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Fascist Italy
Fascist Italy
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The Kingdom of Italy was governed by the National Fascist Party from 1922 to 1943 with Benito Mussolini as prime minister transforming the country into a totalitarian dictatorship. The Fascists crushed political opposition, while promoting economic modernization, traditional social values and a rapprochement with the Roman Catholic Church. They also promoted imperialism, resulting in the expansion of the Italian Empire.

Key Information

According to historian Stanley G. Payne, "[the] Fascist government passed through several relatively distinct phases". The first phase (1922–1925) was nominally a continuation of the parliamentary system, albeit with a "legally-organized executive dictatorship". In foreign policy, Mussolini ordered the pacification of Libya against rebels in the Italian colonies of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (eventually unified in Italian Libya), inflicted the bombing of Corfu, established a protectorate over Albania, and annexed the city of Fiume into Italy after a treaty with the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The second phase (1925–1929) was "the construction of the Fascist dictatorship proper". The third phase (1929–1935) saw less interventionism in foreign policy. The fourth phase (1935–1940) was characterized by an aggressive foreign policy: the Second Italo-Ethiopian War, which was launched from Eritrea and Somaliland; confrontations with the League of Nations, leading to sanctions; growing economic autarky; the invasion of Albania; and the signing of the Pact of Steel. The fifth phase (1940–1943) was World War II itself, ending in military defeat, while the sixth and final phase (1943–1945) was the rump Salò Government under German control.[2]

Italy was a leading member of the Axis powers in World War II, battling with initial success on several fronts. However, after the German-Italian defeat in Africa, the successes of the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front, and the subsequent Allied landings in Sicily, King Victor Emmanuel III overthrew and arrested Mussolini. The new government signed an armistice with the Allies in September 1943. Germany seized control of the northern half of Italy and rescued Mussolini, setting up the Italian Social Republic (RSI), a collaborationist puppet state which was ruled by Mussolini and Fascist loyalists.

From that point onward, the country descended into a civil war, and the large Italian resistance movement continued to wage its guerrilla war against the German and RSI forces. Mussolini was captured and killed by the resistance on 28 April 1945, and hostilities ended the next day. Shortly after the war, civil discontent led to the 1946 institutional referendum on whether Italy would remain a monarchy or become a republic. The Italians decided to abandon the monarchy and form the Italian Republic, the present-day Italian state.

Culture and society

[edit]

After rising to power, the Fascist regime of Italy set a course to becoming a one-party state and to integrate Fascism into all aspects of life. A totalitarian state was officially declared in the Doctrine of Fascism of 1935:

The Fascist conception of the State is all-embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values can exist, much less have value. Thus understood, Fascism is totalitarian, and the Fascist State—a synthesis and a unit inclusive of all values—interprets, develops, and potentiates the whole life of a people.
Doctrine of Fascism, 1935[3]

With the concept of totalitarianism, Mussolini and the Fascist regime set an agenda of improving Italian culture and society based on ancient Rome, personal dictatorship and some futurist aspects of Italian intellectuals and artists.[4] Under Fascism, the definition of the Italian nationality was to rest on a militarist foundation and the Fascist's "new man" ideal, in which loyal Italians would rid themselves of individualism and autonomy and see themselves as a component of the Italian state and be prepared to sacrifice their lives for it.[5] Under such a totalitarian government, only Fascists would be considered "true Italians", and membership and endorsement of the Fascist Party was necessary for people to gain "Complete Citizenship"; those who did not swear allegiance to Fascism would be banished from public life and could not gain employment.[6] The Fascist government also reached out to Italians living overseas to endorse the Fascist cause and identify with Italy rather than their places of residence.[7] Despite efforts to mould a new culture for fascism, Fascist Italy's efforts were not as drastic or successful in comparison to other one-party states like Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in creating a new culture.[8]

Mussolini's propaganda idolized him as the nation's saviour, and the Fascist regime attempted to make him omnipresent in Italian society. Much of Fascism's appeal in Italy was based on Mussolini's popularity and charisma. Mussolini's passionate oratory and the personality cult around him were displayed at huge rallies and parades of his Blackshirts in Rome, which served as an inspiration to Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party in Germany.

The Fascist regime established propaganda in newsreels, radio broadcasting and a few feature films deliberately endorsing Fascism.[9] In 1926, laws were passed to require that propaganda newsreels be shown prior to all feature films in cinemas.[10] These newsreels were more effective in influencing the public than propaganda films or radio, as few Italians had radio receivers at the time. Fascist propaganda was widely present in posters and state-sponsored art. However, artists, writers and publishers were not strictly controlled: they were only censored if they were blatantly against the state. There was a constant emphasis on the masculinity of the "new Italian", stressing aggression, virility, youth, speed and sport.[11] Women were to attend to motherhood and stay out of public affairs.[12]

General elections were held in the form of a referendum on 24 March 1929. By this time, the country was a single-party state with the National Fascist Party as the only legally permitted party. Mussolini used a referendum to confirm a fascist single-party list. The list put forward was ultimately approved by 98.43% of voters.[13] The universal male suffrage, which was legal since 1912, was restricted to men who were members of a trade union or an association, to soldiers and to members of the clergy. Consequently, only 9.5 million people were able to vote.

Roman Catholic Church

[edit]
Roman Catholic procession in Corso Vittorio Emanuele II, Rome, 1931

In 1870, the newly formed Kingdom of Italy annexed the remaining Papal States, depriving the Pope of his temporal power. Relations with the Roman Catholic Church improved significantly during Mussolini's tenure. Despite earlier opposition to the Church, after 1922 Mussolini made an alliance with the Catholic Partito Popolare Italiano (Italian People's Party). In 1929, Mussolini and the papacy came to an agreement that ended the bitter standoff between the Church from the Italian government going back to 1860. The Orlando government had begun the process of reconciliation during World War I and the Pope furthered it by cutting ties with the Christian Democrats in 1922.[14] Mussolini and the leading Fascists were anti-clericals and atheists, but they recognized the advantages of warmer relations with Italy's large Roman Catholic element.[15]

The Lateran Accord of 1929 was a treaty that recognized the Pope as the head of the new city-state of Vatican City within Rome, which gave it independent status and made it an important hub of world diplomacy. The Concordat of 1929 made Roman Catholicism the sole religion of the State[b] (although other religions were tolerated), paid salaries to priests and bishops, recognized religious marriages (previously couples had to have a civil ceremony) and brought religious instruction into the public schools. In turn, the bishops swore allegiance to the Italian Fascist régime, which had a veto power over their selection. A third agreement paid the Vatican 1.75 billion lire (about $100 million) for the seizures of Church property since 1860. The Catholic Church was not officially obliged to support the Fascist régime and the strong differences remained, but the general hostility ended. The Church especially endorsed foreign policies such as support for the Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War and for the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. Friction continued over the Azione Cattolica (Catholic Action) youth network, which Mussolini wanted to merge into his Fascist youth group.[17] In 1931, Pope Pius XI issued the encyclical Non abbiamo bisogno ("We do not need") that denounced the regime's persecution of the Church in Italy and condemned "pagan worship of the state".[18]

Clerical fascism

[edit]
Mussolini and Vatican delegation prior to signing the Lateran Treaty

The 1929 treaties with Mussolini partially recovered the Papacy's spiritual primacy in Italy, making the Pope sovereign in the Vatican City state,[16] and restoring Roman Catholicism as the State religion.[16][19] In March 1929, a nationwide plebiscite was held to publicly endorse the Treaty. Opponents were intimidated by the Fascist régime, the Catholic Action party instructed Catholics to vote for Fascist candidates, and Mussolini claimed that the only "no" votes were of those "few ill-advised anti-clericals who refuse to accept the Lateran Pacts".[20] Nearly 9 million Italians voted (90% of the registered electorate), and only 136,000 voted "no".[21] The Lateran Treaty remains in place today.

In 1938, the Italian Racial Laws and the Manifesto of Race were promulgated by the Fascist régime, designed to outlaw and persecute both Italian Jews[22] and Protestant Christians,[19][23][24] especially Evangelicals and Pentecostals.[23][24]

In January 1939, The Jewish National Monthly reported "the only bright spot in Italy has been the Vatican, where fine humanitarian statements by the Pope have been issuing regularly". When Mussolini's anti-Semitic decrees began depriving Jews of employment in Italy, Pius XI personally admitted professor Vito Volterra, a famous Italian Jewish mathematician, into the Pontifical Academy of Science.[25]

Despite Mussolini's close alliance with Hitler's Germany, Italy did not fully adopt Nazism's genocidal ideology towards the Jews. The Nazis were frustrated by the Italian authorities' refusal to co-operate in the round-ups of Jews, and no Jews were deported prior to the formation of the Italian Social Republic puppet-state following the Armistice of Cassibile.[26] In the Italian-occupied Independent State of Croatia, German envoy Siegfried Kasche advised Berlin that Italian forces had "apparently been influenced" by Vatican opposition to German anti-Semitism.[27] As anti-Axis feeling grew in Italy, the use of Vatican Radio to broadcast papal disapproval of race murder and anti-Semitism angered the Nazis.[28]

Mussolini was overthrown in July 1943, the Germans moved to occupy Italy, and they also commenced a round-up of Jews. Thousands of Italian Jews and a small number of Protestants died in the Nazi concentration camps.[22][24]

Antisemitism

[edit]

Until he formed his alliance with Hitler, Mussolini always denied the existence of antisemitism within the National Fascist Party. In the early 1920s, Mussolini wrote an article which stated that Fascism would never elevate a "Jewish Question" and the article also stated that "Italy knows no antisemitism and we believe that it will never know it" and then, the article elaborated "let us hope that Italian Jews will continue to be sensible enough so as not to give rise to antisemitism in the only country where it has never existed".[29] In 1932, during a conversation with Emil Ludwig, Mussolini described antisemitism as a "German vice" and stated: "There was 'no Jewish Question' in Italy and could not be one in a country with a healthy system of government".[30] On several occasions, Mussolini spoke positively about Jews and the Zionist movement.[31] Mussolini had initially rejected Nazi racism, especially the idea of a master race, as "arrant nonsense, stupid and idiotic".[32]

In 1929, Mussolini acknowledged the contributions which Italian Jews had made to Italian society, despite their minority status, and he also believed that Jewish culture was Mediterranean, aligning his early opinion of Italian Jews with his early Mediterraneanist perspective. He also argued that Jews were natives of Italy, after living on the Italian Peninsula for a long period of time.[33] In the early 1930s, Mussolini held discussions with Zionist leadership figures over proposals to encourage the emigration of Italian Jews to the mandate of Palestine, as Mussolini hoped that the presence of pro-Italian Jews in the region would weaken pro-British sentiment and potentially overturn the British mandate.[34]

On the issue of antisemitism, the Fascists were divided on what to do, especially after the rise of Hitler in Germany. A number of members of the Fascist Party were Jewish and Mussolini affirmed that he was a Zionist,[35] but to appease Hitler, antisemitism within the Fascist Party steadily increased. In 1936, Mussolini made his first written denunciation of Jews by claiming that antisemitism had only arisen because Jews had become too predominant in the positions of power of countries and claimed that Jews were a "ferocious" tribe who sought to "totally banish" Christians from public life.[36] In 1937, Fascist member Paolo Orano criticized the Zionist movement as being part of British foreign policy which designed to secure British hold of the area without respecting the Christian and Islamic presence in Palestine. On the matter of Jewish Italians, Orano said that they "should concern themselves with nothing more than their religion" and not bother boasting of being patriotic Italians.[37]

Nobel laureate physicists Enrico Fermi (left) and Emilio Segrè (right) were among the Italians who emigrated after the Fascist regime implemented anti-semitic legislation.

The major source of friction between Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy was Italy's stance on Jews. In his early years as Fascist leader, Mussolini believed in racial stereotypes of Jews, however, he did not hold firm to any concrete stance on Jews because he changed his personal views and his official stance on them in order to meet the political demands of the various factions of the Fascist movement.[38] Of the 117 original members of the Fasci Italiani di Combattimento founded on 23 March 1919, five were Jewish.[39] Since the movement's early years, there were a small number of prominent openly antisemitic Fascists such as Roberto Farinacci.[40] There were also prominent Fascists who completely rejected antisemitism, such as Italo Balbo, who lived in Ferrara, which had a substantial Jewish community that was widely accepted and suffered few antisemitic incidents.[41] Mussolini initially had no antisemitic statements in his policies.[42] However, in response to his observation of large numbers of Jews amongst the Bolsheviks and claims (that were later confirmed to be true) that the Bolsheviks and Germany (that Italy was fighting in World War I) were politically connected, Mussolini made antisemitic statements involving the Bolshevik-German connection as being "an unholy alliance between Hindenburg and the synagogue".[42] Mussolini came to believe rumors that Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin was of Jewish descent.[42] Mussolini attacked the Jewish banker Giuseppe Toeplitz of Banca Commerciale Italiana by claiming that he was a German agent and traitor of Italy.[43] In an article in Il Popolo d'Italia in June 1919, Mussolini wrote a highly antisemitic analysis on the situation in Europe involving Bolshevism following the October Revolution, the Russian Civil War and war in Hungary involving the Hungarian Soviet Republic.[43] In June 1919, Mussolini wrote on Il Popolo d'Italia:

If Petrograd (Pietrograd) does not yet fall, if [General] Denikin is not moving forward, then this is what the great Jewish bankers of London and New York have decreed. These bankers are bound by ties of blood to those Jews who in Moscow as in Budapest are taking their revenge on the Aryan race that has condemned them to dispersion for so many centuries. In Russia, 80 percent of the managers of the Soviets are Jews, in Budapest 17 out of 22 people's commissars are Jews. Might it not be that bolshevism is the vendetta of Judaism against Christianity?? It is certainly worth pondering. It is entirely possible that bolshevism will drown in the blood of a pogrom of catastrophic proportions. World finance is in the hands of the Jews. Whoever owns the strongboxes of the peoples is in control of their political systems. Behind the puppets (making peace) in Paris, there are the Rothschilds, the Warburgs, the Schiffs, the Guggenheims who are of the same blood who are conquering Petrograd and Budapest. Race does not betray race ... Bolshevism is a defense of the international plutocracy. This is the basic truth of the matter. The international plutocracy dominated and controlled by Jews has a supreme interest in all of Russian life accelerating its process of disintegration to the point of paroxysm. A Russia that is paralyzed, disorganized, starved, will be a place where tomorrow the bourgeoisie, yes the bourgeoisie, o proletarians will celebrate its spectacular feast of plenty.[43]

Mussolini's statement on a Jewish-Bolshevik-plutocratic connection and conspiracy was met with opposition in the Fascist movement, leading Mussolini to respond to this opposition amongst his supporters by abandoning and reversing this stance shortly afterward in 1919.[42] In reversing his stance due to opposition to it, Mussolini no longer expressed his previous assertion that Bolshevism was Jewish, but warned that—due to the large numbers of Jews in the Bolshevik movement—the rise of Bolshevism in Russia would result in a ferocious wave of anti-Semitism in Russia.[42] He then claimed that "anti-Semitism is foreign to the Italian people", but warned Zionists that they should be careful not to stir up antisemitism in "the only country where it has not existed".[42] One of the Jewish financial supporters of the Fascist movement was Toeplitz, whom Mussolini had earlier accused of being a traitor during World War I.[44] Early on there were prominent Jewish Italian Fascists such as Aldo Finzi,[44] who was born of a mixed marriage of a Jewish and Christian Italian and was baptized as a Roman Catholic.[45] Another prominent Jewish Italian Fascist was Ettore Ovazza, who was a vocal Italian nationalist and an opponent of Zionism in Italy.[46] 230 Italian Jews took part in the Fascists' March on Rome in 1922.[39] In 1932, Mussolini made his private attitude about Jews known to the Austrian ambassador when discussing the issue of the antisemitism of Hitler, saying: "I have no love for the Jews, but they have great influence everywhere. It is better to leave them alone. Hitler's anti-Semitism has already brought him more enemies than is necessary".[42]

At the 1934 Montreux Fascist conference which was chaired by the Italian-led Comitati d'Azione per l'Universalità di Roma [it] (CAUR) in an attempt to found a Fascist International, the issue of antisemitism was debated amongst representatives of various fascist parties, some of them were more favorable to it than others were. Two final compromises were adopted, resulting in the official stance of the Fascist International:

