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Sea level rise
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The sea level has been rising since the end of the last ice age, which was around 20,000 years ago.[3] Between 1901 and 2018, the average sea level rose by 15–25 cm (6–10 in), with an increase of 2.3 mm (0.091 in) per year since the 1970s.[4]: 1216 This was faster than the sea level had ever risen over at least the past 3,000 years.[4]: 1216 The rate accelerated to 4.62 mm (0.182 in)/yr for the decade 2013–2022.[5] Climate change due to human activities is the main cause.[6]: 5, 8 Between 1993 and 2018, melting ice sheets and glaciers accounted for 44% of sea level rise, with another 42% resulting from thermal expansion of water.[7]: 1576
Sea level rise lags behind changes in the Earth's temperature by decades, and sea level rise will therefore continue to accelerate between now and 2050 in response to warming that has already happened.[8] What happens after that depends on future human greenhouse gas emissions. If there are very deep cuts in emissions, sea level rise would slow between 2050 and 2100. The reported factors of increase in flood hazard potential are often exceedingly large, ranging from 10 to 1000 for even modest sea-level rise scenarios of 0.5 m or less.[9] It could then reach by 2100 between 30 cm (1 ft) and 1.0 m (3+1⁄3 ft) from now and approximately 60 cm (2 ft) to 130 cm (4+1⁄2 ft) from the 19th century. With high emissions it would instead accelerate further, and could rise by 50 cm (1.6 ft) or even by 1.9 m (6.2 ft) by 2100.[10][6][4]: 1302 In the long run, sea level rise would amount to 2–3 m (7–10 ft) over the next 2000 years if warming stays to its current 1.5 °C (2.7 °F) over the pre-industrial past. It would be 19–22 metres (62–72 ft) if warming peaks at 5 °C (9.0 °F).[6]: 21
Rising seas affect every coastal population on Earth.[11] This can be through flooding, higher storm surges, king tides, and increased vulnerability to tsunamis. There are many knock-on effects. They lead to loss of coastal ecosystems like mangroves. Crop yields may reduce because of increasing salt levels in irrigation water. Damage to ports disrupts sea trade.[12][13] The sea level rise projected by 2050 will expose places currently inhabited by tens of millions of people to annual flooding. Without a sharp reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, this may increase to hundreds of millions in the latter decades of the century.[14]
Local factors like tidal range or land subsidence will greatly affect the severity of impacts. For instance, sea level rise in the United States is likely to be two to three times greater than the global average by the end of the century.[15][16] Yet, of the 20 countries with the greatest exposure to sea level rise, twelve are in Asia, including Indonesia, Bangladesh and the Philippines.[17] The resilience and adaptive capacity of ecosystems and countries also varies, which will result in more or less pronounced impacts.[18] The greatest impact on human populations in the near term will occur in low-lying Caribbean and Pacific islands including atolls. Sea level rise will make many of them uninhabitable later this century.[19]
Societies can adapt to sea level rise in multiple ways. Managed retreat, accommodating coastal change, or protecting against sea level rise through hard-construction practices like seawalls[20] are hard approaches. There are also soft approaches such as dune rehabilitation and beach nourishment. Sometimes these adaptation strategies go hand in hand. At other times choices must be made among different strategies.[21] Poorer nations may also struggle to implement the same approaches to adapt to sea level rise as richer states.
Observations
[edit]
Between 1901 and 2018, the global mean sea level rose by about 20 cm (7.9 in).[6] More precise data gathered from satellite radar measurements found an increase of 7.5 cm (3.0 in) from 1993 to 2017 (average of 2.9 mm (0.11 in)/yr).[7] This accelerated to 4.62 mm (0.182 in)/yr for 2013–2022.[5] Paleoclimate data shows that this rate of sea level rise is the fastest it had been over at least the past 3,000 years.[4]: 1216 An research paper published in October 2025 updated the global sea level curve for the last 11,700 years, finding that global mean sea-level rise since 1900 is faster than in any century over at least the last 4,000 years.[23]
While sea level rise is uniform around the globe, some land masses are moving up or down as a consequence of subsidence (land sinking or settling) or post-glacial rebound (land rising as melting ice reduces weight). Therefore, local relative sea level rise may be higher or lower than the global average. Changing ice masses also affect the distribution of sea water around the globe through gravity.[24][25]
Projections
[edit]Approaches used for projections
[edit]
Several complementary approaches are used for sea level rise (SLR) projections.[26] One is process-based modeling, where ice melting is computed through an ice-sheet model and rising sea temperature and expansion through a general circulation model, and then these contributions are added up.[27] The so-called semi-empirical approach instead applies statistical techniques and basic physical modeling to the observed recent sea level rise and reconstructions from the older historical geological data (known as paleoclimate modeling).[28] It was developed because process-based model projections in the past IPCC reports (such as the Fourth Assessment Report from 2007) were found to underestimate the already observed sea level rise.[27]
By 2013, improvements in modeling had addressed this issue, and model and semi-empirical projections for the year 2100 are now very similar.[27][26] Yet, semi-empirical estimates are reliant on the quality of available observations and struggle to represent non-linearities, while processes without enough available information about them cannot be modeled.[27] Thus, another approach is to combine the opinions of a large number of scientists in what is known as a structured expert judgement (SEJ).[26] Some analyses suggest that if fossil fuel use continues indefinitely and all polar and mountain ice melts, global sea level could rise by as much as 216 feet.[29]
Variations of these primary approaches exist.[26] For instance, large climate models are computationally expensive, so less complex models are often used in their place for simpler tasks like projecting flood risk in the specific regions. A structured expert judgement may be used in combination with modeling to determine which outcomes are more or less likely, which is known as "shifted SEJ". Semi-empirical techniques can be combined with the so-called "intermediate-complexity" models.[26] After 2016, some ice sheet modeling exhibited the so-called ice cliff instability in Antarctica, which results in substantially faster disintegration and retreat than otherwise simulated.[30][31] The differences are limited with low warming, but at higher warming levels, ice cliff instability predicts far greater sea level rise than any other approach.[26]
The study reports that sea level also is expected to grow by another 6.6 inches (169 millimeters) globally over the next 30 years if it follows this trend, which will lead to 16.63 inches (42.25 centimeters) under a 1.75 °C warming by 2100.[32]
Projections for the 21st century
[edit]
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is the largest and most influential scientific organization on climate change, and since 1990, it provides several plausible scenarios of 21st century sea level rise in each of its major reports. The differences between scenarios are mainly due to uncertainty about future greenhouse gas emissions. These depend on future economic developments, and also future political action which is hard to predict. Each scenario provides an estimate for sea level rise as a range with a lower and upper limit to reflect the unknowns. The scenarios in the 2013–2014 Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) were called Representative Concentration Pathways, or RCPs and the scenarios in the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) are known as Shared Socioeconomic Pathways, or SSPs. A large difference between the two was the addition of SSP1-1.9 to AR6, which represents meeting the best Paris climate agreement goal of 1.5 °C (2.7 °F). In that case, the likely range of sea level rise by 2100 is 28–55 cm (11–21+1⁄2 in).[4]: 1302

The lowest scenario in AR5, RCP2.6, would see greenhouse gas emissions low enough to meet the goal of limiting warming by 2100 to 2 °C (3.6 °F). It shows sea level rise in 2100 of about 44 cm (17 in) with a range of 28–61 cm (11–24 in). The "moderate" scenario, where CO2 emissions take a decade or two to peak and its atmospheric concentration does not plateau until the 2070s is called RCP 4.5. Its likely range of sea level rise is 36–71 cm (14–28 in). The highest scenario in RCP8.5 pathway sea level would rise between 52 and 98 cm (20+1⁄2 and 38+1⁄2 in).[25][35] AR6 had equivalents for both scenarios, but it estimated larger sea level rise under both. In AR6, the SSP1-2.6 pathway results in a range of 32–62 cm (12+1⁄2–24+1⁄2 in) by 2100. The "moderate" SSP2-4.5 results in a 44–76 cm (17+1⁄2–30 in) range by 2100 and SSP5-8.5 led to 65–101 cm (25+1⁄2–40 in).[4]: 1302
This general increase of projections in AR6 came after the improvements in ice-sheet modeling and the incorporation of structured expert judgements.[34] These decisions came as the observed ice-sheet erosion in Greenland and Antarctica had matched the upper-end range of the AR5 projections by 2020,[36][37] and the finding that AR5 projections were likely too slow next to an extrapolation of observed sea level rise trends, while the subsequent reports had improved in this regard.[38] Further, AR5 was criticized by multiple researchers for excluding detailed estimates the impact of "low-confidence" processes like marine ice sheet and marine ice cliff instability,[39][40][41] which can substantially accelerate ice loss to potentially add "tens of centimeters" to sea level rise within this century.[25] AR6 includes a version of SSP5-8.5 where these processes take place, and in that case, sea level rise of up to 1.6 m (5+1⁄3 ft) by 2100 could not be ruled out.[4]: 1302
Role of instability processes
[edit]
The greatest uncertainty with sea level rise projections is associated with the so-called marine ice sheet instability (MISI), and, even more so, Marine Ice Cliff Instability (MICI).[43][4]: 1302 These processes are mainly associated with West Antarctic Ice Sheet, but may also apply to some of Greenland's glaciers.[42] The former suggests that when glaciers are mostly underwater on retrograde (backwards-sloping) bedrock, the water melts more and more of their height as their retreat continues, thus accelerating their breakdown on its own. This is widely accepted, but is difficult to model.[43][42]
The latter posits that coastal ice cliffs which exceed ~90 m (295+1⁄2 ft) in above-ground height and are ~800 m (2,624+1⁄2 ft) in basal (underground) height are likely to rapidly collapse under their own weight once the ice shelves propping them up are gone.[42] The collapse then exposes the ice masses following them to the same instability, potentially resulting in a self-sustaining cycle of cliff collapse and rapid ice sheet retreat.[40][44][45] This theory had been highly influential – in a 2020 survey of 106 experts, the 2016 paper which suggested 1 m (3+1⁄2 ft) or more of sea level rise by 2100 from Antarctica alone,[30] was considered even more important than the 2014 IPCC Fifth Assessment Report.[46] Even more rapid sea level rise was proposed in a 2016 study led by Jim Hansen, which hypothesized multi-meter sea level rise in 50–100 years as a plausible outcome of high emissions,[41] but it remains a minority view amongst the scientific community.[47]

Marine ice cliff instability had also been very controversial, since it was proposed as a modelling exercise,[42] and the observational evidence from both the past and the present is very limited and ambiguous.[49] So far, only one episode of seabed gouging by ice from the Younger Dryas period appears truly consistent with this theory,[50] but it had lasted for an estimated 900 years,[50] so it is unclear if it supports rapid sea level rise in the present.[49] Modelling which investigated the hypothesis after 2016 often suggested that the ice shelves in the real world may collapse too slowly to make this scenario relevant,[51] or that ice mélange – debris produced as the glacier breaks down – would quickly build up in front of the glacier and significantly slow or even outright stop the instability soon after it began.[52][53][54][48]
Due to these uncertainties, some scientists – including the originators of the hypothesis, Robert DeConto and David Pollard – have suggested that the best way to resolve the question would be to precisely determine sea level rise during the Last Interglacial.[49] MICI can be effectively ruled out if SLR at the time was lower than 4 m (13 ft), while it is very likely if the SLR was greater than 6 m (19+1⁄2 ft).[49] As of 2023, the most recent analysis indicates that the Last Interglacial SLR is unlikely to have been higher than 2.7 m (9 ft),[55] as higher values in other research, such as 5.7 m (18+1⁄2 ft),[56] appear inconsistent with the new paleoclimate data from The Bahamas and the known history of the Greenland Ice Sheet.[55]
Post-2100 sea level rise
[edit]
Even if the temperature stabilizes, significant sea-level rise (SLR) will continue for centuries,[58] consistent with paleo records of sea level rise.[25]: 1189 This is due to the high level of inertia in the carbon cycle and the climate system, owing to factors such as the slow diffusion of heat into the deep ocean, leading to a longer climate response time.[59] A 2018 paper estimated that sea level rise in 2300 would increase by a median of 20 cm (8 in) for every five years CO2 emissions increase before peaking. It shows a 5% likelihood of a 1 m (3+1⁄2 ft) increase due to the same. The same estimate found that if the temperature stabilized below 2 °C (3.6 °F), 2300 sea level rise would still exceed 1.5 m (5 ft). Early net zero and slowly falling temperatures could limit it to 70–120 cm (27+1⁄2–47 in).[60]
By 2021, the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report was able to provide estimates for sea level rise in 2150. Keeping warming to 1.5 °C under the SSP1-1.9 scenario would result in sea level rise in the 17–83% range of 37–86 cm (14+1⁄2–34 in). In the SSP1-2.6 pathway the range would be 46–99 cm (18–39 in), for SSP2-4.5 a 66–133 cm (26–52+1⁄2 in) range by 2100 and for SSP5-8.5 a rise of 98–188 cm (38+1⁄2–74 in). It stated that the "low-confidence, high impact" projected 0.63–1.60 m (2–5 ft) mean sea level rise by 2100, and that by 2150, the total sea level rise in his scenario would be in the range of 0.98–4.82 m (3–16 ft) by 2150.[4]: 1302 AR6 also provided lower-confidence estimates for year 2300 sea level rise under SSP1-2.6 and SSP5-8.5 with various impact assumptions. In the best case scenario, under SSP1-2.6 with no ice sheet acceleration after 2100, the estimate was only 0.8–2.0 metres (2.6–6.6 ft). In the worst estimated scenario, SSP-8.5 with ice cliff instability, the projected range for total sea level rise was 9.5–16.2 metres (31–53 ft) by the year 2300.[4]: 1306
Projections for subsequent years are more difficult. In 2019, when 22 experts on ice sheets were asked to estimate 2200 and 2300 SLR under the 5 °C warming scenario, there were 90% confidence intervals of −10 cm (4 in) to 740 cm (24+1⁄2 ft) and −9 cm (3+1⁄2 in) to 970 cm (32 ft), respectively. (Negative values represent the extremely low probability of large climate change-induced increases in precipitation greatly elevating ice sheet surface mass balance.)[61] In 2020, 106 experts who contributed to 6 or more papers on sea level estimated median 118 cm (46+1⁄2 in) SLR in the year 2300 for the low-warming RCP2.6 scenario and the median of 329 cm (129+1⁄2 in) for the high-warming RCP8.5. The former scenario had the 5%–95% confidence range of 24–311 cm (9+1⁄2–122+1⁄2 in), and the latter of 88–783 cm (34+1⁄2–308+1⁄2 in).[46]

After 500 years, sea level rise from thermal expansion alone may have reached only half of its eventual level - likely within ranges of 0.5–2 m (1+1⁄2–6+1⁄2 ft).[62] Additionally, tipping points of Greenland and Antarctica ice sheets are likely to play a larger role over such timescales.[63] Ice loss from Antarctica is likely to dominate very long-term SLR, especially if the warming exceeds 2 °C (3.6 °F). Continued carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel sources could cause additional tens of metres of sea level rise, over the next millennia.[64] Burning of all fossil fuels on Earth is sufficient to melt the entire Antarctic ice sheet, causing about 58 m (190 ft) of sea level rise.[65]
Year 2021 IPCC estimates for the amount of sea level rise over the next 2,000 years project that:
- At a warming peak of 1.5 °C (2.7 °F), global sea levels would rise 2–3 m (6+1⁄2–10 ft)
- At a warming peak of 2 °C (3.6 °F), sea levels would rise 2–6 m (6+1⁄2–19+1⁄2 ft)
- At a warming peak of 5 °C (9.0 °F), sea levels would rise 19–22 m (62+1⁄2–72 ft)[6]: SPM-21
Sea levels would continue to rise for several thousand years after the ceasing of emissions, due to the slow nature of climate response to heat. The same estimates on a timescale of 10,000 years project that:
- At a warming peak of 1.5 °C (2.7 °F), global sea levels would rise 6–7 m (19+1⁄2–23 ft)
- At a warming peak of 2 °C (3.6 °F), sea levels would rise 8–13 m (26–42+1⁄2 ft)
- At a warming peak of 5 °C (9.0 °F), sea levels would rise 28–37 m (92–121+1⁄2 ft)[4]: 1306
Measurements
[edit]Variations in the amount of water in the oceans, changes in its volume, or varying land elevation compared to the sea surface can drive sea level changes. Over a consistent time period, assessments can attribute contributions to sea level rise and provide early indications of change in trajectory. This helps to inform adaptation plans.[66] The different techniques used to measure changes in sea level do not measure exactly the same level. Tide gauges can only measure relative sea level. Satellites can also measure absolute sea level changes.[67] To get precise measurements for sea level, researchers studying the ice and oceans factor in ongoing deformations of the solid Earth. They look in particular at landmasses still rising from past ice masses retreating, and the Earth's gravity and rotation.[7]
Satellites
[edit]
Since the launch of TOPEX/Poseidon in 1992, an overlapping series of altimetric satellites has been continuously recording the sea level and its changes.[68] These satellites can measure the hills and valleys in the sea caused by currents and detect trends in their height. To measure the distance to the sea surface, the satellites send a microwave pulse towards Earth and record the time it takes to return after reflecting off the ocean's surface. Microwave radiometers correct the additional delay caused by water vapor in the atmosphere. Combining these data with the location of the spacecraft determines the sea-surface height to within a few centimetres.[69] These satellite measurements have estimated rates of sea level rise for 1993–2017 at 3.0 ± 0.4 millimetres (1⁄8 ± 1⁄64 in) per year.[70]
Satellites are useful for measuring regional variations in sea level. An example is the substantial rise between 1993 and 2012 in the western tropical Pacific. This sharp rise has been linked to increasing trade winds. These occur when the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) and the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) change from one state to the other.[71] The PDO is a basin-wide climate pattern consisting of two phases, each commonly lasting 10 to 30 years. The ENSO has a shorter period of 2 to 7 years.[72]
Tide gauges
[edit]
The global network of tide gauges is the other important source of sea-level observations. Compared to the satellite record, this record has major spatial gaps but covers a much longer period.[74] Coverage of tide gauges started mainly in the Northern Hemisphere. Data for the Southern Hemisphere remained scarce up to the 1970s.[74] The longest running sea-level measurements, NAP or Amsterdam Ordnance Datum were established in 1675, in Amsterdam.[75] Record collection is also extensive in Australia. They include measurements by Thomas Lempriere, an amateur meteorologist, beginning in 1837. Lempriere established a sea-level benchmark on a small cliff on the Isle of the Dead near the Port Arthur convict settlement in 1841.[76]
Together with satellite data for the period after 1992, this network established that global mean sea level rose 19.5 cm (7.7 in) between 1870 and 2004 at an average rate of about 1.44 mm/yr. (For the 20th century the average is 1.7 mm/yr.)[77] By 2018, data collected by Australia's Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) had shown that the global mean sea level was rising by 3.2 mm (1⁄8 in) per year. This was double the average 20th century rate.[78][79] The 2023 World Meteorological Organization report found further acceleration to 4.62 mm/yr over the 2013–2022 period.[5] These observations help to check and verify predictions from climate change simulations.
