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A celestial map from the 17th century, by the Dutch cartographer Frederik de Wit

Natural philosophy or philosophy of nature (from Latin philosophia naturalis) is the philosophical study of physics, that is, nature and the physical universe, while ignoring any supernatural influence. It was dominant before the development of modern science.

From the ancient world (at least since Aristotle) until the 19th century, natural philosophy was the common term for the study of physics (nature), a broad term that included botany, zoology, anthropology, and chemistry as well as what is now called physics. It was in the 19th century that the concept of science received its modern shape, with different subjects within science emerging, such as astronomy, biology, and physics. Institutions and communities devoted to science were founded.[1] Isaac Newton's book Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687) (English: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy) reflects the use of the term natural philosophy in the 17th century. Even in the 19th century, the work that helped define much of modern physics bore the title Treatise on Natural Philosophy (1867).

In the German tradition, Naturphilosophie (philosophy of nature) persisted into the 18th and 19th centuries as an attempt to achieve a speculative unity of nature and spirit, after rejecting the scholastic tradition and replacing Aristotelian metaphysics, along with those of the dogmatic churchmen, with Kantian rationalism. Some of the greatest names in German philosophy are associated with this movement, including Goethe, Hegel, and Schelling. Naturphilosophie was associated with Romanticism and a view that regarded the natural world as a kind of giant organism, as opposed to the philosophical approach of figures such as John Locke and others espousing a more mechanical philosophy of the world, regarding it as being like a machine.[citation needed]

Origin and evolution of the term

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The term natural philosophy preceded current usage of natural science (i.e. empirical science). Empirical science historically developed out of philosophy or, more specifically, natural philosophy. Natural philosophy was distinguished from the other precursor of modern science, natural history, in that natural philosophy involved reasoning and explanations about nature (and after Galileo, quantitative reasoning), whereas natural history was essentially qualitative and descriptive.

Greek philosophers defined natural philosophy as the combination of beings living in the universe, ignoring things made by humans.[2] The other definition refers to human nature.[2]

In the 14th and 15th centuries, natural philosophy was one of many branches of philosophy, but was not a specialized field of study. The first person appointed as a specialist in Natural Philosophy per se was Jacopo Zabarella, at the University of Padua in 1577.

Modern meanings of the terms science and scientists date only to the 19th century. Before that, science was a synonym for knowledge or study, in keeping with its Latin origin. The term gained its modern meaning when experimental science and the scientific method became a specialized branch of study apart from natural philosophy,[3] especially since William Whewell, a natural philosopher from the University of Cambridge, proposed the term "scientist" in 1834 to replace such terms as "cultivators of science" and "natural philosopher".[4]

From the mid-19th century, when it became increasingly unusual for scientists to contribute to both physics and chemistry, "natural philosophy" came to mean just physics, and the word is still used in that sense in degree titles at the University of Oxford and University of Aberdeen.[citation needed] In general, chairs of Natural Philosophy established long ago at the oldest universities are nowadays occupied mainly by physics professors. Isaac Newton's book Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687), whose title translates to "Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy", reflects the then-current use of the words "natural philosophy", akin to "systematic study of nature". Even in the 19th century, a treatise by Lord Kelvin and Peter Guthrie Tait, which helped define much of modern physics, was titled Treatise on Natural Philosophy (1867).

Scope

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Plato's earliest known dialogue, Charmides, distinguishes between science or bodies of knowledge that produce a physical result, and those that do not. Natural philosophy has been categorized as a theoretical rather than a practical branch of philosophy (like ethics). Sciences that guide arts and draw on the philosophical knowledge of nature may produce practical results, but these subsidiary sciences (e.g., architecture or medicine) go beyond natural philosophy.

The study of natural philosophy seeks to explore the cosmos by any means necessary to understand the universe. Some ideas presuppose that change is a reality. Although this may seem obvious, there have been some philosophers who have denied the concept of metamorphosis, such as Plato's predecessor Parmenides and later Greek philosopher Sextus Empiricus, and perhaps some Eastern philosophers. George Santayana, in his Scepticism and Animal Faith, attempted to show that the reality of change cannot be proven. If his reasoning is sound, it follows that to be a physicist, one must restrain one's skepticism enough to trust one's senses, or else rely on anti-realism.

René Descartes' metaphysical system of mind–body dualism describes two kinds of substance: matter and mind. According to this system, everything that is "matter" is deterministic and natural—and so belongs to natural philosophy—and everything that is "mind" is volitional and non-natural, and falls outside the domain of philosophy of nature.

Branches and subject matter

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Major branches of natural philosophy include astronomy and cosmology, the study of nature on the grand scale; etiology, the study of (intrinsic and sometimes extrinsic) causes; the study of chance, probability and randomness; the study of elements; the study of the infinite and the unlimited (virtual or actual); the study of matter; mechanics, the study of translation of motion and change; the study of nature or the various sources of actions; the study of natural qualities; the study of physical quantities; the study of relations between physical entities; and the philosophy of space and time. (Adler, 1993)

History

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For the history of natural philosophy prior to the 17th century, see History of science, History of physics, History of chemistry, and History of astronomy.

Humankind's mental engagement with nature certainly predates civilization and the record of history. Philosophical, and specifically non-religious, thought about the natural world goes back to ancient Greece. These lines of thought began before Socrates, who turned his philosophical studies from speculations about nature to a consideration of man, or in other words, political philosophy. The thought of early philosophers such as Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Democritus centered on the natural world. In addition, three Presocratic philosophers who lived in the Ionian town of Miletus (hence the Milesian School of philosophy), Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, attempted to explain natural phenomena without recourse to creation myths involving the Greek gods. They were called the physikoi ("natural philosophers") or, as Aristotle referred to them, the physiologoi. Plato followed Socrates in concentrating on man. It was Plato's student, Aristotle, who, in basing his thought on the natural world, returned empiricism to its primary place, while leaving room in the world for man.[5] Martin Heidegger observes that Aristotle was the originator of conception of nature that prevailed in the Middle Ages into the modern era:

