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United States Navy SEALs
United States Navy SEALs
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United States Navy SEALs
Special Warfare insignia known as the "SEAL Trident"
ActiveJanuary 1, 1962 – present
(63 years, 9 months)
Country United States
Branch United States Navy
TypeSpecial operations force
Role
Part of
Garrison/HQNaval Amphibious Base Coronado
Joint Expeditionary Base–Little Creek
Nicknames"Frogmen", "The Teams", "Team Guys", "The Men with Green Faces"[2]
Motto"The Only Easy Day Was Yesterday"[3] "It Pays To Be A Winner". "Never Out Of The Fight".
Engagements[5][6][7]

The United States Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) Teams, commonly known as Navy SEALs, are the United States Navy's primary special operations force and a component of the United States Naval Special Warfare Command. Among the SEALs' main functions are conducting small-unit special operation missions in maritime, jungle, urban, arctic, mountainous, and desert environments. SEALs are typically ordered to capture or kill high-level targets, or to gather intelligence behind enemy lines.[8]

SEAL team personnel are hand-selected, highly trained, and highly proficient in unconventional warfare (UW), direct action (DA), and special reconnaissance (SR), among other tasks like sabotage, demolition, intelligence gathering, and hydrographic reconnaissance, training, and advising friendly militaries or other forces.[9][1] All active SEALs are members of the U.S. Navy.[13]

History

[edit]

Origins

[edit]

Although not formally founded until 1962, the modern-day U.S. Navy SEALs trace their roots to World War II.[8] The United States Military recognized the need for the covert reconnaissance of landing beaches and coastal defenses. As a result, the joint Army, Marine Corps, and Navy Amphibious Scout and Raider School was established in 1942 at Fort Pierce, Florida.[12] The Scouts and Raiders were formed in September of that year, just nine months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, from the Observer Group, a joint U.S. Army-Marine-Navy unit.

Scouts and Raiders

[edit]

Recognizing the need for a beach reconnaissance force, a select group of Army and Navy personnel assembled at Amphibious Training Base (ATB) Little Creek, Virginia on 15 August 1942 to begin Amphibious Scouts and Raiders (Joint) training. The Scouts and Raiders' mission was to identify and reconnoiter the objective beach, maintain a position on the designated beach prior to a landing, and guide the assault waves to the landing beach.[8] The unit was led by U.S. Army 1st Lieutenant Lloyd Peddicord as commanding officer, and Navy Ensign John Bell as executive officer. Navy Chief Petty Officers and sailors came from the boat pool at U. S. Naval Amphibious Training Base, Solomons, Maryland, and Army Raider personnel came from the 3rd and 9th Infantry Divisions. They trained at Little Creek until embarking for the North Africa campaign the following November. Operation Torch was launched in November 1942 off the Atlantic coast of French Morocco in North Africa.[14]

The first group included Phil H. Bucklew, the "Father of Naval Special Warfare," after whom the Naval Special Warfare Center building is named. Commissioned in October 1942, this group saw combat in November 1942 during Operation Torch on the North African Coast. Scouts and Raiders also supported landings in Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, Normandy, and southern France.[15]

The second group of Scouts and Raiders, code-named Special Service Unit No. 1, was established on 7 July 1943, as a joint and combined operations force. The first mission, in September 1943, was at Finschhafen in Papua New Guinea. Later operations were at Gasmata, Arawe, Cape Gloucester, and the east and south coasts of New Britain, all without any loss of personnel. Conflicts arose over operational matters, and all non-Navy personnel were reassigned. The unit, renamed 7th Amphibious Scouts, received a new mission, to go ashore with the assault boats, buoy channels, erect markers for the incoming craft, handle casualties, take offshore soundings, clear beach obstacles, and maintain voice communications linking the troops ashore, incoming boats and nearby ships. The 7th Amphibious Scouts conducted operations in the Pacific for the duration of the conflict, participating in more than 40 landings.[8]

The third and final Scouts and Raiders organization operated in China. Scouts and Raiders were deployed to fight with the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO). To help bolster the work of SACO, Admiral Ernest J. King ordered that 120 officers and 900 men be trained for "Amphibious Raider" at the Scout and Raider school at Fort Pierce, Florida. They formed the core of what was envisioned as a "guerrilla amphibious organization of Americans and Chinese operating from coastal waters, lakes, and rivers employing small steamboats and sampans." While most Amphibious Raider forces remained at Camp Knox in Calcutta, three of the groups saw active service. They conducted a survey of the upper Yangtze River in the spring of 1945 and, disguised as coolies, conducted a detailed three-month survey of the Chinese coast from Shanghai to Kitchioh Wan, near Hong Kong.[8]

[edit]
NCDU 45, CEC Ensign Karnowski, Chief Carpenters Mate Conrad C. Millis, MM2 Equipment Operator Lester Meyers, and three sailors. The unit received a Presidential Unit Citation with ENS Karnowski earning the Navy Cross & French Croix de Guerre with Palm, while MM2 Meyers received a Silver Star.[16]

In September 1942, 17 Navy salvage personnel arrived at ATB Little Creek, Virginia for a week-long course in demolitions, explosive cable cutting, and commando raiding techniques. On 10 November 1942, the first combat demolition unit successfully cut cable and net barriers across the Wadi Sebou River during Operation Torch in North Africa. This enabled USS Dallas (DD-199) to traverse the water and insert U.S. Rangers who captured the Port Lyautey airdrome.

In early May 1943, a two-phase "Naval Demolition Project" was directed by the Chief of Naval Operations "to meet a present and urgent requirement". The first phase began at ATB Solomons, Maryland with the establishment of Operational Naval Demolition Unit No. 1. Six officers and eighteen enlisted men reported from the Seabee's NTC Camp Peary dynamiting and demolition school, for a four-week course. Those Seabees, led by Lieutenant Fred Wise CEC, were immediately sent to participate in the invasion of Sicily.[17] At that time Lieutenant Commander Draper L. Kauffman, "The Father of Naval Combat Demolition," was selected to set up a school for Naval Demolitions and direct the entire Project. The first six classes graduated from "Area E" at NTC Camp Peary.[18] LCDR Kauffman's needs quickly out-grew "Area E" and on 6 June 1943, he established NCDU training at Fort Pierce. Most of Kauffman's volunteers came from the navy's Civil Engineer Corps (CEC) and enlisted Seabees. Training commenced with a grueling week designed to filter out under-performing candidates. Eventually given the name "Hell Week" by NCDU recruits, this rigorous course was integrated into UDT training and remains a part of modern-day Navy Seal training today.[19]

By April 1944, a total of 34 NCDUs were deployed to England in preparation for Operation Overlord, the amphibious landing at Normandy. On 6 June 1944, under heavy fire, the NCDUs at Omaha Beach managed to blow eight complete gaps and two partial gaps in the German defenses. The NCDUs suffered 31 killed and 60 wounded, a casualty rate of 52%. Meanwhile, the NCDUs at Utah Beach met less intense enemy fire. They cleared 700 yards (640 metres) of beach in two hours, another 900 yards (820 metres) by the afternoon. Casualties at Utah Beach were significantly lighter with six killed and eleven wounded. During Operation Overlord, not a single demolitioneer was lost to improper handling of explosives. In August 1944, four NCDUs from Utah Beach plus nine others participated in the landings Operation Dragoon in southern France. It was the last amphibious operation in the European Theater of Operations. Once the European invasions were complete, Rear Admiral Kelly Turner requisitioned all available NCDUs from Fort Pierce for integration into the Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs) operating in the Pacific Theater.

Thirty NCDUs[20] had been sent to the Pacific prior to Normandy. NCDUs 1–10 were staged on Florida Island in the Solomon Islands (archipelago) during January 1944.[21] NCDU 1 went briefly to the Aleutians in 1943.[22] NCDUs 4 and 5 were the first to see combat by helping the 4th Marines at Green Island and Emirau Island.[22] A few were temporarily attached to UDTs.[21] Later NCDUs 1–10 were combined to form Underwater Demolition Team Able.[21] Six NCDUs: 2,3, 19, 20, 21 and 24 served with the Seventh Amphibious Force and were the only remaining NCDUs at the end of the war. The Naval Special Warfare Command building is named for LTJG Frank Kaine CEC commander of NCDU 2.

Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs)

[edit]

The first units designated as Underwater Demolition Teams were formed in the Pacific Theater. Rear Admiral Kelly Turner, the Navy's top amphibious expert, ordered the formation of Underwater Demolition Teams in response to the failed invasion at Tarawa and the Marines' inability to clear the surrounding coral reefs with Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVTS). Turner recognized that amphibious operations required intelligence of underwater obstacles. The personnel for these teams were mostly local Seabees or others that had started out in the NCDUs. UDT training was at the Waipio Amphibious Operating Base, under V Amphibious Corps operational and administrative control. Most of the instructors and trainees were graduates of the Fort Pierce NCDU or Scouts and Raiders schools, Seabees, Marines, and Army soldiers.

Carp. W. H. Acheson Silver Star ceremony for UDT 1 action at Engibi where he stripped down to swim trunks and did reconnaissance in broad daylight on a hostile beach becoming a role model of UDTs being swimmers.

When Teams 1 and 2 were initially formed, they were "provisional" with 180 men in total.[23] The first underwater demolition team commanders were CDR E.D. Brewster (CEC) UDT 1 and CDR John T. Koehler UDT 2.[24] The teams wore fatigues with life-vests and were not expected to leave their boats—similar to the NCDUs. However, at Kwajalein Fort Pierce protocol was changed. Admiral Turner ordered daylight reconnaissance and CEC. ENS Lewis F. Luehrs and Seabee Chief William Acheson wore swim trunks under their fatigues anticipating they would not be able to get what the Admiral wanted by staying in the boat. They stripped down and spent 45 minutes in the water in broad daylight. When they got out they were taken directly to Admiral Turner's flagship to report, still in their trunks. Admiral Turner concluded that daylight reconnaissance by individual swimmers was the way to get accurate information on coral and underwater obstacles for upcoming landings. This is what he reported to Admiral Nimitz.[25] The success of those UDT 1 Seabees not following Fort Pierce protocol rewrote the UDT mission model and training regimen.[26] Those Seabees also created the image of UDTs as the "naked warriors". At Engebi CDR Brewster was wounded and all of the men with ENS Luehrs wore swim trunks under their greens.[20]

After the operations in the Marshall Islands, Admiral Turner restructured the two provisional UDT units and created 7 permanent units with an allotted size of 96 men per team. In the name of operational efficiency, the UDTs were also made an-all Navy outfit, and any Army and Marine corp engineers were returned to their units. Moving forward, the UDTs would employ the reconnaissance method made successful in Kwajalein – daytime use of swimsuits and goggles instead of the Scouts and Raiders method of nighttime rubber boats. In order to implement these changes and grow the UDTs, Koehler was made the commanding officer of the Naval Combat Demolition Training and Experimental Base on Maui. Admiral Turner also brought on LCDR Draper Kauffman as a combat officer.[24]

Lt. Luehrs was one of the 30 officers from the 7th NCR[27] that staged for UDTs 1 & 2. He and Chief Acheson were the first UDT swimmers. His Corps insignia would have had a Seabee on it.

Seabees made up the vast majority of the men in teams 1–9, 13, and 15.[28][29] Seabees were roughly 20% of UDT 11.[28] The officers were mostly CEC.[30] At war's end 34 teams had been formed with teams 1–21 having actually been deployed. The Seabees provided over half of the men in the teams that saw service.

The UDT uniform had transitioned from the combat fatigues of the NCDUs to trunks, swimfins, diving masks and Ka-bars. The men trained by the OSS had brought their swimfins with them when they joined the UDTs.[31] They were adopted by the other teams as quickly as Supply could get them.[31]

These "Naked Warriors", as they came to be called post-war, saw action in every major Pacific amphibious landing including: Eniwetok, Saipan, Kwajalein, Tinian, Guam, Angaur, Ulithi, Peleliu, Leyte, Lingayen Gulf, Zambales, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Labuan, and Brunei Bay. By fall of 1944, the UDT's were considered an indispensable US military special operations unit, and Navy planners in the Central Pacific relied heavily on the UDT's reconnaissance reports and demolition activities to clear the way for landings.[24]

The last UDT operation of the war was on 4 July 1945 at Balikpapan, Borneo. The rapid demobilization at the conclusion of the war reduced the number of active duty UDTs to two on each coast with a complement of seven officers and 45 enlisted men each.[12] However, the UDTs were the only special troops that avoided complete disbandment after the war, unlike the OSS Maritime Unit, the VAC Recon Battalion, and several Marine recon missions.[24]

Because they were so integral to the success of missions in the Pacific during the war, the U.S. Navy did not publicize the existence of the UDTs until post-war.[32] During WWII the Navy did not have a rating for the UDTs nor did they have an insignia. Those men with the CB rating on their uniforms considered themselves Seabees that were doing underwater demolition (Fig. 11). They did not call themselves "UDTs" or "Frogmen" but rather "Demolitioneers" which had carried over from the NCDUs[33] and Lt Cdr Kauffman's recruiting efforts from the Seabee dynamiting and demolition school. The next largest group of UDT volunteers came from the joint Army-Navy Scouts and Raiders school that was also in Fort Pierce and the Navy's bomb disposal school in the Seabee-dominated teams.

For the Marianas operations of Kwajalein, Roi-Namur, Siapan, Tinian, Eniwetok, and Guam, Admiral Turner recommended sixty Silver Stars and over three hundred Bronze Stars with Vs for the Seabees and other service members of UDTs 1–7[34] That was unprecedented in U.S. Naval/Marine Corps history.[34] For UDTs 5 and 7 every officer received a silver star and all the enlisted received bronze stars with Vs for Operation Forager (Tinian).[35] For UDTs 3 and 4 every officer received a silver star and all the enlisted received bronze stars with Vs for Operation Forager (Guam).[35] Admiral Richard Lansing Conolly felt the commanders of teams 3 and 4 (LT Crist and LT W.G. Carberry) should have received Navy Crosses.

LT Crist (CEC), LCDR Kauffman, and LT Carberry right–left at the UDT Silver and Bronze Stars award ceremony.
Seabees in both UDT 3 and 4 made signs to greet the Marines assaulting Guam.[35] However, Team 4 was able to leave theirs on the beach for the Marines to see that the Seabees had been there first. UDT 4 posted this sign again on the Hotel Marquee for its 25-year reunion.[36]

As the first to often make amphibious landings, the UDTs began making signs to welcome the Marines, indicating they had been there first, to foster the continued friendly rivalry. In keeping with UDT tradition, UDT 21 created a sign to greet the Marines landing in Japan. For Operation Beleaguer UDT 9 was deployed with the III Amphibious Corps to Northern China. In 1965 the UDT 12 put up another beach sign to greet the Marines at Da Nang.

Operation Crossroads UDT 3 was designated TU 1.1.3 for the operation. On 27 April 1946, seven officers and 51 enlisted embarked at CBC Port Hueneme, for transit to Bikini.[37] Their assignment was to retrieve water samples from ground zero of the Baker blast.

