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Indian Rebellion of 1857
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| Indian Rebellion of 1857 | |||||||||
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A 1912 map of Northern India, showing the centres of the rebellion. | |||||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||||
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| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
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The Earl Canning George Anson † Sir Patrick Grant Sir Colin Campbell Sir Hugh Rose Sir Henry Havelock † Sir James Outram Sir Henry Lawrence (DOW) James Neill † John Nicholson † Surendra Bikram Shah Dhir Shamsher Rana[1] Randhir Singh Sir Yusef Ali Khan | |||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
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6,000 British killed, including civilians[a][2] Based on a rough comparison of the sketchy pre-1857 regional demographic data and the first 1871 Census of India, probably 800,000 Indians were killed, and very likely more, both in the rebellion and in the famines and epidemics of disease that were caused as a result in its immediate aftermath.[2] | |||||||||
The Indian Rebellion of 1857 was a major uprising in India in 1857–58 against the rule of the British East India Company, which functioned as a sovereign power on behalf of the British Crown.[5][6] The rebellion began on 10 May 1857 in the form of a mutiny of sepoys of the company's army in the garrison town of Meerut, 40 miles (64 km) northeast of Delhi. It then erupted into other mutinies and civilian rebellions chiefly in the upper Gangetic plain and central India,[b][7][c][8] though incidents of revolt also occurred farther north and east.[d][9] The rebellion posed a military threat to British power in that region,[e][10] and was contained only with the rebels' defeat in Gwalior on 20 June 1858.[11] On 1 November 1858, the British granted amnesty to all rebels not involved in murder, though they did not declare the hostilities to have formally ended until 8 July 1859.
The name of the revolt is contested, and it is variously described as the Sepoy Mutiny, the Indian Mutiny, the Great Rebellion, the Revolt of 1857, the Indian Insurrection, and the First War of Independence.[f][12]
The Indian rebellion was fed by resentments born of diverse perceptions, including invasive British-style social reforms, harsh land taxes, summary treatment of some rich landowners and princes,[13][14] and scepticism about British claims that their rule offered material improvement to the Indian economy.[g][15] Many Indians rose against the British; however, many also fought for the British, and the majority remained seemingly compliant to British rule.[h][15] Violence, which sometimes betrayed exceptional cruelty, was inflicted on both sides: on British officers and civilians, including women and children, by the rebels, and on the rebels and their supporters, including sometimes entire villages, by British reprisals; the cities of Delhi and Lucknow were laid waste in the fighting and the British retaliation.[i][15]
After the outbreak of the mutiny in Meerut, the rebels quickly reached Delhi, whose 81-year-old Mughal ruler, Bahadur Shah Zafar, was declared the Emperor of Hindustan. Soon, the rebels had captured large tracts of the North-Western Provinces and Awadh (Oudh). The East India Company's response came rapidly as well. With help from reinforcements, Kanpur was retaken by mid-July 1857, and Delhi by the end of September.[11] However, it then took the remainder of 1857 and the better part of 1858 for the rebellion to be suppressed in Jhansi, Lucknow, and especially the Awadh countryside.[11] Other regions of Company-controlled India—Bengal province, the Bombay Presidency, and the Madras Presidency, remained largely calm.[j][8][11] In the Punjab, the Sikh princes crucially helped the British by providing both soldiers and support.[k][8][11] The large princely states, Hyderabad, Mysore, Travancore, and Kashmir, as well as the smaller ones of Rajputana, did not join the rebellion, serving the British, in the Governor-General Lord Canning's words, as "breakwaters in a storm".[16]
In some regions, most notably in Awadh, the rebellion took on the attributes of a patriotic revolt against British oppression.[17] However, the rebel leaders proclaimed no articles of faith that presaged a new political system.[l][18] Even so, the rebellion proved to be an important watershed in Indian and British Empire history.[m][12][19] It led to the dissolution of the East India Company, and forced the British to reorganize the army, the financial system, and the administration in India, through passage of the Government of India Act 1858.[20] India was thereafter administered directly by the British government in the new British Raj.[16] On 1 November 1858, Queen Victoria issued a proclamation to Indians, which while lacking the authority of a constitutional provision,[n][21] promised rights similar to those of other British subjects.[o][p][22] In the following decades, when admission to these rights was not always forthcoming, Indians were to pointedly refer to the Queen's proclamation in growing avowals of a new nationalism.[q][r][24]
East India Company's expansion in India
[edit]

Although the British East India Company had established a presence in India as far back as 1612,[25] and earlier administered the factory areas established for trading purposes, its victory in the Battle of Plassey in 1757 marked the beginning of its firm foothold in eastern India. The victory was consolidated in 1764 at the Battle of Buxar, when the East India Company army defeated Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II. After his defeat, the emperor granted the company the right to the "collection of Revenue" in the provinces of Bengal (modern day Bengal, Bihar, and Odisha), known as "Diwani" to the company.[26] The Company soon expanded its territories around its bases in Bombay and Madras; later, the Anglo-Mysore Wars (1766–1799) and the Anglo-Maratha Wars (1772–1818) led to control of even more of India.[27]
In 1806, the Vellore Mutiny was sparked by new uniform regulations that created resentment amongst both Hindu and Muslim sepoys.[28]
After the turn of the 19th century, Governor-General Wellesley began what became two decades of accelerated expansion of Company territories. This was achieved either by subsidiary alliances between the company and local rulers or by direct military annexation.[29] The subsidiary alliances created the princely states of the Hindu maharajas and the Muslim nawabs. Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, and Kashmir were annexed after the Second Anglo-Sikh War in 1849; however, Kashmir was immediately sold under the 1846 Treaty of Amritsar to the Dogra Dynasty of Jammu and thereby became a princely state. The border dispute between Nepal and British India, which sharpened after 1801, had caused the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814–16 and brought the defeated Gurkhas under British influence. In 1854, Berar was annexed, and the state of Oudh was added two years later. For practical purposes, the company was the government of much of India.[citation needed]
Causes of the rebellion
[edit]The Indian Rebellion of 1857 occurred as the result of an accumulation of factors over time, rather than any single event.[citation needed]
The sepoys were Indian soldiers who were recruited into the company's army. Just before the rebellion, there were over 300,000 sepoys in the army, compared to about 50,000 British. The East India Company's forces were divided into three presidency armies: Bombay, Madras, and Bengal. The Bengal Army recruited higher castes, such as Brahmins, Rajputs and Bhumihar, mostly from the Awadh and Bihar regions, and even restricted the enlistment of lower castes in 1855.[30] In contrast, the Madras Army and Bombay Army were "more localized, caste-neutral armies" that "did not prefer high-caste men".[31] The domination of higher castes in the Bengal Army has been blamed in part for initial mutinies that led to the rebellion.[citation needed]

