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The arms industry, also known as the defense (or defence) industry, military industry, or the arms trade, is a global industry which manufactures and sells weapons and other military technology to a variety of customers, including the armed forces of states and civilian individuals and organizations. Products of the arms industry include weapons, munitions, weapons platforms, communications systems, and other electronics, and related equipment. The arms industry also provides defense-related services, such as logistical and operational support. As a matter of policy, many governments of industrialized countries maintain or support a network of organizations, facilities, and resources to produce weapons and equipment for their military forces (and sometimes those of other countries). This is often referred to as a defense industrial base. Entities involved in arms production for military purposes vary widely, and include private sector commercial firms, state-owned enterprises and public sector organizations, and scientific and academic institutions.[1] Such entities perform a wide variety of functions, including research and development, engineering, production, and servicing of military material, equipment, and facilities. The weapons they produce are often made, maintained, and stored in arsenals.

In some regions of the world, there is a substantial legal trade in firearms for use by individuals (commonly cited purposes include self-defense and hunting/sporting). Illegal small arms trade occurs in many countries and regions affected by political instability.

History

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Coventry Ordnance Works producing naval artillery during World War I

During the early modern period, England, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands became self-sufficient in arms production, with diffusion and migration of skilled workers to more peripheral countries such as Portugal and Russia.[citation needed]

The modern arms industry emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century as a product of the creation and expansion of the first large military–industrial companies. As smaller countries and even newly industrializing countries like Russia and Japan could no longer produce cutting-edge military equipment with their Indigenous capacity-based resources, they increasingly began to contract the manufacturers of military equipment, such as battleships, artillery pieces and rifles to foreign government military entities.[citation needed] In 1854, the British government awarded a contract to the Elswick Ordnance Company to supply the latest loading artillery pieces. This galvanized the private sector into weapons production, with the surplus increasingly exported to foreign countries. William Armstrong became one of the first international arms dealers, selling his systems to governments across the world from Brazil to Japan.[2][non-primary source needed] In 1884, he opened a shipyard at Elswick to specialize in warship production – at the time, it was the only factory in the world that could build a battleship and arm it completely.[3] The factory produced warships for foreign naval forces, including the Imperial Japanese Navy. Several Armstrong cruisers played an important role in defeating the Russian fleet at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905.[citation needed] In the American Civil War in 1861 the North had about ten times the manufacturing capacity of the economy of the Confederate States of America. This advantage over the South included the ability to produce (in relatively small numbers) breech-loading rifles for use against the muzzle-loading rifled muskets of the South. This began the transition to industrially produced mechanized weapons such as the Gatling gun.[4]

This industrial innovation in the defense industry was adopted by Prussia in its 1864, 1866, and 1870–71 defeats of Denmark, Austria, and, France respectively. By this time the machine gun had begun entering arsenals. The first examples of its effectiveness were in 1899 during the Boer War and in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War. However, Germany led the innovation of weapons and this advantage in the weapons of World War I nearly defeated the allies.[citation needed]

Stacks of shells in the National Shell Filling Factory, Chilwell during World War I

In 1885, France decided to capitalize on this increasingly lucrative trade and repealed its ban on weapon exports. The regulatory framework for the period up to the First World War was characterized by a laissez-faire policy that placed little obstruction in the way of weapons exports. Due to the carnage of World War I, arms traders began to be regarded with odium as "merchants of death" and were accused of having instigated and perpetuated the war for earning their profits from weapons sales. An inquiry into these allegations in Britain failed to find evidence to support them. However, the sea change in attitude about war more generally meant that governments began to control and regulate the trade themselves.[citation needed] The volume of the arms trade greatly increased during the 20th century, and it began to be used as a political tool, especially during the Cold War when the United States and the USSR supplied weapons to their proxies across the world, particularly third world countries (see Nixon Doctrine).[5]

Sectors

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Land-based weapons

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British Mark V Tank
British Mark V tank

This category includes everything from light arms to heavy artillery, and the majority of producers are small. Many are located in third-world countries. International trade in handguns, machine guns, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other relatively inexpensive weapons is substantial. There is relatively little regulation at the international level, and as a result, many weapons fall into the hands of organized crime, rebel forces, terrorists, or regimes under sanctions.[6]

Small arms

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Main articles: Small arms trade, Small arms and light weapons, and List of most-produced firearms
The AK series of weapons have been produced in greater numbers than any other firearm and have been used in conflicts all over the world.

One billion firearms were in global circulation in 2017; of those, 857 million (85%) were possessed by civilians, 133 million (13%) were possessed by national militaries, and 23 million (2%) belonged to law enforcement agencies.[7] 1,135 companies based in more than 98 countries manufactured small arms as well as their various components and ammunition as of 2003.[8]

One billion firearms were in global circulation in 2017; of those, 857 million (85%) were possessed by civilians, 133 million (13%) were possessed by national militaries, and 23 million (2%) belonged to law enforcement agencies.[9]

Aerospace systems

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Main article: Aerospace manufacturer

Encompassing military aircraft (both land-based and naval aviation), conventional missiles, and military satellites, this is the most technologically advanced sector of the market. It is also the least competitive from an economic standpoint, with a handful of companies dominating the entire market. The top clients and major producers are virtually all located in the western world and Russia, with the United States easily in the first place. Prominent aerospace firms include Rolls-Royce, BAE Systems, Saab AB, Dassault Aviation, Sukhoi, Mikoyan, EADS, Leonardo, Thales Group, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, RTX Corporation, and Boeing. There are also several multinational consortia mostly involved in the manufacturing of fighter jets, such as the Eurofighter. The largest military contract in history, signed in October 2001, involved the development of the Joint Strike Fighter.[6]

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Several of the world's great powers maintain substantial naval forces to provide a global presence, with the largest nations possessing aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and advanced anti-air defense systems. The vast majority of military ships are conventionally powered, but some are nuclear-powered. There is also a large global market in second-hand naval vessels, generally purchased by developing countries from Western governments.[6]

Cybersecurity

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Main articles: Cyber-arms industry, Computer security, and Cyberwarfare

The cybersecurity industry is expected to be of increasing importance to defense, intelligence, and homeland security agencies.[10][11][better source needed]

International arms transfers

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Global weapons sales from 1950 to 2006

Over time

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2010–2014

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Share of arms sales by country in 2013. Source is provided by SIPRI.[12]

According to research institute SIPRI, the volume of international transfers of major weapons in 2010–14 was 16 percent higher than in 2005–2009. The five biggest exporters in 2010–2014 were the United States, Russia, China, Germany, and France, and the five biggest importers were India, Saudi Arabia, China, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan. The flow of arms to the Middle East increased by 87 percent between 2009–13 and 2014–18, while there was a decrease in flows to all other regions: Africa, the Americas, Asia and Oceania, and Europe.[13]

2014–2018

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SIPRI has identified 67 countries as exporters of major weapons in 2014–18. The top 5 exporters during the period were responsible for 75 percent of all arms exports. The composition of the five largest exporters of arms changed between 2014 and 2018 and remained unchanged compared to 2009–13, although their combined total exports of major arms were 10 percent higher. In 2014–18, significant increases in arms exports from the US, France and Germany were seen, while Chinese exports rose marginally and Russian exports decreased.[13]

In 2014–18, 155 countries (about three-quarters of all countries) imported major weapons. The top 5 recipients accounted for 33 percent of the total arms imports during the period. The top five arms importers – Saudi Arabia, India, Egypt, Australia, and Algeria – accounted for 35 percent of total arms imports in 2014–18. Of these, Saudi Arabia and India were among the top five importers in both 2009–13 and 2014–18.