Korean War

[edit]
UDT members using the casting technique from a speeding boat

The Korean War began on 25 June 1950, when the North Korean army invaded South Korea. Beginning with a detachment of 11 personnel from UDT 3, UDT participation expanded to three teams with a combined strength of 300 men. During the "Forgotten War" the UDTs fought intensely, employing demolition expertise gained from World War II and using it for an offensive role. Continuing to use water as cover and concealment as well as an insertion method, the Korean Era UDTs targeted bridges, tunnels, fishing nets, and other maritime and coastal targets. They also developed a close working relationship with the Republic of Korea Underwater Demolitions Unit (predecessor to the Navy Special Warfare Flotilla), which continues today.[8]

Through their focused efforts on demolitions and mine disposal, the UDTs refined and developed their commando tactics during the Korean War. The UDTs also accompanied South Korean commandos on raids in the North to demolish train tunnels. This was frowned upon by higher-ranking officials because they believed it was a non-traditional use of Naval forces. Due to the nature of the war, the UDTs maintained a low operational profile. Some of the missions included transporting spies into North Korea and the destruction of North Korean fishing nets used to supply the North Korean Army.[8]

As part of the Special Operations Group, or SOG, UDTs successfully conducted demolition raids on railroad tunnels and bridges along the Korean coast. The UDTs specialized in a somewhat new mission: Night coastal demolition raids against railroad tunnels and bridges. The UDT men were given the task because, in the words of UDT LT Ted Fielding, "We were ready to do what nobody else could do, and what nobody else wanted to do." (Ted Fielding was awarded the Silver Star during Korea, and was later promoted to the rank of Captain.)[38]

On 15 September 1950, UDTs supported Operation Chromite, the amphibious landing at Incheon. UDT 1 and 3 provided personnel who went in ahead of the landing craft, scouting mud flats, marking low points in the channel, clearing fouled propellers, and searching for mines. Four UDT personnel acted as wave-guides for the Marine landing. In October 1950, UDTs supported mine-clearing operations in Wonsan Harbor where frogmen would locate and mark mines for minesweepers. On 12 October 1950, two U.S.minesweepers hit mines and sank. UDTs rescued 25 sailors. The next day, William Giannotti conducted the first U.S. combat operation using an "aqualung" when he dived on USS Pledge. For the remainder of the war, UDTs conducted beach and river reconnaissance, infiltrated guerrillas behind the lines from sea, continued mine sweeping operations and participated in Operation Fishnet, which devastated the North Koreans' fishing capability.[8]

Birth of Navy SEALs and the Vietnam War

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Navy SEALS X-Ray platoon

President John F. Kennedy, aware of the situation in Southeast Asia, recognized the need for unconventional warfare and special operations as a measure against guerrilla warfare. In a speech to Congress on 25 May 1961, Kennedy spoke of his deep respect for the United States Army Special Forces. While his announcement of the government's plan to put a man on the moon drew most of the attention, in the same speech he announced his intention to spend over $100 million to strengthen U.S. special operations forces and expand American capabilities in unconventional warfare. Some people erroneously credit President Kennedy with creating the Navy SEALs. His announcement was actually only a formal acknowledgement of a process that had been underway since the Korean War.[39]

The Navy needed to determine its role within the special operations arena. In March 1961, Admiral Arleigh Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations, recommended the establishment of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla units. These units would be able to operate from sea, air or land. This was the beginning of the Navy SEALs. All SEALs came from the Navy's Underwater Demolition Teams, who had already gained extensive experience in commando warfare in Korea; however, the Underwater Demolition Teams were still necessary to the Navy's amphibious force.[8]

Navy SEAL team boards a Light SEAL Support Craft
Navy SEAL team boards a Light SEAL Support Craft

The first two teams were formed in January 1962[40] and stationed on both US coasts: Team One at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, in San Diego, California and Team Two at Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Formed entirely with personnel from UDTs, the SEALs mission was to conduct counter guerilla warfare and clandestine operations in maritime and riverine environments.[12] Men of the newly formed SEAL Teams were trained in such unconventional areas as hand-to-hand combat, high-altitude parachuting, demolitions, and foreign languages. The SEALs attended Underwater Demolition Team replacement training and they spent some time training in UDTs. Upon making it to a SEAL team, they would undergo a SEAL Basic Indoctrination (SBI) training class at Camp Kerry in the Cuyamaca Mountains. After SBI training class, they would enter a platoon and conduct platoon training.

According to founding SEAL team member Roy Boehm, the SEALs' first missions were directed against communist Cuba. These consisted of deploying from submarines and carrying out beach reconnaissance in a prelude to a proposed US amphibious invasion of the island. On at least one occasion, Boehm and another SEAL had smuggled a CIA agent ashore to take pictures of Soviet nuclear missiles being unloaded on the dockside.[41]

The Pacific Command recognized Vietnam as a potential hot spot for unconventional forces. At the beginning of 1962, the UDTs started hydrographic surveys and along with other branches of the US Military, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) was formed. In March 1962, SEALs were deployed to South Vietnam as advisors for the purpose of training Army of the Republic of Vietnam commandos in the same methods they were trained themselves.

The Central Intelligence Agency began using SEALs in covert operations in early 1963. The SEALs were later involved in the CIA sponsored Phoenix Program where it targeted Vietcong (VC) infrastructure and personnel for capture and assassination.

The SEALs were initially deployed in and around Da Nang, training the South Vietnamese in combat diving, demolitions and guerrilla/anti-guerrilla tactics. As the war continued, the SEALs found themselves positioned in the Rung Sat Special Zone where they were to disrupt the enemy supply and troop movements and in the Mekong Delta to fulfill riverine operations, fighting on the inland waterways.

SEALs on patrol in the Mekong Delta

Combat with the VC was direct. Unlike the conventional warfare methods of firing artillery into a coordinate location, the SEALs operated close to their targets. Into the late 1960s, the SEALs were successful in a new style of warfare, effective in anti-guerrilla and guerrilla actions. SEALs brought a personal war to the enemy in a previously safe area. The VC referred to them as "the men with green faces," due to the camouflage face paint the SEALs wore during combat missions.[42]

In February 1966, a small SEAL Team One detachment arrived in South Vietnam to conduct direct action missions. Operating from Nhà Bè Base, near the Rung Sat Special Zone, this detachment signalled the beginning of a SEAL presence that would eventually include 8 SEAL platoons in country on a continuing basis. SEALs also served as advisors for Provincial Reconnaissance Units and the Lein Doc Nguio Nhia, the Vietnamese SEALs.[12]

1st Presidential Unit Citation awarded to SEAL Team TWO for extraordinary heroism in Vietnam from July 1967 to June 1969

SEALs continued to make forays into North Vietnam and Laos and covertly into Cambodia, controlled by the Studies and Observations Group. The SEALs from Team Two started a unique deployment of SEAL team members working alone with ARVN Commandos. In 1967, a SEAL unit named Detachment Bravo (Det Bravo) was formed to operate these mixed US and ARVN units.

Presidential Unit Citation awarded to SEAL Team TWO for extraordinary heroism in Vietnam from July 1969 to June 1971

By 1970, President Richard Nixon initiated a plan of Vietnamization, which would remove the US from the Vietnam War and return the responsibility of defense back to the South Vietnamese. Conventional forces were being withdrawn; the last SEAL platoon left South Vietnam on 7 December 1971, and the last SEAL advisor left South Vietnam in March 1973. The SEALs were among the most highly decorated units for their size in the war, receiving by 1974 one Medal of Honor, two Navy Crosses, 42 Silver stars, 402 Bronze Stars, two Legions of Merit, 352 Commendation Medals, and 51 Navy Achievement Medals[43] Later awards would bring the total to three Medals of Honor and five Navy Crosses. SEAL Team One was awarded three Presidential Unit Citations and one Navy Unit Commendation; SEAL Team Two received two Presidential Unit Citations.[44] By the end of the war, 48 SEALs had been killed in Vietnam, but estimates of their kill count are as high as 2,000. The Navy SEAL Museum in Fort Pierce, Florida, displays a list of the 48 SEALs who lost their lives in combat during the Vietnam War.[45]

Reorganization

[edit]

In 1974–1975, UDT-13 was redesignated; some personnel established Underwater Construction Teams, and while others joined special boat detachments.[citation needed] On 1 May 1983, UDT–11 was redesignated as SEAL Team Five, UDT–21 was redesignated as SEAL Team Four, UDT–12 became SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team One (SDVT–1), and UDT–22 was redesignated as SDVT-2. SEAL Team Three, was established 1 October 1983 in Coronado, California. United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was established in April 1987 and its Naval component, United States Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), also known as NSWC, was established at the same time.[46]

Grenada

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Both SEAL Team Four and SEAL Team Six, the predecessor to DEVGRU, participated in the US invasion of Grenada. The SEALs' two primary missions were the extraction of Grenada's Governor-General, Sir Paul Scoon, and the capture of Grenada's only radio tower. Neither mission was well briefed or sufficiently supported with timely intelligence and the SEALs ran into trouble from the very beginning. On 24 October 1983, twelve operators from SEAL Team Six and four Air Force Combat Control Team members (CCT) conducted a predawn combat airborne water insertion from C-130 Hercules aircraft with Zodiac inflatable rubber boats 40 kilometers north of Point Salines, Grenada. The team inserted with full combat gear in bad weather with low visibility conditions and high winds. Four SEALs drowned and were never recovered. SEALs split into two teams and proceeded to their objectives. After digging in at the Governor's mansion, the SEALs realized they had forgotten to load their cryptographic satellite phone. As Grenadian and Cuban troops surrounded the team, the SEALs' only radio ran out of battery power, and they used the mansion's land line telephone to call in AC-130 gunship fire support. The SEALs were pinned down in the mansion overnight and were relieved and extracted by a group of Marines the following morning.

The team sent to the radio station also ran into communication problems. As soon as the SEALs reached the radio facility they found themselves unable to raise their command post. After beating back several waves of Grenadian and Cuban troops supported by BTR-60 armored personnel carriers, the SEALs decided that their position at the radio tower was untenable. They destroyed the station and fought their way to the water where they hid from patrolling enemy forces. After the enemy had given up their search, the SEALs, some wounded, swam into the open sea where they were extracted several hours later after being spotted by a reconnaissance aircraft.

Iran–Iraq War

[edit]

During the closing stages of the Iran–Iraq War the United States Navy began conducting operations in the Persian Gulf to protect US-flagged ships from attack by Iranian naval forces. A secret plan was put in place and dubbed Operation Prime Chance. Navy SEAL Teams 1 and 2 along with several Special Boat Units and EOD technicians were deployed on mobile command barges and transported by helicopters from the Army's 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Over the course of the operation SEALs conducted VBSS (visit, board, search, and seizure) missions to counter Iranian mine-laying boats. The only loss of life occurred during the takedown of the Iran Ajr. Evidence gathered on the Iran Ajr by the SEALs later allowed the US Navy to trace the mines that struck USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58). This chain of events led to Operation Praying Mantis, the largest US Naval surface engagement since the Second World War.

During Operation Desert Shield and Storm, Navy SEALs trained Kuwaiti Special Forces. They set up naval special operations groups in Kuwait, working with the Kuwaiti Navy in exile. Using these new diving, swimming, and combat skills, these commandos took part in combat operations such as the liberation of the capital city.

Panama

[edit]
Members of SEAL Team 4 immediately before the start of Operation Just Cause

The United States Navy contributed extensive special operations assets to Panama's invasion, codenamed Operation Just Cause. This included SEAL Teams 2 and 4, Naval Special Warfare Unit 8, and Special Boat Unit 26, all falling under Naval Special Warfare Group 2; and the separate Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU). DEVGRU fell under Task Force Blue, while Naval Special Warfare Group 2 composed the entirety of Task Force White. Task Force White was tasked with three principal objectives: the destruction of Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) naval assets in Balboa Harbor and the destruction of Manuel Noriega's private jet at Paitilla Airport (collectively known as Operation Nifty Package), as well as isolating PDF forces on Flamenco Island.

The strike on Balboa Harbor by Task Unit Whiskey is notably marked in SEAL history as the first publicly acknowledged combat swimmer mission since the Second World War. Prior to the commencement of the invasion four Navy SEALs swam underwater into the harbor on Draeger LAR-V rebreathers and attached C-4 explosives to and destroyed Noriega's personal gunboat the Presidente Porras.

Task Unit Papa was tasked with the seizure of Paitilla airfield and the destruction of Noriega's plane there. Several SEALs were concerned about the nature of the mission assigned to them being that airfield seizure was usually the domain of the Army Rangers. Despite these misgivings and a loss of operational surprise, the SEALs of TU Papa proceeded with their mission. Almost immediately upon landing, the 48 SEALs came under withering fire from the PDF stationed at the airfield. Although Noriega's plane was eventually destroyed, the SEALs suffered four dead, including Chief Petty Officer Donald McFaul, and thirteen wounded.

Persian Gulf War

[edit]
SEALs members wearing chemical biological masks

In August 1990, SEALs were the first western forces to deploy to the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Desert Shield. They infiltrated Kuwait the capital city within hours of the invasion and gathered intelligence and developed plans to rescue US embassy staff should they become hostages. SEALs were also the first to capture Iraqi Prisoners of War when they assaulted nine Kuwaiti Oil platforms on 19 January 1991. On 23 February 1991, a seven-man SEAL team launched a mission to trick the Iraqi military into thinking an amphibious assault on Kuwait by coalition forces was imminent by setting off explosives and placing marking buoys 500 meters off the Kuwaiti coast. The mission was a success and Iraqi forces were diverted east away from the true coalition offensive.[47] The SEALs were first into Kuwait City in their Desert Patrol Vehicles when it was recaptured.[48]

Somalia Intervention

[edit]

On 6 December 1992, as part of Operation Restore Hope, U.S. Navy SEALs and Special Boat crewmen from Naval Special Warfare Task Unit TRIPOLI began a three-day operation carrying out reconnaissance operations in the vicinity of Mogadishu airport and harbor; ahead of UNITAFs deployment to the country. They suffered only one casualty, who was injured by an IED.[49][50]

In August 1993 a four-person DEVGRU SEAL sniper team was deployed to Mogadishu to work alongside Delta Force as part of Task Force Ranger in the search for Somali warlord Mohammed Farrah Aidid. They took part in several operations in support of the CIA and Army culminating in the 3 October 'Battle of Mogadishu' where they were part of the ground convoy raiding the Olympic Hotel. All four SEALs would be later awarded the Silver Star in recognition of their bravery while Navy SEAL Howard E. Wasdin would be awarded a Purple Heart after continuing to fight despite being wounded three times during the battle.[51]

War in Afghanistan

[edit]

Invasion

[edit]

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Navy SEALs quickly dispatched to Camp Doha, and those already aboard U.S. Naval vessels in the Persian Gulf and surrounding waters began conducting VBSS operations against ships suspected of having ties to or even carrying al Qaeda operatives. SEAL Teams 3 and 8 also began rotating into Oman from the United States and staging on the island of Masirah for operations in Afghanistan. One of the SEALs' immediate concerns was their lack of suitable vehicles to conduct special reconnaissance (SR) missions in the rough, landlocked terrain of Afghanistan. After borrowing and retrofitting Humvees from the Army Rangers also staging on Masirah, the SEALs entered Afghanistan to conduct the SR of what would become Camp Rhino, as part of Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan (OEF-A). These early stages of OEF were commanded by a fellow SEAL, Rear Admiral Albert Calland.

Task Force K-Bar SEALs at one of the entrances to the Zhawar Kili cave complex.

As part of the CJSOTF (Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force) under the command of General Tommy Franks at CENTCOM, SEALs from DEVGRU were part of Task Force Sword, which was established in early October 2001. It was a black SOF (Special Operations Forces) unit under direct command of JSOC. It was a so-called hunter-killer force whose primary objective was to capture or kill senior leadership and HVT within both al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Sword was initially structured around a two-squadron component of operators from Delta Force (Task Force Green) and DEVGRU (Task Force Blue) supported by a Ranger protection force team (Task Force Red), ISA signals intercept and surveillance operators (Task Force Orange) and the 160th SOAR (Task Force Brown). Task Force K-Bar was established on 10 October 2001, it was formed around a Naval Special Warfare Group consisting of SEALs from SEAL Teams 2, 3 and 8 and Green Berets from 1st Battalion, 3rd SFG; the task force was led by SEAL Captain Robert Harward.

