backed group, resulting in over 377,000 deaths by 2022 (60% indirect from famine and disease) and 4.5 million displaced. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict intensified with Hamas's October 7, 2023, attack killing 1,200 Israelis and taking 250 hostages, prompting Israel's Gaza operation that has killed over 40,000 Palestinians per Gaza authorities, amid ongoing violence and Houthi disruptions. These conflicts highlight persistent failures of governance, external meddling, and ideological fractures, with no resolution in sight for many as of 2025.

Geography and Environment

Physical Geography and Climate Zones

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region encompasses a diverse array of landforms dominated by arid expanses, with deserts covering approximately 80% of the total land area of over 12 million square kilometers. The Sahara Desert, the world's largest hot desert spanning about 9.2 million square kilometers, forms the core of North Africa's geography, extending across , , , and , characterized by vast sand dunes, rocky plateaus, and extreme aridity that limits vegetation to sparse oases and . In the Middle East, the , covering roughly 2.3 million square kilometers across , , , and the UAE, features similar hyper-arid conditions with gravel plains and salt flats, punctuated by wadis that channel rare flash floods. Mountain ranges provide topographic relief and influence local microclimates, with the stretching over 2,500 kilometers from through and , reaching elevations up to 4,167 meters at Mount Toubkal and acting as a barrier between Mediterranean coastal plains and the Saharan interior. In the eastern MENA, the in rise to over 4,500 meters, forming folded structures from tectonic collisions that trap moisture and support limited agriculture in their foothills, while Turkey's exceed 3,700 meters and border the Anatolian Plateau. Coastal lowlands along the in and the , as well as the shores, contrast these highlands with narrow alluvial plains suitable for settlement. Major river systems are critical hydrological features in an otherwise water-scarce landscape, including the Nile River, which flows 6,650 kilometers northward through Egypt and Sudan, discharging about 84 billion cubic meters annually into the Mediterranean and enabling 95% of Egypt's arable land along its delta and valley. The Tigris and Euphrates rivers, originating in Turkey and converging in Iraq to form the Shatt al-Arab, sustain the Mesopotamian floodplain with seasonal flows averaging 30 billion cubic meters combined, historically fostering early agriculture but now strained by upstream damming. Surrounding water bodies such as the Mediterranean Sea to the north, Red Sea to the east, and Persian Gulf define maritime boundaries and facilitate trade, though coral reefs in the Gulf are vulnerable to salinity fluctuations. Climate zones in MENA are predominantly arid and semi-arid, classified under Köppen systems as BWh (hot desert) and BSh (hot semi-arid), with annual often below 250 millimeters across 70% of the due to subtropical high-pressure systems and from oceanic sources. Mediterranean climates (Csa) prevail in coastal (e.g., , ) and the , featuring hot, dry summers and mild, wet winters with 400-800 millimeters of rain concentrated from October to April, supporting and cultivation. Interior plateaus and southern peninsulas experience extreme heat, with summer temperatures exceeding 50°C in parts of the and diurnal ranges up to 30°C, exacerbated by low humidity and frequent sandstorms known as shamals.

Natural Resources, Water Scarcity, and Environmental Pressures

The and North Africa (MENA) region possesses vast reserves, which dominate its profile and underpin many national economies. Proven crude oil reserves among members, predominantly in MENA countries, stood at 1,241 billion barrels at the end of 2023, representing over 70% of global totals. holds the largest share at approximately 259 billion barrels, followed by (145 billion barrels), the (111 billion barrels), (101 billion barrels), and (209 billion barrels, though sanctions limit extraction). reserves are equally substantial, with the accounting for the world's largest proven volumes; possesses 1,200 trillion cubic feet as of December 2023, second globally only to , while ranks third with around 842 trillion cubic feet. Non-hydrocarbon minerals include phosphates, where controls about 50 billion metric tons—over 70% of global reserves—primarily in the and Boucraa deposits, enabling it to produce 37 million metric tons annually as of 2023. holds an estimated 1 billion metric tons, supporting exports vital for production. Water scarcity pervades the region due to its arid , limited , and high rates, exacerbated by and agricultural demands. MENA holds only 1% of global renewable freshwater resources despite hosting 6% of the world's , resulting in availability often below 1,000 cubic meters annually—the threshold for absolute . In , renewable freshwater was just 61 cubic meters in 2021, among the lowest globally, driven by overexploitation of aquifers and reliance on shared basins like the . The Tigris-Euphrates system, originating in and shared with , , and , supplies 90% of Iraq's water but faces upstream damming and variability, reducing flows by up to 40% since the 1990s. provides relief in Gulf states, with producing 5.9 million cubic meters daily as of 2023, but energy-intensive processes strain grids and yield briny effluents harming marine ecosystems. Environmental pressures compound resource challenges, including widespread and soil salinization from intensive in river valleys. Approximately 50% of MENA's land is degraded, with affecting 34 million hectares through , , and erratic rainfall patterns that erode at rates exceeding 10 tons per hectare annually in parts of . Salinization impacts another 34 million hectares, particularly in irrigated areas of and , where evaporation concentrates salts, reducing productivity by 20-30% over decades due to poor drainage and upstream diversions. arises from dust storms, which deposit fine particulates exceeding WHO guidelines year-round, and industrial emissions; oil refining and flaring in the Gulf contribute to PM2.5 levels averaging 50-100 micrograms per cubic meter in urban centers like and , linked to respiratory diseases. These stressors, rooted in geophysical and human activities like subsidized water use for (consuming 80-90% of supplies), intensify without adaptive measures such as efficient or transboundary agreements.

Climate Change Impacts, Projections, and Policy Responses

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has experienced accelerated warming, with land surface temperatures rising at a rate exceeding the global average, contributing to intensified and agricultural stress. Observed impacts include prolonged droughts, such as those in reducing crop yields by up to 20% in recent years due to heatwaves and diminished flows, alongside increased frequency of sandstorms and evacuations in countries like . These effects exacerbate pre-existing , where 90% of the region already faces chronic shortages, leading to ecological shifts like alterations and , particularly in coastal and riparian zones. Human health risks have risen, with heat-related mortality increasing in urban areas like those in the Gulf states, while climate-induced displacement has affected millions, amplifying migration from rural to urban centers or across borders. Projections indicate amplified warming in MENA, with regional land temperatures expected to rise by 2.3°C ± 0.18°C under 1.5°C global warming, scaling to 4.6°C ± 0.36°C at 4.0°C global levels, driven by feedback from desert expansion and reduced . is forecasted to decline by 10-20% in Mediterranean-adjacent areas, heightening risks, while could render parts of the uninhabitable for extended periods without adaptation. Sea-level rise threatens low-lying deltas, such as the and Euphrates-Tigris, potentially displacing 10-20 million by 2050 under moderate scenarios, compounded by depletion rates already exceeding recharge by factors of 2-5 in aquifers like the Arabian Aquifer. These models, derived from CMIP6 ensembles in IPCC AR6 assessments, highlight vulnerabilities in and the , though uncertainties persist in forcing and regional teleconnections. Policy responses in MENA emphasize over , given hydrocarbon dependencies, with initiatives like the World Bank's MENA Climate Roadmap (2021-2025) targeting through desalination expansions in Gulf states, where capacity has doubled since 2010 to over 20 million cubic meters daily. 's Vision 2030 allocates $50 billion to renewables, aiming for 50% clean energy by 2030, while the UAE has invested in solar projects like Noor , generating 1.2 GW as of 2023. However, emissions from top producers—, UAE, and —continue rising, with regional GHG outputs increasing 5% annually through 2022 despite pledges at COP27 for 2030 reductions of 10-30% in countries like and . Transboundary cooperation remains limited by geopolitical tensions, and policy uncertainty is high due to oil revenue reliance, with funding gaps estimated at $100 billion annually by 2030.