| Rebellions in British India |
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| East India Company |
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| British Raj |
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In 1772, when Warren Hastings was appointed Fort William's first Governor-General, one of his first undertakings was the rapid expansion of the company's army. Since the sepoys from Bengal – many of whom had fought against the Company in the Battles of Plassey and Buxar – were now suspect in British eyes, Hastings recruited farther west from the high-caste rural Rajputs and Bhumihar of Awadh and Bihar, a practice that continued for the next 75 years. However, in order to forestall any social friction, the company also took action to adapt its military practices to the requirements of their religious rituals. Consequently, these soldiers dined in separate facilities; in addition, overseas service, considered polluting to their caste, was not required of them, and the army soon came officially to recognise Hindu festivals. "This encouragement of high caste ritual status, however, left the government vulnerable to protest, even mutiny, whenever the sepoys detected infringement of their prerogatives."[32] Stokes argues that "The British scrupulously avoided interference with the social structure of the village community which remained largely intact."[33]
After the annexation of Oudh (Awadh) by the East India Company in 1856, many sepoys were disquieted both from losing their perquisites, as landed gentry, in the Oudh courts, and from the anticipation of any increased land-revenue payments that the annexation might bring about.[34] Other historians have stressed that by 1857, some Indian soldiers, interpreting the presence of missionaries as a sign of official intent, were convinced that the company was masterminding mass conversions of Hindus and Muslims to Christianity.[35] Although earlier in the 1830s, evangelicals such as William Carey and William Wilberforce had successfully clamoured for the passage of social reform, such as the abolition of sati and allowing the remarriage of Hindu widows, there is little evidence that the sepoys' allegiance was affected by this.[34]
However, changes in the terms of their professional service may have created resentment. As the extent of the East India Company's jurisdiction expanded with victories in wars or annexation, the soldiers were now expected not only to serve in less familiar regions, such as in Burma, but also to make do without the "foreign service" remuneration that had previously been their due.[36]
A major cause of resentment that arose ten months prior to the outbreak of the rebellion was the General Service Enlistment Act of 25 July 1856. As noted above, men of the Bengal Army had been exempted from overseas service. Specifically, they were enlisted only for service in territories to which they could march. Governor-General Lord Dalhousie saw this as an anomaly, since all sepoys of the Madras and Bombay Armies and the six "General Service" battalions of the Bengal Army had accepted an obligation to serve overseas if required. As a result, the burden of providing contingents for active service in Burma, readily accessible only by sea, and China had fallen disproportionately on the two smaller Presidency Armies. As signed into effect by Lord Canning, Dalhousie's successor as Governor-General, the act required only new recruits to the Bengal Army to accept a commitment for general service. However, serving high-caste sepoys were fearful that it would be eventually extended to them, as well as preventing sons following fathers into an army with a strong tradition of family service.[37]: 261
There were also grievances over the issue of promotions, based on seniority. This, as well as the increasing number of British officers in the battalions,[38][better source needed] made promotion slow, and many Indian officers did not reach commissioned rank until they were too old to be effective.[39]
The Enfield rifle
[edit]
The immediate flashpoint for the 1857 uprising is often associated with the introduction of the Pattern 1853 Enfield rifle-musket into the Bengal Army. These rifles used paper cartridges that were pre-greased to allow smooth loading. To load the rifle, a soldier tore open the cartridge, traditionally with his teeth, before pouring the powder down the barrel and ramming home the bullet and wadding.[40]
In early 1857, rumours began circulating among sepoys that the grease used on these cartridges was derived from cow tallow, offensive to Hindus, and pig lard, offensive to Muslims. These rumours caused deep alarm because biting the cartridge could be perceived as a violation of religious practice.[41]
Modern historians emphasize that it was the belief in these rumours, rather than the confirmed presence of animal fat, that inflamed tensions. Kim Wagner argues that there is little direct evidence that large numbers of greased cartridges were actually issued to Indian troops before the revolt.[42] Instead, the affair reflects a broader climate of distrust in which fears of religious pollution merged with anxieties about British intentions toward Indian society and religion.[43]
British officials became aware of the rumours through reports of disputes between sepoys and labourers at military depots such as Dum Dum and Barrackpore.[44] In response, the Company ordered that future cartridges be supplied without grease and allowed sepoys to apply their own lubricant.[45] However, this measure failed to calm fears and, in some cases, reinforced the suspicion that the authorities were concealing the truth.[42]
The "greased cartridge affair" thus became a powerful symbol of British cultural insensitivity and fed into broader grievances over pay, conditions of service, and the perception that the Company was seeking to erode traditional religious and social structures. Historians now view the controversy less as a single cause and more as a catalyst that helped turn widespread discontent into open rebellion.[46]
Civilian disquiet
[edit]Civilian participation in the rebellion was diverse and regionally varied, involving three main groups: the traditional feudal nobility, rural landlords known as taluqdars, and the peasantry.[47]
The feudal nobility included princes and chieftains whose power had been curtailed by British expansionist policies such as the Doctrine of Lapse, which denied recognition to adopted heirs of deceased rulers. Many nobles, such as Nana Sahib and Rani of Jhansi, had initially been willing to accept British supremacy but rebelled when their legal and hereditary claims were rejected. For instance, the Rani of Jhansi resisted British authority after her adopted son was denied recognition as her late husband's successor.[48][49] In regions like Indore and Sagar, where princely privileges were not directly threatened, many rulers remained loyal to the British even when local sepoys revolted.[50]
The taluqdars, particularly in Oudh and Bihar, played a decisive role in the uprising. British land-revenue policies and annexations had stripped many taluqdars of their traditional estates, transferring large portions of land to peasant farmers.[51] During the rebellion, Rajput taluqdars provided much of the leadership in Oudh, while in Bihar, figures like Kunwar Singh emerged as prominent leaders.[47] As the rebellion spread, taluqdars reasserted control over their lost territories, often with the support of peasants bound to them by kinship and feudal loyalty. British officials were surprised at the lack of resistance from these peasant groups, many of whom actively joined the revolt.[51]
Heavy land-revenue assessments imposed by the Company also contributed to widespread rural discontent. Many landowners were forced into debt or bankruptcy, creating deep resentment toward both the British and moneylenders who profited from these policies.[52][53] Moneylenders became symbolic targets of popular anger, alongside Company officials.[54]
Despite the widespread participation of civilians, the rebellion was geographically uneven. Even within rebellious regions of north-central India, some districts remained calm. For example, the prosperous Muzaffarnagar district, which benefited from a Company-sponsored irrigation project, stayed largely loyal to British authority despite its proximity to Meerut, where the uprising began.[55]
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Charles Canning, 1st Earl Canning, the Governor-General of India during the rebellion.
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Lord Dalhousie, Governor-General of India (1848–1856), who devised the Doctrine of Lapse.
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Lakshmibai, Rani of Jhansi, one of the principal rebel leaders who lost her kingdom through the Doctrine of Lapse.
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Bahadur Shah Zafar, the last Mughal emperor, declared symbolic leader of the rebellion, later exiled to Burma.
Reformist policies introduced by the Company were also viewed with suspicion by many Indians. Utilitarian and evangelical-inspired reforms, such as the abolition of sati[56] and the legalisation of widow remarriage, were interpreted by some as attempts to undermine traditional Indian religions and promote Christian conversion.[57][58] Historian Christopher Bayly has described the uprising as, in part, a "clash of knowledges," in which traditional religious and social authorities, including pandits, maulvis, and astrologers, perceived British colonial educational and medical policies as a direct threat to established hierarchies.[59] Testimonies collected after the rebellion, such as those recorded in the 1858 Parliamentary Blue Books, reveal that British-run schools were especially controversial.[60] Many parents feared that the exclusion of religious instruction and the introduction of secular subjects like mathematics and Western science, as well as the education of girls, undermined traditional moral and spiritual values.[61]
The colonial justice system was also widely perceived as biased. Official reports, such as the East India (Torture) 1855–1857 Blue Books laid before the House of Commons, documented that Company officers accused of brutality against Indians were often shielded by extended appeals processes and rarely faced meaningful punishment.[62]
Finally, the economic policies of the East India Company, including high taxation and export-oriented trade practices, were deeply resented by many communities. These policies disrupted traditional industries and contributed to widespread hardship, further fueling rebellion.[63]
The Bengal Army
[edit]
Each of the three "Presidencies" into which the East India Company divided India for administrative purposes maintained its own army. Of these, the Army of the Bengal Presidency was the largest. Unlike the other two presidency armies, it recruited heavily from among high-status Hindus and comparatively wealthy Muslims. Muslims formed a larger percentage of the 18 irregular cavalry units,[64] while Hindus were mainly found in the 84 regular infantry and cavalry regiments. About 75% of the cavalry was composed of Indian Muslims, while roughly 80% of the infantry consisted of Hindus.[65]
During the early years of Company rule, authorities tolerated and even encouraged the social and religious practices of their recruits. The Bengal Army’s regular infantry was drawn almost exclusively from the landowning Rajput and Brahmin communities of Bihar and Oudh, collectively known as Purbiyas. From the 1840s onward, administrative reforms introduced in Calcutta began to erode many of these long-standing privileges. Having grown accustomed to high social and ritual standing, the sepoys became increasingly sensitive to policies or actions they perceived as threatening their religious purity or social status.[66][30]
The sepoys also grew dissatisfied with other aspects of army life. Pay was relatively low, and following the annexations of Oudh and the Punjab, soldiers no longer received extra allowances (batta or bhatta) for service there, as these regions were no longer classified as "foreign missions". Relations between British junior officers and sepoys deteriorated as many officers increasingly treated their men as racial inferiors. In 1856, the Company introduced a new Enlistment Act making all units in the Bengal Army theoretically liable for overseas service. Although intended only for new recruits, many serving sepoys feared it might be applied retroactively. Hindu soldiers in particular were alarmed, as sea voyages under cramped shipboard conditions made it impossible to follow essential religious practices, raising fears of ritual defilement and social ostracism.[37]: 243 [67]
Onset of the rebellion
[edit]
Several months of increasing tensions coupled with various incidents preceded the actual rebellion. On 26 February 1857 the 19th Bengal Native Infantry (BNI) regiment became concerned that new cartridges they had been issued were wrapped in paper greased with cow and pig fat, which had to be opened by mouth thus affecting their religious sensibilities. Their Colonel confronted them supported by artillery and cavalry on the parade ground, but after some negotiation withdrew the artillery, and cancelled the next morning's parade.[68]

Mangal Pandey
[edit]On 29 March 1857 at the Barrackpore parade ground, near Calcutta, 29-year-old Mangal Pandey of the 34th BNI, angered by the recent actions of the East India Company, declared that he would rebel against his commanders. Informed about Pandey's behaviour Sergeant-Major James Hewson went to investigate, only to have Pandey shoot at him. Hewson raised the alarm.[69] When his Adjutant Lt. Henry Baugh came out to investigate the unrest, Pandey opened fire but hit Baugh's horse instead.[70]
General John Hearsey came out to the parade ground to investigate, and claimed later that Mangal Pandey was in some kind of "religious frenzy". He ordered the Indian commander of the Quarter Guard Jemadar Ishwari Prasad to arrest Mangal Pandey, but the Jemadar refused. The quarter guard and other sepoys present, with the single exception of a soldier called Shaikh Paltu, drew back from restraining or arresting Mangal Pandey. Shaikh Paltu restrained Pandey from continuing his attack.[70][71]
After failing to incite his comrades into an open and active rebellion, Mangal Pandey tried to take his own life, by placing his musket to his chest and pulling the trigger with his toe. He managed only to wound himself. He was court-martialled on 6 April and hanged two days later.[citation needed]
The Jemadar Ishwari Prasad was sentenced to death and hanged on 21 April. The regiment was disbanded and stripped of its uniforms because it was felt that it harboured ill-feelings towards its superiors, particularly after this incident. Shaikh Paltu was promoted to the rank of havildar in the Bengal Army but was murdered shortly before the 34th BNI dispersed.[72]
Sepoys in other regiments thought these punishments were harsh. The demonstration of disgrace during the formal disbanding helped foment the rebellion in view of some historians. Disgruntled ex-sepoys returned home to Awadh with a desire for revenge.[citation needed]
Unrest during April 1857
[edit]During April, there were unrest and fires at Agra, Allahabad and Ambala. At Ambala in particular, which was a large military cantonment where several units had been collected for their annual musketry practice, it was clear to General Anson, Commander-in-Chief of the Bengal Army, that some sort of rebellion over the cartridges was imminent. Despite the objections of the civilian Governor-General's staff, he agreed to postpone the musketry practice and allow a new drill by which the soldiers tore the cartridges with their fingers rather than their teeth. However, he issued no general orders making this standard practice throughout the Bengal Army and, rather than remain at Ambala to defuse or overawe potential trouble, he then proceeded to Simla, the cool hill station where many high officials spent the summer.[citation needed]
Although there was no open revolt at Ambala, there was widespread arson during late April. Barrack buildings (especially those belonging to soldiers who had used the Enfield cartridges) and British officers' bungalows were set on fire.[73]
Meerut
[edit]

At Meerut, a large military cantonment, 2,357 Indian sepoys and 2,038 British soldiers were stationed along with 12 British-manned guns. The station held one of the largest concentrations of British troops in India and this was later cited[by whom?] as evidence that the original rising was a spontaneous outbreak rather than a pre-planned plot.[37]: 278
Although the state of unrest within the Bengal Army was well known, on 24 April Lieutenant Colonel George Carmichael-Smyth, the unsympathetic commanding officer of the 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry, which was composed mainly of Indian Muslims,[74] ordered 90 of his men to parade and perform firing drills. All except five of the men on parade refused to accept their cartridges. On 9 May, the remaining 85 men were court martialled, and most were sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment with hard labour. Eleven comparatively young soldiers were given five years' imprisonment. The entire garrison was paraded and watched as the condemned men were stripped of their uniforms and placed in shackles. As they were marched off to jail, the condemned soldiers berated their comrades for failing to support them.[citation needed]

The next day was Sunday. Some Indian soldiers warned off-duty junior British officers that plans were afoot to release the imprisoned soldiers by force, but the senior officers to whom this was reported took no action. There was also unrest in the city of Meerut itself, with angry protests in the bazaar and some buildings being set on fire. In the evening, most British officers were preparing to attend church, while many of the British soldiers were off duty and had gone into canteens or into the bazaar in Meerut. The Indian troops, led by the 3rd Cavalry, broke into revolt. British junior officers who attempted to quell the first outbreaks were killed by the rebels. British officers' and civilians' quarters were attacked, and four civilian men, eight women and eight children were killed. Crowds in the bazaar attacked off-duty soldiers there. About 50 Indian civilians, some of them officers' servants who tried to defend or conceal their employers, were killed by the sepoys.[75] While the action of the sepoys in freeing their 85 imprisoned comrades appears to have been spontaneous, some civilian rioting in the city was reportedly encouraged by Kotwal (chief police officer) Dhan Singh Gurjar.[76]
Some sepoys (especially from the 11th Bengal Native Infantry) escorted trusted British officers and women and children to safety before joining the revolt.[77] Some officers and their families escaped to Rampur, where they found refuge with the Nawab.[citation needed]
The British historian Philip Mason notes that it was inevitable that most of the sepoys and sowars from Meerut should have made for Delhi on the night of 10 May. It was a strong walled city located only forty miles away, it was the ancient capital and present seat of the nominal Mughal Emperor, and there were no British troops in garrison there, in contrast to Meerut.[37]: 278 No effort was made to pursue them.[citation needed]
Delhi
[edit]

Early on 11 May, the first parties of the 3rd Cavalry reached Delhi. From beneath the windows of Emperor Bahadur Shah II's apartments in the palace, they called on the Emperor to acknowledge and lead them. He did nothing at this point, apparently treating the sepoys as ordinary petitioners, but others in the palace were quick to join the revolt. During the day, the revolt spread. British officials and dependents, Indian Christians and shop keepers within the city were killed, some by sepoys and others by crowds of rioters.[78]: 71–73