In 2014–18, the volume of major arms international transfers was 7.8 percent higher than in 2009–13 and 23 percent higher than that in 2004–08. The largest arms importer was Saudi Arabia, importing arms primarily from the United States, United Kingdom, and France. Between 2009–13 and 2014–18, the flow of arms to the Middle East increased by 87 percent. Also including India, Egypt, Australia, and Algeria, the top five importers received 35 percent of the total arms imports, during 2014–18. The five largest exporters were the United States, Russia, France, Germany and China.[13]

Post-2018

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Imports of major arms by states in Europe increased by 155 per cent between 2015–19 and 2020–24, while the global volume of international arms transfers decreased marginally, by 0.6 per cent. The five largest arms importers in 2020–24 were Ukraine, India, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, while the five largest arms exporters were the United States, France, Russia, China and Germany.[14]

World's largest arms exporters

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Top arms exporters by country in Trend-Indicator Values (TIV)
U.S. arms exports by year. The U.S. exported $238 billion in arms in 2023.[15]

The following are estimates from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's Arms Transfers Database.[16]

2020-2024
rank 		Exporter Share of global arms exports
(%)
1  United States 43
2  France 9.6
3  Russia 7.8
4  China 5.9
5  Germany 5.6
6  Italy 4.8
7  United Kingdom 3.6
8  Israel 3.1
9  Spain 3.0
10  Republic of Korea 2.2
Sgraffito at the Lambert Sevart weapons factory, in Liege (Belgium) (early 20th century)

While Russian, Chinese and German arms exports fell from 2015-2019, US and French arms exports rose. The top 25 arms exporters accounted for 98 per cent of the world’s arms exports in 2020–24. States in North America and Europe together accounted for 87 per cent of all arms exports in the period. The five largest exporters in Western Europe supplied around one quarter of total global arms exports in 2020–24.[17]

World's largest arms exporters since 1950

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SIPRI uses the "trend-indicator values" (TIV). These are based on the known unit production costs of weapons and represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.[18]

1950–2022
rank 		Supplier Arms export
(in billion TIV)
1  United States 729,161
2  Soviet Union (1950-1991) 450,786
3  Russia (1992-present) 155,926
4  United Kingdom 144,569
5  France 136,347
6  Germany 90,701
7  China 61,283
8  Italy 37,328
9  Czechoslovakia (1950-1992) 31,066
10  Netherlands 25,632

World's largest arms importers

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Arms import rankings fluctuate heavily as countries enter and exit wars. Accordingly, 5-year moving averages present a much more accurate picture of import volume, free from yearly fluctuations.[19]

2020-2024
rank 		Importer Share of global arms imports
(in %)
1  Ukraine 8.8
2  India 8.3
3  Qatar 6.8
4  Saudi Arabia 6.8
5  Pakistan 4.6
6  Japan 3.9
7  Australia 3.5
8  Egypt 3.3
9  United States 3.1
10  Kuwait 2.9

In the period from 2020 to 2024, the top five arms importers together received 35.3 per cent of all arms imports. States in Asia and Oceania accounted for 33 per cent of all arms imports in 2020–24, followed by Europe (28 per cent), the Middle East (27 per cent), the Americas (6.2 per cent) and Africa (4.5 per cent).[20]

List of major weapon manufacturers

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For a more comprehensive list, see List of modern armament manufacturers and List of defense contractors.

This is a list of the world's largest arms manufacturers and other military service companies who profit the most from the war economy, their origin is shown as well. The information is based on a list published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for 2023.[21]

2023 rank Company name Arms revenue
(US$ billions) 		% of total revenue
from arms
1 United States Lockheed Martin 60.81 90
2 United States RTX Corporation 40.66 59
3 United States Northrop Grumman 35.57 90.5
4 United States Boeing 31.10 40
5 United States General Dynamics 30.20 71.4
6 United Kingdom BAE Systems 29.81 98.2
7 Russia Rostec 21.73 65
8 China Aviation Industry Corporation of China 20.85 25
9 China NORINCO 20.56 26.8
10 China China Electronics Technology Group Corporation 16.05 28.7
11 United States L3Harris Technologies 14.76 76
12 European Union Airbus 12.89 18.2
13 Italy Leonardo 12.39 75
14 China China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation 12.35 30
15 China China State Shipbuilding Corporation 11.48 23.5

Economics of the arms industry

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Market failures

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... in all countries, markets for military goods work poorly. This is to a large extent independent of the constitution of the state and the social and economic system. In all countries, whether ownership is private or collective, and whether rulers are democratic or authoritarian, the agents on each side of the defense market are powerful and well connected. On one side a senior minister manages a government monopsony: there is only one significant customer for such items as heavy artillery, aircraft, and battleships. On the other side is a charmed circle of big defense contractors. A few large-scale corporations supply such weapons; their ability to squeeze money out of government is augmented by the fact that they are too important for production, employment, and national security for the government to let them fail. As a direct result, defense markets everywhere are notorious for cost overruns, delayed deliveries, quality shortfalls, subsidies, and kickbacks. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that defense markets everywhere are uniformly the same.

— Harrison & Markevich[22]: 156 

A free market for weapons cannot exist within a state because the market is necessarily a monopsony where there is a single buyer and a small number of suppliers.[23]: 5, 30–31, 69  The high cost of weapons together with the lack of a free market makes pricing controversial and allegations of corruption and inefficiency common.[23]: 1  Furthermore, the complexity and specialization involved in weapons together with barriers to entry created by the government procurement process frequently result in monopolistic situations where suppliers are able to charge high prices and dictate long delivery times.[23]: 6  The cyclic nature of the business has driven consolidation which further impedes pricing.[23]: 11 

While profiteering by the arms industry is frequently blamed for the costs of defense procurement, a comparison between commercial and defense companies found little difference in profitability. Rather, cost overruns appear to be caused by a variety of complicated factors inherent in the structure of military procurement including needless levels of technological sophistication, a bidding process that rewards underbidding, a profit formula that rewards inefficiency by paying contractors a percentage of the total cost, procurement organization structure that hampers decision-making, and concurrent engineering that requires rework of already produced equipment.[24]: 18–19  Technological determinism may arise where competition between weapons systems drives relentless development of new weapons, not because they are needed, but because they are possible.[25]: 32–33  Pressure on the US government has resulted in an inefficient procurement system where the government negotiates with the objective of low contractor profit rather than low overall cost.[23]

Poorly managed procurement during the American Civil War resulted in generals and states competing against each other when buying arms which resulted in a seller’s market where prices were ten times higher than before the war and the goods were sometimes unusable.[26]: 178  Similar problems occurred at the start of WWII before procurement was centralized to the War Production Board to prevent useless competition.[27]: 119 

Bids for government contracts may involve collusion among the bidders to extract exorbitant profits.[28]: 94  High profitability of companies involved in the manufacture of armor plate for ships resulting from their anti-competitive tactics around the year 1900 lead to much public controversy. This culminated in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 to limit the sort of abuses perpetrated by the nickel-steel cartel.[29]: 56  The period leading up to WWI saw Navy Department funds being used as a source of federal patronage.[30]: 60 

A continuing community of interests between the military and industry creates the potential for an old boy network in control of weapons procurement that threatens the public interest.[31]: 256–257  This may involve a revolving door dynamic were personnel frequently change their employment between government and private industry, thus making their allegiance unclear.[26]: 179 

International trade

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Multinational corporations form a global network stitched together by reciprocal agreements and interlocking ownership that may pursue objectives contrary to that of the nations whose resources they employ.[28]: 94 [32]: 43  For example, the English arms maker Vickers supplied field guns to Germany prior to 1914. These guns were then used against British troops during WWI.[28]: 95 

Furthermore, a tradeoff exists between procuring the best specialized parts and materials from international businesses, or attempting to achieve autarky by developing purely domestic substitutes. During the Gulf War, a shortage of advanced ceramic components for Tomahawk missiles occurred. This was caused by a ceramics manufacturer located in the US being pressured by its Japanese parent company, which was in turn pressured by Socialist members of the National Diet to withhold support for the war.[32]: 43–44 

Arms control

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Main article: Arms control

Arms control refers to international restrictions upon the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation, and usage of small arms, conventional weapons, and weapons of mass destruction.[33] It is typically exercised through the use of diplomacy, which seeks to persuade governments to accept such limitations through agreements and treaties, although it may also be forced upon non-consenting governments.

Notable international arms control treaties

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See also

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Wikimedia Commons has media related to Military industry.