[T]he Jewish question cannot be converted into a universal campaign of hatred against the Jews ... Considering that in many places certain groups of Jews are installed in conquered countries, exercising in an open and occult manner an influence injurious to the material and moral interests of the country which harbors them, constituting a sort of state within a state, profiting by all benefits and refusing all duties, considering that they have furnished and are inclined to furnish, elements conducive to international revolution which would be destructive to the idea of patriotism and Christian civilization, the Conference denounces the nefarious action of these elements and is ready to combat them.[47]

Italian Fascism adopted antisemitism in the late 1930s and as a result, Mussolini personally returned to his earlier invocation of antisemitic statements.[48] From 1937 to 1938, during the Spanish Civil War, the Fascist regime circulated antisemitic propaganda which stated that Italy was supporting Spain's Nationalist forces in their fight against a "Jewish International".[48] The Fascist regime's adoption of official antisemitic racial doctrine in 1938 met opposition from Fascist members including Balbo, who regarded antisemitism as having nothing to do with Fascism and staunchly opposed the antisemitic laws.[41]

In 1938, under pressure from Germany, Mussolini ordered the regime to adopt an antisemitic policy, a policy which was extremely unpopular within Italy as well as within the Fascist Party itself. As a result of this policy, the Fascist regime lost its propaganda director, Margherita Sarfatti, who was Jewish and had previously been Mussolini's mistress. A minority of high-ranking Fascists were pleased with the antisemitic policy such as Roberto Farinacci, who claimed that Jews had taken control of key positions in finance, business and schools through intrigue, accused Jews of sympathizing with Ethiopia during Italy's war with it and accused Jews of sympathizing with Republican Spain during the Spanish Civil War.[49] In 1938, Farinacci became the minister in charge of culture and he also adopted racial laws which were designed to prevent racial intermixing, including antisemitic laws. Until the armistice with the Allies in September 1943, the Italian Jewish community was protected from deportation to the German death camps in the east. With the armistice, Hitler took control of the German-occupied territory in the North and he also launched an effort to liquidate the Jewish community which was under his control. Shortly after the entry of Italy into the war, numerous camps were established for the imprisonment of enemy aliens and Italians suspected to be hostile to the regime. In contrast to the brutality of the Nazi-run camps, the Italian camps allowed families to live together and there was a broad program of social welfare and cultural activities.[50]

Antisemitism was unpopular within Italy, and it was also unpopular within the Fascist Party. Once, when a Fascist scholar protested about the treatment of his Jewish friends to Mussolini, Mussolini reportedly stated: "I agree with you entirely. I don't believe a bit in the stupid anti-Semitic theory. I am carrying out my policy entirely for political reasons".[51]

Homophobia

[edit]

Fascist Italy was intensely hostile towards LGBT people and sought their marginalisation and exclusion from Italian society as one of their social and cultural goals. The Fascist Party shared the homophobic views of the Catholic Church that homosexuality was unnatural and contrary to God's plans for humanity, and it proclaimed that same-sex sexual activity, along with other forms of non-procreative sexual activity, were immoral, lustful, selfish, and unpatriotic. Fascist ideology, along with the sexually repressive, homophobic mores of the Catholic Church, permeated the field of psychiatry during Italy's Fascist period.[52] Although no official laws against homosexuality were passed in Fascist Italy, the Fascist regime used pre-existing legislation it interpreted in a manner favourable to its ideology to target homosexuals in a stealthy, low-key manner;[53] it pursued an off-the-record, shadow policy of persecution by aiming to confine them to psychiatric institutions, believing this would cleanse society of what they saw as their corrupting influence.[52]

Education

[edit]
Propaganda poster of Mussolini

The Fascist government endorsed a stringent education policy in Italy aiming at eliminating illiteracy, which was a serious problem in Italy at the time, as well as improving the allegiance of Italians to the state.[54] To reduce drop-outs, the government changed the minimum age of leaving school from twelve to fourteen and strictly enforced attendance.[55] The Fascist government's first minister of education from 1922 to 1924 Giovanni Gentile recommended that education policy should focus on indoctrination of students into Fascism and to educate youth to respect and be obedient to authority.[55] In 1929, education policy took a major step towards being completely taken over by the agenda of indoctrination.[55] In that year, the Fascist government took control of the authorization of all textbooks, all secondary school teachers were required to take an oath of loyalty to Fascism and children began to be taught that they owed the same loyalty to Fascism as they did to God.[55] In 1933, all university teachers were required to be members of the National Fascist Party.[55] From the 1930s to 1940s, Italy's education focused on the history of Italy displaying Italy as a force of civilization during the Roman era, displaying the rebirth of Italian nationalism and the struggle for Italian independence and unity during the Risorgimento.[55] In the late 1930s, the Fascist government copied Nazi Germany's education system on the issue of physical fitness and began an agenda that demanded that Italians become physically healthy.[55]

Intellectual talent in Italy was rewarded and promoted by the Fascist government through the Royal Academy of Italy which was created in 1926 to promote and coordinate Italy's intellectual activity.[56]

Social welfare

[edit]

A major success in social policy in Fascist Italy was the creation of the Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro (OND; National Afterwork Club) in 1925. The OND was the state's largest recreational organizations for adults.[57] The Dopolavoro was so popular that by the 1930s, every town in Italy had a Dopolavoro clubhouse. The club was responsible for establishing and maintaining 11,000 sports grounds, over 6,400 libraries, 800 movie houses, 1,200 theaters and over 2,000 orchestras.[57] Membership was voluntary and nonpolitical. In the 1930s, under the direction of Achille Starace, the OND became primarily recreational, concentrating on sports and other outings. It is estimated that by 1936 the OND had organized 80% of salaried workers.[58] Nearly 40% of the industrial workforce had been recruited into the Dopolavoro by 1939 and the sports activities proved popular with large numbers of workers. The OND had the largest membership of any of the mass Fascist organizations in Italy.[59] The enormous success of the Dopolavoro in Fascist Italy prompted Nazi Germany to create its own version of the club, the Kraft durch Freude (KdF; "Strength Through Joy"), which saw more success than the Dopolavoro.[60]

Another organization, the Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB), was widely popular and provided young people with access to clubs, dances, sports facilities, radios, concerts, plays, circuses and outdoor hikes at little or no cost. It sponsored tournaments and sports festivals.[61]

Between 1928 and 1930, the government introduced pensions, sick pay and paid holidays.[62] In 1933, the government established unemployment benefits.[62] At the end of the 1930s, 13 million Italians were enrolled in the state health insurance scheme and by 1939 social security expenditure accounted for 21% of government spending.[63] In 1935, the 40-hour working week was introduced and workers were expected to spend Saturday afternoons engaged in sporting, paramilitary and political activities.[64][65] This was called sabato fascista ("Fascist Saturday") and was primarily aimed at the young; exceptions were granted in special cases but not for those under 21.[65] According to Tracy H. Koon, this scheme failed as most Italians preferred to spend Saturday as a day of rest.[65]

Police state and military

[edit]
Mussolini in Milan, 1930

For security of the regime, Mussolini advocated complete state authority and created the Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale ("National Security Volunteer Militia") in 1923, which are commonly referred to as "Blackshirts" for the color of their Royal Italian Army, Navy, and Air Force uniforms. Most of the Blackshirts were members from the Fasci di Combattimento. A secret police force called the OVRA was created in 1927. It was led by Arturo Bocchini to crack down on opponents of the regime and Mussolini (there had been several near-miss assassination attempts on Mussolini's life in his early years in power). Although the OVRA were responsible for far fewer deaths than the Schutzstaffel (SS) in Germany or the NKVD of the Soviet Union, they were nevertheless highly effective in terrorizing political opponents. One of their most notorious methods of torture involved physically forcing opponents of Fascism to swallow castor oil, which would cause severe diarrhea and dehydration, leaving the victim in a physically debilitated state that occasionally resulted in death.[66]

To combat Italian organized crime, notably the Cosa Nostra in Sicilia and the 'Ndrangheta in Calabria, the Fascist government gave special powers in 1925 to Cesare Mori, the prefect of Palermo.[67] These powers gave him the ability to prosecute the Mafia, forcing many Mafiosi to flee abroad (many to the United States) or risk being jailed.[68] However, Mori was fired when he began to investigate Mafia links within the Fascist regime and was removed from his position in 1929, when the Fascist regime declared that the threat of the Mafia had been eliminated. Mori's actions weakened the Mafia, but did not destroy them. From 1929 to 1943 the Fascist regime completely abandoned its previously aggressive measures against the Mafia, and the Mafiosi were left relatively undisturbed.[69]

Women

[edit]

The Fascists paid special attention to the role of women, from elite society women to factory workers[70] and peasants.[71] Fascist leaders sought to "rescue" women from experiencing emancipation even as they trumpeted the advent of the "new Italian woman" (nuova italiana).[72] The policies revealed a deep conflict between modernity and traditional patriarchal authority, as Catholic, Fascist and commercial models of conduct competed to shape women's perceptions of their roles and their society at large. The Fascists celebrated violent "virilist" politics and exaggerated its machismo while also taxing celibate men to pay for child welfare programs. Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and the resulting League of Nations sanctions shaped the tasks assigned to women within the Fascist Party. The empire and women's contribution to it became a core theme in Fascist propaganda. Women in the party were mobilized for the imperial cause both as producers and as consumers, giving them new prominence in the nation. The Fascist women's groups expanded their roles to cover such new tasks as running training courses on how to fight waste in housework. Young Italian women were prepared for a role in Italy's "place in the sun" through special courses created to train them for a future as colonial wives.[73]

The government tried to achieve "alimentary sovereignty", or total self-sufficiency with regard to food supplies. Its new policies were highly controversial among a people who paid serious attention to their food. The goal was to reduce imports, support Italian agriculture and encourage an austere diet based on bread, polenta, pasta, fresh produce and wine. Fascist women's groups trained women in "autarkic cookery" to work around items no longer imported. Food prices climbed in the 1930s and dairy and meat consumption was discouraged, while increasing numbers of Italians turned to the black market. The policy demonstrated that Fascists saw food—and people's behavior generally—as strategic resources that could be manipulated regardless of traditions and tastes.[74]

Economy

[edit]
Mussolini in 1932, giving a speech at the Fiat Lingotto factory in Turin

Mussolini and the Fascist Party promised Italians a new economic system known as corporatism (or tripartism), the creation of profession-wide corporations, in which the trade union and employers organisation belonging to the same profession or branch are organized into professional corporations. In 1935, the Doctrine of Fascism was published under Mussolini's name, although it was most likely written by Giovanni Gentile. It described the role of the state in the economy under corporatism. By this time, Fascism had been drawn more towards the support of market forces being dominant over state intervention. A passage from the Doctrine of Fascism read:

The corporate State considers that private enterprise in the sphere of production is the most effective and useful instrument in the interest of the nation. In view of the fact that private organisation of production is a function of national concern, the organiser of the enterprise is responsible to the State for the direction given to production. State intervention in economic production arises only when private initiative is lacking or insufficient, or when the political interests of the State are involved. This intervention may take the form of control, assistance or direct management.[75]

Fascists claimed that this system would be egalitarian and traditional at the same time. The economic policy of corporatism quickly faltered; the left-wing elements of the Fascist manifesto were opposed by industrialists and landowners who supported the party because it pledged to defend Italy from socialism, and corporatist policy became dominated by the industries. Initially, economic legislation mostly favoured the wealthy industrial and agrarian classes by allowing privatization, liberalization of rent laws, tax cuts, and administrative reform; however, economic policy changed drastically following the Matteotti Crisis where Mussolini began pushing for a totalitarian state. In 1926, the Syndical Laws, also known as the Rocco Laws, were passed, organizing the economy into twelve separate employer and employee unions.[76] The unions were largely state-controlled and were mainly used to suppress opposition and reward political loyalty. While the Fascist unions could not protect workers from all economic consequences, they were responsible for the handling of social security benefits, claims for severance pay, and could sometimes negotiate contracts that benefited workers.[77]

After the Great Depression hit the world economy in 1929, the Fascist regime followed other nations in enacting protectionist tariffs and attempted to set direction for the economy. In the 1930s, the government increased wheat production and made Italy self-sufficient for wheat, ending imports of wheat from Canada and the United States.[78] However, the transfer of agricultural land to wheat production reduced the production of vegetables and fruit.[78] Despite improving production for wheat, the situation for peasants themselves did not improve, as 0.5% of the Italian population (usually wealthy) owned 42% of all agricultural land in Italy[79] and income for peasants did not increase while taxes did increase.[79] The Depression caused unemployment to rise from 300,000 to 1 million in 1933.[80] It also caused a 10% drop in real income and a fall in exports. Italy fared better than most western nations during the Depression: its welfare services did reduce the impact of the Depression.[80] Its industrial growth from 1913 to 1938 was even greater than that of Germany for the same time period. Only the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian nations had a higher industrial growth during that period.[80]

Italy's colonial expansion into Ethiopia in 1936 proved to have a negative impact on Italy's economy. The budget of the colony of Italian East Africa in the 1936–1937 fiscal year requested from Italy 19.136 billion lire to be used to create the necessary infrastructure for the colony.[81] Italy's entire revenue that year was only 18.581 billion lire.[82]

Technology and modernization

[edit]

In 1933, Italy made multiple technological achievements. The Fascist government spent large sums of money on technological projects such as the construction of the Italian ocean liner SS Rex, which in 1933 made a transatlantic sea crossing record of four days,[83] funded the development of the Macchi M.C.72 seaplane, which became the world's fastest seaplane in 1933 and retained the title in 1934.[84] In 1933, Fascist government member Italo Balbo, who was also an aviator, made a transatlantic flight in a flying boat to Chicago for the World's Fair known as the Century of Progress.[85]

Colonial and Foreign policy

[edit]
The Italian Empire in 1940

Stephen Lee identifies three major themes in Mussolini's foreign policy. The first was a continuation of the foreign-policy objectives of the preceding Liberal regime. Liberal Italy had allied itself with Germany and Austria and had great ambitions in the Balkans and North Africa. It had been badly defeated in Ethiopia in 1896, when there was a strong demand for seizing that country. Second was a profound disillusionment after the heavy losses of the First World War. In the eyes of many Italians the small territorial gains from Austria-Hungary were not enough to compensate for the war's terrible costs, especially since countries, such as Poland and Yugoslavia, who contributed far less to the allied victory but received much more. Third was Mussolini's promise to restore the pride and glory of the old Roman Empire.[86]

Mussolini promised to revive Italy's status as a Great Power in Europe, carving out a "New Roman Empire". Mussolini promised that Italy would dominate the Mediterranean Sea. In propaganda, the Fascist government used the originally ancient Roman term Mare Nostrum (Latin for "Our Sea") to refer to the Mediterranean Sea. The Fascist regime increased funding and attention to military projects and began plans to create an Italian Empire in Northern and Eastern Africa and reclaim dominance in the Mediterranean Sea and Adriatic Sea. The Fascists launched wars to conquer Dalmazia, Albania and Greece for the Italian Empire.

Africa

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Parade of Libyan colonial troops in Italian Cyrenaica

Throughout the Fascist period Italian colonial attitudes were characterised by a pettiness of attitude that came to be ridiculed internationally, and combined with Italy’s characteristic combination of limp-wristed beggaring of Great Britain and France for purely symbolic colonial concessions like Jubaland or the Aouzou Strip as bribes for good behaviour or ointment for a general sense of national inferiority, alongside a bombastic braggadocio that culminated in violent incursions into borderlands, racial hiérarchisation (after 1938 or so), and nihilistic atrocities inflicted upon indigenous people like the massacre after an assassination attempt on Rodolfo Graziani of Yekatit 12, Italian colonial rule may be cited as easily the least responsible of all the colonial powers, and symbolic of the wider culture of a nationalistic, peculiarly Italian petulant self-inflicted victimhood over having been wronged supposedly by Great Britain and France at the Paris Peace Conference and in not having gathered sufficient colonial “spazio vitale”.