Regional differences are also visible in the tide gauge data. Some are caused by local sea level differences. Others are due to vertical land movements. In Europe, only some land areas are rising while the others are sinking. Since 1970, most tidal stations have measured higher seas. However sea levels along the northern Baltic Sea have dropped due to post-glacial rebound.[80]
Past sea level rise
[edit]
An understanding of past sea level is an important guide to where current changes in sea level will end up. In the recent geological past, thermal expansion from increased temperatures and changes in land ice are the dominant reasons of sea level rise. The last time that the Earth was 2 °C (3.6 °F) warmer than pre-industrial temperatures was 120,000 years ago. This was when warming due to Milankovitch cycles (changes in the amount of sunlight due to slow changes in the Earth's orbit) caused the Eemian interglacial. Sea levels during that warmer interglacial were at least 5 m (16 ft) higher than now.[81] The Eemian warming was sustained over a period of thousands of years. The size of the rise in sea level implies a large contribution from the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets.[25]: 1139 Levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide of around 400 parts per million (similar to 2000s) had increased temperature by over 2–3 °C (3.6–5.4 °F) around three million years ago. This temperature increase eventually melted one third of Antarctica's ice sheet, causing sea levels to rise 20 meters above the preindustrial levels.[82]
Since the Last Glacial Maximum about 20,000 years ago, sea level has risen by more than 125 metres (410 ft). Rates vary from less than 1 mm/year during the pre-industrial era to 40+ mm/year when major ice sheets over Canada and Eurasia melted. Meltwater pulses are periods of fast sea level rise caused by the rapid disintegration of these ice sheets. The rate of sea level rise started to slow down about 8,200 years before today. Sea level was almost constant for the last 2,500 years. The recent trend of rising sea level started at the end of the 19th or beginning of the 20th century.[83]
Causes
[edit]
Effects of climate change
[edit]The three main reasons why global warming causes sea levels to rise are the expansion of oceans due to heating, water inflow from melting ice sheets and water inflow from glaciers. Other factors affecting sea level rise include changes in snow mass, and flow from terrestrial water storage, though the contribution from these is thought to be small.[7] Glacier retreat and ocean expansion have dominated sea level rise since the start of the 20th century.[28] Some of the losses from glaciers are offset when precipitation falls as snow, accumulates and over time forms glacial ice. If precipitation, surface processes and ice loss at the edge balance each other, sea level remains the same. Because of this precipitation began as water vapor evaporated from the ocean surface, effects of climate change on the water cycle can even increase ice build-up. However, this effect is not enough to fully offset ice losses, and sea level rise continues to accelerate.[84][85][86][87]
The contributions of the two large ice sheets, in Greenland and Antarctica, are likely to increase in the 21st century.[28] They store most of the land ice (~99.5%) and have a sea-level equivalent (SLE) of 7.4 m (24 ft 3 in) for Greenland and 58.3 m (191 ft 3 in) for Antarctica.[7] Thus, melting of all the ice on Earth would result in about 70 m (229 ft 8 in) of sea level rise,[88] although this would require at least 10,000 years and up to 10 °C (18 °F) of global warming.[89][90]
Ocean heating
[edit]
The oceans store more than 90% of the extra heat added to the climate system by Earth's energy imbalance and act as a buffer against its effects.[92] This means that the same amount of heat that would increase the average world ocean temperature by 0.01 °C (0.018 °F) would increase atmospheric temperature by approximately 10 °C (18 °F).[93] So a small change in the mean temperature of the ocean represents a very large change in the total heat content of the climate system. Winds and currents move heat into deeper parts of the ocean. Some of it reaches depths of more than 2,000 m (6,600 ft).[94] The Southern Ocean accounts for approximately 40% ± 5% of global ocean heat uptake, highlighting its critical role in Earth's climate system.[95]
When the ocean gains heat, the water expands and sea level rises. Warmer water and water under great pressure (due to depth) expand more than cooler water and water under less pressure.[25]: 1161 Consequently, cold Arctic Ocean water will expand less than warm tropical water. Different climate models present slightly different patterns of ocean heating. So their projections do not agree fully on how much ocean heating contributes to sea level rise.[96]
Ice loss on the Antarctic continent
[edit]

The large volume of ice on the Antarctic continent stores around 60% of the world's fresh water. Excluding groundwater this is 90%.[97] Antarctica is experiencing ice loss from coastal glaciers in the West Antarctica and some glaciers of East Antarctica. However it is gaining mass from the increased snow build-up inland, particularly in the East. This leads to contradicting trends.[87][98] There are different satellite methods for measuring ice mass and change. Combining them helps to reconcile the differences.[99] However, there can still be variations between the studies. In 2018, a systematic review estimated average annual ice loss of 43 billion tons (Gt) across the entire continent between 1992 and 2002. This tripled to an annual average of 220 Gt from 2012 to 2017.[85][100] However, a 2021 analysis of data from four different research satellite systems (Envisat, European Remote-Sensing Satellite, GRACE and GRACE-FO and ICESat) indicated annual mass loss of only about 12 Gt from 2012 to 2016. This was due to greater ice gain in East Antarctica than estimated earlier.[87]
In the future, it is known that West Antarctica at least will continue to lose mass, and the likely future losses of sea ice and ice shelves, which block warmer currents from direct contact with the ice sheet, can accelerate declines even in East Antarctica.[101][102] Altogether, Antarctica is the source of the largest uncertainty for future sea level projections.[103] In 2019, the SROCC assessed several studies attempting to estimate 2300 sea level rise caused by ice loss in Antarctica alone, arriving at projected estimates of 0.07–0.37 metres (0.23–1.21 ft) for the low emission RCP2.6 scenario, and 0.60–2.89 metres (2.0–9.5 ft) in the high emission RCP8.5 scenario.[4]: 1272 This wide range of estimates is mainly due to the uncertainties regarding marine ice sheet and marine ice cliff instabilities.[43][46][26]
East Antarctica
[edit]The world's largest potential source of sea level rise is the East Antarctic Ice Sheet (EAIS). It is 2.2 km thick on average and holds enough ice to raise global sea levels by 53.3 m (174 ft 10 in)[104] Its great thickness and high elevation make it more stable than the other ice sheets.[105] As of the early 2020s, most studies show that it is still gaining mass.[106][85][87][98] Some analyses have suggested it began to lose mass in the 2000s.[107][86][102] However they over-extrapolated some observed losses on to the poorly observed areas. A more complete observational record shows continued mass gain.[87]

In spite of the net mass gain, some East Antarctica glaciers have lost ice in recent decades due to ocean warming and declining structural support from the local sea ice,[101] such as Denman Glacier,[108][109] and Totten Glacier.[110][111] Totten Glacier is particularly important because it stabilizes the Aurora Subglacial Basin. Subglacial basins like Aurora and Wilkes Basin are major ice reservoirs together holding as much ice as all of West Antarctica.[112] They are more vulnerable than the rest of East Antarctica.[40] Their collective tipping point probably lies at around 3 °C (5.4 °F) of global warming. It may be as high as 6 °C (11 °F) or as low as 2 °C (3.6 °F). Once this tipping point is crossed, the collapse of these subglacial basins could take place over as little as 500 or as much as 10,000 years. The median timeline is 2000 years.[89][90] Depending on how many subglacial basins are vulnerable, this causes sea level rise of between 1.4 m (4 ft 7 in) and 6.4 m (21 ft 0 in).[113]
On the other hand, the whole EAIS would not definitely collapse until global warming reaches 7.5 °C (13.5 °F), with a range between 5 °C (9.0 °F) and 10 °C (18 °F). It would take at least 10,000 years to disappear.[89][90] Some scientists have estimated that warming would have to reach at least 6 °C (11 °F) to melt two thirds of its volume.[114]
West Antarctica
[edit]
East Antarctica contains the largest potential source of sea level rise. However the West Antarctic ice sheet (WAIS) is substantially more vulnerable. Temperatures on West Antarctica have increased significantly, unlike East Antarctica and the Antarctic Peninsula. The trend is between 0.08 °C (0.14 °F) and 0.96 °C (1.73 °F) per decade between 1976 and 2012.[115] Satellite observations recorded a substantial increase in WAIS melting from 1992 to 2017. This resulted in 7.6 ± 3.9 mm (19⁄64 ± 5⁄32 in) of Antarctica sea level rise. Outflow glaciers in the Amundsen Sea Embayment played a disproportionate role.[116]
The median estimated increase in sea level rise from Antarctica by 2100 is ~11 cm (5 in). There is no difference between scenarios, because the increased warming would intensify the water cycle and increase snowfall accumulation over the EAIS at about the same rate as it would increase ice loss from WAIS.[4] However, most of the bedrock underlying the WAIS lies well below sea level, and it has to be buttressed by the Thwaites and Pine Island glaciers. If these glaciers were to collapse, the entire ice sheet would as well.[40] Their disappearance would take at least several centuries, but is considered almost inevitable, as their bedrock topography deepens inland and becomes more vulnerable to meltwater, in what is known as marine ice sheet instability.[43][117][118]
The contribution of these glaciers to global sea levels has already accelerated since the year 2000. The Thwaites Glacier now accounts for 4% of global sea level rise.[117][119][120] It could start to lose even more ice if the Thwaites Ice Shelf fails and would no longer stabilize it, which could potentially occur in mid-2020s.[121] A combination of ice sheet instability with other important but hard-to-model processes like hydrofracturing (meltwater collects atop the ice sheet, pools into fractures and forces them open)[39] or smaller-scale changes in ocean circulation[122][123][124] could cause the WAIS to contribute up to 41 cm (16 in) by 2100 under the low-emission scenario and up to 57 cm (22 in) under the highest-emission one.[4] Ice cliff instability would cause a contribution of 1 m (3+1⁄2 ft) or more if it were applicable.[30][34]
The melting of all the ice in West Antarctica would increase the total sea level rise to 4.3 m (14 ft 1 in).[125] However, mountain ice caps not in contact with water are less vulnerable than the majority of the ice sheet, which is located below the sea level.[126] Its collapse would cause ~3.3 m (10 ft 10 in) of sea level rise.[127] This disappearance would take an estimated 2000 years. The absolute minimum for the loss of West Antarctica ice is 500 years, and the potential maximum is 13,000 years.[89][90]
Once ice loss from the West Antarctica is triggered, the only way to restore it to near-present values is by lowering the global temperature to 1 °C (1.8 °F) below the preindustrial level. This would be 2 °C (3.6 °F) below the temperature of 2020.[114] Other researchers suggested that a climate engineering intervention to stabilize the ice sheet's glaciers may delay its loss by centuries and give more time to adapt. However this is an uncertain proposal, and would end up as one of the most expensive projects ever attempted.[128][129]

Ice sheet loss in Greenland
[edit]Most ice on Greenland is in the Greenland ice sheet which is 3 km (10,000 ft) at its thickest. The rest of Greenland ice forms isolated glaciers and ice caps. The average annual ice loss in Greenland more than doubled in the early 21st century compared to the 20th century.[131] Its contribution to sea level rise correspondingly increased from 0.07 mm per year between 1992 and 1997 to 0.68 mm per year between 2012 and 2017. Total ice loss from the Greenland ice sheet between 1992 and 2018 amounted to 3,902 gigatons (Gt) of ice. This is equivalent to a SLR contribution of 10.8 mm.[132] The contribution for the 2012–2016 period was equivalent to 37% of sea level rise from land ice sources (excluding thermal expansion).[133] This observed rate of ice sheet melting is at the higher end of predictions from past IPCC assessment reports.[134][37]

In 2021, AR6 estimated that by 2100, the melting of Greenland ice sheet would most likely add around 6 cm (2+1⁄2 in) to sea levels under the low-emission scenario, and 13 cm (5 in) under the high-emission scenario. The first scenario, SSP1-2.6, largely fulfils the Paris Agreement goals, while the other, SSP5-8.5, has the emissions accelerate throughout the century. The uncertainty about ice sheet dynamics can affect both pathways. In the best-case scenario, ice sheet under SSP1-2.6 gains enough mass by 2100 through surface mass balance feedbacks to reduce the sea levels by 2 cm (1 in). In the worst case, it adds 15 cm (6 in). For SSP5-8.5, the best-case scenario is adding 5 cm (2 in) to sea levels, and the worst-case is adding 23 cm (9 in).[4]: 1260
Greenland's peripheral glaciers and ice caps crossed an irreversible tipping point around 1997. Sea level rise from their loss is now unstoppable.[136][137][138] However the temperature changes in future, the warming of 2000–2019 had already damaged the ice sheet enough for it to eventually lose ~3.3% of its volume. This is leading to 27 cm (10+1⁄2 in) of future sea level rise.[139] At a certain level of global warming, the Greenland ice sheet will almost completely melt. Ice cores show this happened at least once over the last million years, during which the temperatures have at most been 2.5 °C (4.5 °F) warmer than the preindustrial average or 1 °C (1.8 °F) warmer than the 2025 temperature.[140][141]
2012 modelling suggested that the tipping point of the ice sheet was between 0.8 °C (1.4 °F) and 3.2 °C (5.8 °F).[142] 2023 modelling has narrowed the tipping threshold to a 1.7 °C (3.1 °F)-2.3 °C (4.1 °F) range, which is consistent with the empirical 2.5 °C (4.5 °F) upper limit from ice cores. If temperatures reach or exceed that level, reducing the global temperature to 1.5 °C (2.7 °F) above pre-industrial levels or lower would prevent the loss of the entire ice sheet. One way to do this in theory would be large-scale carbon dioxide removal, but there would still be cause of greater ice losses and sea level rise from Greenland than if the threshold was not breached in the first place.[143] If the tipping point instead is durably but mildly crossed, the ice sheet would take between 10,000 and 15,000 years to disintegrate entirely, with a most likely estimate of 10,000 years.[89][90] If climate change continues along its worst trajectory and temperatures continue to rise quickly over multiple centuries, the ice sheet would only take 1,000 years to melt.[144]
Mountain glacier loss
[edit]
