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Xinjiang
Xinjiang
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Xinjiang,[a] officially the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR),[11][12] is an autonomous region of the People's Republic of China (PRC), in the northwest of the country at the crossroads of Central Asia and East Asia. The largest province-level division of China by area and the 8th-largest country subdivision in the world, Xinjiang spans over 1.6 million square kilometres (620,000 sq mi) and has about 25 million inhabitants.[1][13] Xinjiang borders the countries of Afghanistan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, and Tajikistan. The rugged Karakoram, Kunlun, and Tian Shan mountain ranges occupy much of Xinjiang's borders, as well as its western and southern regions. The Aksai Chin and Trans-Karakoram Tract regions are claimed by India but administered by China.[14][15][16] Xinjiang also borders the Tibet Autonomous Region and the provinces of Gansu and Qinghai. The best-known route of the historic Silk Road ran through the territory from the east to its northwestern border.

High mountain ranges divide Xinjiang into the Dzungarian Basin (Dzungaria) in the north and the Tarim Basin in the south. Only about 9.7% of Xinjiang's land area is fit for human habitation.[17][unreliable source?] It is home to a number of ethnic groups, including the Han Chinese, Hui, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Mongols, Russians, Sibe, Tajiks (Pamiris), Tibetans, and Uyghurs.[18] There are more than a dozen autonomous prefectures and counties for minorities in Xinjiang. Many older English-language reference works call the area Chinese Turkestan,[19][20] Chinese Turkistan,[21] East Turkestan[22] or East Turkistan.[23]

With a documented history of at least 2,500 years, a succession of people and empires have vied for control over all or parts of this territory. In the 18th century it came under the rule of the Qing dynasty, which was later replaced by the Republic of China. Since 1949 and the Chinese Civil War, it has been part of the People's Republic of China. In 1954, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) to strengthen border defense against the Soviet Union and promote the local economy by settling soldiers into the region.[24] In 1955, Xinjiang was administratively changed from a province into an autonomous region. In recent decades, abundant oil and mineral reserves have been found in Xinjiang and it has become China's largest natural-gas-producing region.

From the 1990s to the 2010s, the East Turkestan independence movement, separatist conflict and the influence of radical Islam have resulted in unrest in the region with occasional terrorist attacks and clashes between separatist and government forces.[25][26] These conflicts prompted the Chinese government to commit a series of ongoing human rights abuses against Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minorities in the region including, according to some, genocide.[27][28]

Names

[edit]
Xinjiang
"Xīnjiāng" in Chinese characters
Chinese name
Chinese新疆
Hanyu PinyinXīnjiāng
PostalSinkiang
Literal meaning"New Frontier"
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinXīnjiāng
Bopomofoㄒㄧㄣ   ㄐㄧㄤ
Gwoyeu RomatzyhShinjiang
Wade–GilesHsin1-chiang1
Tongyong PinyinSinjiang
Yale RomanizationSyīnjyāng
MPS2Shinjiang
IPA[ɕín.tɕjáŋ]
other Mandarin
Xiao'erjingثٍ‌ڭِیَانْ
DunganЩинҗён
Hakka
RomanizationSîn-kiông
Yue: Cantonese
Yale RomanizationSān'gēung
Jyutpingsan1 goeng1
IPA[sɐn˥ kœŋ˥]
Southern Min
Hokkien POJSin-kiong
Teochew Peng'imSing-kiang
Eastern Min
Fuzhou BUCSĭng-giŏng
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region
Simplified Chinese新疆维吾尔自治区
Traditional Chinese新疆維吾爾自治區
Hanyu PinyinXīnjiāng Wéiwú'ěr Zìzhìqū
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinXīnjiāng Wéiwú'ěr Zìzhìqū
Bopomofo
  • ㄒㄧㄣ   ㄐㄧㄤ
  • ㄨㄟˊ   ㄨˊ   ㄦˇ
  • ㄗˋ   ㄓˋ   ㄑㄩ
Gwoyeu RomatzyhShinjiang Weiwueel Tzyhjyhchiu
Wade–GilesHsin1-chiang1 Wei2-wu2-erh3 Tzu4-chih4-chʻü1
Tongyong PinyinSinjiang Wéiwú'ěr Zìhjhìhcyu
Yale RomanizationSyīnjyāng Wéiwúěr Dz̀jr̀chyū
MPS2Shinjiang Wheihuel Tzyhgukhickhu
IPA[ɕín.tɕjáŋ wěɪ.ǔ.àɚ tsɹ̩̂.ʈʂɻ̩̂.tɕʰý]
other Mandarin
Xiao'erjingثٍ‌ڭِیَانْ وِوُعَر زِجِ‌کِیُوِ
DunganЩинҗён Уйгур Зыҗычү
Wu
Romanizationsin cian vi ng el zy zy chiu
Hakka
RomanizationSîn-kiông Vì-ngâ-ngì Tshṳ-tshṳ-khî
Southern Min
Hokkien POJSin-kiong Ûi-ngô͘-ní Chū-tī-khu
Teochew Peng'imSing-kiang Jûi-û-jéu Tsĕu-tī-khu
Eastern Min
Fuzhou BUCSĭng-giŏng Mì-ngù-ī Cê̤ṳ-dê-kṳ̆
Mongolian name
Mongolian CyrillicШиньжян Уйгурын өөртөө засах орон
Mongolian scriptᠰᠢᠨᠵᠢᠶᠠᠩ
ᠤᠶᠢᠭᠤᠷ
ᠤᠨ
ᠥᠪᠡᠷᠲᠡᠭᠡᠨ
ᠵᠠᠰᠠᠬᠤ
ᠣᠷᠤᠨ
Transcriptions
SASM/GNCSinjiyaŋ Uyiɣur-un öbertegen jasaqu orun
(Classical)
Shin'jyan Uiguryn öörtöö zasakh oron
(Khalkha)
Uyghur name
Uyghurشىنجاڭ ئۇيغۇر ئاپتونوم رايونى
Transcriptions
Latin YëziqiShinjang Uyghur Aptonom Rayoni
Yengi YeziⱪXinjang Uyƣur Aptonom Rayoni
SASM/GNCXinjang Uyĝur Aptonom Rayoni
Siril YëziqiШинҗаң Уйғур Аптоном Райони
Manchu name
Manchu scriptᡳᠴᡝ
ᠵᡝᠴᡝᠨ
ᡠᡳᡤᡠᡵ
ᠪᡝᠶᡝ
ᡩᠠᠰᠠᠩᡤᠠ
ᡤᠣᠯᠣ
MöllendorffIce Jecen Uigur beye dasangga golo
Kazakh name
Kazakhشينجياڭ ۇيعۇر اۆتونوميالىق ئاۋدانى
Шыңжаң Ұйғыр автономиялық ауданы
Shyńjań Uıǵyr aýtonomııalyq aýdany
Kyrgyz name
Kyrgyzشئنجاڭ ۇيعۇر اپتونوم رايونۇ
Шинжаң-Уйгур автоном району
Şincañ-Uyğur avtonom rayonu
Oirat name
Oiratᠱᡅᠨᡓᡅᡕᠠᡊ
ᡇᡕᡅᡎᡇᠷ
ᡅᠨ
ᡄᡋᡄᠷᡄᡃᠨ
ᠴᠠᠰᠠᡍᡇ
ᡆᠷᡇᠨ

Šinǰiyang Uyiγur-in ebereen zasaqu orun
Xibe name
Xibeᠰᡞᠨᡪᠶᠠᡢ
ᡠᡞᡤᡠᠷ
ᠪᡝᠶᡝ
ᡩᠠᠰᠠᡢᡤᠠ
ᡤᠣᠯᠣ

Sinjyang Uigur beye dasangga golo
Sarikoli name
Sarikoliشىنجاڭ ئۈيغۈر ئافتۇنۇم رەيۇن
Xinjong Üighür Oftunum Rayun[b]

The general region of Xinjiang has been known by many different names, including Altishahr—the historical Uyghur name for the southern half of the region referring to "the six cities" of the Tarim Basin—Khotan, Khotay, Chinese Tartary, High Tartary, East Chagatay (it was the eastern part of the Chagatai Khanate), Moghulistan ("land of the Mongols"), Kashgaria, Little Bokhara, Serindia (due to Indian cultural influence)[30] and, in Chinese, Xiyu (西域), meaning "Western Regions".[31]

Between the 2nd century BC and 2nd century AD, the Han Empire established the Protectorate of the Western Regions or Xiyu Protectorate (西域都護府) in an effort to secure the profitable routes of the Silk Road.[32] The Western Regions during the Tang era were known as Qixi (磧西). Qi refers to the Gobi Desert and Xi refers to the west. The Tang Empire established the Protectorate General to Pacify the West or Anxi Protectorate (安西都護府) in 640 to control the region.

During the Qing dynasty, the northern part of Xinjiang, Dzungaria, was known as Zhunbu (準部, "Dzungar region") and the Southern Tarim Basin as Huijiang (回疆, "Muslim Frontier"). Both regions merged after the Qing dynasty suppressed the Revolt of the Altishahr Khojas in 1759, becoming "Xiyu Xinjiang" (西域新疆, literally "Western Regions' New Frontier"), later simplified as "Xinjiang" (新疆; formerly romanized as "Sinkiang"). The official name was given during the reign of the Guangxu Emperor in 1878.[33] It can be translated as "new frontier" or "new territory".[34] In fact, the term "Xinjiang" was used in many other places conquered but never ruled by Chinese empires directly until the gradual Gaitu Guiliu administrative reform, including regions in Southern China.[35] For instance, present-day Jinchuan County in Sichuan was then known as "Jinchuan Xinjiang", Zhaotong in Yunnan was named "Xinjiang", Qiandongnan region, Anshun and Zhenning were named "Liangyou Xinjiang", etc.[36]

In 1955, Xinjiang Province was renamed "Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region". The name originally proposed was simply "Xinjiang Autonomous Region" because that was the name of the imperial territory. This proposal was not well received by Uyghurs in the Communist Party, who found the name colonialist since it meant "new territory". Seypidin Azizi, the first chairman of Xinjiang, expressed his strong objection to the proposed name to Mao Zedong, arguing that "autonomy is not given to mountains and rivers. It is given to particular nationalities." Some Uyghur Communists proposed the name "Tian Shan Uyghur Autonomous Region" instead. The Han Communists in the central government denied the name Xinjiang was colonialist or that the central government could be colonialist, both because they were communists and because China was a victim of colonialism. But due to the Uyghur complaints, the administrative region was named "Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region".[37][34]

Description

[edit]
Dzungaria (red) and the Tarim Basin / Altishahr (blue)
Physical map showing the separation of Dzungaria and the Tarim Basin (Altishahr) by the Tien Shan Mountains

Xinjiang consists of two main geographically, historically, and ethnically distinct regions with different historical names, Dzungaria north of the Tianshan Mountains and the Tarim Basin south of the Tianshan Mountains. Qing China unified them into one political entity, Xinjiang Province, in 1884. At the time of the Qing conquest in 1759, Dzungaria was inhabited by steppe-dwelling, nomadic Tibetan Buddhist Dzungar people and the Tarim Basin by sedentary, oasis-dwelling, Turkic-speaking Muslim farmers, now known as the Uyghurs, who were governed separately until 1884.[citation needed]

The Qing dynasty was well aware of the differences between the former Buddhist Mongol area in the north and the Turkic Muslim area in the south, and ruled them in separate administrative units at first.[38] But Qing people began to think of both areas as part of a single region called Xinjiang.[39] The very concept of Xinjiang as a single geographic identity was created by the Qing.[40] During Qing rule, ordinary Xinjiang people had no sense of "regional identity"; rather, Xinjiang's distinct identity was given to the region by the Qing, since it had distinctive geography, history, and culture, while at the same time it was created by the Chinese, multicultural, settled by Han and Hui, and separated from Central Asia for over a century and a half.[41]

In the late 19th century, some people were still proposing that two separate regions be created out of Xinjiang, the area north of the Tianshan and the area south of the Tianshan, while it was being debated whether to make Xinjiang a province.[42]

Xinjiang is a large, sparsely populated area, spanning over 1.6 million km2 (comparable in size to Iran), about a sixth of China's territory. Xinjiang borders the Tibet Autonomous Region and India's Leh district in Ladakh to the south, Qinghai and Gansu provinces to the east, Mongolia (Bayan-Ölgii, Govi-Altai and Khovd Provinces) to the east, Russia's Altai Republic to the north, and Kazakhstan (Almaty and East Kazakhstan Regions), Kyrgyzstan (Issyk-Kul, Naryn and Osh Regions), Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, Afghanistan's Badakhshan Province, and Pakistan's Gilgit-Baltistan to the west.

The east–west chain of the Tian Shan separates Dzungaria in the north from the Tarim Basin in the south. Dzungaria is a dry steppe and the Tarim Basin contains the massive Taklamakan Desert, surrounded by oases. In the east is the Turpan Depression. In the west, the Tian Shan split, forming the Ili River valley.

History

[edit]

Early history

[edit]
Map of Han Dynasty in 2 AD. Light blue is the Tarim Basin protectorate.

The earliest inhabitants of the region encompassing modern day Xinjiang were genetically of Ancient North Eurasian and Northeast Asian origin, with later geneflow from during the Bronze Age linked to the expansion of early Indo-Europeans. These population dynamics gave rise to a heterogeneous demographic makeup. Iron Age samples from Xinjiang show intensified levels of admixture between Steppe pastoralists and northeast Asians, with northern and eastern Xinjiang showing more affinities with northeast Asians, and southern Xinjiang showing more affinity with central Asians.[43][44]

Between 2009 and 2015, the remains of 92 individuals in the Xiaohe Cemetery were analyzed for Y chromosome and mitochondrial DNA markers. Genetic analyses of the mummies showed that the paternal lineages of the Xiaohe people were of almost all European[45] origin, while the maternal lineages of the early population were diverse, featuring both East Eurasian and West Eurasian lineages, as well as a smaller number of Indian / South Asian lineages. Over time, the west Eurasian maternal lineages were gradually replaced by east Eurasian maternal lineages. Outmarriage to women from Siberian communities, led to the loss of the original diversity of mtDNA lineages observed in the earlier Xiaohe population.[46][47][48]

The Tarim population was therefore always notably diverse, reflecting a complex history of admixture between people of Ancient North Eurasian, South Asian and Northeast Asian descent. The Tarim mummies have been found in various locations in the Western Tarim Basin such as Loulan, the Xiaohe Tomb complex and Qäwrighul. These mummies have been previously suggested to have been Tocharian or Indo-European speakers, but recent evidence suggest that the earliest mummies belonged to a distinct population unrelated to Indo-European pastoralists and spoke an unknown language, probably a language isolate.[49]

Although many of the Tarim mummies were classified as Caucasoid by anthropologists, Tarim Basin sites also contain both "Caucasoid" and "Mongoloid" remains, indicating contact between newly arrived western nomads and agricultural communities in the east.[50] Mummies have been found in various locations in the Western Tarim Basin such as Loulan, the Xiaohe Tomb complex and Qäwrighul.

Nomadic tribes such as the Yuezhi, Saka and Wusun were probably part of the migration of Indo-European speakers who had settled in Tarim Basin of Xinjiang long before the Xiongnu and Han Chinese. By the time the Han dynasty under Emperor Wu (r. 141–87 BC) wrested the western Tarim Basin away from its previous overlords (the Xiongnu), it was inhabited by various peoples who included the Indo-European-speaking Tocharians in Turfan and Kucha, the Saka peoples centered in the Shule Kingdom and the Kingdom of Khotan, the various Tibeto-Burmese groups (especially people related to the Qiang) as well as the Han Chinese people.[51] Some linguists posit that the Tocharian language had high amounts of influence from Paleosiberian languages,[52] such as Uralic and Yeniseian languages.

Yuezhi culture is documented in the region. The first known reference to the Yuezhi was in 645 BC by the Chinese chancellor Guan Zhong in his work, Guanzi (管子, Guanzi Essays: 73: 78: 80: 81). He described the Yúshì, 禺氏 (or Niúshì, 牛氏), as a people from the north-west who supplied jade to the Chinese from the nearby mountains (also known as Yushi) in Gansu.[53] The longtime jade supply[54] from the Tarim Basin is well-documented archaeologically: "It is well known that ancient Chinese rulers had a strong attachment to jade. All of the jade items excavated from the tomb of Fuhao of the Shang dynasty, more than 750 pieces, were from Khotan in modern Xinjiang. As early as the mid-first millennium BC, the Yuezhi engaged in the jade trade, of which the major consumers were the rulers of agricultural China."[55]

Crossed by the Northern Silk Road,[56] the Tarim and Dzungaria regions were known as the Western Regions. At the beginning of the Han dynasty the region was ruled by the Xiongnu, a powerful nomadic people.[57]: 148  During the 2nd century BC, the Han dynasty prepared for war against Xiongnu when Emperor Wu of Han dispatched Zhang Qian to explore the mysterious kingdoms to the west and form an alliance with the Yuezhi against the Xiongnu. As a result of the war, the Chinese controlled the strategic region from the Ordos and Gansu corridor to Lop Nor. They separated the Xiongnu from the Qiang people on the south and gained direct access to the Western Regions. Han China sent Zhang Qian as an envoy to the states of the region, beginning several decades of struggle between the Xiongnu and Han China in which China eventually prevailed. During the 100s BCE, the Silk Road brought increasing Chinese economic and cultural influence to the region.[57]: 148  In 60 BCE, Han China established the Protectorate of the Western Regions (西域都護府) at Wulei (烏壘, near modern Luntai), to oversee the region as far west as the Pamir Mountains. The protectorate was seized during the civil war against Wang Mang (r. AD 9–23), returning to Han control in 91 due to the efforts of general Ban Chao.

Uyghur art from the Bezeklik cavels from 9th Century
Old Uyghur / Yugur art from the Bezeklik murals
Color-coded physical map of the Tarim Basin
The Tarim Basin in the 3rd century AD

The Western Jin dynasty succumbed to successive waves of invasions by nomads from the north at the beginning of the 4th century. The short-lived kingdoms that ruled northwestern China one after the other, including Former Liang, Former Qin, Later Liang and Western Liáng, all attempted to maintain the protectorate, with varying degrees of success. After the final reunification of Northern China under the Northern Wei empire, its protectorate controlled what is now the southeastern region of Xinjiang. Local states such as Shule, Yutian, Guizi and Qiemo controlled the western region, while the central region around Turpan was controlled by Gaochang, remnants of a state (Northern Liang) that once ruled part of what is now Gansu province in northwestern China.