Colonial efforts in Africa began in the 1920s, as civil war plagued Italian North Africa (Africa Settentrionale Italiana, or ASI) and the Arab population there refused to accept Italian colonial government. Mussolini sent Marshal Rodolfo Graziani to lead a punitive pacification campaign against the Arab nationalists. Omar al-Mukhtar led the Arab resistance movement. After a much-disputed truce on 3 January 1928, the Fascist policy in Libya increased in brutality. A barbed wire fence was built from the Mediterranean Sea to the oasis of Jaghbub to sever lines critical to the resistance. Soon afterwards, the colonial administration began the wholesale deportation of the people of the Jebel Akhdar to deny the rebels the support of the local population. The forced migration of more than 100,000 people ended in concentration camps in Suluq and El Agheila where tens of thousands died in squalid conditions. It is estimated that the number of Libyans who died – killed either through combat or starvation and disease – was at least 80,000, including up to half of the Cyrenaican population. After resistance leader Omar Al-Mukhtar was captured on 15 September 1931 and executed in Benghazi, the resistance petered out. Limited resistance to the Italian occupation crystallized around Sheik Idris, the Emir of Cyrenaica.[87]

Depiction of Mussolini in Italian East Africa

Negotiations on expanding the borders of the colony of Libya took place with the British government following similarly derisible concessions from the French Maghreb possessions in 1919 as a compensation for the unsatisfactory gains ofItaly in Europe following the Paris Peace Conference.Similar concessions had already been made by the British Colonial Office with Jubaland, formerly part of British East Africa being attached to Italian Somaliland in 1924. Further negotiations began in 1925 to define the border between Libya and British-held Egypt. These negotiations resulted in Italy gaining previously undefined territory in a chicanery of dubious value.[88] In 1934, once again the Italian government requested more territory for Libya from British-held Sudan. The United Kingdom allowed Italy to gain some territory from Sudan to add to Libya.[88]

In October 1935, Mussolini believed that the time was right for Italy to invade Ethiopia (also known as Abyssinia) to make it a colony. Since December 1934, Mussolini has been preparing for an invasion by sending troops to Italian colonies, when at Wal-Wal, a provocative Italian border fort built well inside internationally recognised Ethiopian borders was challenged by Ethiopian surveyors who were attacked by an Italian force. As a result, the Second Italo-Abyssinian War erupted. Italy invaded Ethiopia from the Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland. Italy committed atrocities against the Ethiopians during the war, including the use of aircraft to drop poison gas on the defending Ethiopian soldiers. The last regular Ethiopian forces were defeated in 1937, completing Italy's petty revenge for its failed colonial conquest of the 1890s. Ethiopia was merged with Eritrea and Somaliland into Africa Orientale Italians (AOI) and King Victor Emmanuel III was soon proclaimed Emperor of Ethiopia. The international consequences for Italy's belligerence resulted in its diplomatic isolation, with only Hitlerian Germany willing to offer a lifeline, the Rome-Berlin Axis that eventually became Italy’s downfall when it bound itself too closely to the Nazis. France and Britain quickly abandoned their trust of Mussolini but failed to take decisive action. Italy's actions were formally condemned by the League of Nations, prompting a Grand Council of Fascism vote to withdraw from the League on 11 December 1937 and Mussolini denounced the League as a mere "tottering temple".[89] However Italian East Africa was poorly defended and quickly overrun by British Commonwealth, Free French and Ethiopian resistance forces in May 1941 during the East African Campaign, restoring Haile Selassie I to the throne.

Racial laws

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Front page of the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera on 11 November 1938: "Le leggi per la difesa della razza approvate dal Consiglio dei ministri" (English: "The laws for the defense of race approved by the Council of Ministers").

Until 1938, Mussolini had denied any antisemitism within Fascist Italy and dismissed the racial policies of Nazi Germany. However, by mid-1938 Hitler's influence over Mussolini had persuaded him to make a specific agenda on race, the Fascist regime moved away from its previous promotion of colonialism based on the spread of Italian culture to a directly race-oriented colonial agenda.

In 1938, Fascist Italy passed the Manifesto of Race which stripped Jews of their Italian citizenship and prohibited them from any professional position. The Racial Laws declared that Italians were of the Aryan race and forbid sexual relations and marriages between Italians and Jews or Africans.[90] The final decision about the Racial Laws was made during the meeting of the Gran Consiglio del Fascismo, which took place on the night between 6 and 7 of October 1938 in Rome, Palazzo Venezia. Not all Italian Fascists supported discrimination: while the pro-German, anti-Jewish Roberto Farinacci and Giovanni Preziosi strongly pushed for them, Italo Balbo strongly opposed the Racial Laws. Balbo, in particular, regarded antisemitism as having nothing to do with fascism and staunchly opposed the antisemitic laws.[91] The Fascist regime declared that it would promote mass Italian settlements in the colonies that would—in the Fascist government's terms—"create in the heart of the African continent a powerful and homogeneous nucleus of whites strong enough to draw those populations within our economic orbit and our Roman and Fascist civilization".[92]

Fascist rule in its Italian colonies differed from region to region. Rule in Italian East Africa (Africa Orientale Italiana, or AOI), a colony including Ethiopia, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, was harsh for the native peoples as Fascist policy sought to destroy native culture. In February 1937, Rodolfo Graziani ordered Italian soldiers to pillage native settlements in Addis Ababa, which resulted in hundreds of Ethiopians being killed and their homes being burned to the ground.[93] After the occupation of Ethiopia, the Fascist government endorsed racial segregation to reduce the number of mixed offspring in Italian colonies, which they claimed would "pollute" the Italian race.[94] Marital and sexual relationships between Italians and Africans in its colonies were made a criminal offense when the Fascist regime implemented decree-law No. 880 19 April 1937 which gave sentences of one to five years imprisonment to Italians caught in such relationships.[94] The law did not give any sentences to native Africans, as the Fascist government claimed that only those Italians were to blame for damaging the prestige of their race.[94] Despite racist language used in some propaganda, the Fascist regime accepted recruitment of native Africans who wanted to join Italy's colonial armed forces and native African colonial recruits were displayed in propaganda.[95][96]

Fascist Italy embraced the "Manifesto of the Racial Scientists" which embraced biological racism and it declared that Italy was a country populated by people of Aryan origin, Jews did not belong to the Italian race and that it was necessary to distinguish between Europeans and Jews, Africans and other non-Europeans.[97] The manifesto encouraged Italians to openly declare themselves as racists, both publicly and politically.[98] Fascist Italy often published material that showed caricatures of Jews and Africans.[99]

In Italian Libya, Mussolini downplayed racist policies as he attempted to earn the trust of Arab leaders there. Individual freedom, inviolability of home and property, right to join the military or civil administrations and the right to freely pursue a career or employment were guaranteed to Libyans by December 1934.[94] In a famous trip to Libya in 1937, a propaganda event was created when on 18 March Mussolini posed with Arab dignitaries who gave him an honorary "Sword of Islam" (that had actually been crafted in Florence), which was to symbolize Mussolini as a protector of the Muslim Arab peoples there.[100] In 1939, laws were passed that allowed Muslims to be permitted to join the National Fascist Party and in particular the Muslim Association of the Lictor (Associazione Musulmana del Littorio) for Islamic Libya and the 1939 reforms allowed the creation of Libyan military units within the Italian Army.[101]

Foreign policy

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Italian forces in Albania

The Fascist regime also engaged in an interventionist foreign policy in Europe. In 1923, Italian soldiers captured the Greek island of Corfu as part of the Fascists' plan to eventually take over Greece. Corfu was later returned to Greece and war between Greece and Italy was avoided. In 1925, Italy forced Albania to become a de facto protectorate which helped Italy's stand against Greek sovereignty. Corfu was important to Italian imperialism and nationalism due to its presence in the former Republic of Venice which left behind significant Italian cultural monuments and influence, though the Greek population there (especially youth) heavily protested the Italian occupation.

Relations with France were mixed: the Fascist regime consistently had the intention to eventually wage war on France to regain Italian-populated areas of France,[102] but with the rise of Hitler the Fascists immediately became more concerned of Austria's independence and the potential threat of Germany to Italy, if it demanded the German-populated areas of Tyrol. Due to concerns of German expansionism, Italy joined the Stresa Front with France and Britain against Germany which existed from 1935 to 1936. This followed a previous treaty with the Soviet Union aimed against Germany: the Italo-Soviet Pact.[103]

The Fascist regime held negative relations with Yugoslavia, as they long wanted the implosion of Yugoslavia in order to territorially expand and increase Italy's power. Italy pursued espionage in Yugoslavia, as Yugoslav authorities on multiple occasions discovered spy rings in the Italian Embassy in Yugoslavia, such as in 1930.[102] In 1929, the Fascist government accepted Croatian extreme nationalist Ante Pavelić as a political exile to Italy from Yugoslavia. The Fascists gave Pavelić financial assistance and a training ground in Italy to develop and train his newly formed fascist militia and terrorist group, the Ustaše. This organization later became the governing force of the Independent State of Croatia, and murdered hundreds of thousands of Serbs, Jews and Roma during World War II.[104]

After Germany annexed Czechoslovakia, Mussolini turned his attention to Albania. On 7 April 1939, Italy invaded the country and after a short campaign, Albania was occupied, turned into a protectorate and its parliament crowned Victor Emmanuel III King of Albania. The historical justification for the annexation of Albania laid in the ancient history of the Roman Empire in which the region of Albania had been an early conquest for the Romans, even before Northern Italy had been taken by Roman forces. However, by the time of annexation little connection to Italy remained amongst Albanians. Albania was very closely tied to Italy even before the Italian invasion. Italy had built up heavy influence over Albania through the Treaties of Tirana, which gave Italy concessions over the Albanian economy and army. The occupation was not appreciated by King Emmanuel III, who feared that it had isolated Italy even further than its war against Ethiopia.[105]

Spain

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Italian troops manning a 10 cm howitzer at Guadalajara, 1937

As the conquest of Ethiopia in the Second Italo-Ethiopian War made the Italian government confident in its military power, Mussolini joined the war to secure Fascist control of the Mediterranean,[106] supporting the Nationalists to a greater extent than Nazi Germany did.[107] The Royal Italian Navy (Italian: Regia Marina) played a substantial role in the Mediterranean blockade, and ultimately Italy supplied machine guns, artillery, aircraft, tankettes, the Aviazione Legionaria, and the Corpo Truppe Volontarie (CTV) to the Nationalist cause.[108] The Italian CTV would, at its peak, supply the Nationalists with 50,000 men.[108] Italian warships took part in breaking the Republican navy's blockade of Nationalist-held Spanish Morocco and took part in naval bombardment of Republican-held Málaga, Valencia, and Barcelona.[109] In addition, the Italian air force made air raids of some note, targeting mainly cities and civilian targets.[110] These Italian commitments were heavily propagandised in Italy proper, and became a point of fascist pride.[110] In total, Italy provided the Nationalists with 660 planes, 150 tanks, 800 artillery pieces, 10,000 machine guns, and 240,747 rifles.[111]

Italian military for war and improve relations with the Roman Catholic Church. It was a success that secured Italy's naval access in and out of the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic Ocean and its ability to pursue its policy of Mare Nostrum without fear of opposition by Spain. The other major foreign contributor to the Spanish Civil War was Germany. This was the first time that Italian and German forces fought together since the Franco-Prussian War in the 1870s. During the 1930s, Italy built many large battleships and other warships to solidify Italy's hold on the Mediterranean Sea.

Germany

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Italy was Nazi Germany's closest ally for most of that regime's existence.

When the Nazi Party attained power in Germany in 1933, Mussolini and the Fascist regime in public showed approval of Hitler's regime, with Mussolini saying: "The victory of Hitler is our victory".[112] The Fascist regime also spoke of creating an alliance with the new regime in Germany.[113] In private, Mussolini and the Italian Fascists showed disapproval of the Nazi government and Mussolini had a disapproving view of Hitler despite ideological similarities. The Fascists distrusted Hitler's Pan-German ideas which they saw as a threat to territories in Italy that previously had been part of the Austrian Empire. Although other Nazis disapproved of Mussolini and Fascist Italy, Hitler had long idolized Mussolini's oratorical and visual persona and adopted much of the symbolism of the Fascists into the Nazi Party, such as the Roman, straight-armed salute, dramatic oratory, the use of uniformed paramilitaries for political violence and the use of mass rallies to demonstrate the power of the movement. In 1922, Hitler tried to ask for Mussolini's guidance on how to organize his own version of the "March on Rome" which would be a "March on Berlin" (which came into being as the failed Beer Hall Putsch in 1923). Mussolini did not respond to Hitler's requests as he did not have much interest in Hitler's movement and regarded Hitler to be somewhat crazy.[114] Mussolini did attempt to read Mein Kampf to find out what Hitler's Nazi movement was, but was immediately disappointed, saying that Mein Kampf was "a boring tome that I have never been able to read" and remarked that Hitler's beliefs were "little more than commonplace clichés".[102] While Mussolini like Hitler believed in the cultural and moral superiority of whites over colored peoples,[94] he opposed Hitler's antisemitism. A number of Fascists were Jewish, including Mussolini's mistress Margherita Sarfatti, who was the director of Fascist art and propaganda, and there was little support amongst Italians for antisemitism. Mussolini also did not evaluate race as being a precursor of superiority, but rather culture.

Hitler and the Nazis continued to try to woo Mussolini to their cause and eventually Mussolini gave financial assistance to the Nazi Party and allowed Nazi paramilitaries to train in Italy in the belief that despite differences, a nationalist government in Germany could be beneficial to Italy.[102] As suspicion of the Germans increased after 1933, Mussolini sought to ensure that Germany would not become the dominant nationalist state in Europe. To do this, Mussolini opposed German efforts to annex Austria after the assassination of fascist Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss in 1934 and promised the Austrians military support if Germany were to interfere. This promise helped save Austria from annexation in 1934.

Adolf Hitler and Mussolini walking in front of saluting military during Hitler's visit to Venice, June 1934

Public appearances and propaganda constantly portrayed the closeness of Mussolini and Hitler and the similarities between Italian Fascism and German Nazism. While both ideologies had significant similarities, the two factions were suspicious of each other and both leaders were in competition for world influence. Hitler and Mussolini first met in June 1934, as the issue of Austrian independence was in crisis. In private after the visit in 1934, Mussolini said that Hitler was just "a silly little monkey".

After Italy became isolated in 1936, the government had little choice but to work with Germany to regain a stable bargaining position in international affairs and reluctantly abandoned its support of Austrian independence from Germany. In September 1937, Mussolini visited Germany in order to build closer ties with his German counterpart.[115] On 28 October 1937, Mussolini declared Italy's support of Germany regaining its colonies lost in World War I, declaring: "A great people such as the German people must regain the place which is due to it, and which it used to have beneath the sun of Africa".[116]

With no significant opposition from Italy, Hitler proceeded with the Anschluss, the annexation of Austria in 1938. Germany later claimed the Sudetenland, a province of Czechoslovakia inhabited mostly by Germans. Mussolini felt he had little choice but to help Germany to avoid isolation. With the annexation of Austria by Germany in 1938, the Fascist regime began to be concerned about the majority ethnic German population in South Tyrol and whether they would want to join a Greater Germany. The Fascists were also concerned about whether Italy should follow Nazi antisemitic policies in order to gain favor from those Nazis who had mixed feelings about Italy as an ally. In 1938, Mussolini pressured fellow Fascist members to support the enacting of antisemitic policies, but this was not well taken as a number of Fascists were Jewish and antisemitism was not an active political concept in Italy. Nevertheless, Mussolini forced through antisemitic legislation even while his own son-in-law and prominent Fascist Count Galeazzo Ciano personally condemned such laws. In turn for enacting the extremely unpopular antisemitic laws, Mussolini and the Fascist government demanded a concession from Hitler and the Nazis. In 1939, the Fascists demanded from Hitler that his government willingly accept the Italian government's plan to have all Germans in South Tyrol either leave Italy or be forced to accept Italianization. Hitler agreed and thus the threat to Italy from the South Tyrol Germans was neutralized.

Alliance with Germany

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Mussolini inspects the troops in 1934.