There are roughly 200,000 glaciers on Earth, which are spread out across all continents.[146] Less than 1% of glacier ice is in mountain glaciers, compared to 99% in Greenland and Antarctica. However, this small size also makes mountain glaciers more vulnerable to melting than the larger ice sheets. This means they have had a disproportionate contribution to historical sea level rise and are set to contribute a smaller, but still significant fraction of sea level rise in the 21st century.[147] Observational and modelling studies of mass loss from glaciers and ice caps show they contribute 0.2–0.4 mm per year to sea level rise, averaged over the 20th century.[148] The contribution for the 2012–2016 period was nearly as large as that of Greenland. It was 0.63 mm of sea level rise per year, equivalent to 34% of sea level rise from land ice sources.[133] Glaciers contributed around 40% to sea level rise during the 20th century, with estimates for the 21st century of around 30%.[7]
In 2023, a Science paper estimated that at 1.5 °C (2.7 °F), one quarter of mountain glacier mass would be lost by 2100 and nearly half would be lost at 4 °C (7.2 °F), contributing ~9 cm (3+1⁄2 in) and ~15 cm (6 in) to sea level rise, respectively. Glacier mass is disproportionately concentrated in the most resilient glaciers. So in practice this would remove 49–83% of glacier formations. It further estimated that the current likely trajectory of 2.7 °C (4.9 °F) would result in the SLR contribution of ~11 cm (4+1⁄2 in) by 2100.[149] Mountain glaciers are even more vulnerable over the longer term. In 2022, another Science paper estimated that almost no mountain glaciers could survive once warming crosses 2 °C (3.6 °F). Their complete loss is largely inevitable around 3 °C (5.4 °F). There is even a possibility of complete loss after 2100 at just 1.5 °C (2.7 °F). This could happen as early as 50 years after the tipping point is crossed, although 200 years is the most likely value, and the maximum is around 1000 years.[89][90]
Sea ice loss
[edit]Sea ice loss directly contributes only very slightly to global sea level rise. If the melt water from ice floating in the sea was exactly the same as sea water then, according to Archimedes' principle, no rise would occur. However melted sea ice contains less dissolved salt than sea water and is therefore less dense, with a slightly greater volume per unit of mass. If all floating ice shelves and icebergs were to melt sea level would only rise by about 4 cm (1+1⁄2 in).[150]

Changes to land water storage
[edit]Human activity impacts how much water is stored on land. Dams retain large quantities of water, which is stored on land rather than flowing into the sea, though the total quantity stored will vary from time to time. On the other hand, humans extract water from lakes, wetlands and underground reservoirs for drinking and food production. This often causes subsidence. Furthermore, the hydrological cycle is influenced by climate change and deforestation. In the 20th century, these processes had approximately cancelled out each other's impact on sea level rise, but dam building has slowed down and is expected to stay low for the 21st century.[151][25]: 1155
Water redistribution caused by irrigation moving groundwater into the oceans, was estimated at 2,150 GT between 1993 and 2010 - equivalent to a global sea level rise of 6.24 millimetres (0.246 in), but which could not be directly measured. The net movement of water was also expected to cause caused a drift of Earth's rotational pole by 78.48 centimetres (30.90 in), which was confirmed in 2023.[152]
Impacts
[edit]On people and societies
[edit]Sea-level rise has many impacts. They include higher and more frequent high-tide and storm-surge flooding and increased coastal erosion. Other impacts are inhibition of primary production processes, more extensive coastal inundation, and changes in surface water quality and groundwater. These can lead to a greater loss of property and coastal habitats, loss of life during floods and loss of cultural resources. There are also impacts on agriculture and aquaculture. There can also be loss of tourism, recreation, and transport-related functions.[12]: 356 Land use changes such as urbanisation or deforestation of low-lying coastal zones exacerbate coastal flooding impacts. Regions already vulnerable to rising sea level also struggle with coastal flooding. This washes away land and alters the landscape.[155]
Changes in emissions are likely to have only a small effect on the extent of sea level rise by 2050.[8] So projected sea level rise could put tens of millions of people at risk by then. Scientists estimate that 2050 levels of sea level rise would result in about 150 million people under the water line during high tide. About 300 million would be in places flooded every year. This projection is based on the distribution of population in 2010. It does not take into account the effects of population growth and human migration. These figures are 40 million and 50 million more respectively than the numbers at risk in 2010.[14][156] By 2100, there would be another 40 million people under the water line during high tide if sea level rise remains low. This figure would be 80 million for a high estimate of median sea level rise.[14] Ice sheet processes under the highest emission scenario would result in sea level rise of well over one metre (3+1⁄4 ft) by 2100. This could be as much as over two metres (6+1⁄2 ft),[16][6]: TS-45 This could result in as many as 520 million additional people ending up under the water line during high tide and 640 million in places flooded every year, compared to the 2010 population distribution.[14]

Over the longer term, coastal areas are particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels. They are also vulnerable to changes in the frequency and intensity of storms, increased precipitation, and rising ocean temperatures. Ten percent of the world's population live in coastal areas that are less than 10 metres (33 ft) above sea level. Two thirds of the world's cities with over five million people are located in these low-lying coastal areas.[157] About 600 million people live directly on the coast around the world.[158] Cities such as Miami, Rio de Janeiro, Osaka and Shanghai will be especially vulnerable later in the century under warming of 3 °C (5.4 °F). This is close to the current trajectory.[13][35] LiDAR-based research had established in 2021 that 267 million people worldwide lived on land less than 2 m (6+1⁄2 ft) above sea level. With a 1 m (3+1⁄2 ft) sea level rise and zero population growth, that could increase to 410 million people.[159][160]
Potential disruption of sea trade and migrations could impact people living further inland. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres warned in 2023 that sea level rise risks causing human migrations on a "biblical scale".[161] Sea level rise will inevitably affect ports, but there is limited research on this. There is insufficient knowledge about the investments necessary to protect ports currently in use. This includes protecting current facilities before it becomes more reasonable to build new ports elsewhere.[162][163] Some coastal regions are rich agricultural lands. Their loss to the sea could cause food shortages. This is a particularly acute issue for river deltas such as Nile Delta in Egypt and Red River and Mekong Deltas in Vietnam. Saltwater intrusion into the soil and irrigation water has a disproportionate effect on them.[164][165]
In 2025, the World Economic Forum said that rising sea levels caused by climate change were impacting 1 billion people worldwide.[166]
On May 20, 2025, about 230 million people live within 1 metre above current sea level, and 1 billion live within 10 metres above sea level. In total, 1.23 billion people live within 1–10 meters above sea level. Even just 20 cm of sea level rise by 2050 would lead to global flood damages of at least $1 trillion a year for the world's 136 largest coastal cities and huge impacts on people's lives and livelihoods. Scientists warned sea level rise would link to catastrophic inland migration.[167]
On ecosystems
[edit]
Flooding and soil/water salinization threaten the habitats of coastal plants, birds, and freshwater/estuarine fish when seawater reaches inland.[168] When coastal forest areas become inundated with saltwater to the point no trees can survive the resulting habitats are called ghost forests.[169][170] Starting around 2050, some nesting sites in Florida, Cuba, Ecuador and the island of Sint Eustatius for leatherback, loggerhead, hawksbill, green and olive ridley turtles are expected to be flooded. The proportion will increase over time.[171] In 2016, Bramble Cay islet in the Great Barrier Reef was inundated. This flooded the habitat of a rodent named Bramble Cay melomys.[172] It was officially declared extinct in 2019.[173]

Some ecosystems can move inland with the high-water mark. But natural or artificial barriers prevent many from migrating. This coastal narrowing is sometimes called 'coastal squeeze' when it involves human-made barriers. It could result in the loss of habitats such as mudflats and tidal marshes.[174][175] Mangrove ecosystems on the mudflats of tropical coasts nurture high biodiversity. They are particularly vulnerable due to mangrove plants' reliance on breathing roots or pneumatophores. These will be submerged if the rate is too rapid for them to migrate upward. This would result in the loss of an ecosystem.[176][177][178][179] Both mangroves and tidal marshes protect against storm surges, waves and tsunamis, so their loss makes the effects of sea level rise worse.[180][181] Human activities such as dam building may restrict sediment supplies to wetlands. This would prevent natural adaptation processes. The loss of some tidal marshes is unavoidable as a consequence.[182]
Corals are important for bird and fish life. They need to grow vertically to remain close to the sea surface in order to get enough energy from sunlight. The corals have so far been able to keep up the vertical growth with the rising seas, but might not be able to do so in the future.[183]
Regional variations
[edit]
When a glacier or ice sheet melts, it loses mass. This reduces its gravitational pull. In some places near current and former glaciers and ice sheets, this has caused water levels to drop. At the same time water levels will increase more than average further away from the ice sheet. Thus ice loss in Greenland affects regional sea level differently than the equivalent loss in Antarctica.[185] On the other hand, the Atlantic is warming at a faster pace than the Pacific. This has consequences for Europe and the U.S. East Coast. The East Coast sea level is rising at 3–4 times the global average.[186] Scientists have linked extreme regional sea level rise on the US Northeast Coast to the downturn of the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC).[187]
Many ports, urban conglomerations, and agricultural regions stand on river deltas. Here land subsidence contributes to much higher relative sea level rise. Unsustainable extraction of groundwater and oil and gas is one cause. Levees and other flood management practices are another. They prevent sediments from accumulating. These would otherwise compensate for the natural settling of deltaic soils.[188]: 638 [189]: 88
Estimates for total human-caused subsidence in the Rhine-Meuse-Scheldt delta (Netherlands) are 3–4 m (10–13 ft), over 3 m (10 ft) in urban areas of the Mississippi River Delta (New Orleans), and over 9 m (30 ft) in the Sacramento–San Joaquin River Delta.[189]: 81–90 On the other hand, relative sea level around the Hudson Bay in Canada and the northern Baltic Sea is falling due to post-glacial isostatic rebound.[190]
Adaptation
[edit]
Cutting greenhouse gas emissions can slow and stabilize the rate of sea level rise after 2050. This would greatly reduce its costs and damages, but cannot stop it outright. So climate change adaptation to sea level rise is inevitable.[191]: 3–127 The simplest approach is to stop development in vulnerable areas and ultimately move people and infrastructure away from them. Such retreat from sea level rise often results in the loss of livelihoods. The displacement of newly impoverished people could burden their new homes and accelerate social tensions.[192] Some communities are responding to sea-level rise by building protective infrastructure, moving away from the coast, or introducing new policies to support long-term adaptation. At the same time, certain coastal ecosystems such as wetlands can naturally adjust by migrating to higher ground if the surrounding conditions allow.[193]
It is possible to avoid or at least delay the retreat from sea level rise with enhanced protections. These include dams, levees or improved natural defenses.[21] Other options include updating building standards to reduce damage from floods, addition of storm water valves to address more frequent and severe flooding at high tide,[194] or cultivating crops more tolerant of saltwater in the soil, even at an increased cost.[165][21][195] These options divide into hard and soft adaptation. Hard adaptation generally involves large-scale changes to human societies and ecological systems. It often includes the construction of capital-intensive infrastructure. Soft adaptation involves strengthening natural defenses and local community adaptation. This usually involves simple, modular and locally owned technology. The two types of adaptation may be complementary or mutually exclusive.[195][196] Adaptation options often require significant investment. But the costs of doing nothing are far greater. One example would involve adaptation against flooding. Effective adaptation measures could reduce future annual costs of flooding in 136 of the world's largest coastal cities from $1 trillion by 2050 without adaptation to a little over $60 billion annually. The cost would be $50 billion per year.[197][198] Some experts argue that retreat from the coast would have a lower impact on the GDP of India and Southeast Asia then attempting to protect every coastline, in the case of very high sea level rise.[199]

To be successful, adaptation must anticipate sea level rise well ahead of time. As of 2023, the global state of adaptation planning is mixed. A survey of 253 planners from 49 countries found that 98% are aware of sea level rise projections, but 26% have not yet formally integrated them into their policy documents. Only around a third of respondents from Asian and South American countries have done so. This compares with 50% in Africa, and over 75% in Europe, Australasia and North America. Some 56% of all surveyed planners have plans which account for 2050 and 2100 sea level rise. But 53% use only a single projection rather than a range of two or three projections. Just 14% use four projections, including the one for "extreme" or "high-end" sea level rise.[201] Another study found that over 75% of regional sea level rise assessments from the West and Northeastern United States included at least three estimates. These are usually RCP2.6, RCP4.5 and RCP8.5, and sometimes include extreme scenarios. But 88% of projections from the American South had only a single estimate. Similarly, no assessment from the South went beyond 2100. By contrast 14 assessments from the West went up to 2150, and three from the Northeast went to 2200. 56% of all localities were also found to underestimate the upper end of sea level rise relative to IPCC Sixth Assessment Report.[202]
By region
[edit]Africa
[edit]
In Africa, future population growth amplifies risks from sea level rise. Some 54.2 million people lived in the highly exposed low elevation coastal zones (LECZ) around 2000. This number will effectively double to around 110 million people by 2030, and then reach 185 to 230 million people by 2060. By then, the average regional sea level rise will be around 21 cm, with little difference from climate change scenarios.[84] By 2100, Egypt, Mozambique and Tanzania are likely to have the largest number of people affected by annual flooding amongst all African countries. And under RCP8.5, 10 important cultural sites would be at risk of flooding and erosion by the end of the century.[84]