The task force's principal task was to conduct SR and SSE missions in the south of the country. Other Coalition SOF-particularly KSK, JTF2 and New Zealand Special Air Service were assigned to the task force. As part of the JIATF-CT (Joint Interagency Task Force-Counterterrorism)—intelligence integration and fusion activity composed of personnel from all of Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan-participating units—SEALs from DEVGRU were part of Task Force Bowie, they were embedded in the task force in AFOs (Advanced Force Operations). The AFOs were 45-man reconnaissances units made up of Delta Force recce specialists augmented by selected SEALs from DEVGRU and supported by ISA's technical experts. The AFOs had been raised to support TF Sword and were tasked with intelligence preparation of the battlefield, working closely with the CIA and reported directly to Task Force Sword. The AFOs conducted covert reconnaissance—sending small two or three-man teams into al-Qaeda 'Backyard' along the border with Pakistan, the AFO operators would deploy observation posts to watch and report enemy movements and numbers as well as environmental reconnaissance; much of the work was done on foot or ATVs.[52]

SEALs were present at the Battle of Qala-i-Jangi in November 2001 alongside their counterparts from the British SBS. Chief Petty Officer Stephen Bass was awarded the Navy Cross for his actions during the battle.

Before the US Marines landed at Camp Rhino in November 2001, a SEAL recce team from SEAL Team 8 conducted reconnaissance of the area, they were mistakenly engaged by orbiting AH-1W attack helicopters, but the SEALs managed to get a message through to the Marines before they suffered casualties.[53] The SR mission in the region of Camp Rhino lasted for four days, after which two United States Air Force Combat Control Teams made a nighttime HALO jump to assist the SEALs in guiding in Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit who seized control of the area and established a forward operating base.

Post-invasion

[edit]
Task Force K-Bar SEALs searching munitions found in the Zhawar Kili cave complex

In January 2002, following the Battle of Tora Bora, another series of caves was discovered in Zhawar Kili, just south of Tora Bora; airstrikes hit the sites before SOF teams were inserted into the area. A SEAL platoon from SEAL Team 3, including several of their Desert Patrol Vehicles, accompanied by a German KSK element, a Norwegian SOF team and JTF2 reconnaissance teams spent some nine days conducting extensive SSE, clearing an estimated 70 caves and 60 structures in the area, recovering a huge amount of both intelligence and munitions, but they didn't encounter any al-Qaeda fighters.[54] Subsequent SEAL operations during the invasion of Afghanistan were conducted within Task Force K-Bar, a joint special operations unit of Army Special Forces, United States Air Force Special Tactics Teams, and special operations forces from Norway, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Denmark. Task Force K-Bar conducted combat operations in the massive cave complexes near the city of Kandahar and surrounding territory, the town of Prata Ghar and hundreds of miles of rough terrain in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Over the course of six months, Task Force K-Bar killed or captured over 200 Taliban and al Qaeda fighters and destroyed tens of thousands of pounds of weapons and ordnance.

In February 2002, while at Camp Rhino, the CIA passed on intelligence from a Predator drone operating in the Paktia province that Taliban Mullah Khirullah Said Wali Khairkhwa was spotted leaving a building by vehicle convoy. SEALs and Danish Jægerkorpset commandos boarded Air Force Pave Low helicopters and seized Khairkhwa on the road less than two hours later.[55] The SEALs continued to perform reconnaissance operations for the Marines until leaving after having spent 45 days on the ground.

In March 2002, SEALs from DEVGRU, SEAL Teams 2, 3 and 8 participated extensively in Operation Anaconda. During what would become known as the Battle of Takur Ghar, whilst inserting from an MH-47E Chinook, PO1 Neil Roberts from DEVGRU,[56] was thrown from his helicopter when it took fire from entrenched al Qaeda fighters. Roberts was subsequently killed after engaging and fighting dozens of enemies for almost an hour. Several SEALs were wounded in a rescue attempt and their Air Force Combat Controller, Technical Sergeant John Chapman, was killed. Attempts to rescue the stranded SEAL also led to the deaths of several US Army Rangers and an Air Force Pararescueman acting as a Quick Reaction Force.

Navy SEALs LT Michael P. Murphy and STG2 Matthew Axelson in Afghanistan, both of whom were killed in action

Later in 2002, CJSOFT became a single integrated command under the broader CJTF-180 that commanded all US forces assigned to OEF-A, it was built around an Army Special Forces Group (composed of soldiers from National Guard units) and SEAL teams. A small JSOC element (formerly Task Force Sword/11) not under direct CTJF command—embedded within CJSOFT, it consisted of a joint SEAL and Ranger element that rotated command, and was not under direct ISAF command, although it operated in support of NATO operations.[57]

In June 2005, Lieutenant Michael P. Murphy was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor after his four-man reconnaissance counterinsurgency team was almost wiped out during Operation Red Wings. After the four-man team lost Danny Dietz, he put himself in open view to call in the QRF. He soon after died from injuries sustained. Matthew Axelson also died on this operation. The QRF never reached the scene; it was struck by an RPG killing eight Navy SEALs and eight Army Night Stalkers. Marcus Luttrell was the only survivor from this operation.

A US Navy SEAL, assigned to Special Operations Task Force-South East, greets children in a village in Uruzgan Province,[58] 30 August 2012.

In early 2010, Brigadier General Scott Miller took command of CJSOTF-Afghanistan and assigned virtually all SOF in the theatre to a new counterinsurgency role that would become known as the ALP/VSO Program (Afghan Local Police/Village Stability Operations), the SOF in Afghanistan were organized into battalion level SOTF (Special Operations Task Forces) each with a geographic area of responsibility-the SEALs were given southeast Afghanistan. To increase security of their assigned VSO village, a SEAL Platoon in Chora District, Uruzgan Province built a wall constructed of 500 metres (550 yd) of HESCO barriers to divert insurgent movements away, this proved successful and eventually the Afghan villagers took ownership of it. SEALs and other SOTF still conducted Direct Action missions, but now partnered with Afghan forces.[59]

On 6 August 2011, seventeen U.S. Navy SEALs were killed when their CH-47 Chinook helicopter was shot down by an RPG fired by Taliban militants. The SEALs were en route to support U.S. Army Rangers who were taking fire while attempting to capture a senior Taliban leader in the Tangi Valley. Fifteen of the SEALs belonged to the Naval Special Warfare Development Group.[60][61][62] Two others were SEALs assigned to a West Coast-based Naval Special Warfare unit.[60][63] A total of 30 Americans and eight Afghans were killed in the crash, making it the single largest loss of U.S. lives in the Global War on Terrorism.

On 16 August 2012, SEALs in Uruzgan Province conducted a joint operation into the Shah Wali Kot Valley where they suffered the loss of a Black Hawk helicopter when it was struck by an insurgent RPG, the crash killed 11 servicemen (seven US and four Afghan).[64]

In December 2012, SEALs from DEVGRU rescued a US doctor who had been kidnapped a few days earlier. However, during the operation the unit suffered a fatality, Petty Officer 1st Class Nicolas D. Checque.[65] Senior Chief Edward Byers, was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during this mission.[66]

In May 2013, Rear Admiral Sean Pybus, commander of Navy Special Warfare stated that the unit would cut in half the number of SEAL platoons in Afghanistan by the end of 2013. Pybus also added that the unit is already "undergoing a transition back to its maritime roots" by placing more emphasis on sea-based missions after being involved in mostly landlocked missions since 2001.[67]

Iraq War

[edit]

Invasion

[edit]
US military security personnel on the Al Basrah Oil Terminal after its capture

For the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a squadron from DEVGRU operated as part of Task Force 20. Their role was to conduct heliborne direct action raids, particularly against HVTs. The Naval Special Operations Task Group was assigned to Operation Iraqi Freedom, and was built around a core of SEAL Teams 8 and 10, Polish GROM, Royal Marines from 40 and 42 Commando under the command of 3 Commando Brigade and attached US Psy Ops and civil affairs teams. The Naval Task Group was principally tasked with the capture of the port of Umm Qasr, Iraq's only deep-water port; the oil pipeline facilities of the Al-Faw Peninsula; and the two off-shore platforms the pipelines fed. Once these initial target sets were secured, the Task Group would support conventional forces in the south, conducting reconnaissance and raiding activities. Aviation support was provided by both Marine air of the 15th MEU and 20th Special Operations Squadron.[68]

Several days before the beginning of the invasion, two SDV teams were launched from Mark V Special Operations Craft in the Persian Gulf. Their objectives were the hydrographic reconnaissance of the Al Basrah (MABOT) and Khawr Al Amaya (KAAOT) Oil Terminals. After swimming under the terminals and securing their Mark 8 mod 1s, the SDV SEALs spent several hours taking pictures and surveying Iraqi activity on both platforms before returning to their boats.[47] On 20 March 2003, SEALs from SEAL Team 8 and 10 (31 SEALs, 2 Navy EOD a USAF combat controller and several Iraqi interpreters) moved to seize the MABOT oil terminal whilst GROM operators assaulted the KAAOT Oil Terminals. The terminals were quickly seized with no casualties, and explosives which were found on the terminals were made safe by GROM operators.[69]

The shore-based pumping stations (known as MMS-Monitoring and Meter Stations) and their pipelines on the Al-Faw Peninsula were seized by 12 SEALS from SEAL Team 3, who were mounted in DPVs. They took off from Kuwait and were inserted under Iraqi anti-aircraft fire by MH-53 helicopters. The target area was 'softened up' by JDAM bombs dropped from B-52s on Iraqi bunkers, trenches and dugouts around the oil facilities. After a brief firefight in which the SEALs killed 1 Iraqi soldier and captured 13, the SEALs secured the MMS and the pipelines and were relieved by Royal Marines from 40 Commando. The SEALs advised the Marines, helping coordinate AC-130 Spectres fire support onto Iraqi forces. The other shore-based pumping station at Umm Qasr was secured by SEALs and Royal Marines; before they landed, AC-130 Spectres and A-10As engaged a nearby SAM installation and a responding Iraqi mechanized unit. The SEALs secured the facility itself whilst the Royal Marines cleared Iraqi bunkers, killing several Iraqi soldiers.[70][71][72]

Other Naval Task Group operations included elements of three SEAL platoons in GMV trucks and DPVs seizing the al Zubayr MMS, whilst I MEF attacked the Rumaylah Oil Fields north of al-Faw. SEALs and Special Boat teams helped secure the Khawr Abd Allah and Khawr Az Zubyar waterways, which enabled humanitarian supplies to be delivered to the port of Umm Qasr. SEALs from the unit that secured the al-Faw MMS also conducted reconnaissance on the Shat Al Arab waterway, which was later secured by British forces. SEALs were also involved in various VBSS missions with British and Australian forces to seize Iraqi craft carrying seaborne mines.[47][72][73]

Coalition military planners were concerned that retreating Iraqi forces would destroy the Mukatayin hydroelectric dam, located 57 miles northeast of Baghdad, in an attempt to slow advancing US troops. In addition to restricting the manoeuvre of Coalition forces, the destruction of the dam would deny critical power needs to the surrounding area, as well as cause massive flooding and loss of Iraqi civilian life. A mixed team of SEALs from SEAL Team 5 and Polish GROM was called in to seize the dam. This force was flown several hours by six US Air Force MH-53J Pave Lows; the force consisted of 20 SEALs (with an extra six SEAL snipers in one helicopter carrying the SEAL command and control element) and two EOD operators along with 35 GROM operators to the dam. The SEALs employed DPVs into blocking positions to defend against counterattack and roving bands of Iranian bandits that had been crossing the border and raiding Iraqi towns. As in Al Faw, the SEALs found their DPVs (the SEAL unit at the al-Faw MMS lost all but two DPVs when they were bogged down in the oily mud) to be ineffective, and this marked the last time they would employ them in Iraq. The SEALs and GROM on foot fast-roped out of their helicopters and immediately stormed the dam. The minimal[clarification needed] Iraqi troops guarding the dam surrendered without a fight, and with the exception of a GROM soldier who broke an ankle during the insertion, no casualties were sustained in the operation. After several hours of searching the dam for remaining hostile forces or any explosives, the SEALs secured the dam and held it for five days until they were relieved by advancing elements of the US Army.[77]

During the Battle of Basra, SEALs along with the Brigade Reconnaissance Force and 539 Assault Squadron RM attempted a waterborne approach to Basra via the Shatt al-Arab waterway but were intercepted by Iranian Revolutionary Guard patrol craft and did not want to engage them so they withdrew. On 6 April 2003, after relocating further up the waterway they successfully infiltrated via the waterway, using SEAL UAVs they called in "show-of-force" and an airstrike by a USMC Harrier on Iraqi troops, the SEALs then headed to "Chemical Ali's" house with SSE teams to find traces of chemical weapons.[78] SEALs carried out missions around Nasiriyah, carrying out reconnaissance on surrounding villages and engaging enemy strong points bypassed by the US Marine advance. Charlie Platoon, SEAL Team 3, later operated ahead of the Marine advance carrying out similar missions.[72] SEAL and GROM units continued to cooperate throughout the rest of the invasion phase, with raids and anti-sniper missions in Baghdad.[79]

Post-invasion Iraq

[edit]
Petty Officer Michael A. Monsoor, 2nd Navy SEAL killed in Iraq. This photo was taken during an extraction after a firefight, and the smoke was used to conceal their movements from the enemy.