As war approached in 1939, the Fascist regime stepped up an aggressive press campaign against France claiming that Italian people were suffering in France.[117] This was important to the alliance as both regimes mutually had claims on France, Germany on German-populated Alsace–Lorraine and Italy on Italian-populated Corsica, Nizza and Savoia. In May 1939, a formal alliance was organized. The alliance was known as the Pact of Steel, which obliged Italy to fight alongside Germany if war broke out against Germany. Mussolini felt obliged to sign the pact in spite of his own concerns that Italy could not fight a war in the near future. This obligation grew from his promises to Italians that he would build an empire for them and from his personal desire to not allow Hitler to become the dominant leader in Europe.[118] Mussolini was displeased with Germany's invasion of Poland as he wanted to mediate the crisis, but decided to remain officially silent.[119]

World War II

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Map of Great Italy according to the 1940 fascist project in case Italy had won the World War II (the orange line delimits metropolitan Italy, the green line the borders of the enlarged Italian Empire)
The Italian Empire (red) before World War II. Pink areas were annexed/occupied for various periods between 1940 and 1943 (the Tientsin concession in China is not shown).

Italy's military and logistical resources were stretched by successful pre-WWII military interventions in Spain,[120] Ethiopia, Libya, and Albania and were not ready for a long conflict. Nevertheless, Mussolini went to war to further the imperial ambitions of the Fascist regime, which aspired to restore the Roman Empire in the Mediterranean (the Mare Nostrum).

Italy joined the war as one of the Axis Powers in 1940, entering after it appeared France was likely to lose to Germany. The Italian invasion of France was brief and achieved modest gains only as the French Third Republic surrendered shortly afterward. Italy readied to fight against the British Empire in Africa and the Middle East, known as the "parallel war", while expecting a similar collapse of British forces in the European theatre. The Italians bombed Mandatory Palestine, invaded Egypt and occupied British Somaliland with initial success. The Italian military machine showed weakness during the 1940 Greco-Italian War, a war of aggression Italy launched unprovoked, but where the Italian army found little progress. German intervention during the Battle of Greece would eventually bail the Italians out, and their grander ambitions were partially met by late 1942 with Italian influence extended throughout the Mediterranean. Most of Greece was occupied by Italy; Italians administered the French territories of Corsica and Tunisia following Vichy France's collapse and occupation by German forces; and a puppet regime was installed in Croatia following the German-Italian Invasion of Yugoslavia. Albania, Ljubljana, coastal Dalmatia (for the presence of Dalmatian Italians), and Montenegro had been directly annexed by the Italian state. Italo-German forces had also achieved victories suppressing the partisans in Yugoslavia and had occupied parts of British-held Egypt on their push to El Alamein after their victory at Gazala.

Italian troops fighting in North Africa

However, Italy's conquests were always heavily contested, both by various insurgencies (most prominently the Greek resistance and Yugoslav partisans) and Allied military forces, which waged the Battle of the Mediterranean throughout and beyond Italy's participation. German and Japanese actions in 1941 led to the entry of the Soviet Union and United States, respectively, into the war, thus ruining the Italian plan of forcing Britain to agree to a negotiated peace settlement.[121] Ultimately the Italian Empire collapsed after disastrous defeats in the Eastern European and North African campaigns. In July 1943, following the Allied invasion of Sicily, Mussolini was arrested by orders of King Victor Emmanuel III, and Badoglio became the new prime minister and formed a new government. Badoglio began to dismantle all Fascist organizations throughout Italy and the National Fascist Party was disbanded. Italy's military outside of the Italian peninsula collapsed, its occupied and annexed territories falling under German control. Italy signed the armistice to the Allies on 3 September 1943. And on 29 September, Italy signed the longer version of the armistice at Malta.

Following Italy's surrender to the Allies. The Italian Civil War began. The northern half of the country was occupied by the Germans with the cooperation of Italian fascists and became the Italian Social Republic, a collaborationist puppet state still led by Mussolini that recruited more than 500,000 soldiers for the Axis cause. The south was officially controlled by monarchist forces, which fought for the Allied cause as the Italian Co-belligerent Army (at its height numbering more than 50,000 men), as well as around 350,000[122] Italian resistance movement partisans (mostly former Royal Italian Army soldiers) of disparate political ideologies that operated all over Italy. On 28 April 1945, Mussolini was executed by Italian partisans, two days before Hitler's suicide.

Anti-fascism during Mussolini's rule

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Flag of Arditi del Popolo, an axe cutting a fasces. Arditi del Popolo was a militant anti-fascist group founded in 1921.

In Italy, Mussolini's Fascist regime used the term anti-fascist to describe its opponents. During the 1920s in the Kingdom of Italy, anti-fascists, many of them members and supporters of the Labour movement, fought against the violent Blackshirts and they also fought against the rise of the fascist leader Mussolini. After the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) signed a pacification pact with Mussolini and his Fasces of Combat on 3 August 1921,[123] and trade unions adopted a legalist and pacified strategy, members of the workers' movement who disagreed with this strategy formed Arditi del Popolo.[124]

The Italian General Confederation of Labour (CGL) and the PSI refused to officially recognize the anti-fascist militia and it also maintained a non-violent, legalist strategy, while the Communist Party of Italy (PCd'I) ordered its members to leave the organization. The PCd'I organized some militant groups, but their actions were relatively minor.[125] The Italian anarchist Severino Di Giovanni, who exiled himself to Argentina following the 1922 March on Rome, organized several bombings against the Italian fascist community.[126] The Italian liberal anti-fascist Benedetto Croce wrote his Manifesto of the Anti-Fascist Intellectuals, which was published in 1925.[127] Other notable Italian liberal anti-fascists around that time were Piero Gobetti and Carlo Rosselli.[128]

1931 badge of a member of Concentrazione Antifascista Italiana

Concentrazione Antifascista Italiana (Italian Anti-Fascist Concentration), officially known as Concentrazione d'Azione Antifascista (Anti-Fascist Action Concentration), was an Italian coalition of Anti-Fascist groups which existed from 1927 to 1934. Founded in Nérac, France, by expatriate Italians, the CAI was an alliance of non-communist anti-fascist forces (republican, socialist, nationalist) trying to promote and to coordinate expatriate actions to fight fascism in Italy; they published a propaganda paper entitled La Libertà.[129][130][131]

Flag of Giustizia e Libertà, anti-fascist movement active from 1929 to 1945

Giustizia e Libertà (Justice and Freedom) was an Italian anti-fascist resistance movement, active from 1929 to 1945.[132] The movement was cofounded by Carlo Rosselli,[132] Ferruccio Parri, who later became Prime Minister of Italy, and Sandro Pertini, who became President of Italy, were among the movement's leaders.[133] The movement's members held various political beliefs but shared a belief in active, effective opposition to fascism, compared to the older Italian anti-fascist parties. Giustizia e Libertà also made the international community aware of the realities of fascism in Italy, thanks to the work of Gaetano Salvemini.

Many Italian anti-fascists participated in the Spanish Civil War with the hope of setting an example of armed resistance to Franco's dictatorship against Mussolini's regime; hence their motto: "Today in Spain, tomorrow in Italy".[134]

Between 1920 and 1943, several anti-fascist movements were active among the Slovenes and Croats in the territories annexed to Italy after World War I, known as the Julian March.[135][136] The most influential was the militant insurgent organization TIGR, which carried out numerous sabotages, as well as attacks on representatives of the Fascist Party and the military.[137][138] Most of the underground structure of the organization was discovered and dismantled by the OVRA in 1940 and 1941,[139] and after June 1941 most of its former activists joined the Slovene Partisans.

During World War II, many members of the Italian resistance left their homes and went to live in the mountains, fighting against Italian fascists and German Nazi soldiers during the Italian Civil War. Many cities in Italy, including Turin, Naples and Milan, were freed during anti-fascist uprisings.[140]

Historiography

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Most of the historiographical controversy centers on sharply conflicting interpretations of Fascism and the Mussolini regime.[141] The 1920s writers on the left, following the lead of communist theorist Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), stressed that Fascism was a form of capitalism. The Fascist regime controlled the writing and teaching of history through the Giunta Centrale per gli Studi Storici (Central Council for Historical Studies) and control of access to the archives and sponsored historians and scholars who were favorable toward it such as philosopher Giovanni Gentile and historians Gioacchino Volpe and Francesco Salata.[142] In October 1932, it sponsored a large Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution, featuring its favored modernist art and asserting its own claims to express the spirit of Roman glory.[143]

After the war, most historiography was intensely hostile to Mussolini, emphasizing the theme of Fascism and totalitarianism.[144] An exception was historian Renzo De Felice (1929–1996), whose Mussolini's Biography, four volumes and 6,000 pages long (1965–1997), remains the most exhaustive examination of public and private documents about Italian Fascism and serves as a basic resource for all scholars. De Felice argued that Mussolini was a revolutionary modernizer in domestic issues, but a pragmatist in foreign policy who continued the Realpolitik policies of liberal Italy (1861–1922).[145] In the 1990s, a cultural turn began with studies that examined the issue of popular reception and acceptance of Fascism using the perspectives of "aestheticization of politics" and "sacralisation of politics".[146] By the 21st century, the old "anti-Fascist" postwar consensus was under attack from a group of revisionist scholars who have presented a more favorable and nationalistic assessment of Mussolini's role, both at home and abroad. Controversy rages as there is no consensus among scholars using competing interpretations based on revisionist, anti-Fascist, intentionalist or culturalist models of history.[147]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Fascist Italy encompassed the authoritarian regime that governed the Kingdom of Italy from the National Fascist Party's seizure of power in October 1922 until the deposition of Benito Mussolini in July 1943, marked by the centralization of authority under Mussolini as Duce, the abolition of democratic institutions, and the imposition of a totalitarian state structure prioritizing national unity, militarism, and expansionism. Mussolini, leveraging widespread post-World War I discontent and socialist unrest, orchestrated the March on Rome—a coordinated show of force by paramilitary squadristi—prompting King Victor Emmanuel III to appoint him prime minister without significant violence, after which he systematically dismantled opposition through emergency decrees, the assassination of socialist deputy Giacomo Matteotti in 1924, and the 1925-1926 leggi fascistissime that banned rival parties and curtailed press freedoms. The regime's ideology, as articulated in Mussolini's 1932 Doctrine of Fascism co-authored with Giovanni Gentile, rejected both liberal individualism and Marxist class struggle in favor of a hierarchical, organic state where individual interests subordinated to collective national goals, fostering a cult of personality that portrayed Mussolini as infallible savior. Domestically, Fascist Italy pursued corporatist economic policies, organizing production into state-supervised syndicates representing employers, workers, and the regime to enforce and mitigate strikes, alongside autarkic initiatives like the Battle for Grain campaign to boost agricultural self-sufficiency and reduce imports amid global depression. These efforts achieved modest industrialization and gains, such as and marsh reclamations, but were hampered by inefficiency, , and overemphasis on prestige projects, failing to resolve underlying structural weaknesses like resource scarcity. Social policies emphasized demographic growth through pronatalist incentives, youth indoctrination via organizations like the Balilla, and cultural revival of Roman imperial grandeur, while the 1938 racial laws aligned with excluded Jews from public life, marking a shift toward ideological . A pivotal diplomatic success was the 1929 Lateran Pacts with the , which resolved the by recognizing Vatican City's sovereignty and Catholicism's role in education, securing clerical support for the regime. In foreign affairs, Mussolini's irredentist and imperial ambitions drove conquests including the 1935-1936 invasion of —avenging Adowa defeat through brutal tactics involving chemical weapons—annexation of in 1939, and support for Franco in the , culminating in the 1939 with and Italy's ill-prepared entry into in June 1940. Military overextension exposed profound deficiencies in preparation and logistics, leading to defeats in and , eroding domestic support amid Allied bombings and economic strain. The regime collapsed following the July 1943 and Fascist Grand Council vote against Mussolini, who was arrested; German commandos rescued him, installing the —a nominal in —as a last-ditch fascist holdout until Mussolini's execution by partisans in April 1945. Despite initial stabilization against leftist threats, Fascist Italy's pursuit of grandeur ultimately precipitated national ruin, with over 400,000 military deaths and widespread devastation.

Origins and Rise to Power

Post-World War I Instability and Fascist Foundations

Italy emerged from as a nominal victor but faced acute disillusionment over its territorial rewards under the , signed on June 28, 1919. Despite promises in the 1915 Treaty of London for gains including and the Adriatic islands, Italy received Trentino-Alto Adige, , and but was denied Fiume () and coastal , which went to the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (); this shortfall, decried as vittoria mutilata (mutilated victory) by nationalists like and , exacerbated resentment toward the liberal establishment perceived as weak in international negotiations. The war had exacted over 600,000 Italian military deaths and 1 million wounded, with demobilization flooding the labor market and contributing to spikes amid industrial reconversion from wartime production. Economic pressures intensified post-war instability, as inflation quadrupled living costs from 1914 to 1919, eroding middle-class savings and fueling urban discontent; agricultural wages stagnated while urban workers faced factory layoffs, with the depreciating sharply against the dollar. This crisis manifested in the (Red Biennium) of 1919–1920, a surge of socialist and communist agitation inspired by the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, featuring mass strikes—over 1,663 in 1919 involving 1.5 million workers—and rural land occupations in regions like Puglia and . The peak came in September 1920, when approximately 500,000 workers seized control of around 500 factories in , including and plants, establishing factory councils (consigli di fabbrica) to manage production; these actions reflected the Italian Socialist Party's (PSI) maximalist wing's push for soviet-style revolution, though internal divisions and government concessions ultimately defused the occupations without full-scale insurgency. Politically, the fragmented produced unstable coalitions, with the 1919 elections yielding no majority—the PSI securing 32.3% of votes and 156 seats but boycotting alliances—leaving Francesco Nitti's administration paralyzed against rising violence from both left-wing militants and returning veterans' unrest. The Fascist movement originated as a direct counter to this turmoil, founded by Benito Mussolini on March 23, 1919, in a Milan piazza (Piazza San Sepolcro) where he rallied about 200 supporters, including arditi (elite assault troops) and syndicalists, to form the Fasci Italiani di Combattimento. Mussolini, a former socialist editor of Avanti! expelled from the PSI in November 1914 for endorsing interventionism, shifted to ultranationalism, condemning the "mutilated victory" and Bolshevik threats while blending interventionist veterans' grievances with anti-clericalism and republicanism. The inaugural manifesto demanded universal suffrage for women, an eight-hour workday, land redistribution, and aggressive colonial expansion but rejected class warfare, positioning the Fasci as a pragmatic alternative to liberal impotence and socialist radicalism; initial electoral failure—4,000 votes in Milan—belied its appeal to middle-class fears of proletarian upheaval, laying groundwork for paramilitary organization against leftist dominance in local governments.

Squadrismo and Political Violence

Squadrismo originated in the turbulent , as groups known as squadre d'azione formed under the auspices of the nascent Fascist movement to counter socialist and communist organizing. These squads, often composed of demobilized , ex-servicemen, and local toughs, first coalesced in northern and around late 1919, with widespread organization by spring 1920, amid widespread strikes, factory occupations, and land seizures during the so-called "Red Biennium" of 1919–1920. The violence was framed by participants as a defensive response to perceived Bolshevik threats, including the socialist control of local governments and labor unions that disrupted agricultural production and intimidated property owners. The squads, clad in black shirts reminiscent of Arditi uniforms, employed systematic intimidation tactics including beatings, forced ingestion of castor oil to humiliate victims, arson against socialist headquarters, newspaper offices, and cooperatives, and targeted assassinations of leftist leaders. Primary targets were members of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and its offshoots, trade unionists, and cooperative societies that dominated rural economies in regions like Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, and Lombardy. A pivotal escalation occurred following the PSI's electoral victory in Bologna on November 21, 1920, when fascist squads, with tacit support from conservative elites and landowners, launched reprisals that included the murder of socialist mayor Giulitto Giordani and the purging of socialist officials, setting a pattern for "fascistization" of local institutions. This violence intensified in 1921, with waves of attacks preceding the May national elections, where squads dismantled opposition networks, enabling Fascists to secure 35 parliamentary seats despite comprising a minority. By mid-1921, had expanded into a semi-organized numbering in the tens of thousands, with regional ras (local leaders) like in and in directing operations that blended punitive raids with symbolic rituals evoking wartime camaraderie. Estimates of casualties remain contested, with early fascist accounts claiming around 108 "martyrs" on their side from 1919 to June 1921, though total deaths from squadristi actions likely exceeded several hundred, including events like the December 1922 clashes where up to 24 workers perished. The repetitive, intensifying nature of these assaults—often banal in execution yet terrorizing in accumulation—eroded socialist resilience, as victims faced not only physical harm but social and economic ruin, compelling many to flee or submit. State authorities, including the liberal governments of and , frequently turned a blind eye or provided indirect aid, sharing the Fascists' antipathy toward amid fears of revolution; army and police units occasionally collaborated, as in , where regular forces failed to intervene decisively. This leniency, coupled with backing from industrialists and agrarians who funded squads to protect investments, amplified squadrismo's efficacy in restoring order on right-wing terms. By late 1922, as the approached, the squads had swelled to approximately 200,000 , transitioning from autonomous thugs to proto-state enforcers, though internal rivalries persisted until Mussolini's consolidation subordinated them to party discipline.