Demographics and Society

Population Growth, Ethnic Composition, and Linguistic Diversity

The of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region stood at approximately 473 million in 2023, with projections indicating growth to over 500 million by 2030 amid ongoing demographic momentum. Annual rates have averaged 1.9% in recent years, reflecting a decline from the 3% peak around 1980 but remaining above the global average due to persistently elevated . Total rates for developing MENA countries averaged 3.08 births per woman in 2023, exceeding the replacement level of 2.1 and sustaining growth despite falling from over 5 in prior decades; this trend correlates with improvements in and uneven access to . High youth dependency ratios, with over half the under 25 in many countries, amplify pressures on resources and labor markets, though and education are gradually moderating declines. Ethnic composition in MENA is characterized by a patchwork of groups shaped by historical migrations, conquests, and state boundaries, with no single aggregating the region due to varying national definitions and sensitivities around identity. predominate in and the , forming the core population in countries like (over 100 million), , and , where they constitute 90-99% of residents based on self-identification. comprise the majority in (about 61% of its 89 million people), while form over 70% in (population around 85 million). Significant transnational minorities include (estimated 30-40 million across , , , and ), (20-30 million primarily in , , and ), and smaller communities such as (mainly in , totaling about 7 million), Assyrians, , and . These distributions reflect causal factors like Ottoman-era settlements and post-colonial borders that often ignore ethnic contiguities, contributing to tensions in multi-ethnic states like and . Linguistic diversity underscores MENA's ethnic heterogeneity, with over 60 languages from Afro-Asiatic (Semitic and Berber branches), Indo-European (Iranian), and Turkic families spoken across the region. serves as a and in 22 states, with native speakers numbering around 350-400 million in dialectal forms ranging from Maghrebi to Gulf variants; these dialects exhibit gradients but diverge phonologically and lexically, complicating regional communication. Persian (Farsi) is spoken by roughly 80 million, primarily in , while claims about 80 million speakers centered in . Other key languages include Kurdish (26-40 million speakers in Sorani and varieties), like Tamazight (spoken by 10-20 million in ), and Hebrew (about 9 million, revived as Israel's primary tongue). Minority tongues such as dialects persist among Christian communities, and immigrant languages like South Asian tongues appear in Gulf labor populations; this pluralism, rooted in pre-Islamic substrates and Islamic expansions, often aligns with ethnic lines but faces assimilation pressures from state monolingual policies favoring or national languages.
Major LanguageLinguistic FamilyApproximate Native Speakers in MENA (millions)
Afro-Asiatic (Semitic)350-400
Persian (Farsi)Indo-European (Iranian)80
TurkishTurkic80
KurdishIndo-European (Iranian)30-40
Berber (various)Afro-Asiatic20-30
This table highlights dominant languages but excludes diaspora influences and non-native usage; speaker estimates derive from national censuses and linguistic surveys, which undercount minorities due to political incentives for homogeneity. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has undergone accelerated since the mid-20th century, driven primarily by economic opportunities in oil-dependent economies, industrial development, and rural push factors such as agricultural decline and . By 2023, the urban population in MENA countries averaged approximately 73% of the total, with stark variations: Gulf states like the and exceeding 85%, while and lagged below 40%. This trend has concentrated populations in megacities, including (over 22 million residents in its as of 2023), (around 9.5 million), and (7.7 million), straining and amplifying issues like informal settlements and . Internal migration patterns dominate, with rural-to-urban flows accounting for much of the demographic shift, as individuals seek in expanding service and sectors. In , for instance, net migration to urban areas contributed to a 2.5% annual urban growth rate between 2010 and 2020. International migration adds complexity: the region hosts about 35 million migrants and refugees as of recent estimates, including labor inflows to (GCC) states—where expatriates comprise up to 90% of the workforce in and UAE—from and intra-MENA sources. Conflicts have spurred massive , with 28 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2023, predominantly in , , and , alongside 6.8 million Syrian refugees hosted mainly in , , and . Remittances from emigrants, totaling $60 billion annually for MENA by 2022, bolster household incomes but exacerbate brain drain in origin countries like and . Tribal structures remain embedded in MENA societies, particularly in the , , , and parts of , where kinship networks provide , mediate disputes, and shape political allegiances amid weak state institutions. In and , regimes co-opt tribal leaders through appointments and subsidies, integrating them into while preserving loyalties that predate modern borders. has not eroded these ties; instead, tribal identities adapt, influencing voting patterns, business dealings, and even , as seen in the 2017 Gulf crisis where leveraged tribal ideologies against . In conflict zones like and , tribes function as authorities, controlling territories and resources, which perpetuates fragmentation and hinders centralized —evident in Libya's post-2011 , where tribal militias vied for power alongside Islamist groups. This persistence reflects causal factors like historical , uneven modernization, and authoritarian reliance on divide-and-rule tactics, though it often fosters and resistance to merit-based reforms.

Economy

Hydrocarbon Dominance, OPEC Role, and Resource Curse Dynamics

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region possesses approximately 48% of the world's proven oil reserves and 40% of reserves, underpinning its central role in global energy markets. In 2024, Middle Eastern countries accounted for about 30% of global oil production and 17% of output, with key producers including (producing over 9 million barrels per day), , the , , and ranking among the top ten worldwide. dominate MENA economies, contributing 40-50% of GDP on average in (GCC) states and up to 80-95% of export revenues in countries like , , , and . This reliance stems from vast low-cost reserves discovered primarily in the mid-20th century, enabling rapid post-colonial wealth accumulation but fostering structural vulnerabilities to price fluctuations. The , founded in 1960 by , , , , and , coordinates production policies among its members to stabilize markets and influence prices. Seven MENA nations—, , , , , , and the UAE—comprise the core of OPEC, which collectively controls around 40% of global oil supply. OPEC enforces production quotas to manage output, as seen in repeated cuts since 2016 to counter oversupply, including a 2023-2024 agreement reducing 5.86 million barrels per day to support prices above $70 per barrel. While OPEC's influence has waned due to non-member competition and internal quota non-compliance, it remains pivotal for MENA exporters, enabling revenue predictability but drawing criticism for cartel-like behavior that exacerbates price volatility. Resource curse dynamics manifest in MENA through economic distortions, where windfalls hinder diversification, inflate non-tradable sectors via , and sustain rentier governance models. Oil rents correlate positively with short-term GDP growth in MENA exporters but amplify long-term challenges, including fiscal deficits during price slumps (e.g., Saudi Arabia's 2020 budget shortfall exceeding 15% of GDP amid sub-$50 oil) and elevated indices in resource-dependent states like and . Empirical studies highlight symptoms such as suppressed manufacturing (under 10% of GDP in most GCC countries) and rates above 25% in oil-reliant economies, fueled by state subsidies discouraging . While outliers like the UAE have partially mitigated effects through sovereign wealth funds and non-oil growth (reaching 50% of GDP by 2023), pervasive and conflict in , , and underscore how unearned rents erode institutional quality, perpetuating boom-bust cycles without robust causal links to diversified development.
CountryHydrocarbon Share of Exports (%)Hydrocarbon Share of GDP (%)
80 (2018)37 (2023)
90 (2018)~50
95 (2018)~20
~9556 (oil rents, 2021)