The Physics is a lecture in which he seeks to determine beings that arise on their own, τὰ φύσει ὄντα, with regard to their being. Aristotelian "physics" is different from what we mean today by this word, not only to the extent that it belongs to antiquity whereas the modern physical sciences belong to modernity, rather above all it is different by virtue of the fact that Aristotle's "physics" is philosophy, whereas modern physics is a positive science that presupposes a philosophy.... This book determines the warp and weft of the whole of Western thinking, even at that place where it, as modern thinking, appears to think at odds with ancient thinking. But opposition is invariably comprised of a decisive, and often even perilous, dependence. Without Aristotle's Physics there would have been no Galileo.[6]

Aristotle surveyed the thought of his predecessors and conceived of nature in a way that charted a middle course between their excesses.[7]

Plato's world of eternal and unchanging Forms, imperfectly represented in matter by a divine Artisan, contrasts sharply with the various mechanistic Weltanschauungen, of which atomism was, by the fourth century at least, the most prominent... This debate was to persist throughout the ancient world. Atomistic mechanism got a shot in the arm from Epicurus... while the Stoics adopted a divine teleology... The choice seems simple: either show how a structured, regular world could arise out of undirected processes, or inject intelligence into the system. This was how Aristotle... when still a young acolyte of Plato, saw matters. Cicero... preserves Aristotle's own cave-image: if troglodytes were brought on a sudden into the upper world, they would immediately suppose it to have been intelligently arranged. But Aristotle grew to abandon this view; although he believes in a divine being, the Prime Mover is not the efficient cause of action in the Universe, and plays no part in constructing or arranging it... But, although he rejects the divine Artificer, Aristotle does not resort to a pure mechanism of random forces. Instead he seeks to find a middle way between the two positions, one which relies heavily on the notion of Nature, or phusis.[8]

"The world we inhabit is an orderly one, in which things generally behave in predictable ways, Aristotle argued, because every natural object has a "nature"—an attribute (associated primarily with form) that makes the object behave in its customary fashion..."[9] Aristotle recommended four causes as appropriate for the business of the natural philosopher, or physicist, "and if he refers his problems back to all of them, he will assign the 'why' in the way proper to his science—the matter, the form, the mover, [and] 'that for the sake of which'". While the vagaries of the material cause are subject to circumstance, the formal, efficient and final cause often coincide because in natural kinds, the mature form and final cause are one and the same. The capacity to mature into a specimen of one's kind is directly acquired from "the primary source of motion", i.e., from one's father, whose seed (sperma) conveys the essential nature (common to the species), as a hypothetical ratio.[10]

Material cause
An object's motion will behave in different ways depending on the [substance/essence] from which it is made. (Compare clay, steel, etc.)
Formal cause
An object's motion will behave in different ways depending on its material arrangement. (Compare a clay sphere, clay block, etc.)
Efficient cause
That which caused the object to come into being; an "agent of change" or an "agent of movement".
Final cause
The reason that caused the object to be brought into existence.

From the late Middle Ages into the modern era, the tendency has been to narrow "science" to the consideration of efficient or agency-based causes of a particular kind:[11]

The action of an efficient cause may sometimes, but not always, be described in terms of quantitative force. The action of an artist on a block of clay, for instance, can be described in terms of how many pounds of pressure per square inch is exerted on it. The efficient causality of the teacher in directing the activity of the artist, however, cannot be so described… The final cause acts on the agent to influence or induce her to act. If the artist works "to make money," making money is in some way the cause of her action. But we cannot describe this influence in terms of quantitative force. The final cause acts, but it acts according to the mode of final causality, as an end or good that induces the efficient cause to act. The mode of causality proper to the final cause cannot itself be reduced to efficient causality, much less to the mode of efficient causality we call "force."[12]

In ancient Greece

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Early Greek philosophers studied motion and the cosmos. Figures like Hesiod regarded the natural world as offspring of the gods, whereas others like Leucippus and Democritus regarded the world as lifeless atoms in a vortex. Anaximander deduced that eclipses happen because of apertures in rings of celestial fire. Heraclitus believed that the heavenly bodies were made of fire that were contained within bowls. He thought that eclipses happen when the bowl turned away from the earth. Anaximenes is believed to have stated that an underlying element was air, and by manipulating air someone could change its thickness to create fire, water, dirt, and stones. Empedocles identified the elements that make up the world, which he termed the roots of all things, as fire, air, earth, and water. Parmenides argued that all change is a logical impossibility. He gives the example that nothing can go from nonexistence to existence. Plato argues that the world is an imperfect replica of an idea that a divine craftsman once held. He also believed that the only way to truly know something was through reason and logic. Not the study of the object itself, but that changeable matter is a viable course of study.[9]

Aristotle's philosophy of nature

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Main article: Aristotelian physics
"An acorn is potentially, but not actually, an oak tree. In becoming an oak tree, it becomes actually what it originally was only potentially. This change thus involves passage from potentiality to actuality — not from non-being to being but from one kind or degree to being another"[9]

Aristotle held many important beliefs that started a convergence of thought for natural philosophy. Aristotle believed that attributes of objects belong to the objects themselves, and share traits with other objects that fit them into a category. He uses the example of dogs to press this point. An individual dog may have very specific attributes (ex. one dog can be black and another brown) but also very general ones that classify it as a dog (ex. four-legged). This philosophy can be applied to many other objects as well. This idea is different from that of Plato, with whom Aristotle had a direct association. Aristotle argued that objects have properties "form" and something that is not part of its properties "matter" that defines the object.[copyedit or clarification needed] The form cannot be separated from the matter. Given the example that you can not separate properties and matter since this is impossible, you cannot collect properties in a pile and matter in another.[9]

Aristotle believed that change was a natural occurrence. He used his philosophy of form and matter to argue that when something changes you change its properties without changing its matter. This change occurs by replacing certain properties with other properties. Since this change is always an intentional alteration whether by forced means or by natural ones, change is a controllable order of qualities. He argues that this happens through three categories of being: non-being, potential being, and actual being. Through these three states the process of changing an object never truly destroys an object's forms during this transition state but rather just blurs the reality between the two states. An example of this could be changing an object from red to blue with a transitional purple phase.[9]