There were three battalion-sized regiments of Bengal Native Infantry stationed in or near the city. Some detachments quickly joined the rebellion, while others held back but also refused to obey orders to take action against the rebels. In the afternoon, a violent explosion in the city was heard for several miles. Fearing that the arsenal, which contained large stocks of arms and ammunition, would fall intact into rebel hands, the nine British Ordnance officers there had opened fire on the sepoys, including the men of their own guard. When resistance appeared hopeless, they blew up the arsenal. Six of the nine officers survived, but the blast killed many in the streets and nearby houses and other buildings.[79] The news of these events finally tipped the sepoys stationed around Delhi into open rebellion. The sepoys were later able to salvage at least some arms from the arsenal. A magazine 3 km (1.9 mi) outside Delhi, containing up to 3,000 barrels of gunpowder, was captured without resistance.[citation needed]
Many fugitive British officers and civilians had congregated at the Flagstaff Tower on the ridge north of Delhi, where telegraph operators were sending news of the events to other British stations. When it became clear that the help expected from Meerut was not coming, they made their way in carriages to Karnal. Those who became separated from the main body or who could not reach the Flagstaff Tower also set out for Karnal on foot. Some were helped by villagers on the way; others were killed.[citation needed]
The next day, Bahadur Shah held his first formal court in years.[when?] It was attended by many[quantify] excited sepoys. The emperor was alarmed by the turn events had taken, but eventually accepted the sepoys' allegiance and agreed to give his countenance to the rebellion. On 16 May, up to 50 British who had been held prisoner in the palace or had been discovered hiding in the city were killed by some of the emperor's servants in a courtyard outside the palace.[80][81]
Supporters and opposition
[edit]

The news of the events at Meerut and Delhi spread rapidly, provoking uprisings among sepoys and disturbances in many districts. In many cases, it was the behaviour of British military and civilian authorities themselves which precipitated disorder. Learning of the fall of Delhi, many Company administrators hastened to remove themselves, their families and servants to places of safety. At Agra, 160 miles (260 km) from Delhi, no fewer than 6,000 assorted non-combatants converged on the Fort.[82]
The military authorities also reacted in disjointed manner. Some officers trusted their sepoys, but others tried to disarm them to forestall potential uprisings. At Benares and Allahabad, the disarmings were bungled, also leading to local revolts.[83]: 52–53

In 1857, the Bengal Army had 86,000 men, of which 12,000 were British, 16,000 Sikh and 1,500 Gurkha. There were 311,000 native soldiers in India altogether, 40,160 British soldiers (including units of the British Army) and 5,362 officers.[84] Fifty-four of the Bengal Army's 74 regular Native Infantry Regiments mutinied, but some were immediately destroyed or broke up, with their sepoys drifting away to their homes. A number of the remaining 20 regiments were disarmed or disbanded to prevent or forestall mutiny. Only twelve of the original Bengal Native Infantry regiments survived to pass into the new Indian Army.[85] All ten of the Bengal Light Cavalry regiments mutinied.[citation needed]
The Bengal Army also contained 29 irregular cavalry and 42 irregular infantry regiments. Of these, a substantial contingent from the recently annexed state of Awadh mutinied en masse. Another large contingent from Gwalior also mutinied, even though that state's king (Jayajirao Scindia) supported the British. The remainder of the irregular units were raised from a wide variety of sources and were less affected by the concerns of mainstream Indian society. Some irregular units actively supported the company: three Gurkha and five of six Sikh infantry units, and the six infantry and six cavalry units of the recently raised Punjab Irregular Force.[86][87]
On 1 April 1858, the number of Indian soldiers in the Bengal army loyal to the company was 80,053.[88][89] However large numbers were hastily raised in the Punjab and North-West Frontier after the outbreak of the Rebellion.[citation needed]
The Bombay army had three mutinies in its 29 regiments, whilst the Madras Army had none at all, although elements of one of its 52 regiments refused to volunteer for service in Bengal.[90] Nonetheless, most of southern India remained passive, with only intermittent outbreaks of violence. Many parts of the region were ruled by the Nizams or the Mysore royalty, and were thus not directly under British rule.[citation needed]

Although most of the mutinous sepoys in Delhi were Hindus, a significant proportion of the insurgents were Muslims. The proportion of ghazis grew to be about a quarter of the local fighting force by the end of the siege and included a regiment of suicide ghazis from Gwalior who had vowed never to eat again and to fight until they met certain death at the hands of British troops.[91] However, most Muslims did not share the rebels' dislike of the British administration[92] and their ulema could not agree on whether to declare a jihad.[93] Some Islamic scholars such as Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanautavi and Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi took up arms against the colonial rule,[94] but many Muslims, among them ulema from both the Sunni and Shia sects, sided with the British.[95] Various Ahl-i-Hadith scholars and colleagues of Nanautavi rejected the jihad.[96] The most influential member of Ahl-i-Hadith ulema in Delhi, Maulana Sayyid Nazir Husain Dehlvi, resisted pressure from the mutineers to call for a jihad and instead declared in favour of British rule, viewing the Muslim-British relationship as a legal contract which could not be broken unless their religious rights were breached.[97]

The Sikhs and Pathans of the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province supported the British and helped in the recapture of Delhi.[98] The Sikhs in particular feared reinstatement of Mughal rule in northern India[99] because they had been persecuted by the Mughal Empire. They also felt disdain towards the Purbiyas or 'Easterners' (Biharis and those from the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh) in the Bengal Army. The Sikhs felt that the bloodiest battles of the First and Second Anglo-Sikh wars (Chillianwala and Ferozeshah), had been won by British troops, while the Hindustani sepoys had refused to meet the Sikhs in battle.[100] These feelings were compounded when Hindustani sepoys were assigned a very visible role as garrison troops in Punjab and awarded profit-making civil posts in the Punjab.[99]
The varied groups in the support and opposing of the uprising is seen as a major cause of its failure.[citation needed]
The revolt
[edit]Initial stages
[edit]

Bahadur Shah II was proclaimed the Emperor of the whole of India. Most contemporary and modern accounts suggest that he was coerced by the sepoys and his courtiers to sign the proclamation against his will.[101] In spite of the significant loss of power that the Mughal dynasty had suffered in the preceding centuries, their name still carried great prestige across northern India.[91] Civilians, nobility and other dignitaries took an oath of allegiance. The emperor issued coins in his name, one of the oldest ways of asserting imperial status. The adhesion of the Mughal emperor, however, turned the Sikhs of the Punjab away from the rebellion, as they did not want to return to Islamic rule, having fought many wars against the Mughal rulers. The province of Bengal was largely quiet throughout the entire period. The British, who had long ceased to take the authority of the Mughal Emperor seriously, were astonished at how the ordinary people responded to Bahadur Shah's call for war.[91]
Initially, the Indian rebels were able to push back Company forces, and captured several important towns in Haryana, Bihar, the Central Provinces and the United Provinces. When British troops were reinforced and began to counterattack, the mutineers were especially handicapped by their lack of centralized command and control. Although the rebels produced some natural leaders such as Bakht Khan, whom the Emperor later nominated as commander-in-chief after his son Mirza Mughal proved ineffectual, for the most part they were forced to look for leadership to rajahs and princes. Some of these were to prove dedicated leaders, but others were self-interested or inept.[citation needed]

In the countryside around Meerut, a general Gurjar uprising posed the largest threat to the British. In Parikshitgarh near Meerut, Gurjars declared Rao Kadam Singh (Kuddum Singh) their leader, and expelled Company police. Kadam Singh Gurjar led a large force, estimates varying from 2,000 to 10,000.[102] Bulandshahr and Bijnor also came under the control of Gurjars under Walidad Khan and Maho Singh respectively. Contemporary sources report that nearly all the Gurjar villages between Meerut and Delhi participated in the revolt, in some cases with support from Jullundur, and it was not until late July that, with the help of local Jats, and the princely states, the British managed to regain control of the area.[102]
The Imperial Gazetteer of India states that throughout the Indian Rebellion of 1857, Gurjars and Ranghars proved the "most irreconcilable enemies" of the British in the Bulandshahr area.[103]
Mufti Nizamuddin, a renowned scholar of Lahore, issued a Fatwa against the British forces and called upon the local population to support the forces of Rao Tula Ram. Casualties were high at the subsequent engagement at Narnaul (Nasibpur). After the defeat of Rao Tula Ram on 16 November 1857, Mufti Nizamuddin was arrested, and his brother Mufti Yaqinuddin and brother-in-law Abdur Rahman (alias Nabi Baksh) were arrested in Tijara. They were taken to Delhi and hanged.[104]
Siege of Delhi
[edit]

The British were slow to strike back at first. It took time for troops stationed in Britain to make their way to India by sea, although some regiments moved overland through Persia from the Crimean War, and some regiments already en route for China were diverted to India.[citation needed]
It took time to organise the British troops already in India into field forces, but eventually two columns left Meerut and Simla. They proceeded slowly towards Delhi and fought, killed, and hanged numerous Indians along the way. Two months after the first outbreak of rebellion at Meerut, the two forces met near Karnal. The combined force, including two Gurkha units serving in the Bengal Army under contract from the Kingdom of Nepal, fought the rebels' main army at Badli-ke-Serai and drove them back to Delhi.[citation needed]
The company's army established a base on the Delhi ridge to the north of the city and the Siege of Delhi began. The siege lasted roughly from 1 July to 21 September. However, the encirclement was hardly complete, and for much of the siege the besiegers were outnumbered and it often seemed that it was the Company forces and not Delhi that were under siege, as the rebels could easily receive resources and reinforcements. For several weeks, it seemed likely that disease, exhaustion and continuous sorties by rebels from Delhi would force the besiegers to withdraw, but the outbreaks of rebellion in the Punjab were forestalled or suppressed, allowing the Punjab Movable Column of British, Sikh and Pashtun soldiers under John Nicholson to reinforce the besiegers on the Ridge on 14 August.[105] On 30 August the rebels offered terms, which were refused.[106]
-
The Jantar Mantar observatory in Delhi in 1858, damaged in the fighting
-
Mortar damage to Kashmiri Gate, Delhi, 1858
-
Hindu Rao's house in Delhi, now a hospital, was extensively damaged in the fighting.
-
The Bank of Delhi was attacked by mortar and gunfire.
An eagerly awaited heavy siege train joined the besieging force, and from 7 September, the siege guns battered breaches in the walls and silenced the rebels' artillery.[107]: 478 An attempt to storm the city through the breaches and the Kashmiri Gate was launched on 14 September.[107]: 480 The attackers gained a foothold within the city but suffered heavy casualties, including John Nicholson. Major General Archdale Wilson, the British commander, wished to withdraw, but was persuaded to hold on by his junior officers. After a week of street fighting, the British reached the Red Fort. Bahadur Shah Zafar had already fled to Humayun's tomb.