Diversification Efforts, Trade Dependencies, and Economic Reforms

The economies of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have historically depended heavily on exports, prompting sustained efforts to diversify revenue sources and reduce vulnerability to oil price volatility. (GCC) countries, which account for a significant portion of regional output, have pursued ambitious national strategies such as Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 and the ' post-oil economic model, emphasizing sectors like , , , and . These initiatives have driven non-oil GDP growth to 3.7% across the GCC in 2024, supported by investments and free trade zones. In non-GCC states like and , diversification has focused on , renewables, and export-oriented , though progress remains uneven due to political instability and limited involvement. Trade dependencies in MENA reinforce the risks of overreliance on hydrocarbons, with oils comprising the top category and fueling approximately 50% of the region's total as of recent data. MENA nations nearly 40% of global fuel supplies, with deriving about 90% of its earnings from . This concentration exposes economies to fluctuations in global demand, as seen in slowed growth from lower production in 2024. dependencies compound vulnerabilities, particularly for food and capital goods, often sourced from , , and the , while efforts to expand trade partners—such as increasing ties with —have gained traction but have not yet offset hydrocarbon dominance. Economic reforms have been central to enabling diversification, including fiscal consolidation, subsidy rationalization, and labor market liberalization to attract foreign investment and boost participation. (IMF) and World Bank programs have supported these measures, as in Egypt's ongoing IMF agreement addressing fiscal imbalances through tax reforms and exchange rate adjustments. In the GCC, reforms have emphasized reducing public wage burdens and enhancing business environments, contributing to projected regional GDP growth of 3.3% in 2025, with non-oil sectors expected to sustain momentum amid AI integration and infrastructure expansion. However, challenges persist, including and hurdles that limit reform efficacy in oil-importing MENA economies.

Education Systems, Labor Markets, Youth Unemployment, and Human Capital Gaps

Education systems in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) exhibit high gross enrollment ratios at primary and secondary levels, often exceeding 90% in many countries, yet suffer from low learning outcomes and skills mismatches with labor demands. For instance, (PISA) 2022 results show MENA participants scoring well below the OECD average of 472-489 points across reading, mathematics, and science, with countries like at 372 in reading and at 458. Curricula emphasize rote over and problem-solving, contributing to graduates unprepared for private-sector roles. Tertiary enrollment has expanded, with women comprising 43% of enrollees compared to 39% for men in recent data, reversing gender gaps in access but not translating to equitable outcomes. Labor markets in MENA are characterized by segmentation, with public-sector dominating due to and benefits, absorbing up to 60-80% of formal jobs in Gulf states and , while private sectors remain informal and low-productivity. Rigid hiring and firing regulations, coupled with subsidies distorting incentives, hinder private-sector growth and job creation. disparities persist, with female labor force participation averaging below 20% regionally—far lower than male rates—despite higher female , attributed to cultural norms, family codes, and lack of childcare rather than deficits alone. Informality affects 40-60% of workers, limiting access to and social protections, while migration of low-skilled labor to Gulf countries exacerbates domestic shortages in non-oil sectors. Youth unemployment, defined for ages 15-24, averaged 26.45% across 18 MENA countries in 2023, the highest globally, with projections holding at 24.5% in 2024 amid conflicts and economic slowdowns. Rates exceed 30% in and parts of the , driven by a bulge—nearly 300 million projected to enter markets by 2050—and prolonged job searches averaging 1-2 years, termed "wait-hood." Skills mismatches arise from education's focus on credentials over employable competencies, compounded by rents reducing urgency for reforms in rentier economies. Human capital gaps manifest in the region's low World Bank (HCI) score, where a child born today reaches only 50-60% of potential productivity due to poor health, education quality, and stunting affecting 20-30% of children. As of 2025, 70% of 10-year-olds fail basic literacy and numeracy, perpetuating low-skill traps despite rising schooling years. Brain drain intensifies gaps, with skilled emigration rates 2-3 times higher than global averages, particularly from conflict zones and oil-dependent states lacking diversification. Reforms targeting vocational and private-sector incentives show promise in UAE and , but systemic issues like governance failures and underinvestment—education spending at 4-5% of GDP versus 6% globally—constrain progress.
IndicatorMENA Average (Recent Data)Global Comparison
Youth Unemployment Rate (15-24, 2023-2024)24.5-26.5%Highest regionally; global youth rate ~13%
Math Score (2022)~400-450OECD average: 472
Female Tertiary Enrollment Share43% (vs. 39% )Higher female attainment but low workforce entry
Score~0.5-0.6Below global average of 0.59

Politics and Governance

Regime Types, Authoritarianism, and Democratic Experiments

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region features a diverse array of formal regime types, including absolute and constitutional monarchies, presidential and parliamentary s, and theocratic systems, yet the overwhelming majority function as with limited political pluralism, suppressed , and centralized power. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index for 2023, the region's average score of 3.23 out of 10 marked the lowest among global regions for the sixth consecutive year, with 15 of 18 covered MENA countries classified as due to flaws in electoral processes, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and . 2024 report similarly rated over 90 percent of the region's population as living in "Not Free" countries, with aggregate scores reflecting systemic restrictions on freedoms; scored 74/100 (Free), while others like (51/100, Partly Free) and (42/100, Partly Free) showed partial openings amid deeper authoritarian traits. These indices, grounded in empirical assessments of elections, media independence, and , underscore how formal structures—such as Saudi Arabia's or Egypt's presidential —often serve to legitimize hereditary or military-led rather than enable competitive . Absolute monarchies dominate the Arabian Peninsula, where rulers in , , , , and the exercise near-unlimited authority, distributing hydrocarbon rents to maintain loyalty without accountable institutions; for instance, Saudi Arabia's King Salman and Crown Prince have centralized decision-making since 2015, blending Wahhabi clerical influence with modernizing reforms under Vision 2030, yet prohibiting opposition parties and censoring dissent. Constitutional monarchies in and provide limited parliamentary roles, with kings retaining veto powers and security control; Morocco's King Mohammed VI reformed the constitution post-2011 protests to expand parliamentary authority, but retained command over key ministries, yielding a hybrid system rated authoritarian by EIU standards. Republican systems prevail elsewhere, often as personalist dictatorships or military-backed presidencies: under (since 2000) and under (since 2014) feature rigged elections and state security dominance, while Iran's theocratic combines elected elements with vetting under Supreme Leader , ensuring clerical oversight since 1979. , formally a presidential since Recep Tayyip Erdogan's 2017 , has eroded and media freedom, dropping to a "hybrid regime" score of 4.35 in 2023 amid post-2016 purge of over 150,000 officials. remains the outlier, operating as a parliamentary with multiparty elections, an independent , and free press, scoring highest regionally despite internal debates over judicial reforms in 2023. Authoritarianism's persistence in MENA stems from robust coercive institutions, resource-dependent insulating rulers from , and fragmented opposition unable to coalesce against state power; militaries and , often lavishly funded (e.g., Egypt's armed forces control up to 60 percent of the as of 2023), prioritize regime survival over civilian oversight, as evidenced by interventions in (1991), (2013), and (2019). Oil rents in rentier states like those in the Gulf enable networks that co-opt elites and suppress demands for representation, while historical factors such as Ottoman legacies of centralized absolutism and post-colonial military coups (e.g., 1958, 1969) entrenched . Sectarian and tribal divisions further undermine broad coalitions for change, as rulers exploit cleavages—Sunni-Shia in or Arab-Berber in —to delegitimize protests as destabilizing. Empirical analyses, controlling for income and education, attribute lower rates to these domestic dynamics over purely cultural explanations, though indices note weaker compared to other regions. Democratic experiments have been rare and largely unsuccessful, with the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings representing the most significant challenge to entrenched , sparking regime overthrows in , , , and but yielding reversion to or state failure in most cases. In , the only partial success, the 2011 ouster of led to a 2014 establishing multiparty elections and , boosting its EIU score to 5.51 (flawed ) by 2014; however, and political gridlock prompted President Kais Saied's 2021 self-coup, dissolving and rewriting the in 2022, dropping the score to 5.51 again by 2023 amid arrests of opponents. Egypt's brief experiment saw Mohamed Morsi's win 2012 elections, but mass protests and a 2013 military coup restored authoritarian rule under Sisi, with over 60,000 political prisoners reported by 2023. fragmented into civil war post-Gaddafi (2011), with rival governments and militias preventing stable institutions; 's 2011 transition collapsed into Houthi-Saudi proxy conflict by 2014, displacing millions. Iraq's post-2003 U.S.-imposed introduced parliamentary but fostered and sectarian quotas, yielding failures evident in 2019 protests met with lethal force. Lebanon's power-sharing, formalized in 1943 and revised post-1989 civil war, has devolved into paralysis, with no president elected since 2022 amid economic collapse. These outcomes highlight how weak institutions, elite resistance, and external interventions—such as Gulf funding for counter-revolutions—thwart sustained transitions, with public support for persisting in surveys (e.g., 70-80 percent in Arab Barometer data) but prioritizing stability and economic delivery over procedural freedoms.