March on Rome and Consolidation of Dictatorship

The March on Rome transpired from October 28 to 30, 1922, when roughly 30,000 Blackshirts, organized in four columns, advanced toward the capital from northern and central Italy, coordinated by Benito Mussolini from Milan via telegram. Inclement weather and logistical shortcomings limited effective seizures of infrastructure, with fascists capturing only minor sites like the Ministry of War before halting short of Rome proper. Prime Minister sought to impose on October 28 to mobilize 28,000 regular troops against the disorganized fascists, but refused to endorse the decree, wary of army mutiny akin to recent episodes and preferring to avoid bloodshed that might undermine the monarchy. Facta's cabinet resigned, prompting the King to summon Mussolini, who traveled by royal train and was appointed prime minister on October 30, heading a including fascists, nationalists, and liberals. This bloodless transfer averted military clash, as the fascists lacked capacity for sustained assault, yet capitalized on elite fears of socialist upheaval and governmental paralysis. Mussolini's ensuing consolidation exploited parliamentary majorities. The , promulgated November 18, 1923, allocated two-thirds of seats to any list securing the plurality of votes above 25 percent, ostensibly to foster stable governance amid fragmentation but enabling fascist . In the April 6, 1924, elections, the —fascists allied with conservatives—garnered 374 of 535 seats via squadristi intimidation, ballot stuffing, and press suppression, despite securing about 65 percent of valid votes. Opposition coalesced against these irregularities, epitomized by socialist deputy Giacomo Matteotti's June 10, 1924, parliamentary address decrying fascist violence and fraud, followed by his abduction and murder that day by a fascist under , with remains dissolved in acid. Revelations implicating regime figures, including Mussolini's associate Cesare Rossi, fueled the crisis, prompting the Aventine Secession where anti-fascist deputies boycotted sessions and appealed to the King for intervention. Facing potential deposition, Mussolini delivered a defiant oration to the on January 3, 1925, claiming sole political accountability for squad actions while rejecting personal culpability for Matteotti's death and vowing reprisals against foes, thereby rallying fascist loyalists and cowing moderates. This maneuver survived no-confidence motions, ushering in via successive decrees: opposition parties dissolved by November 1926, press muzzled through July 1925 laws, and non-fascist deputies purged, transforming into a under Mussolini's unchallenged authority.

Ideology and Governance

Core Principles of Fascism

Fascism in Italy conceived the state as a totalitarian entity, absolute and all-encompassing, subordinating all individual and group interests to its ethical and spiritual imperatives. As articulated in Benito Mussolini's "The Doctrine of Fascism," published in 1932, the Fascist state represented a synthesis of national values, interpreting and potentiating the fundamental forces of the nation while rendering individuals and groups relative to its authority. Outside the state, no human or spiritual values held validity, positioning it as the sole arbiter of moral and political life. Central to Fascist ideology was a rejection of liberal individualism and democratic egalitarianism, which were deemed historically exhausted and antithetical to national vitality. Mussolini emphasized anti-liberalism by denying the primacy of individual rights or governance, viewing the liberal state as a passive "night-watchman" incapable of fostering collective purpose. Instead, promoted a hierarchical organic , defining the nation as a historically perpetuating people bound by shared will, duty, and expansionist ambition, transcending class divisions inherited from or . This glorified struggle and conquest as spiritual imperatives, with condemned as enervating and war exalted as a mobilizer of energies to their maximum tension. Fascism's action-oriented ethos derived from its origins in post-World War I violence, manifesting as a rejection of passive ideology in favor of pragmatic authoritarianism. It opposed multi-party pluralism and parliamentary inefficiency, advocating a unified command structure under the state's directive will to achieve national self-realization and imperial renewal. While incorporating elements of syndicalism, Fascism subordinated economic organization to state imperatives, prioritizing autarky and militarized discipline over free-market liberalism or proletarian internationalism. This framework, influenced by philosopher Giovanni Gentile's actualist philosophy, framed Fascism as a total ethical system where liberty existed only within the state's bounds, enforcing conformity to foster a disciplined, expansive Italian nation.

Corporatist State and Economic Organization

The corporatist state in Fascist Italy organized economic activity through state-supervised syndicates and corporations, aiming to harmonize interests of producers, workers, and the nation while subordinating class conflict to collective goals. This system emerged as a response to post-World War I instability, drawing from syndicalist ideas but adapted to fascist , with the state claiming ultimate authority over production and distribution. Foundational steps included the Palazzo Vidoni Pact of October 2, 1925, whereby the (Confindustria) recognized fascist syndicates as the exclusive representatives of workers, in exchange for employers' commitment to negotiate solely with them, effectively marginalizing non-fascist unions. The Rocco Law of November 1926 further entrenched this by banning strikes and lockouts, mandating enrollment in fascist syndicates for legal representation, and establishing the Ministry of Corporations to oversee syndical activities. The Charter of Labor, promulgated on April 21, 1927, codified these principles, declaring labor a social duty coordinated by the state, private initiative in production subject to national interest, and syndicates as state organs for collective contracts. By 1928, the unified National Confederation of Fascist Syndicates was dissolved to prevent worker-employer tensions, replaced by separate vertical syndicates for each economic sector under state control. The National Council of Corporations was created in 1930 as an advisory body, evolving into operational corporations by 1934, when 22 such entities—each representing a branch like , industry, or —were instituted to regulate wages, prices, production quotas, and labor conditions. These corporations included representatives from syndicates, entrepreneurs, and fascist officials, ostensibly mediating disputes but functioning primarily as instruments of policy. In 1939, the Chamber of Deputies was reconstituted as the , symbolizing the system's integration into legislative structures. In practice, corporatism emphasized state direction over market freedom, with nominal preservation of but increasing intervention, particularly after the 1929 crash, through entities like the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (IRI) established in to nationalize failing banks and industries. While ideological rhetoric portrayed it as a revolutionary "" transcending and , empirical assessments reveal limited innovation: corporations wielded advisory rather than executive power, often bypassed by direct ministerial decrees, and primarily served to legitimize regime control, suppress independent labor, and favor industrialists over workers' real gains. Economic outcomes included stabilized without strikes but persistent inefficiencies, wage stagnation, and subordination to autarkic and militaristic priorities, reflecting causal prioritization of political unity over efficient resource allocation.

Mussolini's Role and Totalitarian Aspirations

, founder of the , was appointed on October 30, 1922, following the , a show of force by Fascist that pressured King to invite him to form a government amid fears of civil unrest. In this initial coalition cabinet, Mussolini held dictatorial emergency powers granted by the of 1923, which allocated two-thirds of parliamentary seats to the plurality winner, enabling rigged elections in 1924 that secured Fascist dominance despite opposition violence, including the murder of socialist deputy . On January 3, 1925, in a defiant speech to the assuming full responsibility for Matteotti's , Mussolini openly declared his intent to rule without parliamentary constraints, marking the formal inception of his personal and the suppression of liberal institutions. Mussolini centralized authority by merging the Fascist Party with the state apparatus, adopting the title Il Duce ("The Leader") and fostering a pervasive cult of personality through state-controlled media, rallies, and propaganda that depicted him as an infallible savior embodying the nation's will. This cult, propagated via posters, films, and compulsory youth organizations, aimed to inculcate absolute loyalty and portray Mussolini as the architect of Italy's revival, with slogans like "Mussolini is always right" reinforcing his quasi-divine status. By 1926, exceptional decrees dissolved all opposition parties, censored the press, and established the OVRA secret police under Arturo Bocchini to eliminate dissent, while the 1928 electoral law transformed elections into plebiscites on Fascist lists, solidifying one-party rule. Mussolini's totalitarian aspirations sought a complete reconfiguration of society under Fascist ideology, envisioning a "total state" that penetrated all spheres of life—political, economic, cultural, and spiritual—to forge a new Italian ethos of discipline, hierarchy, and national unity, as articulated in his 1932 co-authored with . He pursued this through corporatist structures subordinating labor and capital to state oversight, mass mobilization via organizations like the Balilla youth groups, and rhetoric of perpetual revolution to mobilize the masses toward imperial goals. However, these ambitions encountered structural limits: the retained nominal , the swore allegiance to the king rather than Mussolini, and the Catholic Church's influence via the 1929 Lateran Pacts preserved autonomous social spheres, preventing the full atomization and terror characteristic of more absolute totalitarian regimes like . Historians such as Renzo De Felice have noted this "totalitarian dynamic" in Mussolini's evolving policies, yet emphasized the regime's pragmatic accommodations that diluted pure total control, relying instead on co-optation and incomplete penetration of .

Domestic Policies

Economic Autarky and Industrial Development

Benito Mussolini's regime prioritized economic autarky to reduce dependence on foreign imports and bolster national security, particularly after the League of Nations sanctions imposed in 1935 following the invasion of Ethiopia. This policy, formalized in the 1936 "Autarky Program," aimed at self-sufficiency through import substitution, protectionist tariffs, and state-directed resource allocation. Agricultural initiatives like the 1925 "Battle for Grain" (Battaglia del Grano) sought to increase domestic wheat production to cut food imports, imposing import duties of 7.50 lire per quintal and offering prizes to high-yield farmers, which raised output from approximately 5.5 million tons in 1925 to over 7.5 million tons by 1933. However, this shift diverted land from more profitable crops like olives and citrus, leading to higher food prices and inefficient use of marginal soils, ultimately failing to achieve full self-sufficiency while straining rural economies. Industrial development accelerated under state intervention, especially after the 1929 global depression exposed vulnerabilities in private banking and . The (IRI), established on January 30, 1933, as a temporary agency to manage insolvent banks' industrial assets, evolved into a permanent state controlling key sectors such as , , and . By 1939, IRI oversaw enterprises producing about 80% of Italy's , 90% of merchant shipping , and significant portions of electrical output, fostering expansion in armaments and synthetic materials under "synthetic " efforts to replace imports like rubber and fuels with domestic alternatives. Economic performance reflected mixed outcomes: real GDP grew at an average annual rate of about 2.5% from 1922 to 1925 and 3.5% from 1935 to 1939, driven by and rearmament, but stagnated in the intervening years amid deflationary policies and restrictions. Industrial production indices rose from 100 in 1928 to 145 by 1938, yet barely increased, declined by around 20% between 1929 and 1939, and autarkic measures like quotas and pacts reduced overall efficiency and productivity growth compared to liberal economies. These policies prioritized military preparedness over consumer welfare, enabling short-term industrial mobilization but contributing to long-term structural rigidities evident by Italy's entry into .

Infrastructure Modernization and Public Works

The Fascist regime initiated a comprehensive program of beginning in the mid-1920s, aimed at modernizing Italy's infrastructure, alleviating unemployment during the , and symbolizing national renewal under Mussolini's leadership. These efforts included , road and railway expansion, and hydroelectric development, often framed as battles against nature and economic backwardness. Expenditures on such projects reached significant scales, with the government allocating resources equivalent to billions of contemporary lire, though financed partly through and corporatist structures. A flagship initiative was the bonifica integrale (integral reclamation) of marshlands, particularly the Pontine Marshes south of , launched under a 1928 law that mandated holistic environmental and agricultural transformation. Work on the Pontine project accelerated from 1928, involving drainage of approximately 80,000 hectares of malarial swampland through canals, pumping stations, and embankments, completed in phases by 1939. This effort resulted in the construction of five new towns—Littoria (founded 1932), (1934), Pontinia (1935), (1937), and (1939)—housing over 20,000 settler families relocated from rural areas to promote agrarian productivity and demographic growth. The project reduced incidence dramatically in the region, from endemic levels to near eradication by the late 1930s, though at high human cost including labor exploitation and incomplete long-term sustainability due to soil salinization. Road infrastructure saw pioneering developments with the introduction of autostrade (motorways), the world's first such system. The -Laghi motorway, Italy's inaugural autostrada, began construction on March 26, 1923, under engineer Piero Puricelli's initiative, with Mussolini endorsing the project on November 23 of that year; it opened in 1924, spanning 86 kilometers to connect to the Alpine lakes. By 1943, the network expanded to about 400 kilometers, including routes like Bergamo-Brescia (1927) and Florence-Sea (1935), emphasizing high-speed travel free of tolls initially to foster and autarkic mobility. These highways facilitated industrial transport and but prioritized northern regions, reflecting uneven national coverage. Railway modernization involved electrification and network extension to support and . From to 1939, the rail system grew by over 2,000 kilometers of new track, with electrification advancing on key lines such as the Rome-Naples route (completed 1927-1928) and northern corridors, increasing electrified mileage from under 1,000 kilometers in to approximately 6,000 by 1940. Initiatives like the introduction of "Littorine" railcars in the 1930s enhanced regional connectivity, while stations such as Florence's (opened 1935) exemplified rationalist architecture aligned with regime aesthetics. improved modestly on upgraded lines due to centralized control, though systemic inefficiencies persisted amid wartime strains. Hydroelectric infrastructure expanded rapidly to underpin and industrialization, with output rising from 3 billion kWh in 1922 to over 15 billion by 1939 through alpine dam constructions. Projects post-1928, such as the Kardaun plant in (operational 1931), harnessed mountainous water resources, often involving forced labor and territorial assertions in annexed areas. These developments powered nascent heavy industries like aluminum and synthetics but were critiqued for environmental disruption and overemphasis on quantity over reliability, contributing to vulnerabilities exposed in .

Social Welfare, Family Promotion, and Demographics

The Fascist regime prioritized social welfare initiatives that emphasized support for mothers, children, and large families as instruments of national strength and demographic expansion. Key institutions included the Opera Nazionale per la Maternità e l'Infanzia (ONMI), founded in 1925, which delivered , postnatal assistance, nutritional aid, and daycare services to low-income families, reaching over 1.5 million beneficiaries by the late through a network of local consultorii and asili. These programs were integrated with corporatist structures, channeling aid through fascist organizations to foster loyalty and ideological conformity, though coverage remained uneven, prioritizing rural and working-class populations aligned with regime goals. Family promotion formed the core of demographic policy, framed as the "Battle for Births" launched by Mussolini in a May 1927 speech, targeting a population increase from 40 million to 60 million by 1950 to enhance military and imperial power. Measures included state-subsidized marriage loans, partially forgiven for each child born—up to full remission after three children—and tax credits scaling with family size, exempting men with six or more children from income taxes. Propaganda glorified motherhood with awards like the Medaglia d'Argento della Madre for women bearing five or more children, while legal reforms in 1926 and 1934 elevated family heads' status in civil law, subordinating individual rights to procreative duties. To penalize non-reproduction, a bachelor tax was enacted in 1926 and expanded thereafter, imposing progressive surcharges on unmarried men over age 25 with incomes above a threshold, effectively raising their fiscal burden by 25% or more to incentivize marriage and fatherhood among the affluent. Abortion was criminalized under 1930 laws with penalties up to life imprisonment, and divorce remained prohibited, reinforcing traditional family units. Demographically, these policies yielded limited success amid urbanization, economic pressures, and cultural shifts toward smaller families. The crude birth rate fell from 31.7 per 1,000 inhabitants in 1921 to 23.6 in 1938, with total fertility rates dropping below replacement levels in northern regions by the mid-1930s, contradicting regime projections of exponential growth. Welfare expansions mitigated some infant mortality—declining from 128 per 1,000 live births in 1922 to 82 by 1939—but failed to reverse the secular fertility decline, as evidenced by persistent low compliance with pronatalist ideals among educated urban women. The campaign ultimately entrenched a state-centric welfare model but highlighted the limits of coercive incentives against underlying socioeconomic drivers of demographic transition.