The troops of the besieging force proceeded to loot and pillage the city. A large number of citizens were killed in retaliation for the British and Indian civilians that had been slaughtered by the rebels. During the street fighting, artillery was set up in the city's main mosque. Neighbourhoods within range were bombarded; the homes of the Muslim nobility that housed innumerable cultural, artistic, literary and monetary riches were destroyed.[citation needed]
The British soon arrested Bahadur Shah Zafar, and the next day the British Major William Hodson had his sons Mirza Mughal and Mirza Khizr Sultan and grandson Mirza Abu Bakr shot under his own authority at the Khooni Darwaza (the bloody gate) near Delhi Gate. On hearing the news, Zafar reacted with shocked silence, while his wife Zinat Mahal was content, as she believed her son was now Zafar's heir.[108] Shortly after the fall of Delhi, the victorious attackers organised a column that relieved another besieged Company force in Agra, and then pressed on to Cawnpore, which had also recently been retaken. This gave the Company forces a continuous, although still tenuous, line of communication from the east to the west of India.[citation needed]
Cawnpore (Kanpur)
[edit]

In June, sepoys under General Wheeler in Cawnpore (now Kanpur) rebelled and besieged the British entrenchment. Wheeler was not only a veteran and respected soldier but also married to an Indian woman. He had relied on his own prestige and his cordial relations with local landholder and hereditary prime minister Nana Sahib to thwart rebellion, and took comparatively few measures to prepare fortifications and lay in supplies and ammunition.[citation needed]
Advised by his trusted consultant Azimullah Khan, Nana Sahib led the rebels at Kanpur rather than join the Mughals in Delhi.[109] The besieged endured three weeks of the Siege of Cawnpore with little water or food, suffering continuous casualties among men, women and children. On 25 June Nana Sahib made an offer of safe passage to Allahabad. With barely three days' food rations remaining, the British agreed, provided they could keep their small arms and that the evacuation should take place in daylight on the morning of the 27th (the Nana Sahib wanted the evacuation to take place on the night of the 26th). Early in the morning of 27 June, the British party left their entrenchment and made their way to the river where boats provided by the Nana Sahib were waiting to take them to Allahabad.[110] Several sepoys who had stayed loyal to the company were removed by the mutineers and killed, either because of their loyalty or because "they had become Christian". A few injured British officers trailing the column were also apparently hacked to death by angry sepoys. After the British party had largely arrived at the dock, which was surrounded by sepoys positioned on both banks of the Ganges,[111] with clear lines of fire, firing broke out and the boats were abandoned by their crew, and caught or were set[112] on fire using pieces of red-hot charcoal.[113] The British party tried to push the boats off but all except three remained stuck. One boat with over a dozen wounded men initially escaped, but later grounded, was caught by mutineers and pushed back down the river towards the carnage at Cawnpore. Towards the end, rebel cavalry rode into the water to finish off any survivors.[113] After the firing ceased the survivors were rounded up and the men shot.[113] By the time the massacre was over, most of the male members of the party were dead while the surviving women and children were removed and held hostage to be later killed in the Bibighar massacre.[114] Only four men eventually escaped alive from Cawnpore on one of the boats: two private soldiers, a lieutenant, and Captain Mowbray Thomson, who wrote a first-hand account of his experiences entitled The Story of Cawnpore (London, 1859).[citation needed]
During his trial, Tatya Tope denied the existence of any such plan and described the incident in the following terms: the British had already boarded the boats and Tatya Tope raised his right hand to signal their departure. That very moment someone from the crowd blew a loud bugle, which created disorder and in the ongoing bewilderment, the boatmen jumped off the boats. The rebels started shooting indiscriminately. Nana Sahib, who was staying in Savada Kothi (Bungalow) nearby, was informed about what was happening and immediately came to stop it.[115] Some British histories allow that it might well have been the result of accident or error; someone accidentally or maliciously fired a shot, the panic-stricken British opened fire, and it became impossible to stop the massacre.[83]: 56
The surviving women and children were taken to Nana Sahib and then confined first to the Savada Kothi and then to the home of the local magistrate's clerk (the Bibighar)[116] where they were joined by refugees from Fatehgarh. Overall, five men and 206 women and children were confined in the Bibigarh for about two weeks. In one week 25 were brought out, dead from dysentery and cholera.[112] Meanwhile, a Company relief force that had advanced from Allahabad defeated the Indians and by 15 July it was clear that Nana Sahib would not be able to hold Cawnpore and a decision was made by Nana Sahib and other leading rebels that the hostages must be killed. After the sepoys refused to carry out this order, two Muslim butchers, two Hindu peasants and one of Nana's bodyguards went into the Bibigarh. Armed with knives and hatchets, they murdered the women and children.[117] After the massacre, the walls were covered in bloody handprints, and the floor littered with parts of human limbs.[118] The dead and the dying were thrown down a nearby well. When the 50-foot (15 m) deep well was filled with remains to within 6 feet (1.8 m) of the top,[119] the remainder were thrown into the Ganges.[120]
Historians have given many reasons for this act of cruelty. With Company forces approaching Cawnpore, some believed that they would not advance if there were no hostages to save. Or perhaps it was to ensure that no information was leaked after the fall of Cawnpore. Other historians have suggested that the killings were an attempt to undermine Nana Sahib's relationship with the British.[117] Perhaps it was due to fear, the fear of being recognised by some of the prisoners for having taken part in the earlier firings.[114]
-
Photograph entitled, "The Hospital in General Wheeler's entrenchment, Cawnpore". (1858) The hospital was the site of the first major loss of British lives in Cawnpore
-
1858 picture of Sati Chaura Ghat on the banks of the Ganges River, where on 27 June 1857 many British men lost their lives and the surviving women and children were taken prisoner by the rebels.
-
Bibigarh house where British women and children were killed and the well where their bodies were found, 1858.
-
The Bibighar Well site where a memorial had been built. Samuel Bourne, 1860.

The killing of the women and children hardened British attitudes against the sepoys. The British public was aghast, and the anti-Imperial and pro-Indian proponents lost all of their support. Cawnpore became a war cry for the British and their allies for the rest of the conflict. Nana Sahib disappeared near the end of the rebellion, and it is not known what happened to him.[citation needed]
Other British accounts[121][122][123] state that indiscriminate punitive measures were taken in early June, two weeks before the murders at the Bibighar (but after those at both Meerut and Delhi), specifically by Lieutenant Colonel James George Smith Neill of the Madras Fusiliers, commanding at Allahabad, while moving towards Cawnpore. At the nearby town of Fatehpur, a mob had attacked and murdered the local British population. On this pretext, Neill ordered all villages beside the Grand Trunk Road to be burned and their inhabitants to be hanged. Neill's methods were "ruthless and horrible",[83]: 53 and far from intimidating the population, may well have induced previously undecided sepoys and communities to revolt.[citation needed]
Neill was killed in action at Lucknow on 26 September and was never called to account for his punitive measures, though contemporary British sources lionised him and his "gallant blue caps".[s] When the British retook Cawnpore, the soldiers took their sepoy prisoners to the Bibighar and forced them to lick the bloodstains from the walls and floor.[124] They then hanged or "blew from the cannon", the traditional Mughal punishment for mutiny, the majority of the sepoy prisoners. Although some claimed the sepoys took no actual part in the killings themselves, they did not act to stop it and this was acknowledged by Captain Thompson after the British departed Cawnpore for a second time.[citation needed]
Lucknow
[edit]
Very soon after the events at Meerut, rebellion erupted in the state of Awadh (also known as Oudh, in modern-day Uttar Pradesh), which had been annexed barely a year before. The British Commissioner resident at Lucknow, Sir Henry Lawrence, had enough time to fortify his position inside the Residency compound. The defenders, including loyal sepoys, numbered some 1700 men. The rebels' assaults were unsuccessful, so they began a barrage of artillery and musket fire into the compound. Lawrence was one of the first casualties. He was succeeded by John Eardley Inglis. The rebels tried to breach the walls with explosives and bypass them via tunnels that led to underground close combat.[107]: 486 After 90 days of siege, the defenders were reduced to 300 loyal sepoys, 350 British soldiers and 550 non-combatants.[citation needed]
On 25 September, a relief column under the command of Sir Henry Havelock and accompanied by Sir James Outram (who in theory was his superior) fought its way from Cawnpore to Lucknow in a brief campaign, in which the numerically small column defeated rebel forces in a series of increasingly large battles. This became known as 'The First Relief of Lucknow', as this force was not strong enough to break the siege or extricate themselves, and so was forced to join the garrison. In October, another larger army under the new Commander-in-Chief, Sir Colin Campbell, was finally able to relieve the garrison and on 18 November, they evacuated the defended enclave within the city, the women and children leaving first. They then conducted an orderly withdrawal, firstly to Alambagh 4 miles (6.4 km) north where a force of 4,000 were left to construct a fort, then to Cawnpore, where they defeated an attempt by Tantia Tope to recapture the city in the Second Battle of Cawnpore.[citation needed]