Medieval philosophy of motion

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Medieval thoughts on motion involved much of Aristotle's works Physics and Metaphysics. The issue that medieval philosophers had with motion was the inconsistency found between book 3 of Physics and book 5 of Metaphysics. Aristotle claimed in book 3 of Physics that motion can be categorized by substance, quantity, quality, and place. where in book 5 of Metaphysics he stated that motion is a magnitude of quantity. This disputation led to some important questions to natural philosophers: Which category/categories does motion fit into? Is motion the same thing as a terminus? Is motion separate from real things? These questions asked by medieval philosophers tried to classify motion.[13]

William of Ockham gives a good concept of motion for many people in the Middle Ages. There is an issue with the vocabulary behind motion that makes people think that there is a correlation between nouns and the qualities that make nouns. Ockham states that this distinction is what will allow people to understand motion, that motion is a property of mobiles, locations, and forms and that is all that is required to define what motion is. A famous example of this is Occam's razor, which simplifies vague statements by cutting them into more descriptive examples. "Every motion derives from an agent." becomes "each thing that is moved, is moved by an agent" this makes motion a more personal quality referring to individual objects that are moved.[13]

Natural philosophy in the early modern period

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The scientific method has ancient precedents, and Galileo exemplifies a mathematical understanding of nature, which is a hallmark of modern natural scientists. Galileo proposed that objects falling regardless of their mass would fall at the same rate, as long as the medium they fall in is identical. The 19th-century distinction of a scientific enterprise apart from traditional natural philosophy has its roots in prior centuries. Proposals for a more "inquisitive" and practical approach to the study of nature are notable in Francis Bacon, whose ardent convictions did much to popularize his insightful Baconian method. The Baconian method is employed throughout Thomas Browne's encyclopaedia Pseudodoxia Epidemica (1646–1672), which debunks a wide range of common fallacies through empirical investigation of nature. The late-17th-century natural philosopher Robert Boyle wrote a seminal work on the distinction between physics and metaphysics called, A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature, as well as The Skeptical Chymist, after which the modern science of chemistry is named, (as distinct from proto-scientific studies of alchemy). These works of natural philosophy are representative of a departure from the medieval scholasticism taught in European universities, and anticipate in many ways, the developments that would lead to science as practiced in the modern sense. As Bacon would say, "vexing nature" to reveal "her" secrets (scientific experimentation), rather than a mere reliance on largely historical, even anecdotal, observations of empirical phenomena, would come to be regarded as a defining characteristic of modern science, if not the very key to its success. Boyle's biographers, in their emphasis that he laid the foundations of modern chemistry, neglect how steadily he clung to the scholastic sciences in theory, practice and doctrine.[14] However, he meticulously recorded observational detail on practical research, and subsequently advocated not only this practice, but its publication, both for successful and unsuccessful experiments, so as to validate individual claims by replication.

For sometimes we use the word nature for that Author of nature whom the schoolmen, harshly enough, call natura naturans, as when it is said that nature hath made man partly corporeal and partly immaterial. Sometimes we mean by the nature of a thing the essence, or that which the schoolmen scruple not to call the quiddity of a thing, namely, the attribute or attributes on whose score it is what it is, whether the thing be corporeal or not, as when we attempt to define the nature of an angel, or of a triangle, or of a fluid body, as such. Sometimes we take nature for an internal principle of motion, as when we say that a stone let fall in the air is by nature carried towards the centre of the earth, and, on the contrary, that fire or flame does naturally move upwards toward heaven. Sometimes we understand by nature the established course of things, as when we say that nature makes the night succeed the day, nature hath made respiration necessary to the life of men. Sometimes we take nature for an aggregate of powers belonging to a body, especially a living one, as when physicians say that nature is strong or weak or spent, or that in such or such diseases nature left to herself will do the cure. Sometimes we take nature for the universe, or system of the corporeal works of God, as when it is said of a phoenix, or a chimera, that there is no such thing in nature, i.e. in the world. And sometimes too, and that most commonly, we would express by nature a semi-deity or other strange kind of being, such as this discourse examines the notion of.[15]

— Robert Boyle, A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature

Natural philosophers of the late 17th or early 18th century were sometimes insultingly described as 'projectors'. A projector was an entrepreneur who invited people to invest in his invention but – as the caricature went – could not be trusted, usually because his device was impractical.[16] Jonathan Swift satirized natural philosophers of the Royal Society as 'the academy of projectors' in his novel Gulliver's Travels. Historians of science have argued that natural philosophers and the so-called projectors sometimes overlapped in their methods and aims.[17][18]

Current work in the philosophy of science and nature

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In the middle of the 20th century, Ernst Mayr's discussions on the teleology of nature brought up issues that were dealt with previously by Aristotle (regarding final cause) and Kant (regarding reflective judgment).[19]

Especially since the mid-20th-century European crisis, some thinkers argued the importance of looking at nature from a broad philosophical perspective, rather than what they considered a narrowly positivist approach relying implicitly on a hidden, unexamined philosophy.[20] One line of thought grows from the Aristotelian tradition, especially as developed by Thomas Aquinas. Another line springs from Edmund Husserl, especially as expressed in The Crisis of European Sciences. Students of his such as Jacob Klein and Hans Jonas more fully developed his themes. Last, but not least, there is the process philosophy inspired by Alfred North Whitehead's works.[21]

Among living scholars, Brian David Ellis, Nancy Cartwright, David Oderberg, and John Dupré are some of the more prominent thinkers who can arguably be classed as generally adopting a more open approach to the natural world. Ellis (2002) observes the rise of a "New Essentialism".[22] David Oderberg (2007) takes issue with other philosophers, including Ellis to a degree, who claim to be essentialists. He revives and defends the Thomistic-Aristotelian tradition from modern attempts to flatten nature to the limp subject of the experimental method. In Praise of Natural Philosophy: A Revolution for Thought and Life (2017), Nicholas Maxwell argues that we need to reform philosophy and put science and philosophy back together again to create a modern version of natural philosophy.