In the near term, some of the largest displacement is projected to occur in the East Africa region. At least 750,000 people there are likely to be displaced from the coasts between 2020 and 2050. By 2050, 12 major African cities would collectively sustain cumulative damages of US$65 billion for the "moderate" climate change scenario RCP4.5 and between US$86.5 billion to US$137.5 billion on average: in the worst case, these damages could effectively triple.[84] In all of these estimates, around half of the damages would occur in the Egyptian city of Alexandria.[84] Hundreds of thousands of people in its low-lying areas may already need relocation in the coming decade.[164] Across sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, damage from sea level rise could reach 2–4% of GDP by 2050, although this depends on the extent of future economic growth and climate change adaptation.[84]
Asia
[edit]

Asia has the largest population at risk from sea level due to its dense coastal populations. As of 2022, some 63 million people in East and South Asia were already at risk from a 100-year flood. This is largely due to inadequate coastal protection in many countries. Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam alone account for 70% of people exposed to sea level rise during the 21st century.[17][203] Sea level rise in Bangladesh is likely to displace 0.9–2.1 million people by 2050. It may also force the relocation of up to one third of power plants as early as 2030, and many of the remaining plants would have to deal with the increased salinity of their cooling water.[17][204] Nations like Bangladesh, Vietnam and China with extensive rice production on the coast are already seeing adverse impacts from saltwater intrusion.[205]
Modelling results predict that Asia will suffer direct economic damages of US$167.6 billion at 0.47 meters of sea level rise. This rises to US$272.3 billion at 1.12 meters and US$338.1 billion at 1.75 meters. There is an additional indirect impact of US$8.5, 24 or 15 billion from population displacement at those levels. China, India, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Indonesia and Russia experience the largest economic losses.[17] Out of the 20 coastal cities expected to see the highest flood losses by 2050, 13 are in Asia. Nine of these are the so-called sinking cities, where subsidence (typically caused by unsustainable groundwater extraction in the past) would compound sea level rise. These are Bangkok, Guangzhou, Ho Chi Minh City, Jakarta, Kolkata, Nagoya, Tianjin, Xiamen and Zhanjiang.[206]
By 2050, Guangzhou would see 0.2 meters of sea level rise and estimated annual economic losses of US$254 million – the highest in the world.[17] In Shanghai, coastal inundation amounts to about 0.03% of local GDP, yet would increase to 0.8% by 2100 even under the "moderate" RCP4.5 scenario in the absence of adaptation.[17] The city of Jakarta is sinking so much (up to 28 cm (11 in) per year between 1982 and 2010 in some areas[207]) that in 2019, the government had committed to relocate the capital of Indonesia to another city.[208]
Australia
[edit]
In Australia, erosion and flooding of Queensland's Sunshine Coast beaches is likely to intensify by 60% by 2030. Without adaptation there would be a big impact on tourism. Adaptation costs for sea level rise would be three times higher under the high-emission RCP8.5 scenario than in the low-emission RCP2.6 scenario. Sea level rise of 0.2–0.3 meters is likely by 2050. In these conditions what is currently a 100-year flood would occur every year in the New Zealand cities of Wellington and Christchurch. With 0.5 m sea level rise, a current 100-year flood in Australia would occur several times a year. In New Zealand this would expose buildings with a collective worth of NZ$12.75 billion to new 100-year floods. A meter or so of sea level rise would threaten assets in New Zealand with a worth of NZD$25.5 billion. There would be a disproportionate impact on Maori-owned holdings and cultural heritage objects. Australian assets worth AUS$164–226 billion including many unsealed roads and railway lines would also be at risk. This amounts to a 111% rise in Australia's inundation costs between 2020 and 2100.[209]
Central and South America
[edit]
By 2100, coastal flooding and erosion will affect at least 3–4 million people in South America. Many people live in low-lying areas exposed to sea level rise. This includes 6% of the population of Venezuela, 56% of the population of Guyana and 68% of the population of Suriname. In Guyana much of the capital Georgetown is already below sea level. In Brazil, the coastal ecoregion of Caatinga is responsible for 99% of its shrimp production. A combination of sea level rise, ocean warming and ocean acidification threaten its unique ecosystem. Extreme wave or wind behavior disrupted the port complex of Santa Catarina 76 times in one 6-year period in the 2010s. There was a US$25,000–50,000 loss for each idle day. In Port of Santos, storm surges were three times more frequent between 2000 and 2016 than between 1928 and 1999.[210]
Europe
[edit]
Many sandy coastlines in Europe are vulnerable to erosion due to sea level rise. In Spain, Costa del Maresme is likely to retreat by 16 meters by 2050 relative to 2010. This could amount to 52 meters by 2100 under RCP8.5[211] Other vulnerable coastlines include the Tyrrhenian Sea coast of Italy's Calabria region,[212] the Barra-Vagueira coast in Portugal[213] and Nørlev Strand in Denmark.[214]
In France, it was estimated that 8,000–10,000 people would be forced to migrate away from the coasts by 2080.[215] The Italian city of Venice is located on islands. It is highly vulnerable to flooding and has already spent $6 billion on a barrier system.[216][217] A quarter of the German state of Schleswig-Holstein, inhabited by over 350,000 people, is at low elevation and has been vulnerable to flooding since preindustrial times. Many levees already exist. Because of its complex geography, the authorities chose a flexible mix of hard and soft measures to cope with sea level rise of over 1 meter per century.[200] In the United Kingdom, sea level at the end of the century would increase by 53 to 115 centimeters at the mouth of the River Thames and 30 to 90 centimeters at Edinburgh.[218] The UK has divided its coast into 22 areas, each covered by a Shoreline Management Plan. Those are sub-divided into 2000 management units, working across three periods of 0–20, 20–50 and 50–100 years.[200]
The Netherlands is a country that sits partially below sea level and is subsiding. It has responded by extending its Delta Works program.[219] Drafted in 2008, the Delta Commission report said that the country must plan for a rise in the North Sea up to 1.3 m (4 ft 3 in) by 2100 and plan for a 2–4 m (7–13 ft) rise by 2200.[220] It advised annual spending between €1.0 and €1.5 billion. This would support measures such as broadening coastal dunes and strengthening sea and river dikes. Worst-case evacuation plans were also drawn up.[221]
North America
[edit]
As of 2017, around 95 million Americans lived on the coast. The figures for Canada and Mexico were 6.5 million and 19 million. Increased chronic nuisance flooding and king tide flooding is already a problem in the highly vulnerable state of Florida.[222] The US East Coast is also vulnerable.[223] On average, the number of days with tidal flooding in the US increased 2 times in the years 2000–2020, reaching 3–7 days per year. In some areas the increase was much stronger: 4 times in the Southeast Atlantic and 11 times in the Western Gulf. By the year 2030 the average number is expected to be 7–15 days, reaching 25–75 days by 2050.[224] U.S. coastal cities have responded with beach nourishment or beach replenishment. This trucks in mined sand in addition to other adaptation measures such as zoning, restrictions on state funding, and building code standards.[225][226]
Along an estimated ~15% of the US coastline, the majority of local groundwater levels are already below sea level. This places those groundwater reservoirs at risk of sea water intrusion. That would render fresh water unusable once its concentration exceeds 2-3%.[227] Damage is also widespread in Canada. It will affect major cities like Halifax and more remote locations like Lennox Island. The Mi'kmaq community there is already considering relocation due to widespread coastal erosion. In Mexico, damage from SLR to tourism hotspots like Cancun, Isla Mujeres, Playa del Carmen, Puerto Morelos and Cozumel could amount to US$1.4–2.3 billion.[228] The increase in storm surge due to sea level rise is also a problem. Due to this effect Hurricane Sandy caused an additional US$8 billion in damage, impacted 36,000 more houses and 71,000 more people.[229][230] In the future, the northern Gulf of Mexico, Atlantic Canada and the Pacific coast of Mexico would experience the greatest sea level rise. By 2030, flooding along the US Gulf Coast could cause economic losses of up to US$176 billion. Using nature-based solutions like wetland restoration and oyster reef restoration could avoid around US$50 billion of this.[228]

By 2050, coastal flooding in the US is likely to rise tenfold to four "moderate" flooding events per year. That forecast is even without storms or heavy rainfall.[231][232] In New York City, current 100-year flood would occur once in 19–68 years by 2050 and 4–60 years by 2080.[233] By 2050, 20 million people in the greater New York City area would be at risk. This is because 40% of existing water treatment facilities would be compromised and 60% of power plants will need relocation.
By 2100, sea level rise of 0.9 m (3 ft) and 1.8 m (6 ft) would threaten 4.2 and 13.1 million people in the US, respectively. In California alone, 2 m (6+1⁄2 ft) of SLR could affect 600,000 people and threaten over US$150 billion in property with inundation. This potentially represents over 6% of the state's GDP. In North Carolina, a meter of SLR inundates 42% of the Albemarle-Pamlico Peninsula, costing up to US$14 billion. In nine southeast US states, the same level of sea level rise would claim up to 13,000 historical and archaeological sites, including over 1000 sites eligible for inclusion in the National Register for Historic Places.[228]
Island nations
[edit]
Small island states are nations with populations on atolls and other low islands. Atolls on average reach 0.9–1.8 m (3–6 ft) above sea level.[234] These are the most vulnerable places to coastal erosion, flooding and salt intrusion into soils and freshwater caused by sea level rise. Sea level rise may make an island uninhabitable before it is completely flooded.[235] Already, children in small island states encounter hampered access to food and water. They suffer an increased rate of mental and social disorders due to these stresses.[236] At current rates, sea level rise would be high enough to make the Maldives uninhabitable by 2100.[237][238] Five of the Solomon Islands have already disappeared due to the effects of sea level rise and stronger trade winds pushing water into the Western Pacific.[239]

Adaptation to sea level rise is costly for small island nations as a large portion of their population lives in areas that are at risk.[241] Nations like Maldives, Kiribati and Tuvalu already have to consider controlled international migration of their population in response to rising seas.[242] The alternative of uncontrolled migration threatens to worsen the humanitarian crisis of climate refugees.[243] In 2014, Kiribati purchased 20 square kilometers of land (about 2.5% of Kiribati's current area) on the Fijian island of Vanua Levu to relocate its population once their own islands are lost to the sea.[244]
Fiji also suffers from sea level rise.[245] It is in a comparatively safer position. Its residents continue to rely on local adaptation like moving further inland and increasing sediment supply to combat erosion instead of relocating entirely.[242] Fiji has also issued a green bond of $50 million to invest in green initiatives and fund adaptation efforts. It is restoring coral reefs and mangroves to protect against flooding and erosion. It sees this as a more cost-efficient alternative to building sea walls. The nations of Palau and Tonga are taking similar steps.[242][246] Even when an island is not threatened with complete disappearance from flooding, tourism and local economies may end up devastated. For instance, sea level rise of 1.0 m (3 ft 3 in) would cause partial or complete inundation of 29% of coastal resorts in the Caribbean. A further 49–60% of coastal resorts would be at risk from resulting coastal erosion.[247]
See also
[edit]- Climate emergency declaration – Emergency proclaimed due to climate change
- Coastal development hazards – Type of anthropogenic effect on the environment
- Effects of climate change on oceans
- List of countries by average elevation
- Paleoclimate – Study of changes in ancient climate
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This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
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- ^ Simon Albert; Javier X Leon; Alistair R Grinham; John A Church; Badin R Gibbes; Colin D Woodroffe (May 2016). "Interactions between sea-level rise and wave exposure on reef island dynamics in the Solomon Islands". Environmental Research Letters. 11 (5) 054011. doi:10.1088/1748-9326/11/5/054011. ISSN 1748-9326.
- ^ Nurse, Leonard A.; McLean, Roger (2014). "29: Small Islands" (PDF). In Barros, VR; Field (eds.). AR5 WGII. Cambridge University Press. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2018-04-30. Retrieved 2018-09-02.
- ^ a b c Grecequet, Martina; Noble, Ian; Hellmann, Jessica (2017-11-16). "Many small island nations can adapt to climate change with global support". The Conversation. Archived from the original on 2020-05-27. Retrieved 2019-02-02.
- ^ "Small Islands, Rising Seas". United Nations. Archived from the original on 2023-05-06. Retrieved 2021-12-17.
- ^ Caramel, Laurence (July 1, 2014). "Besieged by the rising tides of climate change, Kiribati buys land in Fiji". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 13 November 2022. Retrieved 9 January 2023.
- ^ Long, Maebh (2018). "Vanua in the Anthropocene: Relationality and Sea Level Rise in Fiji". Symplokē. 26 (1–2): 51–70. doi:10.5250/symploke.26.1-2.0051. S2CID 150286287. Archived from the original on 2019-07-28. Retrieved 2019-10-04.
- ^ "Adaptation to Sea Level Rise". UN Environment. 2018-01-11. Archived from the original on 2020-08-07. Retrieved 2019-02-02.
- ^ Thomas, Adelle; Baptiste, April; Martyr-Koller, Rosanne; Pringle, Patrick; Rhiney, Kevon (2020-10-17). "Climate Change and Small Island Developing States". Annual Review of Environment and Resources. 45 (1): 1–27. doi:10.1146/annurev-environ-012320-083355. ISSN 1543-5938.
External links
[edit]- Vital signs / Sea level (NASA)
- Sea level change / Observations from space (NASA; links to multiple measurements)
- Fourth National Climate Assessment (2017) Sea Level Rise Key Message (US government agencies)
- Fifth National Climate Assessment (2023) Coastal Effects Chapter
- The Global Sea Level Observing System (GLOSS)
- USA Sea Level Rise Viewer (NOAA)
- USA Sea Level Calculator (NOAA)
- "Surging Seas in a Warming World: The latest science on present-day impacts and future projections of sea-level rise" (PDF). United Nations. 26 August 2024. Archived (PDF) from the original on 20 October 2024.