In March 1858, Campbell once again advanced on Lucknow with a large army, meeting up with the force at Alambagh, this time seeking to suppress the rebellion in Awadh. He was aided by a large Nepalese contingent advancing from the north under Jung Bahadur Kunwar Rana.[125] General Dhir Shamsher Kunwar Rana, the youngest brother of Jung Bahadur, also led the Nepalese forces in various parts of India including Lucknow, Benares and Patna.[1][126] Campbell's advance was slow and methodical, with a force under General Outram crossing the river on cask bridges on 4 March to enable them to fire artillery in flank. Campbell drove the large but disorganised rebel army from Lucknow with the final fighting taking place on 21 March.[107]: 491 There were few casualties to Campbell's own troops, but his cautious movements allowed large numbers of the rebels to disperse into Awadh. Campbell was forced to spend the summer and autumn dealing with scattered pockets of resistance while losing men to heat, disease and guerrilla actions.[citation needed]
Jhansi
[edit]
Jhansi State was a Maratha-ruled princely state in Bundelkhand. When the Raja of Jhansi died without a biological male heir in 1853, it was annexed to the British Raj by the Governor-General of India under the doctrine of lapse. His widow Rani Lakshmi Bai, the Rani of Jhansi, protested against the denial of rights of their adopted son. When war broke out, Jhansi quickly became a centre of the rebellion. A small group of Company officials and their families took refuge in Jhansi Fort, and the Rani negotiated their evacuation. However, when they left the fort they were massacred by the rebels over whom the Rani had no control; the British suspected the Rani of complicity, despite her repeated denials.[citation needed]
By the end of June 1857, the company had lost control of much of Bundelkhand and eastern Rajputana. The Bengal Army units in the area, having rebelled, marched to take part in the battles for Delhi and Cawnpore. The many princely states that made up this area began warring amongst themselves. In September and October 1857, the Rani led the successful defence of Jhansi against the invading armies of the neighbouring rajas of Datia and Orchha.[citation needed]
On 3 February, Sir Hugh Rose broke the 3-month siege of Saugor. Thousands of local villagers welcomed him as a liberator, freeing them from rebel occupation.[127]
In March 1858, the Central India Field Force, led by Sir Hugh Rose, advanced on and laid siege to Jhansi. The Company forces captured the city, but the Rani fled in disguise.[citation needed]
After being driven from Jhansi and Kalpi, on 1 June 1858 Rani Lakshmi Bai and a group of Maratha rebels captured the fortress city of Gwalior from the Scindia rulers, who were British allies. This might have reinvigorated the rebellion, but the Central India Field Force very quickly advanced against the city. The Rani died on 17 June, the second day of the Battle of Gwalior, probably killed by a carbine shot from the 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars according to the account of three independent Indian representatives. The Company forces recaptured Gwalior within the next three days. In descriptions of the scene of her last battle, she was compared to Joan of Arc by some commentators.[128]
Indore
[edit]Colonel Henry Marion Durand, the then-Company resident at Indore, had brushed away any possibility of uprising in Indore. However, on 1 July, sepoys in Holkar's army revolted and opened fire on the cavalry pickets of the Bhopal Contingent (a locally raised force with British officers). When Colonel Travers rode forward to charge, the Bhopal Cavalry refused to follow. The Bhopal Infantry also refused orders and instead levelled their guns at British sergeants and officers. Since all possibility of mounting an effective deterrent was lost, Durand decided to gather up all the British residents and escape, although 39 British residents of Indore were killed.[129]
Bihar
[edit]The rebellion in Bihar was mainly concentrated in the Western regions of the state; however, there were also some outbreaks of plundering and looting in Gaya district.[130] One of the central figures was Kunwar Singh, the 80-year-old Rajput Zamindar of Jagdishpur (Bhojpur district), whose estate was in the process of being sequestrated by the Revenue Board, instigated and assumed the leadership of revolt in Bihar.[131] His efforts were supported by his brother Babu Amar Singh and his commander-in-chief Hare Krishna Singh.[132]
On 25 July, mutiny erupted in the garrisons of Danapur. Mutinying sepoys from the 7th, 8th and 40th regiments of Bengal Native Infantry quickly moved towards the city of Arrah and were joined by Kunwar Singh and his men.[133] Mr. Boyle, a British railway engineer in Arrah, had already prepared an outbuilding on his property for defence against such attacks.[134] As the rebels approached Arrah, all British residents took refuge at Mr. Boyle's house.[135] A siege soon ensued – eighteen civilians and 50 loyal sepoys from the Bengal Military Police Battalion under the command of Herwald Wake, the local magistrate, defended the house against artillery and musketry fire from an estimated 2000 to 3000 mutineers and rebels.[136]
On 29 July 400 men were sent out from Danapur to relieve Arrah, but this force was ambushed by the rebels around a mile away from the siege house, severely defeated, and driven back. On 30 July, Major Vincent Eyre, who was going up the river with his troops and guns, reached Buxar and heard about the siege. He immediately disembarked his guns and troops (the 5th Fusiliers) and started marching towards Arrah, disregarding direct orders not to do so.[137] On 2 August, some 6 miles (9.7 km) short of Arrah, the Major was ambushed by the mutineers and rebels. After an intense fight, the 5th Fusiliers charged and stormed the rebel positions successfully.[136] On 3 August, Major Eyre and his men reached the siege house and successfully ended the siege.[138][139]
After receiving reinforcements, Major Eyre pursued Kunwar Singh to his palace in Jagdispur; however, Singh had left by the time Eyre's forces arrived. Eyre then proceeded to destroy the palace and the homes of Singh's brothers.[136]
In addition to Kunwar Singh's efforts, there were also rebellions carried out by Hussain Baksh Khan, Ghulam Ali Khan and Fateh Singh among others in Gaya, Nawada and Jehanabad districts.[140]
In Barkagarh Estate of South Bihar (now in Jharkhand), a major rebellion was led by Thakur Vishwanath Shahdeo who was part of the Nagavanshi dynasty.[141] He was motivated by disputes he had with the Christian Kol tribals who had been grabbing his land and were implicitly supported by the British authorities. The rebels in South Bihar asked him to lead them and he readily accepted this offer. He organised a Mukti Vahini (Liberation Regiment) with the assistance of nearby zamindars including Pandey Ganpat Rai and Nadir Ali Khan.[141]
Other regions
[edit]Punjab and Afghan Frontier
[edit]
What was then referred to by the British as the Punjab was a very large administrative division, centred on Lahore. It included not only the present-day Indian and Pakistani Punjabi regions but also the North West Frontier districts bordering Afghanistan.[citation needed]
Much of the region had been the Sikh Empire, ruled by Ranjit Singh until his death in 1839. The empire had then fallen into disorder, with court factions and the Khalsa (Orthodox Sikhs) contending for power at the Lahore Durbar (court). After two Anglo-Sikh Wars, the entire region was annexed by the East India Company in 1849. In 1857, the region still contained the highest numbers of both British and Indian troops.[citation needed]
The inhabitants of the Punjab were not as sympathetic to the sepoys as they were elsewhere in India, which limited many of the outbreaks in the Punjab to disjointed uprisings by regiments of sepoys isolated from each other. In some garrisons, notably Ferozepore, indecision on the part of the senior British officers allowed the sepoys to rebel, but the sepoys then left the area, mostly heading for Delhi.[citation needed] At the most important garrison, that of Peshawar close to the Afghan frontier, many comparatively junior officers ignored their nominal commander, General Reed, and took decisive action. They intercepted the sepoys' mail, thus preventing their coordinating an uprising, and formed a force known as the "Punjab Movable Column" to move rapidly to suppress any revolts as they occurred. When it became clear from the intercepted correspondence that some of the sepoys at Peshawar were on the point of open revolt, the four most disaffected Bengal Native regiments were disarmed by the two British infantry regiments in the cantonment, backed by artillery, on 22 May. This decisive act induced many local chieftains to side with the British.[142]: 276

Jhelum in Punjab saw a mutiny of native troops against the British. Here 35 British soldiers of Her Majesty's 24th Regiment of Foot (South Wales Borderers) were killed by mutineers on 7 July 1857. Among the dead was Captain Francis Spring, the eldest son of Colonel William Spring. To commemorate this event St. John's Church Jhelum was built and the names of those 35 British soldiers are carved on a marble lectern present in that church.[citation needed]
The final large-scale military uprising in the Punjab took place on 9 July, when most of a brigade of sepoys at Sialkot rebelled and began to move to Delhi.[143] They were intercepted by John Nicholson with an equal British force as they tried to cross the Ravi River. After fighting steadily but unsuccessfully for several hours, the sepoys tried to fall back across the river but became trapped on an island. Three days later, Nicholson annihilated the 1,100 trapped sepoys in the Battle of Trimmu Ghat.[142]: 290–293
The British had been recruiting irregular units from Sikh and Pashtun communities even before the first unrest among the Bengal units, and the numbers of these were greatly increased during the rebellion, 34,000 fresh levies eventually being pressed into service.[144]

At one stage, faced with the need to send troops to reinforce the besiegers of Delhi, the Commissioner of the Punjab (Sir John Lawrence) suggested handing the coveted prize of Peshawar to Dost Mohammad Khan of Afghanistan in return for a pledge of friendship. The British agents in Peshawar and the adjacent districts were horrified. Referring to the massacre of a retreating British Army in 1842, Herbert Edwardes wrote, "Dost Mahomed would not be a mortal Afghan ... if he did not assume our day to be gone in India and follow after us as an enemy. British cannot retreat – Kabul would come again."[142]: 283 In the event Lord Canning insisted on Peshawar being held, and Dost Mohammad, whose relations with Britain had been equivocal for over 20 years, remained neutral.[citation needed]
In September 1858 Rai Ahmad Khan Kharal, head of the Kharal tribe, led an insurrection in the Neeli Bar district, between the Sutlej, Ravi and Chenab rivers. The rebels held the forests of Gogaira and had some initial successes against the British forces in the area, besieging Major Crawford Chamberlain at Chichawatni. A squadron of Punjabi cavalry sent by Sir John Lawrence raised the siege. Ahmed Khan was killed but the insurgents found a new leader in Mahr Bahawal Fatyana, who maintained the uprising for three months until Government forces penetrated the jungle and scattered the rebel tribesmen.[78]: 343–344
Bengal and Tripura
[edit]In September 1857, sepoys took control of the treasury in Chittagong.[145] The treasury remained under rebel control for several days. Further mutinies on 18 November saw the 2nd, 3rd and 4th companies of the 34th Bengal Infantry Regiment storming the Chittagong Jail and releasing all prisoners. The mutineers were eventually suppressed by the Gurkha regiments.[146] The mutiny also spread to Kolkata and later Dhaka, the former Mughal capital of Bengal. Residents in the city's Lalbagh area were kept awake at night by the rebellion.[147] Sepoys joined hands with the common populace in Jalpaiguri to take control of the city's cantonment.[145] In January 1858, many sepoys received shelter from the royal family of the princely state of Hill Tippera.[145]
The interior areas of Bengal proper were already experiencing growing resistance to Company rule due to the Muslim Faraizi movement.[145]
Gujarat
[edit]In central and north Gujarat, the rebellion was sustained by landowner jagirdars, taluqdar and thakurs with the support of armed communities of Bhil, Koli, Pathans and Arabs, unlike the mutiny by sepoys in north India. Their main opposition of British was due to Inam commission. The Bet Dwarka island, along with Okhamandal region of Kathiawar peninsula which was under the Gaekwad of Baroda State, saw a revolt by the Waghers in January 1858 who, by July 1859, controlled that region. In October 1859, a joint offensive by British, Gaekwad and other princely states troops ousted the rebels and recaptured the region.[148][149][150]
Orissa
[edit]During the rebellion, Surendra Sai was one of the many people broken out of Hazaribagh jail by mutineers.[151] In the middle of September Surendra established himself in Sambalpur's old fort. He quickly organised a meeting with the Assistant Commissioner (Captain Leigh), and Leigh agreed to ask the government to cancel his and his brother's imprisonment while Surendra dispersed his followers. This agreement was soon broken, however, when on 31 September escaped the town and make for Khinda, where his brother was located with a 1,400-man force.[151] The British quickly moved to send two companies from the 40th Madras Native Infantry from Cuttack on 10 October, and after a forced march reached Khinda on 5 November, only to find the place abandoned as the rebels retreated to the jungle. Much of the country of Sambalpur was under the rebels' control, and they maintained a hit and run guerrilla war for quite some time. In December the British made further preparations to crush the uprising in Sambalpur, and it was temporarily transferred from the Chota Nagpur Division into the Orissa Division of the Bengal Presidency. On the 30th a major battle was fought in which Surendra's brother was killed and the mutineers were routed. In January the British achieved minor successes, capturing a few major villages like Kolabira, and in February calm began to be restored. However, Surendra still held out, and the jungle hampered British parties from capturing him. Additionally, any native daring to collaborate with the British were terrorized along with their family. After a new policy that promised amnesty for mutineers, Surendra surrendered in May 1862.[151]
Shamli
[edit]In September 1857, Shamli, then a tahsil of Muzaffarnagar district in the North-Western Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh), witnessed a local uprising during the Indian Rebellion of 1857. Chaudhary Mohar Singh, a Jat zamindar of Maulaheri, led villagers and allied groups in attacking the tahsil headquarters, setting fire to government offices and briefly seizing control of the town. The action disrupted British administration and supply routes in the region.[152][153]
British troops subsequently recaptured Shamli, and executed Mohar Singh. Contemporary colonial accounts describe his body being displayed publicly as a warning to others.[154][155]
British Empire
[edit]The authorities in British colonies with an Indian population, sepoy or civilian, took measures to secure themselves against copycat uprisings. In the Straits Settlements and Trinidad the annual Hosay processions were banned,[156] riots broke out in penal settlements in Burma and the Settlements, in Penang the loss of a musket provoked a near riot,[157] and security was boosted especially in locations with an Indian convict population.[158]
Consequences
[edit]Death toll and atrocities
[edit]
Both sides committed atrocities against civilians.[t][15]
In Oudh alone, some estimates put the toll at 150,000 Indians killed during the war, with 100,000 of them being civilians. The capture of Delhi, Allahabad, Kanpur and Lucknow by British forces were followed by general massacres.[159]
Another notable atrocity was carried out by General Neill who massacred thousands of Indian mutineers and Indian civilians suspected of supporting the rebellion.[160]
The rebels' murder of British women, children and wounded soldiers (including sepoys who sided with the British) at Cawnpore, and the subsequent printing of the events in the British papers, left many British soldiers outraged and seeking revenge. Aside from hanging mutineers, the British had some "blown from cannon", (an old Mughal punishment adopted many years before in India), in which sentenced rebels were tied over the mouths of cannons and blown to pieces when the cannons were fired.[161][162] A particular act of cruelty on behalf of the British troops at Cawnpore included forcing many Muslim or Hindu rebels to eat pork or beef, as well as licking buildings freshly stained with blood of the dead before subsequent public hangings.[162]
Practices of torture included "searing with hot irons...dipping in wells and rivers till the victim is half suffocated... squeezing the testicles...putting pepper and red chillies in the eyes or introducing them into the private parts of men and women...prevention of sleep...nipping the flesh with pinners...suspension from the branches of a tree...imprisonment in a room used for storing lime..."[163]
British soldiers also committed sexual violence against Indian women as a form of retaliation against the rebellion.[164][165] As towns and cities were captured from the sepoys, the British soldiers took their revenge on Indian civilians by committing atrocities and rapes against Indian women.[166][167][168][169][170]
Most of the British press, outraged by the stories of alleged rape committed by the rebels against British women, as well as the killings of British civilians and wounded British soldiers, did not advocate clemency of any kind towards the Indian population.[171] Governor General Canning ordered moderation in dealing with native sensibilities and earned the scornful sobriquet "Clemency Canning" from the press[172] and later parts of the British public.
In terms of sheer numbers, the casualties were much higher on the Indian side. A letter published after the fall of Delhi in the Bombay Telegraph and reproduced in the British press testified to the scale of the Indian casualties:
.... All the city's people found within the walls of the city of Delhi when our troops entered were bayoneted on the spot, and the number was considerable, as you may suppose, when I tell you that in some houses forty and fifty people were hiding. These were not mutineers but residents of the city, who trusted to our well-known mild rule for pardon. I am glad to say they were disappointed.[173]