Root Causes of Instability: Governance Failures and Cultural Factors

Governance failures in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are marked by systemic weaknesses in institutional effectiveness and accountability, as quantified by the World Bank's (WGI). In the 2023 WGI dataset, MENA countries averaged percentile ranks below 30 for key dimensions including government effectiveness, , and control of corruption, far underperforming global benchmarks and correlating with reduced and heightened fragility. These metrics reflect chronic underinvestment in public goods, with authoritarian structures suppressing dissent and innovation; for instance, regimes in , , and have maintained power through coercive apparatuses that divert resources from development to , exacerbating grievances that fueled uprisings like the 2011 Arab Spring. Corruption permeates these systems, undermining trust and efficiency. The 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from scored the MENA regional average at 37 out of 100, with nations like (16), Syria (13), and (18) ranking among the world's most corrupt, while even higher performers such as the UAE (69) exhibit opaque practices in state-linked enterprises. Such entrenched graft, often enabled by unaccountable elites, distorts resource allocation—evident in rentier economies where revenues fund networks rather than diversified , perpetuating dependency and volatility as oil prices fluctuate. Rent-seeking and nepotistic practices further entrench these failures, as by ruling families and elites prioritizes personal enrichment over meritocratic administration. In resource-rich states like and , governance models reliant on oil rents discourage broad-based taxation and representation, fostering "" dynamics where accountability erodes and public sectors bloat with unqualified appointees. Cultural factors amplify governance deficits through and kinship-based loyalties that prioritize group solidarity over impersonal institutions. Tribal structures, persistent in countries from to , fragment national authority, as allegiances to clans mediate access to power and resources, often overriding legal frameworks and enabling factional conflicts. The practice of —informal nepotism leveraging personal connections—permeates Arab bureaucracies, systematically favoring relatives and affiliates in hiring and contracts, which scholarly institutional links to the failure of rational-legal models to displace pre-modern systems. This cultural embedding of favoritism sustains inefficiency, as merit-based competition yields to relational obligations, breeding public disillusionment and sporadic revolts. Religious ideologies, particularly politicized Islam, contribute to instability by imposing rigid doctrinal constraints on adaptive governance. Islamist movements, from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to Salafi groups in the Gulf, often reject secular pluralism in favor of sharia-based rule, which empirical reviews identify as a disruptive force fueling sectarian divides and jihadist insurgencies across Syria, Iraq, and Yemen since the 2010s. In societies where religious authority supersedes empirical policy-making—evident in resistance to reforms in family law or education—theological primacy hinders modernization, as seen in Iran's post-1979 theocracy, where clerical vetoes have stifled economic diversification and escalated proxy conflicts. Such dynamics, compounded by Sunni-Shia rivalries, transform internal governance disputes into enduring violence, with data from conflict trackers showing over 500,000 deaths in MENA sectarian clashes since 2011. These intertwined failures and factors create feedback loops: poor entrenches cultural pathologies like tribal vetoes on central , while cultural resistance to institutional reform perpetuates , yielding cycles of protest and repression as in Tunisia's post-2011 democratic or Algeria's stalled transitions. Addressing them demands decoupling and from state functions, though empirical precedents remain scarce amid entrenched interests.

Armed Conflicts, Proxy Wars, and Sectarian Escalations

The Middle East and North Africa region has experienced persistent armed conflicts since the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, with many evolving into proxy wars driven by regional powers such as , , , and seeking to expand influence through non-state actors and militias. These conflicts often overlay sectarian tensions, particularly the Sunni-Shia divide, where 's Shia-aligned "Axis of Resistance"—including in , Houthi rebels in , and Shia militias in —clashes with Sunni-majority states backed by Western allies. Casualty figures from such wars exceed hundreds of thousands, with proxy dynamics allowing deniability while prolonging instability; for instance, 's support for militias has sustained low-intensity warfare across multiple fronts, while Saudi and Emirati interventions aimed to counter Iranian expansion but yielded mixed results. The Israel-Hamas war, ignited by Hamas's October 7, 2023, attack that killed approximately 1,200 and took over 250 hostages, has become a central flashpoint, drawing in Iranian proxies and escalating into multi-front engagements. Israel's subsequent military campaign in Gaza has resulted in over 71,200 reported deaths according to the Hamas-controlled as of October 22, 2025, though independent analyses question the figures for including combatants and unverified data, with estimating nearly 20,000 Hamas fighters killed by January 2025. Cross-border exchanges with in intensified in 2024, leading to Israeli ground operations and the displacement of over 1 million Lebanese, while Houthi missile and drone attacks from targeted Israeli territory and shipping, prompting U.S. and Israeli retaliatory strikes. These actions reflect Iran's strategy of calibrated proxy aggression to deter normalization between and Arab states, with suffering significant losses, including leadership decapitation, by late 2024. In Yemen, the civil war pits Iran-backed Houthi forces against a Saudi-led supporting the internationally recognized , evolving from Houthi seizures in into a protracted proxy conflict that has caused over 377,000 deaths by 2021 estimates, with ongoing violence exacerbating affecting 19.5 million people in 2025. Houthi control of Sana'a since has been bolstered by Iranian arms and advisors, while Saudi airstrikes from 2015 aimed to restore order but faced international criticism for casualties; by October 2025, Houthi attacks on global shipping persisted despite U.S.-led naval interventions, and the group detained over 20 UN staff in raids, signaling hardened internal repression. Truces, such as the UN-brokered one in , have held unevenly on land fronts but failed to curb maritime escalations tied to solidarity with . Syria's civil war, spanning 2011 to 2024, transitioned after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024 to interim governance marred by proxy-fueled fragmentation and sectarian clashes. Russian and Iranian support prolonged Assad's rule, enabling regime forces and to reclaim territory, but Turkish-backed Sunni rebels and U.S.-supported Kurdish forces contested control, resulting in over 500,000 deaths overall. Post-Assad, violence surged in 2025, including Druze-Bedouin clashes in southern Suwayda starting July 13, 2025, and massacres of entire families by armed groups in March 2025, displacing 1.1 million in the northeast amid Turkish-Kurdish confrontations. Iran's residual influence via militias persists, complicating stabilization efforts. Sectarian escalations, rooted in the Sunni-Shia schism exacerbated by state sponsorship, underpin much of the violence, with 's promotion of Shia interests provoking Sunni backlash and enabling groups like to exploit divisions. In , Shia militias targeted U.S. forces in over 100 attacks in 2024 as proxies for , while Sunni insurgencies lingered; Yemen's conflict has sectarianized, with Houthis framing their fight against "Sunni aggressors" despite local tribal dynamics. Overall, these tensions have fueled over 200,000 sectarian-related deaths since 2011, per aggregated estimates, as regional powers instrumentalize religious identities for geopolitical gain rather than purely theological disputes.