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Natural philosophy

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Natural philosophy is the study of the natural world and its phenomena through rational inquiry, encompassing the investigation of causes, principles, and changes in physical entities independent of human intervention. Originating in ancient Greece, particularly with Aristotle (384–322 BCE) and his systematic exploration of nature's motions, elements, and biological processes, it formed the cornerstone of Western intellectual tradition by seeking teleological explanations for natural events. In the medieval period, natural philosophy integrated Aristotelian frameworks with theological considerations, viewing the study of nature as a means to understand divine order, as seen in the works of scholars like Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) who reconciled faith and reason in analyzing natural causes. During the Renaissance and early modern era, it expanded to include empirical methods and mathematical approaches, with figures such as Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) and Isaac Newton (1643–1727) advancing mechanistic views that emphasized quantifiable laws over qualitative essences, thereby laying the groundwork for the Scientific Revolution. By the 19th century, as specialization grew and the term "science" gained prominence, natural philosophy evolved into distinct disciplines like physics, chemistry, and biology, though its philosophical underpinnings continue to influence contemporary debates in the philosophy of science. Key aspects include its interdisciplinary nature, blending observation, experimentation, and metaphysical reflection, and its role in transitioning from speculative cosmology to empirical rigor, marking humanity's progressive comprehension of the cosmos.

Definition and Terminology

Origin of the Term

The term "natural philosophy" traces its etymological roots to , where "" (φύσις) denoted the intrinsic nature or essence of things, encompassing growth, origin, and the principles governing the physical world, while "philosophia" (φιλοσοφία) meant the love or pursuit of wisdom. This conceptual framework emerged among pre-Socratic philosophers, beginning with (c. 624–546 BCE), who sought rational, naturalistic explanations for cosmic phenomena, such as predicting solar eclipses and positing as the fundamental substance underlying all matter, thereby shifting inquiry from mythological to philosophical grounds. Subsequent thinkers like and Anaximenes built on this by exploring arche (originating principles) in terms of boundless or air-like substances, establishing "" as a central object of systematic investigation. Aristotle (384–322 BCE) formalized the study of nature within through his treatise Physics (Greek: Ta Physika), literally "the [books on] natural things," which examined the principles of change, motion, and causality in the natural realm, distinguishing it from metaphysics and . In this work, Aristotle defined natural philosophy as the investigation of entities possessing an internal principle of motion and rest, such as living beings and celestial bodies, thereby embedding it as a core division of theoretical philosophy alongside and first philosophy. His systematic approach, including concepts like , provided a foundational structure for understanding nature's operations without reliance on divine intervention alone. The Romans adopted and Latinized this tradition, rendering it as philosophia naturalis by the 1st century BCE. Cicero (106–43 BCE) employed the term in his subdivisions of philosophy, distinguishing philosophia naturalis (concerned with the physical world and cosmology) from rational and moral branches, as seen in works like De Natura Deorum, where he debates the origins and governance of the universe through natural and theological lenses. This usage integrated Greek ideas into Roman intellectual discourse, emphasizing empirical observation alongside dialectical reasoning. In the early medieval period, the term gained further traction through Latin translations and commentaries that preserved Aristotelian thought amid the decline of classical learning. Boethius (c. 477–524 CE), in his ambitious project to translate Aristotle's complete corpus into Latin—though he completed only the logical works (Organon)—along with commentaries on related texts, helped embed philosophia naturalis within the quadrivium and trivium curricula, formalizing its role as a bridge between logic and the study of nature. His efforts, drawing on Cicero and earlier sources, ensured the term's continuity in monastic and scholarly traditions, setting the stage for its expansion in later medieval scholasticism.

Evolution of the Term

In the medieval period, the term "natural philosophy" was firmly adopted within the scholastic tradition, particularly through the efforts of in the 13th century, who integrated Aristotelian concepts of nature with . Aquinas treated natural philosophy as a subordinate yet essential discipline that illuminated divine order through rational inquiry into the physical world, aligning with the scholastic view of philosophy as the "handmaid of ." This synthesis positioned natural philosophy as a bridge between empirical observation and revealed truth, embedding it deeply in university curricula across . The marked a revival and reconfiguration of the term, shifting it toward more empirical and anti-speculative orientations. Figures like played a pivotal role, as seen in his (1620), where he explicitly distinguished natural philosophy from speculative philosophy—criticizing the latter's reliance on ungrounded metaphysical deductions—and advocated instead for an inductive method based on systematic experimentation and sensory to reveal nature's laws. This reframing emphasized natural philosophy's practical utility for human advancement, moving it away from purely contemplative pursuits and aligning it with emerging mechanical and observational practices. By the , the term began to evolve amid growing mathematization, exemplified by Isaac Newton's (1687), which applied rigorous mathematical principles to phenomena like motion and gravitation, signaling a transition from qualitative Aristotelian explanations to quantitative "." This work underscored natural philosophy's increasing focus on predictive laws, yet it also foreshadowed specialization. In the , the term's broad encompassing of all studies declined sharply with the professionalization of ; by the 1830s, institutions like the British Association for the Advancement of Science promoted "" as an umbrella, while specific fields such as physics and chemistry supplanted "natural philosophy" in English usage, reflecting a linguistic shift toward disciplinary precision and away from philosophical connotations.

Scope and Subject Matter

Core Areas of Inquiry

Natural philosophy primarily sought to understand the causes of natural phenomena, the underlying principles governing change, and the fundamental distinction between processes driven by natural principles and those attributed to supernatural forces. At its core, it addressed why things occur in the observable world, emphasizing explanations rooted in the intrinsic properties of entities rather than external divine intervention alone. This inquiry differentiated natural entities—those possessing an internal source of motion and rest—from artifacts or celestial bodies moved by external agents, thereby establishing a framework for rational analysis of the physical realm. The key domains of natural philosophy encompassed cosmology, which examined the and eternal motions of the ; , focusing on transient earthly changes such as weather patterns and atmospheric phenomena; , which investigated the , , and functions of living organisms; and , dealing with the motion and interactions of inanimate bodies. These areas were not isolated but interconnected, allowing for explanations that spanned from the heavens to the and from lifeless matter to vital processes. For instance, in thought, these domains were explored through systematic to uncover universal patterns in nature. Central to this approach was the Aristotelian framework of the , which provided a comprehensive method for analyzing natural phenomena: the material cause (the from which something is made), the formal cause (its defining or ), the efficient cause (the agent initiating change), and the final cause (its purpose or end goal). This schema enabled philosophers to dissect complex events by considering multiple explanatory layers, ensuring that accounts of change integrated both mechanistic and teleological elements. Unlike contemporary specialized sciences, natural philosophy maintained a holistic integration, weaving physical, biological, and metaphysical explanations into a unified understanding of nature's order.