From the end of 1857, the British had begun to gain ground again. Lucknow was retaken in March 1858. On 8 July 1858, a peace treaty was signed, and the rebellion ended. The last rebels were defeated in Gwalior on 20 June 1858. By 1859, rebel leaders Bakht Khan and Nana Sahib had either been slain or had fled.[citation needed]
Edward Vibart, a 19-year-old officer whose parents, younger brothers, and two of his sisters had died in the Cawnpore massacre,[174] recorded his experience:
The orders went out to shoot every soul.... It was literally murder... I have seen many bloody and awful sights lately but such a one as I witnessed yesterday I pray I never see again. The women were all spared but their screams on seeing their husbands and sons butchered, were most painful... Heaven knows I feel no pity, but when some old grey bearded man is brought and shot before your very eyes, hard must be that man's heart I think who can look on with indifference ...[175]

Some British troops adopted a policy of "no prisoners". One officer, Thomas Lowe, remembered how on one occasion his unit had taken 76 prisoners – they were just too tired to carry on killing and needed a rest, he recalled. Later, after a quick trial, the prisoners were lined up with a British soldier standing a couple of yards in front of them. On the order "fire", they were all simultaneously shot, "swept... from their earthly existence".[citation needed]
The aftermath of the rebellion has been the focus of new work using Indian sources and population studies. In The Last Mughal, historian William Dalrymple examines the effects on the Muslim population of Delhi after the city was retaken by the British and finds that intellectual and economic control of the city shifted from Muslim to Hindu hands because the British, at that time, saw an Islamic hand behind the mutiny.[176]
Approximately 6,000 of the 40,000 British living in India were killed.[2]
Reaction in Britain
[edit]
The scale of the punishments handed out by the British "Army of Retribution" was considered largely appropriate and justified in a Britain shocked by embellished reports of atrocities carried out against British troops and civilians by the rebels.[177] Accounts of the time frequently reach the "hyperbolic register", according to Christopher Herbert, especially in the often-repeated claim that the "Red Year" of 1857 marked "a terrible break" in British experience.[173] Such was the atmosphere – a national "mood of retribution and despair" that led to "almost universal approval" of the measures taken to pacify the revolt.[178]: 87
Incidents of rape allegedly committed by Indian rebels against British women and girls appalled the British public. These atrocities were often used to justify the British reaction to the rebellion. British newspapers printed various eyewitness accounts of the rape of English women and girls. One such account was published by The Times, regarding an incident where 48 English girls as young as 10 had been raped by Indian rebels in Delhi. Karl Marx criticized this story as false propaganda, and pointed out that the story was written by a clergyman in Bangalore, far from the events of the rebellion, with no evidence to support his allegation.[179] Individual incidents captured the public's interest and were heavily reported by the press. One such incident was that of General Wheeler's daughter Margaret being forced to live as her captor's concubine, though this was reported to the Victorian public as Margaret killing her rapist then herself.[180] Another version of the story suggested that Margaret had been killed after her abductor had argued with his wife over her.[181]
During the aftermath of the rebellion, a series of exhaustive investigations were carried out by British police and intelligence officials into reports that British women prisoners had been "dishonoured" at the Bibighar and elsewhere. One such detailed enquiry was at the direction of Lord Canning. The consensus was that there was no convincing evidence of such crimes having been committed, although numbers of British women and children had been killed outright.[182]
The term 'Sepoy' or 'Sepoyism' became a derogatory term for nationalists, especially in Ireland.[183]
Reorganisation
[edit]This section needs additional citations for verification. (May 2017) |

Bahadur Shah II was arrested at Humayun's Tomb and tried for treason by a military commission assembled at Delhi and exiled to Rangoon where he died in 1862, bringing the Mughal dynasty to an end. In 1877 Queen Victoria took the title of Empress of India on the advice of Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli.[184]
The rebellion saw the end of the East India Company's rule in India. In August, by the Government of India Act 1858, the company's ruling powers over India were transferred to the British Crown.[185] A new British government department, the India Office, was created to handle the governance of India, and its head, the Secretary of State for India, was entrusted with formulating Indian policy. The Governor-General of India gained a new title, Viceroy of India, and implemented the policies devised by the India Office. Some former East India Company territories, such as the Straits Settlements, became colonies in their own right. The British colonial administration embarked on a program of reform, trying to integrate Indian higher castes and rulers into the government and abolishing attempts at Westernization. The Viceroy stopped land grabs, decreed religious tolerance and admitted Indians into civil service, albeit mainly as subordinates.[citation needed]
Essentially the old East India Company bureaucracy remained, though there was a major shift in attitudes. In looking for the causes of the Rebellion the authorities alighted on two things: religion and the economy. On religion it was felt that there had been too much interference with indigenous traditions, both Hindu and Muslim. On the economy it was now believed that the previous attempts by the company to introduce free market competition had undermined traditional power structures and bonds of loyalty placing the peasantry at the mercy of merchants and moneylenders. In consequence the new British Raj was constructed in part around a conservative agenda, based on a preservation of tradition and hierarchy.[citation needed]
On a political level it was also felt that the previous lack of consultation between rulers and ruled had been another significant factor in contributing to the uprising. In consequence, Indians were drawn into government at a local level. Though this was on a limited scale a crucial precedent had been set, with the creation of a new 'white collar' Indian elite, further stimulated by the opening of universities at Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, a result of the Indian Universities Act. So, alongside the values of traditional and ancient India, a new professional middle class was starting to arise, in no way bound by the values of the past. Their ambition can only have been stimulated by Queen Victoria's Proclamation of November 1858, in which it is expressly stated, "We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to our other subjects...it is our further will that... our subjects of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability and integrity, duly to discharge."[citation needed]
Acting on these sentiments, Lord Ripon, viceroy from 1880 to 1885, extended the powers of local self-government and sought to remove racial practices in the law courts by the Ilbert Bill. But a policy at once liberal and progressive at one turn was reactionary and backward at the next, creating new elites and confirming old attitudes. The Ilbert Bill had the effect only of causing a white mutiny and the end of the prospect of perfect equality before the law. In 1886 measures were adopted to restrict Indian entry into the civil service.[citation needed]
Military Reorganisation
[edit]

The Bengal Army dominated the Presidency armies before 1857 and a direct result after the rebellion was the scaling back of the size of the Bengali contingent in the army.[186] The Brahmin presence in the Bengal Army was reduced because of their perceived primary role as mutineers. The British looked for increased recruitment in the Punjab for the Bengal army as a result of the apparent discontent that resulted in the Sepoy conflict.[187]
The rebellion transformed both the native and British armies of British India. Of the 74 regular Bengal Native Infantry regiments in existence at the beginning of 1857, only twelve escaped mutiny or disbandment.[188] All ten of the Bengal Light Cavalry regiments were lost. The old Bengal Army had accordingly almost completely vanished from the order of battle. These troops were replaced by new units recruited from castes hitherto under-utilised by the British and from the minority so-called "Martial Races", such as the Sikhs and the Gurkhas.[citation needed]
The inefficiencies of the old organisation, which had estranged sepoys from their British officers, were addressed, and the post-1857 units were mainly organised on the "irregular" system. From 1797 until the rebellion of 1857, each regular Bengal Native Infantry regiment had had 22 or 23 British officers,[37]: 238 who held every position of authority down to the second-in-command of each company. In irregular units there were fewer British officers, but they associated themselves far more closely with their soldiers, while more responsibility was given to the Indian officers.[citation needed]
The British increased the ratio of British to Indian soldiers within India. From 1861 Indian artillery was replaced by British units, except for a few mountain batteries.[37]: 319 The post-rebellion changes formed the basis of the military organisation of British India until the early 20th century.[citation needed]
Awards
[edit]
Victoria Cross- 182 Victoria Crosses were awarded to members of the British Armed Forces and the British Indian Army during the rebellion.
Indian Mutiny Medal- 290,000 Indian Mutiny Medals were awarded. Clasps were awarded for the Siege of Delhi and the Siege and relief of Lucknow.[189]
Indian Order of Merit- A military and civilian decoration of British India, the Indian Order of Merit was first introduced by the East India Company in 1837, and was taken over by the Crown in 1858, following the Indian Mutiny of 1857. The Indian Order of Merit was the only gallantry medal available to Native soldiers between 1837 and 1907.[190]
Nomenclature
[edit]There is no universally agreed name for the events of this period.
In India and Pakistan, it has been termed as the "War of Independence of 1857" or "First War of Indian Independence"[191] but it is not uncommon to use terms such as the "Revolt of 1857". The classification of the Rebellion being "First War of Independence" is not without its critics in India.[192][193][194][195] The use of the term "Indian Mutiny" is considered by some Indian politicians[196] as belittling the importance of what happened and therefore reflecting an imperialistic attitude. Others dispute this interpretation.[citation needed]
In the UK and parts of the Commonwealth it is commonly called the "Indian Mutiny", but terms such as "Great Indian Mutiny", the "Sepoy Mutiny", the "Sepoy Rebellion", the "Sepoy War", the "Great Mutiny", the "Rebellion of 1857", "the Uprising", the "Mahomedan Rebellion", and the "Revolt of 1857" have also been used.[197][198][199] "The Indian Insurrection" was a name used in the press of the UK and British colonies at the time.[200]
Historiography
[edit]
Michael Adas (1971) examines the historiography with emphasis on the four major approaches: the Indian nationalist view; the Marxist analysis; the view of the Rebellion as a traditionalist rebellion; and intensive studies of local uprisings.[201] Many of the key primary and secondary sources appear in Biswamoy Pati, ed. 1857 Rebellion.[202][203]