Religion and Ideology

Islamic Foundations, Sunni-Shia Divide, and Theological Influences

originated in the during the early 7th century CE, when ibn Abdullah began receiving revelations in around 610 CE, culminating in the 's compilation following his death in 632 CE. These teachings emphasized , submission to God (), and a legal-ethical framework derived from the and the Prophet's example (), which unified fractious tribes under a theocratic polity centered in after the Hijra migration in 622 CE. By the mid-7th century, Islamic expansion under the Caliphs (632–661 CE) and subsequent (661–750 CE) rapidly incorporated the , , , and into a , establishing as a liturgical and integrating local populations through conversion incentives like tax exemptions for non-Muslims. This foundational era imprinted MENA with core Islamic institutions, including sharia-based governance and to and , which remain central to regional identity. The Sunni-Shia divide emerged immediately after Muhammad's death in 632 CE, stemming from disputes over political succession rather than core doctrinal differences. Sunnis, comprising the majority tradition, supported electing as the first caliph through communal consensus (), viewing the first four "Rightly Guided" caliphs— (r. 632–634), (r. 634–644), (r. 644–656), and (r. 656–661)—as legitimate leaders prioritizing the ummah's unity. Shias (from "Shiat Ali," party of Ali) contended that leadership should remain within Muhammad's bloodline, designating ibn Abi Talib, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, as the divinely appointed ; Ali's delayed caliphate ended with his assassination in 661 CE, followed by the martyrdom of his son Husayn at the in 680 CE under Umayyad forces, an event that crystallized Shia narratives of injustice and esoteric authority. This , initially political, evolved into distinct sects, with Sunnis forming about 85–90% of global Muslims and Shias 10–15%, though in MENA, Shias form majorities in (90–95%), (60–65%), (60–70%), and significant minorities in (30–40%), (35–40%), and Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province (10–15%). Theologically, Sunnis adhere to the Quran and authenticated hadith collections (e.g., Sahih Bukhari and Muslim), supplemented by ijma (consensus) and qiyas (analogy) in jurisprudence, yielding four orthodox madhabs: Hanafi (prevalent in Turkey, Central Asia), Maliki (North Africa), Shafi'i (Egypt, Levant), and Hanbali (Saudi Arabia, influencing Wahhabism). Shias, particularly Twelver Shiism dominant in Iran and Iraq, elevate the role of infallible Imams—descendants of Ali—as interpreters of divine will, incorporating aql (reason) and reliance on Imam-specific hadith, with Ja'fari fiqh emphasizing temporary marriage (mut'ah) and distinct ritual practices like combining prayers. These variances manifest in practices such as Shia veneration of saints' shrines (e.g., Karbala's Imam Husayn) versus Sunni iconoclasm, and eschatological beliefs in the Hidden Imam's return for Twelvers versus Sunni messianic figures. While both sects affirm the Five Pillars, interpretive divergences underpin ongoing tensions, as seen in fatwas clashing over taqlid (imitation of scholars) versus ijtihad (independent reasoning). In MENA, these foundations and divides profoundly shape societal norms, governance, and conflicts, with Sunni-majority states like exporting Salafi interpretations via funding, while Shia promotes wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurist) as state ideology since Khomeini's 1979 revolution. Theological influences foster resilience against —evident in resistance to Western legal imports—but also exacerbate proxy wars, as in Yemen's Houthi (Zaydi Shia) insurgency against Sunni-led government since 2014, or Iraq's post-2003 Shia ascendancy displacing Ba'athist Sunni dominance. Empirical data from conflict analyses link sectarian mobilization to resource competition and historical grievances, rather than inherent doctrinal incompatibility, though biased academic narratives often understate Islamist agency in favor of geopolitical framing. Regional stability hinges on managing these influences, as unchecked revivalism correlates with elevated violence metrics, per datasets tracking jihadist attacks from 2000–2023.

Rise of Political Islam, Extremism, and Jihadist Movements

The emergence of political Islam in the Middle East and North Africa during the early 20th century represented a reaction against Western colonial influence, secular nationalism, and perceived moral decay in Muslim societies. Founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood sought to revive Islamic governance through gradual societal Islamization, education, and social services, positioning itself as an alternative to both colonial powers and emerging secular elites. The Brotherhood's ideology emphasized sharia as the basis for state and society, criticizing Western liberalism and pan-Arab socialism for diluting Islamic principles, and it rapidly expanded across the region, influencing groups in Syria, Jordan, and Sudan by mid-century. This movement gained traction amid the failures of secular regimes, such as Egypt's under Gamal Abdel Nasser, where authoritarianism and economic stagnation alienated pious populations without delivering promised modernization. A pivotal radicalization occurred through the writings of Sayyid Qutb, a Brotherhood ideologue executed by Egypt's government in 1966, who reframed modern Muslim societies as jahiliyya—a state of pre-Islamic ignorance warranting revolutionary jihad by a vanguard of true believers against apostate rulers and their Western backers. Qutb's concepts of takfir (declaring Muslims as unbelievers) and offensive jihad to establish God's sovereignty (hakimiyyah) diverged from traditional defensive interpretations, inspiring generations of extremists who viewed electoral politics or compromise as illegitimate. His influence extended beyond Egypt, fueling assassinations and uprisings, such as the 1970s-1980s takfiri attacks by Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which targeted Copts, tourists, and officials, culminating in the 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat. Parallel to Brotherhood-style , puritanical strains like solidified in through a 1744 pact between and Muhammad bin Saud, merging religious zeal with tribal conquest to establish the first Saudi state, emphasizing strict , rejection of innovations (), and intolerance toward Shia and Sufi practices. Revived in the with the Third Saudi State's founding in and oil wealth post-1938, was exported globally via funding for mosques, schools, and charities, promoting Salafi literalism that intersected with Qutbist radicalism to foster . This alliance provided jihadists with ideological rigor and financial networks, though Saudi rulers periodically suppressed domestic Wahhabi militants, as in the 1979 by extremists decrying royal corruption. Jihadist movements crystallized during the 1979 Soviet invasion of , where fighters, backed by Saudi funds, Pakistani logistics, and U.S. arms via , framed resistance as global jihad, drawing Arab volunteers and forging transnational networks. , returning from the war, founded in 1988 to continue armed struggle against perceived enemies of , evolving from anti-Soviet focus to targeting the "far enemy" (U.S. and allies) in attacks like the 1998 embassy bombings and 2001 World Trade Center assault. The U.S.-led (2001) and Iraq (2003) fragmented these networks but spurred adaptation; (AQI), under , employed sectarian violence against Shia, rebranding as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria () amid Arab Spring upheavals in 2011. Exploiting power vacuums in Syria's and Iraq's sectarian failures, declared a in June 2014 across swaths of territory, enforcing brutal , enslaving , and inspiring lone-wolf attacks worldwide, with peak control over 100,000 square kilometers and 10 million people by 2015. Though territorially defeated by 2019 through coalitions involving U.S., Kurdish, and regional forces, remnants persist via insurgencies in , , and affiliates in and Sinai, underscoring how thrives on , Sunni grievances, and ideological appeal to youth disillusioned with secular . These movements' causal roots lie in theological absolutism rejecting pluralism, amplified by voids rather than alone, as evidenced by recruits from educated, middle-class backgrounds.