Education, Youth Indoctrination, and Propaganda

The Fascist regime centralized control over education to foster loyalty to Mussolini and the state, beginning with the 1923 enacted through royal decrees on December 31, 1922, and subsequent measures. Minister of Education , a philosopher aligned with , restructured the system by extending compulsory elementary schooling to five years, prioritizing classical such as Latin and Greek for secondary levels, and curtailing vocational training to cultivate a hierarchical society with an ideologically committed elite. This reform embedded fascist principles in the curriculum, including mandatory instruction in national history revised to exalt Italy's Roman past, the Risorgimento, and Mussolini's as foundational myths, while promoting , , and obedience. Teachers and academics faced direct coercion to enforce this ideology. In 1931, a required all professors—numbering about 1,250—to swear an to the Fascist regime, pledging to "defend its institutions" and inculcate its values in students; only 11 or 12 refused, resulting in their dismissal and blacklisting, which demonstrated near-total compliance among educators. School curricula integrated through state-approved textbooks that portrayed Mussolini as infallible and as Italy's salvation, supplemented by daily rituals like the fascist and songs glorifying the . emphasized paramilitary drills, with schools serving as venues for regime-sponsored events, films, and lectures to instill discipline and anti-communist, nationalist sentiments from primary levels onward. Youth organizations formed the core of indoctrination efforts, aiming to capture children before family or church influences predominated. The (ONB), established in , organized boys aged 8–14 in the Balilla proper and 15–18 in the Avanguardisti, with parallel Piccole Italiane for girls, mandating participation through school integration and providing uniforms, parades, sports, and ideological camps to build fascist virtues like , , and . By the mid-1930s, the ONB claimed millions of members, functioning as a parallel education system that supplanted groups and emphasized over , with activities designed to prepare youth for and regime loyalty. In 1937, the ONB merged into the Gioventù Italiana del Littorio (GIL), extending coverage to ages 6–21 and making enrollment compulsory for secondary students, thereby monopolizing extracurricular formation. Propaganda in education extended to universities, where fascist student groups enforced orthodoxy, disrupted anti-regime lectures, and promoted the cult of Mussolini through mandatory courses on fascist doctrine. While the regime achieved superficial permeation—evidenced by mass youth rallies and oath compliance—deeper ideological conversion varied, with some youth exposed to clandestine anti-fascist influences, though official metrics reported near-universal participation by the 1940s. This system prioritized state over individual agency, reflecting fascism's view of education as a tool for forging a totalitarian national character rather than fostering critical inquiry.

Society and Internal Controls

Relations with the Catholic Church and Clerical Accommodation

Despite Benito Mussolini's regime originating with anti-clerical sentiments rooted in its socialist origins, pragmatic considerations led to a policy of reconciliation with the to consolidate power and counter leftist threats. The 1929 Lateran Pacts, signed on February 11, 1929, between Mussolini's government and the under , resolved the "" stemming from Italy's 1870 annexation of the . These agreements established as a sovereign entity spanning 0.44 square kilometers, with Italy recognizing the Pope's spiritual and temporal authority therein, while the accepted the loss of broader territorial claims. In parallel, the made Roman Catholicism the sole of , mandated in public schools, provided state salaries for , and subordinated to , thereby integrating Church influence into state structures. This accord facilitated clerical accommodation to the , as the Church viewed Mussolini's as a bulwark against and secular liberalism, sharing enemies in atheistic ideologies. Many Italian , representing a population where 97% identified as Catholic, endorsed Fascist initiatives; fascist rallies frequently commenced with Catholic Masses, and priests participated in by urging obedience to as divinely ordained. The state subsidized Church activities, including youth groups under controlled integration, and exempted religious orders from certain fascist oaths, fostering a symbiotic relationship where the gained moral legitimacy and the Church regained institutional privileges lost since unification. Historians note this "" as mutually beneficial, with the Vatican providing tacit support in exchange for protections against perceived radical threats. Tensions arose over Fascist encroachments on Church autonomy, particularly regarding lay organizations. In 1931, Pius XI issued the Non Abbiamo Bisogno, protesting the regime's suppression of and its imposition of totalitarian youth indoctrination that rivaled religious formation, decrying "pagan" and statolatry without outright condemning the Fascist Party. Mussolini responded by easing restrictions, allowing to persist under oversight, which preserved the alliance amid ongoing accommodations. Clerical support persisted, with bishops and priests often preaching regime loyalty, though isolated dissent occurred; overall, the Church's pragmatic endorsement bolstered Fascist stability until wartime reversals.

Policies on Women, Family, and Gender Roles

The Fascist regime under emphasized traditional gender roles, positioning women primarily as mothers and homemakers to bolster national demographics and military potential. This pronatalist agenda viewed the as the foundational unit of the state, with policies designed to maximize birth rates for imperial expansion, targeting a population increase from approximately 40 million to 60 million by the mid-20th century. Mussolini's framed women's reproductive role as a patriotic , declaring in 1927 that "the nation must be conceived as a " and that was essential to Fascist vitality. Central to these efforts was the Battaglia per le Nascite (Battle for Births), launched on December 23, 1927, which implemented incentives such as marriage loans repayable with interest reductions for each child born, tax exemptions scaling with family size (full relief for fathers of seven or more children), and cash bonuses for large families. Mothers were awarded medals for exceptional fertility, including the Medaglia d'Argento della Nazione for ten children and the Medaglia d'Oro for fourteen or more, symbolizing state recognition of demographic contributions. Complementary measures banned abortion and contraception distribution in 1926, reinforced divorce prohibitions from the 1865 Zanardelli Code, and imposed a "bachelor tax" on unmarried men over 25 to discourage celibacy. The Opera Nazionale per la Maternità e l'Infanzia (ONMI), established in 1925, operationalized these policies by providing services, , and child welfare programs to over 1.5 million women annually by the 1930s, while propagating the ideal of women as "prolific mothers" confined to domestic spheres. Education reinforced this: girls' schooling via the Opera Nazionale Ballila emphasized skills like and childcare, preparing them for family roles rather than professional careers, in contrast to boys' training. Employment policies restricted women, with a 1938 decree capping female public sector roles at 10% in fields like and to prioritize male breadwinners and family formation, though wartime needs later increased female labor. Despite initial birth rate upticks—crude rates rose from 27.4 per 1,000 in 1925 to 29.1 in 1930—the campaign ultimately failed to reverse declining , which fell to 14.9 per woman by 1940, undermined by , low wages, and inadequate welfare amid autarky-induced hardships rather than ideological resistance alone. Women's organizations like the Fasci Femminili were subordinated to male oversight by , limiting autonomous advocacy and channeling participation into supportive roles such as nursery assistance. These measures reflected a causal prioritization of demographic quantity for state power, yet empirical outcomes highlighted tensions between rhetoric and socioeconomic realities.

Repression of Dissent and Anti-Fascist Movements

Following Benito Mussolini's appointment as on October 31, 1922, Fascist paramilitary squads, known as , intensified violence against perceived opponents, including socialists, communists, and labor union organizers, through punitive expeditions that destroyed union halls and newspaper offices. This extralegal repression, which predated formal state mechanisms, resulted in hundreds of deaths and injuries in the early , as squads operated with tacit government approval to dismantle left-wing resistance. A pivotal event occurred on June 10, 1924, when socialist deputy was kidnapped and murdered in Rome by a group of Fascist militants, including , in retaliation for Matteotti's parliamentary exposé on during the April 1924 elections. The crisis prompted opposition walkouts from parliament and international condemnation, but on January 3, 1925, Mussolini addressed the , assuming political responsibility for squadristi actions while denying direct involvement, which neutralized liberal opposition and paved the way for . Subsequent "exceptional laws," or leggi fascistissime, enacted between November 1925 and November 1926, formalized repression by dissolving all non-Fascist , banning trade unions independent of state control, and requiring journalists to register with the regime, effectively eliminating organized dissent. Triggered partly by assassination attempts on Mussolini, the November 1926 decrees outlawed opposition associations and authorized the Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State to prosecute political crimes without . The , established in 1927 under police chief Arturo Bocchini as Fascist Italy's and intelligence agency, targeted underground anti-Fascist networks through surveillance, informants, and arbitrary arrests, focusing on preemptive suppression rather than mass executions. Complementing OVRA, the confino system exiled thousands of suspects—primarily communists, socialists, and anarchists—to remote islands or villages without trial, with police records documenting over 10,000 such internal exiles by the 1930s for political offenses. Early anti-Fascist resistance included the , a militant militia formed in June 1921 by war veterans and leftists to counter squadristi violence in cities like and , achieving temporary successes through armed street clashes before fracturing due to communist and socialist party withdrawals by 1922. Later, in exile, emerged in 1929 under and , organizing propaganda, sabotage plots, and assassination attempts from until Rosselli's murder by French fascists in 1937, sustaining low-level opposition into the 1940s. These movements, though fragmented and ultimately crushed by state apparatus, highlighted regime vulnerabilities but elicited harsher controls, including border surveillance and international extraditions.

Treatment of Minorities, Including Racial Laws and Antisemitism

The Fascist regime's treatment of minorities evolved from pressures on ethnic groups in annexed territories to explicit after 1938, particularly targeting , though early policies emphasized over biological . In border regions acquired post-World War I, such as Venezia Giulia and , and Croats faced forced starting in the 1920s: Slovenian-language schools were closed by 1927, place names were Italianized, and cultural organizations suppressed, with fascist squads perpetrating against non-Italians, including attacks on Slovenian institutions in as early as 1920. An estimated 10,000 emigrated or were displaced by these measures, while resistance led to arrests and executions. Albanian minorities in occupied after 1941 experienced similar assimilation but with some elite co-optation, though broader suppression included cultural bans. In African colonies, manifested through segregation and : following the 1935–1936 Ethiopian conquest, chemical weapons were used against civilians, killing thousands, and 1937 decrees banned interracial marriages and cohabitation in and to preserve "racial prestige." Antisemitism was not a foundational element of ; prior to the mid-1930s, —numbering around 47,000 and highly assimilated—faced minimal , with many serving in the , including as officers in the Ethiopian campaign where over 3,000 Jewish soldiers fought. Mussolini publicly rejected biological in the 1920s, stating in 1932 that held no place in , and Jewish integration continued, evidenced by figures like economist Umberto Terracini initially supporting the movement. This shifted with the 1936 Axis alignment, culminating in the July 14, 1938, "," published in Il Giornale d'Italia, which proclaimed as a distinct and justified on pseudoscientific grounds. The ensuing Racial Laws, decreed on November 17, 1938, excluded from public employment, the military, education, and professions; barred intermarriage; and defined by religious criteria rather than ancestry, affecting about 10% of Italy's who held state positions. Approximately 5,000–6,000 emigrated by 1939, while assets were confiscated under 1939–1940 decrees, with the regime seizing properties valued at millions of lire. Enforcement was inconsistent, with some local officials mitigating impacts, but universities dismissed over 100 Jewish professors, and children were expelled from schools. Unlike Nazi policies, mass extermination was absent until German occupation; instead, from 1940, around 2,000 foreign and 4,000 Italian were interned in over 40 camps like Ferramonti, where conditions were harsh but mortality low compared to Nazi camps, with total internment peaking at 6,000–7,000 by 1943. Italian authorities in occupied zones, such as and , often protected from until September 1943, saving tens of thousands despite Axis pressure. Post-armistice under the Republic, collaboration led to 7,482 deportations to Auschwitz, with 80% perishing, though this reflected German dominance rather than indigenous policy.

Military and Security

Armed Forces Expansion and Modernization

Mussolini's Fascist pursued aggressive military expansion to revive Italy's imperial status, reallocating resources toward defense despite economic constraints. Following demobilization, which reduced forces to peacetime levels of around 200,000-300,000 for the , the regime reorganized the starting in the mid-1920s. A key reform shifted divisions from ternary (three regiments) to binary structure (two regiments) between and , effectively doubling the number of divisions from 17 to approximately 34 by 1938 without proportional manpower increases, aiming for greater flexibility and cost efficiency. By 1939-1940, the could mobilize roughly 3 million personnel for operations, reflecting expanded and reserve training. Modernization efforts yielded mixed results, hampered by industrial limitations and prioritization of quantity over quality. The army retained significant World War I-era equipment, including rifles and , with tank production limited to about 800 light models like the CV-33 by , insufficient for mechanized warfare doctrines emerging elsewhere. and anti-tank capabilities remained outdated, as domestic industry struggled with raw material shortages under policies. Mussolini's direct oversight often prioritized political loyalty over technical expertise, exacerbating inefficiencies in and . The , formalized as an independent service on March 28, 1923, exemplified propaganda-driven growth, expanding from roughly 100 aircraft in 1922 to about 2,600 by the mid-1930s and 3,000 operational planes by June 1940. Investments focused on fighters (e.g., /42) and bombers, with notable achievements like long-distance formation flights to showcase capability. However, engine development stalled, relying on underpowered radial designs, and production failed to achieve parity with advanced peers due to metallurgical weaknesses and dispersed . Naval expansion under the emphasized Mediterranean dominance, adhering to Washington and Naval Treaties until the 1930s. The fleet grew through construction of 20+ modern cruisers and numerous destroyers/torpedo boats in the interwar years, modernizing older battleships like the Conte di Cavour class and initiating four Littorio-class battleships from 1937, positioning with the world's fourth-largest navy by displacement in 1939 (around 400,000 tons). force reached 116 units, though classes were varied and not optimized for wolfpack tactics. Constraints included fuel scarcity, absence of fleet carriers (only seaplane tenders), and delayed adoption of , limiting blue-water projection. Despite numerical gains—fueled by rising military expenditures reaching significant GDP shares by the late —the forces suffered from systemic flaws: overextension across colonial commitments, in officer corps, and Mussolini's unrealistic timelines for parity with major powers. These factors, rooted in Italy's underdeveloped and resource dependencies, precluded genuine modernization, as evidenced by poor performance in early engagements.

Police State Mechanisms and Internal Security

The Fascist regime established a comprehensive apparatus for internal security following the assassination of on June 10, 1924, which prompted Mussolini's January 3, 1925, speech assuming full responsibility for squadrista violence and initiating systematic repression. The leggi fascistissime of November 1926 dissolved all opposition parties, abolished and , and centralized police powers under the Ministry of the Interior, led by Arturo Bocchini from 1926 to 1940. This reorganization transformed the regular police into an instrument of political control, emphasizing over overt force, with mandatory identity cards introduced to monitor movement, employment, and public services. Central to this system was the (Organizzazione per la Vigilanza e la Repressione dell'Antifascismo), Mussolini's secret political police, covertly formed in 1926–1927 under Bocchini to detect and eliminate anti-Fascist activities through networks of informants embedded in workplaces, universities, and communities. Unlike the earlier squadristi violence, OVRA operated with discretion, relying on denunciations and wiretaps to preempt dissent, resulting in thousands of arrests and pre-trial detentions; for instance, between 1926 and 1928, the Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State, established November 1926, prosecuted over 5,000 cases, issuing hundreds of convictions often based on OVRA intelligence. Parallel to OVRA, the MVSN (Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale), formalized February 1, 1923, as the paramilitary, served as a party-loyal force for maintaining order, suppressing strikes, and intimidating opponents, numbering up to 200,000 by the mid-1920s and operating outside regular military chains. Administrative measures like confino, or internal exile, provided a non-judicial tool for repression, allowing prefects to banish suspects to remote islands (e.g., Lipari, Ustica) or southern villages without trial under 1926 public safety laws, affecting an estimated 10,000–15,000 individuals over the regime's duration, primarily socialists, communists, and intellectuals. Conditions in confino involved surveillance, restricted movement, and forced labor, yet mortality was low compared to Nazi camps, reflecting the regime's preference for containment over mass extermination to project stability. By the late 1930s, as war approached, repression intensified with expanded OVRA operations and MVSN mobilizations, though inefficiencies—such as Bocchini's personal oversight and informant unreliability—limited total efficacy, allowing underground networks to persist until 1943. This blend of secret surveillance, paramilitary intimidation, and administrative exile ensured regime longevity through pervasive control rather than constant terror, distinguishing it from more brutal totalitarian models.

