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Iranian Revolution
Iranian Revolution
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Iranian Revolution
Part of the Cold War and constitutionalization attempts in Iran
Mass demonstrations of people protesting against the Shah and the Pahlavi government on the day of Hosseini's Ashura on 11 December 1978 at College Bridge, Tehran
Date7 January 1978 (1978-01-07) – 11 February 1979 (1979-02-11)
(1 year, 1 month and 4 days)
Location
Caused by
GoalsOverthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty
Methods
Resulted inRevolutionaries' victory
Parties

Lead figures
Casualties and losses
See Casualties of the Iranian Revolution
  1. ^ Regency Council was practically dissolved on 22 January 1979, when its head resigned to meet Ruhollah Khomeini.
  2. ^ Imperial Iranian Army revoked their allegiance to the throne and declared neutrality on 11 February 1979.

The Iranian Revolution[Note 1] or the Islamic Revolution[3] was a series of events that culminated in the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979. The revolution led to the replacement of the Imperial State of Iran by the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the monarchical government of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was superseded by Ruhollah Khomeini, an Islamist cleric who had headed one of the rebel factions. The ousting of Mohammad Reza, the last shah of Iran, formally marked the end of Iran's historical monarchy.[4]

In 1953, the CIA- and MI6-backed 1953 Iranian coup d'état overthrew Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, who had nationalized the country's oil industry to reclaim sovereignty from British control.[5][6][7] The coup reinstated Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as an absolute monarch and significantly increased United States influence over Iran.[8]

In the early 1970s, Iran’s defense budget increased 800 percent over four to five years which contributed to severe economic instability and social disruption. The Shah’s regime grew increasingly authoritarian; those who spoke out were often arrested or tortured by the Shah's secret police SAVAK.[9] Additionally in 1963, the Shah had launched the White Revolution, a top-down modernization and land reform program that alienated many sectors of society, especially the clergy. Khomeini emerged as a vocal critic and was exiled in 1964. However, as ideological tensions persisted between Pahlavi and Khomeini, anti-government demonstrations began in October 1977, developing into a campaign of civil resistance that included communism, socialism, and Islamism.[10][11][12] Mass protests were underway. A key turning point occurred in August 1978, when the Cinema Rex fire killed around 400 people. While arson by Islamist militants was later alleged, a large portion of the public believed it was a false flag operation by SAVAK to discredit the opposition and justify a crackdown, fueling nationwide outrage and mobilization. By the end of 1978, the revolution had become a broad-based uprising that paralyzed the country for the remainder of that year.[13][14]

On 16 January 1979, Pahlavi went into exile as the last Iranian monarch,[15] leaving his duties to Iran's Regency Council and Shapour Bakhtiar, the opposition-based prime minister. On 1 February 1979, Khomeini returned, following an invitation by the government;[16][17] several million greeted him as he landed in Tehran.[18] By 11 February, the monarchy was brought down and Khomeini assumed leadership while guerrillas and rebel troops overwhelmed Pahlavi loyalists in armed combat.[19][20] Following the March 1979 Islamic Republic referendum, in which 98% approved the shift to an Islamic republic, the new government began drafting the present-day constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran;[21][10][11][22][23] Khomeini emerged as the Supreme Leader of Iran in December 1979.[24]

The revolution was fueled by widespread perceptions of the Shah's regime as corrupt, repressive, and overly reliant on foreign powers, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom. Many Iranians felt that the Shah's government was not acting in the best interests of the Iranian people and that it was too closely aligned with Western interests, especially at the expense of Iranian sovereignty and cultural identity.[25][26] However others perceived the success of the revolution as being unusual,[27] since it lacked many customary causes of revolutionary sentiment, e.g. defeat in war, financial crisis, peasant rebellion, or disgruntled military.[28] It occurred in a country experiencing relative prosperity,[16][23] produced profound change at great speed,[29] and resulted in a massive exile that characterizes a large portion of Iranian diaspora,[30] and replaced a pro-Western secular[31] and authoritarian monarchy[16] with an anti-Western Islamic republic[16][22][23][32] based on the concept of Velâyat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), straddling between authoritarianism and totalitarianism.[33] In addition to declaring the destruction of Israel as a core objective,[34][35] post-revolutionary Iran aimed to undermine the influence of Sunni leaders in the region by supporting Shi'ite political ascendancy and exporting Khomeinist doctrines abroad.[36] In the aftermath of the revolution, Iran began to back Shia militancy across the region, to combat Sunni influence and establish Iranian dominance in the Arab world, ultimately aiming to achieve an Iranian-led Shia political order.[37]

Names

[edit]

While the name "Iranian Revolution"[Note 2] is widely common, it is also referred to as the 1979 Revolution, the Islamic Revolution[Note 3] or the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

Background (1891–1977)

[edit]

Reasons advanced for the revolution and its populist, nationalist, and later Shia Islamic character include:

  1. A backlash against imperialism;
  2. The 1953 Iranian coup d'état;
  3. A rise in expectations created by the 1973 oil revenue windfall;
  4. An overly ambitious economic program;
  5. Anger over a short, sharp economic contraction in 1977–1978; and[Note 4]
  6. Other shortcomings of the previous regime.

The Shah's regime was seen as an oppressive, brutal,[43][44] corrupt, and lavish regime by some of the society's classes at that time.[43][45] It also suffered from some basic functional failures that brought economic bottlenecks, shortages, and inflation.[46] The Shah was perceived by many as beholden to—if not a puppet of—a non-Muslim Western power (i.e., the United States)[47][48] whose culture was affecting that of Iran. At the same time, support for the Shah may have waned among Western politicians and media—especially under the administration of US President Jimmy Carter—as a result of the Shah's support for OPEC petroleum price increases earlier in the decade.[49] When President Carter enacted a human rights policy which said that countries guilty of human rights violations would be deprived of American arms or aid, this helped give some Iranians the courage to post open letters and petitions in the hope that the repression by the government might subside.[50]

The revolution that substituted the monarchy of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi with Islam and Khomeini is credited in part to the spread of the Shi'a version of the Islamic revival. It resisted westernization and saw Ayatollah Khomeini as following in the footsteps of the Shi'a Imam Husayn ibn Ali, with the Shah playing the role of Husayn's foe, the hated tyrant Yazid I.[51] Other factors include the underestimation of Khomeini's Islamist movement by both the Shah's reign—who considered them a minor threat compared to the Marxists and Islamic socialists[52][53][54]—and by the secularist opponents of the government—who thought the Khomeinists could be sidelined.[55]

Tobacco Protest (1891)

[edit]

At the end of the 19th century, the Shi'a clergy (ulama) had a significant influence on Iranian society. The clergy first showed itself to be a powerful political force in opposition to the monarchy with the 1891 Tobacco protest. On 20 March 1890, the long-standing Iranian monarch Nasir al-Din Shah granted a concession to British Major G. F. Talbot for a full monopoly over the production, sale, and export of tobacco for 50 years.[56] At the time, the Persian tobacco industry employed over 200,000 people, so the concession represented a major blow to Persian farmers and bazaaris whose livelihoods were largely dependent on the lucrative tobacco business.[57] The boycotts and protests against it were widespread and extensive as result of Mirza Hasan Shirazi's fatwa (judicial decree).[58] Within two years, Nasir al-Din Shah found himself powerless to stop the popular movement and cancelled the concession.[59]

The Tobacco Protest was the first significant Iranian resistance against the Shah and foreign interests, revealing the power of the people and the ulama influence among them.[56]

Persian Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911)

[edit]

The growing dissatisfaction continued until the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911. The revolution led to the establishment of a parliament, the National Consultative Assembly (also known as the Majlis), and approval of the first constitution. Although the constitutional revolution was successful in weakening the autocracy of the Qajar regime, it failed to provide a powerful alternative government. Therefore, in the decades following the establishment of the new parliament, a number of critical events took place. Many of these events can be viewed as a continuation of the struggle between the constitutionalists and the Shahs of Persia, many of whom were backed by foreign powers against the parliament.

Reza Shah (1921–1941)

[edit]

Insecurity and chaos that were created after the Constitutional Revolution led to the rise of General Reza Khan, the commander of the elite Persian Cossack Brigade who seized power in a coup d'état in February 1921. He established a constitutional monarchy, deposing the last Qajar Shah, Ahmad Shah, in 1925 and being designated monarch by the National Assembly, to be known thenceforth as Reza Shah, founder of the Pahlavi dynasty.

There were widespread social, economic, and political reforms introduced during his reign, a number of which led to public discontent that would provide the circumstances for the Iranian Revolution. Particularly controversial was the replacement of Islamic laws with secular Western ones and the forbidding of traditional Islamic clothing, separation of the sexes, and veiling of women's faces with the niqab.[60] Police forcibly removed and tore the chadors off women who resisted his ban on the public hijab.

In 1935, dozens were killed and hundreds injured in the Goharshad Mosque rebellion.[61][62][63] On the other hand, during the early rise of Reza Shah, Abdul-Karim Ha'eri Yazdi founded the Qom Seminary and created important changes in seminaries. However, he would avoid entering into political issues, as did other religious leaders who followed him. Hence, no widespread anti-government attempts were organized by the clergy during the rule of Reza Shah. However, the future Ayatollah Khomeini was a student of Sheikh Abdul Karim Ha'eri.[64]

Anglo-Soviet invasion and Mohammad Reza Shah (1941–1951)

[edit]

In 1941, an invasion of allied British and Soviet troops deposed Reza Shah, who was considered friendly to Nazi Germany, and installed his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as Shah.[65] Iran remained under Soviet occupation until the Red Army withdrew in June 1946.[66]

The post-war years were characterized by political instability, as the Shah clashed with the pro-Soviet Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam, the communist Tudeh Party grew in size and influence and the Iranian Army had to deal with Soviet-sponsored separatist movements in Iranian Azerbaijan and Iranian Kurdistan.[67]

Mosaddegh and The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (1951–1952)

[edit]

From 1901 on, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1935), a British oil company, enjoyed a monopoly on sale and production of Iranian oil. It was the most profitable British business in the world.[68] Most Iranians lived in poverty while the wealth generated from Iranian oil played a decisive role in maintaining Britain as a preeminent global power. In 1951, Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh pledged to throw the company out of Iran, reclaim the petroleum reserves and free Iran from foreign powers.

In 1952, Mosaddegh nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and became a national hero. The British, however, were outraged and accused him of stealing. The British unsuccessfully sought punishment from the International Court of Justice and the United Nations, sent warships to the Persian Gulf, and finally imposed a crushing embargo. Mosaddegh was unmoved by Britain's campaign against him. One European newspaper, the Frankfurter Neue Presse, reported that Mosaddegh "would rather be fried in Persian oil than make the slightest concession to the British." The British considered an armed invasion, but U.K. Prime Minister Winston Churchill decided on a coup after being refused American military support by US President Harry S. Truman, who sympathized with nationalist movements like Mosaddegh's and had nothing but contempt for old-style imperialists like those who ran the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Mosaddegh, however, learned of Churchill's plans and ordered the British embassy to be closed in October 1952, forcing all British diplomats and agents to leave the country.

Although the British were initially turned down in their request for American support by President Truman, the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower as US president in November 1952 changed the American stance toward the conflict. This, paired with Cold War paranoia and fears of communist influence, contributed to American strategic interests. On 20 January 1953, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother, C.I.A. Director Allen Dulles, told their British counterparts that they were ready to move against Mosaddegh. In their eyes, any country not decisively allied with the United States was a potential enemy. Iran had immense oil wealth, a long border with the Soviet Union, and a nationalist prime minister. The prospect of a fall into communism and a "second China" (after Mao Zedong won the Chinese Civil War) terrified the Dulles brothers. Operation Ajax was born, in which the only democratic government Iran ever had was deposed.[69]

Iranian coup d'état and US influence

[edit]

On 15 August 1953 a coup d'état was initiated to remove Mosaddegh, with the support of the United States, the United Kingdom and most of the Shia clergy.[69] The Shah fled to Italy when the initial coup attempt on August 15 failed, but returned after a successful second attempt on August 19.[70] Mosaddegh was removed from power and put under house arrest, while lieutenant general Fazlollah Zahedi was appointed as new Prime Minister by the Shah. The sovereign, who was mainly seen as a figurehead at the time, eventually managed to break free from the shackles of the Iranian elites and impose himself as an autocratic reformist ruler.[71]

The coup reinstated Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as an absolute monarch and significantly increased United States influence over Iran. Economically, American firms gained considerable control over Iranian oil production, with US companies taking around 40 percent of the profits. Politically, Iran acted as a counterweight to the Soviet Union and aligned closely with the Western Bloc. Additionally, the US provided the Shah both the funds and the training for SAVAK, Iran’s infamous secret police, with CIA assistance.[8][72][73]

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, with the US increasingly involved in the Vietnam War and unable to maintain its interests globally, it adopted the Nixon Doctrine, effectively shifting the burden of regional security to allied states. Iran under the Shah, became "regional policemen" in the Persian Gulf, with Iran’s defense budget increasing around 800 percent over four to five years, as it purchased advanced weaponry from the US. This rapid militarization contributed to severe economic instability, including spiraling inflation, mass migration from rural areas to cities, and widespread social disruption. At the same time, the Shah’s regime grew increasingly authoritarian; those who spoke out were often arrested or tortured by SAVAK.[9] Much of this repression unfolded with little scrutiny or challenge from the US. By the late 1970s, popular resistance to the Shah’s rule had reached a breaking point.[8][16][74]

White Revolution (1963–1979)

[edit]
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi

The White Revolution was a far-reaching series of reforms in Iran launched in 1963 by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and lasting until 1979. Mohammad Reza Shah's reform program was built especially to weaken those classes that supported the traditional system. It consisted of several elements including land reform; sales of some state-owned factories to finance the land reform; the enfranchisement of women; nationalization of forests and pastures; formation of a literacy corps; and the institution of profit-sharing schemes for workers in industry.[75]

The Shah pushed the White Revolution as a step toward westernization,[76] and it was a way for him to legitimize the Pahlavi dynasty. Part of the reason for launching the White Revolution was that the Shah hoped to eliminate the influence of landlords and to create a new base of support among the peasants and the working class.[77][78] Thus, the White Revolution in Iran was an attempt to introduce reform from above and preserve traditional power patterns. Through land reform, the essence of the White Revolution, the Shah hoped to ally himself with the peasantry in the countryside, and hoped to sever their ties with the aristocracy in the city.

What the Shah did not expect, however, was that the White Revolution led to new social tensions that helped create many of the problems that he was trying to avoid. The Shah's reforms more than quadrupled the combined size of the two classes that posed the greatest challenges to his monarchy in the past — the intelligentsia, and the urban working class. Their resentment of the Shah also grew, as they were now stripped of organizations that had represented them in the past, such as political parties, professional associations, trade unions, and independent newspapers. The land reform, instead of allying the peasants with the government, produced large numbers of independent farmers and landless laborers who became loose political cannons, with no loyalty to the Shah. Many of the masses resented the increasingly corrupt government; their loyalty to the clergy, who were viewed as more concerned with the fate of the populace, remained consistent or increased. As Ervand Abrahamian pointed out: "The White Revolution had been designed to preempt a Red Revolution. Instead, it paved the way for an Islamic Revolution."[79] In theory, oil money funneled to the elite was supposed to be used to create jobs and factories, eventually distributing the money, but instead the wealth tended to remain concentrated in the hands of the very few at the top.[80]

Rise and exile of Ayatollah Khomeini (1963–1979)

[edit]

Post-revolutionary leader — Twelver Shia cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini — first rose to political prominence in 1963 when he led opposition to the Shah and his White Revolution. Khomeini was arrested in 1963 after declaring the Shah a "wretched, miserable man" who "embarked on the [path toward] destruction of Islam in Iran."[81] Three days of major riots throughout Iran followed, with 15,000 dead from police fire as reported by opposition sources.[82] However, anti-revolutionary sources conjectured that just 32 were killed.[83]

Khomeini was released after eight months of house arrest and continued his agitation, condemning Iran's close cooperation with Israel and its capitulations, or extension of diplomatic immunity, to American government personnel in Iran. In November 1964, Khomeini was re-arrested and sent into exile where he remained for 15 years (mostly in Najaf, Iraq), until the revolution.

Ideology of the Iranian Revolution

[edit]
Residents of Tehran participating in the demonstrations of 5 June 1963 with pictures of Ruhollah Khomeini in their hands

In this interim period of "disaffected calm,"[84] the budding Iranian revival began to undermine the idea of Westernization as progress that was the basis of the Shah's secular reign, and to form the ideology of the 1979 revolution: Jalal Al-e-Ahmad's idea of Gharbzadegi—that Western culture was a plague or an intoxication to be eliminated;[85] Ali Shariati's vision of Islam as the one true liberator of the Third World from oppressive colonialism, neo-colonialism, and capitalism;[86] and Morteza Motahhari's popularized retellings of the Shia faith all spread and gained listeners, readers and supporters.[85]

Most importantly, Khomeini preached that revolt, and especially martyrdom, against injustice and tyranny was part of Shia Islam,[87] and that Muslims should reject the influence of both liberal capitalism and communism, ideas that inspired the revolutionary slogan "Neither East, nor West – Islamic Republic!"

Away from public view, Khomeini developed the ideology of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist) as government, that Muslims—in fact everyone—required "guardianship," in the form of rule or supervision by the leading Islamic jurist or jurists.[88] Such rule was ultimately "more necessary even than prayer and fasting" in Islam,[Note 5] as it would protect Islam from deviation from traditional sharia law and in so doing eliminate poverty, injustice, and the "plundering" of Muslim land by foreign non-believers.[89]

This idea of rule by Islamic jurists was spread through his book Islamic Government, mosque sermons, and smuggled cassette speeches by Khomeini[90][91] among his opposition network of students (talabeh), ex-students (able clerics such as Morteza Motahhari, Mohammad Beheshti, Mohammad-Javad Bahonar, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Mohammad Mofatteh), and traditional businessmen (bazaari) inside Iran.[90]

Opposition groups and organizations

[edit]

Other opposition groups included constitutionalist liberals—the democratic, reformist Islamic Freedom Movement of Iran, headed by Mehdi Bazargan, and the more secular National Front. They were based in the urban middle class, and wanted the Shah to adhere to the Iranian Constitution of 1906 rather than to replace him with a theocracy,[92] but lacked the cohesion and organization of Khomeini's forces.[93]

Communist groups—primarily the Tudeh Party of Iran and the Fedaian guerrillas[Note 6]—had been weakened considerably by government repression. Despite this the guerrillas did help play an important part in the final February 1979 overthrow[95] delivering "the regime its coup de grace."[96] The most powerful guerrilla group—the People's Mujahedin—was leftist Islamist and opposed the influence of the clergy as reactionary.

Some important clergy did not follow Khomeini's lead. Popular ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani supported the left, while perhaps the most senior and influential ayatollah in Iran—Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari—first remained aloof from politics and then came out in support of a democratic revolution.[97]

Khomeini worked to unite this opposition behind him (except for the unwanted 'atheistic Marxists'),[10][98] focusing on the socio-economic problems of the Shah's government (corruption and unequal income and development),[10][99] while avoiding specifics among the public that might divide the factions[100]—particularly his plan for clerical rule, which he believed most Iranians had become prejudiced against as a result of propaganda campaign by Western imperialists.[Note 7][101]

In the post-Shah era, some revolutionaries who clashed with his theocracy and were suppressed by his movement complained of deception,[99] but in the meantime anti-Shah unity was maintained.[102]

1970–1977

[edit]

Several events in the 1970s set the stage for the 1979 revolution.