Sea level rise
View on GrokipediaEmpirical Foundations
Long-term Geological and Proxy Records
Geological and proxy records provide the primary evidence for sea level variations over timescales from millions to thousands of years, utilizing indicators such as oxygen isotope ratios in benthic foraminifera, which reflect global ice volume and deep ocean temperature; fossil coral reef stratigraphy; raised beach deposits; and sequence stratigraphy in sedimentary basins.[12] These proxies enable reconstruction of eustatic (global) sea level changes, though local records require corrections for isostatic rebound, tectonics, and dynamic topography.[13] Uncertainties arise from proxy calibration, age dating, and regional variability, but multiple lines of evidence converge on large-amplitude fluctuations driven by ice sheet dynamics and tectonics.[14] Over the Cenozoic era (66 million years ago to present), proxy records indicate a long-term decline in sea level from greenhouse highs to icehouse lows, with early Eocene levels estimated 70-100 meters above present due to minimal polar ice and higher ocean basin volumes from slower mid-ocean ridge subduction.[12] The onset of Antarctic glaciation around 34 million years ago marked a ~50-meter drop, followed by Miocene fluctuations of 20-60 meters tied to transient Northern Hemisphere glaciations.[15] Benthic foraminiferal Mg/Ca and δ¹⁸O data from deep-sea cores confirm these trends, showing a transition to bipolar glaciation in the late Miocene and amplified Quaternary variability.[16] In the Quaternary period, glacial-interglacial cycles produced sea level swings of approximately 120 meters, with the Last Glacial Maximum (~21,000 years ago) featuring levels 120-130 meters below present, as evidenced by coral reef terraces in Barbados and Tahiti, and exposure of continental shelves.[17] Deglaciation from ~19,000 to 7,000 years ago involved rapid rises averaging 10-20 mm/year, punctuated by meltwater pulses exceeding 40 mm/year, reconstructed from Tahitian corals and Red Sea sediments.[13] Proxy data from 88 North Sea sites reveal early Holocene rates of ~10 mm/year from 13.7 to 6.2 thousand years ago, slowing thereafter.[18] Late Holocene records, spanning the past ~6,000-7,000 years, show relative stability or minor regression in far-field locations like coral atolls and mangrove peats, with global mean sea level fluctuating within ±2-5 meters of present, as compiled from over 300 Florida coral samples and global databases correcting for vertical land motion.[19] This stability reflects minimized ice volume changes post-deglaciation, contrasting with earlier rapid adjustments, though some regional proxies indicate slight falls due to ongoing isostatic responses.[20] These long-term patterns underscore ice sheet mass balance as the dominant control on eustatic sea level, with geological archives providing benchmarks for assessing modern deviations.Tide Gauge Measurements
Tide gauges measure relative sea level (RSL) changes at coastal locations by recording water height against a fixed land reference, capturing both ocean surface variations and local vertical land motion such as subsidence or uplift.[21] Records from the Permanent Service for Mean Sea Level (PSMSL) database include over 2,000 stations worldwide, with some continuous measurements dating to the early 1800s, providing the longest instrumental dataset for sea level prior to satellite era.[22] These gauges typically consist of stilling wells connected to recording mechanisms, yielding monthly or hourly means after tidal averaging, though early records suffer from inconsistencies in instrumentation and datum changes.[23] To derive global mean sea level (GMSL) trends, researchers reconstruct from sparse, unevenly distributed tide gauge data by applying statistical methods to infill gaps and correct for vertical land motion (VLM), often using geological proxies or modern GPS-collocated measurements.[24] One widely cited reconstruction estimates a 20th-century GMSL rise of 1.44 mm per year from 1900 to 1999, based on 1,292 stations with adjustments for isostatic rebound and incomplete spatial coverage.[25] Updated analyses, incorporating more records and refined VLM corrections, yield similar rates of approximately 1.7 mm per year over 1901–2000, with total rise of about 17 cm since 1900.[26] However, raw individual station trends vary regionally: European gauges often show slower rises or falls due to glacial isostatic adjustment, while subsiding deltas like the Gulf of Mexico exhibit amplified RSL increases exceeding 5 mm per year.[27] Evidence for acceleration in tide gauge-derived GMSL remains debated, as many long-term station records (e.g., over 60 years) display linear trends without statistically significant quadratic components, suggesting steady rates since the late 19th century.[28] Global reconstructions report acceleration to 1.9–2.0 mm per year by the 1990s, aligning with post-1993 satellite altimetry, but critics argue these rely on model-dependent infilling and VLM estimates that may overestimate recent rates by conflating natural variability with long-term trends.[29] For instance, a 2017 reassessment of tide gauge data found 20th-century rates closer to 1.0–1.2 mm per year after excluding short or biased records, challenging claims of pre-satellite acceleration.[28] Collocation with GPS since the 1990s has improved VLM corrections, confirming tide gauges underestimate absolute sea level rise in subsiding areas but overstate it relative to stable or uplifting coasts.[30] Limitations of tide gauge data include coastal bias (under-sampling open ocean dynamics), incomplete global coverage until the mid-20th century, and susceptibility to local factors like harbor dredging or tectonic activity, necessitating cautious interpretation for GMSL inference.[31] Despite these, tide gauges validate satellite measurements at proximal sites with correlations often exceeding 0.9, though discrepancies arise from altimetry's absolute ocean focus versus gauges' land-tied RSL.[32] Recent efforts, such as reconstructing RSL at 945 PSMSL stations from 1900–2022, highlight persistent linear trends at 95% of sites, with acceleration detectable only in select subsiding regions rather than globally uniform.[31]Satellite Altimetry Data
Satellite altimetry measures sea surface height by emitting radar pulses from orbiting spacecraft and recording the time for echoes to return, enabling global mapping of ocean topography with centimeter-level precision after corrections for atmospheric effects, tides, and instrument biases.[33] The technique provides comprehensive coverage of the open ocean, complementing tide gauge records by avoiding land-based limitations and revealing spatial variability in sea level trends. The modern era of satellite altimetry for sea level monitoring began with the launch of TOPEX/Poseidon in August 1992, followed by Jason-1 in 2001, Jason-2 in 2008, Jason-3 in 2016, and Sentinel-6 Michael Freilich in 2020, forming a continuous record spanning over three decades.[6] These missions operate in tandem or succession, repeating ground tracks every 10 days to track changes in global mean sea level (GMSL). Data processing involves averaging along-track measurements, removing seasonal signals, and applying geophysical corrections derived from models and auxiliary observations.[34] From 1993 to 2023, satellite altimetry records indicate a GMSL rise of approximately 101 millimeters, with an average rate of 3.7 mm per year, accelerating from about 2.1 mm/year in the early 1990s to 4.5 mm/year by 2023.[35] [6] This acceleration, estimated at 0.104 mm/year² over the full record, aligns across independent datasets from NASA, NOAA, and the European Space Agency, though inter-mission biases and short-term variability from phenomena like El Niño-Southern Oscillation introduce uncertainties of ±0.4 mm/year in trend estimates.[35] [36] Regional trends derived from altimetry show greater variability than the global mean, with faster rises in the western Pacific and Arctic (exceeding 5 mm/year in some areas) and localized declines in the eastern Pacific due to natural ocean circulation patterns.[37] Uncertainties persist in coastal and high-latitude regions owing to land interference and ice coverage, but the global record's robustness supports attribution of the observed rise primarily to thermal expansion and land ice melt.[38]Causal Drivers
Ocean Thermal Expansion
Ocean thermal expansion, or thermosteric sea level rise, results from the decrease in seawater density as ocean temperatures increase, leading to an expansion in volume for a fixed mass of water.[39] The thermal expansion coefficient for seawater depends on temperature, salinity, and pressure, with warmer surface waters exhibiting higher sensitivity to heating.[40] This process accounts for a substantial portion of observed global mean sea level rise, as oceans absorb approximately 90% of excess atmospheric heat, driving volumetric changes.[35] Measurements of thermosteric changes rely on in-situ temperature profiles from Argo floats, historical ship-based observations, and conductivity-temperature-depth instruments, supplemented by satellite altimetry for total sea level after correcting for mass changes via gravimetry.[41] Global ocean heat content in the upper 2000 meters has increased markedly since the mid-20th century, with anomalies relative to 1971-2000 baselines showing steady accumulation.[42] The thermosteric component contributed about 56% of global sea level rise in recent decades, with rates estimated at 0.8 ± 0.1 mm per year for the global mean thermosteric sea level due to ocean warming.[43] [44] Recent analyses indicate acceleration in ocean heat uptake, nearly doubling since the 1990s, particularly from 2010 onward, which has amplified thermal expansion rates.[45] In 2024, an unexpected surge in global sea level rise was predominantly attributed to enhanced thermal expansion from rapid ocean warming.[46] While upper ocean layers dominate the signal, deep ocean warming below 2000 meters also contributes, though at lower rates due to slower heat diffusion.[41] Quarterly updates from NOAA's ocean climate variables confirm ongoing positive anomalies in heat content and thermosteric height, underscoring the causal link between anthropogenic heat trapping and expansion-driven sea level rise.[42]Cryospheric Mass Loss
Mass loss from the cryosphere's land-based components—principally the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets and peripheral glaciers and ice caps—directly elevates sea levels by adding freshwater to the oceans. Floating elements such as sea ice and ice shelves, by contrast, exert no net effect on sea level upon melting, as their displacement equals the volume they occupy prior to loss. This distinction arises from Archimedes' principle, wherein grounded ice's ablation exceeds the displacement of any preexisting floating fraction. Satellite gravimetry from missions like GRACE and GRACE-FO, combined with altimetry and input-output modeling, quantifies these losses. From 1992 to 2020, the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets cumulatively shed 7,560 ± 570 billion metric tons of ice, equivalent to 21.0 ± 1.6 millimeters of global mean sea level rise and comprising about one-quarter of total observed rise over that interval. Acceleration is evident: combined losses averaged 105 Gt per year in the 1990s, escalating to 372 Gt per year by the 2010s.[47][48] The Greenland Ice Sheet dominates recent contributions, with mass loss driven by enhanced surface melting and increased iceberg calving. Between 2002 and 2019, it lost approximately 3,900 Gt, yielding 10.8 mm sea level equivalent, at rates rising from -34 Gt/year (1992–2001) to -234 Gt/year (2010–2019). In 2023, losses reached 177 Gt, though 2024 saw a lesser 55 ± 35 Gt due to anomalous snowfall. Uncertainties stem from variable firn densification and basal melt estimates, but consensus holds for sustained net ablation under warming conditions.[47][49][50] Antarctica exhibits regional divergence: East Antarctica often gains mass via snowfall, offsetting some West Antarctic and Peninsula losses from dynamic thinning and marine-terminating glacier retreat. Net Antarctic loss totaled 2,720 Gt from 1992–2020 (7.4 mm SLE), accelerating to 142 Gt/year in the 2010s. The 2023 loss was 57 Gt, following a 2022 gain. Processes like unstable grounding line retreat amplify West Antarctic vulnerabilities, though overall ice sheet stability hinges on subsurface ocean warming and surface balance.[47][49] Mountain glaciers and ice caps worldwide contribute independently, with losses totaling 6,542 Gt from 2000–2023 at -273 ± 16 Gt/year, equating to 18 ± 1 mm SLE and 0.75 ± 0.04 mm/year. The 2023 melt set a record, exceeding prior maxima by 80 Gt. These peripheral sources, concentrated in regions like Alaska, the Arctic, and the Himalayas, respond sensitively to air temperature rises, with mass balance increasingly negative since the 1990s. Combined cryospheric inputs thus account for roughly half of contemporary sea level rise, alongside thermal expansion.[51][52][53]Terrestrial Water Storage Changes
Terrestrial water storage (TWS) encompasses water held in groundwater aquifers, lakes, reservoirs, rivers, soil moisture, and wetlands, with changes influencing global mean sea level through net transfers to or from the oceans. Depletion of TWS, primarily via human groundwater extraction for irrigation and urban use, releases water that eventually reaches the sea, contributing positively to sea level rise, while impoundment in reservoirs exerts an opposing effect.[54][55] Satellite missions GRACE (2002–2017) and GRACE-FO (2018–present) have enabled global monitoring of TWS variations by detecting monthly changes in Earth's gravity field caused by mass redistributions. From April 2002 to November 2014, GRACE observations revealed regional trends of TWS decline in areas like northern India, the Middle East, and the southeastern United States, contrasted by gains in regions such as the Amazon and northern high latitudes. Over the longer 2003–2020 period, GRACE data indicate a net TWS loss contributing +0.76 ± 0.03 mm per year to sea level rise, driven largely by groundwater depletion outweighing reservoir storage.[56][57] Global groundwater depletion since 1900 totals approximately 4,500 km³, equivalent to a sea level rise of 12.6 mm, with rates accelerating from 0.035 ± 0.009 mm per year in 1900 to 0.57 ± 0.09 mm per year by recent decades, primarily in intensively irrigated regions. Reservoir impoundment has stored about 30,000 km³ of water since the mid-20th century, offsetting an estimated 80–100 mm of potential sea level rise, but this effect peaked around 2010 and has since been surpassed by extraction rates, resulting in a net positive TWS contribution to sea level rise of about 0.8 mm per year projected through 2050 from groundwater alone. Recent analyses from 2002–2023 show continental TWS losses exceeding those from individual ice sheets like Greenland, with an abrupt decline post-2015 linked to intensified drought and overuse.[58][59][60] These anthropogenic-driven TWS changes, estimated at 0.37 mm per year (range 0.30–0.45 mm) for 2003–2016, represent roughly 10% of observed sea level rise in that interval, underscoring their role as a significant non-climatic driver amid broader water cycle alterations. Projections suggest continued net TWS depletion could add 10% or more to 21st-century sea level rise under high-emission scenarios, contingent on unsustainable extraction practices.[61][62][63]Natural Oscillatory Influences
Natural oscillations, including interannual to multidecadal climate modes and astronomical cycles, superimpose variability on the long-term sea level trend, with amplitudes ranging from millimeters to centimeters globally. These influences arise from atmospheric-oceanic interactions, such as wind-driven redistribution of ocean water and changes in terrestrial hydrology, as well as gravitational and tidal modulations. Tide gauge and satellite records reveal that such variability can account for significant portions of decadal fluctuations in global mean sea level (GMSL), complicating the isolation of secular trends without accounting for them.[64] The El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), with a typical period of 2-7 years, drives interannual GMSL anomalies of 5-10 mm through coupled effects on ocean dynamics, heat content, and land water storage. During El Niño events, enhanced trade wind relaxation and altered precipitation patterns reduce continental water storage via droughts in key regions like Australia and Southeast Asia, contributing to a net increase in ocean volume, though steric cooling from atmospheric heat uptake can partially offset this. La Niña phases reverse these effects, leading to temporary GMSL declines. Analysis of satellite altimetry from 1993-2010 confirms ENSO's dominant role in global sea level variability, with phase shifts explaining up to 20% of short-term changes.[65][66] On decadal timescales, the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO), spanning 20-30 years, modulates sea level in the Pacific basin via shifts in Aleutian Low intensity and subtropical gyre circulation, producing anomalies of 3-5 cm regionally and influencing global patterns through teleconnections. Positive PDO phases correlate with accelerated sea level rise along western North American coasts due to strengthened southward transport, while negative phases dampen it; GRACE satellite data from 2002-2014 highlight PDO-driven low-frequency signals in ocean mass redistribution. Similarly, the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO), with a 60-80 year cycle, affects North Atlantic sea levels by 5-10 cm through variations in meridional overturning circulation and steric height, with warm phases linked to higher steric contributions since the mid-1990s.[67][68][69] Astronomical cycles introduce deterministic variability independent of atmospheric forcing. The 18.6-year lunar nodal cycle, arising from the precession of the Moon's orbital plane, modulates tidal amplitudes and mean sea levels by 1-2 cm globally through changes in lunar declination and resultant gravitational gradients, with steric sea level variations amplified in mid-latitudes. Tide gauge records from the U.S. East Coast demonstrate this cycle's dominance in annual high-water means, peaking during nodal alignments. Additionally, the 11-year solar cycle imprints oscillations of ~1 mm on GMSL via modulated precipitation and runoff, shifting water between land and ocean reservoirs, as evidenced in reconstructions from 1900 onward. A longer ~64-year oscillation, potentially linked to combined climate modes, appears in global tide gauge data spanning centuries, with amplitudes up to 5 cm.[70][71][72][73] These oscillations underscore the need for extended records to discern trends from noise, as unadjusted analyses may overestimate or underestimate acceleration; for instance, decadal minima in PDO or AMO phases have coincided with slower apparent rises in recent decades. Empirical decomposition of altimetry and gauge data confirms that natural variability explains 10-30% of GMSL changes over 1993-2020, varying by basin.[64][74]Attribution and Acceleration
Anthropogenic Forcing Mechanisms