References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Arms industry

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The arms industry encompasses private and state-owned enterprises engaged in the , development, production, and sale of weaponry, , vehicles, , and related services primarily to governments for defense purposes. It operates within a framework of imperatives, export regulations, and international treaties aimed at controlling proliferation, though enforcement varies due to geopolitical rivalries. In 2023, the 100 largest arms-producing and services companies worldwide generated $632 billion in arms-related revenues, a 4.2 percent real-terms increase from 2022, fueled by ongoing conflicts and regional tensions that heightened demand for advanced weaponry and sustainment services. The sector's economic footprint extends beyond direct sales, supporting high-technology jobs, spillovers to civilian applications, and substantial contributions to GDP in major producer nations, where often constitutes the primary revenue stream. The leads as the dominant exporter, capturing 43 percent of global major arms transfers from 2020 to 2024, followed by , , , and , reflecting alignments with allied defense networks and strategic deterrence needs. Key characteristics include heavy reliance on state-funded , which drives breakthroughs in areas such as precision-guided munitions and stealth technologies, alongside persistent debates over the military-industrial complex's influence on policy through and cycles. Controversies often center on arms diversion to non-state and the ethical implications of profiting from conflict, yet empirical evidence underscores the industry's role in maintaining military balances that deter , as evidenced by sustained exports to regions facing existential threats. Russia's exports declined sharply by 64 percent between 2015–19 and 2020–24 due to sanctions and production constraints, illustrating how supply disruptions can shift global market dynamics.

Overview and Economic Significance

Definition and Scope

The arms industry, also known as the defense industry, consists of the global network of public and private companies involved in the , development, , , and sale of goods and services primarily to forces, governments, and allied entities. This sector focuses on lethal and non-lethal systems designed for combat, defense, and security operations, with "arms sales" defined by the (SIPRI) as revenues from goods and services sold to customers, encompassing both domestic and exports. Excluded from this scope are or activities conducted directly by services themselves, as well as purely products, though dual-use technologies (e.g., certain or materials applicable to both and commercial uses) may contribute if their primary revenue derives from applications. The scope extends beyond hardware to include subsystems, components, ammunition, and specialized support such as logistics, training, and operational sustainment, enabling the full lifecycle of military capabilities from design to deployment. Core product categories encompass , armored ground vehicles, systems (fixed- and rotary-wing ), naval vessels, missiles, and advanced electronics like , , and command-and-control systems. While the industry is regulated by national export controls and international agreements such as the (established in 1996 to promote transparency and responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods), its operations remain shaped by strategic imperatives, with production often concentrated in a handful of nations possessing advanced technological and industrial bases. This delineation underscores the industry's distinct role in , separate from broader economic sectors, though overlaps exist in supply chains for raw materials and intermediate goods.

Global Market Size and Employment

The revenues from arms sales and military services by the world's 100 largest arms-producing companies totaled $632 billion in 2023, marking a 4.2 percent real-terms increase from 2022 and a 19 percent rise since 2015. This figure, compiled by the (SIPRI) from company financial reports, captures the core scale of the global arms market, dominated by firms in , missiles, ships, and production, though it excludes smaller producers and non-disclosed state-owned entities in countries like . Growth was propelled by heightened demand amid the Russia-Ukraine war, tensions, and regional conflicts, with production backlogs delaying fuller revenue realization in some sectors. United States-based companies generated $317 billion, or 50 percent of the total, underscoring national dominance driven by procurement from the U.S. Department of Defense. European firms contributed $133 billion, while Russian companies saw $25.5 billion despite sanctions-related constraints. Broader estimates of the defense market, encompassing and related sectors, place global revenues higher when including commercial overlaps; for instance, the top 100 aerospace and defense firms reported $922 billion in in , with defense comprising a significant portion amid rising budgets. However, arms-specific revenues remain a subset, as global expenditure reached $2.718 trillion in —up 9.4 percent from 2023—but efficiency, domestic production mandates, and limit direct industry capture to under 25 percent of spending. Projections indicate continued expansion, with the defense market forecasted to grow from $473.47 billion in to $506.9 billion in 2025 at a compound annual rate influenced by geopolitical instability and technological investments in unmanned systems and cyber defenses. Employment in the arms industry supports millions of high-skill positions worldwide, though comprehensive global aggregates are limited due to varying national reporting and classification of defense versus dual-use manufacturing. In the United States, the aerospace and defense sector employed 2.211 million workers in 2023, equating to 1.4 percent of total U.S. employment and reflecting growth in direct defense roles amid supply chain expansions. Europe's aerospace and defense industry, per the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe, sustained 921,400 jobs across member states in recent years, with a 5.2 percent increase tied to post-Ukraine rearmament. These roles span engineering, R&D, assembly, and logistics, often requiring specialized skills that contribute to broader technological spillovers, though critics note opportunity costs relative to civilian sectors; SIPRI data implies the top 100 firms alone employ several million, concentrated in high-wage OECD economies.

Historical Evolution

Origins to Industrial Revolution

The production of arms in antiquity relied on artisanal craftsmanship, with bronze weapons such as spears and swords manufactured by specialized smiths in civilizations like and the as early as 2000 BCE, using basic and techniques to meet demands of early warfare. In medieval Europe, arms manufacturing evolved through guild systems, where armorers and bladesmiths in centers like , , and , , produced high-quality plate armor and edged weapons for knights and mercenaries, often exporting to broader markets by the 14th and 15th centuries. These operations remained small-scale and labor-intensive, lacking , with each piece hand-forged to fit individual users. A pivotal advancement occurred with the establishment of the in 1104 CE, which developed into Europe's first large-scale, state-controlled arms and shipbuilding complex, employing division of labor and prefabricated components to produce galleys, crossbows, and later and early firearms. By the , the Arsenal housed up to 16,000 workers across forges, foundries, and assembly areas, enabling the rapid output of one armed galley per day and munitions sufficient to sustain Venice's maritime dominance, foreshadowing proto-industrial methods through workflow organization rather than machinery. Similar but smaller facilities emerged elsewhere, such as royal arsenals in and , where weapons like matchlocks—introduced around 1400—began supplementing traditional arms, though production stayed guild-dominated and limited by manual processes. The , commencing in Britain around 1760, transformed arms production from craft-based to mechanized factory systems, driven by wartime demands that incentivized innovations in and . In Birmingham's , clusters of workshops scaled up using steam-powered hammers and lathes, with output expanding fivefold from 1790 to the 1830s to supply conflicts like the , where Britain produced over 1 million annually by the early . This shift enabled —pioneered in musket contracts—and rifled barrels, reducing costs and increasing reliability, while state oversight in facilities like the Royal Gunpowder Mills integrated chemical advances for propellants, laying foundations for mass militarization.

World Wars and Mass Production

The First World War compelled belligerent nations to industrialize arms manufacturing on an immense scale, marking the industry's transition to mass production of standardized weaponry and munitions. Factories across Europe and later the United States shifted from civilian output to wartime needs, producing vast quantities of artillery shells, rifles, and ammunition; Britain, for instance, manufactured nearly four million artillery shells to sustain prolonged trench warfare. This escalation was evident in machine guns, where global stockpiles grew from approximately 12,000 units in 1914 to over 100,000 by war's end, primarily through assembly-line techniques that prioritized volume over customization. Innovations in armored fighting vehicles highlighted the era's production imperatives, with Britain deploying firms like to build around 1,000 tanks, including Mark IV models numbering over 1,000 units completed between 1917 and 1918. The , entering the conflict in April 1917, rapidly scaled up contributions, exemplified by the of the Liberty aircraft engine—designed in five days and manufactured in thousands to power Allied air efforts. German firms such as focused on heavy and steel components, supplying both sides indirectly through pre-war exports, though Allied naval blockades constrained their output. World War II intensified these dynamics, as total war demanded mobilization of entire economies, with the positioning itself as the by furnishing nearly two-thirds of Allied military matériel from 1941 onward. American industry, adapting automotive assembly lines, produced over 300,000 aircraft—far exceeding the combined Axis total of approximately 200,000—through contractors like and Lockheed, with annual output peaking at 96,000 in 1944. Ground systems followed suit, as Corporation alone assembled 22,234 tanks at the Arsenal Tank Plant by 1945. The oversaw this conversion, prioritizing raw material allocation and labor shifts that linked industrial capacity directly to battlefield superiority, while European producers like those in Britain and grappled with bombing disruptions and resource shortages.