The 1971 2,500-year celebration of the Persian Empire at Persepolis, organized by the government, was attacked for its extravagance. "As the foreigners reveled on drink forbidden by Islam, Iranians were not only excluded from the festivities, some were starving."[103] Five years later, the Shah angered pious Iranian Muslims by changing the first year of the Iranian solar calendar from the Islamic hijri to the ascension to the throne by Cyrus the Great. "Iran jumped overnight from the Muslim year 1355 to the royalist year 2535."[104]

The Shah of Iran (left) meeting with members of the US government: Alfred Atherton, William Sullivan, Cyrus Vance, Jimmy Carter, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, 1977

The oil boom of the 1970s produced an "alarming" increase in inflation, waste and an "accelerating gap" between the rich and poor, the city and the country,[105] along with the presence of tens of thousands of unpopular skilled foreign workers. Many Iranians were also angered by the fact that the Shah's family was the foremost beneficiary of the income generated by oil, and the line between state earnings and family earnings blurred. By 1976, the Shah had accumulated upward of $1 billion from oil revenue; his family – including 63 princes and princesses had accumulated between $5 and $20 billion; and the family foundation controlled approximately $3 billion.[106] By mid-1977 economic austerity measures to fight inflation disproportionately affected the thousands of poor and unskilled male migrants settling in the cities working in the construction industry. Culturally and religiously conservative,[107] many went on to form the core of the revolution's demonstrators and "martyrs".[108]

All Iranians were required to join and pay dues to a new political party, the Rastakhiz Party —all other parties were banned.[109] That party's attempt to fight inflation with populist "anti-profiteering" campaigns—fining and jailing merchants for high prices – angered and politicized merchants while fueling black markets.[110]

In 1977 the Shah responded to the "polite reminder" of the importance of political rights by the new American president, Jimmy Carter, by granting amnesty to some prisoners and allowing the Red Cross to visit prisons. Through 1977 liberal opposition formed organizations and issued open letters denouncing the government.[111] Against this background a first crucial manifestation of public expression of social discontent and political protest against the regime took place in October 1977, when the German-Iranian Cultural Association in Tehran hosted a series of literature reading sessions, organized by the newly revived Iranian Writers Association and the German Goethe-Institute. In these "Ten Nights" (Dah Shab) 57 of Iran's most prominent poets and writers read their works to thousands of listeners. They demanded the end of censorship and claimed the freedom of expression.[112]

Also in 1977, the popular and influential modernist Islamist theorist Ali Shariati died under mysterious circumstances. This both angered his followers, who considered him a martyr at the hands of SAVAK, and removed a potential revolutionary rival to Khomeini. Finally, in October Khomeini's son Mostafa died of an alleged heart attack, and his death was also blamed on SAVAK. A subsequent memorial service for Mostafa in Tehran put Khomeini back in the spotlight.[113][114]

Outbreak

[edit]

By 1977, the Shah's policy of political liberalization was underway. Secular opponents of the Shah began to meet in secret to denounce the government.[115][116] Led by the leftist intellectual Saeed Soltanpour, the Iranian Writers Association met at the Goethe Institute in Tehran to read anti-government poetry.[115] Ali Shariati's death in the United Kingdom shortly after led to another public demonstration, with the opposition accusing the Shah of murdering him.[17][115]

The chain of events began with the death of Mostafa Khomeini, chief aide and eldest son of Ruhollah Khomeini. He mysteriously died at midnight on 23 October 1977 in Najaf, Iraq. SAVAK and the Iraqi government declared heart attack as the cause of death, though many attributed his death to SAVAK.[117] Khomeini remained silent after the incident, while in Iran with the spread of the news came a wave of protest and mourning ceremonies in several cities.[118][119] The mourning of Mostafa was given a political cast by Khomeini's political credentials, their enduring opposition to the monarchy and their exile. This dimension of the ceremonies went beyond the religious credentials of the family.[22]

Approaching revolution (1978)

[edit]

Beginning of protests (January)

[edit]

On 7 January 1978, an article titled "Iran and Red and Black Colonization" appeared in the national daily Ettela'at newspaper. Written under a pseudonym by a government agent, it denounced Khomeini as a "British agent" and a "mad Indian poet" conspiring to sell out Iran to neo-colonialists and communists.[16][17]

The developments initiated by seminaries in the city of Qom closing on 7 January 1978 were followed by the bazaar and seminary closing, and students rallied towards the homes of the religious leaders on the next day.[120] On 9 January 1978, seminary students and other people demonstrated in the city, which was cracked down by the Shah's security forces who shot live ammunition to disperse the crowd when the peaceful demonstration turned violent.[121] Between 5–300 of the demonstrators were reportedly killed in the protest.[120] 9 January 1978 (19 Dey) is regarded as a bloody day in Qom.[122][123]

Consolidation of the opposition (February–March)

[edit]

According to Shia customs, memorial services (chehelom) are held 40 days after a person's death.[124] Encouraged by Khomeini (who declared that the blood of martyrs must water the "tree of Islam"),[116] radicals pressured the mosques and moderate clergy to commemorate the deaths of the students, and used the occasion to generate protests.[125] The informal network of mosques and bazaars, which for years had been used to carry out religious events, increasingly became consolidated as a coordinated protest organization.[22][124][126]

On 18 February, 40 days after the Qom protests, demonstrations broke out in various different cities.[127] The largest was in Tabriz, which descended into a full-scale riot. "Western" and government symbols such as cinemas, bars, state-owned banks, and police stations were set ablaze.[124] Units of the Imperial Iranian Army were deployed to the city to restore order. The death toll, according to the government was 6,[128] while Khomeini claimed hundreds were "martyred."[11][115][129]

Forty days later, on 29 March, demonstrations were organized in at least 55 cities, including Tehran.[124] In an increasingly predictable pattern, deadly riots broke out in major cities,[124][130] and again 40 days later, on 10 May. It led to an incident in which army commandos opened fire on Shariatmadari's house, killing one of his students. Shariatmadari immediately made a public announcement declaring his support for a "constitutional government," and a return to the policies of the 1906 Constitution.[11][116][124]

Government reaction

[edit]
Pro-Shah demonstration organized by the Resurgence Party in Tabriz, April 1978

The Shah was taken completely by surprise by the protests and,[11][23] to make matters worse, he often became indecisive during times of crisis;[16] virtually every major decision he would make backfired on his government and further inflamed the revolutionaries.[16]

The Shah decided to continue on his plan of liberalization and to negotiate rather than to use force against the still-nascent protest movement:[124][125][130] he promised that fully democratic elections for the Majlis would be held in 1979; censorship was relaxed; a resolution was drafted to help reduce corruption within the royal family and the government;[131] and protesters were tried in civilian courts rather than by military courts-martial and were quickly released.[127][130]

Iran's security forces had not received any riot-control training nor equipment since 1963.[128] As a result, police forces were unable to control demonstrations, thus the army was frequently deployed.[130] Soldiers were instructed not to use deadly force, yet there were instances of inexperienced soldiers reacting excessively, inflaming the violence without cowing the opposition, and receiving official condemnation from the Shah.[128] The Carter administration in the US also refused to sell non-lethal tear gas and rubber bullets to Iran.[116][132]

As early as the February riots in Tabriz, the Shah fired all SAVAK officials in the city as a concession to the opposition, and soon began to dismiss civil servants and government officials whom he felt the public blamed.[11][23][130] In the first national concession, he replaced the hardline SAVAK chief General Nematollah Nassiri with the more moderate General Nasser Moghaddam.[16][130] The government also negotiated with moderate religious leaders such as Shariatmadari, apologizing to him for the raid on his house.[17]

Early summer (June)

[edit]

By summer, the protests had stagnated, remaining at a steady rate for four months, with about 10,000 participants in each major city—with the exception of Isfahan, where protests were larger, and Tehran, where they were smaller—protesting every 40 days. This amounted to a small minority of the more than 15 million adults in Iran.[133]

Against the wishes of Khomeini, Shariatmadari called for 17 June mourning protests to be carried out as a one-day stay.[124] Although tensions remained in the milieu, the Shah's policy appeared to have worked, leading Amuzegar to declare that "the crisis is over." A CIA analysis in August concluded that Iran "is not in a revolutionary or even a pre-revolutionary situation."[134] These and later events in Iran are frequently cited as one of the most consequential strategic surprises that the United States has experienced since the CIA was established in 1947.[135]

As a sign of easing of government restrictions, three prominent opposition leaders from the secular National FrontKarim Sanjabi, Shapour Bakhtiar, and Dariush Forouhar—were allowed to pen an open letter to the Shah demanding that he reign according to the constitution of Iran.[11][116][131]

Renewed protests (August–September)

[edit]

Appointment of Jafar Sharif-Emami as prime minister (11 August)

[edit]

By August, the protests had "kick[ed]…into high gear,"[136] and the number of demonstrators mushroomed to hundreds of thousands.[133] In an attempt to dampen inflation, the Amuzegar administration cut spending and reduced business. However, the cutbacks led to a sharp rise in layoffs—particularly among young, unskilled, male workers living in the working-class districts. By summer 1978, the working class joined the street protests in massive numbers.[129] In addition, it was the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, bringing a sense of increased religiosity among many people.[124]

A series of escalating protests broke out in major cities, and deadly riots broke out in Isfahan where protesters fought for the release of Ayatollah Jalaluddin Taheri.[137][124] Martial law was declared in the city on 11 August as symbols of Western culture and government buildings were burned, and a bus full of American workers was bombed.[124][131] Due to his failure to stop the protests, Prime Minister Amuzegar offered his resignation.

The Shah increasingly felt that he was losing control of the situation and sought to regain it through complete appeasement.[11][116] He decided to appoint Jafar Sharif-Emami to the post of prime minister, himself a veteran prime minister. Emami was chosen due to his family ties to the clergy, although he had a reputation of corruption during his previous premiership.[16][17]

Under the Shah's guidance, Sharif-Emami effectively began a policy of "appeasing the opposition's demands before they even made them."[17] The government abolished the Rastakhiz Party, legalized all political parties and released political prisoners, increased freedom of expression, curtailed SAVAK's authority and dismissed 34 of its commanders,[131] closed down casinos and nightclubs, and abolished the imperial calendar. The government also began to prosecute corrupt government and royal family members. Sharif-Emami entered into negotiations with Shariatmadari and National Front leader Karim Sanjabi to help organize future elections.[131] Censorship was effectively terminated, and the newspapers began reporting heavily on demonstrations, often highly critically and negatively of the Shah. The Majlis (Parliament) also began issuing resolutions against the government.[16]

Cinema Rex fire (19 August)

[edit]

On 19 August, in the southwestern city of Abadan, four arsonists barred the door of the Cinema Rex movie theatre and set it on fire. In what would be the largest terrorist attack in history prior to the September 11 attacks in the US in 2001,[138] 422 people inside the theatre were burned to death. Khomeini immediately blamed the Shah and SAVAK for setting the fire, and,[11][116][139] due to the pervasive revolutionary atmosphere, the public also blamed the Shah for starting the fire, despite the government's insistence that they were uninvolved. Tens of thousands of people took to the streets shouting "Burn the Shah!" and "The Shah is the guilty one!"[127]

After the revolution, many claimed that Islamist militants had started the fire.[138][140][141][142][143][144] After the Islamic republic government executed a police officer for the act, a man claiming to be the lone surviving arsonist claimed he was responsible for starting the fire.[145] After forcing the resignation of the presiding judges in an attempt to hamper the investigation, the new government finally executed Hossein Talakhzadeh for "setting the fire on the Shah's orders," despite his insistence that he did it on his own accord as an ultimate sacrifice for the revolutionary cause.[140][145]

Declaration of martial law and the Jaleh Square Massacre (8 September)

[edit]
Demonstration of 8 September 1978. The placard reads: We want an Islamic government, led by Imam Khomeini.
Demonstration of "Black Friday" (8 September 1978)

The 4th of September marked Eid al-Fitr, the holiday celebrating the end of the month of Ramadan. A permit for an open-air prayer was granted, in which 200,000–500,000 people attended.[124] Instead, the clergy directed the crowd on a large march through the center of Tehran, while the Shah reportedly watched the march from his helicopter, unnerved, and confused.[124] A few days later, even larger protests took place, and, for the first time, protesters called for Khomeini's return and the establishment of an Islamic republic.[124]

At midnight on 8 September, the Shah declared martial law in Tehran and 11 other major cities throughout the country. All street demonstrations were banned, and a night-time curfew was established. Tehran's martial law commander was General Gholam-Ali Oveissi, who was known for his severity against opponents.[11][16][17][115][116][129][138] However, the Shah made clear that once martial law was lifted, he intended to continue with the liberalization. He retained Sharif-Emami's civilian government, hoping that protesters would avoid taking the streets.[116][125][131]

However, 5,000 protesters took to the streets, either in defiance or because they had missed hearing the declaration, and faced off with soldiers at Jaleh Square.[11][22][116] After warning shots failed to disperse the crowd, troops fired directly into the crowd, killing 64,[124] while General Oveissi claimed that 30 soldiers were killed by snipers in surrounding buildings.[11][17][23][116][124][126][139] Additional clashes throughout the day, which would be called Black Friday by the opposition, brought the opposition death toll to 89.[16][129]

Reactions to Black Friday
[edit]
Victims of Black Friday

The deaths shocked the country and damaged any attempt at reconciliation between the Shah and the opposition. Khomeini immediately declared that "4,000 innocent protesters were massacred by Zionists," which gave him a pretext to reject any further compromise with the government.

The Shah himself was horrified by the events of Black Friday, and harshly criticized the events, though this did little to sway public perception of him as being responsible for the shooting.[16][124][128] While martial law officially remained in effect, the government decided not to break up any more demonstrations or strikes (in effect, "martial law without there exactly being martial law," according to Sharif-Emami), instead continuing to negotiate with protest leaders.[131] Consequently, protest gatherings often took place without any serious intervention by soldiers.[130]

Nationwide strikes (September–November)

[edit]

Oil strikes started in fall of 1978 and led to a 4.8 million drop of crude oil production every day, which was about seven percent of the world's supply. Prices rose from 13 dollars per barrel in 1979 to 34 dollars in 1980.[146] While increased production from other countries, like Saudi Arabia, offset the decline in supply slightly there was still a 10 percent drop in available oil.

There were a variety of factors influencing the workers' decision to strike. The Shah's regime had relaxed oppression in 1977, giving people more access to protest and organizing. At the same time, the economy had faltered after doing better in the early 70s. The strikes began when the workers at a refinery in Tehran, calling for higher wages and housing allowances, were ignored by the government. The Shah's government responded by killing dozens of strikers in an event known as Black Friday.[147] The following day, strikes emerged in Tehran, Abadan, Isfahan, Shiraz, and Kermanshah.[148] This first wave of strikes was reported by SAVAK to involve 11,000 workers. The oil strikes of 1978 were imperative to the Iranian Revolution's success, as they put extreme economic pressure on the Shah's regime.[147] Oil revenues are a significant part of the government's income and regardless of the motivation behind those who strike, oil strikes will always threaten to destabilize Iranian regimes.[149]

By late October, a nationwide general strike was declared, with workers in virtually all major industries walking off their jobs, most damagingly in the oil industry and the print media.[22][115] Special "strike committees" were set up throughout major industries to organize and coordinate the activities.[137]

The Shah did not attempt to crack down on strikers,[131] instead granting them generous wage increases and allowing strikers who lived in government housing to remain in their homes.[11][16][131] By early November, many government officials demanded the Shah use forceful measures to bring the strikers back to work.[11][16][115]

Khomeini moves to France (November)

[edit]

Seeking to break Khomeini's contacts with the opposition, the Shah pressured the Iraqi government to expel him from Najaf. Khomeini left Iraq, instead moving to a house bought by Iranian exiles in Neauphle-le-Château, a village near Paris, France. The Shah wished that Khomeini would be cut off from the mosques of Najaf and the protest movement. Instead, the plan backfired badly. French telephone and postal connections, superior to those of Iraq, let Khomeini's supporters flood Iran with tapes and recordings of his sermons.[17][116][130]

Ayatollah Khomeini in Neauphle-le-Château surrounded by journalists

Worse for the Shah was that the Western media, especially the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), immediately put Khomeini into the spotlight.[17][150] Khomeini rapidly became a household name in the West, portraying himself as an "Eastern mystic" who did not seek power, but instead sought to "free" his people from "oppression." Many Western media outlets, usually critical of such claims, became one of Khomeini's most powerful tools.[17][116]

In addition, the media coverage eroded the influence of other, more moderate clergy such as Ayatollah Shariatmadari and Ayatollah Taleghani.[124][131][130] The BBC itself later issued a statement admitting to having a "critical" disposition to the Shah, saying that its broadcasts helped to "change the collective perception of the population."[16]

In November, secular National Front leader Karim Sanjabi flew to Paris to meet Khomeini. There the two signed an agreement for a draft constitution that would be "Islamic and democratic". It signaled the now official alliance between the clergy and the secular opposition.[16][124] To help create a democratic façade, Khomeini placed Westernized figures (such as Sadegh Ghotbzadeh and Ebrahim Yazdi) as the public spokesmen of the opposition, and never spoke to the media of his intentions to create a theocracy.[16]

University of Tehran protest (5 November)

[edit]

Street demonstrations continued at full force with little response from the military; by late October, government officials effectively ceded the University of Tehran to student protesters.[131][130] Worse, the opposition was increasingly becoming armed, firing at soldiers and attacking banks and government buildings in an attempt to destabilize the country.[23][116]

On 5 November, demonstrations at University of Tehran became deadly after a fight broke out with armed soldiers.[137][22][130] Within hours, Tehran broke out into a full-scale riot. Block after block of Western symbols such as movie theaters and department stores, as well as government and police buildings, were seized, looted, and burned. The British embassy in Tehran was partially burned and vandalized as well, and the American embassy nearly suffered the same fate. The event became known to foreign observers as "The Day Tehran Burned."[11][130][151]

Many of the rioters were young teenage boys, often organized by the mosques in southern Tehran, and encouraged by their mullahs to attack and destroy western and secular symbols.[22][130][151] The army and police, confused about their orders and under pressure from the Shah not to risk initiating violence, effectively gave up and did not intervene.[130][151][152]

Appointment of a military government (6 November)

[edit]

As the situation on the streets spiraled out of control, many well known and reputable figures within the country began to approach the Shah, begging him to stop the chaos.[16][23][116][130]

On 6 November, the Shah dismissed Sharif-Emami from the post of prime minister, and chose to appoint a military government in its place.[16][151] The Shah chose General Gholam-Reza Azhari to be prime minister because of his mild-mannered approach to the situation.[11][116][151] The cabinet he would choose was a military cabinet in name only and consisted primarily of civilian leaders.[151]

The same day, the Shah made a speech on Iranian television.[16][17][152] He referred to himself as Padeshah ('master king'), instead of the more grandiose Shahanshah (king of kings), which he insisted on being called previously.[131] In his speech he stated "I have heard the voice of your revolution...this revolution cannot but be supported by me, the king of Iran".[131][153] He apologized for mistakes that were committed during his reign, and promised to ensure that corruption would no longer exist.[130][152] He stated he would begin to work with the opposition to bring democracy, and would form a coalition government.[11][130][152] In effect, the Shah intended to restrain the military government (which he described as a temporary caretaker government) from carrying out a full crackdown.[131]

The speech backfired when the revolutionaries sensed weakness from the Shah and "smelled blood".[130][153] Khomeini announced that there would be no reconciliation with the Shah and called on all Iranians to overthrow him.[130][153]

Military authorities declared martial law in Khuzestan province (Iran's main oil producing province) and deployed troops to its oil facilities. Navy personnel were also used as strikebreakers in the oil industry.[11][116][151] Street marches declined, and oil production began increasing once again, nearly reaching pre-revolutionary levels.[116][151] In a symbolic blow to the opposition, Karim Sanjabi, who had visited Khomeini in Paris, was arrested upon his return to Iran.[131]

However, the government still continued the policy of appeasement and negotiation.[16][17][130][152] The Shah ordered the arrest of 100 officials from his own government for charges of corruption, including former prime minister Amir Abbas-Hoveyda and former SAVAK head Nematollah Nassiri.[16][17][130]

Muharram protests (early December)

[edit]
Mohammad Beheshti in the Tehran Ashura demonstration, 11 December 1978
People marching during the Iranian Revolution, 1979

Khomeini condemned the military government and called for continued protests.[124][154] He and the protest organizers planned a series of escalating protests during the holy Islamic month of Muharram, to culminate with massive protests on the days of Tasu'a and Ashura, the latter commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Husayn ibn Ali, the third Shia Muslim imam.[124]

While the military authorities banned street demonstrations and extended the curfew, the Shah faced deep misgivings about the potential violence.[131]

On 2 December 1978, the Muharram protests began. Named for the Islamic month they began in, the Muharram protests were impressively huge and pivotal. Over two million protesters[155] (many teenagers proselytized by mullahs from the mosques of southern Tehran) took to the streets, crowding Shahyad Square. Protesters frequently went out at night, violating the curfew, often taking to rooftops and shouting "Allahu-akbar" ('God is great'). According to one witness, many of the clashes on the street had an air of playfulness, with security forces using "kid gloves" against the opposition.[130] Nevertheless, the government reported at least 12 opposition deaths.[154]

The protesters demanded that Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi step down from power and that Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini be returned from exile. The protests grew incredibly fast, reaching between six million and nine million in strength in the first week. About 5% of the population had taken to the streets in the Muharram protests. Both beginning and ending in the month of Muharram, the protests succeeded, and the Shah stepped down from power later that month.[155]

After the success of what would become known as a revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran as its religious and political leader for life. Khomeini had been an opposition leader to Shah for many years, rising to prominence after the death of his mentor, renowned scholar Yazdi Ha'iri, in the 1930s.[156] Even in his years in exile, Khomeini remained relevant in Iran. Supporting the protests from beyond Iran's borders, he proclaimed that "freedom and liberation from the bonds of imperialism" was imminent.[156]

Tasu'a and Ashura marches (10–11 December)

[edit]
Tehran Ashura demonstration, 11 December 1978

As the days of Tasu'a and Ashura (10 and 11 December) approached, to prevent a deadly showdown, the Shah began to draw back. In negotiations with Ayatollah Shariatmadari, the Shah ordered the release of 120 political prisoners and Karim Sanjabi, and on 8 December revoked the ban on street demonstrations. Permits were issued for the marchers, and troops were removed from the procession's path. In turn, Shariatmadari pledged that to make sure that there would be no violence during the demonstrations.[131]

On 10 and 11 December 1978, the days of Tasu'a and Ashura, between 6 and 9 million anti-Shah demonstrators marched throughout Iran. According to one historian, "even discounting for exaggeration, these figures may represent the largest protest event in history."[157] The marches were led by Ayatollah Taleghani and National Front leader Karim Sanjabi, thus symbolizing the "unity" of the secular and religious opposition. The mullahs and bazaaris effectively policed the gathering, and protesters who attempted to initiate violence were restrained.[124]

More than 10% of the country marched in anti-Shah demonstrations on the two days, possibly a higher percentage than any previous revolution. It is rare for a revolution to involve as much as 1 percent of a country's population; the French, Russian, and Romanian revolutions may have passed the 1 percent mark.[30]

Revolution (late 1978–1979)

[edit]

Much of Iranian society was in euphoria about the coming revolution. Secular and leftist politicians piled onto the movement seeking to gain power in the aftermath, ignoring the fact that Khomeini was the very antithesis to all of the positions they supported.[16] While it was increasingly clear to more secular Iranians that Khomeini was not a liberal, he was widely perceived as a figurehead, and that power would eventually be handed to the secular groups.[16][130]

Demoralization of the army (December, 1978)

[edit]
A protester giving flowers to an army officer

The military leadership was increasingly paralyzed by indecision, and rank-and-file soldiers were demoralized, having been forced to confront demonstrators while prohibited from using their own weapons (and being condemned by the Shah if they did).[128] Increasingly, Khomeini called on the soldiers of the armed forces to defect to the opposition.[127][116] Revolutionaries gave flowers and civilian clothes to deserters, while threatening retribution to those who stayed.