Ceramic statue of a small amn riding a large camel
A Sogdian man on a Bactrian camel. Sancai ceramic statuette, Tang dynasty

During the Tang dynasty, a series of expeditions were conducted against the Western Turkic Khaganate and their vassals: the oasis states of southern Xinjiang.[58] Campaigns against the oasis states began under Emperor Taizong with the annexation of Gaochang in 640.[59] The nearby kingdom of Karasahr was captured by the Tang in 644 and the kingdom of Kucha was conquered in 649.[60] The Tang Dynasty then established the Protectorate General to Pacify the West (安西都護府) or Anxi Protectorate, in 640 to control the region.

During the Anshi Rebellion, which nearly destroyed the Tang dynasty, Tibet invaded the Tang on a broad front from Xinjiang to Yunnan. It occupied the Tang capital of Chang'an in 763 for 16 days, and controlled southern Xinjiang by the end of the century. The Uyghur Khaganate took control of Northern Xinjiang, much of Central Asia and Mongolia at the same time.

As Tibet and the Uyghur Khaganate declined in the mid-9th century, the Kara-Khanid Khanate (a confederation of Turkic tribes including the Karluks, Chigils and Yaghmas)[61] controlled Western Xinjiang during the 10th and 11th centuries. After the Uyghur Khaganate in Mongolia was destroyed by the Kirghiz in 840, branches of the Uyghurs established themselves in Qocha (Karakhoja) and Beshbalik (near present-day Turfan and Ürümqi). The Uyghur state remained in eastern Xinjiang until the 13th century, although it was ruled by foreign overlords. The Kara-Khanids converted to Islam. The Uyghur state in Eastern Xinjiang, initially Manichean, later converted to Buddhism.

Remnants of the Liao dynasty from Manchuria entered Xinjiang in 1132, fleeing rebellion by the neighboring Jurchens. They established a new empire, the Qara Khitai (Western Liao), which ruled the Kara-Khanid and Uyghur-held parts of the Tarim Basin for the next century. Although Khitan and Chinese were the primary administrative languages, Persian and Uyghur were also used.[62]

Islamization

[edit]

Present-day Xinjiang consisted of the Tarim Basin and Dzungaria and was originally inhabited by Indo-European Tocharians and Iranian Sakas who practiced Buddhism and Zoroastrianism. The Turfan and Tarim Basins were inhabited by speakers of Tocharian languages,[63] with Caucasian mummies found in the region.[64] The area became Islamified during the 10th century with the conversion of the Kara-Khanid Khanate, who occupied Kashgar. During the mid-10th century, the Saka Buddhist Kingdom of Khotan was attacked by the Turkic Muslim Karakhanid ruler Musa; the Karakhanid leader Yusuf Qadir Khan conquered Khotan around 1006.[65]

Mongol period

[edit]
Physical map of the Mongol states from the 14th to the 17th centuries
Mongol states from the 14th to the 17th centuries: the Northern Yuan dynasty, Four Oirat, Moghulistan and Kara Del

After Genghis Khan unified Mongolia and began his advance west the Uyghur state in the Turpan-Urumchi region offered its allegiance to the Mongols in 1209, contributing taxes and troops to the Mongol imperial effort. In return, the Uyghur rulers retained control of their kingdom; Genghis Khan's Mongol Empire conquered the Qara Khitai in 1218. Xinjiang was a stronghold of Ögedei Khan and later came under the control of his descendant, Kaidu. This branch of the Mongol family kept the Yuan dynasty at bay until their rule ended.

During the Mongol Empire era the Yuan dynasty vied with the Chagatai Khanate for rule of the region and the latter controlled most of it. After the Chagatai Khanate divided into smaller khanates during the mid-14th century, the politically fractured region was ruled by a number of Persianized Mongol Khans, including those from Moghulistan (with the assistance of local Dughlat emirs), Uigurstan (later Turpan) and Kashgaria. These leaders warred with each other and the Timurids of Transoxiana to the west and the Oirats to the east: the successor Chagatai regime based in Mongolia and China. During the 17th century, the Dzungars established an empire over much of the region.

The Mongolian Dzungars were the collective identity of several Oirat tribes which formed and maintained, one of the last nomadic empires. The Dzungar Khanate covered Dzungaria, extending from the western Great Wall of China to present-day Eastern Kazakhstan and from present-day Northern Kyrgyzstan to Southern Siberia. Most of the region was renamed "Xinjiang" by the Chinese after the fall of the Dzungar Empire, which existed from the early 17th to the mid-18th century.[66]

Color-coded map, with troop movements
The Dzungar–Qing Wars, between the Qing Dynasty and the Dzungar Khanate

The sedentary Turkic Muslims of the Tarim Basin were originally ruled by the Chagatai Khanate and the nomadic Buddhist Oirat Mongols in Dzungaria ruled the Dzungar Khanate. The Naqshbandi Sufi Khojas, descendants of Muhammad, had replaced the Chagatayid Khans as rulers of the Tarim Basin during the early 17th century. There was a struggle between two Khoja factions: the Afaqi (White Mountain) and the Ishaqi (Black Mountain). The Ishaqi defeated the Afaqi and the Afaq Khoja invited the 5th Dalai Lama (the leader of the Tibetans) to intervene on his behalf in 1677. The Dalai Lama then called on his Dzungar Buddhist followers in the Dzungar Khanate to act on the invitation. The Dzungar Khanate conquered the Tarim Basin in 1680, setting up the Afaqi Khoja as their puppet ruler. After converting to Islam, the descendants of the previously-Buddhist Uyghurs in Turfan believed that the "infidel Kalmuks" (Dzungars) built Buddhist monuments in their region.[67]

Qing dynasty

[edit]
Artists' depiction of a chaotic battle scene, from a distance
The Battle of Oroi-Jalatu in 1756, between the Manchu and Oirat armies
Color=coded map of 19th-century China
The Qing Empire ca. 1820
Another battle scene, this one from a greater distance with mountains in the background
Scene from the 1828 Qing campaign against rebels in Altishahr

The Turkic Muslims of the Turfan and Kumul oases then submitted to the Qing dynasty and asked China to free them from the Dzungars; the Qing accepted their rulers as vassals. They warred against the Dzungars for decades before defeating them; Qing Manchu Bannermen then conducted the Dzungar genocide, nearly eradicating them and depopulating Dzungaria. The Qing freed the Afaqi Khoja leader Burhan-ud-din and his brother, Khoja Jihan, from Dzungar imprisonment and appointed them to rule the Tarim Basin as Qing vassals. The Khoja brothers reneged on the agreement, declaring themselves independent leaders of the Tarim Basin. The Qing and the Turfan leader Emin Khoja crushed their revolt, and by 1759 China controlled Dzungaria and the Tarim Basin.[68]

The Manchu Qing dynasty gained control of eastern Xinjiang as a result of a long struggle with the Dzungars which began during the 17th century. In 1755, with the help of the Oirat noble Amursana, the Qing attacked Ghulja and captured the Dzungar khan. After Amursana's request to be declared Dzungar khan went unanswered, he led a revolt against the Qing. Qing armies destroyed the remnants of the Dzungar Khanate over the next two years, and many Han Chinese and Hui moved into the pacified areas.[69]

The native Dzungar Oirat Mongols suffered greatly from the brutal campaigns and a simultaneous smallpox epidemic. Writer Wei Yuan described the resulting desolation in present-day northern Xinjiang as "an empty plain for several thousand li, with no Oirat yurt except those surrendered."[70] It has been estimated that 80 percent of the 600,000 (or more) Dzungars died from a combination of disease and warfare,[71] and recovery took generations.[72]

Han and Hui merchants were initially only allowed to trade in the Tarim Basin; their settlement in the Tarim Basin was banned until the 1830 Muhammad Yusuf Khoja invasion, when the Qing rewarded merchants for fighting off Khoja by allowing them to settle in the basin.[73] The Uyghur Muslim Sayyid and Naqshbandi Sufi rebel of the Afaqi suborder, Jahangir Khoja was sliced to death (Lingchi) in 1828 by the Manchus for leading a rebellion against the Qing. According to Robert Montgomery Martin, many Chinese with a variety of occupations were settled in Dzungaria in 1870; in Turkestan (the Tarim Basin), however, only a few Chinese merchants and garrison soldiers were interspersed with the Muslim population.[74]

The 1765 Ush rebellion by the Uyghurs against the Manchu began after Uyghur women were raped by the servants and son of Manchu official Su-cheng.[75] It was said that "Ush Muslims had long wanted to sleep on [Sucheng and son's] hides and eat their flesh" because of the months-long abuse.[76] The Manchu emperor ordered the massacre of the Uyghur rebel town; Qing forces enslaved the Uyghur children and women, and killed the Uyghur men.[77] Sexual abuse of Uyghur women by Manchu soldiers and officials triggered deep Uyghur hostility against Manchu rule.[78]

Yettishar

[edit]
Yakub Beg, ruler of Yettishar

By the 1860s, Xinjiang had been under Qing rule for a century. The region was captured in 1759 from the Dzungar Khanate,[79] whose population (the Oirats) became the targets of genocide. Xinjiang was primarily semi-arid or desert and unattractive to non-trading Han settlers, and others (including the Uyghurs) settled there.[citation needed]

The Dungan Revolt by the Muslim Hui and other Muslim ethnic groups was fought in China's Shaanxi, Ningxia and Gansu provinces and in Xinjiang from 1862 to 1877. The conflict led to a reported 20.77 million deaths due to migration and war, with many refugees dying of starvation.[80][failed verification] Thousands of Muslim refugees from Shaanxi fled to Gansu; some formed battalions in eastern Gansu, intending to reconquer their lands in Shaanxi. While the Hui rebels were preparing to attack Gansu and Shaanxi, Yakub Beg (an Uzbek or Tajik commander of the Kokand Khanate) fled from the khanate in 1865 after losing Tashkent to the Russians. Beg settled in Kashgar, and soon controlled Xinjiang. Although he encouraged trade, built caravansareis, canals and other irrigation systems, his regime was considered harsh. The Chinese took decisive action against Yettishar; an army under General Zuo Zongtang rapidly approached Kashgaria, reconquering it on 16 May 1877.[81]

Photo of three bearded, armed men
19th-century Khotan Uyghurs in Yettishar

After reconquering Xinjiang in the late 1870s from Yakub Beg,[82] the Qing dynasty established Xinjiang ("new frontier") as a province in 1884[83] – making it part of China, and dropping the old names of Zhunbu (準部, Dzungar Region) and Huijiang (Muslimland).[84][85] Many Uyghurs subsequently migrated from southern Xinjiang to the fertile lands of the north and east, sometimes with the support of the Qing government.[86]

Republic of China

[edit]
Soldiers and other sitting on benches in front of a stage
Kuomintang in Xinjiang, 1942

In 1912, the Qing dynasty was replaced by the Republic of China. The ROC continued to treat the Qing territory as its own, including Xinjiang.[87]: 69  Yuan Dahua, the last Qing governor of Xinjiang, fled. One of his subordinates, Yang Zengxin, took control of the province and acceded in name to the Republic of China in March of that year. Balancing mixed ethnic constituencies, Yang controlled Xinjiang until his 1928 assassination after the Northern Expedition of the Kuomintang.[88]

Sheng Shicai in uniform, looking left
Governor Sheng Shicai ruled from 1933 to 1944.

The Kumul Rebellion and others broke out throughout Xinjiang during the early 1930s against Jin Shuren, Yang's successor, involving Uyghurs, other Turkic groups and Hui (Muslim) Chinese. Jin enlisted White Russians to crush the revolts. In the Kashgar region on 12 November 1933, the short-lived First East Turkestan Republic was self-proclaimed after debate about whether it should be called "East Turkestan" or "Uyghuristan".[89][90] The region claimed by the ETR encompassed the Kashgar, Khotan and Aksu Prefectures in southwestern Xinjiang.[91] The Chinese Muslim Kuomintang 36th Division (National Revolutionary Army) defeated the army of the First East Turkestan Republic in the 1934 Battle of Kashgar, ending the republic after Chinese Muslims executed its two emirs: Abdullah Bughra and Nur Ahmad Jan Bughra.

Soviet partial occupation

[edit]

The Soviet Union invaded the province; it was brought under the control of northeast Han warlord Sheng Shicai after the 1937 Xinjiang War. Sheng ruled Xinjiang for the next decade with support from the Soviet Union, many of whose ethnic and security policies he instituted. The Soviet Union maintained a military base in the province and deployed several military and economic advisors. Sheng invited a group of Chinese Communists to Xinjiang (including Mao Zedong's brother, Mao Zemin),[92]: 111  but executed them all in 1943 in fear of a conspiracy. In 1944, President and Premier of China Chiang Kai-shek, informed by the Soviet Union of Shicai's intention to join it, transferred him to Chongqing as the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry the following year.[93] During the Ili Rebellion, the Soviet Union backed Uyghur separatists to form the Second East Turkestan Republic (ETR) in the Ili region while most of Xinjiang remained under Kuomintang control.[89]

People's Republic of China

[edit]
Color-coded map of China
The Soviet-backed Second East Turkestan Republic encompassed Xinjiang's Ili, Tarbagatay and Altay districts.

The People's Liberation Army entered Xinjiang in 1949, when Kuomintang commander Tao Zhiyue and government chairman Burhan Shahidi surrendered the province to them.[90] Five ETR leaders who were to negotiate with the Chinese about ETR sovereignty died in an airplane crash that year in the outskirts of Kabansk in the Russian SFSR.[94] The PRC continued the migration of Han Chinese in Xinjiang to dilute the percentage of the Uyghur population.[95]

The PRC autonomous region was established on 1 October 1955, replacing the province;[90] that year (the first modern census in China was taken in 1953), Uyghurs were 73 percent of Xinjiang's total population of 5.11 million.[37] Although Xinjiang has been designated a "Uygur Autonomous Region" since 1954, more than 50 percent of its area is designated autonomous areas for 13 native non-Uyghur groups.[96] Modern Uyghurs developed ethnogenesis in 1955, when the PRC recognized formerly separately self-identified oasis peoples.[97]

Southern Xinjiang is home to most of the Uyghur population, about nine million people, out of a total population of twenty million; fifty-five percent of Xinjiang's Han population, mainly urban, live in the north.[98][99] This created an economic imbalance, since the northern Junghar basin (Dzungaria) is more developed than the south.[100]

Land reform and collectivization occurred in Uyghur agricultural areas at the same general pace as in most of China.[101]: 134  Hunger in Xinjiang was not as great as elsewhere in China during the Great Leap Forward and a million Han Chinese fleeing famine resettled in Xinjiang.[101]: 134 

In 1980, China allowed the United States to establish electronic listening stations in Xinjiang so the United States could monitor Soviet rocket launches in central Asia in exchange for the United States authorizing the sale of dual-use civilian and military technology and nonlethal military equipment to China.[102]

The Chinese economic reform since the late 1970s has exacerbated uneven regional development, more Uyghurs have migrated to Xinjiang's cities and some Han have migrated to Xinjiang for economic advancement. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping made a nine-day visit to Xinjiang in 1981 and described the region as "unsteady".[103] The Deng era reforms encouraged China's ethnic minorities, including Uyghurs, to establish small private companies for commodity transit, retail, and restaurants.[104] By the early 1990s, a total of 19 billion yuan had been spent in Xinjiang on large- and medium-sized industrial projects, with an emphasis on developing modern transportation, communications infrastructure, and support for the oil and gas industries.[57]: 149 

A brisk cross-border shuttle trade by Uyghurs further developed following the adoption of the Soviet Union's perestroika.[104]

Increased ethnic contact and labor competition has coincided with Uyghur terrorism since the 1990s, such as the 1997 Ürümqi bus bombings.[105]

In 2000, Uyghurs made up 45 percent of Xinjiang's population and 13 percent of Ürümqi's population. With nine percent of Xinjiang's population, Ürümqi accounts for 25 percent of the region's GDP; many rural Uyghurs have migrated to the city for work in its light, heavy and petrochemical industries.[106] Han in Xinjiang are older, better-educated and work in higher-paying professions than their Uyghur counterparts. Han are more likely to cite business reasons for moving to Ürümqi, while some Uyghurs cite legal trouble at home and family reasons for moving to the city.[107] Han and Uyghurs are equally represented in Ürümqi's floating population, which works primarily in commerce. Auto-segregation in the city is widespread in residential concentration, employment relationships and endogamy.[108] In 2010, Uyghurs were a majority in the Tarim Basin and a plurality in Xinjiang as a whole.[109]

Xinjiang has 81 public libraries and 23 museums, compared to none in 1949. It has 98 newspapers in 44 languages, compared with four in 1952. According to official statistics, the ratio of doctors, medical workers, clinics and hospital beds to the general population surpasses the national average; the immunization rate has reached 85 percent.[5]

The ongoing Xinjiang conflict[110][111] includes the 2007 Xinjiang raid,[112] a thwarted 2008 suicide-bombing attempt on a China Southern Airlines flight,[113] the 2008 Kashgar attack which killed 16 police officers four days before the Beijing Olympics,[114][115] the August 2009 syringe attacks,[116] the 2011 Hotan attack,[117] the 2014 Kunming attack,[118] the April 2014 Ürümqi attack,[119] and the May 2014 Ürümqi attack.[120] Several of the attacks were orchestrated by the Turkistan Islamic Party (formerly the East Turkestan Islamic Movement), identified as a terrorist group by several entities (including Russia,[121] Turkey,[122][123] the United Kingdom,[124] the United States until October 2020,[125][126] and the United Nations).[127]