Thomas R. Metcalf has stressed the importance of the work by Cambridge professor Eric Stokes (1924–1981), especially Stokes' The Peasant and the Raj: Studies in Agrarian Society and Peasant Rebellion in Colonial India (1978). Metcalf says Stokes undermines the assumption that 1857 was a response to general causes emanating from entire classes of people. Instead, Stokes argues that 1) those Indians who suffered the greatest relative deprivation rebelled and that 2) the decisive factor in precipitating a revolt was the presence of prosperous magnates who supported British rule. Stokes also explores issues of economic development, the nature of privileged landholding, the role of moneylenders, the usefulness of classical rent theory, and, especially, the notion of the "rich peasant".[204]
To Kim A. Wagner, who has conducted the most recent survey of the literature, modern Indian historiography is yet to move beyond responding to the "prejudice" of colonial accounts. Wagner sees no reason why atrocities committed by Indians should be understated or inflated merely because these things "offend our post-colonial sensibilities".[205]
Wagner also stresses the importance of William Dalrymple's The Last Mughal: The Fall of a Dynasty, Delhi 1857. Dalrymple was assisted by Mahmood Farooqui, who translated key Urdu and Shikastah sources and published a selection in Besieged: Voices from Delhi 1857.[206] Dalrymple emphasized the role of religion and explored in detail the internal divisions and politico-religious discord amongst the rebels. He did not discover much in the way of proto-nationalism or any of the roots of modern India in the rebellion.[207][208] Sabbaq Ahmed has looked at the ways in which ideologies of royalism, militarism, and Jihad influenced the behaviour of contending Muslim factions.[209]
Almost from the moment the first sepoys mutinied in Meerut, the nature and the scope of the Indian Rebellion of 1857 has been contested and argued over. Speaking in the House of Commons in July 1857, Benjamin Disraeli labelled it a 'national revolt' while Lord Palmerston, the Prime Minister, tried to downplay the scope and the significance of the event as a 'mere military mutiny'.[210] Reflecting this debate, an early historian of the rebellion, Charles Ball, used the word mutiny in his title, but labelled it a "struggle for liberty and independence as a people" in the text.[211] Historians remain divided on whether the rebellion can properly be considered a war of Indian independence or not,[212] although it is popularly considered to be one in India. Arguments against include:
- A united India did not exist at that time in political, cultural, or ethnic terms;
- The rebellion was put down with the help of other Indian soldiers drawn from the Madras Army, the Bombay Army and the Sikh regiments; 80% of the East India Company forces were Indian;[213]
- Many of the local rulers fought amongst themselves rather than uniting against the British;
- Many rebel sepoy regiments disbanded and went home rather than fight;
- Not all of the rebels accepted the return of the Mughals;
- The King of Delhi had no real control over the mutineers;[214]
- The revolt was largely limited to north and central India. Whilst risings occurred elsewhere they had little impact because of their limited nature;
- A number of revolts occurred in areas not under British rule, and against native rulers, often as a result of local internal politics;
- "The revolt was fractured along religious, ethnic and regional lines.[215]