On 11 December, a dozen officers were shot dead by their own troops at Tehran's Lavizan barracks. Fearing further mutinies, many soldiers were returned to their barracks.[128] Mashhad (the second largest city in Iran) was abandoned to the protesters, and in many provincial towns demonstrators were effectively in control.[124]

American and internal negotiations with the opposition (late December, 1978)

[edit]

The Carter administration increasingly became locked in a debate about continued support for the monarchy.[158] As early as November, ambassador William Sullivan sent a telegram to Carter (the "Thinking the Unthinkable" telegram[158]). The telegram effectively declared his belief that the Shah would not survive the protests and that the US should consider withdrawing its support for his government and persuading the monarch to abdicate. The United States would then help assemble a coalition of pro-Western military officers, middle class professionals, and moderate clergy, with Khomeini installed as a Gandhi-like spiritual leader.[158]

The telegram touched off a vigorous debate in the American cabinet, with some, such as National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski,[158] rejecting it outright. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance rejected a military crackdown;[124] he and his supporters believed in the "moderate and progressive" intentions of Khomeini and his circle.[132][158]

Increasing contact was established with the pro-Khomeini camp. Based on the revolutionaries' responses, some American officials (especially Ambassador Sullivan) felt Khomeini genuinely intended to create a democracy.[16] According to historian Abbas Milani, this led to the United States facilitating Khomeini's rise to power.[16][159][160]

The Shah began to search for a new prime minister, one who was a civilian and a member of the opposition. On 28 December, he secured an agreement with another major National Front figure, Shapour Bakhtiar. Bakhtiar would be appointed prime minister (a return to civilian rule), while the Shah and his family would leave the country. His royal duties would be carried out by a Regency Council, and three months after his departure a referendum would be submitted to the people deciding on whether Iran would remain a monarchy or become a republic. A former opponent of the Shah, Bakhtiar became motivated to join the government because he was increasingly aware of Khomeini's intentions to implement hard-line religious rule rather than a democracy.[17] Karim Sanjabi immediately expelled Bakhtiar from the National Front, and Bakhtiar was denounced by Khomeini (who declared that acceptance of his government was the equivalent of "obedience to false gods").[16][161]

The Shah leaves (16 January 1979)

[edit]
Shah and his wife, Shahbanu Farah, leaving Iran on 16 January 1979
Ayatollah Khomeini giving a speech after arranging a press-conference at Neauphle-le-Château, France, the day after the departure of the Shah
Front cover of Ettela'at, 16 January 1979, featuring the now-famous headline "The Shah Is Gone". The front cover of the same day's edition of Kayhan featured the same headline

The Shah, wanting to see Bakhtiar established, kept delaying his departure. Consequently, to the Iranian public, Bakhtiar was seen as the Shah's last prime minister, undermining his support.[124]

American General Robert Huyser, the Deputy Commander of US European Command, entered Iran.[16] While the option of a pro-Shah military coup still was a possibility, Huyser met with military leaders (but not the Shah) and established meetings between them and Khomeini allies for the purpose of agreeing on Bakhtiar's transitional government.[16][116][124][162] Ambassador Sullivan disagreed, and attempted to pressure Huyser to ignore the military and work directly with Khomeini's opposition.[124][162] Nevertheless, Huyser won out and continued to work with both the military and opposition. He left Iran on 3 February.[124][162] The Shah was privately embittered by Huyser's mission and felt that the United States no longer wanted him in power.[116]

On the morning of 16 January 1979, Bakhtiar was officially appointed prime minister. The same day, a tearful Shah and his family left Iran for exile in Egypt, never to return.[16]

Bakhtiar's premiership and Ayatollah Khomeini's return (January–February, 1979)

[edit]
Cartoon depicting Shapour Bakhtiar and Mosaddegh on 22 January 1978 issue of Ettela'at, during the revolution

When the news of the Shah's departure was announced from newspapers and news at 2 pm on Iran's National Radio, there were spontaneous scenes of joy throughout the country. Millions poured onto the streets, and virtually every remaining sign of the monarchy was torn down by the crowds.[124][163] Bakhtiar dissolved SAVAK and freed all remaining political prisoners. He ordered the army to allow mass demonstrations, promised free elections and invited the revolutionaries into a government of "national unity".[161][164]

Video of people welcoming Ayatollah Khomeini in the streets of Tehran after his return from exile

Bakhtiar invited Khomeini back to Iran, with the intention of creating a Vatican-like state in the holy city of Qom, declaring that "We will soon have the honor of welcoming home the Ayatollah Khomeini".[161] On 1 February 1979 Khomeini returned to Tehran in a chartered Air France Boeing 747.[165] The welcoming crowd of several million Iranians was so large he was forced to take a helicopter after the car taking him from the airport was overwhelmed by enthusiastic supporters.[166]

Khomeini was now not only the undisputed leader of the revolution,[4][167] he had become someone seen as a divinely-appointed figure, greeted as he descended from his airplane with cries of 'Khomeini, O Imam, we salute you, peace be upon you.'[168] When asked by a reporter how he felt returning to his home country after a long exile, Khomeini replied "Nothing".

On the day of his arrival Khomeini made clear his rejection of Bakhtiar's government in a speech promising, "I shall kick their teeth in. I appoint the government, I appoint the government in support of this nation".[161] On 5 February at his headquarters in the Refah School in southern Tehran, he declared a provisional revolutionary government, appointed opposition leader Mehdi Bazargan (from the religious-nationalist Freedom Movement, affiliated with the National Front) as his own prime minister, and commanded Iranians to obey Bazargan as a religious duty:[137][17][124][161]


[T]hrough the guardianship [Velayat] that I have from the holy lawgiver [the Prophet], I hereby pronounce Bazargan as the Ruler, and since I have appointed him, he must be obeyed. The nation must obey him. This is not an ordinary government. It is a government based on the sharia. Opposing this government means opposing the sharia of Islam ... Revolt against God's government is a revolt against God. Revolt against God is blasphemy.[169][170]

Angered, Bakhtiar made a speech of his own. Reaffirming himself as the legitimate leader, he declared that:

Iran has one government. More than this is intolerable, either for me or for you or for any other Iranian. As a Muslim, I had not heard that jihad refers to one Muslim against other Muslims.... I will not give permission to Ayatollah Khomeini to form an interim government. In life there comes a time when one must stand firm and say no.... I have never seen a book about an Islamic republic; neither has anyone else for that matter.... Some of the people surrounding the Ayatollah are like violent vultures.... The clergy should go to Qom and build a wall around themselves and create their own Vatican.[161]

Armed battles and collapse of the monarchy (February, 1979)

[edit]

Tensions between the two rival governments increased rapidly. To demonstrate his support, Khomeini called for demonstrators to occupy the streets throughout the country. He also sent a letter to American officials warning them to withdraw support for Bakhtiar.[16] Bakhtiar became increasingly isolated, with members of the government (including the entire Regency Council) defecting to Khomeini. The military was crumbling, with its leadership completely paralyzed, unsure of whether to support Bakhtiar or act on their own, and rank-and-file soldiers either demoralized or deserting.[124][128]

On 9 February, a rebellion of pro-Khomeini air force technicians broke out at the Doshan Tappeh Air Base. A unit of the pro-Shah Immortal Guards attempted to apprehend the rebels, and an armed battle broke out. Soon large crowds took to the streets, building barricades and supporting the rebels, while Islamic-Marxist guerillas with their weapons joined in support.[124]

Iranian armed rebels during the revolution

The armed rebels attacked a weapons factory, capturing nearly 50,000 machine guns and distributing them to civilians who joined in the fighting. The rebels began storming police stations and military bases throughout Tehran. The city's martial law commander General Mehdi Rahimi decided not to use his 30,000 loyal Immortal Guards to crush the rebellion for fear of producing civilian casualties.[152]

The final collapse of the provisional non-Islamist government came at 2 pm on 11 February when the Supreme Military Council declared itself "neutral in the current political disputes... in order to prevent further disorder and bloodshed."[171][172] All military personnel were ordered back to their bases, effectively yielding control of the entire country to Khomeini.[128] Revolutionaries took over government buildings, TV and radio stations, and palaces of the Pahlavi dynasty, marking the end of the monarchy in Iran. Bakhtiar escaped the palace under a hail of bullets, fleeing Iran in disguise. He was later assassinated by an agent of the Islamic republic in 1991 in Paris.

This period, from 1 to 11 February, is celebrated every year in Iran as the "Decade of Fajr".[173] 11 February is "Islamic Revolution's Victory Day", a national holiday with state sponsored demonstrations in every city.[174][175]

Casualties

[edit]

Some sources (such as Emadeddin Baghi, a researcher at the Martyrs Foundation) claim 2,781 protesters and revolutionaries were killed in 1978–79 during the revolution.[176][Note 8] Khomeini reported a much larger number, saying "60,000 men, women and children were martyred by the Shah's regime".[177][176][178] In reference to this 60,000 figure, the military historian Spencer C. Tucker notes that "Khomeini's regime grossly overstated the revolution's death toll for propaganda purposes".[179] Tucker explains that the consensus of historians regarding estimated deaths during the Iranian Revolution (from January 1978 to February 1979), numbers between 532 and 2,781.[179] According to the historian Ervand Abrahamian, the number executed by revolutionary courts as the revolution was consolidated (8,000 opponents between June 1981 and June 1985)[180] exceeded those killed by the royalist government trying to stop the revolution.[181] According to Tucker's estimations, in the period of 1980 to 1985, between 25,000 and 40,000 Iranians were arrested, 15,000 Iranians were tried, and between 8,000 and 9,500 Iranians were executed.[179] The Iranian government paved over areas believed to be graves of thousands of the 1979 revolution victims, turning the area into a parking lot in 2025.[182]

Songs of Iranian Revolution

[edit]

The songs most closely associated with the revolution are epic ballads, composed during and in support of the Islamic Revolution and in opposition to the Pahlavi dynasty.[183] Before the revolution was consolidated, these chants were made by various political supporters, and were often recorded on cassette tapes in underground and home studios. In schools, these songs were sung by students as part of the celebrations of Fajr Decades.[184] "Iran Iran" or "Allah Allah" chants are famous revolutionary songs.[185]

Women's role

[edit]

The Iranian Revolution was a gendered revolution; much of the new regime's rhetoric was centered on the position of women in society.[186] Beyond rhetoric, thousands of women were also heavily mobilized in the revolution itself,[187] and different groups of women actively participated alongside their male counterparts.[188] Not only participating through voting, women also contributed to the revolution through marches, demonstrations and chanting slogans.[189] Women were involved in caring for the wounded, including doctors who responded to calls for help and opened their homes for those who needed assistance. While women themselves were often killed, tortured, arrested or injured and some were involved in guerilla activities, most contributed in non-violent ways.[190] Many women were instrumental not only in being involved in the revolution themselves but in mobilizing men and other non-political women. Many women protested while carrying children and their presence was one of the main reasons for disarming soldiers (who were there on behalf of the regime) who were ordered to shoot if necessary.[190]

Ayatollah Khomeini's rhetoric on women's participation

[edit]

Ayatollah Khomeini asserted that "You ladies here have proved that you are at the forefront of this movement. You have a great share in our Islamic movement. The future of our country depends on your support."[191] He invoked the image of the hijab as a symbol of the revolution, saying that "a nation whose respected women demonstrate in modest garb [hejab] to express their disgust with the Shah's regime—such a nation will be victorious."[192] He also said that "women from all levels of society took part in the recent demonstrations, which we are calling the 'referendum of the streets'... women fought side by side with men in the struggle for their independence and their liberty."[193] Khomeini pleaded for women to participate in anti-Shah demonstrations in various cities. Furthermore, women later responded to Khomeini's urgings to vote in favor of the Islamic Republic and the new constitution.[189] Women were so pivotal to the revolution that in response to a suggestion from a top aide to ban women from coming to group audience, Khomeini said "I threw the Shah out with these women, there's no problem in their coming."[192]

After the revolution, Khomeini credited much of the success of the movement to women, even commending the women for mobilizing men, "you ladies have proved that you are in the vanguard of the movement, you have proved that you lead the men, men get their inspiration from you, the men of Iran have learnt lessons from the honourable ladies of Iran ... You are in the vanguard of the movement."[191]

It has been argued that Khomeini and his fellow leaders danced around the issue of women's rights and rather focused their rhetoric on mobilizing women through encouraging them to participate in protests and fueling their anti-Shah sentiments.[194]

Variation within women's participation

[edit]
The presence of segregated women in the Tehran Ashura Demonstration, 11 December 1978

The motivations of women for being part of the revolutions were complex and varied among a plethora of religious, political and economic reasons[195] and women participating were from various classes and backgrounds.[196] Many Western educated upper-middle-class women from secular, urban and professional families were involved as well as many women from working-class and rural backgrounds.[190] There were groups as varied as the Fida'iyan-i Khalq, and the Mujahedin were functioning as guerrilla units during the revolutions in opposition to the Shah's regime.[190] There were also other groups of women with various agendas that sometimes converged and sometimes diverged from the Islamic Republic's political positions. For example, organized feminism, which was around since the Pahlavi dynasty, joined the revolutionary movement after the Shah dropped the cabinet position on Women's Affairs to appease the Islamists.[192] Members of the Women's Organization of Iran marched in support for the revolution and it was important that women very much linked to the government also turned against the Shah's regime.[194] Yet, there was some tension later between feminists' dress and the revolution's stance on women's clothing and they began to feel uncomfortable at opposition events.[195]

Some argue that this politicization and mobilization of women made it difficult for the new regime to push them out of the public and political spheres. The revolution resulted in an unprecedented opening for Iranian women into politics (mostly through demonstrations and voting),[197] and some authors argue that this had a lasting impact on Iranian women's political participation and role in the public sphere.[189] Some women were also part of the inner circle of the leaders of the new regime such as Marzieh Hadidchi. Other than the politicization of women, there were particular circumstances during the revolution which pushed women into being involved with politics. For example, "the combination of martial law with its curfew hours and the closing down of shops and workplaces, together with the cold of the fall and winter months resulted in the centers of political discussion often being within the home."[198] Women engaged with news and media as well as political discussions alongside their male counterparts as "the revolution was the only topic of interest to anyone, regardless of age or sex."[198] During 1978 and 1979 there were many gatherings in women's homes where they exchanged interpersonal news and anecdotes. These personal accounts were valuable in a time when the official coverage of news was not trusted by many people.[190]

Women who were activists, religious women and women dissatisfied with the regime were able to unite under the anti-Shah umbrella. However, "women were not united in their opinions of the revolution and its outcome as much as they were not united in their reasons for joining the revolution".[199] Despite this mobilization and high participation rate of women, they were still kept out of leadership positions which were exclusive to men; women are thought to be part of the rank and file rather than the elite strata of the revolution.[194]

Academic literature on women's participation

[edit]

While there has been some academic literature exploring individual narratives of women on the revolution,[189] most of the academic work produced focuses on the effect of the revolution on women rather than the role of Iranian women during the revolution. Scholar Guity Nashat highlights this neglected aspect of the revolution, "Although women's participation in the events leading to the 11 February revolution was instrumental in its success, most studies have not addressed the reasons for their involvement or their contribution."[200] Janet Baur argues the necessity of examining the daily lives of women, their living conditions and their relationship to other groups to understand their participation in the socio-political events of the revolution. She further explains that the cultural, ideological, social and material factors shaping the social life and class differences in the period just prior to the revolution need to be studied to understand how the Iranian women's social consciousness developed and how it led them to take part in public protests.[190] Caroline M. Brooks argues that women were left to express their concerns through the protest rather than in the Majlis. Thus, this created a "dangerous bargaining position for activist women" since rather than arguing their position through intellect they were only able to "argue by numbers in the streets and be repelled by force".[194]

There are some contesting understandings in academic literature regarding the reasons behind the mobilization of women. While some argue that the micro-level actions of women can be understood through religious and political ideologies, others argue that it is in fact the effect of manipulations of information, symbols and context which should be studied.[190]

Aftermath

[edit]

From early 1979 to either 1982 or 1983 Iran was in a "revolutionary crisis mode."[201] After the system of despotic monarchy had been overthrown,[202] the economy and the apparatus of government had collapsed, and military and security forces were in disarray. Yet, by 1982 Khomeini and his supporters had crushed the rival factions, defeated local rebellions and consolidated power.

At the same time, events that made up both the crisis and its resolution were the Iran hostage crisis, the invasion of Iran by Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and the presidency of Abolhassan Banisadr.[201][203]

Ayatollah Khomeini's consolidation of power

[edit]

Conflicts among revolutionaries

[edit]

Some observers believe "what began as an authentic and anti-dictatorial popular revolution based on a broad coalition of all anti-Shah forces was soon transformed into an Islamic fundamentalist power-grab,"[204] and that except for his core supporters, the members of the coalition thought Khomeini intended to be more of a spiritual guide than a ruler.[205] Khomeini was in his mid-70s, never held public office, had been out of Iran for more than a decade, and told questioners "the religious dignitaries do not want to rule."[206] However, nobody could deny the unanimous central role of the Imam, and the other factions were too small to have any real impact.

Another view is Khomeini had "overwhelming ideological, political and organizational hegemony,"[207] and non-theocratic groups never seriously challenged Khomeini's movement in popular support.[Note 9] Supporters of the new rule themselves have claimed that Iranians who opposed Khomeini were "fifth columnists" led by foreign countries attempting to overthrow the Iranian government.[209]

Khomeini and his loyalists in the revolutionary organizations implemented Khomeini's velayat-e faqih design for an Islamic republic led by himself as Supreme Leader[210] by exploiting temporary allies[211] such as Mehdi Bazargan's Provisional Government of Iran, whom they later eliminated from Iran's political stage one by one.[212]

Organizations of the revolution

[edit]

The most important bodies of the revolution were the Revolutionary Council, the Revolutionary Guards, Revolutionary Tribunals, Islamic Republican Party, and Revolutionary Committees (komitehs).[213]

While the moderate Bazargan and his government (temporarily) reassured the middle class, it became apparent they did not have power over the "Khomeinist" revolutionary bodies, particularly the Revolutionary Council (the "real power" in the revolutionary state),[214][215] and later the Islamic Republican Party. Inevitably, the overlapping authority of the Revolutionary Council (which had the power to pass laws) and Bazargan's government was a source of conflict[216] despite the fact that both had been approved by or put in place by Khomeini.