Branches and Classifications

Natural philosophy historically encompassed several major branches that sought to understand the natural world through systematic inquiry. Physics, rooted in Aristotelian texts such as the Physics and On Generation and Corruption, focused on the study of motion, change, and the fundamental principles governing natural bodies, including the four elements and their transformations. Astronomy, another core branch, examined celestial mechanics and the structure of the heavens, drawing on works like Ptolemy's Almagest and integrating mathematical models to describe planetary motions and cosmic order. Natural history involved the classification and observation of living organisms and natural phenomena, as detailed in Aristotle's History of Animals and expanded through empirical descriptions of species, minerals, and plants in Renaissance botanical studies. These branches collectively addressed the causes of natural change, providing a framework for investigating the observable universe. A key classification within natural philosophy was the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian division of the cosmos into sublunary and superlunary realms. The sublunary realm, encompassing the Earth and its atmosphere, was characterized as changeable and composed of the four terrestrial elements—earth, water, air, and fire—subject to generation, corruption, and irregular motions. In contrast, the superlunary realm, extending from the Moon outward, was deemed perfect and eternal, filled with aether and governed by uniform circular motions of celestial bodies. This dichotomy, central to medieval and Renaissance natural philosophy, structured explanations of terrestrial irregularities versus heavenly harmony, influencing cosmological models until challenged by figures like Copernicus. In the medieval period, natural philosophy was systematized through the , a of mathematical arts that included arithmetic, , , and astronomy, positioned as preparatory for deeper philosophical study. Astronomy, in particular, served as a bridge to natural philosophy by applying geometric principles to celestial phenomena, aligning with the broader goal of discerning divine order in nature. This classification, derived from and integrated into curricula, emphasized quantitative reasoning over purely qualitative analysis, distinguishing natural philosophy from the trivium's focus on language and logic. During the early , natural philosophy expanded to incorporate proto-scientific pursuits such as and , reflecting a growing emphasis on experimental investigation. , treated as a legitimate inquiry into matter's transformation and the underlying principles of generation, was pursued by scholars like as integral to understanding natural processes. Similarly, William Gilbert's (1600) elevated to a foundational phenomenon, positing magnetic forces as explanatory for both terrestrial and celestial motions, thus broadening natural philosophy beyond traditional Aristotelian categories. These inclusions marked a shift toward empirical and mechanical explanations, enriching the discipline's scope without fully displacing classical branches.

Historical Development

Ancient Greek Foundations

The origins of natural philosophy in ancient Greece trace back to the pre-Socratic thinkers of the 6th and 5th centuries BCE, who sought rational explanations for the natural world beyond mythological accounts. , active around 585 BCE, is credited with initiating this inquiry by proposing that water served as the fundamental substance from which all things arise and into which they dissolve, marking a shift toward material monism in understanding the cosmos. His student advanced this by introducing the , an indefinite and boundless principle that generates opposites like hot and cold through a process of separation, serving as the eternal source of all existence without specific form. of , around 500 BCE, emphasized constant change, asserting that the universe operates through a perpetual flux where "everything flows" (panta rhei), with fire as the underlying element symbolizing transformation and . Building on these ideas, of Abdera, in the 5th century BCE, developed alongside , positing that reality consists of indivisible particles called atoms moving through an infinite void, explaining diversity in nature through their shapes, sizes, and arrangements without invoking divine intervention. This mechanistic view rejected , attributing natural phenomena to the random collisions of these eternal, unchangeable atoms, which combine to form all perceptible . Plato, in his dialogue Timaeus composed around 360 BCE, offered a contrasting idealist cosmology where a divine craftsman, the , imposes mathematical order on chaotic matter to create the as a living, spherical . Drawing on geometric forms, Plato described the elements as derived from Platonic solids—tetrahedrons for fire, icosahedrons for water, and so forth—reflecting a harmonious structure modeled after eternal Forms, with the demiurge shaping the world soul to animate the physical realm. Aristotle, in the 4th century BCE, synthesized these traditions in works like Physics and On the Heavens, defining natural philosophy as the study of physis—the intrinsic principles of change and motion in natural bodies—distinguishing it from mathematics by its focus on material causes. He emphasized empirical observation alongside teleological explanations, arguing that natural objects possess inherent tendencies toward their ends, as seen in his analysis of celestial motion as eternal circular movement driven by the unmoved mover. This framework integrated qualitative analysis with systematic inquiry, establishing natural philosophy as a foundational discipline for understanding the ordered universe.