In 2014, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership in Xinjiang commenced a People's War against the "Three Evil Forces" of separatism, terrorism, and extremism. They deployed two hundred thousand party cadres to Xinjiang and the launched the Civil Servant-Family Pair Up program.[128][129] Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping was dissatisfied with the initial results of the People's War and replaced Zhang Chunxian with Chen Quanguo as Party Committee Secretary in 2016. Following his appointment Chen oversaw the recruitment of tens of thousands of additional police officers and the division of society into three categories: trusted, average, untrustworthy. He instructed his subordinated to "Take this crackdown as the top project," and "to preëmpt the enemy, to strike at the outset." Following a meeting with Xi in Beijing Chen Quanguo held a rally in Ürümqi with ten thousand troops, helicopters, and armored vehicles. As they paraded he announced a "smashing, obliterating offensive," and declared that they would "bury the corpses of terrorists and terror gangs in the vast sea of the People's War."[128]

Chinese authorities have operated internment camps to indoctrinate Uyghurs and other Muslims as part of the People's War since at least 2017.[130][27] The camps have been criticized by a number of governments and human-rights organizations for patterns of abuse and mistreatment, with various characterizations up to and including that of a genocide being perpetrated by the Chinese government.[131] In 2020, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping said: "Practice has proven that the party's strategy for governing Xinjiang in the new era is completely correct."[132]

In 2021, authorities sentenced Sattar Sawut and Shirzat Bawudun—former heads of Xinjiang's education and justice departments respectively—both to death with a two-year reprieve on separatism and bribery charges.[133] Such a sentence is usually commuted to life imprisonment.[134] Officials said Sawut was found guilty of incorporating ethnic separatism, violence, and religious extremism content into Uyghur-language textbooks, which had influenced several people to participate in attacks in Ürümqi. They said Bawudun was found guilty of colluding with ETIM and carrying out "illegal religious activities at his daughter's wedding".[133][135] Three other educators were sentenced to life in prison.[136] Chen was replaced as Community Party Secretary for Xinjiang by Ma Xingrui in December 2021.[137]

Xi Jinping made a four-day visit to Xinjiang in July 2022 where Kompas TV had documented groups of Uyghurs welcoming his arrival.[138] Xi called on local officials to do more in preserving ethnic minority culture[139] and following an inspection of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, he praised the organization's "great progress" in reform and development.[140] During another visit to Xinjiang in August 2023, Xi said in a speech that the region should open up more for tourism to attract domestic and foreign visitors.[141][142]

Administrative divisions

[edit]

Xinjiang is divided into thirteen prefecture-level divisions: four prefecture-level cities, six prefectures and five autonomous prefectures (including the sub-provincial autonomous prefecture of Ili, which in turn has two of the seven prefectures within its jurisdiction) for Mongol, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Hui minorities.[143]

These are then divided into 13 districts, 29 county-level cities, 62 counties and 6 autonomous counties. Twelve of the county-level cities do not belong to any prefecture and are de facto administered by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). Sub-level divisions of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region is shown in the adjacent picture and described in the table below:

Administrative divisions of Xinjiang
Division code[144] Division Area in km2[145] Population 2020[146][147] Seat Divisions[148]
Districts Counties Aut. counties CL cities
650000 Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 1,664,900.00 25,852,345 Ürümqi city 13 62 6 29
650100 Ürümqi city 13,787.90 4,054,369 Tianshan District 7 1
650200 Karamay city 8,654.08 490,348 Karamay District 4
650400 Turpan city 67,562.91 693,988 Gaochang District 1 2
650500 Hami city 142,094.88 673,383 Yizhou District 1 1 1
652300 Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture 73,139.75 1,613,585 Changji city 4 1 2
652700 Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture 24,934.33 488,198 Bole city 2 2
652800 Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture 470,954.25 1,613,979 Korla city 7 1 1
652900 Aksu Prefecture 127,144.91 2,714,422 Aksu city 7 2
653000 Kizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture 72,468.08 622,222 Artux city 3 1
653100 Kashgar Prefecture 137,578.51 4,496,377 Kashi city 10 1 1
653200 Hotan Prefecture 249,146.59 2,504,718 Hotan city 9 1
654000 Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture 56,381.53 * 2,848,393 * Yining city 7 * 1 * 3 *
654200 Tacheng Prefecture* 94,698.18 1,138,638 Tacheng city 4 1 3
654300 Altay Prefecture* 117,699.01 668,587 Altay city 6 1
659000 Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps 13,055.57 1,573,931 Ürümqi city 12
659001 Shihezi city   (8th Division) 456.84 498,587 Hongshan Subdistrict 1
659002 Aral city   (1st Division) 5,266.00 328,241 Jinyinchuan Road Subdistrict 1
659003 Tumxuk city   (3rd Division) 2,003.00 263,245 Jinxiu Subdistrict 1
659004 Wujiaqu city   (6th Division) 742.00 141,065 Renmin Road Subdistrict 1
659005 Beitun city   (10th Division) 910.50 20,414 Beitun Town (Altay) 1
659006 Tiemenguan city   (2nd Division) 590.27 104,746 Xingjiang Road, 29th Regiment 1
659007 Shuanghe city   (5th Division) 742.18 54,731 Hongxing No.2 Road, 89th Regiment 1
659008 Kokdala city   (4th Division) 979.71 69,524 Xinfu Road, 66th Regiment 1
659009 Kunyu city   (14th Division) 687.13 63,487 Yuyuan Town 1
659010 Huyanghe city   (7th Division) 677.94 29,891 Gongqing town 1
659011 Xinxing city   (13th Division) 593.00 44,700 Huangtian Town 1
659012 Baiyang city   (9th Division) 4,928.00 85,655 163rd Regiment of the 9th Division 1

* – Altay Prefecture or Tacheng Prefecture are subordinate to Ili Prefecture. / The population or area figures of Ili do not include Altay Prefecture or Tacheng Prefecture which are subordinate to Ili Prefecture.

Urban areas

[edit]
Population by urban areas of prefecture & county cities
# Cities 2020 Urban area[149] 2010 Urban area[150] 2020 City proper
1 Ürümqi 3,864,136 2,853,398 4,054,369
2 Yining 654,726 368,813 part of Ili Prefecture
3 Korla 490,961 425,182 part of Bayingolin Prefecture
4 Karamay 481,249 353,299 490,348
5 Aksu 470,601 284,872 part of Aksu Prefecture
6 Shihezi 461,663 313,768 498,587
7 Changji 451,234 303,938 part of Changji Prefecture
8 Hami 426,072 310,500[i] 673,383
9 Kashi 392,730 310,448 part of Kashi Prefecture
10 Hotan 293,056 119,804 part of Hotan Prefecture
11 Kuqa 262,771 [ii] part of Aksu Prefecture
12 Aral 239,647 65,175 328,241
13 Kuytun 224,471 20,805 part of Ili Prefecture
14 Bole 177,536 120,138 part of Bortala Prefecture
15 Usu 156,437 131,661 part of Tacheng Prefecture
(16) Shawan 150,317[iii] part of Tacheng Prefecture
17 Altay 147,301 112,711 part of Altay Prefecture
18 Turpan 143,456 89,719[iv] 693,988
19 Tumxuk 128,056 34,808 263,245
20 Fukang 125,080 67,598 part of Changji Prefecture
21 Tacheng 122,447 75,122 part of Tacheng Prefecture
22 Wujiaqu 118,893 75,088 141,065
23 Artux 105,855 58,427 part of Kizilsu Prefecture
(24) Baiyang 85,655[v] 85,655
25 Tiemenguan 77,969 [vi] 104,746
26 Korgas 44,701 [vii] part of Ili Prefecture
(27) Xinxing 44,700[viii] 44,700
28 Shuanghe 43,263 [ix] 54,731
29 Kokdala 39,257 [x] 69,524
30 Kunyu 32,591 [xi] 63,487
32 Huyanghe 24,769 [xii] 29,891
32 Beitun 13,874 [xiii] 20,414
33 Alashankou 11,097 [xiv] part of Bortala Prefecture
  1. ^ Hami Prefecture is currently known as Hami PLC after 2010 census; Hami CLC is currently known as Yizhou after 2010 census.
  2. ^ Kuqa County is currently known as Kuqa CLC after 2010 census.
  3. ^ Shawan County is currently known as Shawan CLC after 2020 census.
  4. ^ Turpan Prefecture is currently known as Turpan PLC after 2010 census; Turpan CLC is currently known as Gaochang after 2010 census.
  5. ^ Baiyang CLC was established from parts of Tachang CLC after 2020 census.
  6. ^ Tiemenguan CLC was established from parts of Korla CLC after 2010 census.
  7. ^ Korgas CLC was established from parts of Huocheng County after 2010 census.
  8. ^ Xinxing CLC was established from parts of Yizhou District after 2020 census.
  9. ^ Shuanghe CLC was established from parts of Bole CLC after 2010 census.
  10. ^ Kokdala CLC was established from parts of Huocheng County after 2010 census.
  11. ^ Kunyu CLC was established from parts of Hotan County, Pishan County, Moyu County, & Qira County after 2010 census.
  12. ^ Huyanghe CLC was established from parts of Usu CLC after 2010 census.
  13. ^ Beitun CLC was established from parts of Altay CLC after 2010 census.
  14. ^ Alashankou CLC was established from parts of Bole CLC & Jinghe County after 2010 census.

Geography and geology

[edit]
Close to Karakoram Highway in Xinjiang.

Xinjiang is the largest political subdivision of China, accounting for more than one sixth of China's total territory and a quarter of its boundary length. Xinjiang is mostly covered with uninhabitable deserts and dry grasslands, with dotted oases conducive to habitation accounting for 9.7 percent of Xinjiang's total area by 2015[17] at the foot of Tian Shan, Kunlun Mountains and Altai Mountains, respectively.

Mountain systems and basins

[edit]

Xinjiang is split by the Tian Shan mountain range (تەڭرى تاغ‎, Tengri Tagh, Тәңри Тағ), which divides it into two large basins: the Dzungarian Basin in the north and the Tarim Basin in the south. A small V-shaped wedge between these two major basins, limited by the Tian Shan's main range in the south and the Borohoro Mountains in the north, is the basin of the Ili River, which flows into Kazakhstan's Lake Balkhash; an even smaller wedge farther north is the Emin Valley.

Pamir Mountains and Muztagh Ata.

Other major mountain ranges of Xinjiang include the Pamir Mountains and Karakoram in the southwest, the Kunlun Mountains in the south (along the border with Tibet) and the Altai Mountains in the northeast (shared with Mongolia). The region's highest point is the mountain K2, an eight-thousander located 8,611 metres (28,251 ft) above sea level in the Karakoram Mountains on the border with Pakistan.

Taklamakan Desert

Much of the Tarim Basin is dominated by the Taklamakan Desert. North of it is the Turpan Depression, which contains the lowest point in Xinjiang and in the entire PRC, at 155 metres (509 ft) below sea level.

The Dzungarian Basin is slightly cooler, and receives somewhat more precipitation, than the Tarim Basin. Nonetheless, it, too, has a large Gurbantünggüt Desert (also known as Dzoosotoyn Elisen) in its center.

The Tian Shan mountain range marks the Xinjiang-Kyrgyzstan border at the Torugart Pass (3752 m). The Karakorum highway (KKH) links Islamabad, Pakistan with Kashgar over the Khunjerab Pass.

Mountain passes

[edit]

From south to north, the mountain passes bordering Xinjiang are:

Geology

[edit]

Xinjiang is geologically young. Collision of the Indian and the Eurasian plates formed the Tian Shan, Kunlun Shan, and Pamir mountain ranges; said tectonics render it a very active earthquake zone. Older geological formations are located in the far north, where Kazakhstania is geologically part of Kazakhstan, and in the east, where is part of the North China Craton.[citation needed]

Center of the continent

[edit]

Xinjiang has within its borders, in the Gurbantünggüt Desert, the location in Eurasia that is furthest from the sea in any direction (a continental pole of inaccessibility): 46°16.8′N 86°40.2′E / 46.2800°N 86.6700°E / 46.2800; 86.6700 (Eurasian pole of inaccessibility). It is at least 2,647 km (1,645 mi) (straight-line distance) from any coastline.

In 1992, local geographers determined another point within Xinjiang – 43°40′52″N 87°19′52″E / 43.68111°N 87.33111°E / 43.68111; 87.33111 in the southwestern suburbs of Ürümqi, Ürümqi County – to be the "center point of Asia". A monument to this effect was then erected there and the site has become a local tourist attraction.[151]

Rivers and lakes

[edit]
Tianchi Lake
Black Irtysh river in Burqin County is a famous spot for sightseeing.

Having hot summer and low precipitation, most of Xinjiang is endorheic. Its rivers either disappear in the desert, or terminate in salt lakes (within Xinjiang itself, or in neighboring Kazakhstan), instead of running towards an ocean. The northernmost part of the region, with the Irtysh River rising in the Altai Mountains, that flows (via Kazakhstan and Russia) toward the Arctic Ocean, is the only exception. But even so, a significant part of the Irtysh's waters were artificially diverted via the Irtysh–Karamay–Ürümqi Canal to the drier regions of southern Dzungarian Basin.

Kanas Lake

Elsewhere, most of Xinjiang's rivers are comparatively short streams fed by the snows of the several ranges of the Tian Shan. Once they enter the populated areas in the mountains' foothills, their waters are extensively used for irrigation, so that the river often disappears in the desert instead of reaching the lake to whose basin it nominally belongs. This is the case even with the main river of the Tarim Basin, the Tarim, which has been dammed at a number of locations along its course, and whose waters have been completely diverted before they can reach the Lop Lake. In the Dzungarian basin, a similar situation occurs with most rivers that historically flowed into Lake Manas. Some of the salt lakes, having lost much of their fresh water inflow, are now extensively use for the production of mineral salts (used e.g., in the manufacturing of potassium fertilizers); this includes the Lop Lake and the Manas Lake.

Deserts

[edit]

Deserts include:

Major cities

[edit]

Due to water scarcity, most of Xinjiang's population lives within fairly narrow belts that are stretched along the foothills of the region's mountain ranges in areas conducive to irrigated agriculture. It is in these belts where most of the region's cities are found.

Largest cities and towns of Xinjiang

Climate

[edit]
Köppen–Geiger climate classification map at 1-km resolution for Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (China) for 1991–2020
Köppen climate map of Xinjiang

A semiarid or desert climate (Köppen BSk or BWk, respectively) prevails in Xinjiang. The entire region has great seasonal differences in temperature with cold winters. The Turpan Depression often records some of the hottest temperatures nationwide in summer,[152] with air temperatures easily exceeding 40 °C (104 °F). Winter temperatures regularly fall below −20 °C (−4 °F) in the far north and highest mountain elevations. On 18 February 2024, a record low temperature for the region of −52.3 °C (−62.1 °F) was recorded.[153]

Continuous permafrost is typically found in the Tian Shan starting at the elevation of about 3,500–3,700 m above sea level. Discontinuous alpine permafrost usually occurs down to 2,700–3,300 m, but in certain locations, due to the peculiarity of the aspect and the microclimate, it can be found at elevations as low as 2,000 m.[154]

Time

[edit]

Despite the province's easternmost point being more than 1,600 kilometres (990 mi) west of Beijing, Xinjiang, like the rest of China, is officially in the UTC+8 time zone, known by residents as Beijing Time. Despite this, some residents, local organizations and governments observe UTC+6 as the standard time and refer to this zone as Xinjiang Time.[155] Han people tend to use Beijing Time, while Uyghurs tend to use Xinjiang Time as a form of resistance to Beijing.[156] Time zones notwithstanding, most schools and businesses open and close two hours later than in the other regions of China.[157]

Politics

[edit]

Structure

[edit]
Current leaders of the Xinjiang Regional Government
Title CCP Committee Secretary People's Congress Chairwoman Chairman Xinjiang CPPCC Chairman
Name Chen Xiaojiang Zumret Obul Erkin Tuniyaz Nurlan Abilmazhinuly
Born June 1962 (age 63) August 1959 (age 66) November 1961 (age 63–64) December 1962 (age 62)
Assumed office July 2025 January 2023 September 2021 January 2023
Statue of Mao Zedong in Kashgar
Erkin Tuniyaz, the incumbent Chairman of the Xinjiang Government

Like all governing institutions in mainland China, Xinjiang has a parallel party-government system. The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Regional Committee of the CCP acts as the top policy-formulation body, and exercises control over the Regional People's Government. The CCP Committee Secretary, generally a member of the Han ethnic group, outranks the Government Chairman, always an Uyghur. The Government Chairman typically serves as a Deputy Committee Secretary.[158] The central leadership in Beijing formulates policies regarding Xinjiang through the Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Group, which is usually led by the chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.[158][159]

Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps

[edit]

Xinjiang maintains the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), an economic and paramilitary organization administered by the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It plays a critical role in the region's economy, owning or being otherwise connected to many companies in the region as well as dominating Xinjiang's agricultural output.[160] It additionally directly administers cities throughout Xinjiang, mainly concentrated in the northern parts. It is headed by the CCP secretary of Xinjiang, while the CCP secretary of the XPCC is considered the second most powerful person in the region.[160]

Poverty alleviation programs

[edit]

Local governments in Xinjiang seek to address ethnic tensions in the region through poverty alleviation and redistributive programs.[161]: 189  These efforts include working with state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in the mining sector.[161]: 189  For example, during the Targeted Poverty Alleviation Campaign, officials paired 1,000 villages with 1,000 enterprises for economic development projects.[161]: 189 

Human rights abuses

[edit]

Human Rights Watch has documented the denial of due legal process and fair trials and failure to hold genuinely open trials as mandated by law e.g. to suspects arrested following ethnic violence in the city of Ürümqi's 2009 riots.[162]

The Chinese government, under Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping's administration,[27] launched the Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism in 2014, which involved mass detention and surveillance of ethnic Uyghurs there;[163] the program was massively expanded by Chen Quanguo when he was appointed as CCP Xinjiang secretary in 2016.[164] The campaign included the detainment of 1.8 million people in internment camps, mostly Uyghurs, but also including other ethnic and religious minorities, by 2020.[164] An October 2018 exposé by BBC News claimed, based on analysis of satellite imagery collected over time, that hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs were likely interned in the camps, and they are rapidly being expanded.[165] In 2019, The Art Newspaper reported that "hundreds" of writers, artists, and academics had been imprisoned in (what the magazine qualified as) an attempt to "punish any form of religious or cultural expression" among Uyghurs.[166] China has also been accused of targeting Muslim religious figures, Mosques and tombs in the region.[167] This program has been called a genocide by some observers, while a report by the UN Human Rights Office said they may amount to crimes against humanity.[168][169]

On 28 June 2020, the Associated Press published a report which stated the Chinese government was taking draconian measures to slash birth rates among Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, even as it encouraged some of the country's Han majority to have more children.[170] While individual women have spoken out before about forced birth control, the practice was far more widespread and systematic than previously known, according to an AP investigation based on government statistics, state documents and interviews with 30 ex-detainees, family members and a former detention camp instructor. The campaign over the past four years in Xinjiang has been labeled by some experts as a form of "demographic genocide."[170] The allegation of Uyghur birth rates being lower than those of Han Chinese have been disputed by pundits from Pakistan Observer,[171] Antara,[172] and Detik.com.[173]

East Turkestan independence movement

[edit]
The Kök Bayraq has become a symbol of the East Turkestan independence movement.