The dominant anthropogenic forcing mechanism influencing sea level rise stems from emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases (GHGs), particularly carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄), and nitrous oxide (N₂O), which enhance the atmosphere's absorption of outgoing infrared radiation, thereby increasing the effective radiative forcing (ERF) at the top of the atmosphere.[75] These emissions arise chiefly from fossil fuel combustion (accounting for over 80% of CO₂ increases since the Industrial Revolution), cement production, deforestation, agriculture, and waste management, elevating atmospheric CO₂ from approximately 280 ppm pre-industrially to 420 ppm by 2023, CH₄ to 1,934 ppb, and N₂O to 336.9 ppb.[76] [77] The logarithmic relationship in CO₂'s radiative effect yields an ERF of about 2.16 W/m² from CO₂ alone since 1750, with other well-mixed GHGs adding roughly 1.08 W/m², for a combined GHG ERF of +3.24 W/m² (likely range 2.82–3.64 W/m²).[78] This net positive ERF, totaling +2.72 W/m² (likely range 1.96–3.48 W/m²) when accounting for offsetting factors like anthropogenic aerosols (-1.3 W/m², primarily sulfate particles reflecting sunlight) and tropospheric ozone (+0.47 W/m² from precursors like nitrogen oxides), creates an energy imbalance that predominantly heats the oceans, as they absorb over 90% of excess energy.[75] [78] Recent observations confirm an accelerating trend in this imbalance, with an ERF increase of 0.71 ± 0.21 W/m² per decade from 2001 to 2024, consistent with rising GHG concentrations outpacing aerosol reductions in many regions.[79] The resulting ocean heat uptake expands seawater volume through thermal contraction's inverse—steric expansion—while also elevating air and surface temperatures that drive land ice mass loss from glaciers and ice sheets.[80] Secondary anthropogenic forcings include changes in tropospheric aerosols from industrial activities, which exert a cooling effect via direct scattering and indirect cloud brightening, partially masking GHG warming; however, regional clean-air policies have reduced this negative forcing since the 1980s, amplifying net warming.[75] Halogenated gases (e.g., CFCs and HFCs) contribute an additional +0.45 W/m² ERF, stemming from refrigeration, foam production, and other uses, though Montreal Protocol controls have slowed their growth.[78] Land-use changes, such as deforestation, induce minor positive forcing through reduced surface albedo (less reflection of sunlight) and biogenic carbon releases, but these are dwarfed by atmospheric GHG effects on a global scale.[75] Collectively, these mechanisms link human-induced radiative perturbations to the observed post-1970 dominance of anthropogenic drivers in global mean sea level rise, where natural variability alone cannot explain the trends.[81]Evidence for Recent Acceleration
Satellite altimetry measurements from the TOPEX/Poseidon, Jason-1, Jason-2, and Jason-3 missions, spanning 1993 to the present, indicate a global mean sea level (GMSL) rise averaging 3.4 mm/year, with an estimated acceleration of 0.084 ± 0.025 mm/year² over the 25-year period ending in 2017.[82] This acceleration is attributed to a quadratic fit to the time series after removing interannual variability from phenomena like El Niño-Southern Oscillation, revealing a statistically significant upward curvature consistent with climate model expectations for thermal expansion and ice mass loss.[82] Updated analyses extending to 2023 confirm the rate has increased to approximately 4.5 mm/year since around 2017, driven by enhanced contributions from Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets amid reduced variability.[35] Tide gauge records, providing longer-term context since the late 19th century, show a 20th-century GMSL rise of about 1.5-2.0 mm/year, with evidence of acceleration emerging in the latter half of the 20th century and strengthening post-1990.[1] A reconstruction from over 900 tide gauges detects persistent acceleration since the 1960s, primarily linked to Indo-Pacific sea level changes, at a rate contributing to a total GMSL acceleration of around 0.07 mm/year² from 1900 onward.[83] Regional analyses, such as along the U.S. Southeast and Gulf coasts, report decadal-scale accelerations exceeding 1 mm/year² since 2010, corroborated by steric and dynamic ocean changes.[84] Proxy records from salt-marsh sediments and coral microatolls further support recent acceleration, indicating that current GMSL rise rates—exceeding 4 mm/year in places—surpass those during the stable mid-Holocene period (roughly 4,000-7,000 years ago), marking the fastest rise in at least four millennia.[85] These findings align with mass budget closures from GRACE/GRACE-FO gravimetry, which quantify accelerating land ice loss (Greenland at ~270 Gt/year, Antarctica at ~150 Gt/year by the 2010s) and thermal expansion as dominant drivers.[35] ![A map showing sea level change from 1993 to 2018, highlighting global trends][float-right]Debates on Trend Significance and Natural Variability
Analyses of long-term tide gauge records, which provide direct measurements of relative sea level change at coastal sites, often reveal linear trends spanning the 20th century without statistically significant acceleration. A global assessment of tide gauge datasets concluded that approximately 95% of suitable locations exhibit no significant acceleration in sea level rise rates, with mean trends around 1.5–2.0 mm/year consistent across extended periods.[87] Similarly, examinations of U.S. tide gauge data from the 20th century found no evidence of acceleration, attributing observed rates to steady post-glacial adjustment rather than increasing forcing.[88] These findings challenge claims of robust acceleration, emphasizing that linear fits better explain empirical records than quadratic models, which require longer timescales for reliable detection—potentially centuries to distinguish from noise.[89] Satellite altimetry, operational since 1993, reports global mean sea level rise rates of approximately 3.3 mm/year, which some interpret as evidence of recent acceleration when compared to earlier tide gauge averages of 1.7 mm/year.[35] However, this discrepancy fuels debate, as reconstructed global tide gauge trends align more closely with lower rates after corrections for vertical land motion, suggesting potential overestimation in satellite data due to calibration drifts, instrumental biases, or incomplete accounting for ocean dynamics like steric effects.[90] Critics argue that the short satellite record, spanning only a few decades, is prone to conflating transient variability with sustained trends, particularly amid unadjusted influences from glacial isostatic adjustment or deep ocean processes not fully captured in altimeter measurements.[91] Natural internal climate variability significantly modulates sea level trends, complicating attribution to external forcings. Oscillations such as the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) and Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO) drive decadal to multidecadal fluctuations through alterations in ocean heat content, circulation patterns, and steric expansion; for example, positive PDO phases correlate with enhanced sea level variability in the Pacific via heat and freshwater fluxes.[92] The AMO's warm phase, dominant from the mid-1990s to around 2020, has been linked to amplified North Atlantic sea levels and potential global teleconnections affecting mean trends, masking underlying forced changes or mimicking acceleration over short intervals.[93] Such variability can account for interannual to decadal swings of several millimeters per year, as seen in ENSO influences, underscoring that recent rate increases may partly reflect oscillatory peaks rather than irreversible anthropogenic signals.[35] Proponents of acceleration counter that ensemble modeling isolates forced components exceeding variability thresholds, yet empirical tide gauge persistence in linear trends invites scrutiny of model assumptions versus raw data.[37]Projection Methodologies
Empirical and Semi-empirical Models
Empirical models for sea-level rise projections derive statistical relationships directly from historical tide gauge and satellite altimetry data, often fitting trends or accelerations without explicit physical mechanisms. These approaches assume that past patterns, such as linear or quadratic trends observed since the late 19th century, persist into the future under specified forcing scenarios. For instance, simple extrapolations of 20th-century rates (approximately 1.7 mm/year globally from 1901-2010) yield projections of 0.3-0.6 meters by 2100, but they fail to incorporate feedbacks like ice sheet dynamics, leading to underestimation of potential nonlinear responses.[94] Semi-empirical models extend this by incorporating semi-physical scaling laws calibrated against paleoclimate, instrumental, and recent observational records, typically linking the rate of global mean sea-level change to global surface temperature anomalies or radiative forcing. A foundational example is the model by Rahmstorf (2007), which posits a linear relationship between sea-level rise rate and temperature deviation from equilibrium: , where is sea level, is global mean temperature, and parameters and are fitted to data spanning the last two millennia; this yielded projections of 0.18-0.57 meters by 2100 under IPCC SRES scenarios, higher than contemporaneous process-based estimates due to implicit inclusion of rapid ice-mass loss responses observed historically. An improved variant by Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009) adds a quadratic acceleration term and accounts for rate dependence, fitting synthetic data tests and projecting 0.75-1.9 meters by 2100 for A1FI to B1 emissions pathways, closely matching observed 20th-century acceleration (from ~1 mm/year pre-1990 to ~3.3 mm/year post-1993).[95] [96] These models' strength lies in their empirical fidelity to centennial-scale data, capturing total observed rise (about 21-24 cm since 1880) and recent acceleration driven by thermal expansion and land-ice melt, which process-based simulations sometimes underrepresent due to incomplete ice-sheet parameterizations.[1] However, critiques highlight assumptions of stable response functions, potential overestimation from conflating short-term thermal and long-term glacial contributions, and sensitivity to data selection—such as excluding post-2000 satellite records in calibrations—which can inflate projections by up to 50% compared to physics-based IPCC AR5 medians (0.52-0.98 m by 2100 under RCP2.6-8.5).[97] [94] Recent assessments, including expert elicitations, note semi-empirical upper bounds (up to 2 meters by 2100) as plausible for high-emissions paths if paleoclimate analogies hold, though they recommend hybrid approaches to bound uncertainties from unmodeled thresholds like marine ice-cliff instability.[98] [99]Process-based Climate Simulations
Process-based climate simulations for sea level rise project future changes by modeling the physical processes underlying contributors such as ocean thermal expansion, glacier mass loss, and ice sheet dynamics, driven by forcings from general circulation models (GCMs) under shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs).[100] These simulations integrate outputs from coordinated model intercomparisons, including CMIP6 for climate forcing, GlacierMIP for ~215,000 glaciers excluding those in Greenland and Antarctica, ISMIP6 for Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, and specialized ocean models for thermal expansion.[101] Unlike empirical approaches, process-based methods explicitly resolve mechanisms like surface mass balance, iceberg calving, sub-ice-shelf melting, and ocean heat uptake, though they require parameterizations for unresolved scales such as turbulence and fracture mechanics.[100] Ocean thermal expansion, accounting for 30-50% of projected 21st-century rise, is simulated using CMIP6 ocean components or emulators calibrated to observed heat content, yielding 0.15-0.30 m under SSP5-8.5 by 2100 relative to 1995-2014.[100] Glacier models in GlacierMIP compute mass loss via degree-day or energy-balance schemes forced by downscaled GCM precipitation and temperature, projecting a global equivalent sea level rise of 0.09-0.19 m across SSPs, with higher losses under elevated emissions due to amplified melt rates.[100] Ice sheet projections from ISMIP6 employ stand-alone models like the Ice Sheet System Model (ISSM) or Community Ice Sheet Model (CISM), forced by atmospheric (surface mass balance) and oceanic (basal melt) anomalies from CMIP6 ensembles; median contributions are 0.04-0.18 m from Greenland and 0.03-0.34 m from Antarctica by 2100, with Antarctic estimates incorporating structured expert assessments for low-confidence processes.[101][100] Projections synthesize these components probabilistically, often using Gaussian processes or emulators to sample uncertainties in climate sensitivity and forcing, resulting in global mean sea level rise likely ranges of 0.28-0.55 m under SSP1-2.6 and 0.63-1.01 m under SSP5-8.5 by 2100 (relative to 1995-2014).[100] For longer horizons, simulations extend to 2300, but with reduced confidence due to unmodeled feedbacks.[102] These methods have demonstrated skill in hindcasting 20th-century trends when including anthropogenic forcings, though early generations underestimated observed acceleration by omitting full ice dynamic responses.[103] Limitations include coarse resolution failing to capture regional ocean dynamics like eddy effects or AMOC weakening, which can bias heat distribution and thus expansion by up to 40% regionally; ice sheet models struggle with rapid instabilities such as marine ice cliff instability (MICI), parameterized via expert elicitation rather than direct simulation due to computational constraints.[104][100] Parameter uncertainties in calving laws and sub-shelf melt sensitivity contribute 20-40% of ice sheet variance, while separation of anthropogenic from natural variability remains challenging in forcing data.[105] Process-based projections generally yield lower 21st-century estimates than semi-empirical models assuming fixed temperature-sensitivity, reflecting conservative assumptions on ice response but highlighting the need for ongoing validation against satellite gravimetry and altimetry observations.[106]Uncertainty Quantification
Uncertainty in sea level rise (SLR) projections stems predominantly from the behavior of major ice sheets, where processes such as marine ice sheet instability (MISI) and marine ice cliff instability (MICI) introduce deep structural uncertainties that process-based models struggle to resolve. These instabilities could amplify mass loss from Antarctica and Greenland beyond current simulation capabilities, leading to potentially rapid but unquantified contributions to SLR. Other sources include variability in ocean heat uptake efficiency, glacier responses, and terrestrial water storage changes, though ice sheets dominate long-term uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainties, reducible with more data, contrast with aleatory uncertainties inherent to chaotic systems, but both are compounded by scenario-dependent forcing pathways.[107][108] Quantification methods encompass probabilistic frameworks, including structured expert judgment (SEJ) and emulator-based approaches that sample parameter spaces to generate probability density functions (PDFs). In SEJ for ice sheets, elicited expert distributions for 2100 under high-emissions scenarios yield median contributions of 7.4 cm from Greenland and 8.6 cm from Antarctica, with 95th percentiles reaching 28.2 cm and 28.6 cm, respectively, reflecting tail risks from dynamical instabilities. The Framework for Assessing Changes To Sea-level (FACTS) integrates these via conditional probabilistic projections, distinguishing quantifiable from deep uncertainties by bounding low-confidence high-end scenarios, such as Antarctic contributions exceeding 1 m by 2300 under rapid collapse pathways. Process-based models from CMIP6 ensembles provide central estimates but widen ranges for multi-century horizons due to unmodeled feedbacks.[107][108][109] IPCC AR6 synthesizes these into likely ranges for global mean SLR by 2100: 0.28–0.55 m (SSP1-2.6) to 0.63–1.01 m (SSP5-8.5), with medium confidence, but assigns low confidence to exceeding 2 m due to ice sheet deep uncertainty; beyond 2100, projections diverge sharply, with 95th percentiles up to 2.3 m by 2150 under high emissions. These ranges incorporate thermal expansion uncertainties (±20–30% variability across models) and glacier contributions (median 0.10–0.21 m by 2100), but exclude low-probability, high-impact MICI scenarios that could add meters over centuries. Validation against historical data reveals past IPCC projections overestimated thermal expansion but underestimated recent acceleration, highlighting biases in model tuning toward equilibrium climates rather than transient dynamics. Uncertainty shrinks near-term (to 2050: ~0.1–0.3 m with high confidence) due to committed responses, enabling robust planning despite tails.[100][110][100]Projected Scenarios
Near-term Changes (to 2100)
Projections for global mean sea level (GMSL) rise by 2100, relative to the 1995–2014 baseline, span 0.28–0.55 meters under the very low emissions scenario SSP1-1.9 and 0.63–1.01 meters under the very high emissions scenario SSP5-8.5, representing the likely ranges (17th–83rd percentiles) from process-based models assessed in IPCC AR6.[100] These estimates incorporate ocean thermal expansion, glacier and ice cap mass loss, and contributions from the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, with thermal expansion projected to contribute 0.15–0.43 meters across scenarios.[100] Glacier melt is expected to add 0.07–0.25 meters, while Greenland ice sheet loss ranges from 0.04–0.32 meters.[100] Antarctic ice sheet contributions remain the dominant source of uncertainty, projected at 0.03–0.25 meters in median process-based models but potentially higher if marine ice sheet instability triggers rapid discharge.[100] Structured expert elicitations, accounting for low-likelihood dynamical processes, indicate a 5–95% uncertainty range extending to 0.7–1.2 meters from Antarctica alone under high emissions, potentially pushing total GMSL rise above 2 meters.[111] Recent process-informed assessments of tail risks suggest high-end GMSL rises of 1.3–1.6 meters by 2100 under unmitigated warming, exceeding AR6 medians due to amplified ice sheet sensitivities.[112] Current observed rates of GMSL rise, approximately 3.7 mm per year as of recent satellite data, are projected to accelerate to 5–15 mm per year by 2100 depending on scenario, driven by cumulative emissions and ice-ocean interactions.[1] Projections exclude post-2100 committed rise from slow-responding ice sheets, which could add substantial volume beyond 2100 even under near-term mitigation.[100] Deep uncertainties in ice sheet modeling persist, as advances in resolution and physics have narrowed but not eliminated discrepancies between simulated and observed mass loss trends.[113]Long-term Trajectories (Post-2100)