Cold War Expansion

The bipolar confrontation between the and the from 1947 to 1991 drove a profound expansion of the global arms industry, as both powers pursued mutual deterrence through massive military buildups. This emphasized nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and conventional armaments, with production scaled to sustain standing armies, alliances, and proxy conflicts. In the US, post-World War II demobilization reversed sharply under the and , which formalized containment policy and reoriented industry toward sustained defense output; Korean War demands in 1950 further accelerated growth, pushing defense spending to 14% of GDP by 1953. Soviet responses mirrored this, with Stalin's Five-Year Plans post-1949 prioritizing heavy industry for tanks, artillery, and aircraft to match capabilities. US industry flourished via government contracts for strategic systems, including Boeing's B-52 Stratofortress bombers (first flown 1952, entering service 1955) and Lockheed's U-2 reconnaissance aircraft (operational 1956), alongside missile programs like the Convair Atlas ICBM (tested 1957). By the 1960s, defense accounted for 9% of GDP on average, employing millions in facilities from shipyards to avionics plants, with prime contractors expanding to produce F-4 Phantom fighters and Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The Soviet military-industrial complex, encompassing ministries like the Ministry of Defense Industry, achieved parallel surges, producing over 50,000 T-54/55 tanks by the 1960s and MiG-21 fighters numbering in the thousands, supported by expenditures rising 4-7% annually through the 1970s. These efforts yielded organizational momentum, as research labs institutionalized rapid prototyping amid escalating threats. By the Cold War's close, the and USSR comprised 36% and 20% of global spending, respectively, underwriting industry innovations like stealth precursors and while exporting systems to allies— firms to partners, Soviets to and proxies. This era's causal dynamic—reciprocal escalation rooted in credible threat perceptions—contrasted with peacetime contractions, fostering a self-reinforcing production ecosystem critiqued by President Eisenhower in as the "-industrial complex," where contractor influence risked undue sway over policy. Yet empirical outputs validated the approach: defense production output rose dynamically in early decades, enabling technological edges in conflicts like . Soviet parallels strained resources but sustained parity until economic rigidities emerged.

Post-Cold War Realignments and Recent Surge

The end of the Cold War in 1991 prompted a major contraction in the global arms industry, as major powers anticipated a "peace dividend" from reduced military threats. U.S. defense procurement budgets fell by approximately 70% in real terms between 1985 and 1998, leading to widespread layoffs and facility closures. This triggered extensive consolidation, with mergers and acquisitions totaling $55 billion from 1992 to 1997, shrinking the number of prime contractors from over 50 to five dominant firms by 2000. The U.S. Department of Defense actively encouraged this restructuring to achieve economies of scale and preserve capabilities amid shrinking demand. European industries underwent parallel consolidations, such as the formation of BAE Systems in 1999 and Airbus Defence and Space, driven by similar budget cuts and efforts to maintain competitiveness. International arms transfers reflected this realignment, with the volume of major weapons deliveries declining in the immediate post- period before stabilizing. According to SIPRI data, global transfers in 1994–98 were lower than Cold War peaks, shifting focus toward regional conflicts, operations, and counter-terrorism equipment rather than large-scale conventional forces. Russia's arms exports, previously bolstered by Soviet stockpiles, began a long-term decline, dropping 64% between 2015–19 and 2020–24 as Western sanctions and lost markets took effect. Meanwhile, emerging exporters like and expanded production for domestic needs and limited exports, altering traditional supplier-recipient dynamics. A marked surge in arms industry activity emerged in the 2020s, fueled by renewed great-power competition and active conflicts. Russia's full-scale invasion of in February 2022 catalyzed sharp defense spending increases across allies and partners, with European military expenditures (including ) rising 17% in 2023 alone. Global military spending hit $2,443 billion in 2023, up 6.8% in real terms from 2022—the steepest year-on-year rise in decades—and climbed further to $2.72 trillion in 2024, a 9.4% increase marking the largest post-Cold War jump. This demand boom boosted arms producers' revenues, with the SIPRI Top 100 companies reporting $597 billion in sales for 2022 amid order backlogs from aid and regional tensions. U.S. arms exports grew 17% between 2014–18 and 2019–23, capturing 43% of the global market by 2020–24, driven by deliveries to , , and the . European imports surged 94% over the same period, with heightened U.S. reliance underscoring vulnerabilities. Contributing factors included threats from , Iran's proxies in the , and China's assertiveness in , prompting investments in munitions, missiles, and high-tech systems despite ongoing consolidation risks like reduced competition.

Production Sectors

Small Arms and Light Weapons

Small arms and light weapons (SALW) consist of man-portable lethal devices designed for individual or small crew operation, including firearms that expel projectiles via explosives and associated crew-served systems. The United Nations defines small arms as weapons for individual use, such as revolvers, self-loading pistols, rifles, carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles, and light machine guns; light weapons include designs for two or three persons, encompassing heavy machine guns, hand-held grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft launchers, and recoilless rifles. This classification excludes antique or replica items and focuses on contemporary production for military, law enforcement, and civilian applications. SALW production is decentralized and widespread, involving thousands of firms across more than 100 countries, with around 30 nations qualifying as major producers and 20 leading exporters. In the United States, annual firearm manufacturing averaged 5.4 million units from 1986 to 2018, surging to 7.9 million in 2018 alone due to demand from civilian and institutional buyers. Globally, small arms output reached 21.7 million units in 2024, supporting a market valued at USD 9.4 billion that year. Key U.S. producers include Smith & Wesson and Sturm, Ruger & Co., which supply pistols, rifles, and shotguns for domestic and export markets. European firms dominate high-end military contracts, with Germany's manufacturing assault rifles like the G36, Italy's producing the M9 pistol adopted by U.S. forces until 2017, and Belgium's developing the series for . Russia's remains the benchmark for mass-produced assault rifles, with over 100 million variants manufactured since 1947, enabling low-cost proliferation in developing regions. Other notable players include Switzerland's for modular pistols and rifles, Israel's for the Tavor bullpup rifle, and Austria's for polymer-framed handguns favored by law enforcement worldwide. These companies often integrate advanced materials like polymers and modular designs to enhance reliability and adaptability. International trade in SALW lacks the comprehensive tracking of major arms systems, complicating precise statistics, though the U.S. leads legal exports alongside European states and . From 2020 to 2024, small arms transfers contributed to broader arms flows, with the U.S. holding 43% of global major arms exports, a portion including SALW components. Diversion to illicit markets remains prevalent, as evidenced by UN reports on uncontrolled proliferation fueling conflicts in . Despite regulatory frameworks like the , enforcement varies, with domestic civilian demand—particularly in the U.S.—driving production volumes exceeding military needs. SALW's high-volume, low-unit-cost nature distinguishes it within the arms industry, prioritizing over technological .