Some factions in Xinjiang, most prominently Uyghur nationalists, advocate establishing an independent country named East Turkestan (also sometimes called "Uyghuristan"),[174] which has led to tension, conflict,[175] and ethnic strife in the region.[176][177][178] Autonomous regions in China do not have a legal right to secede, and each one is considered to be an "inseparable part of the People's Republic of China" by the government.[179][180] The separatist movement claims that the region is not part of China, but was invaded by the CCP in 1949 and has been under occupation since then. The Chinese government asserts that the region has been part of China since ancient times,[181] and has engaged in "strike hard" campaigns targeted at separatists.[182] The movement has been supported by both militant Islamic extremist groups such as the Turkistan Islamic Party,[183] as well as advocacy groups with no connection to extremist groups.

According to the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the two main sources for separatism in the Xinjiang Province are religion and ethnicity. Religiously, the most Uyghur peoples of Xinjiang follow Islam; in the rest of China, many are Buddhist, Taoist and Confucian, although many follow Islam as well, such as the Hui ethnic subgroup of the Han ethnicity, comprising some 10 million people. Thus, the major difference and source of friction with eastern China is ethnicity and religious doctrinal differences that differentiate them politically from other Muslim minorities elsewhere in the country.[182]

Economy

[edit]
Development of GDP
Year GDP in billions of Yuan
1995 82
2000 136
2005 260
2010 544
2015 932
2020 1,380
Source:[184]
The distribution map of Xinjiang's GDP per person (2011)
Ürümqi is a major industrial center within Xinjiang.
Wind farm in Xinjiang
Sunday market in Khotan

The GDP of Xinjiang was about CN¥2.053 trillion (US$289 billion) as of 2024.[185] Economic growth has been fueled by to discovery of the abundant reserves of coal, oil, gas as well as the China Western Development policy introduced by the State Council to boost economic development in Western China.[186] Its per capita GDP for 2022 was CN¥68,552 (US$10,191). Southern Xinjiang, with 95 percent non-Han population, has an average per capita income half that of Xinjiang as a whole.[185] XPCC plays an outsized role in Xinjiang's economy, with the organization producing CN¥350 billion (US$52 billion), or around 19.7% of Xinjiang's economy, while the per capita GDP was CN¥98,748 (US$14,680).[187][non-primary source needed]

In general, China's autonomous regions have some of the highest per capita government spending public goods and services.[188]: 366  Providing public goods and services in these areas is part of a government effort to reduce regional inequalities, reduce what the government views as a risk of separatism, and stimulate economic development.[188]: 366  Economic development of Xinjiang is a priority for China.[189] As of at least 2019, Xinjiang is among the regions of China with the highest total per capita government expenditure, including on health care, education, and social security.[188]: 367–369 

In 1997, the 26,000 km Uzbek-Kyrgyz-Chinese highway became operational.[57]: 150  In 1998, the Turpan–Ürümqi–Dahuangshan Expressway was completed, linking several key areas in Xinjiang.[57]: 150  In 2000, the government articulated its strategy for developing the western regions of the country, and that plan made Xinjiang a major focus.[189] Accelerating development in Xinjiang is intended by China to achieve a number of objectives, including narrowing the economic gap between Xinjiang and the more developed eastern provinces, as well as alleviating political discontent and security problems by alleviating poverty and raising the standard of living in order to increase stability.[189] From 2014 to 2020, fiscal transfers from China's central government to Xinjiang grew by an average of 10.4% per year.[190]: 110 

In July 2010, state media outlet China Daily reported that:

Local governments in China's 19 provinces and municipalities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Zhejiang and Liaoning, are engaged in the commitment of "pairing assistance" support projects in Xinjiang to promote the development of agriculture, industry, technology, education and health services in the region.[191]

Xinjiang has traditionally been an agricultural region, but is also rich in minerals and oil. Xinjiang is a major producer of solar panel components due to its large production of the base material polysilicon. In 2020 45 percent of global production of solar-grade polysilicon occurred in Xinjiang. Concerns have been raised both within the solar industry and outside it that forced labor may occur in the Xinjiang part of the supply chain.[192] The global solar panel industry is under pressure to move sourcing away from the region due to human rights and liability concerns.[193] China's solar association claimed the allegations were baseless and unfairly stigmatized firms with operations there.[194] A 2021 investigation in the United Kingdom found that 40 percent of solar farms in the UK had been built using panels from Chinese companies linked to forced labor in Xinjiang.[195]

Agriculture and fishing

[edit]

Main area is of irrigated agriculture. By 2015, the agricultural land area of the region is 631 thousand km2 or 63.1 million ha, of which 6.1 million ha is arable land.[196][needs update] In 2016, the total cultivated land rose to 6.2 million ha, with the crop production reaching 15.1 million tons.[197] Agriculture in Xinjiang is dominated by the XPCC, which employs a majority of the organization's workforce.[198] Wheat was the main staple crop of the region, maize grown as well, millet found in the south, while only a few areas (in particular, Aksu) grew rice.[199]

Cotton became an important crop in several oases, notably Hotan, Yarkand and Turpan by the late 19th century.[199] Sericulture is also practiced.[200] The Xinjiang cotton industry is the world's largest cotton exporter, producing 84 percent of Chinese cotton while the country provides 26 percent of global cotton export.[201] Xinjiang also produces peppers and pepper pigments used in cosmetics such lipstick for export.[202]

Xinjiang is famous for its tomatoes, grapes and melons, particularly Hami melons and Turpan raisins.[203] The region is a leading source for tomato paste, which it supplies for international brands.[201]

The main livestock of the region have traditionally been sheep. Much of the region's pasture land is in its northern part, where more precipitation is available,[204] but there are mountain pastures throughout the region.[205]: 29 

Due to the lack of access to the ocean and limited amount of inland water, Xinjiang's fish resources are somewhat limited. Nonetheless, there is a significant amount of fishing in Lake Ulungur and Lake Bosten and in the Irtysh River. A large number of fish ponds have been constructed since the 1970s, their total surface exceeding 10,000 hectares by the 1990s. In 2000, the total of 58,835 tons of fish was produced in Xinjiang, 85 percent of which came from aquaculture.[206][needs update] The Sayram Lake is both the largest alpine lake and highest altitude lake in Xinjiang, and is the location of a major cold-water fishery.[citation needed] Originally Sayram had no fish but in 1998, northern whitefish (Coregonus peled) from Russia were introduced and investment in breeding infrastructure and technology has consequently made Sayram into the country's largest exporter of northern whitefish with an annual output of over 400 metric tons.[207][better source needed]

Mining and minerals

[edit]

Mining-related industries are a major part of Xinjiang's economy.[161]: 23 

Xinjiang was known for producing salt, soda, borax, gold, and jade in the 19th century.[208]

The Lop Lake was once a large brackish lake during the end of the Pleistocene but has slowly dried up in the Holocene where average annual precipitation in the area has declined to just 31.2 millimeters (1.2 inches), and experiences annual evaporation rate of 2,901 millimeters (114 inches). The area is rich in brine potash, a key ingredient in fertilizer and is the second-largest source of potash in the country. Discovery of potash in the mid-1990s, has transformed Lop Nur into a major potash mining industry.[209]

The oil and gas extraction industry in Aksu and Karamay is growing, with the West–East Gas Pipeline linking to Shanghai. The oil and petrochemical sector get up to 60 percent of Xinjiang's economy.[210] The region contains over a fifth of China's hydrocarbon resources and has the highest concentration of fossil fuel reserves of any region in the country.[211] The region is rich in coal and contains 40 percent of the country's coal reserves or around 2.2 trillion tonnes, which is enough to supply China's thermal coal demand for more than 100 years even if only 15 percent of the estimated coal reserve prove recoverable.[212][213]

Tarim basin is the largest oil and gas bearing area in the country with about 16 billion tonnes of oil and gas reserves discovered.[214] The area is still actively explored and in 2021, China National Petroleum Corporation found a new oil field reserve of 1 billion tons (about 907 million tonnes). That find is regarded as being the largest one in recent decades. As of 2021, the basin produces hydrocarbons at an annual rate of 2 million tons, up from 1.52 million tons from 2020.[215]

Foreign trade

[edit]

Trade with Central Asian countries is crucial to Xinjiang's economy.[216] Most of the overall import / export volume in Xinjiang was directed to and from Kazakhstan through Ala Pass. China's first border free trade zone (Horgos Free Trade Zone) was located at the Xinjiang-Kazakhstan border city of Horgos.[217] Horgos is the largest "land port" in China's western region and it has easy access to the Central Asian market. Xinjiang also opened its second border trade market to Kazakhstan in March 2006, the Jeminay Border Trade Zone.[218]

Vietnam is a major importer of Xinjiang cotton.[219]: 45 

Economic and Technological Development Zones

[edit]
  • Bole Border Economic Cooperation Area[220]
  • Shihezi Border Economic Cooperation Area[221]
  • Tacheng Border Economic Cooperation Area[222]
Ürümqi Diwopu International Airport
  • Ürümqi Economic & Technological Development Zone is northwest of Ürümqi. It was approved in 1994 by the State Council as a national level economic and technological development zones. It is 1.5 km (0.93 mi) from the Ürümqi International Airport, 2 km (1.2 mi) from the North Railway Station and 10 km (6.2 mi) from the city center. Wu Chang Expressway and 312 National Road passes through the zone. The development has unique resources and geographical advantages. Xinjiang's vast land, rich in resources, borders eight countries. As the leading economic zone, it brings together the resources of Xinjiang's industrial development, capital, technology, information, personnel and other factors of production.[223]
  • Ürümqi Export Processing Zone is in Urumuqi Economic and Technology Development Zone. It was established in 2007 as a state-level export processing zone.[224]
  • Ürümqi New & Hi-Tech Industrial Development Zone was established in 1992 and it is the only high-tech development zone in Xinjiang, China. There are more than 3470 enterprises in the zone, of which 23 are Fortune 500 companies. It has a planned area of 9.8 km2 (3.8 sq mi) and it is divided into four zones. There are plans to expand the zone.[225]
  • Yining Border Economic Cooperation Area[226]

Culture

[edit]

Media

[edit]

The Xinjiang Networking Transmission Limited operates the Urumqi People's Broadcasting Station and the Xinjiang People Broadcasting Station, broadcasting in Mandarin, Uyghur, Kazakh and Mongolian.

In 1995, there were 50 minority-language newspapers published in Xinjiang, including the Qapqal News, the world's only Xibe language newspaper.[227] The Xinjiang Economic Daily is considered one of China's most dynamic newspapers.[228]

For a time after the July 2009 riots, authorities placed restrictions on the internet and text messaging, gradually permitting access to state-controlled websites like Xinhua News Agency,[229] until restoring Internet to the same level as the rest of China on 14 May 2010.[230][231][232]

Demographics

[edit]
Distribution of ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region
Historical population
YearPop.±%
1912[233] 2,098,000—    
1928[234] 2,552,000+21.6%
1936–37[235] 4,360,000+70.8%
1947[236] 4,047,000−7.2%
1954[237] 4,873,608+20.4%
1964[238] 7,270,067+49.2%
1982[239] 13,081,681+79.9%
1990[240] 15,155,778+15.9%
2000[241] 18,459,511+21.8%
2010[242] 21,813,334+18.2%
2020[243] 25,852,345+18.5%

The earliest Tarim mummies, dated to 1800 BC, are of a Caucasoid physical type.[244] East Asian migrants arrived in the eastern portions of the Tarim Basin about 3000 years ago and the Uyghur peoples appeared after the collapse of the Orkhon Uyghur Kingdom, based in modern-day Mongolia, around 842 AD.[245][246]

The Islamization of Xinjiang started around 1000 AD. Xinjiang Muslim Turkic peoples contain Uyghurs, Kazaks, Kyrgyz, Tatars, Uzbeks; Muslim Iranian peoples comprise Tajiks, Sarikolis / Wakhis (often conflated as Tajiks); Muslim Sino-Tibetan peoples are such as the Hui. Other ethnic groups in the region are Hans, Mongols (Oirats, Daurs, Dongxiangs), Russians, Xibes, Manchus. Around 70,000 Russian immigrants were living in Xinjiang in 1945.[247]

The Han Chinese of Xinjiang arrived at different times from different directions and social backgrounds. There are now descendants of criminals and officials who had been exiled from China during the second half of the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries; descendants of families of military and civil officers from Hunan, Yunnan, Gansu and Manchuria; descendants of merchants from Shanxi, Tianjin, Hubei and Hunan; and descendants of peasants who started immigrating into the region in 1776.[248]

The languages of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region
Uyghur girl in Kashgar
County-level ethnicity map of Xinjiang as of 2018

Some Uyghur scholars claim descent from both the Turkic Uyghurs and the pre-Turkic Tocharians (or Tokharians, whose language was Indo-European); also, Uyghurs often have relatively-fair skin, hair and eyes and other Caucasoid physical traits.

In 2002, there were 9,632,600 males (growth rate of 1.0 percent) and 9,419,300 females (growth rate of 2.2 percent). The population overall growth rate was 1.09 percent, with 1.63 percent of birth rate and 0.54 percent mortality rate.

Three Uyghur girls at a Sunday market in the oasis city Khotan.

The Qing began a process of settling Han, Hui, and Uyghur settlers into Northern Xinjiang (Dzungaria) in the 18th century. At the start of the 19th century, 40 years after the Qing reconquest, there were around 155,000 Han and Hui Chinese in northern Xinjiang and somewhat more than twice that number of Uyghurs in Southern Xinjiang.[249] A census of Xinjiang under Qing rule in the early 19th century tabulated ethnic shares of the population as 30 percent Han and 60 percent Turkic and it dramatically shifted to 6 percent Han and 75 percent Uyghur in the 1953 census. However, a situation similar to the Qing era's demographics with a large number of Han had been restored by 2000, with 40.57 percent Han and 45.21 percent Uyghur.[250] Professor Stanley W. Toops noted that today's demographic situation is similar to that of the early Qing period in Xinjiang.[251] Before 1831, only a few hundred Chinese merchants lived in Southern Xinjiang oases (Tarim Basin), and only a few Uyghurs lived in Northern Xinjiang (Dzungaria).[252]

After 1831, the Qing encouraged Han Chinese migration into the Tarim Basin, in southern Xinjiang, but with very little success, and permanent troops were stationed on the land there as well.[253] Political killings and expulsions of non-Uyghur populations during the uprisings in the 1860s[253] and the 1930s saw them experience a sharp decline as a percentage of the total population[254] though they rose once again in the periods of stability from 1880, which saw Xinjiang increase its population from 1.2 million,[255][256] to 1949. From a low of 7 percent in 1953, the Han began to return to Xinjiang between then and 1964, where they comprised 33 percent of the population (54 percent Uyghur), like in Qing times. A decade later, at the beginning of the Chinese economic reform in 1978, the demographic balance was 46 percent Uyghur and 40 percent Han,[250] which did not change drastically until the 2000 Census, when the Uyghur population had reduced to 42 percent.[257] In 2010, the population of Xinjiang was 45.84 percent Uyghur and 40.48 percent Han. The 2020 Census showed the share of the Uyghur population decline slightly to 44.96 percent, and the Han population rise to 42.24 percent[258][259]

Military personnel are not counted and national minorities are undercounted in the Chinese census, as in some other censuses.[260] 3.6 million people reside in XPCC administered areas, around 14 percent of Xinjiang's population.[187] While some of the shift has been attributed to an increased Han presence,[18] Uyghurs have also emigrated to other parts of China, where their numbers have increased steadily. Uyghur independence activists express concern over the Han population changing the Uyghur character of the region though the Han and Hui Chinese mostly live in Northern Xinjiang Dzungaria and are separated from areas of historic Uyghur dominance south of the Tian Shan mountains (Southwestern Xinjiang), where Uyghurs account for about 90 percent of the population.[261]

In general, Uyghurs are the majority in Southwestern Xinjiang, including the prefectures of Kashgar, Khotan, Kizilsu and Aksu (about 80 percent of Xinjiang's Uyghurs live in those four prefectures) as well as Turpan Prefecture, in Eastern Xinjiang. The Han are the majority in Eastern and Northern Xinjiang (Dzungaria), including the cities of Ürümqi, Karamay, Shihezi and the prefectures of Changjyi, Bortala, Bayin'gholin, Ili (especially the cities of Kuitun) and Kumul. Kazakhs are mostly concentrated in Ili Prefecture in Northern Xinjiang. Kazakhs are the majority in the northernmost part of Xinjiang.