Colonial Administration and Atrocities in Africa

![Parade of Fascist Italy in Cyrenaica (1932](./assets/Parade_of_Fascist_Italy_in_Cyrenaica_(1932) Fascist Italy's colonial holdings in encompassed , , and , acquired prior to Mussolini's rise but subjected to intensified exploitation and settlement policies under the regime. The 1935–1936 invasion and conquest of expanded these into (), administered from 1936 to 1941 as a unified territory under a , initially and later Prince Luigi Amedeo, Duke of Aosta. Colonial governance emphasized demographic colonization, infrastructure development for Italian settlers, and resource extraction, with forced labor systems imposed on indigenous populations to support fascist goals. In , a 1938 plan aimed to settle 500,000 Italians by dividing land into concessions, though actual immigration reached about 110,000 by 1940. and functioned primarily as military bases and supply hubs, with policies promoting Italian settlement and while restricting native land ownership. Suppression of resistance in Libya involved severe measures, particularly in against Senussi-led revolts. From 1930 to 1933, under Governor-General , Italian forces deported an estimated 10,000 nomadic families—around 80,000 people—to sixteen concentration camps in coastal marshlands like Soluch and Agedabia, where inadequate food, water, and shelter caused mass deaths from , , and exposure; mortality rates exceeded 50% in some camps, contributing to overall Cyrenaican losses of 40,000 to 70,000 during the pacification campaign. Villages were systematically destroyed, livestock confiscated, and wells poisoned to prevent return, as part of a broader strategy that reduced the population by up to 60%. These operations, documented in Italian military archives, reflected fascist doctrine's emphasis on total control over "rebellious" territories. The Ethiopian campaign featured extensive use of prohibited chemical agents, with Italian aircraft dropping 300 to 500 tons of , , and between October 1935 and April 1936, targeting troop concentrations, retreats, and civilian areas in battles such as those at Tembien, (February–March 1936), and Maychew (March 1936). This deployment, confirmed by declassified Italian and eyewitness accounts, inflicted severe burns and respiratory damage, exacerbating Ethiopian casualties estimated at 200,000 from combat and related effects. Post-conquest administration maintained repressive tactics; following an assassination attempt on Graziani in on February 19, 1937, reprisals under his orders executed 19,000 to 30,000 Ethiopians over three days, including clergy, intellectuals, and civilians, with systematic village burnings and further gas attacks on guerrillas. Graziani's directives explicitly authorized punitive expeditions, , and mass executions to eradicate resistance, aligning with Mussolini's vision of a pacified empire. In and , colonial policies under involved of askari troops for Ethiopian operations and forced labor for roads and ports, but documented atrocities were fewer compared to and , though exploitation contributed to demographic declines and uprisings suppressed by summary executions. The overall fascist approach prioritized Italian demographic dominance and economic self-sufficiency, often at the cost of indigenous lives and , with administrative structures reinforcing racial hierarchies through segregated settlements and legal codes barring native .

Foreign Policy and Expansion

Early Diplomatic Maneuvers and Mediterranean Ambitions

Upon assuming power in October 1922, articulated foreign policy objectives centered on revising the post-World War I settlement to rectify perceived injustices against Italy, particularly in the Adriatic and , while pursuing dominance in the Mediterranean basin conceptualized as . This vision drew on imperial Roman precedents, aiming to secure sea lanes for trade and military projection, consolidate control over , and expand influence into the and against French and British interests. Early maneuvers blended opportunism with restraint, as Mussolini navigated constraints and rivalries to test Italian resolve without provoking outright isolation. The crisis of 1923 exemplified Mussolini's aggressive brinkmanship in the eastern Mediterranean. On August 27, Italian delegates, including General Enrico Tellini, were murdered near the Greek-Albanian border during boundary demarcation; Mussolini attributed responsibility to , issuing an on August 29 for reparations, arrests, and military honors. Italian forces bombarded on , killing at least 16 civilians and occupying the island with 5,000-10,000 troops, while blockading Greek waters. Under pressure from Britain and via the , Italy withdrew on October 27 after paid 50 million lire in , framed domestically as a fascist triumph despite exposing military limitations against naval powers. This episode asserted Italian claims over Albanian stability and Adriatic approaches, signaling intolerance for border encroachments. In the Adriatic sphere, Mussolini pressured to cede Fiume (), occupied by Italian nationalists since 1919. The January 1924 Rome Accords formalized Italian sovereignty over the city, which had been designated a free state under the 1920 Treaty of Rapallo, in exchange for recognizing Yugoslav borders and non-aggression pacts. Irredentist aspirations lingered for Dalmatian territories, but pragmatic diplomacy averted escalation, allowing focus on economic penetration via loans and infrastructure. Concurrently, Mussolini cultivated as a to buffer against Yugoslav expansion and secure strategic ports. The 1926 Pact of established a defensive alliance, with Italy providing 20,000 lire annually in subsidies, military advisors, and infrastructure loans totaling 100 million lire by 1930, fostering economic dependency while stationing troops under bilateral accords. Broader Mediterranean maneuvers included naval buildup and colonial consolidation in , where 20,000 troops suppressed Senussi revolts by , enabling settlement of 20,000 colonists. Mussolini eyed French Tunisia and for irredentist claims but prioritized conciliation, joining the as a guarantor of western borders and signing the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war, actions that masked expansionist intent while building prestige. These steps positioned as a Mediterranean arbiter, leveraging Mare Nostrum rhetoric to justify interventions, though constrained by economic weakness—defense spending hovered at 10-12% of budget—and great power deterrence until the mid-1930s.

Ethiopian War and League of Nations Confrontation

Benito Mussolini initiated the Second Italo-Ethiopian War to expand Italian influence in East Africa, motivated by desires to revive imperial prestige, secure resources, and bolster domestic support amid economic stagnation. The immediate pretext stemmed from the Walwal incident on December 5, 1934, a border clash at the disputed oasis between Ethiopian troops and an Italian-Somali garrison, killing roughly 107 Ethiopians and 50 Italians and allies. Diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute failed, as Italy rejected arbitration proposals and mobilized forces along the frontiers. On October 3, , Italian troops under Marshal launched a coordinated invasion from and , deploying approximately 200,000 soldiers equipped with modern , tanks, and against Ethiopia's larger but outdated forces numbering around 800,000. Initial advances captured by October 6, avenging Italy's 1896 defeat, though progress slowed due to Ethiopian guerrilla tactics and terrain. To break stalemates, Italian command under resorted to , deploying 300–500 tons of via aerial bombardment from late through early , targeting both combatants and non-combatants, which inflicted severe casualties and demoralized resistance. The decisive on March 31, 1936, saw Italian forces overwhelm Emperor Haile Selassie's main army through combined arms assaults and gas attacks, nullifying organized Ethiopian opposition. fell on May 5, prompting Mussolini to proclaim the on May 9, with as emperor. The League of Nations confronted 's aggression by declaring it the aggressor on , 1935, following Ethiopian appeals, and enacting sanctions from , 1935, that banned arms exports, financial loans, and select raw materials to and its colonies. These measures excluded oil, coal, and steel—key to 's —due to British and French reluctance to risk broader conflict, reflecting priorities over enforcement. Sanctions inflicted minimal economic harm, as sourced alternatives and leveraged propaganda to frame the war as a national triumph, while the League's inaction eroded its credibility in upholding . formally withdrew from the League on December 11, 1937, citing its politicized futility. The episode exposed systemic weaknesses in international institutions, emboldening fascist absent robust opposition.

Alignment with Germany and Axis Formation

Following the Italian invasion of Ethiopia on October 3, 1935, under provided diplomatic backing to Benito Mussolini's regime, refusing to impose sanctions and recognizing Italy's conquest, which contrasted with and Britain's condemnation and marked an early thaw in Italo-German relations strained by Germany's earlier opposition to Italian ambitions in . This support intensified through coordinated interventions in the starting in July 1936, where both nations supplied Franco's Nationalists with troops, aircraft, and materiel—Italy committing over 50,000 soldiers via the and deploying the —fostering military collaboration and ideological alignment against and Western democracies. On October 25, 1936, Italian Foreign Minister and German counterpart signed a secret nine-point protocol in , establishing a political and economic understanding that Mussolini publicly proclaimed as the "Rome-Berlin Axis" in a Milan speech on November 1, 1936, envisioning a line of common policy from to to counter British and French influence in the Mediterranean and regions. This informal axis evolved in November 1937 when Italy acceded to the on November 6, allying with and against Soviet expansionism, with Mussolini viewing it as a bulwark for fascist interests in the and . Italy's acquiescence to Germany's with on March 12, 1938—despite Mussolini's prior 1934 guarantees to Austrian independence—signaled further deference, as prioritized alliance benefits over regional influence, enabling Hitler to focus eastward without a southern front. Tensions arose in 1938-1939 over Germany's absorption of and Mussolini's occupation of on April 7, 1939, which prompted negotiations for a formal pact amid fears of imminent war. The culmination came with the , signed on May 22, 1939, in by Ciano and , committing and to immediate military assistance if either faced war with a third power, superseding the looser 1936 axis with binding obligations for joint aggression or defense, though secret protocols acknowledged Italy's unreadiness for conflict before 1943. Mussolini endorsed the pact to secure German protection for Mediterranean expansion, but privately expressed reservations about Hitler's aggressive timeline, as evidenced by his later June 1939 letter to Hitler stipulating Italy's military limitations. This formalized the core of the , paving the way for Italy's entry into on June 10, 1940, despite inadequate preparations.

Intervention in Spanish Civil War

Benito Mussolini decided to intervene in the Spanish Civil War on behalf of the Nationalist forces led by General Francisco Franco shortly after the military uprising began on July 17, 1936, driven by anti-communist ideology, the aim to export fascism, and strategic goals to secure Italian influence in the western Mediterranean against potential French or British dominance. Initial assistance consisted of secret shipments of arms, ammunition, and aircraft; the first Savoia-Marchetti SM.81 bombers arrived in Nationalist-held Spanish Morocco on August 1, 1936, followed by submarine support that disrupted Republican shipping. By late August, Mussolini authorized the formation of the Aviazione Legionaria, an air expeditionary unit that eventually committed 763 aircraft and nearly 6,000 personnel, providing critical close air support and bombing operations throughout the conflict. In November 1936, ground forces arrived with the establishment of the (CTV), an expeditionary corps nominally composed of volunteers but including regular army units, Blackshirt militia, and engineers, initially commanded by General and later by General . The CTV peaked at over 50,000 troops organized into four divisions—Littorio, Black Flames, 23 March, and 3 January—supported by , light tanks such as the CV-33, and motorized units, with a total of approximately 78,500 Italians rotating through service in by the war's end in March 1939. Italian naval forces, including cruisers and destroyers, conducted blockades and protections, while overall materiel aid encompassed 3,227 pieces, 157 tankettes, and thousands of machine guns and vehicles. The CTV participated in major operations, including the failed assault on in late 1936 and the successful northern campaign against Republican-held and Santander in 1937. A pivotal engagement occurred at the from March 8 to 23, 1937, where the Italian Littorio Division and other CTV units, advancing alongside Nationalist troops, were routed by Republican forces bolstered by the , suffering around 400 killed, 1,500 wounded, and significant captures of equipment due to poor coordination, inadequate reconnaissance, and exposure to counterattacks. This defeat damaged Italian military prestige and prompted Mussolini to reorganize the CTV, reducing its autonomy and integrating it more closely with Franco's command, though subsequent contributions aided Nationalist advances in and . Italian involvement incurred 3,819 fatalities and approximately 12,000 wounded among the expeditionary forces, with total costs straining Italy's economy amid concurrent preparations for expansion in . Despite public withdrawal announcements in 1937 under the Non-Intervention Agreement, aid continued covertly until Franco's victory on March 28, 1939, after which the CTV was fully repatriated by June 1939, leaving behind captured equipment as gifts to the new regime. The intervention tested Italian weaponry and tactics under combat conditions, exposed operational weaknesses such as logistical shortcomings and officer incompetence, and fostered closer ties with through parallel support for Franco, culminating in the Rome-Berlin Axis of November 1936 and later the .

World War II Participation

Entry into War and Initial Operations

On June 10, 1940, announced Italy's entry into by declaring war on and the from the balcony of in . This decision followed Germany's rapid advances in the , with Mussolini aiming to secure territorial gains and align with the apparent victor without prior consultation with military leaders who deemed the armed forces unready. Despite warnings from his chiefs of staff about inadequate preparation, including obsolete equipment, insufficient modernization, and limited stockpiles of fuel and munitions, Mussolini proceeded, driven by ideological commitment to the 1939 and ambitions for Mediterranean dominance. Hostilities commenced at midnight on June 11, initiating the , known as the Battle of the Alps. Italian forces, numbering approximately 300,000 troops across 22 divisions concentrated on the Alpine front, conducted limited probes and skirmishes through mid-June amid challenging mountainous terrain that favored defenders. A general offensive launched on June 21, after sought an with , involved assaults toward and the Little Saint Bernard Pass but yielded minimal advances, with Italian troops gaining only a few kilometers against stout from fortified positions held by about 35,000 defenders under General René Olry. The campaign concluded with the signed on June 24, 1940, granting Italy control over modest border territories including , , and parts of the , though these concessions were largely symbolic given the stalled offensive. Italian casualties totaled around 6,000, including over 1,000 dead, compared to French losses of about 250, highlighting the offensive's ineffectiveness due to logistical shortcomings, poor coordination, and troops unaccustomed to high-altitude combat. Initial naval operations in the Mediterranean ensued, with the engaging British forces in skirmishes, but the army's Alpine performance underscored broader deficiencies that would plague subsequent efforts.

North African and Balkan Campaigns

Following Italy's entry into on June 10, 1940, its North African operations began with an offensive launched on September 13, 1940, when Marshal Rodolfo Graziani's 10th Army, comprising about 200,000 troops, advanced from into , reaching after covering roughly 95 kilometers in three days before halting due to extended supply lines and logistical constraints. The stalled advance exposed vulnerabilities in Italian armor and infantry coordination, with forces relying on outdated equipment and inadequate desert mobility. British and troops, outnumbered but better supplied, initiated on December 9, 1940, encircling Italian positions at and inflicting heavy casualties, capturing over 38,000 prisoners in the initial phase. The British offensive continued into January 1941, capturing on January 5 with 40,000 Italian prisoners and on January 22, pushing Axis forces back nearly 800 kilometers to El Agheila by mid-February, during which Italians suffered approximately 130,000 prisoners, 380 tanks destroyed or captured, and 1,300 guns lost, highlighting systemic issues in Italian command structure, troop morale, and industrial underpreparation for sustained mechanized warfare. In response, Mussolini appealed to for support; Erwin Rommel's arrived on February 12, 1941, launching a counteroffensive that recaptured much lost territory, though Italian units remained subordinate and continued to underperform in operations due to inferior training and equipment standardization. Concurrently, Italian ambitions extended to the Balkans, where on October 28, 1940, Mussolini ordered an invasion of Greece from Italian-occupied Albania, deploying around 140,000 troops under General Sebastiano Visconti Prasca against a Greek force that quickly mobilized over 100,000 defenders, aiming to secure the Ionian Sea and preempt German influence in the region. Initial Italian advances captured parts of Epirus by early November, but harsh terrain, inadequate winter preparations, and overextended supply lines—exacerbated by mules replacing mechanized transport—halted progress, enabling Greek forces to launch a counteroffensive on November 14 that recaptured lost ground and pushed into Albania, inflicting 12,000 Italian casualties in the first month alone. By December 1940, Greek advances controlled up to Mount Tomorr, stalemating Italian reinforcements that swelled to 500,000 troops amid poor coordination and leadership failures, including Visconti Prasca's dismissal after initial setbacks; an in March 1941 under gained minor ground but failed to break Greek lines fortified by mountainous defenses and determined resistance. Mussolini's request for Axis aid prompted Hitler's Operation Marita, with German forces invading on April 6, 1941—following a pro-Allied coup on —and simultaneously, overrunning both in weeks despite Italian participation in Yugoslavia's occupation, where Italian troops occupied and but contributed little to the decisive German breakthroughs. The Balkan diversions delayed German plans for by up to six weeks, though Italian operational deficiencies stemmed from chronic underinvestment in military modernization, politicized command appointments, and a doctrine ill-suited to offensive warfare against prepared foes.