Medieval and Islamic Contributions

During the , spanning the 8th to 13th centuries, scholars in the advanced natural philosophy by integrating Aristotelian principles with Islamic theology, fostering advancements in , astronomy, and metaphysics. The in , established in the early 9th century under Caliph , served as a pivotal center for intellectual activity, where scholars translated and preserved Greek works on natural philosophy, including those of , , and , from Syriac and Greek into . This translation movement not only safeguarded ancient texts but also enabled original contributions, such as systematic commentaries that expanded on Aristotelian concepts of motion, elements, and causation within an Islamic framework. Notable among these was (Alhazen, c. 965–1040), whose (c. 1011–1021) pioneered experimental methods by emphasizing controlled observation and mathematical analysis of light and vision, laying early foundations for the in natural philosophy. A cornerstone of this era was (Ibn Sina, 980–1037), whose (completed around 1025) synthesized Aristotelian natural philosophy with empirical medical knowledge, describing the four elements, humors, and physiological processes as part of a unified system of nature governed by divine order. 's work extended natural philosophy by positing that the natural world operates through necessary causes emanating from , influencing later understandings of and substance in both Islamic and European thought. In contrast, (1058–1111) critiqued such philosophical excesses in his Incoherence of the Philosophers (c. 1095), arguing that 's emanationist metaphysics undermined divine by implying eternal necessity in nature over 's direct will, thus prioritizing occasionalism where all events require constant divine intervention. Responding to , (Ibn Rushd, 1126–1198) defended Aristotelian philosophy in his Incoherence of the Incoherence (c. 1180) and extensive commentaries on Aristotle's works, reconciling reason and faith while emphasizing natural causation; his writings, translated into Latin in the , profoundly shaped Scholastic natural philosophy in Europe. These debates highlighted tensions between rational inquiry into nature's laws and theological assertions of divine sovereignty, shaping subsequent Islamic natural philosophy. The transmission of these Arabic texts to medieval Europe, via translations in Toledo and Sicily during the 12th century, facilitated a synthesis of natural philosophy with Christian theology through the Scholastic method. Scholasticism employed disputations—structured debates on quaestiones—to reconcile faith and reason, often examining nature's autonomy versus divine will; for instance, Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) in his Summa Theologica (1265–1274) argued that natural philosophy reveals God's rational design through observable causes, while supernatural truths require faith, affirming that grace perfects rather than contradicts nature. This approach integrated Aristotelian foundations, viewing the study of motion and change as complementary to theology. In 13th-century Europe, figures like (c. 1200–1280) advanced experimental natural philosophy by commenting extensively on Aristotle's works, such as De Animalibus, where he combined observation of natural phenomena—like animal anatomy and mineral properties—with theological interpretation, emphasizing empirical verification to understand divine creation. His student (c. 1219–1292) further promoted scientia experimentalis, advocating and direct observation in and as essential to natural philosophy, warning against over-reliance on untested authorities and proposing that experimentation could uncover hidden qualities in nature ordained by God. Building on these ideas, Jean Buridan (c. 1300–1361) developed the impetus theory of motion in his Questions on Aristotle's Physics (c. 1340), positing that a continues moving due to an impressed force (impetus) rather than inherent soul or void, providing a mechanistic precursor to later dynamics while preserving theological compatibility by attributing ultimate causation to God. These contributions marked a medieval toward rigorous inquiry into nature's mechanisms, bridging with emerging empirical traditions.

Early Modern Transition

The Early Modern Transition marked a pivotal shift in natural philosophy during the 16th to 18th centuries, as thinkers increasingly emphasized empirical observation, mathematical rigor, and mechanistic explanations over medieval and Aristotelian . This period saw the erosion of geocentric cosmology and the rise of experimental methods, laying the groundwork for the . Key figures challenged inherited doctrines through innovative methodologies, fostering a view of as governed by discoverable laws rather than divine purpose alone. A cornerstone of this transition was the , initiated by in his 1543 work , which proposed a heliocentric model placing the Sun at the center of the and the in orbital motion around it. This heliocentrism directly challenged the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic geocentric cosmology, which had posited as the fixed center of a hierarchical, spherical with celestial bodies moving in perfect circles. By reinterpreting astronomical data through a Sun-centered framework, Copernicus simplified planetary motion explanations and eliminated the need for complex epicycles, though his model retained circular orbits and was motivated partly by aesthetic and mathematical elegance rather than empirical proof. The work's publication sparked debates that undermined the authority of ancient texts, encouraging subsequent astronomers to prioritize observational evidence. Galileo Galilei advanced this empirical turn through his telescopic observations and mathematical analyses of motion, detailed in Dialogues Concerning (1638). His 1609-1610 telescope revelations, including the and , provided visual support for by demonstrating that not all celestial bodies revolved around Earth. In the , Galileo formulated foundational laws of motion—such as the principle that objects in uniform motion continue indefinitely unless acted upon—and emphasized as the language of , deriving results through idealization and experimentation rather than Aristotelian qualities. These contributions shifted natural philosophy toward quantifiable, testable hypotheses, building briefly on medieval impetus theories but prioritizing controlled trials like experiments to reveal uniform acceleration. René Descartes further propelled the mechanistic worldview in Principles of Philosophy (1644), envisioning the as an extended, material plenum operating like a vast clockwork mechanism devoid of voids or forces. In this corpuscular philosophy, all natural phenomena arose from the motion and collision of particles following deterministic laws established by at creation, reducing qualities like and to mechanical interactions. Descartes integrated this into a vortex theory of planetary motion, where swirling ethereal carried celestial bodies, aligning with Copernican ideas while rejecting in favor of continuous . His approach promoted a mathematical, a priori deduction from first principles, influencing the period's shift from qualitative to quantitative explanations of . Complementing these developments, championed inductive empiricism in (1605), advocating systematic observation and experimentation to uncover nature's hidden structures through accumulated particulars rather than syllogistic deduction. Bacon criticized Aristotelian reliance on authority, proposing instead a collaborative, methodical ascent from sensory data to general axioms, exemplified by his tables of presence, absence, and degrees in later works. This elevated experimentation as the cornerstone of inquiry, promoting "" to dominate and interpret nature for human benefit, and it inspired the formation of scientific societies that institutionalized empirical practices. This transition culminated in the work of (1642–1727), whose (1687) unified terrestrial and through universal laws of motion and gravitation, derived from empirical data and mathematical principles. Newton's framework portrayed the universe as a mathematical system governed by immutable laws, eschewing Cartesian vortices in favor of gravitational attraction acting at a distance, while maintaining a theological underpinning with as the divine legislator. By prioritizing experimentation, quantification, and hypothetico-deductive reasoning, Newton solidified the mechanistic paradigm, transforming natural philosophy into the empirical science of the modern era.