Secularism, Reformist Challenges, and Compatibility with Modernity

In the early , secularism gained traction in parts of the through state-led reforms inspired by European models and anti-colonial . Turkey's founder established a secular republic in 1923, abolishing the , adopting a based on Swiss law, and enforcing policies like banning the fez and veiling to promote Western-style modernity. Similar efforts occurred in under Pahlavi from 1925 to 1941, who centralized power, unveiled women by force in 1936, and curtailed clerical influence to foster national modernization. In Arab states, Ba'athist regimes in and , along with Gamal Abdel Nasser's in the 1950s-1960s, pursued secular , suppressing Islamist groups and prioritizing state control over religious institutions. These initiatives often prioritized authoritarian governance and over democratic pluralism, leading to perceptions of cultural alienation among pious populations. Post-1970s, faced severe challenges from resurgent , fueled by doctrinal revivalism, oil wealth, and governance failures of secular regimes. The 1979 overthrew the Pahlavi , establishing a Shia under Khomeini that enshrined as state law and reversed secular policies, inspiring similar movements region-wide. In Sunni-majority states, Saudi Arabia's export of via petrodollars strengthened Islamist opposition, while the Muslim Brotherhood's ideological influence grew amid secular dictatorships' corruption and repression, as seen in under Mubarak. secular governments, often characterized by and one-party rule, eroded public support, paving the way for Islamist electoral gains, such as the Brotherhood's 2012 victory in before its military ouster. By the 2010s, even nominally secular states like grappled with Islamist pressures post-Arab Spring, though Ennahda's moderation reflected pragmatic adaptations rather than deep ideological shifts. Reformist challenges to orthodox Islamism have been marginal and often suppressed, focusing on reinterpretation via (independent reasoning) to align faith with modern governance. 19th-20th century modernists like advocated reconciling Islam with science and , influencing early secular experiments, but successors like veered toward Salafism, prioritizing scriptural literalism. Contemporary figures, such as Sudanese-American Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, argue for a to protect religious freedom, positing that historical applications were context-bound and incompatible with universal in diverse societies. However, such views face resistance from dominant clerical establishments; in , reformist networks challenging Salafism have been curtailed by state security measures amid post-2011 dissent. Gulf states' recent shifts toward "post-Islamism," emphasizing over , stem more from authoritarian consolidation than grassroots reform, targeting Salafi extremism while maintaining monarchical legitimacy. Public attitudes underscore tensions in Islam's compatibility with , with empirical surveys revealing widespread preference for integration over strict . A 2013 study across 17 Muslim-majority countries found majorities favoring as official law, including 74% in , 83% in , and 99% in ; in the Middle East-North Africa, at least 40% supported its application to non-Muslims. Support for punishments—such as amputation for theft (endorsed by 45-82% in countries like and )—and apostasy penalties (up to 86% in and ) highlights doctrinal conflicts with secular norms like individual liberty and equality. While urban youth in (36% support) and (12%) show lower religiosity, regional trends indicate revivalism over secularization, with religiosity dipping mid-2010s in Arab states but rebounding by 2022 amid instability. Critics attribute limited reform success to Islam's theocratic imperatives in core texts, which prioritize divine sovereignty over popular will, rendering full compatibility with liberal improbable without marginalizing orthodox interpretations.

Culture and Human Rights

Historical Cultural Achievements and Intellectual Traditions

The Middle East and North Africa served as the cradle of several ancient civilizations that laid foundational achievements in writing, law, architecture, and governance. In , the Sumerians developed script around 3500 BCE, enabling the recording of administrative, legal, and literary texts on clay tablets. They also invented the circa 3200 BC, revolutionizing transportation and pottery production. The Babylonian ruler issued his code of 282 laws around 1754 BCE, establishing principles of justice based on social class and retribution, inscribed on a . In , hieroglyphic writing emerged by 3000 BC, used for monumental inscriptions and religious texts, while the Fourth Dynasty constructed the circa 2580–2560 BCE as a for , demonstrating advanced engineering with over 2 million blocks. Persian and North African civilizations further contributed to administrative innovation and maritime prowess. The Achaemenid Empire, founded by Cyrus the Great in 550 BCE, implemented a satrapy system for efficient governance across vast territories from the Indus to the Mediterranean, while promoting Zoroastrianism as a state religion emphasizing moral dualism between good and evil. Zoroastrian texts like the Avesta influenced concepts of cosmic order and eschatology in subsequent Abrahamic traditions. In North Africa, Phoenician settlers established Carthage around 814 BCE, which grew into a thalassocratic power controlling Mediterranean trade routes and developing naval innovations, including the corvus boarding device during conflicts with Rome. Berber populations interacted with these settlers, contributing to agricultural terracing and metallurgy in the Maghreb region predating Phoenician arrival. The Islamic era from the 8th to 13th centuries marked a pinnacle of intellectual synthesis, with Abbasid scholars in Baghdad's Bayt al-Hikma translating Greek, Persian, and Indian works into Arabic, fostering empirical inquiry in multiple fields. Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi's treatise Al-Kitab al-Mukhtasar fi Hisab al-Jabr wal-Muqabala around 820 CE formalized as a , solving quadratic equations systematically. Ibn al-Haytham's Kitab al-Manazir (circa 1011–1021 CE) pioneered through experimentation, disproving ancient emission theories of vision and laying groundwork for the . In , Ibn Sina's Al-Qanun fi al-Tibb (completed 1025 CE), a comprehensive , integrated , , and clinical observation, serving as Europe's primary medical text until the 1650s. Intellectual traditions emphasized ijtihad (independent reasoning) in and , as seen in ' (Ibn Rushd, 1126–1198 CE) commentaries reconciling Aristotelian logic with Islamic theology, influencing European . However, post-11th century shifts toward taqlid (imitation of precedents) and theological conservatism, exemplified by Al-Ghazali's critique of in Tahafut al-Falasifa (1095 CE), prioritized orthodoxy over speculative inquiry. The Mongol sack of in 1258 CE destroyed libraries and killed scholars, exacerbating depopulation and disrupting patronage networks, though scientific decline had earlier roots in institutional rigidification. These traditions preserved and advanced knowledge amid conquests, but faltered under political fragmentation and anti-rationalist currents, contrasting with Europe's emerging .