Ethnic groups in Xinjiang
2020 Chinese census[262]
Nationality Population Percentage
Uyghur 11,624,257 44.96 percent
Han 10,920,098 42.24 percent
Kazakh 1,539,636 5.96 percent
Hui 1,102,928 4.27 percent
Kirghiz 199,264 0.77 percent
Mongols 169,143 0.65 percent
Dongxiang 72,036 0.28 percent
Tajiks 50,238 0.19 percent
Xibe 34,105 0.13 percent
Manchu 20,915 0.080 percent
Tujia 15,787 0.086 percent
Tibetan 18,276 0.071 percent
Uzbek 12,301 0.048 percent
Miao 12,220 0.047 percent
Russian 8,024 0.031 percent
Yi 7,752 0.030 percent
Zhuang 5,727 0.022 percent
Daur 5,447 0.021 percent
Tatar 5,183 0.024 percent
Tu 3,827 0.015 percent
Salar 3,266 0.013 percent
Other 11,764 0.046 percent
Major ethnic groups in Xinjiang by region (2018 data)[I]
P = Prefecture; AP = Autonomous prefecture; PLC = Prefecture-level city; DACLC = Directly administered county-level city.[263]
Uyghurs (%) Han (%) Kazakhs (%) others (%)
Xinjiang 51.14 34.41 6.90 7.55
Ürümqi PLC 12.85 71.21 2.77 13.16
Karamay PLC 15.59 74.67 4.05 5.69
Turpan Prefecture 76.96 16.84 0.05 6.15
Kumul Prefecture 20.01 65.49 10.04 4.46
Changji AP 4.89 72.28 10.34 12.49
Bortala AP 14.76 63.27 10.41 11.56
Bayin'gholin AP 36.38 53.31 0.11 10.20
Aksu Prefecture 80.08 18.56 0.01 1.36
Kizilsu AP 66.24 6.29 0.03 27.44
Kashgar Prefecture 92.56 6.01 < 0.005 1.42
Khotan Prefecture 96.96 2.85 < 0.005 0.19
Ili AP[c] 17.95 40.09 27.16 14.80
former Ili Prefecture 26.30 35.21 21.57 16.91
Tacheng Prefecture 4.25 54.66 26.66 14.43
Altay Prefecture 1.42 39.85 52.76 5.97
Shihezi DACLC 1.09 94.13 0.63 4.15
Aral DACLC 3.66 91.96 < 0.005 4.38
Tumushuke DACLC 67.49 31.73 < 0.005 0.78
Wujiaqu DACLC 0.05 96.29 0.10 3.55
Tiemenguan DACLC 0.07 95.96 0.00 3.97
  1. ^ Does not include members of the People's Liberation Army in active service.

Vital statistics

[edit]
Year[264] Population Live births Deaths Natural change Crude birth rate
(per 1000)
Crude death rate
(per 1000)
Natural change
(per 1000)
2011 22,090,000 14.99 4.42 10.57
2012 22,330,000 15.32 4.48 10.84
2013 22,640,000 15.84 4.92 10.92
2014 22,980,000 16.44 4.97 11.47
2015 23,600,000 15.59 4.51 11.08
2016 23,980,000 15.34 4.26 11.08
2017 24,450,000 15.88 4.48 11.40
2018 24,870,000 10.69 4.56 6.13
2019 25,230,000 8.14 4.45 3.69
2020 25,852,000 7.01
2021 25,890,000 6.16 5.60 0.56[265]

Religion

[edit]
Religion in Xinjiang (around 2010)
  1. Islam (58.0%)
  2. Buddhism (32.0%)
  3. Taoism (9.00%)
  4. Christianity (1.00%)

The major religions in Xinjiang are Islam, practiced largely by Uyghurs and the Hui Chinese minority, as well as Chinese folk religions, Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism, practiced essentially by the Han Chinese. Christianity in Xinjiang is practiced by 1 percent of the population according to the Chinese General Social Survey of 2009.[266] According to a demographic analysis of the year 2010, Muslims formed 58 percent of the province's population.[267] In 1950, there were 29,000 mosques and 54,000 imams in Xinjiang, which fell to 14,000 mosques and 29,000 imams by 1966. Following the Cultural Revolution, there were only about 1,400 remaining mosques. By the mid-1980's, the number of mosques had returned to 1950 levels.[268] According to a 2020 report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, since 2017, Chinese authorities have destroyed or damaged 16,000 mosques in Xinjiang – 65 percent of the region's total.[269][270]

According to a DeWereldMorgen report in March 2024, there are more than 100 Islamic associations in Xinjiang where imams have lessons in theology, Arabic and Mandarin.[203] A majority of the Uyghur Muslims adhere to Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence or madhab.[citation needed] A minority of Shias, almost exclusively of the Nizari Ismaili (Seveners) rites are located in the higher mountains of Tajik and Tian Shan. In the western mountains (the Tajiks), almost the entire population of Tajiks (Sarikolis and Wakhis), are Nizari Ismaili Shia.[18] In the north, in the Tian Shan, the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz are Sunni.

Afaq Khoja Mausoleum and Id Kah Mosque in Kashgar are most important Islamic Xinjiang sites. Emin Minaret in Turfan is a key Islamic site. Bezeklik Thousand Buddha Caves is a notable Buddhist site. In Awat County also lies a huge park with a statue of Turkish-Muslim philosopher Nasreddin.[271]

Sports

[edit]

Xinjiang is home to the Xinjiang Flying Tigers professional basketball team of the Chinese Basketball Association[272] and the Xinjiang Magic Deer of the Women's Chinese Basketball Association.[273] It was previously home to the now-defunct Xinjiang Tianshan Leopard F.C., a football team that most recently played in China League One.[274]

The capital, Ürümqi, is home to the Xinjiang University baseball team, an integrated Uyghur and Han group profiled in the documentary film Diamond in the Dunes.[275]

Transportation

[edit]

Roads

[edit]
Karakorum highway

In 2008, according to the Xinjiang Transportation Network Plan, the government has focused construction on State Road 314, Alar-Hotan Desert Highway, State Road 218, Qingshui River Line-Yining Highway and State Road 217, as well as other roads.

The construction of the first expressway in the mountainous area of Xinjiang began a new stage in its construction on 24 July 2007. The 56 km (35 mi) highway linking Sayram Lake and Guozi Valley in Northern Xinjiang area had cost 2.39 billion yuan. The expressway is designed to improve the speed of national highway 312 in northern Xinjiang. The project started in August 2006 and several stages have been fully operational since March 2007. Over 3,000 construction workers have been involved. The 700 m-long Guozi Valley Cable Bridge over the expressway is now currently being constructed, with the 24 main pile foundations already completed. Highway 312 national highway Xinjiang section, connects Xinjiang with China's east coast, Central and West Asia, plus some parts of Europe. It is a key factor in Xinjiang's economic development. The population it covers is around 40 percent of the overall in Xinjiang, who contribute half of the GDP in the area.

Zulfiya Abdiqadir, head of the Transport Department was quoted as saying that 24,800,000,000 RMB had been invested into Xinjiang's road network in 2010 alone and, by this time, the roads covered approximately 152,000 km (94,000 mi).[276]

Rail

[edit]

Xinjiang's rail hub is Ürümqi. To the east, a conventional and a high-speed rail line runs through Turpan and Hami to Lanzhou in Gansu Province. A third outlet to the east connects Hami and Inner Mongolia.

To the west, the Northern Xinjiang runs along the northern footslopes of the Tian Shan range through Changji, Shihezi, Kuytun and Jinghe to the Kazakh border at Alashankou, where it links up with the Turkestan–Siberia Railway. Together, the Northern Xinjiang and the Lanzhou-Xinjiang lines form part of the Trans-Eurasian Continental Railway, which extends from Rotterdam, on the North Sea, to Lianyungang, on the East China Sea. The Northern Xinjiang railway provides additional rail transport capacity to Jinghe, from which the Jinghe–Yining–Khorgos railway heads into the Ili River Valley to Yining, Huocheng and Khorgos, a second rail border crossing with Kazakhstan. The Kuytun–Beitun railway runs from Kuytun north into the Junggar Basin to Karamay and Beitun, near Altay.

In the south, the Southern Xinjiang railway from Turpan runs southwest along the southern footslopes of the Tian Shan into the Tarim Basin, with stops at Yanqi, Korla, Kuqa, Aksu, Maralbexi (Bachu), Artux and Kashgar. From Kashgar, the Kashgar–Hotan railway, follows the southern rim of the Tarim to Hotan, with stops at Shule, Akto, Yengisar, Shache (Yarkant), Yecheng (Karghilik), Moyu (Karakax). There are also the Hotan–Ruoqiang railway and Golmud–Korla railway.

The Ürümqi–Dzungaria railway connects Ürümqi with coal fields in the eastern Junggar Basin. The Hami–Lop Nur railway connects Hami with potassium salt mines in and around Lop Nur. The Golmud–Korla railway, opened in 2020, provides an outlet to Qinghai. Planning is underway on additional intercity railways.[277] Railways to Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan have been proposed.[citation needed]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is a vast autonomous region in northwestern China, spanning 1.66 million square kilometers and comprising one-sixth of the country's land area, making it the largest provincial-level division. It borders eight countries—Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India—along a frontier exceeding 5,000 kilometers, positioning it as a strategic hub for trade and the Belt and Road Initiative. The region encompasses diverse terrain, including the Taklamakan Desert, Tian Shan mountains, and oases that historically facilitated the Silk Road, and it holds substantial reserves of oil, natural gas, and minerals driving its economy. Its major cities include the capital Urumqi, Xinjiang's most populous city with over 4 million residents and one of the largest in Central Asia, and Kashgar, a historically significant Silk Road trading hub.
As of 2022, Xinjiang's permanent population stands at 25.87 million, with ethnic minorities comprising 57.8%, including at approximately 45%, at 42%, and smaller groups such as , Kyrgyz, and Hui. The Uyghur population has grown from 2.2 million at the region's founding in to over 12 million today, reflecting sustained demographic expansion amid broader development. Incorporated into during the Qing dynasty's campaigns against the Dzungars in the and formally designated an autonomous region in , Xinjiang has experienced rapid modernization, with GDP growth fueled by energy extraction, via , and that attracted 323 million visitors in 2025, generating 370 billion yuan. However, the region has been marked by ethnic strife and Islamist-inspired , with incomplete records indicating thousands of attacks causing significant casualties prior to intensified counter-terrorism measures launched in 2014, which have since prevented major incidents through de-extremification programs, enhanced , and socioeconomic integration efforts. These policies, framed by Chinese authorities as essential for stability, have drawn international scrutiny, though empirical indicators like zero large-scale attacks post-2017 and challenge narratives of systematic demographic erasure prevalent in some Western analyses, which often rely on unverified testimonies amid acknowledged biases in advocacy-driven reporting.

Names and Terminology

Historical and Alternative Designations

The region comprising modern Xinjiang was historically divided into two primary geographic and cultural areas: in the north, named after the Oirat Mongol Dzungar tribes who dominated it until the mid-18th century, and the in the south, known for its oasis city-states inhabited by Turkic-speaking peoples. These divisions, separated by the mountain range, predated any unified administrative nomenclature and reflected distinct pastoral and sedentary lifestyles, with Dzungaria featuring steppe landscapes suitable for nomadic herding and the Tarim Basin centered around irrigated agriculture amid desert surroundings. In Chinese historical records dating back to the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), the Tarim Basin and surrounding areas were collectively termed Xiyu (Western Regions), denoting territories west of the Jade Gate Pass along the Silk Road, without implying a single political entity. Following the Qing Dynasty's conquest of the Dzungar Khanate between 1755 and 1759, which eliminated the Mongol rulers of northern Xinjiang, the Manchu administration initially referred to the pacified territories as Xiyu Xinjiang ("New Frontier of the Western Regions") to signify reclamation and incorporation into the empire. The name Xinjiang (新疆), literally translating to "new frontier" or "newly restored territory," was formalized in 1884 when Qing general Zuo Zongtang petitioned to establish the area as a province after reconquering it from Yakub Beg's rebellion in the 1870s, emphasizing the restoration of imperial control over lands previously lost to Central Asian powers. This designation underscored the Qing view of the region as an extension of core Chinese domains rather than a colonial outpost, contrasting with earlier fluid references tied to transient khanates or basin-specific identities. The term "East Turkestan" (Sharqiy Turkistan in Uyghur) originated in the 19th century among Russian Turkologists as a designation for the Tarim Basin, distinguishing it from Russian-controlled "Turkestan" to the west and replacing the colonial-era label "Chinese Turkestan." It later became associated with pan-Turkic nationalist sentiments in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, promoted by intellectuals seeking to unify Turkic peoples under a shared ethnic identity, though it lacked roots in pre-modern indigenous nomenclature and primarily applied to the southern basin rather than the entire region including Dzungaria.

Official and Contemporary Usage

The designates the region as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), formally established on October 1, 1955, within its ethnic regional autonomy framework, which nominally grants to minority nationalities while maintaining central oversight. In official Chinese usage, it is rendered as Xīnjīang Wéiwú'ěr Zìzhìqū (新疆维吾尔自治区) using Hanyu romanization, with Xīnjīang translating to "" or "new territory," reflecting imperial expansion connotations from the Qing but standardized in modern administrative contexts. The Uyghur-language equivalent is Shinjang Uyghur Aptonom Rayoni (شىنجاڭ ئۇيغۇر ئاپتونوم رايونى), employing a Latin-based script in contemporary PRC publications, though traditional Perso-Arabic script persists in cultural and settings. Internationally, "Xinjiang" predominates in diplomatic, governmental, and references, aligned with recognition of PRC territorial claims by entities such as the , where the region is listed under China's administrative divisions without alternative nomenclature. In contrast, Uyghur diaspora organizations and independence advocates, including the and Campaign for Uyghurs, favor "East Turkestan" to underscore pre-20th-century Turkic and Islamic historical identities and reject perceived colonial implications of the Chinese term, though this usage lacks formal international endorsement and appears primarily in activist literature. Isolated parliamentary motions, such as a 2025 city council vote, have adopted "East Turkestan" in non-binding resolutions to highlight concerns, but such instances remain exceptional against global standard practice. Linguistic adaptations in English and other languages employ Pinyin-derived "Xinjiang," supplanting earlier Wade-Giles "Sinkiang" post-1950s standardization efforts by the PRC to promote phonetic consistency in transliteration. Equivalent forms appear in as Xinjiang or slight variants (e.g., French Xinjiang, Spanish Xinjiang), while often retain "Şinjang" or cognates aligning with Uyghur phonetics, facilitating cross-cultural administrative and trade documentation in multilateral forums. These conventions underscore the region's integration into PRC structures, with naming reflecting both phonetic fidelity and political assertions in contemporary global discourse.

Geography

Location, Borders, and Physical Features

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region constitutes China's largest and westernmost provincial-level administrative division, located in the northwest of the country and encompassing Central Asia's eastern periphery. Covering an area of 1,660,001 square kilometers, it represents about one-sixth of China's total land area. The region borders eight countries, including Russia and Mongolia to the north, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to the northwest, Tajikistan to the west, Afghanistan to the southwest, and Pakistan and India to the south, with a total international border length exceeding 5,400 kilometers. The physical landscape is bisected by the Tian Shan mountain range, separating the northern Dzungarian Basin—characterized by steppe and mountain encirclement—from the southern Tarim Basin, which is largely occupied by the expansive Taklamakan Desert. Additional ranges include the Altai Mountains along the northern frontier and the Kunlun Mountains framing the southern edge. Elevation extremes underscore the region's topographic diversity, ranging from the Turpan Depression at 155 meters below sea level—the lowest point in China—to Kongur Tagh at 7,649 meters above sea level in the Pamir Mountains. These variations, coupled with surrounding high plateaus and deserts, have shaped natural barriers and corridors that influenced historical connectivity along routes like the Silk Road.

Climate and Environmental Conditions

Xinjiang exhibits a typical arid continental climate characterized by significant diurnal and seasonal temperature variations, low humidity, and sparse precipitation. Annual average temperatures range from 10°C to 15°C, with summers featuring prolonged hot periods where temperatures can exceed 40°C in low-lying areas like the Turpan Depression, and winters dropping below -20°C in northern and mountainous regions. Precipitation is highly uneven, averaging less than 150 mm annually across much of the region, with desert areas such as the Taklamakan receiving under 50 mm, while mountainous zones like the Tian Shan may see up to 1,000 mm due to orographic effects. Environmental pressures include widespread and , exacerbated by wind-driven processes. As of 2019, desertified land in Xinjiang spanned approximately 106.87 million hectares, representing a substantial portion of the region's arid and semi-arid expanses prone to aeolian degradation. storms are frequent, particularly in the and Junggar regions, where intense wind mobilizes particles, leading to nutrient loss and farmland degradation; these events contribute to PM10 and PM2.5 emissions that affect air quality and agricultural productivity. wind rates in northern Xinjiang's farmlands correlate with frequency, underscoring causal links between bare land exposure and erosional losses. Climate change amplifies these challenges through accelerated glacier retreat in the range, which supplies critical to rivers sustaining over 25 million residents. Nearly all (97.52%) of glaciers are retreating, with volume reductions estimated at 27% over recent decades, initially increasing flows but ultimately threatening long-term as "peak water" is approached and supplies diminish. This glacial melt, driven by rising temperatures, heightens risks of hydrological extremes, including floods from surges and droughts from reduced base flows, while regional warming—projected to continue—further stresses arid ecosystems. Mitigation efforts, including afforestation campaigns initiated around 2000 as part of broader national programs, have yielded mixed outcomes in combating . While some plantings have reduced incidence in targeted oases by stabilizing soils, empirical analyses indicate that improper species selection and overplanting in fragile arid zones contributed to up to 24.2% of cases in Xinjiang, as vegetation failed to establish, leading to resource competition and further degradation. Survival rates and ecological integration remain variable, with state-reported gains in not always translating to sustained amid ongoing climatic pressures.