Key Philosophical Concepts

Philosophy of Motion and Change

In natural philosophy, the philosophy of motion and change centers on understanding how entities in the natural world transition from potentiality to actuality, a process fundamentally explained through Aristotle's doctrine of hylomorphism. According to this view, every physical object is a composite of matter (hylē), which provides the underlying substrate capable of receiving change, and form (morphē), which actualizes that potential by determining the object's essential nature and enabling its characteristic activities. For instance, in the generation of a bronze statue, the bronze serves as the matter that persists through the change, while the form of the statue is imposed upon it by the sculptor's art, transforming it from mere potential into an actual artwork; this interaction of matter and form is the mechanism by which natural change occurs, as nature itself is defined as an internal principle of motion and rest in such compounds. Aristotle distinguished between qualitative and quantitative aspects of motion, particularly in his cosmological framework dividing the universe into sublunary and superlunary realms. In the sublunary region—encompassing the Earth and its atmosphere—motions are irregular, rectilinear, and involve qualitative changes such as generation, corruption, and alteration of the four elements (earth, water, air, fire), driven by their natural tendencies toward specific places (e.g., heavy elements downward, light elements upward). By contrast, the superlunary realm, beyond the Moon's orbit, features perfect, eternal circular motions of the celestial spheres, composed of the fifth element (aether), which undergoes only quantitative changes in position without qualitative alteration, reflecting the immutable order of the heavens. This dichotomy underscores natural philosophy's emphasis on explaining diverse modes of change within a hierarchical cosmos. Central to these explanations are causal hierarchies, where efficient causes—agents that initiate motion or change in natural processes—operate in chains distinct from the divine first cause. Aristotle posited that natural changes arise from proximate efficient causes, such as a begetting offspring or heating wood, which form instrumental series where each link transmits motion from a prior agent; however, these chains ultimately trace back to an as the ultimate efficient cause, but natural philosophy focuses on the immanent, secondary causes governing sublunary and superlunary phenomena without invoking divine intervention in every instance. This framework integrates the (material, formal, efficient, final) to provide a complete account of change, with efficient causes ensuring the transmission of actuality through matter-form interactions. Medieval natural philosophers refined these Aristotelian concepts, often through nominalist critiques and innovative theories of motion. , adhering to , rejected the realist notion of substantial forms as universal entities inhering in multiple substances, instead treating them as particular qualities or configurations that explain change without positing abstract universals; this simplified avoided unnecessary multiplicities, allowing motion to be understood through observable singular substances and their accidental qualities rather than metaphysical forms. Similarly, Jean Buridan advanced the as a quality impressed by a mover onto a moved body, sustaining against resistance until diminished, serving as a precursor to the modern concept of by attributing continued motion to an internal force rather than external media like air. These developments, while rooted in , shifted emphasis toward more mechanistic explanations within natural philosophy's scope, influencing later inquiries into branches like .

Teleology and Natural Order

In natural philosophy, teleology posits that natural processes and entities are inherently directed toward purposeful ends, reflecting an intrinsic order in the universe. This perspective, central to ancient and medieval thought, views nature not as random but as governed by final causes that guide development and function. Aristotle, in his Physics and Metaphysics, articulated the doctrine of the four causes, with the final cause (telos) explaining why something exists or occurs by reference to its end or purpose. For instance, he argued that an acorn's growth into an oak tree exemplifies this teleological direction, where the potential in the seed is actualized toward a specific endpoint inherent to its nature. Platonic influences shaped this teleological framework by introducing ideal forms as eternal, perfect archetypes that structure the sensible world in a hierarchical order. In works like the Timaeus, Plato described the cosmos as crafted by a divine demiurge who imposes rational order on chaotic matter, aligning physical reality with higher, immaterial Forms such as Goodness at the apex of the hierarchy. This Platonic hierarchy informed natural philosophy by suggesting that observable natural phenomena—such as the ordered motions of celestial bodies—manifest lower reflections of these ideal principles, thereby embedding purpose within the fabric of existence. Aristotle, while critiquing Plato's separation of forms from matter, adapted this idea into immanent teleology, where ends are realized within natural substances themselves. Medieval natural philosophers, particularly , integrated Aristotelian with to argue for a divine underlying natural order. In his , Aquinas's Fifth Way—the argument from —observes that non-intelligent bodies, like arrows directed by archers, act toward ends with regularity and precision, implying direction by an intelligent being, identified as . This teleological proof posits that the universe's purposeful design, evident in the adaptation of means to ends (e.g., eyes for seeing), necessitates a supreme designer to account for the observed and efficacy in nature. Aquinas thus preserved as essential to understanding natural processes, bridging pagan philosophy with monotheistic cosmology. Early modern thinkers began critiquing this teleological emphasis, shifting toward mechanical explanations while some retained elements of purposeful order. , in his Principles of Philosophy and correspondence, rejected final causes in physics as inscrutable and unnecessary, advocating instead for a mechanistic view where natural phenomena arise from matter in motion governed by divine laws, without reference to ends. He argued that inquiring into 's purposes in nature leads to speculation rather than certain knowledge, prioritizing efficient causes and geometrical necessity. In contrast, upheld a form of through his doctrine of pre-established , positing that synchronizes the independent monads composing such that their perceptions and actions align perfectly, mimicking causal interactions while fulfilling an optimal divine plan. This ensures natural order without direct intervention, viewing the universe as the best directed toward rational ends. Motion served briefly as a in these debates, illustrating teleological processes through directed changes rather than mere locomotion.

Empiricism and Observation

In natural philosophy, rooted in provided a foundational method for acquiring knowledge about the natural world, emphasizing the role of sensory experience alongside rational deduction. articulated this approach in his , where he argued that scientific knowledge begins with pre-existing perceptions and advances through induction, a process by which repeated observations of particulars lead to universal principles. He posited that sense-perception implants universals in the mind inductively, forming the basis for demonstrative reasoning without which true understanding remains unattainable. This framework balanced empirical data collection with logical synthesis, positioning as essential yet subordinate to reason in establishing causal explanations. During the medieval period, the pursuit of empirical knowledge in natural philosophy involved both heavy reliance on authoritative ancient texts and significant innovations in observation and experimentation. While scholars often deferred to Ptolemy's (c. 150 CE) as a key model for astronomy, accepting its geocentric framework and planetary calculations, there were notable advancements, such as Robert Grosseteste's introduction of controlled experiments to isolate causes and Roger Bacon's advocacy for scientia experimentalis, which emphasized testing theories through direct experience to uncover nature's secrets. These efforts, integrated with Aristotelian and Ptolemaic traditions, combined interpretive commentary with exploratory practices, laying groundwork for later empirical methods. A critical advancement in addressing perceptual flaws came with Francis Bacon's (1620), which critiqued the obstacles to reliable through his doctrine of the "idols of the mind." Bacon identified four types of idols—those of the tribe (human nature's biases), the cave (individual prejudices), the marketplace (linguistic ambiguities), and the theater (dogmatic systems)—as systematic errors that distort sensory data and impede inductive truth-seeking. By exposing these, Bacon advocated purging the mind to enable purer empirical , shifting natural philosophy toward methodical scrutiny of nature over unexamined assumptions. The transition toward more rigorous empiricism emerged in early modern works like William Gilbert's (1600), which pioneered controlled experiments to investigate , distinguishing it from other forces through systematic trials such as versorium tests on loadstones. Gilbert emphasized repeatable observations under varied conditions, rejecting speculative analogies in favor of direct, manipulative evidence, thereby exemplifying a balanced that integrated experimentation with theoretical interpretation. This approach influenced subsequent natural philosophers, including Galileo, who similarly prioritized observational precision in his studies of motion.