This conflict lasted only a few months however. The provisional government fell shortly after American Embassy officials were taken hostage on 4 November 1979. Bazargan's resignation was received by Khomeini without complaint, saying "Mr. Bazargan ... was a little tired and preferred to stay on the sidelines for a while." Khomeini later described his appointment of Bazargan as a "mistake."[217]

The Revolutionary Guard, or Pasdaran-e Enqelab, was established by Khomeini on 5 May 1979, as a counterweight both to the armed groups of the left, and to the Shah's military. The guard eventually grew into "a full-scale" military force,[218] becoming "the strongest institution of the revolution."[219]

Serving under the Pasdaran are the Baseej-e Mostaz'afin, volunteers in everything from earthquake emergency management to attacking opposition demonstrators and newspaper offices.[220] The Islamic Republican Party[221] then fought to establish a theocratic government by velayat-e faqih.

Thousands of komiteh or Revolutionary Committees[222] served as "the eyes and ears" of the new rule and are credited by critics with "many arbitrary arrests, executions and confiscations of property".[223]

Also enforcing the will of the government were the Hezbollahi (the Party of God), "strong-arm thugs" who attacked demonstrators and offices of newspapers critical of Khomeini.[224]

Two major political groups that formed after the fall of the Shah that clashed with and were eventually suppressed by pro-Khomeini groups, were the moderate religious Muslim People's Republican Party (MPRP) which was associated with Grand Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, and the secular leftist National Democratic Front (NDF).

1979 ethnic uprisings

[edit]

Following the events of the revolution, Marxist guerrillas and federalist parties revolted in some regions comprising Khuzistan, Kurdistan and Gonbad-e Qabus, which resulted in fighting between them and revolutionary forces. These revolts began in April 1979 and lasted between several months to over a year, depending on the region.

Establishment of Islamic republic government

[edit]

Referendum of 12 Farvardin

[edit]

On 30 and 31 March (Farvardin 10, 11) a referendum was held over whether to replace the monarchy with an "Islamic republic". Khomeini called for a massive turnout[225] and only the National Democratic Front, Fadayan, and several Kurdish parties opposed the vote.[225] The results showed that 98.2% had voted in favor of the Islamic Republic.[225]

Writing of the constitution

[edit]

In June 1979 the Freedom Movement released its draft constitution for the Islamic Republic that it had been working on since Khomeini was in exile. It included a Guardian Council to veto un-Islamic legislation, but had no guardian jurist ruler.[226] Leftists found the draft too conservative and in need of major changes but Khomeini declared it 'correct'.[227] To approve the new constitution and prevent leftist alterations, a relatively small seventy-three-member Assembly of Experts for Constitution was elected that summer. Critics complained that "vote-rigging, violence against undesirable candidates and the dissemination of false information" was used to "produce an assembly overwhelmingly dominated by clergy, all took active roles during the revolution and loyal to Khomeini."[228]

Khomeini (and the assembly) now rejected the constitution – its correctness notwithstanding – and Khomeini declared that the new government should be based "100% on Islam."[229]

In addition to the president, the new constitution included a more powerful post of guardian jurist ruler intended for Khomeini,[230] with control of the military and security services, and power to appoint several top government and judicial officials. It increased the power and number of clerics on the Council of Guardians and gave it control over elections[231] as well as laws passed by the legislature.

The new constitution was also approved overwhelmingly by the December 1979 constitutional referendum, but with more opposition[Note 10] and smaller turnout.[232]

Hostage crisis

[edit]

In late October 1979, the exiled and dying Shah was admitted into the United States for cancer treatment. In Iran there was an immediate outcry, and both Khomeini and leftist groups demanded the Shah's return to Iran for trial and execution. On 4 November 1979 youthful Islamists, calling themselves Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line, invaded the US embassy compound in Tehran and seized its staff. Revolutionaries were angry because of how the Shah had left Iran which spawned rumors of another US–backed coup in Iran that would re-install him. The occupation was also intended as leverage to demand the return of the Shah to stand trial in exchange for the hostages, and depose Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, who they believed was plotting to normalize relations with the US. The students held 52 American diplomats hostage for 444 days, which played a role in helping to pass the constitution, suppressing moderates, and otherwise radicalising the revolution.[233]

Holding the hostages was very popular and continued even after the death of the Shah. As Khomeini explained to his future President Banisadr, "This action has many benefits. ... This has united our people. Our opponents do not dare act against us. We can put the constitution to the people's vote without difficulty ..."[234]

With great publicity the students released documents from the American embassy, which they labeled a "den of spies",[235] showing that moderate Iranian leaders had met with US officials (and did not release similar evidence of high-ranking Islamists having done the same).[236] Among the casualties of the hostage crisis was Prime Minister Bazargan and his government, who resigned in November unable to enforce the government's order to release the hostages.[237]

The prestige of Khomeini and the hostage taking was further enhanced with the failure of a hostage rescue attempt, widely credited to divine intervention.[238]

The hostage crisis ended with the signing of the Algiers Accords in Algeria on 19 January 1981. The hostages were formally released to United States custody the following day, just minutes after Ronald Reagan was sworn in as the new American president.

Suppression of opposition

[edit]
A revolutionary firing squad in 1979

Khomeini and his followers claimed sole credit for the revolution, sidelining other revolutionary groups. This was possible due to the regime’s control over public opinion and historical narrative.[239] In early March 1979, Khomeini announced, "do not use this term, 'democratic.' That is the Western style," giving pro-democracy liberals (and later leftists) a taste of disappointments to come.[225] In succession the National Democratic Front was banned in August 1979, the provisional government was disempowered in November, the Muslim People's Republican Party was banned in January 1980, the People's Mujahedin of Iran guerrillas came under attack in February 1980, a purge of universities started in March 1980, and the liberal Islamist President Abolhassan Banisadr was impeached in June 1981.[240]

Executed generals of the Imperial Iranian Army: Reza Naji, Mehdi Rahimi, and Manouchehr Khosrodad

After the revolution, human rights groups estimated the number of casualties suffered by protesters and prisoners of the new system to be several thousand. The first to be executed were members of the old system – senior generals, followed by over 200 senior civilian officials[241] – as punishment and to eliminate the danger of a coup d'état. Brief trials lacking defense attorneys, juries, transparency or the opportunity for the accused to defend themselves[242] were held by revolutionary judges such as Sadegh Khalkhali, the Sharia judge. By January 1980 "at least 582 persons had been executed."[243] Among those executed was Amir Abbas Hoveida, former Prime Minister of Iran.[244] Between January 1980 and June 1981, when Bani-Sadr was impeached, at least 900 executions took place,[245] for everything from drug and sexual offenses to "corruption on earth", from plotting counter-revolution and spying for Israel to membership in opposition groups.[246]

The 1981-1982 massacre

[edit]

Between June 1981 and March 1982, the theocratic regime carried out the largest political massacre in Iranian history, targeting communists, socialists, social democrats, liberals, monarchists, moderate Islamists, and members of the Baha'i faith as part of the Iranian Cultural Revolution decreed by Khomeini on 14 June 1980 with the intent of "purifying" Iranian society of non-Islamic elements.[247] Between June 1981 and June 1982, Amnesty International documented 2,946 executions, with several thousand more killed in the next two years according to the anti-government guerilla People's Mujahedin of Iran.[248] More recently, Rastyad Collective has verified the identities of more than 3,400 political dissidents who were executed between June 1981 and March 1982.[249][250] These dissidents were sentenced to death by the Islamic Revolutionary Courts during show trials in more than eighty-five cities across the country on charges of spreading "corruption on Earth" (ifsad-fi-alarz), "espionage", "terrorism", or "enmity against Allah" (Moharebeh).[247] Most victims of the 1981 massacre were young activists aged eleven to twenty-four. These activists were either high school students or had recently graduated from universities in Iran and abroad. During the massacre, hundreds of minors were also subjected to arbitrary detention, torture, and summary executions on ideologically motivated charges of ifsad-fi-alarz and moharebeh by the revolutionary courts.[249][247][251] In July 2024, The Special Rapporteur published a landmark UN Report on the 1981 massacre and categorised the atrocity crimes committed in 1981 and 1982 as genocide and crimes against humanity. In this report, the Rapporteur called for the establishment of an independent and international accountability mechanism.[252]

Closing of non-Islamist newspapers

[edit]

In mid-August 1979, shortly after the election of the constitution-writing assembly, several dozen newspapers and magazines opposing Khomeini's idea of theocratic rule by jurists were shut down.[253][254][255] When protests were organized by the National Democratic Front (NDF), Khomeini angrily denounced them saying, "we thought we were dealing with human beings. It is evident we are not."[256]

... After each revolution several thousand of these corrupt elements are executed in public and burnt and the story is over. They are not allowed to publish newspapers.[256]

Hundreds were injured by "rocks, clubs, chains and iron bars" when Hezbollahi attacked the protesters,[254] and shortly after, a warrant was issued for the arrest of the NDF's leader.[257]

Muslim People's Republican Party

[edit]
Kazem Shariatmadari and Ayatollah Khomeini

In December the moderate Islamic party Muslim People's Republican Party (MPRP) and its spiritual leader Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari had become a rallying point for Iranians who wanted democracy not theocracy.[258] Riots broke out in Shariatmadari's Azeri home region with members of the MPRP and Shariatmadari's followers seizing the Tabriz television station and using it to "broadcast demands and grievances." The regime reacted quickly, sending Revolutionary Guards to retake the TV station, mediators to defuse complaints and activists to stage a massive pro-Khomeini counter-demonstration.[259] The party was suppressed,[258] and in 1982 Shariatmadari was "demoted" from the rank of Grand Ayatollah and many of his clerical followers were purged.[260]

Islamist left

[edit]

In January 1980, Abolhassan Banisadr was elected president of Iran. Though an adviser to Khomeini, he was a leftist who clashed with another ally of Khomeini, the theocratic Islamic Republic Party (IRP) – the controlling power in the new parliament.[261]


At the same time, erstwhile revolutionary allies of Khomeini – the Islamist modernist guerrilla group People's Mujahedin of Iran (the MEK) – were being suppressed by Khomeini's forces. Khomeini attacked the MEK, referring to them as monafeqin (hypocrites) and kafer (unbelievers).[262] Hezbollahi people attacked meeting places, bookstores, and newsstands of Mujahideen and other leftists,[263] driving them underground. Universities were closed to purge them of opponents of theocratic rule as a part of the "Cultural Revolution", and 20,000 teachers and nearly 8,000 military officers deemed too westernized were dismissed.[264]

By mid-1981 matters came to a head. An attempt by Khomeini to forge a reconciliation between Banisadr and IRP leaders had failed,[265] and now it was Banisadr who was the rallying point "for all doubters and dissidents" of the theocracy, including the MEK.[266]

When leaders of the National Front called for a demonstration in June 1981 in favor of Banisadr, Khomeini threatened its leaders with the death penalty for apostasy "if they did not repent".[267] Leaders of the Freedom Movement of Iran were compelled to make and publicly broadcast apologies for supporting the Front's appeal.[267] Those attending the rally were menaced by Hezbollahi and Revolutionary Guards and intimidated into silence.[268]

On 28 June 1981, a bombing of the office of the IRP killed around 70 high-ranking officials, cabinet members and members of parliament, including Mohammad Beheshti, the secretary-general of the party and head of the Islamic Republic's judicial system. The government arrested thousands, and there were hundreds of executions against the MEK and its followers.[269] Despite these and other assassinations[221] the hoped-for mass uprising and armed struggle against the Khomeiniists was crushed.

In May 1979, the Furqan Group (Guruh-i Furqan) assassinated an important lieutenant of Khomeini, Morteza Motahhari.[270]

Impacts

[edit]

International impact

[edit]

Internationally, the initial impact of the revolution was immense. In the non-Muslim world, it changed the image of Islam, generating much interest in Islam—both sympathetic[271] and hostile[272]—and even speculation that the revolution might change "the world balance of power more than any political event since Hitler's conquest of Europe."[273]

The Islamic Republic positioned itself as a revolutionary beacon under the slogan "neither East nor West, only Islamic Republic" ("Na Sharq, Na Gharb, Faqat Jumhuri-e Islami," i.e., neither Soviet nor American / West European models) and called for the overthrow of capitalism, American influence, and social injustice in the Middle East and the rest of the world. Revolutionary leaders in Iran gave and sought support from non-Muslim activists such as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Ireland and the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, even favoring far-left revolutionaries over Islamist (but ideologically different and strategically harmful) causes such as the neighboring Afghan Mujahideen.[274] The revolution itself was supported by the Palestine Liberation Organization.[275] In terms of future relevance, the conflicts that originated from the Iranian Revolution continued to define geo-politics for the following decades.[276]

In February 1981, the Iranian Republic supported Hunger strikes in the H-Block of the HM Prison Maze by Irish Republicans including Bobby Sands. Following the death of Sands in May 1981, the street in Tehran the British Embassy is on was renamed from "Winston Churchill Street" to "Bobby Sands Street".[277] The IRA saw the Iranian Revolution as aspirational, an example of mass action as a way to meet goals. Both the Iranian government and their opposition supported the hunger strikes, creating a competition for the favor of the IRA. The support by the government came after the UK sided with Iraq and Saddam Hussein in the Iran–Iraq war. Oppositional groups like Mojahedin-e-Khalq claimed solidarity with the hunger strike and connected their Marxist influences. The Iranian government, Iranian leftist groups, and the IRA saw Britain as a colonizing force in both regions. For a time, Mojahedin-e-Khalq and the Provisional Sinn Féin (the political arm of the Provisional IRA) had consistent contact.[277] Contact ended in June 1981 after fear of offending the Iranian Government.[277]

The Islamic Republic changed the foreign policy of the Pahlavi dynasty by supporting third worldist movements like the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. The Pahlavis and South Africa had relations dating back to when Reza Shah went there in exile. After the first Shah's ousting by the Soviets and British during World War II, he spent the remainder of his life in Johannesburg.[278] Pre-revolution Iran provided 90% of South Africa's oil.[279] After the revolution, Iran cut South Africa off from its oil supply and financially supported the African National Congress.[279] This was part of the larger want by Khomeini to support the "downtrodden" of the world, including, non-aligned countries. In 1980, the ANC attended the "Gather of World Liberation" hosted in Tehran for the third worldist movement.[280] In 2015, the International Relations and Cooperation minister of South Africa said of Iran, "The Islamic Republic stood by us during our darkest days, cutting ties with the apartheid regime. Your revolution was our revolution. You showed us that emancipation was possible, whatever the odds".[281] A connection with the ANC continued even when tested during the apartheid era and the Iran–Iraq war. In 1985, Iran and South Africa traded weapons for oil.[282] The belief in third-worldism seemed to have superseded the change in behavior by Iran.

Persian Gulf and the Iran–Iraq War

[edit]
Obverse
Reverse
Iranian 20 Rials coin – monument of 3rd anniversary of Iranian Revolution

Supporters of the revolution both within and outside of Iran began calling for the overthrow of monarchies in the region and for them to be replaced by Islamic republics. This alarmed many of Iran's neighbours, particularly Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia as well as Western nations dependent on Middle Eastern oil for their energy needs.

In September 1980, Iraq took advantage of the febrile situation and invaded Iran. At the centre of Iraq's objectives was the annexation of the East Bank of the Shaat Al-Arab waterway that makes up part of the border between the two nations and which had been the site of numerous border skirmishes between the two countries going back to the late 1960s. The president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, also wanted to annex the Iranian province of Khuzestan, substantially populated by Iranian Arabs. There was also concern that a Shia-centric revolution in Iran may stimulate a similar uprising in Iraq, where the country's Sunni minority ruled over the Shia majority.

Hussein was confident that with Iraq's armed forces being well-equipped with new technology and with high morale would enjoy a decisive strategic advantage against an Iranian military that had recently had much of its command officers purged following the revolution. Iran was also struggling to find replacement parts for much of its US- and British-supplied equipment. Hussein believed that victory would therefore come swiftly.

However, Iran was "galvanized"[283] by the invasion and the populace of Iran rallied behind their new government in an effort to repel the invaders. After some early successes, the Iraqi invasion stalled and was then repelled and by 1982, Iran had recaptured almost all of its territories. In June 1982, with Iraqi forces all but expelled from Iranian territory, the Iraqi government offered a ceasefire. This was rejected by Khomeini, who declared that the only condition for peace was that "the regime in Baghdad must fall and must be replaced by an Islamic republic".[284]

The war would continue for another six years during which time countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf states provided financial assistance to Iraq in an effort to prevent an Iranian victory, even though their relations with Iraq were often hostile – Kuwait itself was invaded by Iraq two years after the peace agreement between Iraq and Iran was signed.

The war served in part as an opportunity for the government to strengthen revolutionary ardour and revolutionary groups; the Revolutionary Guard and committees at the expense of its remaining allies-turned-opponents, such as the MEK.[285][286] While enormously costly and destructive, the war "rejuvenate[d] the drive for national unity and Islamic revolution" and "inhibited fractious debate and dispute" in Iran.[287]

Foreign relations

[edit]

The Islamic Republic of Iran experienced difficult relations with some Western countries, especially the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the Eastern Bloc nations led by the Soviet Union. Iran was under constant US unilateral sanctions, which were tightened under the presidency of Bill Clinton. Most European countries, despite their significant investments within Iran, stood in solidarity with the United States and also imposed economic sanctions on the theocratic regime.[288] Britain suspended all diplomatic relations with Iran and did not re-open their embassy in Tehran until 1988.[289] The European country that maintained the closest relations with the new Iranian government was Switzerland, which was neither a part of the European Economic Community nor the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.[290] Relations with the USSR became strained as well after the Soviet government condemned Khomeini's repression of certain minorities after the revolution.[291] Diplomatic relations between Iran and the apartheid government of South Africa were completely severed following Khomeini's rise to power.[292]

Israel had relations with Iran under the Shah, but relations were cut on 18 February 1979 when Iran adopted an anti-Zionist stance. The former Israeli embassy in Tehran was handed over to the PLO, and Iran has allied and funded several anti-Israeli Islamist militant groups since.[293]

After the US sanctions were tightened and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China became the main principal allies for Iran.[294] Relations between the two countries improved after Vladimir Putin took office in 2000 and increasingly warmer in recent years following an international backlash over the annexation of Crimea in 2014 which led to sanctions by the Western powers. Russia had sought Iran on expanding arms trade over the past three decades especially with the cooperation with the Assad government during the Syrian civil war.[295][296] Iran also began its economic cooperation with China that includes "political, strategic and economic" components between the two nations.[297][298][299][300]

In the Muslim world

[edit]

In the Muslim world, particularly in its early years, the revolution inspired enormous enthusiasm and redoubled opposition to western imperialism, intervention and influence. Islamist insurgents rose in Saudi Arabia (1979), Egypt (1981), Syria (1982), and Lebanon (1983).[301]

In Pakistan, it has been noted that the "press was largely favorable towards the new government"; the Islamist parties were even more enthusiastic; while the ruler, General Zia-ul-Haq, himself on an Islamization drive since he took power in 1977, talked of "simultaneous triumph of Islamic ideology in both our countries" and that "Khomeini is a symbol of Islamic insurgence." Some American analysts noted that, at this point, Khomeini's influence and prestige in Pakistan was greater than Zia-ul-Haq's himself.[302] After Khomeini claimed that Americans were behind the 1979 Grand Mosque seizure, student protesters from the Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad attacked the US embassy, setting it on fire and taking hostages. While the crisis was quickly defused by the Pakistan military, the next day, before some 120 Pakistani army officers stationed in Iran on the road to hajj, Khomeini said, "it is a cause of joy that… all Pakistan has risen against the United States" and the struggle is not that of the US and Iran but "the entire world of disbelief and the world of Islam". According to journalist Yaroslav Trofimov, "the Pakistani officers, many of whom had graduated from Western military academies, seemed swayed by the ayatollah's intoxicating words."[303]

Ultimately only the Lebanese Islamists succeeded. The Islamic revolutionary government itself is credited with helping establish Hezbollah in Lebanon[304] and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.