Ground and Armored Systems

Ground and armored systems encompass a range of military vehicles designed for terrestrial operations, including main battle tanks (MBTs), infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), armored personnel carriers (APCs), and , primarily engineered for mobility, firepower, and protection in combat environments. These systems form the backbone of mechanized forces, enabling tactics where armored units provide direct fire support and breakthrough capabilities against enemy defenses. Production focuses on integrating advanced armor composites, reactive protection, and networked sensors to counter anti-tank threats like guided missiles and drones. The global market for armored vehicles was valued at approximately USD 32.4 billion in , projected to reach USD 44.6 billion by 2030, driven by escalating geopolitical tensions and modernization demands in regions such as and the . Key segments include tracked MBTs for heavy combat and wheeled vehicles for rapid deployment, with a shift toward lighter, more versatile platforms to address and logistical constraints. Major producers include U.S.-based , which manufactures the MBT, and Germany's , producer of the Leopard 2 series, both ranking among the top arms firms by revenue in SIPRI's assessments of global defense contractors. Russia's remains a significant player with the and platforms, though production has been hampered by sanctions following the 2022 Ukraine invasion. Exports of tanks and armored fighting vehicles highlight dominance by Western and select non-Western suppliers; in 2022, the United States exported USD 938.9 million worth, trailing Canada's USD 940.3 million but leading in volume of advanced systems like the Abrams to allies such as Poland and Australia. Germany has supplied Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine and other NATO partners, bolstering interoperability, while Russia's exports have declined sharply, dropping from pre-2022 levels due to redirected production for domestic needs. Singapore emerged as a top exporter in 2023 with USD 9.17 billion in sales, largely Terrex IFVs to Nigeria, underscoring niche roles for smaller producers in filling gaps left by major powers. Recent advancements emphasize survivability enhancements, such as active protection systems (APS) that intercept incoming projectiles—exemplified by Israel's system integrated on U.S. Abrams variants—and modular designs for rapid upgrades. Unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) are gaining traction, with the sector projected to grow from USD 3.05 billion in 2024 to USD 6.46 billion by 2034, enabling remote operations to reduce personnel risk in contested areas. and hybrid are emerging to extend range and reduce thermal signatures, as seen in prototypes from and , amid broader trends toward AI-driven autonomy and networked warfare integration. These developments reflect causal pressures from asymmetric threats, including cheap drones, prompting a reevaluation of traditional heavy armor toward agile, sensor-fused formations.

Aerospace and Missile Technologies

The aerospace and missile technologies sector of the arms industry involves the research, development, production, and maintenance of military aircraft—including fighter jets, bombers, transport planes, and helicopters—as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missile systems such as cruise, ballistic, surface-to-air, and air-to-air variants. These technologies enable air dominance, precision strikes, reconnaissance, and ballistic missile defense, with production emphasizing stealth, hypersonic speeds, and integrated sensor suites to counter evolving threats from peer adversaries. Demand surges from geopolitical tensions, including conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, have accelerated investments in sustainment and next-generation platforms. Global military manufacturing reached $280.9 billion in market size by 2025, encompassing fixed- and rotary-wing platforms and associated . The and segment, valued at $62.50 billion in 2024, is forecasted to expand to $85.22 billion by 2029, growing at a 6.4% compound annual rate, driven by procurements for integrated air defense and long-range strike capabilities. According to SIPRI data, arms revenues for the top 100 producers hit $632 billion in 2023, with significant portions from and sales amid heightened regional conflicts. Prominent firms dominate production: , the largest by revenue, manufactures the F-35 Lightning II multirole fighter, with over 1,000 units delivered across U.S. and allied forces by mid-2024, integrating advanced stealth and features. leads in missiles, producing systems like the Patriot surface-to-air interceptor and , which accounted for key intercepts in recent engagements. contributes bombers such as the B-52 upgrades and strike platforms, while develops the B-21 Raider stealth bomber and RQ-4 Global Hawk UAV for high-altitude surveillance. International players include Europe's for joint missile programs like air-to-air weaponry and China's Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation for ballistic systems. Advancements center on hypersonic glide vehicles, exceeding Mach 5 speeds to evade defenses, with U.S. firms like Lockheed testing prototypes under the initiative. UAV proliferation features swarming tactics and autonomy, as seen in systems like the MQ-9 Reaper, enhancing persistent ISR without risking pilots. Integration of AI for targeting and electronic warfare, alongside additive manufacturing for , addresses supply chain vulnerabilities exposed by wartime attrition. These innovations, however, face challenges from export controls like the , reformed in early 2025 to adapt to emerging threats while curbing proliferation. The naval and maritime systems sector encompasses the design, construction, and outfitting of surface combatants such as destroyers, frigates, and aircraft carriers; including nuclear-powered attack and variants; amphibious and auxiliary vessels; and integrated systems like vertical launch systems, anti-ship missiles, arrays, and radar suites essential for and . These platforms form the backbone of national navies, enabling , blockade enforcement, and expeditionary operations, with production driven by geopolitical tensions in regions like the and . Major U.S. producers dominate high-end capabilities, with Huntington Ingalls Industries constructing nuclear-powered aircraft carriers like the Gerald R. Ford-class and amphibious assault ships at its Newport News Shipbuilding yard, delivering the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) in 2017 after a $13 billion program cost overrun due to advanced electromagnetic catapults and stealth features. General Dynamics Electric Boat specializes in Virginia-class attack submarines, with 66 planned through 2048 at a unit cost exceeding $3.6 billion each, incorporating Virginia Payload Modules for expanded Tomahawk missile capacity. In Europe, France's Naval Group builds Barracuda-class submarines and FREMM frigates, while Italy's Fincantieri produces multi-mission destroyers exported to the U.S. under the Constellation-class program. BAE Systems in the UK focuses on Type 26 anti-submarine frigates, securing a £10 billion contract on August 31, 2025, to supply at least five to Norway—the largest UK warship export deal, sustaining 4,000 jobs and enhancing NATO's High North defenses against submarine threats. The global market for warships and naval vessels reached $71.14 billion in 2024, with defense applications comprising 72.8% of demand, projected to grow amid rising naval budgets in and . and segments alone are forecast to expand from $125.8 billion in 2025 to $214.8 billion by 2035 at a 5.5% CAGR, fueled by modular designs and integration. Naval combat systems, including fire control and electronic warfare, were valued at $53.65 billion in 2025, emphasizing networked warfare capabilities. Exports remain concentrated among established powers, with the U.S. holding a 40% share of major naval transfers per SIPRI data, though emerging competitors like advance stealth corvettes and carrier production at state-owned yards. Technological trends prioritize unmanned and autonomous systems for mine countermeasures and , as seen in U.S. robotic crawlers reducing manned risk in littoral operations. Underwater warfare markets, valued at $14.70 billion in 2024, integrate AI-driven and expendable unmanned underwater vehicles to counter quiet diesel-electric submarines proliferating in export markets. Production challenges include vulnerabilities for rare earth-dependent sensors and labor shortages in skilled , contributing to delays in programs like Australia's Hunter-class frigates based on Type 26 designs. Despite these, sector revenues for top firms like those in SIPRI's Top 100— including and —rose 4.2% in arms sales for 2023, reflecting sustained investment in modular, upgradeable hulls for extended service life.