Social Structures, Family Dynamics, and Gender Norms

Societies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are characterized by collectivist social structures where kinship ties and family units predominate over individualistic orientations, fostering strong intergenerational solidarity and social integration through familial networks. These structures emphasize loyalty to extended kin groups, often patrilineal clans or tribes, which historically provide economic security, dispute resolution, and social status in environments marked by political instability. Urbanization and modernization have prompted a gradual shift toward nuclear families, with extended family households declining from approximately 51% in parental generations to 43% in current ones in select studies, though multigenerational living persists due to cultural norms and economic pressures like housing costs. Family dynamics remain predominantly patriarchal, with male authority figures—typically fathers or eldest brothers—exercising control over major decisions, including arrangements and . Extended families maintain high cohesion, reinforced by practices such as consanguineous marriages, which occur in 20-50% of unions across MENA countries, predominantly first-cousin pairings that preserve wealth, alliances, and within sects or tribes. Rates vary significantly, reaching up to 58% in and 29% in , though some declines are observed, as in where first-cousin marriages fell from 5.9% in 2010 to 3.2% by 2023. Arranged marriages, often with required for women, continue to shape partner selection, while fertility rates have dropped amid delayed marriages, reflecting socioeconomic changes yet retaining cultural emphasis on large families for lineage continuity. Honor codes tied to reputation further dictate behaviors, sometimes enforcing strict segregation and limiting individual . Gender norms uphold male guardianship and female subordination, rooted in interpretations of Sharia law that codify inequalities such as women's half-share in inheritance compared to men and reduced weight of female testimony in certain legal matters. In many MENA jurisdictions, women require male approval for travel, employment, or divorce, perpetuating domestic roles and restricting public participation, with regional surveys indicating rising support for these patriarchal arrangements in private spheres post-2021. Despite educational gains—young women outnumbering men in university enrollment in countries like Tunisia and Jordan—labor force participation remains low at around 20-30% for women versus 70-80% for men, constrained by cultural expectations and legal barriers. Reforms, such as Saudi Arabia's 2018 lifting of the driving ban, have occurred, but entrenched norms, including veiling mandates and familial honor-based violence, continue to limit female agency, with peer-reviewed analyses attributing persistence to religious fundamentalism over modernization alone. Legal systems across the Middle East and North Africa predominantly blend civil law traditions inherited from Ottoman, French, or British colonial codes with Islamic principles, particularly in , , and personal status matters, where Sharia often enforces gender-based inequalities such as unequal weights and inheritance shares favoring males. In stricter applications, countries like and incorporate Sharia-derived punishments into criminal codes, including flogging for , amputation for , and execution for or , which contravene international standards prohibiting . Judicial independence remains compromised in most states due to executive interference, military tribunals for civilians, and lack of , as evidenced by widespread reports of arbitrary detention without charge. Human rights records in the region are marked by systemic violations of political rights and , with Freedom House's 2025 rating 17 of 18 MENA countries as "Not Free," citing autocratic consolidation, conflict-driven abuses, and erosion of freedoms amid ongoing wars in Gaza, , and . Common issues include severe restrictions on freedom of expression, with and laws used to prosecute critics; for instance, detained over 60,000 political prisoners under anti-terrorism pretexts in 2024, often subjecting them to and enforced disappearances. face entrenched barriers, including legal guardianship systems in —despite partial reforms allowing women to travel without male permission since 2019—and enforcement of laws, which triggered the 2022-2023 protests resulting in at least 551 deaths and 22,000 arrests by mid-2024. Religious minorities endure persecution, such as Iran's execution of Baha'is on fabricated charges and discrimination against Coptic Christians in , where church construction permits are routinely denied. LGBTQ individuals face criminalization in 12 MENA countries, with penalties up to death in Iran and , rooted in interpretations equating with moral corruption. Israel stands out as the region's sole "Free" nation per metrics, with an independent , free press, and protections for within its sovereign territory, though international observers note concerns over administrative detentions and settlement policies in the . , rated "Not Free," has seen democratic since 2016, with over 100,000 prosecutions for insulting the president and purges of and media following the coup attempt. , once a post-Arab Spring outlier with partial freedoms, declined to "Partly Free" status by 2025 due to President Saied's 2021 power grab, including dissolution of parliament and mass arrests of opponents. International critiques, primarily from the U.S. State Department's 2024 Country Reports, highlight credible evidence of arbitrary killings, , and labor exploitation of migrants in Gulf states like and the UAE, where kafala sponsorship ties workers to employers, enabling forced labor affecting 2.6 million in alone. The UN Council has issued resolutions condemning abuses, but analyses note disproportionate focus on —over 100 resolutions since 2006 versus fewer for Syria's 500,000 war deaths—reflecting geopolitical biases among member states. reports echo these findings, linking aid to reforms, yet enforcement remains inconsistent amid energy dependencies on producers like and . Organizations like document executions in (at least 853 in 2023, trending higher in 2024) and Saudi beheadings (196 in 2022, with ongoing trends), attributing patterns to theocratic and absolutist governance incompatible with universal rights frameworks. These critiques underscore causal links between authoritarian legal structures—often justified via religious doctrine—and persistent violations, with limited progress tied to pragmatic reforms rather than ideological shifts.

International Relations and Global Impact

Ties with Western Powers, Alliances, and Intervention Debates

The has maintained strategic alliances with several Middle Eastern states since the mid-20th century, primarily driven by , countering Soviet influence during the , and later containing and combating . In 1945, President met with Saudi King Abdulaziz aboard the USS Quincy, establishing a foundational U.S.-Saudi security partnership in exchange for access, which evolved into formal defense agreements including U.S. arms sales exceeding $100 billion since 2010. Similarly, U.S. ties with solidified after the 1967 , with annual military aid reaching $3.8 billion by 2023, totaling over $150 billion since 1948, justified by shared intelligence on threats like and mutual strategic interests in regional stability. These relationships often prioritized over democratic ideals, as evidenced by U.S. support for authoritarian Gulf monarchies despite concerns. European powers, particularly and the , have focused on North Africa through colonial legacies and post-independence partnerships, with maintaining military bases in and providing training to and forces. NATO has extended partnerships via the 1994 Mediterranean Dialogue, encompassing , , , , , , and , fostering joint exercises and counter-terrorism cooperation, such as the 2023 Sea Guardian drills involving over 20 ships. The 2004 further engages Gulf states like , , , and the UAE in areas like and explosive ordnance disposal, with UAE hosting NATO's first regional hub in 2017. The 2020 , brokered by the U.S., normalized relations between and the UAE, , , and , leading to trade surges—UAE-Israel hit $2.6 billion in 2022—and joint ventures in technology and defense, enhancing Western-aligned coalitions against Iranian influence. However, these ties face strains from regional conflicts, as seen in 's 2023 suspension of Accords-related flights amid Israel-Hamas tensions. Debates over Western interventions in MENA intensified post-9/11, contrasting neoconservative advocacy for to promote with realist warnings of unintended consequences like power vacuums and sectarian strife. The 1991 , a U.S.-led coalition expelling from , succeeded militarily with 100-hour ground campaign and minimal coalition casualties (under 400), restoring Kuwaiti sovereignty and deterring aggression, though it left in power. In contrast, the 2003 invasion, premised on unsubstantiated weapons of mass destruction claims, toppled Saddam but triggered insurgency, costing over 4,400 U.S. lives and $2 trillion by 2020, while enabling 's 2014 declaration across Iraq-Syria. The 2011 intervention in , authorized under UN Resolution 1973 to protect civilians, ousted but resulted in state fragmentation, arms proliferation to jihadists, and ongoing civil war, with GDP per capita stagnating at $6,000 by 2023 versus pre-intervention peaks. U.S.-led operations against from 2014 achieved territorial defeat by 2019 through 100,000+ airstrikes, but underlying failures persist, as critiqued by analysts noting interventions' frequent exacerbation of rather than resolution. Critics, including from think tanks like the , argue U.S. interventionism has eroded credibility and empowered adversaries like , which expanded influence via proxies in , , and post-2003, while costing American taxpayers $8 trillion across post-9/11 wars with negligible long-term stability gains. Proponents highlight tactical successes, such as degrading and containing proliferation, but empirical data shows mixed outcomes: democracy indices in intervened states like (score 0.29 on 2023 scale) lag non-intervened peers, fueling retrenchment debates under administrations from Obama to Biden, who reduced troop levels to under 2,500 in by 2021. Mainstream media and academic sources often frame interventions through humanitarian lenses, yet reveals oil and preservation as primary drivers, with failures attributed to inadequate post-conflict planning rather than inherent overreach. These debates underscore a shift toward proxy support and deterrence over , as Western powers balance commitments against domestic fatigue.