On the other side of the ledger, at least one observer argues that despite great effort and expense the only countries outside Iran the revolution had a "measure of lasting influence" on are Lebanon and Iraq.[305] Others claim the devastating Iran–Iraq War "mortally wounded ... the ideal of spreading the Islamic revolution,"[203] or that the Islamic Republic's pursuit of an ideological rather than a "nationalist, pragmatic" foreign policy has weakened Iran's "place as a great regional power".[306]

Domestic impact

[edit]

Views differ on the impact of the revolution.[Note 11] For some it was "the most significant, hopeful and profound event in the entirety of contemporary Islamic history",[308] while other Iranians believe that the revolution was a time when "for a few years we all lost our minds",[309] and which "promised us heaven, but... created a hell on earth."[310]

People celebrating anniversary of the revolution in Mashhad in 2014

Internally, Iran has had some success with the governmental promotion of Islam, and the elimination of secularism and American influence in government. Criticisms have been raised with regards to political freedom, governmental honesty and efficiency, economic equality and self-sufficiency, or even popular religious devotion.[311][312] Opinion polls and observers report widespread dissatisfaction, including a "rift" between the revolutionary generation and younger Iranians who find it "impossible to understand what their parents were so passionate about."[313] To honor the 40th anniversary of revolution around 50,000 prisoners were forgiven by order Ali Khamenei to receive "Islamic clemency".[314][315][316] Many religious minorities such as Christians, Baháʼís, Jews and Zoroastrians have had to flee Iran since the Islamic Revolution of 1979.[317][318]

Literacy has continued to increase under the Islamic Republic.[319][320] By 2002, illiteracy rates dropped by more than half.[321][322] Maternal and infant mortality rates have also been cut significantly.[323] Population growth was first encouraged but discouraged after 1988.[324] Overall, Iran's Human development Index rating has climbed significantly from 0.569 in 1980 to 0.732 in 2002, on a par with neighbouring Turkey.[325][326] In the latest HDI, however, Iran has since fallen 8 ranks below Turkey.[327]

Politics and government

[edit]

Iran has elected governmental bodies at the national, provincial, and local levels. Although these bodies are subordinate to theocracy – which has veto power over who can run for parliament (or Islamic Consultative Assembly) and whether its bills can become law – they have more power than equivalent organs in the Shah's government.

Iran's Sunni minority (about 8%) has seen some unrest.[328] Five of the 290 parliamentary seats are allocated to their communities.[329]

The members of the Baháʼí Faith have been declared heretical and subversive.[330] While persecution occurred before the revolution since then more than 200 Baháʼís have been executed or presumed killed, and many more have been imprisoned, deprived of jobs, pensions, businesses, and educational opportunities. Baháʼí holy places have been confiscated, vandalized, or destroyed. More recently, Baháʼís in Iran have been deprived of education and work. Several thousand young Baháʼís between the ages of 17 and 24 have been expelled from universities.

Whether the Islamic Republic has brought more or less severe political repression is disputed. Grumbling once done about the tyranny and corruption of the Shah and his court is now directed against "the Mullahs."[331] Fear of SAVAK has been replaced by fear of Revolutionary Guards, and other religious revolutionary enforcers.[224] Violations of human rights by the theocratic government is said to be worse than during the monarchy,[332] and in any case extremely grave.[333] Reports of torture, imprisonment of dissidents, and the murder of prominent critics have been made by human rights groups. Censorship is handled by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, without whose official permission, "no books or magazines are published, no audiotapes are distributed, no movies are shown and no cultural organization is established. Men and women are not allowed to dance or swim with each other."[334]

Women

[edit]

Throughout the beginning of the 20th century and prior to the revolution, many women leaders emerged and demanded basic social rights for women.[335] During the reign of Reza Shah, the government mandated the removal of the veil and promoted the education of young girls.[335] However, the push-back of the Shia clerics made progress difficult, and the government had to contain its promotion of basic women's rights to the norms of the patriarchal social hierarchy to accommodate the clerics.[335] After the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941, the discipline of the government decreased, and women were able to further exercise their rights, including the ability to wear the veil if they wanted.[335] More organization of women's groups occurred in the 1960s and 70s, and they used the government's modernization to define and advocate for women's issues.[335] During these decades, women became active in formerly male domains such as the parliament, the cabinet, armed forces, legal professions, and fields of science and technology.[335] Additionally, women achieved the right to vote in 1963.[335] Many of these achievements and rights that Iranian women had gained in the decades leading up to the revolution were reversed by the Islamic Revolution.[335]

The revolutionary government rewrote laws in an attempt to force women to leave the workforce by promoting the early retirement of female government employees, the closing of childcare centers, enforcing full Islamic cover in offices and public places, as well as preventing women from studying in 140 fields in higher education.[335] Women fought back against these changes, and as activist and writer Mahnaz Afkhami writes, "The regime succeeded in putting women back in the veil in public places, but not in resocializing them into fundamentalist norms."[335] After the revolution, women often had to work hard to support their families as the post-revolutionary economy suffered.[335] Women also asserted themselves in the arts, literature, education, and politics.[335]

Women – especially those from traditional backgrounds – participated on a large scale in demonstrations leading up to the revolution.[336] They were encouraged by Ayatollah Khomeini to join him in overthrowing the Pahlavi dynasty.[196] However, most of these women expected the revolution to lead to an increase in their rights and opportunities rather than the restrictions that actually occurred.[196] The policy enacted by the revolutionary government and its attempts to limit the rights of women were challenged by the mobilization and politicization of women that occurred during and after the revolution.[196] Women's resistance included remaining in the work force in large numbers and challenging Islamic dress by showing hair under their head scarves.[196] The Iranian government has had to reconsider and change aspects of its policies towards women because of their resistance to laws that restrict their rights.[196]

Since the revolution, university enrollment and the number of women in the civil service and higher education has risen.[Note 12] and several women have been elected to the Iranian parliament.

Homosexuality

[edit]

When Ruhollah Khomeini came to power in 1979, he called for homosexuals to be "exterminated",[338] and one of his first political actions was to institute imprisonment, corporal punishment, and the death penalty for any sexual acts outside traditional Islamic heterosexual marriage. In a 1979 interview with The New York Times, a journalist asked Khomeini to justify the state-sanctioned shootings of homosexuals. In reply Khomeini compared them as well as other adulterers to gangrene, thieves, and murderers.[339]

Iran is currently one of the world's only jurisdictions to actively execute gay men.[340][341][342] Amnesty International reports that approximately 5,000 homosexuals have been executed in Iran since the revolution.[343]

Economic impact

[edit]

Iran's post-revolutionary economy has a significant state-owned or parastatal sector, including businesses owned by the Revolutionary Guards and Bonyad foundations.[344][345]

Since the revolution Iran's GDP (PPP) has grown from $114 billion in 1980 to $858 billion in 2010.[346] GDP per capita (PPP) has grown from $4,295 in 1980 to $11,396 in 2010.[346]

Since the revolution Iran's GDP (Nominal) has grown from $90.392 billion in 1979 to $385.874 in 2015.[347] GDP per capita (nominal) has grown from $2290 in 1979 to $5470 in 2016.[348] Real GNI per capita in 2011 constant international dollars decreased after the revolution and during the Iran-Iraq war from $7762 in 1979 to $3699 at the end of the war in 1989. After three decades of reconstruction and growth since then, it has not yet reached its 1979 level and has only recovered to $6751 in 2016.[349] Data on GNI per capita in PPP terms is only available since 1990 globally. In PPP terms, GNI per capita has increased from Int. $11,425 in 1990 to Int. $18,544 in 2016. But most of this increase can be attributed to the rise in oil prices in the 2000s.[350]

The value of Iran's currency declined precipitously after the revolution. Whereas on 15 March 1978, 71.46 rials equaled one US dollar, in January 2018, 44,650 rials amounted to one dollar.[351]

The economy has become slightly more diversified since the revolution, with 80% of Iranian GDP dependent on oil and gas as of 2010.[352] The Islamic Republic lags some countries in transparency and ease of doing business according to international surveys. Transparency International ranked Iran 136th out of 175 countries in transparency (i.e., lack of corruption) for its 2014 index;[344] and the IRI was ranked 130th out of the 189 countries surveyed in the World Bank 2015 Doing Business Report.[353]

Islamic political culture

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It is said[by whom?] that there were attempts to incorporate modern political and social concepts into Islamic canon since 1950. The attempt was a reaction to the secular political discourse namely Marxism, liberalism and nationalism. Following the death of Ayatollah Boroujerdi, some of the scholars like Murtaza Mutahhari, Muhammad Beheshti and Mahmoud Taleghani found new opportunity to change conditions. Before them, Boroujerdi was considered a conservative Marja. They tried to reform conditions after the death of the ayatollah. They presented their arguments by rendering lectures in 1960 and 1963 in Tehran. The result of the lectures was the book "An inquiry into principles of Mar'jaiyat". Some of the major issues highlighted were the government in Islam, the need for the clergy's independent financial organization, Islam as a way of life, advising and guiding youth and necessity of being community. Allameh Tabatabei refers to velayat as a political philosophy for Shia and velayat faqih for Shia community. There are also other attempts to formulate a new attitude of Islam such as the publication of three volumes of Maktab Tashayyo. Also some believe that it is indispensable to revive the religious gathered in Hoseyniyeh-e-Ershad.[354]

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Depictions in Western media

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See also

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Revolution-related topics
Related conflicts
General

Notes

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Iranian Revolution, spanning 1978 to 1979, was a multifaceted uprising that culminated in the overthrow of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's monarchy on February 11, 1979, and the founding of the following a March 30–31 referendum that approved the new system with 98.2% support, declared official on April 1. , exiled since 1964 for opposing the Shah's reforms, returned on and assumed de facto leadership, mobilizing Shia Islamist ideology that framed resistance as religious duty against perceived tyranny and foreign influence. Key triggers included economic disparities from oil-fueled inflation and uneven modernization under the land reforms, which displaced rural populations and clashed with clerical landholdings, alongside SAVAK's political repression that alienated intellectuals, leftists, and nationalists. Protests escalated from January 1978 seminary demonstrations in to nationwide strikes and clashes, including the September 8 "Black Friday" massacre in , with historian Charles Kurzman estimating total revolutionary deaths at approximately 2,000, far below regime claims of 60,000. Though initially a broad coalition against autocracy, the revolution's outcome favored Khomeini's vision of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist), sidelining secular and leftist allies through post-victory purges and revolutionary courts that executed thousands of former officials and opponents by 1980, entrenching a theocracy that exported Shia militancy and clashed with the West, notably via the 444-day U.S. embassy hostage crisis starting November 1979. This shift marked a causal rupture, reversing 's secular trajectory and imposing sharia-based governance amid economic isolation and internal consolidation.

Etymology and Terminology

Names and Interpretations

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the upheaval of 1978–1979 is officially termed the Engelab-e Eslami (Islamic Revolution), a designation that underscores the establishment of a Shiite theocratic governance under Ayatollah as a divinely sanctioned victory over monarchical secularism and Western influence. This framing, enshrined in state commemorations and education since April 1, 1979—the date of the republic's founding referendum—prioritizes religious ideology as the causal force, portraying the events as a fulfillment of Islamic jurisprudence (velayat-e faqih) rather than mere political contestation. In contrast, Western scholarship and media predominantly employ neutral descriptors such as the "Iranian Revolution" or "1979 Revolution," focusing on the dynasty's overthrow and regime transition without emphasizing theological primacy, which aligns with a secular lens on state power shifts. These terms, evident in analyses from institutions like the , reflect a historiographical tendency to categorize it alongside secular upheavals like the French or Russian Revolutions, potentially downplaying the Islamist mobilization that consolidated clerical authority post-February 11, 1979. Interpretive debates hinge on whether the events constituted a genuine —entailing profound socioeconomic restructuring—or a selective regime replacement with authoritarian continuities, such as centralized repression and elite entrenchment. Critics, including some leftist observers, contend it failed to displace the underlying , which relocated abroad rather than being eradicated, preserving power dynamics under theocratic guise. Others affirm its revolutionary status due to the monarchy's dismantlement and theocracy's imposition, marking a systemic rupture in form, though subsequent purges of non-Islamist factions revealed how initial broad coalitions were subordinated to Khomeinist dominance. Such nomenclature variances often betray ideological priors: state-sanctioned terms exalt religious agency, while skeptical labels like "Khomeini coup" (implying clerical over ) emerge from exile narratives questioning the revolution's mass legitimacy.

Historical Preconditions

Late Qajar and Constitutional Era (1890s–1920s)

The of 1891–1892 marked the first major instance of organized mass resistance in Iran against foreign economic concessions granted by the Qajar monarchy, galvanizing merchants, bazaaris, and in opposition to Naser al-Din Shah's 1890 agreement awarding a fifty-year monopoly to the British-owned Imperial Tobacco Corporation. Protests erupted in urban centers like , , and , involving boycotts and demonstrations that spread nationwide, culminating in a issued by the prominent Najaf-based cleric Mirza Hasan Shirazi declaring tobacco use sinful and equivalent to harming the Twelfth Imam, which prompted widespread compliance and economic disruption to the concessionaire. The shah capitulated in January 1892 by annulling the concession and paying compensation, demonstrating the clergy's capacity to mobilize popular sentiment against perceived monarchical overreach and foreign intrusion, though the event also highlighted internal divisions as some elites benefited from such deals. This precedent informed the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911, triggered by grievances over economic hardship, arbitrary taxation, and abuses by officials, such as the bastinadoing of sugar merchants in in December 1905 protesting inflated prices linked to a royal monopoly. A coalition of intellectuals, merchants, and lower-ranking demanded accountability, leading to sanctuary protests (bast) at the British legation and mosques; Mozaffar ad-Din Shah relented by appointing a constitutionalist cabinet and promulgating the Fundamental Laws on December 30, 1906, which established the () as a legislative body and imposed limits on absolute monarchical authority, including requirements for shah approval of laws and budgets. The 1907 Supplementary Fundamental Laws further enshrined principles like and a committee of five high-ranking Shia mujtahids to vet legislation for conformity with Islamic , reflecting clerical influence in tempering secular reforms. However, the revolution faltered amid internal factionalism and external meddling: Mohammad Ali Shah, ascending in 1907, dissolved the in June 1908 with Russian-backed forces bombarding its building, prompting constitutionalist forces to regroup in and rally provincial support until British and Russian interventions in 1909–1911 restored a weakened parliament but entrenched foreign oversight. The of 1907 formalized spheres of influence, assigning northern to and the south to Britain, exacerbating economic exploitation through loans, tariffs, and concessions that drained revenues—Russia's 1911 ultimatum demanding repayment of 8 million rubles in loans underscored the dynasty's fiscal dependency. Such dynamics eroded Qajar legitimacy, fostering nascent among intellectuals and elites who viewed the shahs as complicit in capitulatory privileges granting extraterritorial rights to foreigners. Shia clergy played a pivotal yet ambivalent role, initially allying with constitutionalists to curb the shah's unchecked power—as seen in ulama endorsements of the Majlis to prevent "un-Islamic" edicts—but withdrawing support when reforms threatened traditional authority, such as proposals for Western-style education or judiciary, prefiguring tensions between clerical guardianship and modern state-building. This era's mobilizations thus sowed seeds of anti-monarchical distrust and clerical populism, as the Majlis's early achievements—like ratifying railway and petroleum concessions in 1907—were overshadowed by the regime's inability to assert sovereignty, leaving Iran vulnerable to great-power rivalries.

Reza Shah's Modernization (1925–1941)

Reza Shah Pahlavi ascended to the throne in December 1925 following a coup that ended the , establishing the Pahlavi era with a focus on rapid secular modernization to forge a centralized nation-state from a fragmented, tribal society. His reforms emphasized through military consolidation, bureaucratic centralization, and infrastructure development, drawing inspiration from Atatür while prioritizing Persian nationalism over Islamic traditions. These efforts succeeded in unifying administrative control and fostering economic self-reliance, yet their authoritarian implementation, including forced , generated resentment among clerical and tribal elites who viewed them as cultural erasure. A cornerstone of Reza Shah's program was the creation of a modern , expanding from disorganized Cossack brigades to a force of approximately 127,000 by 1941, equipped with imported and armored vehicles to suppress internal and tribal autonomy. This military buildup enabled the and settlement of nomadic tribes, such as the Bakhtiari and Qashqai, through campaigns in the and that relocated over 1 million nomads to sedentary villages, reducing their resistance to central authority but causing widespread hardship and loss of traditional livelihoods. Concurrently, bureaucratic reforms centralized provincial governance, replacing tribal khans with appointed officials and instituting a national budget system that increased government revenue through taxation and customs duties. Infrastructure projects symbolized Reza Shah's vision of progress, most notably the , initiated in 1927 and completed in 1938, spanning 1,400 kilometers from the to the without foreign loans, funded instead by domestic oil revenues and taxes despite costing an estimated 8 million pounds sterling. Road networks expanded to over 14,000 kilometers by 1941, facilitating trade and troop mobility, while urban development included the construction of factories for textiles and sugar processing to promote import substitution. These initiatives reduced foreign economic leverage, as Reza Shah renegotiated concessions like the 1933 oil agreement with the , increasing Iran's royalty share from 16% to 20% and asserting greater over resources. Social reforms targeted education and gender roles to cultivate a modern citizenry, with the establishment of primary schools rising from fewer than 100 in to over 800 by 1941, alongside the founding of Dar ul-Funun as a secular training institute. Literacy rates, starting from a baseline of under 10% nationwide, saw modest gains through laws in 1931, particularly benefiting urban males, though rural and female access remained limited. Women's education advanced with co-educational policies and the admission of the first female students to Tehran University in 1935, yet the 1936 decree mandating unveiling—enforced by police ripping veils from women in public—provoked backlash as a coercive on Islamic norms, alienating conservative families and bolstering clerical opposition. Reza Shah curtailed clerical influence by secularizing the judiciary, replacing Sharia courts with civil codes modeled on European systems, and confiscating religious endowments (waqfs) to fund state projects, effectively sidelining the ulema from political power. While these measures laid foundations for a cohesive state apparatus and incipient industrialization, the regime's repression—via a nascent and —fostered underground grievances among traditionalists, setting precedents for that echoed in later Pahlavi rule without fully eradicating tribal or religious identities.

World War II and Early Pahlavi Challenges (1941–1953)

In August 1941, British and Soviet forces launched a coordinated invasion of Iran, citing the need to secure Allied supply routes to the Soviet Union via the Persian Corridor and to counter perceived pro-German sympathies in the Iranian government, despite Iran's declaration of neutrality. The rapid campaign overwhelmed Iranian defenses, which numbered around 127,000 troops but suffered from poor equipment, low morale, and internal disarray; Soviet forces advanced from the north while British troops moved from the south and Iraq, capturing key cities including Tabriz, Hamadan, and Abadan within days. Reza Shah, facing Allied ultimatums, abdicated on September 16, 1941, in favor of his 21-year-old son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who ascended the throne amid the occupation; Reza was exiled to Mauritius and later South Africa, where he died in 1944. The invasion granted the Allies control over Iran's oil infrastructure, particularly the Abadan refinery, which produced over 8 million tons of oil annually by 1941, essential for the war effort. The tripartite occupation—Soviet in the north, British in the south, with the joining for in 1942—created a that exacerbated internal divisions and exposed the fragility of central authority. Mohammad Reza Shah inherited a weakened state apparatus, with the military decimated and tribal groups in regions like Luristan and Khuzestan reasserting autonomy amid disrupted governance. Leftist agitation intensified under the newly formed Tudeh Party, established in October 1941 as Iran's first Marxist organization, which capitalized on wartime grievances, anti-imperialist rhetoric, and Soviet proximity to infiltrate labor unions, , and even military officers, amassing tens of thousands of members by 1944. Clerical leaders, already resentful of 's secular reforms such as unveiling mandates and confiscations, viewed the young monarch's tentative rule and Allied presence as further threats to Islamic traditions, fostering quiet opposition networks. Postwar separatist movements highlighted these vulnerabilities, as the Soviet Union delayed troop withdrawal beyond the January 1942 Tripartite Treaty deadline of March 1946, exploiting northern unrest to establish puppet regimes. In December 1945, the Soviet-backed Azerbaijan People's Government under Ja'far Pishevari seized control of Iranian Azerbaijan, implementing land reforms and suppressing Persian-language instruction to appeal to ethnic grievances. Simultaneously, on January 22, 1946, Kurds in Mahabad declared the Republic of Mahabad under Qazi Muhammad, with Soviet military training for around 60 fighters and ideological support for autonomy demands, drawing on tribal militias numbering up to 3,000. U.S. and UN pressure, including Security Council resolutions in January 1946, compelled Soviet announcement of withdrawal on March 24, completed by May 10; Iranian forces, numbering about 30,000 under General Fazlollah Zahedi, then reintegrated Azerbaijan in December 1946 with minimal resistance after Pishevari's flight, while Mahabad collapsed by the same month, its leaders executed. These crises underscored the shah's early dependence on tribal loyalties and army remnants for stability, while Tudeh's covert support for separatists—evident in propaganda and espionage—further eroded his authority until the party's ban following a February 1949 assassination attempt.