Home Front Strain and Military Collapse

The Italian military's entry into World War II on June 10, 1940, quickly exposed profound weaknesses, with initial offensives in North Africa stalling against British forces by September 1940, necessitating German intervention via the Afrika Korps in February 1941. The invasion of Greece on October 28, 1940, from Albania further strained resources, as Italian troops bogged down in mountainous terrain, suffering over 100,000 casualties and requiring a German bailout in April 1941 that delayed Operation Barbarossa. Commitments in the Balkans tied down up to 20 Italian divisions through 1943, diverting troops from critical fronts and fostering resentment among officers over Mussolini's overextension. On the Eastern Front, the Italian Eighth Army, deployed in late 1941, endured catastrophic losses at the Don River in December 1942–January 1943, with approximately 85,000 of 235,000 troops killed, wounded, or captured during the Soviet counteroffensive. These reversals compounded home front pressures, where food shortages, originating from the 1935 Ethiopian campaign, intensified under wartime ; by 1941, urban dwellers received just 200 grams of daily, with meat rations often below 100 grams weekly, driving reliance on black markets where prices exceeded official levels by tenfold. Per capita GDP and consumption plummeted during 1939–1945, correlating with rising from , while fats and oils remained critically scarce, forcing substitutions like chestnut flour in baking. Allied bombings, commencing hours after Italy's war declaration and escalating in late 1942 against industrial centers like , , and , inflicted thousands of civilian casualties and disrupted infrastructure, eroding public morale as inadequate air defenses and shelters highlighted regime incompetence. soared, labor swelled factories with underfed workers, and urban populations faced acute scarcity of staples like and , exacerbating class tensions in the industrial north. By early 1943, military defeats—culminating in the (October–November 1942), where four Italian divisions were annihilated, and the Axis surrender in on May 13, 1943, yielding 250,000 prisoners—intersected with domestic unrest. Worker strikes erupted in on March 5, 1943, involving over 200,000 participants demanding higher wages amid hyperinflation, spreading to and despite fascist repression, signaling the regime's loss of proletarian support. Desertions surged in the armed forces, with morale collapsing under repeated humiliations and logistical failures, such as chronic shortages; by mid-1943, the had lost effective combat capability, reliant on German reinforcements that bred dependency and bitterness. This convergence of battlefield routs and civilian privation undermined fascist legitimacy, paving the way for internal challenges to Mussolini's rule.

Overthrow of Mussolini and Civil War Phase

On 24–25 July 1943, the Grand Council of Fascism convened in amid mounting military defeats, including the and losses in ; , a longtime fascist hierarch, proposed a motion to restore constitutional powers to King , which passed 19 to 7 with one abstention. The following day, the King summoned to the Villa Savoia, dismissed him as prime minister—citing the Council's vote and Italy's dire war situation—and had him arrested by upon departure; , a with prior fascist ties, was appointed head of government, retaining most fascist institutions intact while promising to prosecute the war but privately pursuing an armistice with the Allies. This coup, driven primarily by elite disillusionment over battlefield failures rather than ideological rejection of fascism, fragmented the regime without immediate popular uprising or purge of its apparatus. The Badoglio government signed the Armistice of Cassibile on 3 September 1943 near Syracuse, Sicily, agreeing to cease hostilities, surrender the fleet and air force to Allied control, and facilitate operations against German forces; the terms were publicly announced on 8 September via radio from Allied headquarters in Algiers, triggering chaos as German troops—anticipating betrayal—rapidly occupied Rome and key northern cities, disarming over 600,000 Italian soldiers and taking approximately 45,000 as prisoners. In response, German commandos under SS-Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny executed Operation Eiche on 12 September, landing gliders on the Gran Sasso plateau to rescue Mussolini from his mountain hotel prison without firing a shot, then flying him to Vienna and Rastenburg for a meeting with Adolf Hitler. Mussolini, bolstered by German occupation of northern and central Italy, proclaimed the Italian Social Republic (Repubblica Sociale Italiana, or RSI) on 23 September from the town of Salò on Lake Garda, establishing a puppet state controlling roughly the Po Valley and Adriatic coast, with nominal fascist governance but de facto German oversight; RSI forces, numbering around 200,000 by 1944 including Black Brigades and X Mas, collaborated in anti-partisan operations while the regime devolved into internal purges and reliance on German supplies. The armistice announcement ignited the (Guerra Civile Italiana), pitting RSI loyalists and German occupiers against the royalist in the south—now a co-belligerent with advancing Allied forces—and increasingly active partisan groups coordinated by the Committee of National Liberation (CLN), which drew from communist, socialist, Catholic, and monarchist factions totaling about 200,000 fighters by war's end. intensified through 1943–1945, with partisans sabotaging infrastructure, ambushing convoys, and liberating northern cities in ; German and RSI reprisals, such as the (over 770 civilians killed in September–October 1944), aimed to suppress resistance but fueled recruitment. Casualties were severe: partisan deaths exceeded 35,000 in combat, with RSI and Italian co-belligerent forces suffering comparable losses around 30,000–40,000, alongside 10,000–20,000 civilian victims of reprisals and an estimated 117,000 total battle-related fatalities across factions. The conflict's ideological core—fascist-nationalist defense of the RSI versus anti-fascist pushes for regime change—intersected with Allied advances, culminating in Mussolini's capture and execution by partisans on 28 April 1945 near , followed by RSI collapse as German forces surrendered. This phase exposed deep societal divisions, with communist partisans often pursuing revolutionary aims beyond mere anti-Nazism, while royalist elements sought continuity under the monarchy.

Fall, Aftermath, and Historiography

Allied Invasion and Regime Dissolution

The , codenamed Operation Husky, commenced on July 9–10, 1943, with roughly 160,000 troops from British, American, and Canadian forces landing under General Dwight D. Eisenhower's command, supported by overwhelming air and naval superiority that neutralized Italian and German defenses. By mid-August, Axis forces had evacuated the island after sustaining heavy losses, including over 10,000 German and 7,000 Italian killed or wounded, while Allied casualties numbered around 22,000. This rapid conquest exposed the Italian military's fragility, contributing to internal pressures that culminated in Benito Mussolini's ouster on July 25, 1943, though the invasion's momentum directly undermined the regime's cohesion. Following the announced on September 8, 1943, between the Badoglio government and the Allies, mainland invasions proceeded with British Eighth landings at on September 3 (over 30,000 troops facing minimal resistance) and the larger at on September 9, involving U.S. Fifth Army's 180,000 personnel against fierce German counterattacks led by Field Marshal . German forces, anticipating the betrayal, swiftly occupied and via , disarming Italian units and rescuing Mussolini on September 12, which enabled the establishment of the (RSI) as a German on September 23, nominally headed by Mussolini from but effectively controlled by Nazi officials and SS units. The RSI maintained Fascist trappings, including forced labor deportations and collaboration in anti-partisan operations, yet its military capacity was limited, with the Aeronautica Nazionale Repubblicana claiming 262 Allied aircraft downed at the cost of 158 of its own between 1944 and 1945. The Italian campaign's protracted nature, marked by stalled advances at the Gustav Line (including the from January to May 1944) and the landing on January 22, 1944 (initially 36,000 troops expanding to over 150,000), inflicted severe attrition: an estimated 60,000–70,000 Allied deaths and up to 150,000 German casualties from September 1943 to April 1945, compounded by rugged terrain and harsh weather that favored defenders. Allied breakthroughs, such as the fall of on June 4, 1944, and the breaching of the in August 1944, progressively eroded RSI control, with co-belligerent Italian forces (reorganized under Badoglio) contributing over 50,000 troops to Allied commands by late 1944. The regime's dissolution accelerated in the final offensive launched April 9, 1945, as U.S., British, Polish, and Indian divisions surged across the , prompting German Heinrich von Vietinghoff's surrender on May 2, 1945, while partisans captured and executed Mussolini on April 28 near , effectively terminating Fascist governance.

Post-War Trials and National Reckoning

Following the collapse of the on April 25, 1945, and his mistress were captured by communist partisans led by while attempting to flee to ; they were summarily executed by firing squad on April 28, 1945, near Dongo on , along with 14 other fascist officials and ministers. Their bodies were transported to , where they were publicly displayed upside down from a girder at on April 29, 1945, an act of retribution echoing the 1942 hanging of 15 partisans at the same site under fascist orders. This , carried out without trial, symbolized immediate partisan vengeance against but bypassed formal legal processes, with Audisio later claiming authorization from the . Formal post-war accountability began in liberated territories as early as , with the establishment of Special Tribunals for the Defense of the State repurposed against fascists, evolving into the for Sanctions against Fascism by July 1945 under the and provisional government. These bodies prosecuted former fascist hierarchs for crimes including collaboration with , suppression of liberties, and war conduct; proceedings targeted regime officials, with sentences ranging from disqualification from public office to imprisonment, though executions were rare outside partisan actions. The courts operated amid political fragmentation, often lenient toward defendants who emphasized obedience to orders or anti-German stances post-1943 , reflecting a pragmatic transition to restore governance rather than exhaustive retribution. A pivotal shift occurred with the Togliatti Amnesty of June 22, 1946, decreed by , the communist Minister of in Alcide De Gasperi's government, which pardoned most political offenses committed for fascist motives, including common crimes tied to regime loyalty, effectively releasing thousands of convicted fascists from prison. Enacted amid fears of civil unrest and to consolidate the fragile ahead of the June 2, 1946, institutional referendum abolishing the , the amnesty prioritized national reconciliation over punitive , drawing criticism for shielding collaborators while exposing anti-fascist partisans to prosecution for excesses; it emptied fascist-held cells but filled others with resisters demanding deeper purges. Togliatti justified it as preventing a "white terror" by monarchists and former regime elements, yet it perpetuated institutional continuity, as many fascist-era bureaucrats retained positions due to administrative needs and lack of alternatives. Italy's national reckoning proved superficial and contested, marked by incomplete epuration (purging) processes that disqualified only about 10,000 from public roles by 1948, far short of the regime's 20-year entrenchment in society, economy, and military. The "good Italian" narrative emerged, portraying as a brief aberration imposed on an inherently democratic populace, which minimized complicity in colonial atrocities, racial laws, and with Hitler, allowing former fascists to reenter via parties like the Italian Democratic Party of the Right or monarchist groups. This selective memory, reinforced by amnesty and alignments, contrasted with Allied demands for thorough denazification-like reforms, as U.S. officials noted the persistence of fascist influences in Italian life; subsequent decades saw sporadic trials for war crimes, such as Rodolfo Graziani's 1950 conviction reduced on appeal, underscoring judicial reluctance to confront systemic guilt.

Debates on Achievements, Failures, and Totalitarian Myths

Historians debate the achievements of Fascist Italy's economic policies, noting modest gains in agricultural output and infrastructure amid broader inefficiencies. The "Battle for Grain" campaign, launched in 1925, increased wheat production from 5.5 million tons in 1925 to over 8 million tons by 1935 through and subsidies, reducing food imports and bolstering self-sufficiency. projects, including the draining of the between 1928 and 1939, reclaimed 80,000 hectares of land for farming and settlement, while expanded from 1,000 km in 1922 to 6,500 km by 1940, facilitating industrial transport. Overall GDP growth averaged 1.8% annually from 1922 to 1938, with industrial production rising 60% in the same period, though critics attribute much of this to recovery from post-World War I instability rather than fascist innovation, as policies stifled trade and innovation. Social policies yielded mixed results, with some successes in welfare and demographics but failures in equitable development. The regime's pronatalist measures, including the 1927 fertility bonuses and 1934 tax exemptions for large families, raised the from 27.4 per 1,000 in 1922 to a peak but ultimately failed to reverse decline, dropping to 20.3 by 1938 amid pressures. Corporatist structures under the 1927 Charter of Labor aimed to mediate class conflict, establishing 22 corporations by 1934 to coordinate production, yet they preserved private ownership while imposing state oversight, leading to wage stagnation—real wages fell 20% between 1926 and 1930—and persistent north-south disparities. like the Milan-Genoa autostrada, completed in 1935, symbolized modernization, but uneven favored urban centers, exacerbating . Military and foreign policy failures overshadowed domestic gains, rooted in chronic unpreparedness and overambition. Despite rhetoric of imperial revival, Italy's armed forces entered with obsolete equipment—only 20% of the army mechanized by 1940—and inadequate training, suffering defeats in (1940-1941, requiring German bailout) and , where 400,000 troops were lost or captured by 1943. diverted resources to synthetic production, yielding inefficiencies like low-grade fuels, while corruption and monarchic interference fragmented command; King retained army loyalty, undermining fascist control. These shortcomings, compounded by the 1936 alliance with , precipitated collapse, with GDP contracting 20% from 1938 to 1943 due to war strains. Debates on Fascist Italy's totalitarian character challenge the myth of absolute control, contrasting aspirational ideology with practical limitations. Proponents like Emilio Gentile argue the regime pursued a "totalitarian dynamic" through , youth indoctrination via the (enrolling 3 million by 1937), and the 1929 Lateran Pacts integrating Catholicism, aiming to sacralize the state. However, revisionist historians, including Renzo De Felice, contend it fell short of true , as the , church, and industrial elites retained autonomy—King Victor Emmanuel dismissed Mussolini in 1943 without resistance—and corruption permeated bureaucracy, with only partial societal penetration; opposition persisted underground, and rural areas evaded full fascistization. Unlike Nazi Germany's racial purge or Soviet purges, Italy's repression killed fewer than 10,000 political opponents from 1922-1943, relying more on acquiescence than terror, fostering a "dual state" where formal masked incomplete . Postwar antifascist narratives in academia often amplify totalitarian myths to delegitimize any positives, overlooking corporatist experiments' influence on later welfare states, though empirical evidence underscores regime fragility over omnipotence.

Revisionist Views and Comparative Assessments

Revisionist historians, particularly Renzo De Felice, contend that differed fundamentally from in structure and outcomes, rejecting the historiographical tendency to equate the two as interchangeable totalitarian evils driven by identical racial and expansionist imperatives. De Felice's multi-volume of Mussolini, drawing on extensive , delineates phases of Fascist rule, highlighting a "consensus" era from 1929 to 1936 where regime policies garnered broad support through pragmatic governance rather than unrelenting terror, contrasting with the Nazi regime's immediate reliance on and extermination. Empirical achievements underpin these assessments: literacy rates advanced markedly, with female climbing from 50% in 1911 to 76% by 1931 amid expanded compulsory schooling, reducing overall illiteracy to 27% by 1931 despite persistent regional disparities. The regime's "Battle for Grain" campaign doubled wheat yields from 9.5 to 15.5 quintals per hectare between 1922 and 1937, bolstering food self-sufficiency during global depression. Infrastructure initiatives included draining the from 1928 onward, reclaiming over 80,000 hectares for agriculture, founding new towns like Littoria (now Latina), and curtailing through diking and pumping, transforming malarial swampland into productive farmland settled by thousands of families. Motorway development further exemplifies state-directed modernization, with the Autostrada dei Laghi—opened in 1924 as the world's first such highway—followed by expansions totaling over 300 kilometers by 1940, facilitated by fascist endorsements of private-public consortia emphasizing efficiency over ideology. Corporatist economic policies stabilized industry post-1929 crash, achieving average annual GDP growth of around 2% from 1922 to 1938 through , synthetic production, and , outperforming many contemporaries without full . In comparative terms, De Felice and allies argue Italian Fascism's retention of the , Vatican influence via the 1929 , and delayed, externally pressured racial laws (1938 Manifesto) imposed institutional restraints absent in Nazi Germany's , fostering a less monolithic control where private enterprise and Catholic social doctrine coexisted, unlike the Nazi fusion of party, state, and volkisch mysticism. Policing and repression were severe but targeted politically, with fewer mass atrocities; Fascist Italy's African campaigns involved chemical weapons and reprisals but lacked Holocaust-scale , reflecting pragmatic over pseudoscientific . Revisionists critique mainstream academia's systemic aversion to such distinctions—rooted in post-1945 anti-Fascist often amplified by left-leaning institutions—as distorting causal realities, privileging narratives over evidence of relative and developmental gains that sustained regime longevity until wartime overreach.

References

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