Natural Resources and Geological Aspects

Xinjiang's geological structure is dominated by the and Junggar sedimentary basins separated by the mountain range, formed through prolonged tectonic interactions including late collisions between the Tarim Craton and surrounding terranes, as well as ongoing compression from the distant India-Eurasia plate convergence. The uplift, extending over 2,500 kilometers, results from reactivation of sutures, creating a fold-and-thrust belt with peaks exceeding 7,000 meters, such as those near . This intracontinental sustains active along faults like the Alai and Kalpin thrust systems. The hosts substantial hydrocarbon reserves, with proven oil fields like those in the Kuqa Depression and deep ultra-deep discoveries exceeding 1 billion tonnes in aggregate since intensified exploration in the late 1980s, including a 2021 find of approximately 900 million tonnes equivalent. accumulations, including tight and varieties, underpin Xinjiang's role as China's leading producer, with Tarim fields contributing over 181 million tonnes of oil equivalent extracted by 2021 from conventional and unconventional sources buried up to 10,000 meters. Mineral resources include vast coal deposits, particularly in the Zhundong Coalfield of the Junggar Basin, positioning Xinjiang as an emerging national hub with reserves supporting large-scale production. Uranium occurs in coal-hosted ores within the Jurassic strata of the Yili Basin, associated with organic-rich sediments. Rare earth elements are present in localized deposits, contributing to China's overall dominance, though extraction details remain tied to broader tectonic mineralizations. Seismic hazards persist due to the region's position in the Alpine-Himalayan seismic belt, exemplified by the August 22, 1902, Mw 7.7 Atushi earthquake near Artux, which caused widespread destruction along the southwestern Tian Shan front with surface ruptures and heavy casualties. At least 24 earthquakes exceeding magnitude 7 have struck since 1900, underscoring recurrent tectonic stress release. The basin-dominated topography fosters extensive desert coverage, constraining arable land to roughly 4.3% of the 1.66 million square kilometers, primarily in oasis depressions amid hyper-arid geological basins.

History

Ancient and Pre-Imperial Periods

The in present-day Xinjiang preserves evidence of settlements dating back to approximately 2100 BCE, with the representing one of the earliest and most significant sites. This cemetery, active from around 2100 to 1700 BCE, yielded over 150 burials featuring naturally mummified bodies preserved by the arid desert conditions, often interred in boat-shaped structures atop oval mounds. The mummies exhibited Caucasian physical traits, including light-colored hair, high cheekbones, and elongated skulls, alongside artifacts such as grains, sheep and remains, and dairy residues in dental , indicating a mixed pastoral-agricultural economy with possible western influences in crop origins. Genomic analysis of Xiaohe individuals reveals an indigenous population with ancestry linked to ancient north Eurasians and Northeast Asians, lacking genetic continuity with Afanasievo pastoralists or Andronovo groups, thus challenging earlier hypotheses of Indo-European migration as the source of these remains. Despite physical resemblances to later Tocharian speakers—whose , an Indo-European , is attested in the region from the 1st millennium CE—the Tarim mummies formed a genetically isolated group, sustained by local adaptations rather than large-scale influxes. Other contemporaneous sites, such as Gumugou (c. 1900 BCE), similarly document early oasis-based communities with hybrid subsistence strategies, laying the groundwork for enduring cultural layers in the basin's isolated environment. By the 2nd millennium BCE, oasis polities like Loulan emerged along the Tarim Basin's edges, functioning as nascent trade nodes amid rudimentary overland routes that foreshadowed the . Loulan, centered near , hosted mummies such as the "" (c. 1800 BCE), buried with practical items like combs and baskets, evidencing settled life amid shifting dunes. These sites facilitated early exchanges of goods, including metals and textiles, with distant influences detectable in artifacts, though direct Persian or Hellenistic impacts postdate this era. In the northern and eastern fringes, nomadic confederations exerted pressure from the 3rd century BCE, with the occupying areas near before westward displacements and the dominating eastern steppes, occasionally raiding basin peripheries. These groups, pastoralists reliant on horses and archery, interacted with sedentary Tarim communities without establishing lasting control, maintaining a mosaic of mobile and fixed societies. Significant engagement began in 138 BCE, when envoy Zhang Qian's mission, aimed at allying with the against threats, first documented the region's kingdoms and routes, marking the transition from pre-imperial autonomy.

Imperial and Central Asian Eras

The Han dynasty initiated sustained imperial involvement in the region now known as Xinjiang by establishing the Protectorate of the Western Regions (Xiyu Duhufu) in 60 BCE, following military campaigns that subdued local kingdoms and secured Silk Road trade routes against Xiongnu threats. This administrative structure, headquartered at Wulei near modern-day Urumqi, facilitated tribute collection from oasis city-states in the Tarim Basin and exerted influence over approximately 36 polities, though control remained intermittent due to nomadic pressures. After the Han collapse, subsequent dynasties like the Sui and early Tang faced renewed challenges, but Tang forces reestablished dominance by 640 CE through the creation of the Protectorate General to Pacify the West (Anxi Daduhufu), which oversaw the Tarim Basin, Tian Shan mountains, and Pamir approaches from bases in Turpan and Kucha. Tang expansion peaked amid alliances with Turkic groups but halted decisively at the Battle of Talas in 751 CE, where an Abbasid-Tibetan-Qarluk coalition defeated Tang armies, curbing Chinese westward advances and enabling greater Islamic penetration into Central Asia via trade and migration. The Uyghur Khaganate (744–840 CE), founded by Turkic tribes after overthrowing the Second Turkic Khaganate, exerted control over parts of Xinjiang and Mongolia, with its capital at Ordu-Baliq north of the Tian Shan. Khagan Bögü's alliance with the Tang against the Tibetan Empire in 762 CE led to his exposure to Manichaeism through Sogdian intermediaries, prompting its adoption as the khaganate's state religion and influencing Uyghur art, script, and governance until internal strife and Kyrgyz invasions precipitated its collapse in 840 CE. Post-Uyghur fragmentation saw Kara-Khanid and other Turkic-Islamic states emerge in the Tarim oases, blending sedentary and nomadic elements amid fluctuating suzerainties. The Mongol conquests integrated Xinjiang into the vast empire, with the (1271–1368) formalizing administration through commands like Beiting, encompassing Ili and , to manage trade and taxation across the western frontiers. Following Yuan decline, the , assigned to Genghis Khan's son Chagatai, dominated including Kashgaria (southern Xinjiang), promoting Turco-Mongol synthesis until fragmentation into and by the 14th century. id campaigns under (r. 1370–1405) briefly imposed overlordship on eastern Chagatai territories, fostering Persianate cultural exchanges, while Oirat (Dzungar) consolidated power in the 17th century, ruling and Tarim oases through a mix of Buddhist patronage and military dominance, perpetuating cycles of nomadic hegemony before Qing interventions.

Qing Dynasty and Transition to Modernity

The Qing dynasty consolidated control over Xinjiang through military campaigns against the Dzungar Khanate, culminating in the Qianlong Emperor's orders for the systematic extermination of the Oirat Mongol population between 1755 and 1759. Following the decisive Battle of Oroi-Jalatu in 1756 and subsequent operations, Qing forces implemented policies that resulted in the deaths of approximately 480,000 to 600,000 Dzungars out of an estimated pre-war population of 600,000 to 750,000, achieving near-total eradication of the group through massacre, starvation, and disease. This genocide, explicitly commanded to show "no mercy at all to individuals," cleared the northern steppe regions of Zungharia, enabling Han Chinese, Hui, and Uyghur settlement while establishing military garrisons under Manchu generals in key centers like Ili and Urumqi. Qing administration initially divided the territory into three circuits—Ili General, Tarbagatai, and Altay for the north, with the under separate commanderies—to integrate local Uyghur begs under a banner system adapted for non-Manchu forces. Innovations included subsidized migration of Han farmers to reclaim arable lands, construction of fortresses, and a dual civil-military structure that prioritized stability over assimilation, fostering economic ties via the while suppressing nomadic threats. In , amid recovery from the Dungan Revolt, the Qing formalized Xinjiang as a under a in Urumqi, marking the region's integration into the imperial provincial system and enhancing central fiscal oversight. The mid-19th century Dungan Revolt, spilling over from Han-Dungan conflicts in amid the , fragmented Qing authority and enabled Muhammad Yakub Beg, a Kokandi adventurer, to establish the in 1865 as an spanning to Yarkand. Yakub Beg's regime, reliant on alliances with Dungan forces and recognition from and Britain, imposed governance and expanded through conquest until Qing reconquest under in 1877, restoring imperial control after Yakub's suspicious death. Following the , Xinjiang entered a phase of warlord rule, with governing as military commander from 1912 to 1928, maintaining nominal Republican allegiance while suppressing ethnic unrest through divide-and-rule tactics. His assassination led to Jin Shuren's tenure, whose abolition of the semi-autonomous in 1930 provoked the from 1931 to 1934, involving Uyghur forces allied with Hui warlord against Han dominance, highlighting deepening Republican fragmentation and local resistance to centralizing policies.

Republican and Early People's Republic Periods

Following the collapse of Qing authority in 1912, Xinjiang came under the control of local warlords nominally loyal to the Republic of China. governed from 1912 until his assassination on July 7, 1928, maintaining relative stability through a policy of ethnic balance and suppression of separatist movements. His successor, , ruled from November 17, 1928, to May 2, 1933, but faced widespread unrest, including the (1931–1934), triggered by policies favoring Han settlers and taxing Muslim communities heavily. Sheng Shicai seized power on April 4, 1933, and ruled until August 29, 1944, initially consolidating control amid chaos from Islamic and Kazakh revolts. Sheng aligned closely with the Soviet Union in the mid-1930s, implementing Soviet-style administrative reforms and inviting military assistance; Soviet troops intervened in 1934 to support him against rebels in the Xinjiang Wars. Soviet influence peaked during 1939–1941, with occupation forces and advisors shaping governance, though Sheng shifted allegiance to the Kuomintang in 1942 amid purges of pro-Soviet elements. The erupted in November 1944, leading to the establishment of the Second East Turkestan Republic (ETR) in the Ili, Tarbagatay, and Altay districts, backed initially by Soviet forces seeking to counter Japanese expansion. The ETR operated as a independent entity until 1946, when it formed a coalition government with Republic of representatives under KMT governor , retaining autonomy in the "Three Districts." This fragile arrangement persisted until the Chinese Civil War's conclusion. In September 1949, as units advanced, Xinjiang's leaders—including former ETR figures like —pledged allegiance to the newly founded (PRC), enabling incorporation without major resistance on October 25, 1949. The Ili Rebellion's remnants were effectively subsumed through negotiation and the mysterious deaths of key ETR leaders, such as Ehmetjan Qasim, in a 1949 plane crash. Early PRC policies emphasized , confiscating holdings from feudal begs and landlords for redistribution to peasant farmers, including , with significant progress by 1952 in agricultural oases. The (1958–1962) imposed collectivization and industrial targets nationwide, contributing to killing tens of millions in core agricultural regions. Xinjiang experienced reduced severity compared to interior , attributed to its extensive pastoral economy, which relied less on grain monoculture and allowed mobility amid shortages, alongside Soviet border trade. By 1978, these periods marked Xinjiang's transition from warlord autonomy to integrated socialist administration under PRC rule.

Post-1949 Developments and Reforms

Following the economic reforms initiated by in 1978, Xinjiang experienced accelerated development through market liberalization, foreign investment, and expansion, which spurred significant migration to the region. The (XPCC), originally established in 1954, underwent revitalization post-1978, facilitating agricultural reclamation, industrial projects, and urban settlement growth, contributing to the Han rising from approximately 6% in 1953 to over 40% by 2000. This migration was driven by state incentives and economic opportunities in resource-rich areas, aligning with broader national policies to integrate peripheral regions. Economic indicators reflected robust growth, with Xinjiang's GDP expanding at an average annual rate exceeding 10% from the onward, fueled by , gas, and sectors, though disparities persisted between urban Han-dominated areas and rural Uyghur communities. Official Chinese data attribute this to reform-era policies, including special economic zones and XPCC-led initiatives that transferred and expertise. However, rapid demographic shifts and perceived cultural erosion fueled ethnic tensions, manifesting in sporadic unrest. The 1990 Baren Township uprising, where over 200 Uyghurs protested family planning policies and attempted to seize a government office, resulted in at least 23 deaths and marked an early escalation of Islamist-influenced violence, prompting Beijing to intensify border security and counter-separatism measures. Similarly, the 2009 Ürümqi riots, triggered by ethnic clashes following a factory brawl in Guangdong, led to widespread violence between Uyghurs and Han Chinese, with official figures reporting 197 deaths, predominantly Han. These events, amid over 200 documented violent terrorist incidents in Xinjiang from 1990 to 2013 according to Chinese government tallies, underscored vulnerabilities to extremism linked to separatist and religious radicalization. In response, authorities launched the "Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism" in May 2014, following a deadly market attack in , aiming to dismantle networks through heightened and de-radicalization efforts; official statistics claim a subsequent drop to zero major terrorist attacks post-implementation. While Chinese sources credit these reforms with stabilizing the region and enabling continued , independent assessments question the campaign's proportionality, citing risks of alienating local populations amid pre-existing grievances over and cultural policies.

Governance and Administration

Political Structure and Autonomy

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was established on October 1, 1955, as part of China's regional ethnic system, which grants formal self-governing powers to areas with concentrated ethnic minority populations, including over local , , and cultural affairs within the framework of national laws. This status replaced the prior provincial administration, aiming to integrate minority governance under centralized oversight while nominally prioritizing ethnic representation. Governance is led by the (CCP) Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regional Committee, whose first secretary holds supreme authority, directing policy, personnel, and security decisions, with the position typically filled by a appointee from , such as Chen Xiaojiang, appointed in July 2025. The regional government, chaired by an ethnic Uyghur like , serves in a subordinate ceremonial role, often as deputy party secretary, reflecting the paramountcy of party control over state administration in China's Leninist structure. Xinjiang is subdivided into 14 prefecture-level administrative units, comprising 4 prefecture-level cities (, Karamay, , ), 7 prefectures, and 5 autonomous prefectures, further divided into counties and townships that incorporate ethnic quotas for representation in local people's congresses and committees to ensure minority input per the 1984 on Ethnic Regional Autonomy. These mechanisms mandate proportional ethnic minority deputies in legislative bodies, though key executive positions remain centrally vetted. Since the Belt and Road Initiative's announcement in 2013, Xinjiang's political framework has emphasized its role as a strategic hub for the Economic Belt, with regional policies aligned to facilitate cross-border , corridors, and , subordinating local to national connectivity objectives. This integration has driven administrative priorities toward economic integration with , often overriding ethnic-specific governance in favor of developmental mandates from the .

Role of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps

The (XPCC), also known as the Bingtuan, was established in October 1954 as a unique quasi-military and economic organization tasked with reclaiming desert land, developing agriculture, and providing border defense in Xinjiang amid post-1949 consolidation efforts. Drawing from demobilized soldiers and inland migrants—predominantly —it aimed to stabilize the frontier through self-sufficient production units that combined armed defense with construction and farming, reflecting Mao-era priorities of internal security and resource mobilization. By the late , it had organized into divisions controlling arable expansion in arid zones, contributing to Xinjiang's integration into central planning while maintaining internal policing powers independent of local Uyghur-led authorities. Over decades, the XPCC evolved from a reclamation pioneer into a diversified state-owned conglomerate, administering divisions akin to prefectures with authority over policing, , and resource extraction, while expanding into , , and . Restored in 1981 after disruptions, it reclaimed over 20 million mu (about 1.3 million hectares) of land by the 2000s, focusing on , grain, and oil crops to bolster and export revenues, though this involved intensive water diversion from oases traditionally used by local ethnic groups. By 2023, XPCC-administered areas generated 369 billion yuan (approximately $52 billion USD) in GDP contribution to Xinjiang's economy, underscoring its role as an economic engine equivalent to a mid-sized , with subsidiaries dominating regional output—over one-third of China's total. Critics, including U.S. assessments, argue this expansion entrenched Han demographic dominance, controlling roughly 8% of Xinjiang's land and facilitating settler colonialism by prioritizing migrant inflows over , though Chinese state narratives frame it as mutually beneficial development. Empirical data on shows the XPCC supporting around 2.5 million direct and affiliated workers by 2020, primarily in and industry, amid broader regional job creation drives. Since 2014, following escalated violence attributed to Islamist —including the Urumqi attacks—the XPCC has integrated into Xinjiang's "Strike Hard" campaign against and , deploying its structure for , vocational training centers, and labor transfers framed as alleviation and . Official accounts credit these measures with preventing major incidents post-2016, leveraging XPCC farms and factories for "stable employment" programs that relocated hundreds of thousands from southern Xinjiang to northern production zones. However, U.S. sanctions in 2020 designated the XPCC for enabling mass arbitrary detention and forced labor in supply chains like , citing its oversight of reeducation facilities and coercive transfers as tools of repression targeting and —claims supported by defector testimonies and of expanded sites, though contested by as vocational compliant with labor laws. Independent analyses note the XPCC's dual-use assets amplified grid-style monitoring, blending economic output with enforcement, yet Western sources' emphasis on "" risks overstatement absent direct evidence under legal definitions, while underplaying pre-2014 ethnic tensions driven by jihadist incursions from . This role persists, with XPCC prisons handling convictions, prioritizing causal stability through demographic and ideological engineering over decentralized governance.

Local Governance and Policy Implementation

Local governance in Xinjiang is administered through township-level people's congresses and cadres who enforce central directives, including five-year economic and social development plans. Citizens of all ethnic groups directly elect deputies to these and congresses, which supervise local executive bodies responsible for implementation in areas such as , alleviation, and social stability. The fanghuiju (visiting for benefits and integration) campaign, a key mechanism, deploys work teams for regular home visits to monitor compliance, resolve disputes, and integrate policies into daily community life, evolving from earlier Mao-era models to emphasize stability in ethnic minority areas. Ethnic policies at this level incorporate in education, granting minority students preferential treatment via bonus points—up to 20 in Xinjiang—on the national college entrance exam () and reserved quotas for university admissions, particularly benefiting rural southern regions with high Uyghur populations. These measures, administered locally through preparatory classes and enrollment targets, aim to boost minority higher education access amid lower baseline performance in Mandarin-based testing. policies, mandated regionally since the early 2000s to shift instruction from native languages to Mandarin primacy, are executed by schools, often requiring teachers to prioritize curricula; this has elicited resistance from Uyghur educators and elites, who view it as eroding cultural linguistic foundations, though open protests have been limited by security measures. Anti-corruption efforts since 2012, directed by central authorities under , have targeted township and county officials, purging those implicated in graft that impeded policy rollout, with investigations extending to over 100 provincial-level cases nationally by , including Xinjiang instances tied to resource mismanagement. Local cadres, often rotated from Han-majority provinces, implement these drives alongside routine audits to align execution with Beijing's stability and development priorities.