Mossadegh Interlude and 1953 Coup

In April 1951, Mohammad Mossadegh, leader of the National Front coalition, was appointed prime minister amid widespread public support for oil nationalization, following the Majlis's passage of the Oil Nationalization Law on March 20, 1951, which expropriated the assets of the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The move aimed to assert ian sovereignty over its petroleum resources, previously concessioned to Britain since 1901, but triggered an immediate British naval blockade and refusal by Western firms to purchase Iranian oil, halting exports from the —the world's largest—and plunging Iran into economic turmoil with inflation soaring and foreign reserves depleting by over 50% within months. Mossadegh's administration initially garnered acclaim for its anti-imperialist stance, securing emergency powers from the in July 1952 to for six months, which he later extended amid opposition. Facing parliamentary resistance, he orchestrated a from August 3 to 10, 1953, on dissolving the 17th , yielding a reported 99.9% approval (2,043,341 yes vs. 13,289 no), though critics noted procedural irregularities like separate ballot boxes and lack of secrecy, enabling Mossadegh to assume broader authoritarian control and marginalize rivals. This period marked a shift from democratic nationalism to personalist rule, exacerbating political divisions as Mossadegh alienated former allies, including who had backed early protests against AIOC. The 1953 coup, codenamed Operation Ajax by the CIA and , was orchestrated to oust Mossadegh and restore Mohammad Reza 's authority, driven by fears of communist influence via the Tudeh Party and loss of Western access; declassified documents reveal U.S. funding of over $1 million for bribes to politicians, officers, and street mobs, alongside propaganda and coordination with General as loyalist successor. An initial attempt on August 15 failed when Mossadegh evaded arrest, prompting the 's brief flight to and , but a second push on August 19 succeeded through paid thugs storming government buildings, killing dozens, and overwhelming Mossadegh's defenses, leading to his arrest, trial for , and three-year imprisonment followed by until his death in 1967. Crucially, the operation enlisted Iranian clerical networks; Abolqasem Kashani, once a Mossadegh supporter and speaker, defected by mid-1953 over policy disputes and ideological opposition to secular , mobilizing militias and issuing fatwas against Mossadegh while coordinating with coup plotters to incite pro-Shah riots. This collaboration, documented in U.S. intelligence assessments, underscored domestic agency in the Shah's reinstatement, yet the event's foreign orchestration fueled enduring anti-Western narratives, ironically leveraged by later Islamist revolutionaries to claim legitimacy despite their predecessors' complicity in subverting the nationalization experiment.

Mohammad Reza Shah's Consolidation and White Revolution (1953–1970s)

Following the 1953 coup that ousted Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi centralized authority by frequently dismissing premiers and expanding monarchical control, transforming Iran into an autocratic state aligned closely with the United States. In 1957, the Shah established SAVAK, Iran's national intelligence and security organization, modeled with assistance from the United States and Israel, to counter internal threats particularly from communists and Soviet influence. SAVAK proved effective in suppressing leftist and separatist activities through extensive surveillance and arrests, maintaining domestic stability for decades, though its methods included widespread reports of torture and arbitrary detention, drawing eventual criticism from American officials by the late 1960s. To accelerate modernization, the initiated the in January 1963, a series of reforms approved via on January 26, 1963, encompassing land redistribution that transferred property from large landowners to over 2 million peasant families, of forests, of state-owned enterprises, worker profit-sharing, and the creation of and corps to extend and medical services to rural areas. The reforms also advanced , granting through the 1963 and promoting legal equality in family matters, enabling greater female participation in and the workforce. Industrialization efforts under the program prioritized and , supported by foreign investment and oil revenues, fostering urban development and technological advancement. Economically, the period from 1953 to 1979 marked rapid expansion, with average annual GDP growth reaching 9.1% between 1960 and 1979, driven initially by post-coup stabilization and later amplified by the oil price surge that quadrupled revenues and funded massive projects like dams, roads, and factories. doubled during 1962–1972 despite modest early inflows, reflecting efficient toward industrialization and , which raised rates from around 26% in 1960 to over 50% by the mid-1970s. Despite these gains, the reforms' top-down imposition alienated traditional landowners and , whose properties were seized without adequate cultural consideration, exacerbating rural discontent. Oil wealth concentration among urban elites fueled perceptions of and inequality, as rapid strained housing and services, leaving many migrants in slums while a small cadre amassed fortunes. Critics, including domestic opponents, highlighted how unchecked powers and suppressed political pluralism undermined the reforms' legitimacy, prioritizing state control over organic societal .

Ideological and Opposition Dynamics

Khomeini's Islamist Ideology and Velayat-e Faqih

Ruhollah Khomeini's Islamist ideology centered on the establishment of a government ruled exclusively by Islamic jurisprudence, rejecting both secular nationalism and traditional Shia quietism that deferred political authority to the return of the Hidden Imam. In his seminal 1970 work Islamic Government (also known as Velayat-e Faqih), delivered as lectures in Najaf, Iraq, Khomeini argued that the absence of an infallible imam necessitated the rule of qualified jurists (fuqaha) to enforce sharia as divine law over human legislation. He critiqued monarchy as an illegitimate innovation (bid'ah) that usurped divine sovereignty, equating it to pre-Islamic jahiliyyah rule, and condemned Western-influenced modernization under Iran's Pahlavi dynasty as moral corruption that eroded Islamic values. The core doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih—Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist—posits that a single supreme jurist holds absolute (motlaqeh) authority over all aspects of governance, including legislation, executive decisions, and military command, as an extension of the Prophet Muhammad's and imams' (guardianship). Khomeini explicitly subordinated democratic mechanisms to this clerical oversight, asserting that derives from and remains contingent upon adherence to interpreted by the faqih, rendering elections and parliaments advisory at best and revocable by juristic decree. This framework establishes theocratic absolutism, where the jurist's rulings embody divine will, overriding claims or majority preferences that conflict with Islamic law. Khomeini's incorporated expansionist elements, envisioning the Iranian model as a for global Islamic revolution, particularly among Shia populations, to overthrow "oppressive" regimes and establish caliphate-like worldwide. He integrated anti-Zionist rhetoric with anti-Semitic tropes, portraying as a Jewish imperialist outpost conspiring against , drawing on conspiratorial narratives of Jewish global influence that echoed earlier Islamist thinkers while mobilizing domestic and regional support. Empirical outcomes post-1979 reveal this 's primary function as a mechanism for clerical power consolidation, where promises of liberation masked the suppression of dissent and institutionalization of supremacy, diverging from any egalitarian or anti-imperialist pretensions toward unchecked theocratic control.

Secular and Leftist Opposition Groups

The secular opposition to Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi encompassed liberal nationalists organized under the National Front, which originated as a coalition of parties and intellectuals founded in 1949 to advocate , democratic reforms, and national sovereignty against foreign influence. This group, drawing from urban middle-class professionals and intellectuals, critiqued the Shah's consolidation of power after the 1953 coup as a betrayal of parliamentary traditions, emphasizing grievances over suppressed and economic policies favoring elite conglomerates tied to Western capital. While not mass-based, the National Front's publications and statements, such as those from its Freedom Movement faction, highlighted the Shah's regime as perpetuating dependency on through unequal oil contracts and land reforms that benefited large landowners over smallholders. Leftist groups, including the Marxist-Leninist Tudeh Party—established in 1941 as Iran's primary communist organization—operated clandestinely following its 1949 ban, focusing on labor agitation and anti-imperialist propaganda against the Shah's alignment with U.S. interests. Pre-revolution estimates placed Tudeh's core membership at around 25,000, augmented by influence in trade unions representing up to 400,000 workers, through which it disseminated critiques of the Shah's "dependent capitalism" as a system enriching a bourgeoisie while exploiting proletarian labor. Similarly, the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), formed in by university students synthesizing Shia Islamic ethics with Marxist class analysis, rejected both the Shah's secular authoritarianism and pure materialism, advocating armed struggle via guerrilla operations that targeted regime symbols from the late onward. MEK publications portrayed the Pahlavi state as a capitalist puppet sustaining inequality through repression and foreign-backed industrialization that marginalized rural and urban poor. These factions shared a tactical convergence in opposing the Shah's one-party Rastakhiz system and corruption scandals, initially allying with Khomeini's Islamist networks in 1977–1978 protests to amplify anti-regime momentum, as evidenced by joint declarations from National Front leaders and Tudeh statements endorsing broad coalitions against dictatorship. However, their visions diverged fundamentally: secular liberals sought pluralistic governance under the 1906 Constitution, while leftists envisioned socialist redistribution, contrasting sharply with clerical aspirations for theocratic rule. This miscalculation stemmed from overestimating their own organizational strength relative to the clerics' grassroots networks and underappreciating the mobilizational appeal of religious rhetoric in a society where 98% identified as Muslim, leading to fragmented strategies that prioritized anti-Shah unity over ideological safeguards.

Shah's Reforms: Achievements and Grievances

The White Revolution, launched by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi on January 26, 1963, following a national referendum, comprised an initial six pillars—land reform, nationalization of forests and pastures, privatization of state factories, rural electrification, establishment of a literacy corps, and workers' profit-sharing—later expanded to include health corps, educational reforms, and women's enfranchisement. These measures, funded increasingly by surging oil revenues after the 1973 OPEC price quadrupling, drove measurable socioeconomic progress. Land redistribution transferred holdings from absentee landlords to over 1.5 million tenant farmers by 1971, reducing rural inequality and boosting agricultural productivity in targeted areas, though implementation varied regionally. Key achievements included rapid gains in human development indicators. The Literacy Corps, deploying educated youth to villages, contributed to adult literacy rising from approximately 26% in the early to over 50% by the late , with millions of rural illiterates receiving . Women's rights advanced through granted in 1963 and legal reforms ending without consent and raising the marriage age; by 1978, nearly 2 million women were employed across sectors, including as judges, pilots, and professionals, reflecting expanded workforce participation from negligible levels pre-reform. Health initiatives via the Health Corps and investments elevated from around 45 years in the to the mid-50s by 1978, alongside declines in through vaccination drives and rural clinics. Economically, oil windfalls enabled GDP per capita to climb from $170 in 1960 to over $2,000 by 1978 (in constant dollars), industrializing and positioning it as a regional economic leader with modernized . Despite these advances, grievances emerged from uneven implementation and rapid . , while empowering some smallholders, displaced landless laborers lacking capital, skills, or irrigation access, prompting mass rural-to-urban migration that swelled ’s from 2 million in 1960 to over 4.5 million by 1976, fostering urban slums, , and informal economies without commensurate job creation or housing. Oil-funded state expansion bred bureaucratic inefficiency and a rentier mentality, where revenues subsidized consumption over sustainable , inflating entitlements without fostering or broad-based private enterprise growth. Cultural policies promoting Western , , and reduced clerical influence alienated traditional segments, including bazaaris and ulema, who perceived rapid as eroding Islamic norms and , exacerbating social fragmentation amid uneven benefits favoring urban elites. These tensions highlighted a core causal dynamic: while oil wealth accelerated modernization from Qajar-era stagnation—marked by below 10% and feudal backwardness—the pace outstripped institutional adaptation, amplifying perceptions of top-down imposition over organic development.

Triggers and Early Unrest (1977–Mid-1978)

Economic Pressures and Social Discontent

The 1973 oil price surge quadrupled Iran's petroleum export revenues, fueling annual GDP growth averaging over 10% from 1973 to 1976, but mismanagement through excessive imports, military spending, and ambitious infrastructure projects overheated the economy, driving inflation into double digits by 1975 and sustaining it through 1977. Real GDP contracted by 2.8% in 1977 amid falling oil production and austerity measures, exacerbating price pressures on essentials like food and housing. These policy errors, rather than structural flaws, stemmed from overreliance on oil windfalls without corresponding productivity gains or fiscal restraint, creating bottlenecks in supply chains and widening urban-rural disparities. Rapid urbanization, accelerated by rural migration seeking industrial jobs, intensified housing shortages in , where inadequate units affected up to 42% of residents by late 1978, with earlier deficits of 78,000 units reported in 1966 persisting due to insufficient construction amid inflationary building costs. Government efforts to industrialize housing through high-rise projects failed to match demand, leaving many in substandard shanties and fueling resentment over unfulfilled modernization promises. Economic strains disproportionately impacted youth, as the post-oil boom slowdown left graduates and unskilled migrants facing limited opportunities in a labor market skewed toward state and sectors, contributing to amid overall growth deceleration. Bazaari merchants, traditional small-scale traders integral to urban , grew resentful of 1975–1977 government and tax enforcement campaigns, which targeted their networks to curb but eroded customary exemptions and autonomy, straining alliances with clerical intermediaries who amplified grievances over perceived favoritism toward large-scale, Western-linked enterprises. Internationally, U.S. President Jimmy Carter's 1977 human rights emphasis, building on Amnesty International's reports documenting SAVAK's use of and arbitrary detention, pressured the to permit Red Cross prison inspections and ease censorship, inadvertently signaling vulnerability and emboldening domestic critics by contrasting regime practices with global norms. These external dynamics, combined with internal fiscal missteps, heightened social discontent among urban middle and lower classes without directly challenging the monarchy's legitimacy.

Initial Protests and Clerical Mobilization

The protests ignited on January 7, 1978, in , Iran's premier center of Shia clerical learning, after the state-controlled newspaper published an article denigrating Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as a undermining Iranian . Seminary students, numbering in the several thousands alongside local residents, gathered at religious sites including the Feyziyeh Seminary and clerics' residences to denounce the article and demand Khomeini's vindication. responded with gunfire and beatings, killing between five and twenty demonstrators according to varying accounts, which clerical networks framed as martyrdom to galvanize further action. Clergy exploited the Shia tradition of arba'een—40-day mourning rituals for the slain—to orchestrate a propagating wave of demonstrations, transforming isolated unrest into a coordinated of opposition. On , the Qom victims' commemoration drew crowds in estimated at tens of thousands, where protesters torched banks and cinemas symbolizing Western influence, prompting a harsher crackdown with scores killed. This cycle repeated in subsequent cities like and by March, escalating participant numbers from hundreds in nascent gatherings to thousands per event as seminarians and sympathetic merchants—traditional clerical allies providing logistical and financial backing—closed markets in solidarity and mobilized kin networks. Under Jamshid Amuzegar, the government authorized limited force against these early outbursts but refrained from wholesale arrests or , wary of alienating moderate opinion amid U.S. scrutiny following President Carter's inauguration. This restraint, coupled with clerical directives from Khomeini's exile circle emphasizing disciplined, faith-based defiance, allowed protests to sustain momentum without immediate suppression, contrasting the Shah's prior tolerance for dissent under . Amuzegar's administration's equivocation—exemplified by public denials of fatalities—further emboldened organizers, as bazaari funding through tithes and expatriate Shia donations from Gulf trading communities sustained seminary operations amid regime economic strictures.

Escalation of Crisis (Mid-1978–Early 1979)

Government Responses and Repression Events

In response to escalating protests in mid-1978, Prime Minister , appointed by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi on August 7, formed a government aimed at reconciliation, including the release of political prisoners and easing press to appease clerical and opposition elements. However, these concessions failed to unify Iran's fragmented elites or halt revolutionary momentum, as Islamist networks under Ruhollah Khomeini exploited the perceived weakness, intensifying mobilization through cassette tapes and mosques. Sharif-Emami's appeasement strategy, rather than restoring order, emboldened demonstrators and eroded military confidence, contributing to tactical disarray in suppressing unrest. A pivotal incident occurred on , 1978, when arsonists locked the doors of the Cinema Rex theater in Abadan and set it ablaze, trapping and killing between 377 and 470 civilians inside. Although opposition forces immediately attributed the attack to , the Shah's intelligence agency, post-revolutionary trials revealed confessions from Islamist militants affiliated with revolutionary groups, indicating it was a deliberate act to incite anti-regime fury by framing the . This misattribution amplified via foreign media and Khomeini's networks fueled public outrage, marking a tactical error in government communication, as official denials struggled against unchecked propaganda that portrayed the event as . Facing widespread defiance of martial law declared on September 7, 1978, security forces moved to disperse a large anti-government rally on September 8, 1978 (17 Shahrivar 1357 in the Persian calendar), known as Black Friday or in some sources as the "Killing of 17 Shahrivar," which had spread from southern Tehran neighborhoods to Jaleh Street (now Majahidin-e Islam Street) and Jaleh Square (now Shahda Square). The clashes resulted in the deaths of approximately 64 to 88 protesters amid chaotic gunfire exchanges, according to forensic reviews conducted after the revolution, with some estimates citing around 87 fatalities. Opposition claims, echoed by Khomeini and leftist groups, inflated the toll to thousands—ranging from 95 to over 3,000 in various accounts—to depict a massacre and galvanize international sympathy, a pattern of casualty exaggeration evident in revolutionary narratives that prioritized narrative impact over empirical verification. Western press often relayed these unverified figures without scrutiny, reflecting a broader credulity toward anti-Shah sources amid institutional biases favoring underdog insurgencies. Subsequent governments under military premiers Gholam-Reza Azhari (September 7) and Gholam-Ali Oveissi failed to consolidate elite support or enforce cohesion, as repeated cabinet reshuffles and half-measures—such as curfews without decisive action—allowed protests to metastasize, underscoring the regime's inability to counter coordinated Islamist through unified repression. Overall casualty discrepancies in these events highlight dynamics: official estimates documented targeted enforcement with limited fatalities, while revolutionary tallies, disseminated through biased clerical channels, systematically inflated numbers to erode legitimacy and justify escalation, a tactic later confirmed by discrepancies in post-1979 inquiries.

Nationwide Strikes and Institutional Breakdown

In late October 1978, oil workers in Iran's nationalized refineries initiated strikes that rapidly escalated, involving tens of thousands of employees and severely disrupting production. By November, these actions had halted much of the industry, reducing output from approximately 5.8 million barrels per day to levels insufficient for domestic needs, with a cumulative decline of 4.8 million barrels per day by January 1979. This sabotage targeted the regime's primary revenue source, as oil accounted for over 80% of exports, precipitating a sharp contraction in foreign exchange reserves and halting imports of essential goods like foodstuffs and machinery. The strikes extended beyond oil to sectors such as transportation, banking, and , paralyzing economic activity nationwide and exacerbating shortages of fuel and basic commodities by December. Government attempts to maintain operations through military oversight failed, as worker committees assumed control at facilities like , further entrenching the breakdown. This economic strangulation eroded the state's fiscal capacity, with daily revenue losses estimated in tens of millions of dollars, compelling curtailments that deepened amid exceeding 20%. Concurrently, the Iranian armed forces, previously a pillar of regime , experienced widespread demoralization and erosion in late 1978. Desertions surged, with reports of hundreds of soldiers abandoning posts daily by , fueled by low , casualties from suppression, and sympathies for the opposition. Mutinies occurred in , including refusals to fire on crowds, prompting commanders to confine units and limit deployments to avert total disintegration. This institutional collapse left the government unable to enforce order, as police and also faltered under similar pressures. The observances in early December 1978 marked the peak of mass mobilization, channeling religious rituals into political defiance. On (December 10), approximately one million marched in alone, followed by over two million on (December 11), with nationwide participation reaching 6-9 million—roughly 20% of Iran's 35 million population. These processions, blending mourning for Imam Hussein with anti-regime chants, overwhelmed and signaled irreversible loss of control, as participants from diverse classes defied curfews en masse. The convergence of strikes, military disarray, and these fervor-driven marches rendered state institutions inoperable, accelerating the regime's terminal paralysis.

Shah's Departure and Bakhtiar Interregnum

On January 16, 1979, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi departed for exile, initially to , amid widespread protests, army mutinies, and the collapse of effective governance. The Shah's exit followed months of indecision exacerbated by his undisclosed lymphatic cancer diagnosis, which had progressively undermined his physical and resolve to confront the unrest decisively. Prior to his departure, on January 3, 1979, the Shah appointed , a longtime National Front opposition figure, as in a bid to install a civilian, reformist government and appease moderate critics. conditioned his acceptance on the Shah's exile, dissolution of the secret police, release of political prisoners, lifting of , and guarantees of freedoms including press, assembly, and political activity, aiming to transition toward constitutional . The Bakhtiar interregnum, however, faced immediate rejection from Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and allied Islamist and leftist factions, who dismissed it as illegitimate and a monarchical ploy, insisting on the complete dismantling of the Pahlavi regime without interim accommodations. Efforts at negotiation, including overtures to Khomeini to delay his return until stability returned, failed due to the opposition's intransigence and commitment to revolutionary overthrow rather than compromise. Contributing causally to the Shah's flight and the interregnum's fragility were U.S. policies under President , which emphasized and pressured the Shah toward despite warnings that such concessions would embolden radicals without satisfying core grievances. Bakhtiar's 37-day tenure thus represented a narrow window of attempted liberal transition, undermined by institutional breakdown, ongoing strikes, and the opposition's refusal to engage, leading to governance paralysis by early February 1979.