Legacy and Modern Relevance

Transition to Modern Science

The transition from natural philosophy to modern science in the late 18th and 19th centuries was marked by profound institutional shifts that professionalized scientific inquiry and separated it from broader philosophical pursuits. While early academies like the Royal Society, founded in 1660 to promote experimental knowledge, laid groundwork for collaborative research, full professionalization occurred after 1800 as universities increasingly established dedicated departments for the "sciences" rather than philosophy. In the United States and , institutions such as (founded 1876) and German research universities emphasized specialized training, peer-reviewed journals, and salaried positions, transforming science from an amateur pursuit into a distinct . This evolution reflected the growing specialization of knowledge, where natural philosophy's holistic approach yielded to empirical methodologies focused on measurable phenomena. Key markers of this transition included Antoine Lavoisier's Traité élémentaire de chimie (1789), which established modern and rejected speculative theories like phlogiston in favor of quantitative experimentation, signaling the end of philosophical conjecture in chemistry. Similarly, John Dalton's atomic theory, outlined in A New System of Chemical Philosophy (1808), provided a mechanistic framework for matter based on empirical laws of definite and multiple proportions, marking a decisive shift from qualitative natural philosophy to predictive scientific models. These works exemplified how 19th-century advancements prioritized verifiable hypotheses over metaphysical explanations, effectively concluding the era of natural philosophy as a unified field. Philosophically, Immanuel Kant's (1781) played a pivotal role by distinguishing phenomena—observable reality shaped by human cognition—from noumena, the unknowable "things-in-themselves," thereby limiting scientific knowledge to empirical domains and influencing the rise of . This Kantian framework, which emphasized synthetic a priori judgments for natural laws while bracketing speculative metaphysics, inspired positivists like to advocate for a confined to observable facts, free from theological or absolute ideals. By reinforcing empiricism's boundaries, Kant's ideas facilitated the philosophical justification for 's from traditional natural philosophy. The decline of the term "natural philosophy" culminated in William Whewell's coinage of in 1834, during a review of Mary Somerville's work, to denote practitioners of specialized empirical sciences rather than general philosophers of . This , proposed in response to the British Association for the Advancement of Science's need for a unified professional identity, reflected the era's fragmentation into disciplines like physics and , rendering "natural philosophy" obsolete by the mid-19th century. As specialization intensified, the term faded, symbolizing science's emergence as an independent enterprise. Although the term largely fell out of use, "natural philosophy" persists in some contemporary academic contexts, referring to the philosophical dimensions of natural sciences.

Influence on Philosophy of Science

Natural philosophy's emphasis on substantive entities and inherent purposes has left a lasting imprint on the realism versus debate in of , particularly in that echo Aristotelian . Realists argue for the mind-independent existence of unobservable entities described by scientific theories, drawing parallels to Aristotle's view of substances as composite forms and matter that persist through change, which some quantum theorists adapt to reconcile wave-particle duality with . In contrast, instrumentalists treat theories as mere tools for prediction without , yet this tension revives natural philosophy's quest to discern the underlying of beyond empirical observables. In of nature, Martin Heidegger's (1927) critiques technocratic views of the world as a mere resource for human exploitation, echoing natural philosophy's holistic concern for being-in-the-world rather than detached calculation. Heidegger argues that modern technology reduces to "standing-reserve," stripping it of intrinsic meaning and concealing its primordial essence, a perspective that builds on pre-modern natural philosophical traditions by urging a return to authentic engagement with the environment. Complementing this, revives teleological elements from natural philosophy, positing that ecosystems possess inherent value and purposive structures akin to Aristotelian final causes, thereby challenging anthropocentric in . Thomas Kuhn's concept of paradigms in (1962) can be seen as an evolution of natural philosophical frameworks, where shared worldviews guide scientific inquiry much like ancient cosmologies shaped understanding of natural order. Kuhn's incommensurability between paradigms reflects the discontinuous shifts in natural philosophy from Aristotelian to mechanistic views, emphasizing that scientific progress involves transformative gestalts rather than linear accumulation. Similarly, feminist critiques of scientific objectivity draw on natural philosophy's situated knowledge traditions to argue that claims of value-neutrality mask gendered biases, advocating instead for situated knowledges that integrate embodied perspectives into epistemic practices. The revival of holistic approaches in , inspired by Heraclitus's flux doctrine within natural philosophy, integrates non-Western elements by emphasizing dynamic relationality over static substances, influencing contemporary ecological and metaphysical thought. Process thinkers like extend Heraclitean ideas of perpetual becoming to critique reductionist science, fostering integrations with Eastern philosophies such as Buddhism's emphasis on interdependence in holistic . In contemporary developments, Polish philosopher and cosmologist Michał Heller advocates for a renewed philosophy of nature that bridges empirical science and philosophical inquiry. In his work Philosophy in Science: An Historical Introduction (2011), Heller traces the historical evolution of concepts from ancient philosophy to modern scientific theories, positioning science as a successor to traditional philosophy of nature and emphasizing the ongoing need for philosophical reflection on scientific advancements.

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