Economy

Agricultural and Resource-Based Sectors

Xinjiang's agricultural sector is predominantly reliant on irrigation from river oases and meltwater in the Tarim and Ili basins, enabling cultivation in an otherwise arid environment. Cotton remains the cornerstone crop, with the region producing approximately 5.12 million metric tons in 2023, constituting about 90 percent of China's national output. This production is concentrated in the southern Tarim Basin, where drip irrigation and hybrid varieties have sustained high yields averaging over 2,000 kg per hectare. Complementary crops include wheat and corn in the northern Ili Valley, benefiting from fertile alluvial soils and ample precipitation, alongside fruits such as grapes, apricots, and apples, for which Xinjiang leads national production in several varieties. Pastoralism dominates in the expansive northern and eastern grasslands, supporting over 45 million head of sheep and goats as of 2023, primarily managed by Kazakh and Kyrgyz herders through seasonal . These activities leverage natural pastures in areas like the , yielding meat, wool, and dairy products adapted to the region's harsh continental climate. The (XPCC) has integrated into both crop and operations since its establishment in the , achieving full mechanization in grain cultivation and harvesting, which has driven per-unit yields for to around 466 kilograms per mu and corn to 783 kilograms per mu by 2023. Aquatic production is marginal, confined to inland lakes such as , which supports and with an annual catch historically around 2,000 tons, though total regional output reached 173,000 tons in 2022 including . This sector contributes less than 1 percent to Xinjiang's GDP, overshadowed by terrestrial and constrained by limited water bodies and environmental regulations.

Industrial Development and Energy Production

Xinjiang's industrial sector has expanded significantly since the 2000s, driven by extraction of hydrocarbons and minerals, alongside energy infrastructure development. The hosts major oil and gas fields operated primarily by and , with ultra-deep drilling enabling substantial output. In 2024, the Tarim Oilfield produced 20.47 million tons of oil and gas equivalent from reservoirs deeper than 6,000 meters, contributing to Xinjiang's role as a key supplier in China's . Cumulative ultra-deep production reached 150 million tons by early 2025, underscoring technological advances in despite challenging geological conditions. Karamay serves as a central hub for processing, leveraging local crude oil to produce refined products. The Refinery, operated by , integrates upstream extraction with downstream refining, supporting national demands for fuels and chemicals. Petrochemical Company maintains a capacity of 200,000 tons annually for , fulfilling approximately 50% of China's domestic needs as of 2025. This cluster has evolved from basic oilfield operations discovered in 1955 into a diversified energy-chemical base, incorporating initiatives tied to and solar inputs. Mineral extraction complements energy sectors, with focus on non-ferrous metals and . Xinjiang holds reserves of , , and lead-zinc, exemplified by the world's highest-altitude lead-zinc base at over 4,000 meters , boasting 21 million tons in reserves and 2.5 million tons annual capacity as of 2024. deposits in western Xinjiang have yielded large-scale discoveries, while projects feature in recent state-promoted developments. dominates resource extraction, with 74 operational mines producing output that positions the region as an emerging national hub, supported by intelligent technologies for efficiency and safety. These activities fuel downstream , including for components via associated supply chains, even amid Western import restrictions citing labor concerns since the early 2020s. Energy production relies heavily on coal, which constitutes a major share of the regional mix, powering industrial growth while facing national decarbonization pressures. Xinjiang's coal output has surged, undercutting broader climate targets through expanded capacity in the 2020s. Transition efforts include renewables, with wind and solar installations leveraging the region's vast deserts and steppes; Xinjiang's power supply features strong production capacity driven by rapid renewable growth, with wind and solar dominant comprising nearly 60% of total installed capacity, increasing the clean energy proportion, and overall robust generation led by renewables as the primary growth driver. By 2024, provincial capacities contributed to China's national wind and solar boom, though specific Xinjiang figures align with targeted additions exceeding 20 GW cumulatively in recent years. Coal's entrenched role persists due to baseload reliability for heavy industry, with over 66 GW of new national coal permits in 2024 reflecting similar regional dynamics.

Trade, Investment, and Development Initiatives

In 2023, Xinjiang's exports reached approximately $40 billion, primarily consisting of cotton, textiles, and petrochemical products, contributing significantly to the region's foreign trade volume of 357.3 billion yuan (about $50 billion USD). The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), enacted by the United States in 2022, presumes that goods from Xinjiang are produced with forced labor and prohibits their importation unless proven otherwise, leading to heightened scrutiny and detentions of shipments, particularly in apparel and cotton sectors. Despite this, U.S.-bound exports from Xinjiang increased 265% year-on-year to $2.4 billion in the first seven months of 2025, indicating resilience through supply chain adjustments or alternative markets, though overall Western sanctions have prompted diversification toward Central Asia and domestic consumption. Official statistics report Xinjiang's GDP grew by 6.1% in 2024, exceeding 2 trillion yuan ($281 billion) for the first time, driven by infrastructure and trade expansions amid external pressures. Poverty alleviation efforts culminated in 2020 with the eradication of absolute poverty, lifting over 3 million rural residents across 3,666 villages through targeted programs including industrial development, job creation, and relocation of approximately 460,000 individuals from remote southern areas to urban centers for employment in manufacturing and services. These relocations, supported by housing subsidies exceeding 4.3 billion yuan ($600 million) in 2017 alone for initial phases, aimed to integrate impoverished populations into economic hubs, resulting in reported zero absolute poverty rates per national standards, though independent verification remains limited due to restricted access. Under the (BRI), Xinjiang serves as a key hub, with the International Center of Boundary Cooperation facilitating rail and road trade with , handling billions in annual cargo volumes and establishing the world's largest . through has boomed, with Kazakhstan-Xinjiang exchanges growing via duty-free zones and infrastructure like the Lianyungang corridor, contributing to regional GDP gains without evidence of debt traps materializing in Kazakhstan's balances, as loans remain manageable relative to export revenues. (FDI) inflows, including from BRI partners, have supported special economic zones in Urumqi, , and , established in 2023, fostering cross-border and energy exports, though geopolitical tensions have shifted focus from Western investors to Eurasian ones.

Demographics

Ethnic Composition and Historical Shifts

According to the Seventh National Population Census conducted in 2020, Xinjiang's permanent totaled 25.85 million, with the Han ethnic group comprising 10.92 million persons or 42.24 percent. The Uyghur population stood at 11.62 million or approximately 45 percent, while numbered about 1.8 million or 7 percent, and other ethnic minorities including Hui, Kyrgyz, , and smaller groups accounted for the remaining 12.8 percent. Ethnic minorities overall constituted 57.76 percent of the , reflecting a diverse composition dominated by Turkic-speaking groups in the southern and pastoralist minorities in the north. Historically, formed a small minority in Xinjiang until the mid-20th century. The 1953 census recorded a total population of 4.87 million, with Han at 6 percent (approximately 292,000 persons) and at 75 percent. Prior to the Qing Dynasty's in the , Han presence was negligible following the withdrawal of garrisons around the 8th-9th centuries, leaving the region primarily inhabited by Uyghur agriculturalists in oases, Indo-European (extinct by medieval times), and later Mongol and Turkic nomads. Qing rule introduced Han soldiers and settlers, but they remained under 10 percent of the population by the early , concentrated in urban administrative roles rather than widespread settlement. Post-1949, government policies incentivized Han migration through land reclamation, infrastructure projects, and economic opportunities, dramatically shifting the ethnic balance. By 1964, the population had grown to 7.44 million, with Han proportion rising amid influxes tied to the . This trend accelerated, reaching 40 percent Han by 2000 and approaching parity with by 2020, driven predominantly by net in-migration rather than differential natural increase within Xinjiang. From 2010 to 2020, Xinjiang's ethnic minority population grew by 14.27 percent nationally outpacing the Han growth rate of about 5 percent across , though local Han expansion continued via sustained migration.
Census YearTotal Population (millions)Han (%)Uyghur (%)
19534.87675
19647.44~10-15 (rising)~70
200013.084046
202025.8542.2444.96
The population of Xinjiang totaled 25,852,345 as of the 2020 national census, marking an increase of 18.5% from the 2010 figure of 21,813,335. By the end of , the population had risen to 26.23 million, reflecting continued but moderating growth amid national demographic trends. This expansion has been driven by natural increase and , with annual growth rates averaging around 1.6% in the preceding decade. Fertility rates in Xinjiang have undergone significant decline since the mid-20th century, aligning with broader Chinese policies while starting from higher baselines among minority groups. The (TFR) for , estimated at approximately 4.0 in the 1950s, fell to 1.99 by 2000 and 1.84 by 2010, remaining above the national Han average but showing convergence. By 2020, Uyghur TFR hovered around 2.0, though regional birth rates dropped sharply from 15.88 per 1,000 in 2017 to 8.14 per 1,000 in 2019, a decline of 48.74%, the steepest globally in that period per analyzed data. Official sources attribute this to socioeconomic development and voluntary , while critics link it to coercive measures; empirical records confirm the trend regardless of causation. Urbanization has accelerated markedly, with the proportion of urban residents rising from 30.1% in 2000 to 57.89% by 2022, outpacing some national averages due to resource-driven development and investments. This shift involved substantial rural-to-urban migration, including over 1 million relocations since 2014 tied to skills training and programs, contributing to urban densities in prefectures like Urumqi exceeding 1,000 per square kilometer. Such trends have transformed rural-dominant demographics, with urban areas absorbing labor for industrial and service sectors, though challenges like and service strains persist in rapidly expanding cities.

Vital Statistics and Migration Patterns

In Xinjiang, average rose from less than 30 years in 1949 to 74.7 years in 2020, reflecting improvements in healthcare, , and nutrition amid broader socioeconomic development. declined sharply from over 400 per 1,000 live births in 1949 to 6.75 per 1,000 in 2020, while maternal mortality fell from 43.41 per 100,000 in 2010 to 26.65 per 100,000 in 2018. These trends align with a from high birth and death rates post-1949 to lower rates, with death rates declining first due to interventions. Birth rates in Xinjiang decreased from 15.88 per 1,000 people in 2017 to approximately 8 per 1,000 by 2019, contributing to a natural rate that fell from 11.4 per 1,000 in 2017 to 6.13 per 1,000 in 2018. Death rates remained lower than birth rates, supporting overall expansion, though the fertility decline mirrors national patterns influenced by and policy shifts. Migration patterns from 2010 to 2020 featured significant net inflow of , with the Han increasing by 2.174 million, including 1.948 million migrants from other provinces, driven primarily by economic opportunities such as employment in the (XPCC) and resource sectors. Census data indicate this influx was voluntary, tied to job availability rather than , as Han growth outpaced Uyghur natural increase (25% versus 16% over the decade). Outflow remained minimal, with a floating of 8.05 million in 2020 mostly involving intra-regional movement (4.66 million) or short-term inter-regional flows (3.39 million), and some return migration to Xinjiang after earlier departures in the 2000s. Overall, these patterns contributed to Xinjiang's total rising 18.5% to 25.85 million by 2020.

Security, Counter-Terrorism, and Stability

Historical Terrorism and Extremist Incidents

The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), also known as the (TIP), emerged in the as a key Uyghur militant group seeking to establish an independent in Xinjiang through violent jihad, with documented ties to and training camps in and . ETIM leaders, including founder , coordinated attacks and received logistical support from these networks, as evidenced by UN sanctions listings and designations of the group as terrorist since 2002. Ideological drivers included pan-Islamist rejection of secular governance, viewing the Chinese state as un-Islamic and justifying violence to impose rule over East Turkestan. Early incidents in the 1990s involved bombings and clashes, such as the February 25, 1997, explosions on three buses in , which killed nine civilians, including children, using improvised devices planted by Uyghur separatists. This attack followed protests in (Gulja) in 1997, where ethnic unrest escalated into violence against state symbols, reflecting growing separatist mobilization. Violence intensified in the 2000s, culminating in the July 5, 2009, riots, where Uyghur mobs targeted residents, buses, and businesses, resulting in 197 deaths—mostly —and over 1,700 injuries, sparked by factory brawl reports from but rooted in accumulated ethnic grievances and extremist agitation. A spike occurred in 2013–2014, including the October 2013 vehicle ramming that killed five, claimed by TIP, and the April 2014 market bombing that killed three. The most lethal was the March 1, 2014, Kunming railway station knife attack, where eight Uyghur assailants from Xinjiang indiscriminately stabbed civilians, killing 31 and wounding 143, described by Chinese authorities as premeditated by separatist forces. According to Chinese records, terrorist and extremist acts from 1990 to 2013 encompassed over 200 documented incidents, causing more than 1,000 deaths among civilians, security personnel, and perpetrators, though independent verification of exact totals remains limited due to restricted access. These attacks often featured bombings, stabbings, and riots, with perpetrators invoking religious justifications for targeting non-Muslims and state infrastructure, amid reports of Wahhabi-influenced ideologies spreading via returning pilgrims and illicit materials post-1980s reforms.

Evolution of Counter-Terrorism Policies

China's counter-terrorism framework in Xinjiang gained international alignment following the September 11, 2001, attacks, when Beijing identified the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist entity with operational ties to al-Qaeda, prompting its designation under UN Security Council Resolution 1267 on October 25, 2002. This listing sanctioned ETIM assets and travel, framing Xinjiang unrest as part of global jihadism rather than isolated ethnic grievance. By the late 2000s, policies coalesced around combating the "three evils" of , , and religious extremism, viewed by Chinese authorities as mutually reinforcing threats destabilizing the region. In 2010, amid documented attacks such as the July Urumqi riots aftermath and sporadic bombings, official rhetoric and strategies emphasized preemptive measures against these forces, integrating them into regional governance and security protocols. This doctrinal persistence informed legal expansions, prioritizing ideological containment alongside physical security. The 2014 Strike Hard Campaign against violent terrorism marked a strategic escalation, launched in May after a Urumqi market attack killing 43 civilians, by deploying over 20,000 additional police and expanding surveillance infrastructure including checkpoints and facial recognition systems. De-extremification ordinances followed, prohibiting behaviors like abnormal beard growth or veil-wearing as proxies for , with over 10,000 arrests reported in the initial phase. The national Counter-Terrorism Law, passed December 27, 2015, and effective January 1, 2016, codified these shifts by mandating technology-driven prevention—such as real-time data sharing from telecoms and internet firms—and authorizing preventive detentions, with Xinjiang issuing implementing rules in 2018 to localize enforcement.

Vocational Training Centers and Deradicalization Efforts

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region established and training centers following the 2017 Regulation on De-extremification, which authorized measures to prevent and eradicate religious extremism through and training. These centers expanded rapidly during 2017-2019, coinciding with documenting new constructions and expansions at over 380 sites across the region, many beginning in 2016-2017 with added security features like high walls and guard towers. Official Chinese sources describe the facilities as schools providing alongside vocational skills, with operations peaking to address perceived threats from . The curriculum, as outlined in official documents, emphasized standard spoken and written Mandarin Chinese, legal knowledge, vocational skills such as tailoring and electronics assembly, and deradicalization education to counter extremist ideologies. Leaked internal directives from 2017, including speeches attributed to regional leader , instructed center staff to enforce ideological conformity through daily routines of study, labor, and self-criticism sessions, with no tolerance for resistance. Participants, estimated by Chinese officials to number in the hundreds of thousands at peak with over 1.29 million receiving related training from 2014-2018, underwent programs using bilingual materials in ethnic languages and Mandarin. Releases were conditional on demonstrated compliance, including mastery of curriculum and renunciation of extremist views, per operational manuals. Amendments to the de-extremification regulations in October 2018 explicitly incorporated vocational centers into the framework, mandating their role in providing "education and training" to those influenced by while formalizing procedures for intake based on indicators like irregular growth or veiling. Facilities operated under strict protocols revealed in leaked files, including 24-hour , political classes, and phased progression from basic compliance to advanced skills training. Chinese authorities reported that by late , over 90% of participants had completed programs and returned to society, with centers shifting toward optional employment training thereafter. These efforts were framed officially as preventive measures against , distinct from criminal detention, though leaked documents indicate extrajudicial elements in selection and management.

Outcomes in Security and Regional Stability

Following the implementation of intensified counter-terrorism measures after , Xinjiang has experienced no reported violent terrorist incidents since , according to official Chinese government statements. This marks a sharp decline from the period between 1990 and 2016, during which authorities documented several thousand terrorist attacks resulting in significant casualties. Prior volatility included major events such as the 2009 Urumqi riots, the 2013 vehicle attack attributed to Xinjiang-linked extremists, and multiple incidents like the stabbing and Urumqi market bombing, which together killed hundreds. The absence of subsequent large-scale attacks has been cited by Chinese officials as evidence of policy efficacy in neutralizing threats from groups like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), designated as terrorist by the UN and multiple states. This security stabilization has correlated with socioeconomic indicators reflecting enhanced regional stability. Xinjiang's GDP per capita rose from approximately 35,168 RMB in to 73,774 RMB (about $10,469 USD) in 2023, more than doubling amid broader national growth. Tourism, previously hampered by security concerns, rebounded dramatically, with the region receiving 323 million domestic and international visitors in 2025, generating 370 billion yuan in revenue. Such trends suggest that reduced has facilitated and public mobility, contrasting with pre- disruptions that deterred economic activity. Policies targeting proxies, including closures of unregistered religious sites and schools deemed conducive to , have accompanied these outcomes. Authorities report dismantling networks linked to illegal preaching and materials, contributing to the incident-free period, though independent verification remains limited due to access restrictions. While some analyses attribute stability to pervasive and arrests—over 13,000 terrorism-related detentions since —the empirical drop in violence has underpinned development gains, with urban areas like Urumqi showing normalized daily operations and infrastructure expansion. Critics, including groups, contend that such measures risk overreach by conflating dissent with threats, potentially undermining long-term cohesion, yet data on incident reduction and economic proxies indicate short-term stabilization.