Khomeini's Exile, Return, and Power Grab

Following his expulsion from , arrived in on October 6, 1978, settling in the suburb of , which provided him with direct access to global media platforms denied in prior exiles. There, he granted interviews to Western journalists, such as a notable session on November 16, 1978, with a British reporter, allowing his anti-Shah messages to reach international audiences and bolster his stature as the revolution's figurehead. Khomeini supplemented this visibility by recording sermons on cassette tapes, which supporters smuggled into , where they were duplicated and disseminated through an estimated mosques, sustaining clerical networks and fueling protests despite his physical absence. Khomeini returned to Tehran on February 1, 1979, via a chartered , landing at Mehrabad Airport to a tumultuous reception from millions of jubilant supporters who clogged streets and rooftops, a display of mass adoration orchestrated by his followers that obscured the presence of militant elements within his organized retinue. In his first public address at cemetery, he explicitly rejected Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar's interim administration as illegal and treasonous, insisting it held no legitimacy post-Shah and urging strikes and non-cooperation to dismantle it entirely. Khomeini's speeches vilified the Pahlavi monarchy as a corrupt, foreign-backed tyranny that had eroded Iranian sovereignty, while pledging an promising practical freedoms like free electricity, water, and —enticing broad coalitions with visions of prosperity under religious governance, though these assurances proved illusory as theocratic controls supplanted them. On February 5, 1979, he named , a 73-year-old and head of the moderate Freedom Movement of Iran, to lead a , framing it as a bridge to stability amid chaos. Yet Khomeini retained ultimate authority through the parallel Revolutionary Council of Islamic clerics and loyalists he convened, which issued decrees bypassing Bazargan's cabinet and marginalized secular elements, enabling a swift clerical power grab that subordinated the interim setup to velayat-e faqih principles. This structure ensured Khomeini's rule, as Bazargan's liberal-leaning initiatives clashed with the council's of Islamic edicts, foreshadowing the provisional government's erosion.

Overthrow and Immediate Aftermath (February 1979)

Armed Clashes and Monarchy's Collapse

The armed clashes that precipitated the monarchy's collapse intensified on , 1979, when Imperial Iranian Air Force technicians and cadets at Doshan Tappeh Air Base mutinied, defecting en masse to the revolutionaries and arming civilian protesters with weapons. This provided revolutionaries with a decisive advantage, enabling coordinated assaults on loyalist garrisons and key installations in , including the seizure of armories and the national radio station. Guerrilla units from the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas (OIPFG), a Marxist-Leninist group, played a pivotal role in these operations, launching urban attacks alongside defected military personnel against remaining Pahlavi loyalists. Over the following days, Fedai fighters and armed civilians overwhelmed isolated pockets of resistance, exploiting the erosion of command cohesion within the armed forces. The revolutionaries' edge stemmed from widespread defections, superior local intelligence from , and the demoralization of regime troops, who faced internal divisions and orders not to fire on crowds. Key confrontations involved the , the shah's elite praetorian unit, attempting to reinforce loyalist positions in central on February 10–11. Despite their training and equipment, Guard units were routed by numerically superior revolutionary forces, including defectors and guerrillas, leading to surrenders at prime ministerial offices and parliamentary buildings without prolonged engagements in some sectors. By dawn on , as Imperial Guard tanks advanced but encountered barricades defended by volunteers, the military high command broadcast a , effectively disbanding organized resistance. fled, and revolutionary leaders announced victory, marking the collapse of the and the end of Iran's 2,500-year monarchical tradition.

Casualties and Demographic Impact

The Iranian Revolution's casualties primarily stemmed from protests and armed clashes between mid-1978 and February 1979, with empirical estimates from Western observers placing the total death toll at approximately 2,000 to 3,000 individuals. Detailed tallies from contemporaneous reports indicate 2,781 deaths occurred over the course of the revolutionary year up to the Shah's departure in January 1979, the majority concentrated in the final three months amid escalating unrest. These figures derive from , eyewitness accounts by diplomats and journalists, and security force logs, contrasting sharply with post-revolutionary claims by Khomeini and his regime of over 60,000 "martyrs," which military historians attribute to deliberate exaggeration for propagandistic legitimization of the new order. Such inflated numbers served to demonize the Pahlavi and rally support, despite lacking substantiation from independent verifications. Civilian deaths outnumbered security personnel losses, with most fatalities resulting from gunfire during demonstrations and confrontations, though precise breakdowns remain contested due to incomplete records and regime suppression of data post-1979. Non-combat casualties included suicides among regime loyalists and elites facing upheaval, as well as initial executions of military officers and officials accused of activity immediately after the monarchy's collapse on February 11, 1979, though systematic purges escalated later. Western analyses emphasize that the revolution's violence, while intense, was not genocidal in scale, with daily death rates peaking below those of contemporaneous urban riots elsewhere but amplified by media narratives sympathetic to Islamist framing. Demographically, the revolution triggered a massive brain drain through , as skilled professionals, secular intellectuals, and ethnic minorities fled and economic uncertainty. Between and the early 1980s, an estimated 1 to 2 million Iranians—disproportionately urban, educated, and middle-class—left the country, depriving of physicians, engineers, and academics essential for modernization. This exodus, continuing in waves, reduced the proportion of highly qualified personnel; by , emigrant stock reached 3.1 million, including over 110,000 scholars abroad, exacerbating long-term stagnation in and innovation. Population growth persisted due to high birth rates under the new regime's pro-natalist policies, but the selective loss of talent skewed demographics toward less cosmopolitan urban centers and intensified rural-urban divides. The immediate aftermath of the revolution saw a dramatic shift in Iran's foreign policy, from a strategic alliance with Israel to an embrace of the Palestinian cause. Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), arrived in Tehran on February 18, 1979, and was handed the keys to the former Israeli embassy, which was repurposed as the PLO's diplomatic headquarters in Iran. This gesture symbolized Khomeini's commitment to the slogan "Today Iran, tomorrow Palestine," which framed the liberation of Jerusalem as a key objective for the new Islamic Republic. The PLO provided the nascent regime with intelligence and security assistance, including training for revolutionary guards, aiding stabilization during the early chaotic months.

Formation of the Islamic Republic

Referendum and Constitutional Assembly

On 30–31 March 1979, Iran held a national referendum posing a single binary question: whether to establish an Islamic Republic as defined by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Official results reported over 98% approval, with approximately 20.4 million eligible voters and turnout estimated at around 80% based on vote counts exceeding 15 million yes ballots. The process offered no alternatives, such as a secular republic or constitutional monarchy, despite demands from figures like Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari and secular groups for broader options; Khomeini insisted on this format to consolidate revolutionary gains under his interpretation of Islamic governance. Critics, including opposition clerics and liberals, argued the lacked genuine debate and reflected coercive pressures from revolutionary committees and , rendering participation more an affirmation of the post-monarchy status quo than a free choice. Held amid ongoing unrest and without independent oversight, it bypassed substantive discussion on governance models, prioritizing speed to legitimize Khomeini's . This rushed endorsement formalized the shift to an on 1 April 1979, paving the way for institutional restructuring. Following the , elections for the Assembly of Experts—tasked with drafting a new —occurred on 3 August 1979, drawing 10.78 million votes from 20.86 million eligible, for a turnout of 51.7%. The 73-member body was overwhelmingly composed of Khomeini loyalists, including 72 clerics or religious scholars, enabling rapid drafting from late August to mid-October. Key to the resulting document was the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih (), vesting supreme authority in a leading cleric—implicitly Khomeini—over elected institutions, a concept opposed by traditionalists like Shariatmadari who favored clerical oversight without monarchical . The assembly rejected secular and pluralistic amendments, embedding Islamic as the basis of and subordinating democratic elements to religious veto. Debates were curtailed, with Khomeini's influence ensuring alignment with his vision, sidelining non-Islamist factions and forgoing public input beyond the assembly's internal process. This non-inclusive approach underscored the constitution's theocratic foundations, prioritizing ideological uniformity over deliberative consensus.

Power Consolidation and Revolutionary Conflicts

Following the overthrow of the , Ayatollah decreed the establishment of the (IRGC) on May 5, 1979, as a parallel military force tasked with protecting the nascent from internal threats, particularly perceived elements within the remnants of the imperial Iranian army. The IRGC's creation stemmed from distrust of the regular armed forces, which had been purged of thousands of officers loyal to Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in the revolution's immediate aftermath, with executions and forced retirements aimed at neutralizing potential monarchist resurgence. This ideological militia rapidly expanded, absorbing revolutionary committees and komitehs to enforce Islamist authority, sidelining the conventional military and ensuring loyalty to Khomeini's velayat-e faqih doctrine over professional soldiery. Force 17, Yasser Arafat's elite presidential guard, served as a primary model and instructor for the embryonic security organs of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Under the direction of Ali Hassan Salameh and later Hani al-Hassan, Force 17 commandos provided technical expertise to establish the "Office of Liberation Movements," which sought to export the revolution across the Middle East. Because the newly formed IRGC lacked formal structure and professional intelligence training, Force 17 operatives acted as shadow advisors, teaching revolutionary cadres essentials of clandestine communication, weapons maintenance, and protective detail management. This transfer of knowledge professionalized the IRGC during its first year, aiding survival amid internal power struggles and assassination attempts by pro-monarchy remnants. In the immediate months following the 1979 victory, Force 17 and the PLO leadership transitioned from revolutionary partners to institutional architects of the new Iranian security state. Arafat’s top security advisor, Hani al-Hassan, was appointed as the first PLO ambassador to Tehran, effectively serving as a senior consultant to the Revolutionary Council. During this period, Force 17 personnel were instrumental in setting up the "intelligence and research" departments of the fledgling Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), transferring decades of experience in clandestine operations to the new Iranian cadres. This "Palestinian window" provided the regime with its only reliable link to international intelligence networks while the country was under global isolation. Ethnic separatist movements challenged central control soon after, with Kurdish rebels in western Iran declaring autonomy in regions like Mahabad by August 1979, prompting government counteroffensives that recaptured key areas such as Paveh through artillery barrages and troop assaults, resulting in approximately 380 Kurdish deaths alongside 18 soldiers. Similarly, Baloch insurgents in , emboldened by the revolution's anti-centralist rhetoric, launched attacks on state installations in 1979, demanding greater regional amid fears of Persian-Shiite dominance; these were met with IRGC-led operations that reasserted ’s authority, though low-level unrest persisted. These suppressions, involving village razings and mass arrests, underscored the regime's prioritization of unitary Islamist governance over federalist demands, with Kurdish forces suffering heavy losses in a conflict that claimed around 10,000 lives by 1983. Tensions between moderate provisional elements and hardline Islamists peaked with the resignation of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan on November 6, 1979, triggered by Khomeini's endorsement of student militants' seizure of the U.S. embassy four days prior, an act Bazargan decried as undermining diplomatic norms and his government's authority. Bazargan's Freedom Movement cabinet, intended as a bridge to liberal-republican institutions, clashed repeatedly with revolutionary councils and clerical factions over power-sharing, as interference from komitehs and the IRGC eroded executive control. This episode, coinciding with emulation of radical actions like the November 20 Grand Mosque seizure in Mecca by Sunni extremists—which inspired similar confrontational tactics among Iranian hardliners—marked the decisive sidelining of secular-leaning allies, consolidating clerical dominance through bodies like the Revolutionary Council. Factional newspapers, such as the Islamist-leaning Jomhuri-ye Eslami, amplified calls for purges against "liberals," while Bazargan-aligned outlets faced censorship, highlighting the Islamists' media ascendancy.

Suppression of Non-Islamist Factions

Following the February 1979 overthrow of the monarchy, Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamist faction moved to eliminate rival groups within the revolutionary coalition, including leftist organizations and the (PMOI), which combined Islamic and Marxist elements. These non-Islamist allies, initially tolerated for their anti-Shah stance, were purged through arrests, bans, and executions to enforce clerical dominance. Revolutionary courts, established under Khomeini's authority, conducted summary trials lacking , often based on political affiliation rather than evidence of violence. In mid-1979, moderate and secular parties faced dissolution; the Muslim People's Republican Movement, a reformist Islamist group led by Mahmoud Taleghani's associates, was banned after criticizing the emerging theocracy's centralization of power. Similarly, the National Democratic Front, a liberal , was outlawed in August 1979 for opposing clerical overreach. By June 1981, following PMOI bombings that killed over 70 Islamic Republican Party officials, the regime banned all remaining opposition parties except the ruling , labeling them as threats to the Islamic order. Independent media outlets, which had flourished briefly during the "Spring of Freedom," were shuttered to curb dissent. On August 8, 1979, authorities closed the popular daily Ayandegan under a new press law empowering the government to suspend publications deemed critical of the regime. Within weeks, 22 additional newspapers were forced to cease operations, including outlets associated with leftist and liberal factions, as revolutionary guards raided offices and arrested journalists. The suppression intensified in 1981–1982 amid PMOI-led uprisings and leftist activities, culminating in mass executions targeting thousands of perceived enemies. After the PMOI shifted to armed resistance on June 20, 1981, revolutionary courts executed nearly 4,500 non-Islamists, including PMOI members and Tudeh Party communists, often in public hangings or firing squads following perfunctory trials. Survivor testimonies and court records document widespread use of and forced confessions to justify the killings, which decimated opposition and enforced Islamist conformity.

Domestic Transformations and Failures

Political Theocracy and Governance Shifts

Following the 1979 revolution, Iran transitioned to an governed by the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih (), which vests supreme authority in a single cleric as the Supreme Leader, overriding elected institutions and embedding Shia jurisprudence as the basis for all governance. The Supreme Leader, initially Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini from 1979 to 1989 and subsequently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei since 1989, commands the armed forces, appoints the head of the judiciary, half the members of the Guardian Council, and key officials in state media and foundations, ensuring clerical dominance without term limits or direct accountability to voters. The Guardian Council, comprising 12 members—six clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader and six jurists approved by —exercises power over all legislation passed by the () to ensure conformity with Islamic law, while also disqualifying candidates for elections if deemed insufficiently aligned with regime principles, thereby limiting political pluralism and reformist influence. This structure supplants the pre-revolutionary Pahlavi monarchy's secular orientation, which emphasized modernization through land reforms, women's enfranchisement, and suppression of clerical influence under Mohammad Reza Shah, with a system prioritizing Twelver Shia over adaptive policy-making. Governance rigidity manifests in the bonyads (foundations), ostensibly charitable entities like the Foundation of the Oppressed that control up to 20-30% of Iran's but operate with minimal oversight, fostering through preferential contracts and asset allocation to regime loyalists, including the (IRGC). Iran's score of 23 out of 100 in 2024, ranking it 151st out of 180 countries, reflects systemic graft exacerbated by such unaccountable parastatals, where judicial and political interference shields insiders from prosecution. This theocratic framework induces policy paralysis, as competing veto points—Supreme Leader decrees, Guardian Council rejections, and clerical arbitration—block incremental changes, evident in repeated failures to resolve economic bottlenecks or liberalize elections despite parliamentary majorities. Succession mechanisms remain opaque and contested; Khamenei's 1989 elevation bypassed traditional marja-e taqlid (source of emulation) qualifications, relying on an Assembly of Experts whose own candidates are Guardian-vetted, fueling speculation over post-Khamenei instability without institutionalized criteria for selecting a successor.

Economic Policies and Stagnation

Following the 1979 revolution, the implemented extensive nationalizations, seizing control of major industries, banks, and foreign trade under the guise of Islamic economic principles emphasizing state oversight and redistribution. By 1980, the had nationalized all private banks and companies, along with key sectors like , , and automobiles, aiming to eliminate perceived capitalist exploitation and promote self-sufficiency. These measures, however, fostered bureaucratic inefficiencies, as political appointees often lacked expertise, leading to mismanagement and reduced productivity in formerly dynamic sectors. Economic growth starkly contrasted with the pre-revolutionary era. Under the from 1960 to 1978, Iran's real GDP grew at an average annual rate of approximately 9.1%, driven by oil revenues and modernization investments that tripled over three decades. Post-revolution, from to 2020, average annual GDP growth slowed to about 1.9%, with GDP stagnating amid volatility; for instance, real losses accumulated to roughly $34,660 per Iranian from 1978 to 1988 due to disruptions and policy shifts. This deceleration stemmed from centralized planning that prioritized ideological goals over market incentives, resulting in underinvestment in non-oil sectors and chronic underperformance relative to oil-rich peers like or the UAE. Hyperinflation and fiscal distortions compounded stagnation. Inflation averaged over 20% annually since 1979, peaking near 50% in the early , fueled by expansive subsidies on , and essentials that consumed up to $100 billion yearly by the 2010s and distorted . These subsidies, intended to ensure equity, bred dependency and fueled black markets, where goods like were resold at premiums, with the implicated in smuggling networks that undermined official pricing. International sanctions, intensified after 1979 due to asset seizures and geopolitical tensions, further isolated , limiting imports and exacerbating inefficiencies in nationalized firms unable to compete globally.
PeriodAvg. Annual Real GDP GrowthKey Factors
1960–1978 (Pre-Revolution)~9.1%, industrialization, foreign investment
1979–2020 (Post-Revolution)~1.9%Nationalizations, subsidies, sanctions-induced isolation

Status of Women: Pre- and Post-Revolution Realities

Prior to the 1979 revolution, the Pahlavi regime enacted the Family Protection Laws of and , which raised the minimum marriage age to 18 for women and 20 for men, restricted by requiring court permission, and granted women greater rights to initiate and based on the child's best interests. These reforms facilitated increased female access to and , with women's rates among those aged 15-24 rising from approximately 42% in 1976, reflecting rapid modernization efforts. Female participation in the workforce reached about 12% in the , including roles as judges, civil servants, and professionals, supported by legal equality in public spheres. Following the revolution, these gains were systematically reversed as the implemented Sharia-based policies prioritizing female subordination to male guardianship and religious norms. The Protection Laws were abrogated, reverting the marriage age to 9 lunar years (about 8 years and 9 months) for girls with paternal consent, enabling widespread marriages that entrenched dependency and limited autonomy. Compulsory was enforced nationwide from April 1983, with gender segregation imposed in public spaces, , and workplaces, curtailing women's mobility and professional opportunities. Women's workforce participation declined to around 10% immediately post-revolution, as ideological purges excluded them from many sectors and emphasized domestic roles. Although absolute female rates continued to rise—to 66% for in 1986—the relative progress stalled amid broader restrictions, with policies diverting resources toward ideological over secular advancement. Reports indicate a surge in honor killings post-revolution, linked to reinforced patriarchal controls and lenient legal treatments of familial violence, though comprehensive pre-revolution comparative statistics remain scarce due to underreporting in both eras. Khomeini initially mobilized women by affirming their voting and candidacy rights to garner revolutionary support, yet swiftly subordinated them to a theocratic framework viewing women primarily as bearers of and Islamic modesty, contradicting pre-revolution assurances of equality. This irony was evident as many women participated in 1978-1979 protests often unveiled, only to face enforced veiling and exclusion from public life thereafter, underscoring the revolution's causal shift from to systemic regression.

Treatment of Minorities and Dissent

The Islamic Republic's treatment of religious minorities has been marked by severe doctrinal discrimination, particularly against unrecognized groups like Baha'is, whom Shia jurisprudence deems apostates for their post-Islamic origins. Since 1979, Iranian authorities have executed over 200 Baha'is, imprisoned thousands, and systematically confiscated community properties, including schools, cemeteries, and businesses, as part of a state policy equating Baha'i practice with counter-revolutionary activity. This contrasts with the Pahlavi era, when Baha'is operated institutions openly despite societal prejudice, without state-orchestrated killings or asset seizures on religious grounds. Recognized minorities under the —Jews, , and Zoroastrians—faced escalating pressures leading to mass exoduses. Iran's Jewish plummeted from approximately 80,000 on the eve of the revolution to between 5,000 and 10,000 by the , driven by synagogue closures, forced conversions, and executions of prominent figures like in 1979 on fabricated charges of . Christian communities, including and Assyrians, saw similar declines, with many fleeing due to restrictions on church activities and proselytism bans, reducing their numbers from over 200,000 pre-1979 to under 100,000. Sunnis, comprising about 10% of the population and concentrated in border regions, endure exclusion from senior clerical posts and shrine access in Shia holy sites, fostering resentment without formal autonomy. Under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, these groups held parliamentary seats and cultural autonomy, with less systemic exclusion tied to theology. Kurds, an ethnic minority with Sunni leanings numbering around 6-10 million, were promised regional during the 1979 upheaval but met violent denial post-revolution. Revolutionary forces crushed Kurdish demands through military campaigns in 1979-1983, rejecting as antithetical to centralized theocratic rule, resulting in thousands killed and no of power despite resource-rich territories. This suppression reflects causal prioritization of Shia supremacism over pluralistic concessions, unlike the Shah's assimilationist policies that, while coercive, avoided mass purges. Political dissent faced revolutionary courts established in 1979, which conducted show trials with coerced confessions and vague charges like "enmity against God," targeting leftists, monarchists, and Islamists alike. The nadir occurred in July-September 1988, when Khomeini's led to "death commissions" extrajudicially executing thousands of prisoners, primarily People's Mojahedin Organization members, after brief interrogations on ; estimates range from 2,800 to 5,000 deaths across facilities like Evin and Gohardasht. These acts, uninvestigated domestically, underscore a causal logic of preemptive elimination to safeguard velayat-e faqih, diverging sharply from the Shah's era of without mass ideological purges.