Emerging Technologies

The arms industry is increasingly incorporating artificial intelligence (AI) to enhance decision-making, targeting, and operational efficiency in weapon systems, with applications ranging from predictive maintenance to real-time battlefield analytics. For instance, AI-driven systems enable faster data processing for command and control, reducing human error in complex environments. Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), which use AI to select and engage targets without human intervention, are advancing rapidly, offering force multiplication by minimizing personnel exposure while expanding operational tempo. In conflicts like Ukraine, AI-equipped drones have autonomously struck targets such as oil refineries, demonstrating practical deployment. Israel's use of AI tools like Lavender for target identification in Gaza further illustrates integration, though such systems raise concerns over accountability due to potential algorithmic biases or errors. Proponents argue LAWS provide tactical advantages by operating in denied environments, but development is uneven, with the U.S. emphasizing human oversight via doctrines like the Department of Defense's AI Ethical Principles. Hypersonic weapons, traveling at speeds exceeding Mach 5 with maneuverability to evade defenses, represent a in strike capabilities, prompting an intensifying among major powers. and have fielded operational hypersonic glide vehicles and cruise missiles, such as 's Avangard and 's , integrated into their arsenals by 2020 and capable of low-earth orbit trajectories for global reach. The U.S. has accelerated programs like the Army's , with recent tests in 2025 adapting systems for mobile launchers to counter peer adversaries. 's investments, including fractional orbital bombardment systems, have shifted its nuclear posture toward more assertive deterrence, while 's deployments in highlight combat utility despite reliability issues. These weapons challenge existing missile defenses due to their speed and plasma sheaths disrupting guidance, driving industry investments exceeding $10 billion annually across the triad of nations. Directed energy weapons, primarily high-energy lasers and microwaves, offer unlimited "magazine depth" at low marginal cost per shot—around $1 for lasers versus thousands for interceptors—targeting drones, missiles, and with precision. The U.S. Army's Directed Energy Maneuver (DE M-SHORAD) system, deployed in prototypes by 2025, has demonstrated live-fire intercepts of cruise missiles and UAVs at , marking maturity for counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) roles. The Navy's High Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS), tested in 2025, integrates on destroyers for layered defense against swarms. Challenges persist in atmospheric attenuation and power scaling, but advancements in solid-state lasers have reduced size to vehicle-mountable units, with the U.S. Space and Command eyeing contributions to next-generation interceptors. Industry leaders like and are scaling production, projecting operational fleets by 2030 for cost-effective saturation defense. Unmanned systems, particularly drone swarms, leverage AI for coordinated attacks overwhelming defenses through sheer numbers, with a single operator controlling up to 100 units via software like DARPA's 2022 demonstration of 150-drone swarms. The U.S. Pentagon's 2024 tests pitted multi-domain countermeasures—radars, jammers, and kinetics—against swarms of 50 drones, revealing needs for distributed AI to counter proliferation seen in and conflicts. Systems like the Army's LEONIDAS high-power counter-swarm capability, fielded in 2025, neutralize electronics non-kinetically, addressing threats from low-cost, mass-produced UAVs that could saturate traditional air defenses. and are advancing similar technologies, with swarms integrated into anti-access/area-denial strategies, fueling a global market projected to exceed $20 billion by 2030 for resilient, autonomous fleets. These developments underscore a shift toward software-defined warfare, where and electronic warfare resilience determine efficacy.

Major Actors

Leading Corporations

The arms industry is dominated by a handful of multinational corporations, with United States-based firms comprising the majority of the largest players by arms revenue. According to data from the (SIPRI), which tracks arms sales from open sources including company reports, the Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies generated $632 billion in arms revenues in 2023, measured in constant 2023 U.S. dollars; U.S. companies alone accounted for $317 billion, or 50 percent of the total, underscoring the sector's concentration in firms benefiting from domestic and global exports. This U.S. preeminence stems from sustained high levels of federal defense spending, which reached $886 billion in 2023, and export approvals totaling $238 billion in potential sales during the same period. The following table lists the top 10 companies by arms revenue in 2023, highlighting the prevalence of U.S. entities in advanced , , and systems:
RankCompanyCountryArms Revenue (2023 USD billions)
1Lockheed Martin Corp.67.0
2RTX Corp.41.1
3Northrop Grumman Corp.39.1
433.5
5UK31.9
6Europe20.9
7General Dynamics Corp.19.3
8Leonardo S.p.A.12.5
9Thales11.7
10L3Harris Technologies11.2
, the industry leader, derives much of its revenue from including the , which accounted for over 25 percent of its 2023 sales, alongside hypersonic missiles and space systems; the company reported total net sales of $67.6 billion in 2023, with defense contracts forming the core. , second in ranking, specializes in missiles such as the Patriot and systems, integrated defense electronics, and engines, with arms sales reflecting demand surges from conflicts in and the . focuses on strategic bombers like the B-21 Raider, unmanned systems, and nuclear modernization components, benefiting from long-term U.S. Department of Defense contracts. Outside the U.S., leads non-U.S. firms with revenues from naval vessels, combat vehicles, and electronics supplied to allies and export markets including and . These corporations often operate through subsidiaries and joint ventures, adapting to geopolitical shifts such as increased European defense budgets post-2022 , which contributed to a 4.2 percent rise in overall Top 100 arms revenues.

Dominant Exporting Countries

The maintains the position of the world's leading exporter of major arms, accounting for 43 percent of global arms exports in the period 2020–2024 according to the (SIPRI). This represents a 21 percent increase in U.S. exports compared to 2015–2019, elevating its market share from 35 percent, driven primarily by sales of advanced combat aircraft, missiles, and other high-technology systems to allies in the , , and . France ranks second among major exporters, with 9.6 percent of the global share in 2020–2024, marking an 11 percent rise from the previous five-year period, largely attributable to exports of Rafale fighter jets to nations including , , and the . , previously a top exporter, saw its share decline to 7.8 percent amid a 64 percent drop in exports between 2015–2019 and 2020–2024, resulting from , production disruptions from the conflict, and loss of traditional markets in and other regions. holds fourth place at 5.9 percent, with modest growth focused on regional partners but limited penetration in high-end markets due to perceptions of lower technological and reliability compared to Western systems. Other notable exporters include , which supplies advanced submarines and armored vehicles primarily to allies; the , emphasizing integrated defense systems; , with strengths in naval vessels; and emerging players like and , exporting drones, missile defenses, and to diverse recipients. These rankings, based on SIPRI's Trend Indicator Value (TIV) methodology—which measures volume of deliveries rather than financial value—highlight shifts influenced by geopolitical tensions, such as heightened demand from and Middle Eastern states, rather than pure economic factors.
RankCountryShare of Global Exports (2020–2024)
143%
29.6%
37.8%
45.9%

Import Patterns and Recipients

In the period 2020–2024, became the world's largest importer of major arms, receiving 8.8 percent of global imports with volumes surging nearly 100-fold from 2015–2019, primarily due to from over 35 countries amid its defense against Russian invasion. followed as the second-largest recipient, accounting for sustained high volumes driven by border tensions with and , though its imports rose only modestly by 4.7 percent from the prior five-year period. Asia and Oceania dominated import volumes at 44 percent of the global total, with , and as key recipients; Pakistan's imports focused on Chinese and European systems to counter Indian capabilities, while Australia's acquisitions emphasized -compatible naval and air assets for deterrence. The Middle East claimed 27 percent, led by (third globally), , and , where Saudi imports—predominantly US fighter jets and missile defenses—supported operations in and regional rivalry with , and Egypt diversified from Russian to Western suppliers post-2013. European imports excluding rose 155 percent from 2015–2019, reflecting NATO frontline states like and the Baltic nations procuring US and European tanks, artillery, and air defenses to address Russian threats, with alone receiving 20 percent of regional volumes. In , imports remained low at under 5 percent globally but concentrated in North African states like and for , increasingly from and as Western suppliers imposed restrictions. Overall, 170 states imported major arms, but the top five—, , , , and —absorbed over 30 percent, highlighting concentration among states facing acute security pressures rather than broad diffusion.
Top Importers (2020–2024)Share of Global Imports (%)Primary Drivers
8.8Russian invasion defense
~9 (estimated continuity from prior)Regional rivalries with China,
Significant (top Middle East)Yemen conflict, containment
High (Gulf diversification)Regional alliances, hedging
Notable deterrence

International Arms Trade

The international arms trade expanded significantly after , with the and the emerging as dominant exporters during the era from 1950 to 1990. These superpowers supplied major conventional arms to allies and proxy states, accounting for approximately 70-80 percent of global transfers in peak years, driven by ideological competition and regional conflicts such as the (1950-1953) and (1955-1975). The focused on low-cost, mass-produced systems like the rifle and MiG fighters, exporting to over 50 countries including , , and , while the US provided advanced technology to members and partners like and . Following the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991, global arms transfer volumes declined sharply by about 50 percent in the early 1990s due to reduced East-West rivalry and economic constraints on Russian exports, which dropped from a 40 percent share to under 20 percent by the mid-1990s. The US maintained its position as the leading exporter, with shares rising to over 40 percent in the 1990s and 2000s, supported by operations in the Gulf Wars (1990-1991, 2003) and counterterrorism efforts. Emerging suppliers like France, Germany, China, and Israel gained market share, diversifying the trade amid stabilizing volumes through the 2000s, as regional demand in Asia and the Middle East offset the post-Cold War dip. In recent years, the volume of major arms transfers has remained relatively stable, with the 2020-2024 period showing a 0.6 percent decrease compared to 2015-2019 but a 3.9 percent increase over 2010-2014, reflecting persistent geopolitical tensions. The solidified its dominance, capturing 43 percent of global exports in 2020-2024, fueled by sales to and the , while Russia's exports plummeted 64 percent over the same timeframe due to sanctions following the 2022 invasion of , redirecting remaining supplies to and . European imports surged 155 percent from 2015-2019 to 2020-2024, driven by rearmament in response to Russian aggression, whereas and Asian imports continued at high levels amid conflicts in , , and tensions. rose to second place with an 11 percent share, benefiting from deals like Rafale jets to and . Overall, the trade's resilience underscores arms as tools of deterrence and , with total volumes 18 percent higher than in 2005-2009.