Human Rights Controversies and International Debates

Allegations of Mass Detention and Cultural Suppression

and have alleged that between 2017 and 2020, Chinese authorities detained over one million and other Muslim minorities in facilities across Xinjiang, based on interviews with over 100 relatives of detainees and analyses of leaked government documents and . These organizations describe the facilities—often termed " and centers" by officials—as sites of mass arbitrary detention without , targeting individuals for behaviors such as growing beards, wearing veils, or possessing religious texts. Survivor testimonies collected by and report experiences of physical and in these camps, including beatings, , , and forced political sessions lasting up to 18 hours daily. Family separations are also cited in these accounts, with children placed in state-run orphanages or boarding schools while parents are detained, purportedly to prevent "extremist" influences. The 2022 Office of the High Commissioner for assessment reviewed such testimonies and patterns of enforcement under vague counter-terrorism laws, concluding credible indications of arbitrary detention and ill-treatment, though it stopped short of attributing intent or scale definitively. Allegations of cultural suppression include the demolition or alteration of thousands of mosques and removal of Islamic architectural features like domes and minarets since 2017, as documented by analysis from think tanks and NGOs. Activists and reports claim this reduces operational religious sites by half in some areas, aiming to erode Uyghur Islamic identity. Parallel policies on , implemented progressively from the 2010s, mandate Mandarin as the primary in schools, phasing out Uyghur-language textbooks and curricula by the early 2020s, which critics from Uyghur advocacy groups describe as systematic erosion of the Uyghur tongue. These measures, framed by proponents as promoting bilingualism for integration, are contested by sources reliant on testimonies as coercive assimilation tools.

Claims of Forced Labor and Economic Coercion

The (UFLPA), signed into law on December 27, 2021, presumes that all goods produced wholly or in part in Xinjiang or by entities linked to the region are made with forced labor, barring their entry into the unless importers prove otherwise through traceability. By mid-2025, U.S. Customs and Border Protection had examined over 16,000 shipments valued at nearly $3.7 billion under the UFLPA, with a significant portion involving Xinjiang-origin products such as , apparel, and components. Enforcement has targeted high-priority sectors including solar panels, tomatoes, and apparel, reflecting claims that state-sponsored programs integrate ethnic minorities into s under coercive conditions. Allegations center on labor transfer schemes, often described by critics as extensions of vocational centers, where and other minorities are relocated from Xinjiang to factories across . Reports estimate that over 500,000 ethnic minorities, primarily , were mobilized for hand-picking in Xinjiang alone during the 2020 harvest through state-mandated programs involving quotas and surveillance. Broader transfers to inland facilities, framed by Chinese authorities as poverty alleviation, have reportedly involved hundreds of thousands of workers subjected to ideological , restricted movement, and performance-linked insufficient to ensure voluntariness. The U.S. Department of Labor documents these programs as featuring indicators such as abuse of vulnerability, deception, and coercion, linking them to global supply chains in sectors like textiles and aluminum. Investigations have tied over 100 international brands to factories employing transferred minority workers, including apparel makers like Nike and automakers such as and Tesla via aluminum and parts suppliers. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reported in 2025 that facilities owned by Chinese sportswear giants , Anta, and , as well as subcontractors for U.S. brands like and , utilize Uyghur labor schemes involving segregated dorms and political education. In the automotive sector, Wuhan's industrial zone hosts suppliers connected to labor transfers, raising risks for global carmakers despite third-party audits that critics argue fail to detect coercion due to restricted access and scripted interviews. Poverty alleviation relocations, targeting rural minorities since 2017, are alleged to mask economic , with participants facing penalties for refusal and integration into production where 2020s government documents reveal mandatory mobilization exceeding voluntary participation thresholds. U.S. Department of Labor listings include Xinjiang , tomatoes, and polysilicon as produced with forced labor, citing non-compliance in audits that overlook off-site transfers and . These claims, drawn from leaked directives, , and defector accounts, have prompted diversifications but persist amid debates over evidence verifiability, as independent on-site inspections remain limited. International sources continue to highlight ongoing concerns, with UN experts in January 2026 expressing alarm over persistent reports of state-imposed forced labor involving Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang and across China. Human Rights Watch documents persistent surveillance and human rights abuses in the region as of 2026.

Genocide Accusations and Demographic Evidence

In January 2021, the United States Department of State determined that the People's Republic of China had committed genocide against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, citing evidence of intent to prevent births through coercive measures including forced sterilizations, abortions, and intrauterine device insertions. This assessment, issued by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on January 19 and affirmed by the Biden administration, emphasized policies aimed at suppressing Uyghur demographic expansion as a key indicator of genocidal intent under the UN Genocide Convention's prohibition on measures to prevent births within a group. Independent reports, such as one by Adrian Zenz (affiliated with the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, a US-based anti-communist organization), claimed an 80% drop in Uyghur birth rates in Xinjiang between 2017 and 2019, attributing it to intensified enforcement of birth control policies targeting ethnic minorities. These allegations drew from leaked government documents and local statistics, projecting that such policies could prevent 2.6 to 4.5 million births among Uyghurs and other Muslims in southern Xinjiang over two decades. Official Chinese data from 2020, however, records the Uyghur in Xinjiang increasing by 16.2% from to 2020, reaching approximately 11.62 million, outpacing the national growth rate in the region when adjusted for migration but reflecting overall demographic expansion amid . Xinjiang's total rose by 16.73% over the same decade to 25.85 million, exceeding 's national growth of 5.38%, with ethnic minorities comprising a stable 65% share. rates among converged toward national averages—from 1.99 children per woman in 2000 to 1.84 in —consistent with broader trends in , , and nationwide, rather than isolated coercion. Critics of claims, including demographic analysts, argue that the absence of , mass graves, or —hallmarks of historical genocides—undermines assertions of group destruction, even if birth suppression policies exist; Uyghur improved from around 68 years in 2000 to over 72 by 2020, alongside drops in from 26.58 to 6.94 per 1,000 and maternal mortality from 43.41 to 26.65 per 100,000 between and 2018. Empirical scrutiny reveals tensions in the evidence base for designations, as sources like Zenz's reports rely on extrapolated local data amid acknowledged challenges in verifying Xinjiang statistics due to restricted access, while figures—conducted under state oversight—show sustained growth that contradicts physical elimination narratives. The decline post-2017 aligns with intensified counter-extremism campaigns but lacks direct causal linkage to intent for group destruction when viewed against long-term demographic trajectories, where Uyghur numbers have multiplied over 3-fold since 1953. No independent verification has documented net loss or biological attrition sufficient for under international law's requirement of substantial destruction of the group in whole or part.

Chinese Responses, Official Data, and Independent Verifications

The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China issued a white paper in August 2019 titled Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang, which described the centers as lawful institutions established to educate and rehabilitate individuals influenced by terrorism and religious extremism, emphasizing voluntary participation, legal protections, and skills training to prevent radicalization. Subsequent white papers, including Respecting and Protecting the Rights of All Ethnic Groups in Xinjiang in July 2021 and The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang in October 2021, reiterated that these measures safeguard ethnic rights, promote deradicalization through education rather than punishment, and have curbed extremism effectively without infringing on freedoms. Chinese officials have maintained that participants receive standard wages, medical care, and family visitation rights, with no reports of mistreatment. Official statistics indicate that Xinjiang experienced several thousand terrorist incidents from 1990 to the end of 2016, resulting in significant casualties, but no such attacks have occurred since 2017, which authorities attribute to the success of efforts. Demographic data from China's seventh national in 2020 shows the Uyghur in Xinjiang reached 11.62 million, reflecting a 25.04% increase from 10.04 million in 2000 and a 16% rise from 2010, outpacing the national average growth rate for ethnic minorities in some periods and contradicting claims of systematic reduction. Regional GDP grew by 6.1% in 2024 to over 2 yuan (approximately $280 billion USD), driven by sectors like and , demonstrating economic resilience amid . Officials report that over 90% of vocational graduates secured stable and expressed satisfaction with their lives post-training, based on internal surveys. Independent observations include visits by over 1,000 diplomats, international organization officials, and journalists from more than 100 countries since late 2018, many from Muslim-majority nations, who toured facilities and affirmed the programs' focus on development and stability. In 2019, diplomats from over 50 countries, including ambassadors from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Indonesia, inspected sites and commended counter-terrorism measures as effective and rights-compliant. Satellite imagery analysis by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) documents a decline in the operational scale of certain detention facilities after 2019, with some repurposed into schools, hospitals, or vocational sites, aligning with Chinese assertions of phased releases and program transitions. These verifications, often from governments economically aligned with China, contrast with Western critiques, highlighting discrepancies in interpretive frameworks.

Culture and Society

Languages, Traditions, and Ethnic Diversity

Xinjiang hosts over 40 ethnic groups, with forming the largest at around 46% of the population in recent censuses, followed by at approximately 40%, and notable minorities such as (about 7%), Kyrgyz (around 1%), Hui, and . and Kyrgyz predominate in northern and western border areas, while are concentrated in the south and oases. The Uyghur language, a Karluk branch Turkic tongue with agglutinative grammar, vowel harmony, and suffix-based morphology, serves as the primary idiom for over 10 million speakers in the region, using a modified Arabic script. Kazakh and Kyrgyz, both Kipchak Turkic languages mutually intelligible to degrees with shared nomadic vocabulary, are spoken by those groups in Ili and Kizilsu prefectures, respectively, often in Cyrillic or Arabic adaptations. Mongolian variants prevail among Mongol herders, while Mandarin Chinese dominates Han communication. Bilingualism in Uyghur-Chinese or Kazakh-Chinese is common in mixed urban settings, with regional dialects reflecting oasis versus steppe influences. Since the 1950s, Han migration—spurred by state development programs—has swelled the Mandarin-speaking populace from under 7% to over 40%, concentrating in northern Xinjiang and cities like Urumqi, where it functions as a in and administration. This influx, peaking during and industrial pushes in the 1950s-1970s, has diluted monolingual use in public spheres, though ethnic tongues endure in家庭 and rural enclaves. Customary practices highlight pastoral and oasis heritages: Kazakh and Kyrgyz communities uphold horsemanship traditions through annual fairs featuring endurance racing, archery on horseback, and kokpar (goat-pulling games), echoing steppe equestrian skills amid modern ranching. Uyghur meshrep gatherings, involving instrumental ensembles like rawap and satar, poetic improvisation, and communal dances such as saman, persist in southern townships despite urban migration, serving as social bonding rituals. These observances adapt to contemporary life, with festivals drawing mixed audiences in venues like Ili's grasslands. Inter-ethnic unions, while comprising under 4% nationally, have grown with urbanization and mobility, yielding blended rites like shared equestrian events or fusion cuisine in multi-ethnic households.

Religion, Islamization, and State Regulation

Islam arrived in Xinjiang during the late 9th and early 10th centuries through Arab trade and missionary influences along the Silk Road, particularly in Kashgar, where it became a center of learning by that time. The Kara-Khanid Khanate, a Turkic Muslim dynasty, accelerated Islamization from the 10th century onward by conquering Buddhist kingdoms like Khotan around 1006, leading to widespread conversion among Turkic populations through ruler decrees, Sufi missionary work, and political consolidation. By the 19th century, Islam had become the dominant faith among Xinjiang's ethnic minorities, with approximately 96% of non-Han groups such as Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz adhering to it, reflecting a shift from earlier Buddhist and shamanistic traditions. ![Abakh Hoja Tomb in Xinjiang][float-right] Traditional Islam in Xinjiang emphasized Sufi orders like the Naqshbandiyya, which integrated local customs and promoted mystical practices compatible with governance under Qing rule. From the 1980s to the 2000s, however, Salafist and Wahhabi influences imported via Saudi-funded mosques, pilgrimages to , and texts challenged this syncretic model, fostering puritanical strains linked to and violence, as seen in attacks by groups like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). These imports, often backed by foreign funding, contrasted with indigenous Sufism by rejecting veneration and promoting stricter adherence, contributing to Beijing's view of them as vectors for the "three evils" of , , and . In response to rising , Xinjiang authorities implemented regulations in 2017 prohibiting "abnormal" long beards for men and full-face veils for women in public, alongside bans on refusing state TV and with religious content, framed as measures to curb tied to prior . These policies align with broader efforts, including training imams in state-approved interpretations of that emphasize loyalty to the and socialist values over foreign doctrines. By 2023, such programs had standardized sermons in over 20,000 mosques, promoting "Chinese Islam" that subordinates religious authority to national unity. Treatment of Muslim groups varies by ethnicity: Hui Muslims, more assimilated and lacking separatist ties, face fewer restrictions and have seen mosque construction and pilgrimage allowances, while Uyghurs endure heightened scrutiny due to associations with militancy. In contrast, Christianity has grown among Han migrants, with house church networks expanding rapidly in Urumqi since the 1990s, drawing thousands through evangelism amid official tolerance for registered Protestant and Catholic activities. This differential reflects causal priorities: regulating faiths perceived as fueling unrest while permitting those integrated with state stability.

Media, Education, and Social Integration Policies

State-controlled media outlets, including Xinhua and (CGTN), predominate in Xinjiang's information landscape, disseminating official narratives on regional developments while local broadcasting faces stringent oversight. Following the July 2009 Urumqi riots, which resulted in nearly 200 deaths, authorities imposed a near-total media blackout, suspending for 10 months and blocking platforms like to curb the spread of inflammatory content. Local Uyghur-language television and print media underwent enhanced , with content aligned to prevent dissemination of separatist or extremist views, as part of broader efforts to maintain narrative control amid ethnic tensions. Internet access in Xinjiang operates under augmented restrictions beyond the national Great Firewall, including mandatory real-name registration and to block materials deemed extremist or promoting the "three evils" of , , and . In , regional regulations formalized these controls, requiring users to install monitoring software on devices and prohibiting VPNs that evade filters, ostensibly to counter online linked to prior . By , authorities had severed mobile services for residents using unauthorized tools to bypass restrictions, reflecting a prioritizing over unrestricted access. Education policy in Xinjiang mandates nine years of compulsory schooling, typically from ages 6 to 15, encompassing primary and junior secondary levels, with a retention rate of 95.69% recorded in 2020. Gross enrollment in preschools reached 98.19% that year, supported by expanded facilities and subsidies to ensure near-universal primary net enrollment approaching 100%. Vocational high schools form a key component, enrolling a substantial share of post-compulsory —nationally, secondary vocational institutions accounted for over 40% of upper secondary students by 2021—to foster practical skills and labor market readiness, though regional figures emphasize integration into state-directed economic sectors. Social integration initiatives emphasize ethnic unity through structured intermingling, including the Xinjiang Class (Xinjiangban) system since 2000, which relocates minority students to inland provinces for multi-ethnic education and cultural exposure. Urban development projects promote mixed residential communities, reducing traditional ethnic enclaves via resettlement and paired-assistance programs from Han-majority regions, as accelerated post-2010. The 2020 national documented Xinjiang's population at 25.85 million, with ethnic minorities comprising 15 million and showing sustained growth, alongside increased urban inter-ethnic proximity that official reports attribute to these cohesion efforts. Such policies aim to cultivate shared identity, though critics from outlets like interpret them as assimilationist.

Infrastructure and Connectivity

Transportation Networks

Xinjiang's transportation infrastructure features an extensive network of roads, railways, and airports, designed to overcome the region's challenging geography of deserts, mountains, and vast distances. The highway system totals 230,000 kilometers as of 2024, up from 165,900 kilometers in 2012, facilitating connectivity across the autonomous region and links to neighboring countries. Expressways exceed 6,000 kilometers, with the G30 Expressway serving as a critical artery; this 4,395-kilometer route ends at the border crossing, enabling overland trade to . Rail transport spans 8,689 kilometers of operational track as of 2023, including both conventional lines and high-speed segments. The high-speed railway, measuring 1,776 kilometers, opened on December 26, 2014, reducing travel time between the cities to about 12 hours at speeds up to 250 km/h. This line parallels the older –Xinjiang railway, enhancing passenger and freight capacity amid the and mountainous terrain. Air connectivity is anchored by , which handled 25.09 million passengers in 2023, ranking it among China's busiest single-runway facilities. The region operates around two dozen civilian airports, supporting over 30 million total passenger trips annually and integrating with domestic and international routes. These networks position Xinjiang as a pivotal node in the Economic Belt, with border facilities like boosting multimodal links to and beyond, though sparse population and extreme topography continue to constrain accessibility in remote areas despite mileage expansions.

Major Projects in Energy and Water Management

Xinjiang hosts significant energy developments, primarily centered on fossil fuels and increasingly renewables, leveraging its reserves and vast desert areas for solar and . The Tarim Oilfield, discovered in 1988 with large-scale development commencing thereafter, represents China's largest ultra-deep oil and gas production base, having cumulatively extracted 150 million metric tons of oil and gas equivalent by March 2025 from over 1,700 wells exceeding 6,000 meters in depth. The West-East Gas network, initiated with its first line operational in 2004 sourcing from fields, facilitates transport eastward; its fourth line, spanning 3,340 kilometers from Wuqia County in Xinjiang, became fully operational in June 2025, enhancing national . Renewable energy projects have expanded rapidly, transforming desert regions into generation hubs. In December 2024, a 4-gigawatt photovoltaic project commenced operations, marking one of China's largest solar installations and projected to generate substantial clean electricity while curbing emissions. The world's first 100 MW Linear Fresnel concentrated solar power plant, commissioned in January 2025, is expected to produce 1.86 billion kilowatt-hours annually, reducing CO2 emissions by over 1.5 million tons per year. Ultra-high-voltage transmission lines, such as the Hami project linking eastern Xinjiang to Chongqing, support renewable evacuation; by 2024, clean sources like wind and solar constituted about one-third of Xinjiang's transmitted electricity, exceeding 860 billion kilowatt-hours cumulatively. Battery storage advancements include the 500 MW/2 GWh standalone facility in Kashgar, activated in 2025, aiding grid stability for intermittent renewables. Water management initiatives address arid conditions and basin degradation through diversion, conservation, and control structures. The Tarim River ecological restoration, launched in 2001, has conducted 26 rounds of water diversions, releasing over 10 billion cubic meters to revive riparian forests and form green corridors combating . The Dashixia Control , designed for and mitigation plus supply, began storing water in September 2025 and is slated for full operation soon after. Earlier efforts like the Xinjiang Turfan , supported by international financing, aimed to reduce overdraft, enhance on-farm , and mitigate risks in basin areas. Smart systems, deployed regionally by 2025, have improved , bolstering agricultural resilience in water-scarce zones. These projects, while boosting resource utilization, have drawn scrutiny for potential ecological trade-offs in transboundary basins, though empirical data indicate replenishment and recovery in targeted reaches.

References

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