International Repercussions

Hostage Crisis and U.S. Relations

On November 4, 1979, approximately 300-400 Iranian students, organized under the banner of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line, overran the United States Embassy compound in Tehran, seizing control and taking 52 American diplomats and staff as hostages. The attackers, aligned with revolutionary hardliners, breached the embassy grounds amid chants of "Death to America," paralyzing U.S. diplomatic operations and initiating a 444-day crisis. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini explicitly endorsed the action on November 5, declaring it the "second revolution" and urging its continuation, which transformed a student-led protest into a state-sanctioned standoff. This approval came despite initial reservations from moderates, including Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, whose government resigned in protest, allowing Khomeini to sideline liberal factions and centralize clerical authority. The seizure stemmed from immediate triggers, such as U.S. President Jimmy Carter's October 1979 decision to admit the exiled for cancer treatment, viewed by revolutionaries as interference in Iran's sovereignty. Deeper motivations included retribution for the 1953 CIA- and MI6-orchestrated Operation Ajax, which ousted Mohammad Mossadegh and restored the , an event Iranian hardliners framed as enduring imperial humiliation despite U.S. claims of it preventing Soviet influence. Khomeini's rhetoric amplified anti-Western sentiment, portraying the embassy as a "den of spies" linked to the 's regime, thereby rallying Islamist supporters against perceived moderates advocating reconciliation with the West. This calculus prioritized ideological purity over diplomatic norms, as evidenced by the students' demands for the 's extradition and an apology for past interventions, demands unmet but leveraged to delegitimize U.S. influence. The U.S. response escalated tensions: Carter administration froze Iranian assets worth over $8 billion on November 14, 1979, imposed trade sanctions, and severed diplomatic ties on April 7, 1980. A botched rescue mission, , on April 24, 1980, involving eight RH-53 helicopters and , aborted due to mechanical failures and a collision in the Iranian desert, killing eight American servicemen and highlighting logistical failures without freeing hostages. Negotiations, mediated by , culminated in the Algiers Accords signed January 19, 1981, under which Iran released the hostages hours after Ronald Reagan's inauguration on January 20, in exchange for unfrozen assets and a U.S. pledge of non-interference—though the timing fueled suspicions of a partisan "" deal, later unsubstantiated by congressional probes. secured $7.95 billion in returned funds, but the crisis entrenched mutual distrust. The episode solidified Khomeini's "Great Satan" epithet for the U.S., embedding as a pillar of ideology and justifying decades of isolationist policies. It severed formal bilateral relations, prompted enduring U.S. sanctions under frameworks like the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, and conditioned future diplomacy on hostage release precedents, as seen in later detentions. While Iranian celebrated it as a triumph over , declassified U.S. analyses noted it weakened Iran's economy through and oil export disruptions, costing billions without yielding the . The crisis thus exemplified revolutionary provocation's short-term domestic gains against long-term geopolitical costs, with no verified evidence of covert U.S. orchestration despite persistent Iranian claims.

Iran-Iraq War Origins and Costs

The Iran–Iraq War erupted on September 22, 1980, when Iraqi forces under invaded western , seeking to exploit the revolutionary upheaval that had dismantled much of the shah's professional military through purges and executions of officers deemed disloyal. Hussein's strategy targeted 's oil-rich and aimed to preempt perceived threats from the new Islamist regime's instability, amid ongoing border skirmishes abrogating the 1975 Algiers Agreement. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's post-revolutionary rhetoric, which included explicit calls for overthrowing the secular Ba'athist government in and inciting Shia majorities there to revolt, heightened Baghdad's fears of encirclement and ideological contagion, framing the conflict's roots in Iran's expansionist ambitions beyond mere defense. Khomeini rejected early Iraqi truce offers as early as October 1980, insisting on total victory and the toppling of to export the Islamic Revolution. By mid-1982, after Iranian counteroffensives reclaimed invaded territories including , signaled willingness to withdraw to pre-war lines and negotiate, but Khomeini spurned these terms, prolonging the war for four more years in pursuit of a "final " that would dismantle 's regime and extend revolutionary Shia governance. This extension transformed an opportunistic Iraqi incursion into a protracted attritional struggle, with launching offensives into Iraqi territory to fulfill ideological goals of regional Islamic upheaval. Khomeini ideologically recast the war as the "Holy Defense" (Defa'-e Moqaddas), portraying it as a jihad against infidelity and an opportunity divinely granted to safeguard and propagate the revolution, despite its origins in defensive necessity; he described it as "God's hidden gift" to forge martyrs and purify the ummah, subordinating pragmatic peace to transnational Islamist exportation. The human toll on Iran was catastrophic, with estimates of 200,000 to 600,000 fatalities among and civilians, exacerbated by Iraq's deployment of chemical agents— and nerve agents—against Iranian forces starting in 1983, causing tens of thousands of additional casualties from blistering, , and long-term disabilities without effective countermeasures. Iranian troops, often human-wave attackers including poorly trained volunteers, endured these attacks in reminiscent of , sustaining disproportionate losses relative to Iraq's mechanized advantages. Economically, the war devastated Iran, accruing damages exceeding $500 billion through direct military outlays, reconstruction needs, and sabotage of oil infrastructure—such as Iraqi airstrikes on terminals that halved export capacity at peak—and forcing reliance on war bonds and asset seizures that stifled civilian development. revenues, Iran's lifeline, plummeted amid repeated disruptions, while import substitutions and compounded industrial stagnation, leaving a legacy of debt and underinvestment.

Regional and Global Islamist Influence

Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah explicitly advocated exporting the Islamist model abroad, declaring in speeches that the revolution's success against and Western influence should inspire globally to establish similar theocratic . This manifested primarily through the creation and arming of Shia proxy militias, beginning with in , where Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operatives arrived in 1982 amid the Israeli invasion and , providing training, funds, and ideological guidance drawn from Khomeini's wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurist) framework. formally announced its existence in a 1985 manifesto, positioning itself as an extension of 's revolutionary resistance against and Western powers, with Iran supplying an estimated $700 million annually in funding and weapons by the 2010s, enabling attacks such as the that killed 241 U.S. personnel. Iran extended this proxy strategy to other Shia-majority or mixed regions, supporting groups like Iraq's and militias, which emerged post-2003 U.S. invasion and received IRGC-Qods Force training and funding exceeding $100 million yearly, contributing to that displaced millions and undermined state stability. In , Iran bolstered the Houthi (Ansar Allah) movement with ballistic missiles, drones, and advisory support starting around 2014, escalating the and enabling Red Sea shipping disruptions that spiked global trade costs by billions. These networks, collectively termed the "Axis of Resistance," have relied on covert funding trails—often laundered through oil smuggling and front companies—totaling billions since the , fostering persistent low-intensity conflicts that prioritize ideological expansion over regional peace. Such proxy warfare has demonstrably destabilized host countries, prolonging civil strife in , , and while entrenching Iran's veto power over Arab state policies. Despite the early euphoria, the relationship between Arafat and the Iranian leadership fractured due to diverging national interests and regional conflicts. The primary catalyst for this rift was the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), during which Arafat eventually sided with Saddam Hussein, seeking to maintain Arab support for the Palestinian cause.⁶ Furthermore, the ideological gap widened as Tehran began to favor Islamist movements like Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad over Arafat’s secular-nationalist Fatah movement.⁷ By the late 1980s, Iran’s support had shifted toward these more militant religious factions, which Tehran viewed as more reliable proxies for its revolutionary export than Arafat’s diplomatically-focused PLO.⁸ Beyond Shia proxies, the revolution exerted indirect influence on Sunni Islamist extremists by modeling theocratic overthrow of secular regimes, though sectarian divides limited emulation; referenced Iran's anti-imperialist stance in early rhetoric, yet Sunni groups like later targeted Iranian assets as "" (rejectors), highlighting how the revolution's success spurred a competitive global jihadist ecosystem rather than unity. Iran's tactical support extended to Sunni Palestinians, providing with $70-100 million annually via smuggling routes since the 1990s, despite doctrinal differences, to sustain anti-Israel operations that have triggered cycles of Gaza violence. The revolution's global Islamist imprint was starkly illustrated by Khomeini's February 14, 1989, fatwa against author for , which accused the novel of blaspheming and ordered Muslims worldwide to execute him, with a $1-3 million bounty; this edict, broadcast via Iranian state media, incited riots killing dozens in and and forced Rushdie into hiding for years, underscoring Tehran's claim to transnational religious authority unbound by sovereignty. Anti-Western alliances further amplified this influence, as seen in partnerships with under from 2005 onward, where joint summits and $20 billion in trade deals— including oil swaps and exchanges—framed shared opposition to U.S. as revolutionary , though empirical outcomes included mutual economic dependency without alleviating either regime's internal crises. Iran's post-revolution nuclear pursuits, accelerating under from 2002 with undeclared enrichment sites revealed in 2009, have been justified as sovereign defense against aggression but widely assessed as enabling proxy aggression by deterring retaliation, heightening proliferation risks in the . Overall, these extensions of revolutionary ideology have fueled and proxy entanglements, correlating with over 100,000 regional deaths since 1980 and persistent instability, as proxies prioritize over governance.

Controversies and Alternative Perspectives

The Iranian Revolution of involved massive public demonstrations, with estimates of up to 9 million participants in nationwide protests by late 1978, suggesting broad anti-monarchical sentiment rather than unified endorsement of theocratic rule. Proponents of the "popular revolution" view, including historian , argue that Ruhollah Khomeini's rhetoric resonated as a populist critique of inequality and foreign influence, drawing support from diverse classes including urban workers and bazaar merchants who saw in him a symbol of national sovereignty. Abrahamian posits that Khomeini's appeal transcended strict fundamentalism, incorporating socioeconomic grievances that aligned with the revolution's mass mobilization against Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's perceived corruption and authoritarianism. Critics contend the movement was an elite hijacking by clerical forces, as the protests encompassed a heterogeneous of secular nationalists, Marxists, liberals, and Islamists united primarily against the but not in favor of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist). Secular and leftist groups, such as the National Front and guerrillas, participated expecting a , only for Khomeini to consolidate power through purges, including the execution of thousands of former allies and opponents in 1980-1981. This perspective, echoed by figures like , describes extremists overriding a "broad-based popular revolution" via institutional capture, such as stacking the Revolutionary Council with loyalists and suppressing alternatives during the transitional phase. The March 30-31, 1979, on establishing an reported 98.2% approval from 20.4 million voters, but lacked secrecy, opposition campaigning, or detailed options beyond a yes/no on , amid revolutionary fervor and . Turnout claims have been questioned for potential inflation, as subsequent votes showed discrepancies, and the process precluded debate on governance models favored by non-Islamist factions. Post-revolution indicators, including the of over 2 million Iranians by the mid-1980s—disproportionately educated professionals, (from 80,000 to under 20,000), and ethnic minorities—signal widespread disillusionment rather than sustained popular endorsement. Persistent protests, from the 1999 student uprisings to the 2022 Mahsa Amini demonstrations involving millions chanting against the regime, further suggest the outcome deviated from initial aspirations, with a 2022 statement by reformist lawmaker Behnam Masoudi asserting majority regret over the 1979 vote. Revisionist analyses, contrasting Abrahamian's emphasis on organic , highlight clerical in sidelining rivals, yielding an undemocratic consolidation where empirical support for was narrower than protest scales implied.

Western Policy Failures and Shah's Undermining

The Carter administration's emphasis on in led to and private pressures on to moderate his measures against domestic opposition, which inadvertently undermined his regime's stability during the escalating protests of 1978. In particular, U.S. officials conveyed mixed signals, urging restraint on crackdowns while simultaneously advocating for political reforms, paralyzing the 's decisive response to revolutionary fervor. This policy shift, rooted in post-Vietnam idealism, contrasted with prior U.S. support for the 's authoritarian methods to maintain regional order, effectively signaling a withdrawal of unconditional backing at a critical juncture. Western media outlets, notably the BBC Persian Service, played a role in amplifying dissident voices by providing extensive coverage of protests and exiles, including airtime for Ruhollah Khomeini's messages from , which legitimized and coordinated opposition activities without sufficient scrutiny of their Islamist objectives. Accusations persist that such broadcasts, reaching millions inside , functioned as a de facto propaganda tool for revolutionaries, framing the Shah's rule as tyrannical while downplaying the theocratic alternative. This amplification occurred amid broader intelligence shortcomings, as U.S. agencies failed to anticipate the Revolution's Islamist trajectory, producing assessments that underestimated Khomeini's mass appeal and overemphasized secular or liberal elements in the opposition coalition. U.S. policymakers exhibited naivety toward the Islamist core of the movement, often perceiving Khomeini through a lens of progressive reform akin to Gandhi rather than a radical theocrat intent on establishing a clerical , which blinded them to the Revolution's anti-Western and anti-modernizing potential. While not directly causing the upheaval—rooted in internal Iranian dynamics—these policy lapses enabled its success by eroding the 's repressive apparatus and international deterrence. Analysts later argued that firmer, continued U.S. military and diplomatic support, including tolerance for necessary force against mobs, might have allowed the to weather the crisis and sustain Iran's modernization trajectory, averting the theocratic takeover.

Myth of Democratic Aspirations vs. Theocratic Outcomes

The portrayal of the Iranian Revolution as a broad-based movement for democratic governance, subsequently hijacked by clerical extremists to impose , overlooks the explicit ideological blueprint articulated by Ruhollah Khomeini and his Islamist allies prior to the Shah's fall. Khomeini, the revolution's , consistently rejected Western-style as incompatible with Islamic governance, advocating instead for the velayat-e faqih—the —as the sole legitimate form of rule. In his treatise , Khomeini argued that sovereignty belongs exclusively to God and must be exercised through qualified Shia clerics, dismissing and electoral systems unbound by as innovations alien to . This rejection was not a post-revolutionary pivot but a core tenet propagated throughout the 1970s via Khomeini's speeches and writings smuggled from exile, where he framed the monarchy's ouster as a prelude to clerical supremacy rather than secular pluralism. Supporters mobilized under slogans invoking Islamic rule, with Khomeini explicitly stating in early 1979 that the forthcoming government would confront global ideologies with Iran's own, rooted in theocratic principles rather than liberal democratic norms. The March 30–31, 1979, referendum, which approved an "Islamic Republic" with 98.2% reported support amid limited options and no detailed democratic framework, reflected this intent, as Khomeini had predefined the outcome as theocratic consolidation. The 1979 Constitution, ratified on December 3, formalized this structure through Article 5, establishing the supreme leader's absolute authority over state institutions, including veto power over elected bodies and military command, with candidates for president and parliament vetted by the cleric-dominated to ensure ideological conformity. No provisions for free, competitive elections independent of religious oversight were included, rendering the system a hybrid where clerical overrides popular will—a direct implementation of Khomeini's pre-revolutionary vision rather than a deviation from it. Western media and academic narratives, often influenced by sympathy for anti-Shah sentiment, initially framed the upheaval as a "people's revolution" akin to democratic uprisings, downplaying the Islamist core's dominance and Khomeini's unambiguous theocratic goals in favor of emphasizing mass protests against . Subsequent empirical patterns, including the 2009 Green Movement protests—sparked by disputed presidential elections on , 2009, and suppressed with over 100 deaths and thousands arrested—exposed the regime's structural intolerance for genuine electoral , as upheld clerical vetoes over reformist challenges. Likewise, the 2022 protests following Mahsa Amini's death in morality police custody on September 16, 2022, evolved into nationwide rejection of theocratic enforcement, with chants against the supreme leader underscoring the revolution's foundational anti-democratic rigidity rather than a thwarted liberal . These recurring uprisings affirm that the theocratic outcome was the revolution's intended causal endpoint, not an aberration from widespread democratic yearnings.

Long-Term Legacy

Societal and Cultural Reversals

Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the new imposed stringent controls on media and artistic expression, reversing the relative openness of the Pahlavi era. All independent media outlets were shuttered, and broadcasting was consolidated under the state-controlled , which enforces ideological conformity and censors content deemed un-Islamic. Artistic production faced severe restrictions, including bans on Western-influenced music, theater, and unless aligned with revolutionary themes; for instance, many pre-revolutionary films and concerts were prohibited, driving creative activities underground or into exile. , once vibrant with global influences like and fashion, retreated to clandestine networks, where participants risk arrest for distributing forbidden media. Educational reforms emphasized Islamization, supplanting secular curricula with mandatory religious instruction and purging universities of "Westernized" faculty during the Cultural Revolution of 1980–1983, which expelled thousands of professors and students. Enrollment in higher education expanded dramatically—from about 175,000 students in 1979 to over 4.5 million by 2014—but at the cost of ideological vetting and reduced emphasis on sciences and humanities in favor of . This contributed to a massive brain drain, with estimates indicating that around 3 million educated Iranians, including professionals and academics, emigrated in the decades following the revolution, depriving the country of skilled . Family law reverted to stricter Sharia interpretations after the repeal of the 1967 and 1975 Family Protection Laws, which had limited and expanded women's and custody rights. Post-1979 codes reinstated men's unilateral right to (talaq) without oversight, while women face arduous processes for judicial (talaq-e tafrqi) requiring proof of ; was again permitted for men up to four wives, subject only to financial capacity. These changes curtailed women's legal autonomy, contrasting with pre-revolutionary reforms that aligned closer to modern civil codes. Pre-1979 Iran exhibited cosmopolitan traits, with urban centers like featuring mixed-gender social scenes, unveiled women in universities and professions, and cultural exchanges with the West, fostering a secular amid rapid . The revolution induced cultural isolation through policies like mandatory enforcement from , travel restrictions, and bans on "decadent" imports, severing ties to global norms and confining public life to Islamic frameworks, which stifled the hybrid Persian-Western identity that had defined elite society. This shift marked a regression from integration to insularity, as evidenced by the of cultural elites and the state's promotion of rhetoric over international engagement.

Historiographical Revisions and Empirical Assessments

Initial scholarship on the Iranian Revolution, particularly in Western intellectual circles, exhibited sympathy toward its anti-authoritarian and anti-imperialist dimensions, exemplified by philosopher Michel Foucault's contemporaneous endorsements. Foucault, reporting from Iran in 1978, portrayed the uprising as a novel "political spirituality" challenging modern disciplinary power and Western secularism, aligning it with his critiques of the Shah's surveillance apparatus. This perspective, influenced by leftist anti-colonial sentiments prevalent in academia, initially framed the revolution as a potential rupture from Enlightenment toward authentic popular will. Subsequent historiographical revisions, informed by the regime's post-1979 trajectory, critiqued these early idealizations, drawing parallels between Khomeinist Iran and historical totalitarian systems in their monopolization of , purges of , and fusion of religious and state authority. Scholars noted how the revolution devolved into a theocratic consolidation resembling Stalinist or fascist models, where initial broad coalitions fragmented under clerical dominance, contradicting promises of pluralism. Iranian testimonies, including diplomatic memoirs, underscored in the alliances, revealing how Khomeini tactically courted secular nationalists and leftists only to marginalize them via courts and executions post-victory. These accounts, often sidelined in early sympathetic narratives due to institutional biases favoring anti-Western interpretations, highlight a causal pattern: the Shah's created a exploited by ideological rather than yielding progressive governance. Empirical assessments over four decades validate these revisions, demonstrating theocratic rule's causal links to stagnation over advancement. Real GDP contracted 20% between 1978/79 and 1980/81 amid revolutionary disruptions, with growth lagging pre-revolution rates despite oil revenues, fostering widespread perceptions. rates, while declining from wartime peaks around 40% through subsidies, remain entrenched due to mismanagement and sanctions exacerbated by ideological , with inequality metrics showing redistribution but absolute living standards trailing regional peers. Repression data—thousands executed in the purges and ongoing crackdowns—confirms totalitarian echoes, undermining claims of inherent in Islamist and affirming ideology's primacy in filling institutional voids with inefficiency. Such data-driven reevaluations prioritize observable outcomes over ideological , exposing early scholarship's overreliance on aspirational narratives amid academia's systemic tilt toward excusing under anti-imperial guises.

References

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