Following the invasion, SEAL platoons rotated through Iraq, conducting overwatch for US and Iraqi patrols and directly mentoring local Iraqi forces; they also conducted surveillance and sniping missions into known trouble spots. In September 2004, a SEAL sniper element was tasked with establishing an overwatch and surveillance position overlooking Haifa Street, they were inserted by Bradley IFVs from a unit of the 9th Cavalry Regiment, however they were spotted and engaged by insurgents. The SEALs notified the Bradleys, they drove back, fired on the insurgents and set up a cordon for the SEALs to be extracted, one Bradley was destroyed by a car bomb, there were no casualties, and the SEALs were extracted.[80]

In the interim between the First Battle of Fallujah and Second Battle of Fallujah, insurgents in Fallujah knew that the coalition assault was inevitable and under the guidance of the influx of foreign fighters, began to build defensive networks throughout the city-ranging from fortified buildings, trench lines, berms, strategically placed car bombs and IEDs. In preparations for the second battle, SEALs conducted reconnaissance near the berms and tested out reports that the insurgents were equipped with night-vision equipment, they proved this by throwing an infrared chemical light into the street which drew small arms fire. SEALs along with the 5th SFG, Marine Force Recon and Det One and other JSOC elements were heavily involved in shaping operations prior to 7 November D-DAY when coalition forces entered the city. The SOF shaping included sophisticated feints to mislead the insurgents as to the direction of the final assault, close target reconnaissance and direct-action missions where a logistics node or IED factory was targeted. When the offensive on the insurgents in the city began, many of the US Marine companies had SEAL sniper teams attached to them, mainly from SEAL Teams 3, 5 and 10.[81]

From 2005, SEALs were heavily committed to western Iraq in Al Anbar Governorate, AQI terrorists who escaped Fallujah had relocated to Ramadi. A SEAL Task Unit was co-located with the Marines at Al Asad Airbase and sent elements to Ramadi and Habbaniyah, the SEALs were initially tasked with target development for the Marines and providing sniper overwatch for their patrols. The SEALs were already training an Iraqi Army unit in Habbaniyah, although FID was their main focus until later that year. A SEAL Task Unit generally comprised two individual SEAL Platoons: each Platoon was made up of seven-man squad elements commanded by a junior officer, three of these Task Units (although a fourth was often added) along with a Special Boat Team detachment and a Headquarters Team (including integral intelligence, targeting and EOD personnel) made up a Naval Special Warfare Squadron. According to Dick Couch, the SEALs began FID with two Iraqi units-the Army Scouts who conducted conventional reconnaissance missions, and the SMP (Special Missions Platoon), a locally formed unit that would later fight alongside the SEALs. Despite several challenges, the SEALs were soon conducted operations with partnered units, particularly in Special Reconnaissance, focusing on the surveillance aspect, whilst conventional US Army or Marines would conduct raids and arrests.[82] The typical loadout of the SEALs in Ramadi included the M4 carbine, optimized for close quarter battle with a 10-inch barrel equipped with a 6-inch sound suppressor, Surefire flashlight and EOTech sight, short barrel and foregrip and seven magazines.[83]

As the SEALs were beginning to make headway in Ramadi, AQI was starting to infiltrate the area by targeting local Sheikhs and convincing them to allow jihadists to marry into local tribes, thus cementing their powerbase and Sheikhs that resisted these advances were met with typical AQI brutality. Al-Qaeda's efforts to install a Sharia-style shadow government in Ramadi led to AQI's downfall-when in the first half of 2006, in the run-up to the Second Battle of Ramadi SEALs, increasingly partnered with conventional forces of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division which was planning the offensive. SEALs along with the Scouts and SMP, would conduct reconnaissance, surveillance and sniper overwatch tasks; with their own targeting cell, they also began conducting raids on local insurgent leaders. The 1st BCT began the concerted offensive to clear Ramadi of AQI fighters; on 29 September 2006, whilst at a rooftop overwatch position, Petty Officer Michael A. Monsoor died after leaping upon an enemy grenade during a rooftop firefight, two SEALs on the roof were badly wounded from the grenade fragments and their local Iraqi Scouts ran back into the cover of the building, a fourth SEAL (only lightly wounded), managed to radio his colleagues and get the Scouts to return fire. A SEAL element in a second overwatch position immediately ran through heavy fire to reach Monsoor (whom later died from his wounds in the back of a Bradley IFV) and the wounded SEALs, Monsoor was later awarded the Medal of Honor and the Silver Star. The advances by conventional forces and the SEALs in Ramadi, combined with the brutal tactics of AQI, helped to increase recruitment in a local police initiative-the programme was designed to bring the local Sheikhs' militias into the Iraqi Security Forces. These volunteers would serve locally in their communities to defend them against al-Qaeda, a month after the kidnapping and murder of Sheikh Khalid by AQI (which proved to be the tipping point), the Sheikhs signed a declaration agreeing to fight AQI and by the closing of 2006, even former insurgents were joining the local police (later known as the Anbar Awakening) by the end of the battle, some 1,100 terrorists were killed.[84]

In Fallujah, the SEAL Task Unit were also heavily involved in fighting. In one joint operation to capture an AQI leader, they entered the target building and were engaged resulting in an Iraqi Scout being killed and a SEAL severely wounded, two SEALs returned fire and entered the building, both SEALs entered different rooms, in one room the SEAL encountered three insurgents who opened fired at close range, another SEAL across the hallway was struck in the head and killed, the SEAL in the room with the insurgents killed all three.[85]

In September 2009, in a nighttime raid in Fallujah, SEALs captured Ahmad Hashim Abd al-Isawi (nicknamed the "Butcher of Fallujah"), a prominent al-Qaeda terrorist who was the mastermind behind the 2004 Fallujah ambush. Al-Isawai made accusations of mistreatment while in custody, and testified in April 2010 at the ensuing courts-martial against three SEALs (all of whom were acquitted).[86][87][88] Iraqi authorities later tried and executed al-Isawi by hanging at some point before November 2013.[89]

SEALs remained employed throughout the Iraqi Campaign as Task Units or Task Elements until its close in 2011.

Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines

[edit]

OEF-P was established in 2002 to conduct long-term partnered operations with both Philippine Army special operations and intelligence units, as well as police units, to counter the threat posed by the ASG and JI terrorist groups. Much of this work has been assigned to 1st SFG; SEALs and USAF Special Operations who have also had a long-term presence in the Philippines. There are few confirmed operational details about the SEALs and Green Berets conducting partnered operations, although elements are partnered with Philippine Army and SOF; there have been mentions of Green Berets and SEALs wounded. On 21 June 2002, SEALs in RIBs supported the Philippine Naval Special Operations Group in the operation that killed Abu Sabaya, a senior leader in the ASG. A US Predator UAV marked the HVT with an infrared laser as he tried to escape in a smugglers boat; the MH-47Es from the 160th SOAR used search lights mounted on their helicopters to pinpoint the target's boat while operators from the Philippine Naval Special Operations Group opened fire on the boat killing the terrorist leader and capturing four other terrorists with him.[90]

Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa

[edit]

As part of OEF-HOA, Naval Special Warfare Unit 10 are deployed to Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, under the command of SOCCE-HOA (Special Operations Command and Control Element-Horn of Africa) which commands all SOCOM units assigned to training or operational missions in the region. Special operations carried out in Somalia are conducted under the codename: Operation Octave Dune, as part of the overall effort in Somalia, which is known as Operation Octave Shield.[91]

Before Djibouti became the epicentre for counter terrorism operations in Africa, unilateral operations were launched from temporary forward locations in friendly nations such as Kenya, or from US Navy ships. The earliest known operation in Somalia was known as Operation Cobalt Blue: In 2003, SEALs using SEAL Delivery Vehicles swam ashore along the Somali coastline and emplaced covert surveillance cameras. Known as cardinals, the cameras were designed to watch likely target locations for wanted terrorists as al-Qaeda and its affiliates began to regroup in the country, however the cameras only took one image a day and captured very little.[92]

CJSOTF-HOA (Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Horn of Africa) developed a rescue plan called Operation Mystic Talon, in case any CIA SAD or ISA operators were captured in the region, the plan required a SEAL platoon with Air Force Special Operations assets that, if necessary, would fight their way into Somalia, recover the hostage and fight their way out, should a mission need to be launched before a dedicated JSOC task force could be deployed to the region.[93]

Maersk Alabama hijacking

[edit]

On 12 April 2009, in response to a hostage taking incident off the coast of Somalia by Somalian pirates, three Navy SEALs from DEVGRU simultaneously engaged and killed the three pirates who were closely holding the hostage, Captain Richard Phillips, of the freighter ship Maersk Alabama. The pirates and their hostage were being towed in a lifeboat approximately 100 yards behind USS Bainbridge when each of the pirates were killed by a different DEVGRU sniper with a single shot to the head.[94]

Death of Osama bin Laden

[edit]

In the early morning of 2 May 2011 local time, a team of Navy SEALs of the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU), previously called "SEAL Team 6",[95] along with a Belgian Malinois Military Working Dog (named "Cairo"), supported by Special Activities Division officers on the ground, killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan about 35 miles (56 km) from Islamabad in a CIA operation.[96][97] President Barack Obama later confirmed the death of bin Laden, but did not directly mention the involvement of DEVGRU, saying only that a "small team" of Americans undertook the operation to bring down bin Laden.[96] The unprecedented media coverage raised the public profile of the SEAL community, particularly the counter-terrorism specialists commonly known as SEAL Team 6. The Walt Disney Company tried unsuccessfully to trademark the name "SEAL Team 6" the day after the raid.[98] The official name of the military operation was Operation Neptune Spear. The model of the compound used in the 60 Minutes documentary was donated by CBS to the Navy SEAL Museum.[99]

Morning Glory oil tanker

[edit]

On 16 March 2014, thirty U.S. Navy SEALs from SEAL Team 2 took control of MV Morning Glory, a tanker full of oil loaded from a rebel-held port in Libya. The raid by Navy SEALs took place in international waters off the coast of Cyprus; the raid was a success, preventing a Libyan splinter militia group selling nationalized Libyan oil on the black market.[100][101]

Operation Inherent Resolve

[edit]

As part of Operation Inherent Resolve's Iraq Campaign, there are at least 100 SEALs as part of a Special Operations advise and assist mission to Peshmerga and Iraqi Security Forces in combating ISIS. The Navy SEAL operation in northern Iraq is called Task Force Trident.[102] On 3 May 2016, Petty Officer 1st Class Charles Keating IV was killed by ISIS small arms fire near the town of Tel Skuf during an ISIS assault on a Peshmerga position. He was a member of a 20-man Quick Reaction Force (QRF)[102] sent to rescue a dozen U.S. advisors at the position and temporarily assist the Peshmerga. Keating IV was awarded the Navy Cross, posthumously, for his actions.[103][104][105]

Personnel

[edit]

Selection and training

[edit]
U.S. Navy SEALs conducting training with SCAR rifles
Students armed with Mk 18 mod 0s conduct CQB drills during SEAL Qualification Training

Before getting accepted into Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training, a prospective candidate must pass a certain number of both mental and physical requirements.[106] These tests include: Pre-enlistment medical screening, ASVAB, AFQT, C-SORT, and PST. Then, the candidate must get a SEAL contract by passing the SEAL Physical Screening Test: 500-yard swim in 12:30, 50 push-ups in 2 minutes, 50 sit-ups in 2 minutes, 10 consecutive pull-ups in 2 minutes, and a 1.5-mile run in 10:30. Candidates receiving a passing score may then be admitted into training to become Navy SEALs.[107] SEAL training is extremely rigorous. The attrition rate fluctuates, but averages at about 80 percent.[108]

Navy SEALs training with MP5 submachine guns

The average candidate spends more than a year in a series of formal training courses before being awarded the Special Warfare Operator Naval Rating and the Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) 5326 Combatant Swimmer (SEAL) or, in the case of commissioned naval officers, the designation Naval Special Warfare (SEAL) Officer.

Candidates for the Special Warfare Operator (SO) rating must complete an extensive training pipeline beginning with Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training in Coronado, California. Following BUD/S, candidates attend SEAL Qualification Training (SQT) to further develop tactical skills before earning their SEAL Trident. The entire process typically takes over a year, and the attrition rate for candidates exceeds 75 percent, reflecting the extreme physical and mental demands of the program.[109]

Navy SEAL training pipeline:

  • 8-week Naval Recruit Training
  • 8-week Naval Special Warfare Prep School (Pre-BUD/S)
  • 3-week BUD/S Orientation
  • 24-week Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL Training (BUD/S)[110]
  • 3-week Army airborne School
  • 26-week SEAL Qualification Training (SQT)

Upon graduation from SQT, trainees receive the U.S. Navy SEAL Trident, designating them as Navy SEALs. They are subsequently assigned to a SEAL Team or SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Team and begin 18 months of predeployment training before they are considered deployable. This training consists of:[111][112]

  • 6-month Professional Development – Individual Specialty Training (ProDev)
  • 6-month Unit Level Training (ULT). ULT is unit training conducted by each Groups Training Detachment. Core unit training blocks are Air Operations, Land Warfare, Maritime, Urban and Special Reconnaissance.
  • 6-month Squadron Integration Training (SIT)[113]

Those enlisted SEALs with a medical rating will first attend the Special Operations Combat Medic Course for 6 months in Fort Bragg, North Carolina[114] before joining a team in order to become a SEAL/Special Operator Corpsman. Those pursuing officer positions first attend the Junior Officer Training Course (JOTC) to learn about operations planning and how to perform team briefings. In total it can take over two-and-a-half years to completely train a Navy SEAL for his first deployment.[111][112]

Women

[edit]

Until December 2015, female sailors were barred from becoming Navy SEALs by naval regulation; however, this prohibition no longer exists. As early as August 2015, it was reported that the "Navy is planning to open its elite SEAL teams to women who can pass the grueling training regimen."[115] In that same month, Admiral Jon Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations at the time, said that "he and the head of Naval Special Warfare Command, Rear Admiral Brian Losey, believe that if women can pass the legendary six-month Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training, they should be allowed to serve."[115] On 3 December 2015, it was announced that there are now "no exceptions" to all military roles in the U.S., and women can become U.S. Navy SEALs.[116]

Since the Navy opened up special warfare jobs to female sailors in 2016, 18 women have attempted to pass Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC) and SEAL training.[117]

The Washington Examiner reported on 10 August 2017: "A woman aiming to become the first female Navy SEAL officer quit about a week into the initial training".[118]

In 2019, the Navy announced that an unnamed female officer was the first to successfully complete the SEAL Officer Assessment and Selection program (SOAS). She was one of a group of five female candidates to enter the program. She opted not to start BUD/S afterwards, instead choosing another assignment in the Navy.[119][120]

Issues

[edit]

In December 2016, the SEALs halted all training and ordered a safety stand-down because of substance abuse within its ranks.[121] As part of the safety stand-down, all SEALs were required to submit to urinalysis.[121] In August 2019, a review of the culture of Special Operations Command was ordered following cases of misconduct involving the SEALS, which included substance abuse by members of SEAL Team 10 and allegations of sexual assault and intoxication by a SEAL platoon in Iraq.[122]

In 2021, SEAL team members appeared on CBS concealing their identities out of concern for retribution. They alerted the public to a culture of lawlessness, misconduct, and war crimes within their ranks.[123]

Relationship with CIA

[edit]

The CIA's highly secretive and elite Special Operations Group (SOG) recruits operators from SEAL Teams,[124] with joint operations going back to the MACV-SOG during the Vietnam War.[125] This cooperation still exists today, as evidenced by military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.[126][127]

[edit]
Two members of SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 2 conduct lockout training with USS Hawaii in 2007.
SEALs from SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team Two fast-rope to the deck of USS Toledo (2005).

The total number of personnel, including SEALs and SWCCs assigned to Naval Special Warfare Command is approximately 8,195 out of a total 8,985 military staff, and 10,166 including civilian support staff, as of 2015.[128]

[edit]

Naval Special Warfare Command is organized into the following configuration:[129]

Deactivated Groups:

SEAL Teams

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The original SEAL Teams were separated between West Coast (Team One) and East Coast (Team Two) SEALs. Likewise current SEAL Teams are organized into two groups: Naval Special Warfare Group One (West Coast) and Naval Special Warfare Group Two (East Coast), both of which come under the command of Naval Special Warfare Command at NAB Coronado, California. As of 2006, there are eight confirmed Navy SEAL Teams. The current SEAL Team deployments include Teams 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 10. The most recent active-duty teams are SEAL Team 7 and SEAL Team 10, which were formed in March and April 2002, respectively.[136][137] However, two reservist support teams were reorganized into SEAL teams in 2008.[135][138][non-primary source needed]

SEAL Team 5 conducts an exercise in a Combat Rubber Raiding Craft in 2000.

The Teams deploy as Naval Special Warfare Squadrons or Special Operations Task Forces and can deploy anywhere in the world. Squadrons will normally be deployed and fall under a Joint Task Force (JTF) or a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) as a Special Operations Task Force (SOTF).

Each SEAL Team (or "squadron") is commanded by a Navy commander (O-5), and has eight operational SEAL platoons and a headquarters element. Operationally, the "Team" is divided into two to four 40-man "task units" (or "troops"). Each task unit consists of a headquarters element consisting of a task unit commander, typically a lieutenant commander (O-4), a task unit senior enlisted (E-8), a targeting/operations officer (O-2/3) and a targeting/operations leading/chief petty officer (E-6/7). Under the HQ element are two to four SEAL platoons of 16 men (two officers and 14 enlisted SEALs, and sometimes assigned non-NSW support personnel); a company-sized combat service support (CSS) and/or combat support (CS) consisting of staff N-codes (the Army and Marine Corps use S-codes); N1 Administrative support, N2 Intelligence, N3 Operations, N4 Logistics, N5 Plans and Targeting, N6 Communications, N7 Training, and N8 Air/Medical.