Beyond 2100, global mean sea level rise is projected to continue for centuries due to the thermal inertia of the oceans and the slow response of ice sheets to warming, with contributions increasingly dominated by mass loss from Greenland and Antarctica.[100] Under low-emission scenarios like SSP1-2.6, median projections indicate 0.3–0.6 m of additional rise by 2300 relative to 1995–2014, with a likely range extending to 3.1 m, primarily from structured expert assessments accounting for potential ice sheet instabilities.[100] In high-emission scenarios such as SSP5-8.5, median estimates reach 1.7–6.8 m by 2300 without invoking low-confidence marine ice cliff instability (MICI), though upper bounds could exceed 16 m if such processes activate.[100] Ice sheet contributions represent the primary source of uncertainty in these long-term projections, with Antarctica's potential marine ice sheet instability (MISI) capable of amplifying rise through grounding line retreat, while Greenland's surface melt and calving could add 0.3–1.7 m sea level equivalent by 2300 under high emissions.[100] Recent analyses emphasize committed rise from near-term emissions: under current policies approximating SSP2-4.5, emissions through 2050 lock in 0.3 m (likely range 0.2–0.5 m) more global mean sea level rise by 2300 than net-zero pathways by mid-century, with deep emission cuts before 2050 averting up to 0.6 m.[114] These commitments arise from cumulative greenhouse gas effects on ocean heat uptake and ice dynamics, persisting even after emissions cease.[114] Projections incorporate process-based models, semi-empirical approaches, and expert elicitations, but deep uncertainties persist regarding the timing and extent of ice sheet thresholds, as current models struggle to replicate observed accelerations and may underestimate rapid changes.[100] For instance, while MISI is considered plausible for vulnerable Antarctic sectors, MICI remains speculative with limited empirical support, leading some assessments to exclude it from likely ranges.[100] Glaciers and thermal expansion contribute smaller but more predictable amounts, with near-complete glacier loss (0.1–0.4 m equivalent) by 2300 under high emissions.[100] Overall, fulfilling Paris Agreement limits could cap median rise at under 1 m by 2300, but delays in peaking emissions add 0.2 m per five-year postponement.[26]Factors Amplifying or Dampening Projections
Ice sheet dynamics represent the primary source of deep uncertainty in sea level rise projections, with processes in Antarctica potentially amplifying contributions beyond median model estimates. Marine ice sheet instability (MISI) occurs when the grounding line of marine-based sectors retreats across retrograde bedrock slopes, leading to accelerated thinning and further inland migration, as observed in paleo-records and idealized models.[109] This can trigger marine ice cliff instability (MICI), where exposed cliffs taller than 100 meters collapse under their own weight, initiating rapid iceberg calving at rates exceeding 1 km per year, potentially adding 0.5–2 meters or more to global mean sea level by 2100 in low-probability, high-impact scenarios under high-emissions pathways.[114] [115] Such mechanisms, informed by structured expert assessments in IPCC AR6, skew the upper tail of probabilistic projections, though their likelihood remains low due to stabilizing factors like buttressing ice shelves and incomplete representation in process-based simulations.[100] In Greenland, amplifying feedbacks include surface mass balance losses from enhanced melt-albedo reduction and hydrofracturing of crevasses, which could increase contributions by 20–50% over baseline projections if summer melt intensifies nonlinearly.[116] Subglacial meltwater routing may further lubricate basal sliding, exacerbating outlet glacier speeds, as evidenced by recent observations at Thwaites Glacier.[117] However, these effects are better constrained than Antarctic uncertainties, with projections incorporating them showing median rises of 0.2–0.4 meters by 2100 from Greenland alone under SSP2-4.5 scenarios.[100] Dampening factors include stabilizing feedbacks in ice sheet margins, such as relative sea level fall adjacent to retreating grounding lines, which reduces hydrostatic pressure and promotes readvance, potentially limiting Antarctic mass loss by 10–30% in dynamic models.[118] Increased precipitation in polar regions could offset ablation through higher snow accumulation, though net losses dominate in observations; for instance, East Antarctic sectors exhibit mass gain that partially counters West Antarctic and Peninsula losses.[100] Terrestrial water storage changes also play a role: while current groundwater depletion amplifies sea level by ~0.4 mm/year, future impoundment via reservoirs or conservation could dampen this by up to 0.1–0.2 mm/year in low-depletion scenarios.[100] Geological processes like glacial isostatic adjustment contribute a minor global dampening of ~0.1 mm/year, though regionally variable.[119] Model biases introduce further modulation; historical assessments, such as IPCC SAR, overestimated thermal expansion by incorporating unrealized ocean heat uptake, suggesting potential downward revisions in future steric contributions if mixing efficiencies are refined.[110] Recent analyses indicate that the most extreme projections (>2 meters by 2100) are physically implausible due to energy constraints on ice cliff collapse rates and fracture mechanics, capping high-end risks closer to 1.5 meters under RCP8.5.[120] These dampeners underscore that while amplifiers dominate tail risks, median projections from AR6 (0.28–0.55 meters by 2100 across SSPs) align with process understanding, excluding low-confidence rapid collapse pathways.[100]Spatial Heterogeneity
Global Mean vs. Regional Patterns
Global mean sea level (GMSL) rise represents the average increase in ocean height across the world's oceans, primarily driven by thermal expansion of seawater and the addition of water from melting land ice, as measured by satellite altimetry at an average rate of 3.7 mm per year from 1999 to 2023.[121] In contrast, regional sea level changes deviate substantially from this mean, with some areas experiencing rates several millimeters per year higher or lower, influenced by spatially variable processes that redistribute ocean mass and alter local sea surface heights.[122] These deviations arise from ocean dynamics, such as wind-driven currents and internal waves, which can pile up or depress water masses; for instance, strengthening trade winds have contributed to higher sea levels in the western Pacific and lower levels in the eastern Pacific since the 1990s.[123] Gravitational effects from uneven ice melt further amplify regional patterns, creating "sea level fingerprints" where mass loss from Greenland and Antarctica reduces local gravity near the ice sheets, causing nearby sea levels to fall while distant regions, particularly the equatorial belt, experience amplified rise due to redistributed water mass.[123] Satellite data from 1993 to 2023 reveal these spatial heterogeneities, with accelerated rise observed along the U.S. East Coast—up to twice the global mean in some Mid-Atlantic locations—linked to changes in the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation and steric effects, while parts of the U.S. Gulf Coast show even faster increases compounded by local subsidence.[124] Natural climate variability, including phenomena like El Niño, dominates short-term regional fluctuations, though anthropogenic warming imprints longer-term trends, as evidenced by wind-induced circulation shifts explaining much of the observed pattern since 1993.[125][126] Projections indicate these regional disparities will persist or intensify under continued warming, with process-based models simulating greater variability in dynamic sea level contributions compared to the more uniform global mean, necessitating localized assessments for risk evaluation rather than reliance on GMSL alone.[122] Empirical analyses confirm that while GMSL has risen 111 mm over the altimeter era to 2023, regional trends range from near-zero to over 10 mm per year in hotspots, underscoring the causal role of ocean-atmosphere interactions over simplistic uniform rise assumptions.[35]Vertical Land Motion Effects
Vertical land motion (VLM), encompassing both subsidence and uplift of the Earth's crust, modulates the local experience of sea level rise by altering relative sea level (RSL) trends relative to the global mean absolute sea level change.[127] Subsidence exacerbates RSL rise in vulnerable coastal zones, potentially doubling or tripling flood risks, while uplift counteracts it, as observed in tide gauge records corrected via GPS measurements.[128] VLM contributions can account for up to 17% of observed coastal sea level variability, distinct from ocean dynamic trends.[129] Glacial isostatic adjustment (GIA), the viscoelastic response to Pleistocene ice sheet unloading, drives differential VLM patterns globally.[130] In formerly glaciated regions like Hudson Bay and Fennoscandia, ongoing uplift rates of 5–10 mm/year result in RSL fall, offsetting global sea level rise by up to 4 mm/year in some locations as of 2020.[131] Conversely, peripheral forebulge collapse induces subsidence of 1–3 mm/year along the U.S. East Coast and parts of the North Sea, amplifying RSL rise beyond global averages.[132] These GIA effects persist over millennia and must be modeled in regional projections, with uncertainties arising from mantle viscosity estimates.[133] Anthropogenic subsidence, often exceeding natural rates, dominates VLM in densely populated deltas and urban coasts due to groundwater extraction, sediment compaction, and hydrocarbon withdrawal.[134] Rates of 10–50 mm/year have been documented in areas like the Mississippi Delta and Jakarta Basin, where extraction since the mid-20th century has lowered land elevations by meters, compounding SLR to produce effective RSL rises of over 20 mm/year.[135] In U.S. metropolitan areas, at least 20% of urban land subsided at rates above 2 mm/year from 2016–2023, primarily from aquifer depletion, affecting infrastructure for 34 million residents.[136] Tectonic subsidence adds variability, as in the Indo-Gangetic Plain, but human factors often override it, necessitating integrated monitoring with InSAR and GNSS for accurate hazard assessment.[137] Failure to account for VLM in projections can underestimate flood frequencies by factors of 2–5 in subsiding regions.[128]Subsidence and Local Amplification
Land subsidence, the gradual sinking of the Earth's surface, significantly amplifies relative sea level rise (RSLR) in many coastal regions by adding to the global mean sea level rise (GMSLR) rate, resulting in RSLR = GMSLR + subsidence rate (negative for uplift).[138] Subsidence rates often exceed GMSLR, which averages 3.7 mm/year globally, with anthropogenic causes like groundwater extraction and sediment compaction dominating in densely populated deltas and urban areas.[139] [140] In the United States, subsidence affects 24 of 32 major coastal cities along the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts, with rates exceeding 2 mm/year in most cases and reaching up to 13 mm/year on the East Coast.[141] [142] For instance, cities like Norfolk, Virginia, and parts of the Gulf Coast experience subsidence-driven RSLR rates of 4-10 mm/year, far outpacing GMSLR and contributing to increased flooding independent of climatic factors.[143] Globally, over 25% of coastal populations live in areas with subsidence rates surpassing 10 mm/year, particularly in Asian megacities such as Jakarta (up to 20 mm/year) and Shanghai, where combined effects yield RSLR three times the global average, at 7.8-9.9 mm/year over the past two decades.[139] [140] This local amplification exacerbates flood risks, as subsidence can account for 50-90% of observed RSLR in subsiding regions, often overshadowing GMSLR contributions.[138] Unlike GMSLR, subsidence is frequently reversible through measures like regulated groundwater management, as demonstrated in parts of Tokyo where pumping restrictions reduced rates from 10+ mm/year in the mid-20th century to near zero by the 2000s.[144] Projections indicate that without addressing subsidence, low-lying areas could see land below mean sea level expand by 11.9-15.1% along the U.S. Atlantic coast by 2050 due to sinking alone.[141] Accurate assessment requires integrating satellite interferometry (e.g., InSAR) and tide gauge data to distinguish subsidence from eustatic SLR.[143]Consequences
Human and Infrastructural Vulnerabilities
Globally, between 900 million and 1 billion people currently inhabit low-elevation coastal zones (LECZ) below 10 meters elevation, rendering them susceptible to inundation from sea level rise of comparable magnitude combined with storm surges.[145] Improved coastal digital elevation models have tripled prior estimates of such exposure by correcting systematic overestimation of land heights in satellite data, revealing that approximately 110 million people live below mean high tide lines and 250 million below annual flood levels as of recent assessments.[145] These figures concentrate in densely populated deltas and urban agglomerations, particularly in Asia, where countries like China and Bangladesh host the largest shares; for instance, updated analyses indicate hundreds of millions more at risk than previously modeled due to elevation biases in older datasets.[145][146] In the United States, over 120 million individuals reside in coastal counties, with projections under shared socioeconomic pathway 2 and RCP 4.5 indicating that expected annual exposure to coastal flooding could rise 325% to 4.1 million people by 2100, outpacing overall population growth.[147] High tide flooding, exacerbated by relative sea level rise, has surged from an average of 1-2 days per year at many tide gauge sites in the mid-20th century to 5-10 or more days annually at vulnerable locations by the 2020s, disrupting daily life and straining emergency responses.[148] Socially disadvantaged communities often face disproportionate risks due to lower adaptive capacity, though quantification remains challenged by uneven data on socioeconomic factors.[149] Coastal infrastructure, encompassing ports, roads, bridges, airports, power plants, and wastewater systems, confronts amplified threats from chronic inundation and elevated storm impacts as sea levels rise.[150] In the U.S., subsidence in eastern seaboard cities such as Norfolk, Virginia, and parts of Florida intensifies relative sea level changes, endangering naval installations, transportation hubs, and urban developments critical to national security and commerce.[151] Globally, major ports facilitating over 90% of international trade lie in low-lying areas, where even 0.5 meters of rise could necessitate costly elevations or relocations to avert disruptions projected to affect billions in annual economic value under higher scenarios.[1] Nuclear power facilities and refineries clustered along coastlines further heighten risks, as evidenced by increasing flood exposures documented in vulnerability assessments.[152] Vulnerabilities extend to indirect effects like salinization of freshwater aquifers and agricultural lands, potentially displacing populations in deltaic regions without accounting for adaptation measures such as dikes, which many projections conservatively omit.[146] In developing nations, where institutional capacities lag, raw exposure translates more readily to humanitarian challenges, underscoring the interplay of geophysical forcing with socioeconomic factors in determining actual impacts.[153] Empirical observations confirm that current trends already manifest in heightened flood declarations and infrastructure maintenance costs, portending escalated pressures absent robust interventions.[154]Ecological Disruptions and Shifts
Sea level rise (SLR) threatens coastal wetlands, including salt marshes and mangroves, by inundating low-lying habitats faster than sediment accretion or vertical growth can compensate in many regions. In areas where relative SLR exceeds 4-5 mm/year, salt marshes experience increased flooding stress, leading to plant die-off and conversion to open water or mudflats, with models projecting up to 90% loss of U.S. East Coast marshes by 2100 under high-emission scenarios. Mangroves, while capable of landward migration in some subtropical settings, face barriers from human development and coastal squeeze, resulting in net habitat contraction; for instance, Mediterranean marshes could see large-scale loss, degrading ecosystem services like erosion control and carbon sequestration.[155][156][157] Coral reefs encounter disruptions from SLR through reduced light penetration at depth, exacerbating stress on already compromised colonies, though thermal bleaching from ocean warming remains the dominant mortality driver. Studies indicate that reefs with growth rates below 2-3 mm/year—common after bleaching events—cannot maintain pace with projected SLR of 0.5-1 meter by 2100, potentially leading to submergence and diminished protective functions against waves for adjacent shorelines. However, empirical data from sites like the Florida Keys show variable responses, with some reefs accreting via algal frameworks post-coral decline, highlighting that SLR's ecological impact is modulated by local factors like water quality and herbivory rather than SLR alone.[158][159][160] Biodiversity shifts include inland migration of salt-tolerant species, salinization of freshwater aquifers affecting terrestrial flora and fauna, and altered food webs in estuaries, with evidence of declining populations for species like certain wading birds and shellfish tied to habitat fragmentation. Coastal ecosystems may see a 20% decline in vegetative cover per meter of SLR in vulnerable zones, amplifying risks to fisheries that rely on these nurseries, though adaptive responses such as mangrove encroachment into marsh areas in the Gulf of Mexico suggest potential resilience in transitional biomes. Overall, while SLR drives measurable disruptions, confounding factors like pollution, overexploitation, and variable accretion rates underscore that attribution to SLR requires site-specific empirical validation beyond global models.[161][162][163]Quantified Economic and Demographic Risks
Projections indicate that global population exposure to coastal flooding risks associated with sea level rise could peak mid-century and reach up to 1.15 billion people by 2100, driven by demographic growth in low-lying coastal zones and projected inundation under various emission scenarios.[164] In the United States, approximately 20 million coastal residents face risks of isolation or inundation from sea level rise and storm surges as early as the 2030s, with vulnerabilities concentrated in subsiding regions like the Gulf Coast.[165] Under a 0.9-meter global mean sea level rise by 2100, an estimated 4.2 million people in the US could be at direct risk of chronic inundation, escalating to 13.1 million under a 1.8-meter scenario without substantial adaptation.[166] Globally, one analysis projects that 200 million people will reside on land below projected mean sea levels by 2100, with an additional 160 million exposed to heightened annual flooding frequencies.[167] Economic risks manifest primarily through direct damages to coastal infrastructure, real estate devaluation, and disruptions to trade and agriculture in flood-prone areas. Expected annual damages from coastal flooding are estimated to increase from 0.3% of global GDP in the present day to as much as 2.9% by 2100 if defenses fail to match sea level projections.[168] The United Kingdom's National Oceanographic Centre forecasts cumulative global costs from sea level rise reaching $14 trillion annually by 2100, largely attributable to inundation of urban centers and port facilities.[169] In dynamic models incorporating spatial economic shifts, unmitigated high-end sea level rise could induce GDP losses exceeding 1% relative to baselines in vulnerable economies by mid-century, though integrated adaptation strategies like dike elevation and managed retreat may limit macroeconomic impacts to below 1% in developed regions such as Europe through 2050.[170] These estimates vary significantly with assumptions on emission pathways, local subsidence, and adaptive capacity, with higher-end figures often critiqued for underemphasizing historical adaptation successes in coastal societies.[171]Adaptation Measures