Geopolitical Drivers of Transfers

Geopolitical drivers of arms transfers primarily stem from states' strategic imperatives to bolster alliances, deter adversaries, and extend influence in contested regions. Major exporters like the United States leverage arms sales to reinforce security partnerships and counter revisionist powers, such as providing advanced weaponry to NATO allies following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which spurred a 155 per cent increase in European arms imports between 2015–19 and 2020–24. Similarly, transfers to Taiwan and Indo-Pacific partners aim to offset China's territorial assertiveness in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, reflecting a broader U.S. strategy to maintain military primacy amid rising multipolar competition. These dynamics underscore how arms flows serve as instruments of power projection, enabling exporters to secure basing rights, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic alignment from recipients. In the Middle East and North Africa, regional rivalries—particularly between and Sunni Arab states—propel transfers, with countries importing arms to counter Iranian proxies and ballistic threats, accounting for 27 per cent of global imports in 2020–24. The dominates here, supplying systems like Patriot missiles to and the UAE to stabilize energy routes and contain Iranian expansionism, though such sales have faced scrutiny for enabling prolonged conflicts like Yemen's civil war. , despite a post-2022 export decline due to sanctions and domestic needs, sustains ties with actors like to preserve footholds against Western influence, while advances its through affordable arms to and African states, fostering economic dependencies that align with anti-Western sentiments. Asia's 44 per cent share of global imports highlights border disputes and maritime tensions as catalysts, with ramping up purchases from and Western suppliers to balance and . Ukraine's arms influx—nearly 100-fold increase in 2020–24, making it the top importer—exemplifies reactive transfers in active conflicts, drawing from U.S., European, and even unexpected sources to sustain resistance against territorial aggression. Overall, these patterns reveal arms transfers as extensions of realist statecraft, where exporters prioritize strategic offsets over humanitarian concerns, often prioritizing long-term geopolitical gains like solidification against short-term risks of escalation.

Regulation and Arms Control

Key International Treaties

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on April 2, 2013, and entering into force on December 24, 2014, after ratification by 50 states, represents the first global legally binding instrument to regulate international transfers of conventional arms. It mandates states parties to establish export controls, assess risks of arms contributing to genocide, crimes against humanity, serious violations of international humanitarian law, or terrorism before authorizing transfers, and maintain records of imports and exports. The treaty covers eight categories of major conventional arms—battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers, and small arms and light weapons—along with their ammunition and parts. As of 2024, 117 states are parties, with an additional 25 having signed but not ratified; however, leading exporters including the United States (signed but unsigned ratification pending), Russia, China, and India remain outside, limiting its enforcement on high-volume trade routes. Complementing the ATT, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, founded in July 1996 by 42 participating states, operates as a voluntary multilateral to coordinate national export licensing policies and promote transparency without imposing binding obligations. It maintains dual lists of controlled items—conventional arms (e.g., tanks, , assault rifles) and dual-use technologies (e.g., , sensors)—requiring members to report transfers exceeding thresholds and notify sensitive destinations to avert regional destabilization or support for non-state actors. Participants, including the , , , , and emerging exporters like and , exchange information biannually, fostering best practices that indirectly influence arms industry compliance, though adherence relies on domestic implementation rather than international enforcement. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA), established by UN General Assembly Resolution 46/36L on December 9, 1991, and commencing operations in 1992, serves as a transparency mechanism rather than a regulatory , soliciting voluntary annual reports from member states on exports, imports, and military holdings of seven major weapons categories: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles/launchers. By 2023, reporting rates had declined to around 25-30% of UN members, with incomplete data on quantities and values undermining its utility for tracking illicit flows or buildups, though it has facilitated over 1,000 submissions since inception and informs confidence-building dialogues. Other regimes, such as the , established in 1987 and expanded to 35 partners by 2024, focus on export controls for ballistic missiles and related technologies capable of delivering WMDs, imposing presumptive denial policies for transfers exceeding specified payload and range parameters to curb proliferation risks. These mechanisms collectively address arms industry transfers but face challenges from non-universal participation and evasion tactics, with empirical data indicating persistent gaps in coverage of small arms proliferation and dual-use exports.

National and Regional Controls

National arms export controls typically involve licensing requirements administered by agencies to regulate the production, transfer, and sale of military goods, ensuring alignment with , , and non-proliferation goals. These regimes mandate case-by-case assessments of end-users, risks of diversion, and compatibility with , though enforcement rigor varies by jurisdiction. Dual-use items—those with civilian and military applications—often fall under separate but complementary administration rules. In the United States, the of 1976 provides the statutory basis for regulating defense articles and services listed on the , with exports requiring licenses from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) within the Department of State under the . The AECA authorizes presidential control over imports and exports to promote stability and deny approvals to recipients undermining U.S. interests, such as those involved in or abuses; for instance, licenses are presumptively denied to countries like or . Dual-use exports are handled via the by the in the Department of Commerce, which applies controls based on end-use and destination risks. The provides a regional framework through Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, adopted on December 8, 2008, which binds member states to eight assessment criteria for military technology exports, including potential contributions to internal repression, violations of , or regional destabilization. This position promotes transparency via annual reporting and denial notifications among members but delegates licensing authority to national governments, resulting in disparate application—e.g., stricter scrutiny in versus more permissive approvals in some Eastern European states. A 2024 review emphasized enhanced post-shipment verification and cooperation on dual-use controls, though implementation remains uneven due to sovereignty over decisions. Post-Brexit, the maintains a national regime via the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) under the , requiring licences for military and dual-use goods under Consolidated Criteria that mirror principles but prioritize U.K. foreign policy, such as suspending exports to in 2019 over concerns before partial resumption. Open General Export Licences (OGELs) streamline low-risk transfers to approved destinations, with over 100 such licences active as of 2023, subject to compliance audits. Russia's controls are centralized under the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC), with exports necessitating presidential and cabinet approval per federal decrees, focusing on economic benefits and strategic partnerships but lacking robust public transparency on denials. Contracts must comply with end-user certificates to mitigate diversion risks, though Western sanctions since have curtailed third-country re-exports. China regulates via the Export Control Law enacted October 17, 2020, administered by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) alongside customs and military commissions, covering military products and dual-use technologies to safeguard and prevent proliferation. Licensing assesses end-use and recipient reliability, with recent expansions in 2024 targeting civil-military fusion items like drone components, amid U.S. concerns over transfers to sanctioned entities.

Technological Innovations

Research and Development Dynamics

Research and development in the arms industry is characterized by substantial government funding directed toward maintaining technological edges in weaponry and systems, with execution often delegated to private contractors. In the United States, which accounts for the majority of global defense R&D, the Department of Defense's research, development, test, and evaluation budget totaled $141 billion in fiscal year 2025, supporting advancements from basic science to operational prototypes. This funding model relies heavily on competitive contracts awarded to firms like Lockheed Martin and RTX (formerly Raytheon Technologies), fostering a dynamic where public investment stimulates private sector innovation in military applications. Key agencies such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) drive high-risk initiatives aimed at breakthroughs that prevent adversarial technological surprises, exemplified by early contributions to and networked communications. Globally, military R&D trends mirror rising defense expenditures, which reached $2,718 billion in 2024—a 9.4 percent increase from 2023—prompted by conflicts and strategic competitions, though precise R&D shares remain opaque due to classification. In and , national programs emphasize indigenous capabilities, but scale lags behind the U.S., leading to international collaborations like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, involving multiple nations in shared R&D burdens. Challenges inherent to arms R&D include protracted timelines, often spanning 10-20 years, and frequent cost overruns stemming from technical uncertainties, requirement changes, and issues. The F-35 program, a flagship multinational effort, exemplifies these dynamics: initiated in the , it faced delays exceeding 10 years and lifetime costs ballooning to $1.7 trillion by 2023 estimates, roughly 80 percent above original projections due to integration complexities and testing shortfalls. Such overruns, common across major projects, arise partly from secrecy that hampers oversight and efficiency, as well as the dual pressures of rapid innovation and fiscal constraints. Recent dynamics feature industry consolidation to amortize R&D costs amid shrinking post-Cold War markets and heightened demand, alongside growing private venture involvement in niches like autonomous systems. funding predominates, comprising 40-60 percent of U.S. federal R&D and crowding in private expenditures, though private firms increasingly pursue dual-use technologies for commercial viability. These patterns underscore a causal link between geopolitical pressures and accelerated R&D, prioritizing domains like , hypersonics, and cyber defenses to sustain deterrence.