Each 16-man platoon can be task organized for operational purposes into two eight-man squads, four four-man fire teams, or eight two-man sniper/reconnaissance teams. The size of each SEAL "Team", or "squadron", with two to four task units (containing a total of eight platoons) and support staff is approximately 300 personnel. The typical SEAL platoon has an OIC (officer in charge), usually a lieutenant (O-3), a platoon chief (E-7/E-8), and two squads commanded by a LTJG (O-2) and a squad leader (E-6). The remaining members of the squad are operators (E-4 to E-6) with their specialty skills in ordnance, communications, diving, and medical. The core leadership in the troop and platoon are the commander/OIC and the senior enlisted NCO (Senior Chief/chief).

Platoon core skills consist of: Sniper, Breacher, Communicator, Maritime/Engineering, Close Air Support, Corpsman, Point-man/Navigator, Primary Driver/Navigator (Rural/Urban/Protective Security), Heavy Weapons Operator, Sensitive Site Exploitation, Air Operations Master, Lead Climber, Lead Diver/Navigator, Interrogator, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Technical Surveillance, and Advanced Special Operations.

Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, a naval base in Virginia Beach, Virginia, is home to SEAL Teams 2, 4, 8, 10, and 18. Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, a naval base in Coronado, California, is home to SEAL Teams 1, 3, 5, 7, and 17. There are also two SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) units, SDVT-1 and SDVT-2, located in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and Little Creek, Virginia, respectively.[139] SDV Teams are SEAL teams with an added underwater delivery capability. An SDV platoon consists of 12–15 SEALs.

Insignia Team Deployment Number of platoons HQ Notes
SEAL Team 1 Worldwide 8 platoons Coronado, California
SEAL Team 2 Worldwide 8 platoons Virginia Beach, Virginia
SEAL Team 3 Middle East 8 platoons Coronado, California
SEAL Team 4 Worldwide 8 platoons Virginia Beach, Virginia
SEAL Team 5 Worldwide 8 platoons Coronado, California
Naval Special Warfare Development Group
(SEAL Team 6)
Worldwide Classified Virginia Beach, Virginia SEAL Team 6 was dissolved in 1987.[citation needed] The Navy then established the Naval Special Warfare Development Group, also known as DEVGRU. While DEVGRU is administratively supported by Naval Special Warfare Command, they are operationally under the command of the Joint Special Operations Command.
SEAL Team 7 SEAL Team 7 Worldwide 8 platoons Coronado, California
SEAL Team 8 Worldwide 8 platoons Virginia Beach, Virginia
SEAL Team 10 Middle East 8 platoons Virginia Beach, Virginia
SEAL Team 17 Worldwide
Reserve
2 platoons Coronado, California Formerly Operational Support Team 1
SEAL Team 18 Worldwide
Reserve
2 platoons Virginia Beach, Virginia Formerly Operational Support Team 2
SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1 Indian and Pacific Oceans, Middle East[140] 4 platoons Pearl Harbor, Hawaii[140]
SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 2 Atlantic Ocean, Europe and the Americas[140] 4 platoons Virginia Beach, Virginia[140]

Special warfare ratings

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The Special Warfare Operator rating (SO) and Special Warfare Boat Operator rating (SB), were established in 2006.[141] Special Warfare Operators (SEALs) and Special Warfare Boat Operators (SWCCs) are no longer required to maintain the original rating they qualified in upon joining the Navy.[142][143]

The following ratings are specific to Navy SEALs:[144][145][146]

Navy rating Abbreviation Pay grade Special warfare rating Abbreviation Rank insignia
Master chief petty officer MCPO E-9 Master chief special warfare operator SOCM
Senior chief petty officer SCPO E-8 Senior chief special warfare operator SOCS
Chief petty officer CPO E-7 Chief special warfare operator SOC
Petty officer first class PO1 E-6 Special warfare operator, first class SO1
Petty officer second class PO2 E-5 Special warfare operator, second class SO2
Petty officer third class PO3 E-4 Special warfare operator, third class SO3

United States Navy Parachute Team "Leap Frogs"

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A member of the U.S. Navy Parachute Demonstration Team, the "Leap Frogs", returns to Earth after a successful jump.

The primary mission of the Navy Parachute Team (NPT) is to support Naval Special Warfare recruiting by gaining access and exposure to appropriate candidates through aerial parachuting demonstrations.[147] The U.S. Navy Parachute Team is a fifteen-man team composed of U.S. Navy SEALs. Each member comes to the team for a three-year tour from one of the two Naval Special Warfare Groups located on the east and west coasts. On completion of the tour, members return to operational units.[148] The parachute team began in 1969 when Navy SEALs and Frogmen volunteered to perform at weekend air shows. The Team initially consisted of five jumpers: LCDR Olson, PHC Gagliardi, SK2 "Herky" Hertenstein, PR1 Al Schmiz and PH2 "Chip" Maury. Schmiz and Maury were members of the original "Chuting Stars."[149] When LCDR Olson was transferred to California, PHC Gene "Gag" Gagliardi (D 546) of UDT Eleven introduced him to the local jumping elite with the San Diego Skydivers, one of the nation's first sports parachuting clubs. He convinced the Commander Naval Operations Support Group, PACIFIC to create a small demonstration team consisting of a cadre of highly qualified freefall jumpers. Its activities were to be conducted on a "not to interfere" basis with other military duties and at no cost to the government, other than utilizing normally scheduled aircraft. This group eventually adopted the "Leap Frogs" name.[149]

The team was officially commissioned as the U.S. Navy Parachute Team in 1974 by the Chief of Naval Operations and assigned the mission of demonstrating Navy excellence throughout the United States. The East Coast-based "Chuting Stars" were disbanded in the 1980s with the "Leap Frogs" taking on all official parachute demonstrations within the Navy.

A typical Leap Frogs' performance consists of six jumpers leaping out of an aircraft at an altitude of 6,000 feet. After freefalling sometimes using smoke or streamers, the Leap Frogs fly their canopies together to build canopy-relative work formations. After performances, the Leap Frogs make themselves available to the public to answer questions about the Navy and the Naval Special Warfare community, as well as to sign autographs.

Influence on foreign units

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US Navy SEALs and GROM — Polish naval warfare team members — practicing boarding skills near Gdansk, Poland, 2009

From its predecessors, the Underwater Demolition Teams, to its current form, the SEALs have influenced the training and formation of several foreign units. In 1955, the Underwater Demolition Teams provided funding and training for the Republic of Korea Naval Special Warfare Flotilla, who are also known as UDT/SEALs. This was followed in 1956 by providing funding, training and formation of the Philippine Navy Underwater Operations Team (UOT), patterned on the training and implementation of the US Navy SEALs and the UDTs. In 1966, United States Navy SEALs established Pakistan's Special Service Group based on a mutual security understanding and the training provided under the IMET program until the 1970s.[150] U.S. Navy SEALs provided initial training to the Indian Marine Special Force, which later became known as the MARCOS.[151]

Due to their reputation as being one of America's premier special operations forces, SEALs (particularly operators from DEVGRU) will often do exchanges with allied SOFs.[72][152][153]

National Navy UDT-SEAL Museum and memorial

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The National Navy UDT-SEAL Museum, in Fort Pierce, Florida, was founded in 1985[154] and was recognized as a National Museum by an act of Congress.[155] The museum is dedicated to preserving the history of the Navy SEALs and their predecessors. The SEAL Museum stands on the training site of the first Navy frogmen. There through World War II, thousands of service members were trained as members of Naval Combat Demolition Units and Underwater Demolition Teams. The Museum houses rare historical artifacts from the founding of the UDT to present day, including weapons, vehicles, equipment, and most recently added, the Maersk Alabama lifeboat aboard which Somali pirates held Captain Richard Phillips hostage.

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According to the Navy SEAL Museum, 298 UDT and SEALs were killed in action and died during training accidents as of March 2018:[156]

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See also

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References

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Bibliography

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The United States SEALs are the 's elite forces, trained and equipped to conduct maritime, amphibious, and terrestrial missions encompassing raids, , , and operations in austere environments. Formally established on January 1, 1962, as part of President John F. Kennedy's expansion of U.S. capabilities for and , the SEALs trace their operational lineage to Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs), which performed hazardous beach reconnaissance and obstacle clearance to enable amphibious assaults. Candidates for SEAL service must complete the Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training pipeline at the in , a 24-week regimen emphasizing physical conditioning, combat swimming, , and small-unit tactics, followed by SEAL Qualification Training (SQT), with overall attrition rates exceeding 75 percent to ensure selection of personnel capable of sustained performance under duress. SEAL teams have executed high-impact missions across conflicts, from hydrographic surveys and direct actions in —earning multiple Presidential Unit Citations—to reconnaissance insertions during Operation Desert Storm and targeted strikes in and during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, contributing to the neutralization of high-value targets and intelligence gathering in denied areas. While celebrated for their tactical proficiency and adaptability as the nation's premier maritime special operators, SEALs have faced scrutiny over isolated incidents of ethical lapses and operational excesses, leading to command-level reforms in accountability and warfighting ethos to preserve unit cohesion and mission legitimacy.

History

Pre-SEAL Precursors: Units

The precursors to modern Navy SEALs emerged during through specialized units tasked with amphibious reconnaissance, raiding, and demolition to support landings. These included the Amphibious Scouts and Raiders, Naval Combat Demolition Units (NCDUs), and Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs), which honed small-unit tactics for operating ahead of main assault forces, integrating with naval gunfire, and enduring extreme physical demands in hostile environments. Amphibious Scouts and Raiders formed in August 1942 to reconnoiter landing beaches and guide assault waves, drawing from joint Army-Navy efforts. Commissioned that October, the unit conducted its first combat during in on November 8, 1942. A Pacific counterpart, Special Service Unit One, established on July 13, 1943, supported reconnaissance in island-hopping campaigns, emphasizing stealthy infiltration by small teams via rubber boats. Naval Combat Demolition Units, initially comprising volunteers from demolition training, focused on clearing beach obstacles under fire. On D-Day, June 6, 1944, at , 175 NCDU personnel from 16 teams suffered 31 killed and 60 wounded—a 52% casualty rate—while destroying key barriers to enable troop landings. Surviving units redeployed to the Pacific for similar assaults, underscoring the high-risk nature of manual explosive work without modern diving gear. Underwater Demolition Teams evolved from experiences, incorporating swimmers for hydrographic surveys and mine clearance. Formed to address Tarawa's lessons on obstacles, UDTs numbered up to 28 active teams by war's end, participating in every major Pacific amphibious operation. At in , UDTs 12–15, totaling about 100 swimmers, surveyed reefs under fire; Okinawa in April 1945 involved nearly 1,000 personnel clearing extensive barriers, refining techniques for that demanded exceptional endurance and precision.

Formation During the Cold War

During the , Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs) extended their World War II-era roles in hydrographic reconnaissance and obstacle clearance to include raiding, , and gathering, as demonstrated in support of Operation Chromite at the Inchon landings on September 15, 1950, where UDT-3 conducted the first combat-diver operations to map approaches and neutralize mines amid extreme tidal conditions. These missions highlighted limitations in traditional amphibious doctrines, particularly the vulnerability of large-scale landings to fortified defenses and the emerging threats of guerrilla tactics in proxy conflicts, prompting doctrinal evolution toward smaller, stealth-oriented units capable of operating in denied environments without reliance on massed firepower. In response to these gaps and President John F. Kennedy's advocacy for enhanced U.S. capabilities to counter communist insurgencies during the , the authorized the formation of two SEAL (Sea, Air, Land) Teams in December 1961, with official establishment on January 1, 1962, by repurposing experienced UDT personnel to create a dedicated force. SEAL Team One was based at , , while SEAL Team Two was stationed at Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, , enabling East and West Coast deployment flexibility for global contingencies. Initial SEAL training emphasized versatility across maritime, airborne, and terrestrial domains, incorporating advanced small-unit tactics, demolitions, and infiltration methods to address the amphibious force's need for covert operations in littoral and inland zones, distinct from the UDTs' prior focus on pre-assault preparation. This shift prioritized precision raids and intelligence over conventional beach-clearing, aligning with broader strategies to deter asymmetric threats through specialized, high-mobility units rather than overwhelming numerical superiority.

Vietnam War Era

United States Navy SEAL platoons commenced deployments to Vietnam in July 1962, with SEAL Team One providing the initial units for operations against guerrillas in the and Rung Sat Special Zone. These early efforts focused on advisory roles, training South Vietnamese forces in unconventional tactics, before transitioning to missions including ambushes, patrols, and raids on enemy . Operating in six-man squads, SEALs emphasized stealth and mobility, inserting via patrol boats, helicopters, or foot into dense and riverine environments to disrupt Viet Cong supply lines and leadership. By 1967, intensified operations saw SEAL Teams One and Two rotating platoons through the Delta, conducting over 200 documented missions that yielded high tactical effectiveness, with confirmed kills exceeding 600 and probable additional 300, alongside destruction of bunkers, caches, and sampans. Innovations like rigs enabled helicopter extractions from precarious positions, enhancing operational reach but exposing teams to risks in close-quarters combat and booby-trapped terrain. Casualties mounted accordingly, with 46 SEALs between 1965 and 1972, often from punji stakes, grenades, and ambushes during night patrols. The SEALORDS campaign, initiated on October 1, 1968, integrated SEAL elements with riverine forces to interdict enemy infiltration routes across the Delta's waterways and canals, establishing market-time patrols and barrier operations to choke supply flows from . This multi-phase effort, involving coordinated ambushes and , contributed to temporary pacification of key areas but faced challenges from adaptability and terrain, limiting enduring strategic gains amid broader conventional escalations. SEAL participation in programs like Phoenix provided intelligence support, though some actions tested rules of engagement in gray-area targeting of and suspects. Despite tactical successes—evidenced by Presidential Unit Citations awarded to SEAL Team Two for 1967–1969 and 1969–1971 operations—their role yielded disproportionate enemy losses relative to SEAL fatalities, with reported kill ratios approaching 200:1 in some accounts, yet failed to alter the war's trajectory due to insufficient scale and enemy resilience. Empirical assessments highlight proficiency in but underscore the constraints of in asymmetric conflicts without complementary conventional dominance.

Post-Vietnam Reorganization and 1980s Operations

In the aftermath of the , which saw significant attrition in personnel and funding threats to Naval Special Warfare units, the U.S. Navy restructured its SEAL teams to improve operational deployability and sustain peacetime readiness. Early in 1983, the four remaining Teams (UDTs) were fully integrated into the SEAL teams, expanding the total to six active teams and eliminating doctrinal separations between UDTs and SEALs. This merger, led by Rear Adm. Cathal L. "Irish" Flynn, aligned and capabilities under a unified SEAL structure. SEAL Team Three was formally established on October 1, 1983, in , further bolstering West Coast assets. These changes organized teams into Naval Special Warfare Groups 1 through 3, enhancing rotational deployment cycles and responsiveness to global contingencies amid post-Vietnam budget constraints. Training reforms in the 1980s shifted focus toward , driven by the proliferation of aircraft hijackings and maritime threats from groups like the PLO following events such as the 1970 . SEAL curricula incorporated high-altitude low-opening (HALO) parachute techniques for stealthy insertions behind enemy lines, alongside shipboarding and close-quarters battle drills tailored to hostage rescue scenarios. , activated in October 1980 under Virginia Beach, specialized in these no-fail missions, including rapid response to hijackings, which informed broader SEAL readiness. This emphasis fostered interoperability with Marine Corps units, such as joint amphibious exercises, though the SEALs' small force size—approximately 2,000 operators across teams—limited scalability for large-scale influence. The reorganized SEALs' first major test came during Operation Urgent Fury, the U.S.-led invasion of on October 25, 1983, aimed at rescuing American medical students and restoring order after a Marxist coup. SEAL Team Four conducted pre-invasion hydrographic at Point Salines airfield but suffered a setback when four operators drowned in rough seas during an inflatable boat insertion, highlighting equipment and environmental risks. A separate SEAL element successfully reconnoitered beaches near Pearls Airport, enabling Marine landings, while another platoon assaulted the Beauséjour radio transmitter, destroying it before withdrawing under fire after compromise. , deploying 22 operators, executed the high-risk extraction of Sir from in St. George's, repelling Grenadian infantry and armored assaults with limited communications until Marine reinforcements arrived on ; no SEAL fatalities occurred in this phase despite antiaircraft fire downing a support . Coordination failures with Army Rangers at the airfield and incompatible radios exposed joint command deficiencies, contributing to four total SEAL losses and prompting post-operation reviews that influenced the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act for unified . Despite these critiques, the missions demonstrated SEALs' value in rapid, maritime-focused insertions, though their modest scale underscored reliance on larger conventional forces for sustained operations.