Technological and Engineering Interventions
Technological and engineering interventions for sea level rise primarily involve hard infrastructure such as seawalls, dikes, levees, and movable flood barriers, designed to directly resist inundation and erosion. These structures aim to maintain coastal integrity by dissipating wave energy and preventing water overtopping, often incorporating flexible designs to accommodate projected rises of up to 1-2 meters by 2100. Effectiveness varies by location, with studies indicating that rigid barriers reduce local flood risk but can exacerbate erosion and elevate water levels in adjacent areas due to altered tidal dynamics.[172] [173] Prominent examples include the Netherlands' Delta Works and Delta Programme, a comprehensive system of dams, sluices, locks, dikes, and storm surge barriers initiated after the 1953 North Sea flood that killed over 1,800 people. Spanning the Rhine-Meuse-Scheldt delta, it protects approximately 60% of the nation's population and economy from storm surges and rising seas, with standards updated via the Delta Programme to account for 40-85 cm of mean sea level rise by 2100 under moderate emissions scenarios. Construction costs exceeded €5 billion for the core Delta Works (completed 1997), with ongoing maintenance and adaptations projected at €1-2 billion annually by mid-century to counter accelerating SLR and subsidence.[174] [175] In Venice, Italy, the MOSE (Modulo Sperimentale Elettromeccanico) project deploys 78 mobile gates across three lagoon inlets to block high tides exceeding 110 cm above mean sea level. Operational since October 2020, the system has been activated over 50 times annually in initial years, preventing floods during events where Adriatic levels reached 130-138 cm, though it requires raising for tides above design thresholds and faces maintenance challenges from corrosion and silting. Total costs surpassed €6.5 billion, with projections indicating limitations against 50-100 cm SLR by 2100 without extensions, as gates are engineered for up to 3 meters of rise but navigation and ecosystem impacts remain concerns.[176] [177] Beach nourishment, an engineering technique involving dredging and depositing sand to widen shores, temporarily offsets erosion from SLR and storms, with U.S. Geological Survey modeling showing it preserves dune height and island volume over decadal scales during moderate events. Applied extensively along U.S. Atlantic and Gulf coasts, projects like those on Dauphin Island, Alabama, have sustained beach width despite 3-5 mm/year local SLR, but renourishment every 5-10 years is needed as sand volumes erode faster under accelerated rise. Annual U.S. costs exceed $500 million for 100+ projects, deemed unsustainable long-term without addressing root sediment deficits, as effectiveness diminishes with >1 m SLR, potentially requiring hybrid approaches with groins or offshore reefs.[178] [179] [180] Emerging interventions include adaptable levees and elevated infrastructure, such as pump stations and raised roadways, evaluated for U.S. transportation networks vulnerable to 0.5-2 m SLR. Flexible designs, allowing height adjustments, yield benefit-cost ratios up to 3:1 over static structures, per economic analyses, though upfront costs for retrofitting can reach billions for urban ports. These measures prioritize causal factors like wave attenuation and land subsidence correction but demand empirical monitoring, as over-reliance on hard engineering risks maladaptation by interrupting natural sediment flows.[181] [173]Policy and Planning Frameworks
International policy frameworks addressing sea level rise primarily integrate adaptation measures into broader climate agreements rather than standalone treaties. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 2015 Paris Agreement emphasize national adaptation plans that include coastal resilience, with the Global Goal on Adaptation established to enhance collective efforts against risks like sea level rise.[182] The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere (SROCC, 2019) recommends robust planning through vulnerability assessments and scenario-based strategies, urging low-lying regions to prioritize hard infrastructure, ecosystem restoration, and flexible governance to accommodate uncertain projections.[183] However, discussions under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) highlight unresolved issues, such as the preservation of maritime boundaries and statehood for at-risk islands amid inundation, without binding resolutions as of 2023.[184] At the national level, adaptation strategies vary by vulnerability and resources, often incorporating sea level rise into coastal management laws. In the United States, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides guidelines for state and local plans, including the Sea Level Rise Viewer tool for risk mapping and the 2022 Sea Level Rise Vulnerability Assessment Framework, which defines exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity for planners.[185] Federal initiatives, such as the U.S. Department of State's 2024 actions, coordinate with partners for resilience projects, while the Environmental Protection Agency's Coastal Adaptation Toolkit outlines planning frameworks encompassing zoning reforms, funding mechanisms, and nature-based solutions like wetland restoration.[186][187] The Netherlands' Delta Programme, updated annually since 2010, exemplifies integrated water management, budgeting €1.2 billion yearly for dikes, dunes, and flood defenses calibrated to projected rises of 0.4–1.3 meters by 2100 under various scenarios.[188] Local planning frameworks emphasize site-specific tools to balance development and risk. Cities like San Francisco implement the 2016 Sea Level Rise Action Plan, which mandates elevation requirements for new builds and restricts development in high-hazard zones based on assessments projecting 0.6–1.4 meters of rise by 2100.[189] Equity-focused approaches, as analyzed in 2024 studies, integrate justice considerations into urban plans, advocating community involvement to avoid disproportionate burdens on low-income areas, though implementation often lags due to data gaps and political hurdles.[190] Common strategies include "hard" protections like seawalls, "soft" options such as beach nourishment, and managed retreat via land acquisition, with toolkits recommending iterative reviews every 5–10 years to incorporate updated observations over model-dependent forecasts.[191] These frameworks prioritize empirical monitoring from tide gauges and satellites to refine policies, acknowledging that subsidence and storm surges amplify local threats beyond global means.[192]Cost-Benefit Analyses of Strategies
Cost-benefit analyses of sea level rise adaptation strategies evaluate the net present value (NPV) or benefit-cost ratios (BCRs) of interventions by comparing upfront and recurring costs—such as construction, maintenance, and environmental trade-offs—against benefits like averted flood damages, preserved asset values, and reduced relocation needs. These analyses incorporate discount rates, SLR projections, and socioeconomic scenarios, revealing that viability hinges on local asset densities, SLR magnitude, and strategy synergies; for instance, BCRs frequently exceed 1 for urban protections under moderate SLR (e.g., 0.5–1 m by 2100) but decline under high-end projections due to escalating maintenance demands.[193][194] Hard engineering protections, including dikes and seawalls, often demonstrate economic justification in high-value coastal zones by minimizing dryland losses that surpass protection expenses, as dryland asset values typically outweigh combined wetland degradation and construction costs.[195] Global modeling projects annual protection costs rising to 0.3–1.6% of GDP in vulnerable nations under 1–2 m SLR, with BCRs supporting investment for 10–20% of coastlines where residual flood risks remain low post-adaptation.[196][194] However, pure reliance on such measures amplifies GDP losses to 1–2.5% by 2050 under high-end SLR in regions like Southeast Asia, where dike heights must exceed 2 m, straining budgets without ancillary actions.[170] Soft and nature-based protections, such as beach nourishment and wetland or oyster reef restoration, yield superior BCRs in erosion-prone settings by leveraging natural dissipation of wave energy, with U.S. Gulf Coast analyses showing ratios of 3.7–4.9 for nature-based options versus under 1 for equivalent grey infrastructure like local levees, averting $49–65 billion in damages by 2030 at lower unit costs.[197] These approaches also accrue co-benefits like habitat enhancement, though effectiveness diminishes beyond 1 m SLR without hybridization, as hydrodynamic feedbacks erode long-term NPV.[198] Managed retreat, involving relocation from inundation zones, circumvents indefinite protection outlays but incurs immediate costs for property buyouts and infrastructure decommissioning, alongside persistent losses from foregone land productivity; it proves optimal in low-density areas where protection plus wetland mitigation exceeds salvaged dryland benefits.[195] Macroeconomic assessments under RCP8.5 scenarios indicate retreat via autonomous migration limits GDP impacts to under 3% by 2050, outperforming standalone protection in asset-sparse developing economies by avoiding overinvestment in futile defenses.[170] Hybrid strategies combining protection with selective retreat or migration consistently minimize total costs, reducing global GDP losses to under 1% by 2050 even under high-end SLR (e.g., 1.5 m median), as migration absorbs residual risks post-diking, yielding positive NPVs where siloed approaches falter due to uncertainty in SLR trajectories exceeding 2 m.[170][199] Such integrations underscore that adaptation economics favor flexible pathways over rigid commitments, with global flood protection costs potentially reaching $2.3 trillion annually by 2°C warming if high-end SLR materializes without retreats.[200]Scientific Debates
Reliability of Historical Projections
Early projections of sea level rise, such as those in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) First Assessment Report (FAR) published in 1990, estimated a global mean sea level increase of approximately 20 cm by 2030 relative to 1990 levels under a range of scenarios.[201] This implied an average rate exceeding 5 mm per year over the intervening four decades. In comparison, reconstructed observations from tide gauge records indicate an average rise of about 1.7 mm per year from 1900 to 2020, with acceleration to around 3 mm per year from 1990 to 2020, resulting in roughly 9 cm of total rise over those 30 years.[1] [26] Satellite altimetry data from 1993 onward confirm rates starting at 2.1 mm per year in the early 1990s, increasing to 3.9 mm per year in the 2010s, yielding about 10 cm from 1993 to 2023.[6] [35] These observations suggest the FAR's near-term projection substantially overestimated the rate, potentially due to overly pessimistic assumptions about ice sheet response and limited understanding of ocean thermal expansion at the time.[110] Subsequent evaluations of mid-1990s projections from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) indicate greater alignment with data. The SAR's mid-range estimate anticipated roughly 8 cm of rise over the following 30 years from the mid-1990s, which closely matches the approximately 10 cm observed through satellite measurements to the mid-2020s, though with noted underestimation of contributions from ice sheet melting.[202] [110] A 2025 analysis in Earth's Future found these early projections robust overall, accurately forecasting glacier mass loss and seawater thermal expansion, components that have driven about two-thirds of recent sea level change.[110] However, dynamic ice sheet processes, particularly in Antarctica, were not fully incorporated, leading to ranges that sometimes fell short of the observed doubling of the rise rate from 2.1 mm per year in 1993 to 4.5 mm per year by 2023.[203] [35]| Projection Source | Projected Rise (Baseline to Endpoint) | Observed Rise (Approximate) | Key Discrepancy |
|---|---|---|---|
| IPCC FAR (1990) to 2030 | ~20 cm (1990-2030) | ~12-15 cm (1990-2025 est.) | Overestimation of rate by ~2 mm/yr on average |
| IPCC SAR (1995) mid-range to ~2025 | ~8 cm (mid-1990s to mid-2020s) | ~10 cm (1993-2023) | Close match, but underestimated ice melt acceleration |
Attribution Disputes: Natural vs. Human Dominance
![Post-Glacial sea level changes illustrating natural variability over millennia][float-right] The dominant scientific consensus, as synthesized in the IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report, attributes the majority of global mean sea level (GMSL) rise observed since approximately 1970 to anthropogenic forcing, primarily through greenhouse gas-induced ocean warming leading to thermal expansion and enhanced ice melt from glaciers and ice sheets. Attribution studies employing detection and attribution methods, which compare observed trends against model simulations with and without human forcings, indicate that it is very likely that human influence has been the main contributor to GMSL rise over this period, with estimates suggesting anthropogenic factors account for the bulk of the approximately 0.2 meters of rise since 1900, accelerating to rates of 3-4 mm/year in recent decades.[100][205] Disputes arise from analyses emphasizing natural variability's role in modulating sea level trends, arguing that multi-decadal ocean-atmosphere oscillations such as the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) and Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO) can explain much of the observed acceleration without invoking dominant anthropogenic dominance. For instance, Becker et al. (2014) examined long-term tide gauge records and concluded that global sea level trends over the past century align more closely with natural forcings and internal variability than with anthropogenic greenhouse gas increases, noting that rates during the early 20th century were comparable to recent decades prior to significant CO2 emissions rises. Similarly, critiques highlight that climate models used in IPCC assessments often underestimate natural variability at interannual to centennial scales, potentially inflating the attributed anthropogenic signal by failing to fully replicate unforced internal dynamics.[206][207] Paleoclimate reconstructions further fuel the debate, revealing episodes of rapid sea level rise during the Holocene—such as rates exceeding 10 mm/year during meltwater pulses—driven by natural deglaciation without human influence, suggesting current trends may fall within the envelope of natural fluctuations amplified by regional factors like glacial isostatic adjustment. Some studies parse recent acceleration, attributing 40-60% to natural variability intertwined with anthropogenic signals, particularly in regional contexts where ENSO phases correlate with decadal rate changes. These perspectives underscore ongoing uncertainties in partitioning causes, with skeptics of strong anthropogenic dominance pointing to potential biases in model tuning and data homogenization that favor warming narratives, while mainstream views counter that fingerprinting techniques robustly isolate human effects amid noise.[208][209]Data Artifacts and Measurement Biases
Tide gauges provide long-term records of relative sea level change, measuring water height against fixed land-based benchmarks, but these are confounded by vertical land motion (VLM) such as subsidence from groundwater extraction, tectonic activity, or glacial isostatic adjustment (GIA).[127] In subsiding coastal regions, including many urban tide gauge sites like those along the U.S. Gulf Coast or Asian deltas, VLM can contribute 1–3 mm/year or more to apparent sea level rise, inflating relative trends beyond eustatic (absolute ocean volume) changes.[210] For instance, uncorrected tide gauge data from the Pacific Northwest showed SLR rates biased upward by up to 1 mm/year due to anthropogenic subsidence, which GPS measurements later quantified and subtracted to reveal lower eustatic contributions.[210] Globally, the uneven distribution of tide gauges—concentrated in the Northern Hemisphere and near populated, often subsiding coasts—introduces spatial sampling bias, with historical averages of 1.7–2.0 mm/year potentially overestimating eustatic rise when weighted toward high-VLM sites.[29] Satellite altimetry, operational since 1993 via missions like TOPEX/Poseidon and Jason series, measures absolute sea surface height over the open ocean, circumventing direct VLM effects but introducing artifacts from instrument drift, radiometer calibration errors, and tidal model inaccuracies.[211] Drift in altimeter range measurements, monitored by differencing satellite data against tide gauges, has been corrected iteratively, with early underestimations masking acceleration; post-2015 adjustments revealed rates rising from ~2.1 mm/year in the 1990s to ~4.5 mm/year by 2023.[212] [35] However, reliance on tide gauges for absolute bias correction creates potential circularity, as VLM-biased relative records may propagate errors into global means, particularly since altimetry excludes near-shore zones where 90% of human impacts occur.[91] Uncertainties in mean sea surface models and wet tropospheric corrections can contribute up to 0.5 mm/year variability, with higher errors in polar regions due to ice contamination and sparse validation.[91] Reconciling datasets requires VLM corrections via GPS colocated with tide gauges or GIA models, revealing that sterodynamic effects (ocean density/ circulation) and mass addition explain only ~60–80% of observed relative trends, with VLM dominating the rest in 17–20% of coastal sites.[213] In glaciated regions like Scandinavia, post-glacial rebound (uplift of 5–10 mm/year) masks SLR in tide records, while Arctic amplification biases satellite data through unmodeled sea ice effects.[127] These artifacts underscore that raw relative SLR metrics, often cited for policy, conflate geophysical signals; absolute eustatic rise demands integrated corrections, yet incomplete VLM coverage affects ~30% of long-term gauges, limiting confidence in acceleration claims beyond the satellite era.[214] Peer-reviewed analyses emphasize that without such adjustments, global compilations overestimate uniform rise, ignoring heterogeneous drivers like local compaction.[29] [213]References
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