Intra-Regional Rivalries, Arab-Persian Dynamics, and Normalization Processes

Intra-regional rivalries in the Middle East and North Africa have been characterized by competition for geopolitical influence, sectarian tensions, and proxy conflicts, with and as primary antagonists since the early 2000s. The rivalry intensified after the 2003 Iraq invasion, which empowered 's Shia-aligned networks, prompting to counter through support for Sunni factions in , , and . In , Saudi-led coalitions intervened in 2015 against Houthi rebels backed by , resulting in over 377,000 deaths by 2021, including indirect causes like famine, though a UN-brokered truce in 2022 reduced active fighting. Similarly, in 's , funded opposition groups against the Assad regime, which received Iranian military aid and fighters, contributing to prolonged instability and over 500,000 deaths by 2023 estimates. These proxies reflect causal drivers of resource control, sectarian identity, and rather than mere ideological posturing, as both states pursue pragmatic alliances when mutual interests align. The 2017-2021 Gulf crisis exemplified intra-Arab divisions, when , the (UAE), , and imposed a on , severing diplomatic, , and air links over accusations of Qatar's support for Islamist groups like the and ties to . The closed Qatar's only land border and restricted its shipping, but diversified food imports via and , mitigating economic damage and prompting infrastructure investments that boosted LNG exports. occurred at the 2021 Al-Ula GCC summit, where parties agreed to restore ties without resolving underlying disputes over Qatar's foreign policy autonomy. 's expanding role, including military bases in and interventions in alongside , further strained Saudi-UAE relations with , highlighting non-Arab powers' influence in fracturing Arab unity. Arab-Persian dynamics center on the Sunni Arab states' of 's , rooted in Persia's historical and post-1979 export of Shia ideology, clashing with Saudi Wahhabism's claim to Islamic guardianship. 's support for non-state actors like in and militias in has provoked Arab fears of encirclement, leading to heightened naval patrols in the and sanctions alignments with the West. A shift occurred on March 10, 2023, when mediated a , restoring diplomatic relations after a seven-year rupture triggered by Saudi embassy attacks in in 2016; this included reopening consulates and commitments to non-interference, easing proxy escalations in . By 2024, trade resumed, with Saudi imports from reaching $500 million annually, though mutual suspicions persist amid 's nuclear program and tests, underscoring the 's fragility without enforceable mechanisms. This pragmatic thaw reflects both states' incentives to prioritize economic diversification— and 's post-sanctions recovery—over zero-sum conflict, yet underlying causal tensions from sectarian proxies remain unaddressed. Normalization processes, particularly Arab-Israeli ties, represent a to traditional rivalries, driven by shared threats from and economic pragmatism. The , signed in 2020, established full diplomatic relations between and the UAE, , , and , bypassing Palestinian statehood demands and enabling trade volumes exceeding $3 billion annually with the UAE by 2023. These agreements facilitated joint ventures in , defense, and , such as UAE-Israel water desalination projects and 's tourism pacts, yielding measurable gains amid regional instability. Despite the October 2023 Gaza war, the accords endured, with UAE trade with dipping temporarily but rebounding by mid-2024, as signatories prioritized strategic autonomy over public protests. Saudi Arabia's potential accession, discussed in 2024-2025 talks, hinges on U.S. security guarantees and Palestinian concessions, with indications in October 2025 that additional states may follow, signaling a broader realignment toward anti- coalitions. This normalization challenges pan-Arab solidarity narratives, empirically demonstrating that causal incentives like technological exchange and deterrence outweigh ideological resistance, though sustainability depends on resolving Palestinian grievances to mitigate domestic backlash.

Economic Influence, Energy Markets, Terrorism Exports, and Migration Flows

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region exerts significant economic influence through its resources and strategic positions, though its overall GDP represents a modest share of the global . In 2022, the combined GDP of MENA countries reached approximately $4.5 trillion, with over 60% derived from oil-exporting nations such as , the , and . Regional growth is projected at 2.1% for 2024, constrained by geopolitical tensions, fiscal dependencies on energy revenues, and limited diversification in non-oil sectors. Despite these challenges, MENA's role in global supply chains, including phosphates from and transit fees from , underscores its leverage in commodities and logistics, though structural reforms lag behind East Asian peers. Energy markets in MENA are dominated by oil and , with the region holding the majority of 's proven reserves and production capacity. nations in MENA, including (9.3 million barrels per day in mid-2025), (4.35 million b/d), and , account for a substantial portion of global crude output, enabling coordinated cuts or increases that influence Brent and WTI prices. The alone possesses reserves comprising a large fraction of 's total, with + decisions in 2025—such as potential output hikes amid U.S. sanctions on —aimed at stabilizing markets and recapturing share from non- producers. exports from and further amplify influence, though volatility from conflicts like those in Gaza and has prompted diversification efforts, including investments in renewables. Exports of terrorism from MENA involve state and non-state actors funding jihadist ideologies and operations abroad, often through ideological propagation and material support. , designated by the U.S. State Department as the world's leading state sponsor of , provides funding, weapons, and training to groups like , , and , enabling attacks beyond the region. Saudi Arabia's historical export of via mosques, madrasas, and charities has fueled global jihadist recruitment, with U.S. reports noting challenges in curbing private financing despite post-9/11 reforms. faces accusations from neighbors of hosting and financially supporting figures linked to the and , though it denies systematic state involvement; these dynamics highlight how intra-Gulf rivalries exacerbate transnational threats. Such exports have causal links to attacks in and , driven by ideological compatibility with local radicals rather than solely economic motives. Migration flows from MENA to and stem primarily from economic disparities, political instability, and conflict, resulting in millions of departures annually. In 2023, received about 4.5 million immigrants, including significant irregular entries from North African routes, though border crossings dropped 38% in 2024 due to stricter and deals with origin countries like and . Push factors include youth unemployment exceeding 25% in nations like and , alongside violence in , , and , prompting asylum claims that surged in the U.S. by 61% in 2023 among broader migrant cohorts. These outflows strain destination welfare systems and cultural integration, with remittances back to MENA totaling billions but insufficient to offset brain drain in skilled sectors.

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