1990s Conflicts: Grenada, Panama, and Gulf War

During Operation Just Cause, launched on December 20, 1989, to remove Panamanian dictator , U.S. Navy SEALs executed missions to neutralize his potential escape routes. SEAL elements disabled Noriega's gunboat in Balboa Harbor using limpet mines and small arms fire, preventing maritime evasion. Concurrently, three platoons from SEAL Team 4 assaulted Punta Paitilla Airport to destroy Noriega's aircraft, including his personal , successfully denying aerial escape despite encountering resistance from Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) personnel guarding the site. The airfield operation resulted in the destruction of multiple planes but incurred SEAL casualties, highlighting risks in urban close-quarters combat against alerted defenders. In the Persian Gulf War, SEALs deployed among the first U.S. forces during Operation Desert Shield starting August 2, 1990, conducting along the Kuwaiti and Iraqi coastlines to assess defenses and support potential amphibious operations. These missions included hydrographic surveys, beach marking, and intelligence gathering on Iraqi minefields and fortifications, which informed coalition planning despite the ultimate emphasis on ground maneuvers over seaborne assaults. SEALs also created deception by simulating amphibious landings through swimmer incursions that planted explosives and generated noise to mislead Iraqi forces into expecting coastal attacks. During Operation Desert Storm's ground phase in February 1991, SEAL teams infiltrated Kuwaiti shores, capturing Iraqi prisoners, seizing documents, and liberating the first parcel of Kuwaiti territory from occupation, yielding valuable intelligence on enemy positions with no reported SEAL fatalities. These operations demonstrated SEAL effectiveness in littoral and , though the desert environment exposed limitations in equipment suited for maritime over arid inland mobility, prompting post-war adaptations. Tactically, SEAL contributions denied Iraqi assets in and provided early intel gains in the Gulf, but the overwhelming conventional air and armored superiority rapidly achieved strategic objectives, reducing reliance on prolonged .

Global War on Terror: Initial Phases (2001-2010)

In the initial phase of , U.S. Navy SEALs deployed to in late 2001 as part of , conducting missions to support conventional forces. On 21 November 2001, a SEAL detachment provided surveillance over Objective Rhino, a airstrip southwest of , enabling subsequent Marine operations. Similarly, SEALs performed at a remote airstrip that became Rhino, facilitating 58's unopposed insertion on 25 November 2001, the longest-range assault from the sea in U.S. naval history. SEALs emphasized sensitive site exploitation targeting al-Qaeda cave complexes. On 5 2002, a SEAL platoon, supported by Marines and helicopters, raided the Zhawar Kili cave complex near , uncovering a , weapons caches, and materials; the mission extended eight days, directing airstrikes and capturing enemy personnel. Additional reconnaissance operations south and northeast of in and 2002 gathered actionable on al-Qaeda safe houses, disrupting enemy movements. These efforts yielded critical data on terrorist networks while minimizing U.S. ground commitments early in the campaign. During the under Operation Iraqi Freedom, SEALs prioritized maritime and infrastructure security to avert sabotage. On the second night of the war in March 2003, Naval Special Warfare units under Capt. Bob Harward assaulted the Mina al Bakr and Khawr al Amaya gas-oil platforms (GOPLATs) offshore, alongside facilities, in coordination with coalition forces from the , , and . The objective was to secure approximately 90% of Iraq's oil export capacity and prevent environmental catastrophe from deliberate destruction; the raids succeeded without significant resistance, enabling the first post-invasion oil shipment from Mina al Bakr. From 2003 onward, SEALs integrated deeply with (JSOC) task forces in both and , executing raids against high-value targets (HVTs) as part of . In alone, SEALs completed over 75 and missions, destroying enemy assets and capturing personnel integral to operations. These operations contributed to network disruptions by eliminating key facilitators and safe havens, though precise kill/capture ratios for SEAL-specific actions remain classified. The intense operational tempo across multiple rotations strained SEAL personnel, with reports highlighting fatigue from sustained deployments. High optempo, involving repeated high-risk missions, led to burnout risks and readiness concerns, as acknowledged in analyses of special operations sustainability during the early GWOT years. Despite these challenges, SEAL contributions in reconnaissance and targeted strikes bolstered coalition efforts to degrade terrorist leadership in the initial decade.

Global War on Terror: Later Phases and Bin Laden Raid (2011 Onward)

In the later phases of the Global War on Terror, U.S. Navy SEALs shifted emphasis toward high-value target raids, hostage rescues, and countering evolving threats from affiliates and emerging groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), while facing persistent insurgencies in and . A pivotal operation was Neptune Spear on May 2, 2011 (local time), executed by 23 operators from the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU, or ) against Osama bin Laden's compound in , . The assault team, including an interpreter and Belgian Malinois , inserted via two MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters—one of which crash-landed from loss of lift but sustained no injuries—breached the facility, eliminated bin Laden on the third floor after he resisted, and recovered intelligence materials during a 38-minute engagement. Five others in the compound were killed, including bin Laden's son Khalid; DNA analysis confirmed the leader's identity with a 99.9% match to pre-existing samples, while facial recognition and a courier's identification provided corroboration. No U.S. personnel suffered casualties, marking a significant degradation of 's command structure, though the group fragmented into resilient affiliates rather than collapsing entirely. SEAL operations persisted in under and its successors, targeting leadership and networks amid that prioritized and civilian minimization, sometimes constraining aggressive maneuvers according to operator accounts. A stark reminder of risks came on August 6, 2011, when insurgents downed a CH-47 Chinook helicopter in Wardak Province, killing 15 DEVGRU members from Gold Squadron, seven other SEALs, and an Afghan interpreter—the single deadliest day for U.S. forces in the conflict. In , as seized territory post-2011 U.S. drawdown, SEAL teams under (launched 2014) conducted raids to capture or kill mid-level commanders and disrupt logistics, contributing to territorial gains like the 2015-2016 Battle of , where small SEAL elements supported Iraqi forces in urban clearances against entrenched fighters. These efforts empirically reduced operational capacity through over 100 strikes by coalition , but incomplete data on SEAL-specific metrics reflects ; critiques from veterans highlight how restrictive and reliance on local partners limited decisive outcomes, allowing remnants to regroup in ungoverned spaces. Beyond core theaters, SEALs addressed maritime and hostage threats in the , exemplified by the January 25, 2012, rescue of American aid worker and Danish Poul Thisted near Adado, . Roughly 24 SEALs from DEVGRU's Black Squadron HALO-jumped from an MC-130, assaulted the captors' camp under cover of darkness, killed nine armed kidnappers (including their leader), and exfiltrated the hostages—who had endured 93 days of captivity—without U.S. injuries. This raid, informed by and drone overwatch, aligned with multinational counter-piracy efforts under , which correlated with a 75% drop in hijackings from 2011 peaks to under 10 annually by 2013, though piracy's criminal roots persisted amid 's state fragility. In the , as part of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, SEALs augmented joint special operations advising Philippine forces against Group militants on Jolo Island, focusing on maritime interdiction and intelligence sharing to degrade kidnapping networks linked to ; by 2015, U.S. support helped reduce ASG strength from hundreds to dozens, though the group retained sanctuary in remote terrain. Overall, these missions decapitated key figures—over 20 senior terrorists killed or captured post-2011 by DEVGRU alone—but empirical data shows insurgent adaptation and safe havens enabled resurgence, as evidenced by control resumption after the 2021 withdrawal and ISIS attacks exceeding 1,000 annually in / by 2014.

Post-2011 Operations and Shift to Great Power Competition

In , launched in 2014 to combat in and , U.S. Navy SEALs conducted raids, , and advisory missions alongside partners to degrade terrorist and leadership. These efforts included targeting ISIS oil smuggling networks to disrupt funding, exemplified by the , 2014, seizure of the MV Morning Glory oil tanker in the by SEALs from the guided-missile destroyer USS Stethem, preventing illicit sales by Libyan rebels that could finance regional instability. SEAL operations emphasized precision strikes and support for Iraqi forces reclaiming territory, contributing to the territorial defeat of ISIS by 2019, though remnants persisted into the 2020s. By the mid-2010s, Naval Special Warfare (NSW) began pivoting from counterterrorism dominance to great power competition, prioritizing threats from and through enhanced maritime denial, sabotage, and reconnaissance capabilities reminiscent of Cold War-era tactics. This doctrinal shift, articulated in NSW's 2021 vision for high-end conflict relevancy, involved reviving and port denial skills to counter peer naval expansions, such as 's militarization and 's submarine threats. In the , SEALs adapted to hybrid threats, including January 2024 interdictions in the off to seize Iranian-made weapons destined for Houthi forces, a mission during which SEALs Nathan Ingram and Christopher Chambers were lost at sea amid rough conditions. U.S. officials have consistently denied any SEAL advisory or operational roles in against Russian forces, maintaining a policy against direct deployments there. To operationalize the pivot, SEALs integrated into multi-domain exercises like Large Scale Exercise (LSE) , conducted July-August across 22 time zones, which tested joint Navy-Marine Corps responses to peer aggression through simulated global synchronization and advanced warfighting concepts. Bilateral training, such as September joint maritime operations with Egyptian during Bright Star 25, focused on for contested littoral environments. Amid these adaptations, NSW reinforced internal standards in May by expanding random drug testing to 15% of personnel monthly, targeting performance-enhancing substances to safeguard , mitigate risks in high-stakes missions, and uphold the ethos required for peer rivalry.

Mission, Roles, and Capabilities

Primary Functions and Operational Environments

United States Navy SEALs conduct missions encompassing (DA), (SR), (UW), (FID), and (CT), with additional collateral roles in security assistance, anti-terrorism, counterdrug operations, and personnel recovery. These functions emphasize maritime-specific support to requirements, including operations in littoral battlespaces that integrate blue-water approaches, beach landings, and inland waterways. SEAL platoons, typically comprising 16 operators organized into squads or elements, execute these missions through task-organized flexibility, prioritizing surprise, freedom of movement, and operational security to achieve objectives in denied or hostile areas. Operationally, SEALs are doctrinally equipped for versatility across , and land domains, enabling insertions and extractions via maritime, airborne, or ground means to support covert special warfare objectives. This multi-domain capability extends to diverse environments, from riverine and coastal zones to extreme conditions such as , urban, , and mountainous terrains, allowing adaptation to both insurgent threats and emerging peer competitors. Their Navy-centric focus on amphibious primacy differentiates them from other special operations forces like Marine Corps Raiders or Army , which prioritize expeditionary or land-centric maneuvers, by enabling seamless integration with naval assets for over-the-horizon projections and sustained sea-based logistics. The emphasis on small-unit yields significant in asymmetric conflicts, where independent platoons can disrupt enemy capabilities disproportionate to their size; however, this niche specialization constrains scalability against massed conventional forces, necessitating integration with larger operations for broader strategic effects. In peer-level threats, causal factors like advanced anti-access/area-denial systems challenge traditional infiltration methods, prompting doctrinal shifts toward enhanced and distributed lethality to maintain operational relevance.

Equipment, Weapons, and Technological Adaptations

Naval Special Warfare operators employ specialized optimized for maritime and close-quarters environments, including the HK416 , which features a short-stroke gas piston system for enhanced reliability in adverse conditions compared to designs. The MK18 Mod 0/1, a compact 10.3-inch barreled variant of the , is utilized for its maneuverability in confined spaces, often paired with suppressors such as models to minimize acoustic and visual signatures during stealth insertions. These weapons reflect adaptations from post-Vietnam evaluations emphasizing lighter, modular loadouts to improve operator mobility over the heavier gear of earlier eras, though extended operations have highlighted logistical challenges in resupplying specialized suppressors and optics. Underwater operations rely on closed-circuit rebreathers like the Dräger LAR V (MK 25), which recycle exhaled gases to eliminate bubble trails and enable prolonged submerged transits on pure oxygen, trusted by SEALs for over four decades in combat diving. SEAL Delivery Vehicles (SDVs), wet submersibles capable of carrying up to eight operators and their equipment, facilitate covert insertions from submarines via dry deck shelters, with models like the SDV Mark VIII achieving speeds up to 6 knots and depths beyond 150 feet. These systems evolved from Vietnam-era swimmer propulsion devices, prioritizing stealth and endurance over open-circuit SCUBA to support hydrographic and missions. Recent technological integrations include unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), with Naval Special Warfare testing autonomous drones for real-time overwatch in denied areas as early as 2018. Experimental adaptations, such as powered exoskeletons, are under evaluation across to augment load-bearing capacity—up to 200 pounds—reducing fatigue in extended patrols, though field-testing remains limited to prototypes integrated with sensors for human-machine teaming. These enhancements address competition demands, focusing on countering anti-access/area-denial environments through dispersed, low-signature assets rather than massed forces.

Organization and Structure

The Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC), headquartered at , , exercises authority over all U.S. Navy special warfare forces, including SEAL teams and special warfare combatant-craft crewmen (SWCC). Established on April 16, 1987, NSWC centralizes strategic oversight, force development, equipping, and sustainment to ensure operational readiness across maritime domains. This unified command structure enables efficient allocation of logistics and intelligence resources, supporting rapid scaling of forces during high-intensity conflicts by reducing redundancies inherent in fragmented basing. NSWC organizes its operational elements into four Naval Special Warfare Groups: Groups 1 and 3, based in Coronado, which manage Pacific-oriented SEAL Teams 1, 3, 5, and 7 along with specialized units like Team 1; and Groups 2 and 4, located at Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, , overseeing Atlantic-focused SEAL Teams 2, 4, 8, and 10 as well as special boat teams. These groups facilitate rotational deployment models, where teams cycle through green, blue, and gold phases for training, maintenance, and forward operations, maintaining persistent global basing in regions such as the , , and to align with theater commands. As a subordinate unified command under the U.S. Command (USSOCOM), NSWC synchronizes its maritime with joint and interagency efforts, providing scalable forces for , , and . This integration sustains approximately 2,700 active-duty SEAL operators by standardizing supply chains and enabling surge deployments, where centralized can redirect assets to hotspots without disrupting baseline readiness. By 2025, NSWC has prioritized adaptations for distributed lethality in peer-level competition, restructuring oversight to support dispersed operations in denied environments, thereby enhancing joint force persistence through resilient command nodes and forward hubs.