Civilian Spillovers and Dual-Use Applications

The arms industry generates civilian spillovers through technologies originating in military , where innovations funded for defense purposes diffuse into non-military applications, often yielding economic and societal benefits. Empirical analyses of U.S. defense R&D, for example, document gains in sectors from advancements in and , with historical cases showing that military investments in areas like semiconductors and software have accelerated broader technological progress. A prominent example is the (GPS), conceived by the U.S. Department of Defense in 1973 to provide precise , timing, and targeting for military operations. Initially restricted, GPS signals were opened to civilian use in 1983, and selective availability—intentional degradation for non-military users—was discontinued by President Clinton on May 1, 2000, enabling widespread adoption in , maritime , services, and devices, which by 2023 supported a global market valued at over $200 billion annually. The internet's foundational infrastructure similarly traces to , a DARPA-initiated network launched on October 29, 1969, designed for robust military communication amid potential nuclear threats through packet-switching protocols. Evolving via protocols like TCP/IP standardized in 1983, ARPANET transitioned to civilian domains, facilitating the World Wide Web's commercialization in the and underpinning , , and global data flows that contributed to trillions in economic value by the 2010s. Dual-use technologies, applicable to both military and contexts, exemplify ongoing spillovers; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones), developed for since the 1980s, now enable via crop monitoring, infrastructure inspection, and logistics delivery, with the commercial drone market projected to exceed $50 billion by 2025. Advances in and from defense programs further support dual applications in autonomous systems for and healthcare diagnostics. While such spillovers demonstrate causal links from military innovation to civilian efficiency—evidenced by adoption rates and crossovers—quantitative assessments vary, with some studies estimating defense R&D's indirect contributions to GDP growth at 0.5-1% annually in advanced economies, though direct requires isolating from parallel investments.

Strategic and Societal Impacts

Role in and Deterrence

The arms industry plays a foundational role in national security by producing advanced weapons systems, platforms, and technologies that enable states to project power, defend territory, and deter adversaries. Deterrence operates through two primary mechanisms: denial, where potential attackers perceive high costs due to defensive capabilities, and punishment, involving retaliatory strikes backed by credible offensive arsenals. A robust industrial base ensures surge production capacity during crises, signaling resolve and capability to foes; without it, military postures risk appearing hollow, inviting miscalculation. Empirical evidence links arms production directly to enhanced deterrence outcomes. During the , the U.S. military-industrial complex's expansion—producing nuclear submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers—sustained mutually assured destruction (MAD), preventing direct conflict from 1947 to 1991 despite intense rivalry. This "Long Peace" arose from industrial-scale arms output that made aggression irrational, as verified by post-hoc analyses of strategic stability. Similarly, econometric studies show that a 1% rise in national defense spending triggers equivalent growth in arms sales by leading producers, bolstering inventories and readiness metrics like munitions stockpiles and platform availability. In modern , the arms industry's contributions extend to deterrence and peer . U.S. exports of systems like the F-35 fighter jet to allies have integrated interoperable capabilities, amplifying collective defense under Article 5 and deterring Russian incursions post-2014 annexation. Assessments of the U.S. emphasize that industrial deterrence—via rapid scaling of production for hypersonic missiles or precision-guided munitions—counters China's military buildup, where U.S. output shortfalls could erode extended deterrence over . Proponents argue such transfers enhance recipient states' autonomy, reducing U.S. forward deployments while preserving global stability, though empirical validation requires tracking conflict avoidance correlated with capability transfers.

Economic and Industrial Contributions

The arms industry generates substantial revenues, with the 100 largest arms-producing and military services companies worldwide achieving revenues of $632 billion in 2023, marking a 4.2 percent increase in real terms from the previous year. This growth reflects heightened demand driven by ongoing conflicts and regional tensions, supporting extensive industrial supply chains and high-value manufacturing. United States-based firms dominate, accounting for approximately half of the Top 100 revenues, underscoring the sector's role in bolstering national economies through exports and domestic production. Employment in the sector provides millions of skilled jobs globally, fostering technical expertise and economic stability in host regions. , the and defense industry employed 2.21 million workers in 2023, generating $248 billion in labor income and contributing to an average salary of $112,000. , the defense sector supported 581,000 direct jobs in 2023, with turnover exceeding €158 billion, often in advanced and hubs. These positions not only sustain local economies but also build a proficient in , , and , which underpins broader industrial capabilities. The industry drives with spillovers to civilian applications, as defense (R&D) expenditures stimulate advancements. Empirical analysis across countries indicates that a 10 percent increase in defense R&D correlates with a 4 percent rise in private R&D, enhancing overall through shared technologies like advanced and materials. Increases in defense-induced private R&D have been linked to significant gains in non-defense sectors, demonstrating causal benefits from military-funded breakthroughs diffusing into commercial use. Exports further amplify these contributions, with the holding a 43 percent share of global major arms exports from 2020 to 2024, generating trade surpluses and reinforcing industrial bases.

Criticisms and Counterarguments

Critics argue that the arms industry exacerbates global conflicts by supplying weapons to unstable regions, thereby prolonging and increasing casualties. A study analyzing arms imports in found that such transfers heighten the probability of , particularly one-sided , and elevate fighter and deaths. Similarly, reports on highlight how ongoing arms inflows from multiple suppliers sustain relentless suffering amid and war crimes, with weapons traced to exports approved despite known risks. Empirical analyses from organizations like the Campaign Against Arms Trade indicate that arms transfers correlate with extended conflict durations and reduced incentives for peace negotiations, as recipients gain leverage without restraint. Another major criticism centers on the industry's role in violations and . Arms exports have been linked to governments with records of gross abuses, such as repeated civilian targeting, where U.S. and other transfers continue despite legal prohibitions like the . Transparency International's investigations reveal how in arms procurement facilitates diversion to and insurgents, undermining military effectiveness and fueling in regions like the . The sector's opacity further compounds these issues, with SIPRI noting minimal public disclosure of production, sales, and end-use, enabling unaccountable transfers. Proponents counter that the arms industry is indispensable for and deterrence, preventing aggression through credible defense capabilities. U.S. Department of Defense assessments emphasize that a competitive drives innovation in technologies like advanced munitions, ensuring military superiority against peer competitors such as and . Without robust domestic production, nations risk dependency on adversaries for critical systems, as evidenced by Europe's struggles with munitions shortages during the Ukraine conflict, underscoring the strategic value of self-reliant arms manufacturing. Economically, the industry generates substantial benefits, including high-skilled jobs and technological spillovers to sectors. In 2023, the U.S. and defense sector supported over $995 billion in activity, sustaining millions of direct and indirect jobs while fostering advancements in areas like AI and that benefit broader innovation. Regarding conflict causation, empirical evidence remains inconclusive; while correlations exist between arms volumes and violence, no robust causal link demonstrates that transfers inherently provoke wars, as geopolitical factors like regime instability often precede imports. , though influential—with defense firms spending over $100 million annually in the U.S.—is defended as legitimate for priorities, akin to other industries, and subject to disclosure requirements that mitigate undue sway.

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