SEAL Team Composition and Deployment

The United States Navy maintains eight active-duty SEAL Teams (numbered 1 through 5, 7, 8, and 10), each commanded by a Navy (O-5) and comprising a element alongside approximately eight operational . Each typically consists of 16 SEAL operators, including two commissioned officers (led by a , O-3) and 14 enlisted personnel, all qualified in diving, parachuting, and demolitions. These form the core operational unit, capable of subdividing into 8-man squads, 4-man fire teams, or 2-man / elements based on mission requirements. SEAL Team 6, officially designated as the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU), operates distinctly as a Tier 1 unit under , specializing in , hostage rescue, , and clandestine operations, in contrast to the broader , , and maritime roles of Tier 2 regular SEAL Teams. DEVGRU employs a squadron-based structure, with assault squadrons divided into troops (each led by an O-5 or equivalent), enabling scalable task units for high-risk, time-sensitive missions that demand advanced proficiency beyond standard SEAL training. Platoons from regular SEAL Teams follow an 18- to 24-month cycle, incorporating 12- to 18-month pre-deployment workups for mission-specific rehearsals, followed by approximately 6-month forward deployments to maintain persistent readiness and operational tempo. This rotation ensures scalability, with teams deploying troops or platoons modularly to support theater commanders, emphasizing high-fidelity preparation to sustain combat effectiveness. As of 2025, Naval Special Warfare has intensified focus on maritime-centric operations amid competition, repositioning SEAL Teams to integrate as enablers for naval and amphibious missions rather than prolonged land-based , leveraging their underwater and coastal expertise for peer adversary scenarios. This shift maintains an average of eight platoons per team for distributed lethality across sea, air, and domains.

Support and Auxiliary Units

Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC) provide critical maritime mobility and for Naval Special Warfare operations, operating high-speed combatant for SEAL insertions, extractions, and riverine patrols. Organized into three Special Boat Teams—SBT-12, SBT-20, and SBT-22—SWCC personnel maintain and employ vessels such as the Combatant Craft Assault and Medium variants, enabling over-the-horizon transport in littoral environments. Their integration with SEAL platoons amplifies operational reach by delivering firepower from .50 caliber machine guns to precision-guided munitions while navigating contested waters. SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Teams specialize in clandestine underwater insertions using minisubmersibles, supporting SEAL missions in denied coastal areas. SDV Team 1 (SDVT-1), based in , , covers Pacific operations, while SDV Team 2 (SDVT-2), located in Little Creek, , handles Atlantic and global deployments. These teams operate the Mk VIII Mod 1 SDV, a wet submersible capable of carrying up to six combat-equipped SEALs over distances exceeding 40 nautical miles at depths up to 200 feet, launched from or surface vessels. SDV operations enhance SEAL overmatch by providing stealthy approach vectors, minimizing detection risks in high-threat scenarios. Auxiliary units, including Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technicians and cryptologic support personnel, integrate directly with SEAL task units to clear hazards and provide real-time intelligence. Navy EOD teams render safe improvised explosive devices and , ensuring safe access for SEAL maneuvers in booby-trapped environments. Cryptologic units offer and , enabling secure data links and electronic warfare support during missions. These enablers sustain SEAL combat effectiveness by addressing non-kinetic threats, with EOD personnel often embedding in forward-deployed elements to counter asymmetric explosives prevalent in modern conflicts.

Recruitment, Selection, and Training

Enlistment and Initial Screening

Candidates seeking enlistment in the SEALs must meet stringent eligibility criteria, including United States citizenship, an age range of 17 to 28 years for enlisted personnel, possession of a or equivalent, and qualifying scores on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), such as a minimum Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) percentile score typically around 35 or higher depending on specific guidelines. Additional prerequisites encompass correctable vision to 20/25, no , and passing a eligible for . These requirements ensure candidates possess baseline intellectual aptitude and personal reliability before physical evaluation. The initial physical filter is the Physical Screening Test (PST), administered multiple times to verify sustained performance, comprising a 500-yard swim using or completed in under 12 minutes 30 seconds, at least 50 push-ups and 50 curl-ups within two minutes each, a minimum of 10 pull-ups (no time limit), and a 1.5-mile run in under 10 minutes 30 seconds. Competitive PST scores substantially exceed these minima—such as a swim under 9 minutes, over 80 push-ups, and a run under 9 minutes—to rank higher for selection into preparatory programs, as the test assesses not only raw fitness but also recovery under fatigue with brief rest intervals between events. Medical examinations, including orthopedic and dive physicals, and psychological assessments evaluate history, , and suitability for high-stress environments, disqualifying those with disqualifying conditions like or significant prior injuries. Recruitment primarily targets new civilian enlistees via the SEAL Challenge contract, which guarantees an attempt at the upon meeting PST standards, alongside active-duty sailors applying for lateral transfer and select prior-service personnel from other branches, though the latter face restrictions and require command approval due to service obligations. Naval Special Warfare Command conducts targeted outreach to expand applicant diversity, including partnerships with urban swim programs and minority-focused recruiting events, while maintaining unchanged performance thresholds to avoid diluting unit readiness. From the broader pool of annual applicants—often numbering in the thousands—fewer than 1% ultimately qualify through initial screening to enter SEAL-specific training pipelines, underscoring the PST and ancillary evaluations as decisive early eliminators that prioritize verifiable physical and mental capabilities over volume.

Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) Training

Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training is a 24-week program conducted at the in , aimed at forging the physical conditioning, mental resilience, and basic operational skills essential for SEAL candidates. The curriculum progresses through three sequential phases—Basic Conditioning, Combat Diving, and —emphasizing progressive overload in endurance, aquatic proficiency, and tactical fundamentals while exposing trainees to environmental stressors like cold waters to simulate combat demands. Daily routines incorporate timed evolutions such as four-mile beach runs in soft sand and obstacle course completions, with progressive standards requiring completion within specified limits, such as a 2-mile ocean swim with fins in under 75 minutes by mid-phase. The First Phase, Basic Conditioning, spans approximately seven to eight weeks and serves as the foundational crucible for physical and mental fortitude. Trainees perform Log Physical Training (PT), where teams of six to eight candidates hoist and maneuver 200-pound Hawaiian volcanic logs through exercises including overhead presses, squats, and carries to build strength, coordination, and tolerance for shared discomfort. swims of 1 to 2 miles with fins, often in rough surf conditions, alongside surf torture drills—where candidates link arms and submerge in breaking waves—cultivate cold-water resilience against risks and foster unit cohesion under duress. This phase peaks in Hell Week during the fourth week, a 5.5-day gauntlet commencing Sunday midnight and concluding Friday afternoon, featuring relentless cycles of carries, runs, , and minimal food intake on fewer than four hours of total sleep to rigorously test and weed out those lacking . The Second Phase, Combat Diving, lasts about seven weeks and shifts focus to underwater operations, beginning with pool competency tests like the drown-proofing , where bound trainees bob, float, and retrieve objects without aids to instill confidence in water. Instruction covers open-circuit SCUBA and closed-circuit systems, with day and night dives progressing to open-ocean scenarios up to 50 feet, emphasizing , control, and emergency procedures in low-visibility conditions to prepare for covert maritime insertions. The Third Phase, Land Warfare, extends over seven to nine weeks, introducing weapons handling, demolitions, and small-unit tactics. Candidates qualify on pistols, rifles, and machine guns, execute live-fire breaching, and practice patrolling, , and explosive ordnance employment in field exercises simulating and . Despite documented injury risks from repetitive stress—such as stress fractures and —the program's intensity correlates with producing operators capable of sustained high-output missions, as evidenced by SEAL performance in subsequent qualifications.

Advanced and Specialized Qualification Courses

SEAL Qualification Training (SQT) follows successful completion of Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training and consists of a 26-week curriculum designed to develop operational proficiency in small-unit tactics, weapons handling, and mission execution. This phase emphasizes close-quarters battle (CQB) techniques, patrolling operations, land warfare skills, combat swimming, and basic mission planning, enabling trainees to integrate as team members in real-world scenarios. Medical training, including combat medic certification, is incorporated to prepare SEALs for providing advanced trauma care in austere environments. Prior to SQT graduation, candidates undergo parachute qualification, including one week of static-line jumps and three weeks of military freefall training to achieve proficiency in high-altitude low-opening (HALO) and high-altitude high-opening (HAHO) insertions. These capabilities allow SEALs to conduct covert infiltrations from aircraft at altitudes exceeding 25,000 feet, minimizing detection risks during or missions. (SERE) training is also completed, focusing on techniques for operating behind enemy lines and resisting interrogation. Specialized qualification courses extend beyond core SQT to tailor skills for specific roles, such as the three-month SEAL Sniper Training Program, which spans 90 days of instruction in marksmanship, observation, and long-range engagement across diverse terrains. Sniper candidates master eleven weapon systems, including advanced optics and ballistics, with emphasis on stalking, , and precision fire support. Additional billets may require attendance at courses like (JTAC) for coordinating or advanced demolitions for underwater ordnance disposal, ensuring adaptability to evolving mission profiles. Upon completion of SQT and requisite specialties, graduates receive the SEAL Trident insignia, signifying readiness for assignment to operational teams.

Attrition Rates, Standards Maintenance, and Recent Reforms

The Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training pipeline maintains exceptionally high attrition rates, typically between 70% and 85% per class, with some cohorts experiencing rates exceeding 90%. This level of dropout, predominantly voluntary during intense phases like Hell Week, serves as a primary filter to select candidates capable of enduring extreme physical and mental stress, thereby upholding the operational rigor necessary for efficacy. Standards are preserved through unyielding physical benchmarks, academic requirements—such as minimum scores of 70% for enlisted on written tests—and case-by-case evaluations for reattempts, which discourage repeated failures without demonstrating substantial improvement. While no fixed limit on attempts exists, approvals for multiple tries are rare and require rigorous justification, preventing dilution of selection criteria and ensuring graduates meet first-principles demands for resilience and performance in combat environments. Following the February 4, 2022, death of Seaman Kyle Mullen from acute shortly after completing Hell Week, Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) implemented targeted reforms to enhance trainee safety without compromising core standards. These include mandatory prophylactic injections for all candidates prior to BUD/S (unless allergic), expanded medical monitoring during high-risk training evolutions, and a minimum six-hour guarantee in certain scenarios. In response to broader concerns over performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs), NSWC initiated force-wide random testing starting November 1, 2023, targeting 15% of personnel monthly, with expansions in May 2025 to refine protocols and address misuse risks while accommodating legitimate medical needs. A October 2024 Department of Defense report affirmed these improvements in medical oversight but urged clearer guidelines on tactics and reassessment of resources at the SEAL training command. Such measures reflect causal prioritization of preventable risks, sustaining the pipeline's proven selectivity amid institutional pressures that might otherwise erode warfighting standards.

Personnel and Culture

Demographics and Diversity Initiatives

The U.S. Navy SEALs comprise approximately 2,500 to 2,900 active-duty special warfare operators assigned to Naval Special Warfare units. These personnel are primarily enlisted in pay grades E-5 () to E-7 (), reflecting the operational demands of small-team missions that favor experienced mid-level non-commissioned officers over junior or senior ranks. Officers, who lead platoons and teams, represent a smaller proportion, typically entering SEAL roles after commissioning and initial qualifications. The average age of SEAL operators falls between 28 and 30 years, with most entering service around age 19 and accumulating 5 to 10 years of experience by team assignment. This age profile aligns with the physical and maturational requirements of selection processes, where younger candidates predominate due to enlistment age limits of 17 to 28 (with limited waivers). Ethnically, SEALs remain predominantly white, with over 90% of special warfare officers identifying as such and only 2% as as of March 2021. Minorities, including and personnel, are underrepresented relative to broader or eligible pools, a pattern consistent across forces. The has pursued diversity initiatives since at least 2012, including targeted of minority males aged 16 to 24, yet demographic shifts have been minimal, with stable underrepresentation persisting through 2021. Retention data for indicates that peer and leadership diversity has limited empirical impact on overall enlisted or officer continuance, underscoring the primacy of merit-based standards in high-attrition units where capability directly correlates with mission success and team cohesion. In January 2016, the U.S. Navy opened all Naval Special Warfare (NSW) billets, including SEAL operator roles, to female candidates in compliance with the 2013 and 2015 Department of Defense directives mandating gender integration across combat positions. Since then, fewer than 20 women have entered the SEAL assessment and selection process, with all dropping out during Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training's initial phases. No woman has qualified as a SEAL operator by completing the full BUD/S pipeline and subsequent SEAL Qualification Training as of October 2025, despite the program's overall male attrition rate of 70-85%. Female candidates have advanced farthest to day 4 of BUD/S first phase before voluntary withdrawal, reflecting the pipeline's unyielding physical demands on strength, endurance, and cold-water immersion tolerance. In contrast, the first female to graduate an NSW enlisted training pipeline did so on July 15, 2021, earning qualification as a special warfare combatant-craft crewman (SWCC)—a role involving boat operations in support of SEAL missions rather than direct SEAL entry. Physiological disparities underpin the high attrition, with empirical showing women incur musculoskeletal injuries at 2-3 times the rate of men in equivalent high-load environments. Stress fractures, tendonitis, and lower-body overuse injuries predominate due to sex-based differences in , muscle mass, and biomechanical loading capacities, exacerbating risks during BUD/S events like log PT, runs, and ocean swims. NSW maintains uniform standards without gender-normed modifications, prioritizing mission-critical capabilities such as carrying 100+ pounds of gear over extended distances or prolonged underwater breath-holds. Debates on full integration highlight potential unit-level impacts, including strains on cohesion from interpersonal dynamics in small, isolated teams where mutual trust and physical interdependence are paramount. Analyses of mixed-gender integration note risks to morale and readiness from heightened or vulnerabilities, absent in all-male units, alongside administrative burdens on . While proponents cite no inherent barriers to under equal standards, the absence of scalable successes—coupled with internal NSW resistance to rushed diversity metrics—suggests physiological thresholds limit viability without diluting core selection rigor, potentially compromising operational tempo in direct-action raids.

Discipline, Ethical Standards, and Ties to Intelligence Agencies

The SEAL , codified in 2005 by Naval Special Warfare leadership to formalize the community's unwritten standards after four decades of existence, articulates core principles of integrity, resilience, and selfless service, requiring operators to "serve with honor on and off the " and control emotions amid adversity. This framework reinforces a akin to warrior-monks, forged through BUD/S attrition and ongoing ethos reinforcement, prioritizing , to teammates over self, and adherence to values of honor, , and commitment despite the psychological toll of high-stakes environments. Empirical maintenance of these standards involves rigorous self-policing, with emphasizing under duress to minimize lapses in judgment. Sustained operational tempo since 2001, involving repeated deployments averaging 300-plus days annually for many units, has tested these ethical boundaries by inducing fatigue and eroding routine oversight, prompting acknowledgments from commanders of drifts from core values and the need for enhanced intrusive leadership to preserve good order. While specific conviction rates for courts-martial within the approximately 2,500 active SEAL force are not publicly disaggregated, Navy-wide general and special court-martial conviction rates hover around 87-90% for prosecuted cases, reflecting selective pursuit of egregious violations amid broader emphasis on prevention through ethos-driven culture rather than reactive punishment. Leadership responses, including discipline trackers and routine inspections implemented post-2019, underscore causal links between op tempo and strain, yet affirm the ethos's role in sustaining overall low relative incidence of substantiated ethical breaches compared to conventional forces under similar pressures. Ties to intelligence agencies, particularly through DEVGRU's integration with (JSOC) and the CIA's (SAC), facilitate joint operations where SEALs provide tactical execution fused with agency intelligence, as in the Omega Program's targeted killings of high-value Taliban figures under relaxed restrictions. These collaborations enhance causal effectiveness in deniable or covert actions by leveraging SAC's paramilitary expertise—often drawn from former JSOC personnel—for intel-driven raids, but introduce risks of blurred , as CIA oversight differs from military chains of command and uniform , potentially complicating ethical adherence in ambiguous theaters. Despite such integrations yielding operational advantages in intelligence fusion, they demand heightened discipline to navigate deniability imperatives that prioritize mission secrecy over public transparency.

Notable Operations and Achievements

Signature Missions and Tactical Successes

Operation Neptune Spear, conducted on May 2, 2011, by (DEVGRU) in , , exemplified the unit's capability for rapid, decisive action against high-value targets. A team of 23 SEALs, supported by a combat dog and interpreter, infiltrated the compound via , neutralized resistance including Osama bin Laden's courier and son, confirmed bin Laden's identity, and eliminated the al-Qaeda leader in a brief firefight before exfiltrating with significant intelligence materials. The ground phase lasted approximately 40 minutes, with the compound subsequently destroyed to prevent it from becoming a symbolic site, resulting in zero U.S. fatalities and the recovery of computers, documents, and media drives yielding actionable intelligence on al-Qaeda networks. The rescue of Captain Richard Phillips from Somali pirates on April 12, 2009, further highlighted SEALs' precision in maritime counter-piracy operations. After pirates hijacked the Maersk Alabama and held Phillips hostage in a lifeboat for five days, three SEAL snipers positioned aboard the USS Bainbridge executed simultaneous headshots on the three visible pirates at a range of under 100 meters, freeing Phillips without injury to him or the operators. This operation, involving DEVGRU elements, concluded a standoff initiated when the Bainbridge arrived on scene, demonstrating synchronized marksmanship under dynamic conditions with negligible collateral risk. These missions underscore SEALs' tactical successes in high-value target engagements, characterized by swift execution—often under 45 minutes for core objectives—and high operational , enabling the disruption of terrorist and threats with low friendly casualty rates in declassified accounts. Interagency teams incorporating SEALs have achieved consistent tactical outcomes in , prioritizing speed and intelligence exploitation over prolonged engagements.

Decorations, Casualties, and Empirical Effectiveness Metrics

The United States Navy SEALs have received seven Medals of Honor since the units' formal establishment in 1962, reflecting exceptional valor in high-risk operations. Of these, two were awarded posthumously for actions during the Global War on Terror (GWOT): in 2005 for leadership under fire in , and in 2006 for shielding comrades from a grenade explosion in . Earlier recipients include Vietnam-era SEALs such as and Hospital Corpsman , underscoring a pattern of awards for in . ![Navy SEAL Lt. Michael P. Murphy, Medal of Honor recipient](./assets/US_Navy_050628-N-0000X-005_Navy_file_photo_of_SEAL_Lt._Michael_P.Murphy%252C_from_Patchogue%252C_N.Y.%252C_and_Sonar_TechnicianSurfaceSurface SEALs have also earned numerous Silver Stars, the third-highest U.S. valor award, with 42 awarded by 1974 for service alone, highlighting disproportionate recognition relative to unit size. In the GWOT era, over 100 additional Silver Stars were awarded, many initially classified, for combat actions in and through 2016. Casualty rates among SEALs reflect the demands of special operations, with approximately 100 during the GWOT from 2001 to 2021, concentrated in and . Losses peaked in , including 15 SEALs in the Extortion 17 helicopter shootdown, the deadliest single incident for U.S. forces. Per-capita fatalities for deployed SEALs exceeded those of conventional units by factors of 10-20 times, attributable to repeated exposure in enemy-held terrain and close-quarters raids rather than survivability deficits. Empirical effectiveness metrics for SEAL operations emphasize asymmetric impact, with special operations forces (including SEALs) conducting over 20,000 raids in and by 2015, yielding enemy kill-to-death ratios estimated at 10:1 or higher in direct engagements due to superior , integration, and precision fires. (HVT) disruptions—such as the 2011 raid killing —demonstrate return on investment through strategic decapitation effects, though quantifying long-term ROI remains challenging amid insurgent regeneration. Drawbacks include elevated operator burnout and replacement costs, with special operations attrition contributing to overall GWOT personnel strains despite tactical successes.

Controversies, Criticisms, and Reforms

Internal Discipline Issues and Scandals

In the years following 2010, the U.S. SEAL community faced heightened scrutiny over internal discipline, particularly involving drug abuse and violations of media disclosure protocols. A 2017 investigation revealed widespread illicit drug use among SEALs, including , , , ecstasy, and marijuana, with personnel describing testing regimes as ineffective and leadership as sometimes dismissive of the issue. This pattern persisted into 2019, when an internal probe into SEAL Team 10 uncovered abuse by multiple members while stationed in , alongside efforts to evade detection through lax procedures; the investigation found no direct operational harm from the drug use but highlighted systemic testing failures. In response to these and related incidents, three senior leaders of SEAL Team 7 were relieved of command in September 2019 amid broader allegations of platoon misconduct during deployments. Unauthorized media engagements compounded these challenges, with active and former SEALs breaching nondisclosure agreements through book deals and commercial endorsements. Notably, former SEAL Matt Bissonnette, author of the 2012 book No Easy Day detailing the Osama bin Laden raid, agreed in 2016 to forfeit $6.8 million in profits to the U.S. government for violating secrecy pledges by failing to submit the manuscript for pre-publication review. Similarly, in 2012, seven active-duty SEALs received administrative reprimands for undisclosed involvement in a military-themed video game, contravening regulations on operational security. Then-Commander of Naval Special Warfare Collin Green issued a 2019 letter to subordinate leaders acknowledging these patterns as indicative of eroding "order and discipline," urging a cultural reset to prioritize ethical standards over tolerance for deviance. Contributing factors included the psychological toll of prolonged combat deployments, as articulated by Acting Navy Secretary in December 2019, who linked two decades of high-tempo operations to diminished unit discipline across forces. While formal courts-martial referrals for SEAL-specific offenses saw no publicly detailed spike in aggregate statistics, the period marked increased internal investigations and administrative actions, with most infractions addressed through self-policing mechanisms like command reliefs rather than external trials. By , Naval Special Warfare implemented reforms, including revised leadership selection criteria and mandatory courses, aimed at screening for character traits resilient to post-deployment stressors and preventing recurrence of scandals involving drugs or media breaches. These measures sought to reinforce without diluting operational focus, though their long-term efficacy remains under evaluation by command oversight bodies. Special Operations Chief Edward Gallagher, a Navy SEAL deployed to in 2017, faced charges including premeditated for allegedly stabbing a wounded fighter who later died. At his 2019 court-martial, the prosecution's case relied on testimony from fellow SEALs, but a key witness admitted under oath to having killed the fighter himself, leading to the of Gallagher on and related charges. The jury convicted him solely on a charge of posing for photographs with the deceased fighter's body, a violation carrying a maximum four-month sentence, which was effectively nullified by ; no evidence supported premeditation or unlawful killing. Following the trial, Navy leadership sought to revoke Gallagher's Trident pin and pursue further administrative separation, prompting intervention by President Trump, who in November 2019 directed the restoration of his rank and full retirement benefits as a SEAL. Supporters of the intervention, including some military analysts, argued it countered perceived institutional bias against operators in chaotic urban combat environments where rules of engagement (ROE) interpretations vary amid immediate threats. Critics within the Navy, however, contended the acquittal could undermine deterrence of misconduct by signaling leniency, though empirical outcomes showed prosecutorial reliance on potentially incentivized or recanted testimony from peers facing their own disciplinary risks. Other legal cases involving SEALs accused of homicide or unlawful killings have similarly yielded low conviction rates on primary charges. For instance, investigations into alleged prisoner mistreatment or civilian deaths in and from 2010 onward often stalled due to insufficient evidence or combat-context justifications, with fewer than 10% of referred crimes cases against special operators resulting in felony convictions per data. In 2023, probes into SEAL-related incidents focused more on training fatalities than operational homicides, reflecting a shift but highlighting persistent without proportional upheld allegations of criminal intent. Allegations against SEALs spiked following high-profile operations like the 2011 Bin Laden raid, correlating with heightened media and internal oversight that amplified anonymous tips and rival-operator reports, yet formal inquiries frequently dismissed charges for lack of corroboration in fog-of-war scenarios. Proponents of flexibility cite this pattern as evidence of overreach, where post-mission reconstructions ignore causal realities of asymmetric threats, while detractors, often from groups, maintain that low convictions indicate systemic under-prosecution despite credible initial reports. Overall, these cases underscore tensions between operational autonomy and accountability, with trials revealing evidentiary challenges inherent to elite units' high-tempo engagements.

Broader Critiques: Overreliance, Burnout, and Strategic Role

The protracted operational tempo of U.S. Navy SEALs during the Global War on Terror (GWOT), spanning from 2001 to the withdrawal from in 2021, resulted in deployment-to-dwell ratios often approaching 1:1, with units deploying for six months followed by equivalent home periods, rendering the pace unsustainable and contributing to widespread exhaustion among personnel. This high optempo, driven by an overreliance on special operations forces (SOF) for missions ranging from raids to advisory roles, eroded unit readiness by prioritizing short-term tactical engagements over long-term force regeneration, including training and recovery cycles. Critics argue that this dependence on elite units like the SEALs has inflated operational costs, with a single SEAL estimated at $500,000 to $1 million, excluding ongoing expenses for specialized equipment, maintenance, and medical support that amplify annual per-operator expenditures significantly beyond conventional forces. Furthermore, the strategic emphasis on SOF has diluted the capabilities of and Marine units, which have ceded proficiency to special operators, fostering a doctrinal imbalance where conventional forces underinvest in adaptable, skills essential for peer competitions. By 2025, Department of Defense assessments acknowledged these strains, prompting efforts to recalibrate SOF employment toward selective, high-impact roles while bolstering conventional force resilience, though congressional pushback against proposed SOCOM reductions highlights ongoing debates over balancing specialized assets with broader readiness. While SEALs remain vital for countering asymmetric threats—such as non-state actors and tactics often minimized in mainstream analyses— underscores the need for restraint to prevent systemic attrition, ensuring SOF preserve strategic utility without supplanting foundational military structures.

Influence and Legacy

Impact on U.S. Military Doctrine

The U.S. Navy SEALs have influenced by pioneering the integration of maritime forces into joint frameworks, beginning with their roles in -era . In operations under the – Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG), SEAL teams conducted cross-border reconnaissance and sabotage missions from 1964 onward, demonstrating the efficacy of small-unit amphibious insertions for gathering and disruption of enemy supply lines. These efforts highlighted the need for specialized SOF to operate independently yet in coordination with conventional forces, shaping early joint tactics that emphasized flexibility in denied environments. SEAL contributions informed key doctrinal publications, including Joint Publication 3-05 on , which incorporates principles of amphibious SOF primacy for enabling maritime access and littoral maneuver. Naval Special Warfare Publication 3-05 further delineates SEAL roles in supporting projection through , , and , integrating these capabilities into broader and naval strategies post-Vietnam. This doctrinal evolution underscores SEALs' role in advocating for SOF as force multipliers in amphibious operations, where their expertise in hydrographic reconnaissance and obstacle clearance reduces operational risks for follow-on forces. From Vietnam's UW focus, SEALs adapted to gray-zone competitions, employing stealthy, deniable actions to counter hybrid threats short of declared , as outlined in analyses of multidomain operations. Their tactics, blending with influence operations, have been validated in exercises testing distributed maritime operations, including Large Scale Exercise 2025, which refined joint command structures for global SOF synchronization. These adaptations reinforce doctrinal shifts toward persistent presence in contested littorals, prioritizing SEAL-led SR to inform multi-domain decision-making.

Training of Foreign Special Forces

U.S. Navy SEALs engage in (FID) by providing tactical training, advisory support, and joint exercises to enhance partner nations' capabilities, particularly in , raids, and maritime operations. In (OEF-P), initiated in 2002, SEALs contributed to joint task forces advising Philippine Armed Forces against the Group (ASG), focusing on intelligence-driven operations and small-unit tactics in the . This support, alongside broader U.S. efforts, enabled Philippine forces to conduct over 100 island operations, resulting in the degradation of ASG from an estimated 1,000–1,200 fighters in the early 2000s to fewer than 300 by the mid-2010s, with key leaders neutralized and kidnapping revenues curtailed by 90 percent through interdictions. Ongoing exercises like , involving SEALs and Philippine units, continue to build partner capacity in urban combat and , yielding measurable improvements in Philippine operational tempo against residual ASG threats. In Iraq, SEALs played a role in training the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), established in 2004, emphasizing hostage rescue, high-value target raids, and intelligence fusion. From 2006 onward, SEAL advisors integrated CTS units into multinational operations, contributing to the development of an indigenous force that conducted thousands of missions, including the 2017 recapture of Mosul from ISIS, where CTS elements led assaults on fortified positions. By 2018, CTS comprised over 10,000 personnel capable of independent counterterrorism strikes, credited with eliminating hundreds of ISIS leaders and preventing territorial resurgence in key areas. However, some accounts from SEAL trainers note unintended consequences, such as trained units occasionally targeting U.S. forces amid sectarian tensions, highlighting risks in rapid capability transfers without sustained oversight. SEALs have extended FID to counter great-power competition, advising allies in the against Chinese influence. Reports indicate that elements of have trained Taiwanese since 2023 on and asymmetric defense tactics for potential invasion scenarios, aiming to bolster island-hopping resistance and sabotage capabilities. These efforts seek to reduce partner dependency on U.S. direct intervention, though empirical outcomes remain unproven amid escalating tensions. Government Accountability Office assessments of FID reveal mixed effectiveness, citing deficiencies in language proficiency—where only 40 percent of personnel meet deployment standards—and inconsistent metrics for partner self-sufficiency, leading to prolonged U.S. advisory roles and variable long-term gains in host-nation .

Cultural Depictions and Public Perception

Depictions of U.S. Navy SEALs in popular media proliferated following the post-9/11 conflicts, with films such as (2013), adapted from Marcus Luttrell's 2007 memoir recounting , and (2014), based on Chris Kyle's autobiography, achieving commercial success and grossing over $600 million combined worldwide. These works, alongside (2012) featuring active-duty SEALs in realistic tactical scenarios, elevated public fascination but drew internal criticism for potential operational security (OPSEC) violations, as narratives risked disclosing tactics or unit identifiers despite mandatory pre-publication reviews by the Department of Defense. Former SEALs' proliferation of books and media appearances, numbering dozens since , has been attributed to financial incentives and a shift from the community's traditional "quiet professional" ethos, fostering perceptions of self-promotion over discretion. Public perception of SEALs as unparalleled elite forces has been amplified by these portrayals, contributing to recruitment surges—enlistment inquiries spiked 400% after 's release—yet also attracting applicants with inflated expectations of glamour over rigor, as evidenced by a 2020 Naval Special Warfare report citing an "unhealthy sense of entitlement" among some candidates influenced by Hollywood narratives. This media-driven image contrasts sharply with empirical realities, such as Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training's average 68% attrition rate across phases, with historical data showing up to 85% dropout in some classes due to physical exhaustion, injury, and voluntary quits during events like Hell Week, far exceeding dramatized depictions of near-universal perseverance. Scandals in the 2020s, including war crimes allegations and internal misconduct, have tempered this adulation, eroding trust; for instance, a 2021 review prompted reforms after high-profile cases exposed ethical lapses, while 2025 investigations into SEAL Team 4 members sharing racist memes targeting a sailor led to disciplinary actions, highlighting persistent cultural issues amid media scrutiny. Mainstream reporting on such events, often from outlets with institutional biases favoring over operational context, has amplified cynicism, though empirical metrics like sustained deployment effectiveness underscore enduring capabilities despite reputational hits. In response to these challenges, the Naval Special Warfare community marked the 20th anniversary of the SEAL Ethos on May 16, 2025, reaffirming principles of , , and resilience as a "community-driven legacy" to counter fame-induced drifts and restore focus on mission primacy over . This internal recommitment aims to mitigate the dual-edged sword of cultural visibility, balancing inspirational value against risks of mythologization that obscure the attritional costs and disciplined ethos defining SEAL reality.

References

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