A second school of thought while acknowledging the validity of the above-mentioned arguments opines that this rebellion may indeed be called a war of India's independence. The reasons advanced are:
- Even though the rebellion had various causes, most of the rebel sepoys who were able to do so, made their way to Delhi to revive the old Mughal Empire that signified national unity for even the Hindus amongst them;
- There was a widespread popular revolt in many areas such as Oudh, Bundelkhand and Rohilkhand. The rebellion was therefore more than just a military rebellion, and it spanned more than one region;
- The sepoys did not seek to revive small kingdoms in their regions, instead they repeatedly proclaimed a "country-wide rule" of the Mughals and vowed to drive out the British from "India", as they knew it then. (The sepoys ignored local princes and proclaimed in cities they took over: Khalq Khuda Ki, Mulk Badshah Ka, Hukm Subahdar Sipahi Bahadur Ka – "the people belong to God, the country to the Emperor and authority to the Sepoy and Governor"). The objective of driving out "foreigners" from not only one's own area but from their conception of the entirety of "India", signifies a nationalist sentiment;
- The mutineers, although some were recruited from outside Oudh, displayed a common purpose.[216]
150th anniversary
[edit]
The Government of India celebrated the year 2007 as the 150th anniversary of "India's First War of Independence". Several books written by Indian authors were released in the anniversary year including Amresh Mishra's "War of Civilizations", a controversial history of the Rebellion of 1857, and "Recalcitrance" by Anurag Kumar, one of the few novels written in English by an Indian based on the events of 1857.[citation needed]
In 2007, a group of retired British soldiers and civilians, some of them descendants of British soldiers who died in the conflict, attempted to visit the site of the Siege of Lucknow. However, fears of violence by Indian demonstrators, supported by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, prevented the British visitors from visiting the site.[217] Despite the protests, Sir Mark Havelock was able to make his way past police to visit the grave of his ancestor, General Henry Havelock.[218]
In popular culture
[edit]Films
[edit]
- Light of India – A 1929 short American silent film directed by Elmer Clifton and filmed in Technicolor, depicts the rebellion.
- Bengal Brigade – A 1954 film: at the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny. A British officer, Captain Claybourne (Hudson), is cashiered from his regiment over a charge of disobeying orders, but finds that his duty to his men is far from over
- Maniram Dewan – A 1964 Assamese film by Sarbeswar Chakraborty, depicting the life and times of Maniram Dewan who led the revolt in Assam.[219]
- Shatranj Ke Khilari – A 1977 Indian film directed by Satyajit Ray, chronicling the events just before the onset of the Revolt of 1857. The focus is on the British annexation of Oudh, and the detachment of the nobility from the political sphere in 19th-century India.
- Junoon (1978 film) – Directed by Shyam Benegal, it is a critically acclaimed film about the love affair between a Pathan feudal chief and a British girl sheltered by his family during the revolt.
- Mangal Pandey: The Rising (2005) – Ketan Mehta's Hindi film chronicles the life of Mangal Pandey.
- The Charge of the Light Brigade (1936) features a sequence inspired by the massacre at Cawnpore.
- The Last Cartridge, an Incident of the Sepoy Rebellion in India (1908) – A fictionalized account of a British fort besieged during the Rebellion.
- Victoria & Abdul (2017) – Queen Victoria embarrasses herself by recounting to the court the one-sided account of the Indian Mutiny that Abdul had told her, Victoria's faith and trust in him are shaken and she decides he must go home. But soon after, she changes her mind and asks him to stay.[220]
- Manikarnika: The Queen of Jhansi, a 2019 Hindi film chronicles the life of Rani Lakshmi Bai.
Theatre
[edit]- 1857: Ek Safarnama – A play by Javed Siddiqui, set during the Rebellion of 1857 and staged at Purana Qila, Delhi.[221]
Literature
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- Malcolm X's autobiography The Autobiography of Malcolm X details his first encounters with atrocities in the non-British world and his reaction to the rebellion and massacres in 1857.
- John Masters's novel Nightrunners of Bengal, first published by Michael Joseph in 1951 and dedicated to the Sepoy of India, is a fictionalised account of the Rebellion as seen through the eyes of a British Captain in the Bengal Native Infantry who was based in Bhowani, itself a fictionalised version of the town of Jhansi. Captain Savage and his turbulent relationship with the Rani of Kishanpur form an analogous interrelationship of the Indian people and the British and sepoy regiments at that time.
- J. G. Farrell's 1973 novel The Siege of Krishnapur details the siege of the fictional Indian town of Krishnapur during the Rebellion.
- George MacDonald Fraser's 1975 novel Flashman in the Great Game deals with the events leading up to and during the Rebellion.
- Two of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes stories, The Sign of the Four and "The Adventure of the Crooked Man", feature events that took place during the Rebellion.
- Michael Crichton's 1975 novel The Great Train Robbery mentions the Rebellion and briefly details the events of the Siege of Cawnpore, as the Rebellion was happening in tandem with the trial of Edward Pierce.[222]
- The majority of M. M. Kaye's novel Shadow of the Moon is set between 1856 and 1858, and the Rebellion is shown to greatly affect the lives of the main characters, who were inhabitants of the Residency at Lunjore (a fictional town in north India). The early chapters of her novel The Far Pavilions take place during the Rebellion, which leads to the protagonist, a child of British ancestry, being raised as a Hindu.
- Indian writer Ruskin Bond's fictional novella A Flight of Pigeons is set around the Indian Rebellion of 1857. It is from this story that the film Junoon was later adapted in 1978 by Shyam Benegal.
- The 1880 novel The Steam House by Jules Verne takes place in the aftermath of the Indian Rebellion of 1857.
- Flora Annie Steel's novel On the Face of the Waters (1896) describes incidents of the Mutiny.
- The plot of H. Beam Piper's science fiction novel Uller Uprising is based on the events of the Indian Rebellion of 1857.
- Rujub, the juggler and In Times of Peril: A tale of India by G.A. Henty are each based on the Indian Rebellion of 1857[citation needed]
- Vinayak Damodar Savarkar's book The Indian War of Independence (1909) describes incidents of the Mutiny.
Folk music
[edit]- Various folk songs in Assam, called Maniram Dewanor Geet were composed in the memory of Maniram Dewan, highlighting his role in the tea industry and the rebellion.[223]
See also
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ "It has been roughly estimated that 6,000 of the approximately 40,000 Europeans then in India were killed."[2] White or British were labelled European in the 19th-century Censuses of India.[3]
- ^ "The 1857 rebellion was by and large confined to northern Indian Gangetic Plain and central India."[7]
- ^ "The revolt was confined to the northern Gangetic plain and central India."[8]
- ^ Although the majority of the violence occurred in the northern Indian Gangetic plain and central India, recent scholarship has suggested that the rebellion also reached parts of the east and north."[9]
- ^ "What distinguished the events of 1857 was their scale and the fact that for a short time they posed a military threat to British dominance in the Ganges Plain."[10]
- ^ "The events of 1857–58 in India (are) known variously as a mutiny, a revolt, a rebellion and the first war of independence (the debates over which only confirm just how contested imperial history can become) ... "[12]
- ^ "Indian soldiers and the rural population over a large part of northern India showed their mistrust of their rulers and their alienation from them. ... For all their talk of improvement, the new rulers were as yet able to offer very little in the way of positive inducements for Indians to acquiesce in the rule."[15]
- ^ "Many Indians took up arms against the British, if for very diverse reasons. On the other hand, a very large number actually fought for the British, while the majority remained apparently acquiescent. Explanations have therefore to concentrate on the motives of those who actually rebelled."[15]
- ^ The cost of the rebellion in terms of human suffering was immense. Two great cities, Delhi and Lucknow, were devastated by fighting and by the plundering of the victorious British. Where the countryside resisted, as in parts of Awadh, villages were burnt. Mutineers and their supporters were often killed out of hand. British civilians, including women and children, were murdered as well as the British officers of the sepoy regiments."[15]
- ^ "The south, Bengal, and the Punjab remained unscathed, ..."[8]
- ^ "... it was the support from the Sikhs, carefully cultivated by the British since the end of the Anglo-Sikh wars, and the disinclination of the Bengali intelligentsia to throw in their lot with what they considered a backward Zamindar revolt, that proved decisive in the course of the struggle.[8]
- ^ "(they) generated no coherent ideology or programme on which to build a new order."[18]
- ^ "The events of 1857–58 in India, ... marked a major watershed not only in the history of British India but also of British imperialism as a whole."[12]
- ^ "Queen Victoria's Proclamation of 1858 laid the foundation for Indian secularism and established the semi-legal framework that would govern the politics of religion in colonial India for the next century. ... It promised civil equality for Indians regardless of their religious affiliation, and state non-interference in Indians' religious affairs. Although the Proclamation lacked the legal authority of a constitution, generations of Indians cited the Queen's proclamation in order to claim, and to defend, their right to religious freedom."[21]
- ^ The proclamation to the "Princes, Chiefs, and People of India", issued by Queen Victoria on 1 November 1858. "We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligation of duty which bind us to all our other subjects." [p. 2]
- ^ "When the governance of India was transferred from the East India Company to the Crown in 1858, she (Queen Victoria) and Prince Albert intervened in an unprecedented fashion to turn the proclamation of the transfer of power into a document of tolerance and clemency. ... They ... insisted on the clause that stated that the people of India would enjoy the same protection as all subjects of Britain. Over time, this royal intervention led to the Proclamation of 1858 becoming known in the Indian subcontinent as 'the Magna Carta of Indian liberties', a phrase which Indian nationalists such as Gandhi later took up as they sought to test equality under imperial law"[22]
- ^ "In purely legal terms, (the proclamation) kept faith with the principles of liberal imperialism and appeared to hold out the promise that British rule would benefit Indians and Britons alike. But as is too often the case with noble statements of faith, reality fell far short of theory, and the failure on the part of the British to live up to the wording of the proclamation would later be used by Indian nationalists as proof of the hollowness of imperial principles."[23]
- ^ "Ignoring ...the conciliatory proclamation of Queen Victoria in 1858, Britishers in India saw little reason to grant Indians a greater control over their own affairs. Under these circumstances, it was not long before the seed-idea of nationalism implanted by their reading of Western books began to take root in the minds of intelligent and energetic Indians."[24]
- ^ Units of the Army of the Madras Presidency wore blue rather than black shakoes or forage caps
- ^ The cost of the rebellion in terms of human suffering was immense. Two great cities, Delhi and Lucknow, were devastated by fighting and by the plundering of the victorious British. Where the countryside resisted, as in parts of Awadh, villages were burnt. Mutineers and their supporters were often killed out of hand. British civilians, including women and children, were murdered as well as the British officers of the sepoy regiments."[15]
Citations
[edit]- ^ a b Tyagi, Sushila (1974). Indo-Nepalese Relations: (1858–1914). India: Concept Publishing Company. Archived from the original on 19 September 2023. Retrieved 15 September 2020.
- ^ a b c d Peers 2013, p. 64.
- ^ Buettner, Elizabeth (2000), "Problematic spaces, problematic races: defining 'Europeans' in late colonial India", Women's History Review, 9 (2): 277–298, 278, doi:10.1080/09612020000200242, ISSN 0961-2025, S2CID 145297044,
Colonial-era sources most commonly referred to individuals whom scholars today often describe as 'white' or 'British' as 'European' or 'English'.
- ^ Dash, Mike (24 May 2012). "Pass it on: The Secret that Preceded the Indian Rebellion of 1857". Smithsonian. Archived from the original on 24 September 2015. Retrieved 30 July 2015.
- ^ Marshall 2007, p. 197
- ^ David 2003, p. 9
- ^ a b Bose & Jalal 2004, pp. 72–73
- ^ a b c d e f Marriott, John (2013), The other empire: Metropolis, India and progress in the colonial imagination, Manchester University Press, p. 195, ISBN 978-1-84779-061-3
- ^ a b Bender, Jill C. (2016), The 1857 Indian Uprising and the British Empire, Cambridge University Press, p. 3, ISBN 978-1-316-48345-9
- ^ a b Bayly 1987, p. 170
- ^ a b c d e Bandyopadhyay 2004, pp. 169–172, Brown 1994, pp. 85–87, and Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, pp. 100–106
- ^ a b c d Peers, Douglas M. (2006), "Britain and Empire", in Williams, Chris (ed.), A Companion to 19th-Century Britain, John Wiley & Sons, p. 63, ISBN 978-1-4051-5679-0
- ^ Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, pp. 100–103.
- ^ Brown 1994, pp. 85–86.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Marshall, P. J. (2001), "1783–1870: An expanding empire", in P. J. Marshall (ed.), The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire, Cambridge University Press, p. 50, ISBN 978-0-521-00254-7
- ^ a b Spear 1990, pp. 147–148
- ^ Bandyopadhyay 2004, p. 177, Bayly 2000, p. 357
- ^ a b Brown 1994, p. 94
- ^ Bandyopadhyay 2004, p. 179
- ^ Bayly 1987, pp. 194–197
- ^ a b Adcock, C.S. (2013), The Limits of Tolerance: Indian Secularism and the Politics of Religious Freedom, Oxford University Press, pp. 23–25, ISBN 978-0-19-999543-1
- ^ a b Taylor, Miles (2016), "The British royal family and the colonial empire from the Georgians to Prince George", in Aldrish, Robert; McCreery, Cindy (eds.), Crowns and Colonies: European Monarchies and Overseas Empires, Manchester University Press, pp. 38–39, ISBN 978-1-5261-0088-7, archived from the original on 19 September 2023, retrieved 30 March 2017
- ^ Peers 2013, p. 76.
- ^ a b Embree, Ainslie Thomas; Hay, Stephen N.; Bary, William Theodore De (1988), "Nationalism Takes Root: The Moderates", Sources of Indian Tradition: Modern India and Pakistan, Columbia University Press, p. 85, ISBN 978-0-231-06414-9, archived from the original on 19 September 2023, retrieved 19 September 2023
- ^ "Internet History Sourcebooks Project". Sourcebooks.fordham.edu. Archived from the original on 18 August 2014. Retrieved 6 February 2022.
- ^ Keay, John (1994). The Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company. Scribner. ISBN 978-0-02-561169-6.
- ^ Markovitz, Claude. A History of Modern India, 1480–1950. Anthem Press. p. 271.
- ^ "When the Vellore sepoys rebelled". The Hindu. 6 August 2006. Archived from the original on 15 August 2016. Retrieved 23 August 2016.
- ^ Ludden 2002, p. 133
- ^ a b Kim A Wagner (2018). The Skull of Alum Bheg: The Life and Death of a Rebel of 1857. Oxford University Press. p. 18. ISBN 978-0-19-087023-2. Archived from the original on 19 September 2023. Retrieved 17 November 2021.
- ^ Mazumder, Rajit K. (2003), The Indian Army and the Making of the Punjab, Delhi: Permanent Black, pp. 7–8, ISBN 978-81-7824-059-6
- ^ Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, p. 61
- ^ Eric Stokes (February 1973). "The first century of British colonial rule in India: social revolution or social stagnation?". Past & Present (58). Oxford University Press: 136–160. doi:10.1093/past/58.1.136. JSTOR 650259.
- ^ a b Brown 1994, p. 88
- ^ Metcalf 1964, p. 48
- ^ Bandyopadhyay 2004, p. 171, Bose & Jalal 2004, pp. 70–72
- ^ a b c d e f Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour – an Account of the Indian Army, its Officers and Men, ISBN 0-333-41837-9
- ^ Essential histories, The Indian Rebellion 1857–1858, Gregory Fremont-Barnes, Osprey 2007, p. 25.
- ^ From Sepoy to Subedar – Being the Life and Adventures of Subedar Sita Ram, a Native Officer of the Bengal Army, edited by James Lunt, ISBN 0-333-45672-6, p. 172.
- ^ Hyam, Ronald (2002). Britain's Imperial Century, 1815–1914 (3rd ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. p. 135. ISBN 9780333945696.
{{cite book}}: Check|isbn=value: checksum (help) - ^ Headrick, Daniel R. (1981). The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century. Oxford University Press. p. 88. ISBN 978-0195028318.
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Nor did most Muslims share the rebels' hatred of the British, even as they deplored the more egregious excesses of colonial rule.
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During the 1857 uprising, the ulema could not agree whether to declare a jihad.
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Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi (1833–1879), the great Deobandi scholar, fought against the British...Along with Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1828–1905), he took up arms when he was presented with clear evidence of English injustice.
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Many Muslims, including Sunni and Shia ulema, collaborated with the British.
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Several of Nanautawi's fellow seminarians in Deoband and divines of the Ahl-i-Hadith reputed for their adherence to Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi rejected the jihad.
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Maulana Sayyid Nazir Husain Dehalvi was the most influential of the Ahl-Hadith ulema in Delhi at the time of the revolt. The rebels coerced him into issuing a fatwa declaring a jihad...he ruled out armed jihad in India, on the grounds that the relationship with the British government was a contract that Muslims could not legally break unless their religious rights were infringed.
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- ^ In the light of the available evidence, we are forced to the conclusion that the uprising of 1857 was not the result of careful planning, nor were there any master-minds behind it. As I read about the events of 1857, I am forced to the conclusion that the Indian national character had sunk very low. The leaders of the revolt could never agree. They were mutually jealous and continually intrigued against one another. ... In fact these personal jealousies and intrigues were largely responsible for the Indian defeat.Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Surendranath Sen: Eighteen Fifty-seven (Appx. X & Appx. XV).
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- ^ It includes essays by historians Eric Stokes, Christopher Bayly, Rudrangshu Mukherjee, Tapti Roy, Rajat K. Ray and others. Biswamoy Pati (2010), The 1857 Rebellion, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-806913-3
- ^ For the latest research see Crispin Bates, ed., Mutiny at the Margins: New Perspectives on the Indian Uprising of 1857: Volume I: Anticipations and Experiences in the Locality (2013).
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Modern Indian historiography on 1857 still seems, at least in part, to be responding to the prejudice of colonial accounts ... I see no reason to downplay, or to exaggerate, the atrocities carried out by Indians simply because such events seem to offend our post-colonial sensibilities.
- ^ M. Farooqui, trans (2010) Besieged: voices from Delhi 1857 Penguin Books.
- ^ Wagner, Kim A. (2011). "The Marginal Mutiny: The New Historiography of the Indian Uprising of 1857". History Compass. 9 (10): 760–766 [760]. doi:10.1111/j.1478-0542.2011.00799.x.
- ^ See also Kim A. Wagner (2010), The Great Fear Of 1857: Rumours, Conspiracies and the Making of the Indian Uprising, Peter Lang, p. 26, ISBN 978-1-906165-27-7
- ^ Sabbaq Ahmed, "Ideology and Muslim militancy in India: Selected case studies of the 1857 Indian rebellion". (PhD Dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington (NZ), 2015). online Archived 3 October 2018 at the Wayback Machine
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- ^ The History of the Indian Mutiny: Giving a detailed account of the sepoy insurrection in India by Charles Ball, The London Printing and Publishing Company, London, 1860.
- ^ V.D. Savarkar argues that the rebellion was a war of Indian independence. The Indian War of Independence: 1857 (Bombay: 1947 [1909]). Most historians have seen his arguments as discredited, with one venturing so far as to say, 'It was neither first, nor national, nor a war of independence.' Eric Stokes has argued that the rebellion was actually a variety of movements, not one movement. The Peasant Armed (Oxford: 1980). See also S. B. Chaudhuri, Civil Rebellion in the Indian Mutinies 1857–1859 (Calcutta: 1957).
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- Metcalf, Barbara D.; Metcalf, Thomas R. (2006), A Concise History of Modern India (2nd ed.), Cambridge University Press, p. 337, ISBN 978-0-521-68225-1
- Metcalf, Thomas R. (1964), The Aftermath of Revolt: India, 1857–1870, Princeton University Press, LCCN 63-23412
- Nanda, Krishan (September 1965), "'1857 in India: Mutiny or War of Independence?' by Ainslie T. Embree", The Western Political Quarterly (Review), 18 (3): 700–701, JSTOR i218739
- Peers, Douglas M. (2013), India Under Colonial Rule: 1700–1885, Routledge, ISBN 978-1-317-88286-2
- Spear, Percival (1990) [First published 1965], A History of India, vol. 2, New Delhi and London: Penguin Books, ISBN 978-0-14-013836-8
Further reading
[edit]Text-books and academic monographs
[edit]- Alavi, Seema (1996), The Sepoys and the Company: Tradition and Transition 1770–1830, Oxford University Press, p. 340, ISBN 978-0-19-563484-6.
- Anderson, Clare (2007), Indian Uprising of 1857–8: Prisons, Prisoners and Rebellion, New York: Anthem Press, p. 217, ISBN 978-1-84331-249-9.
- Greenwood, Adrian (2015), Victoria's Scottish Lion: The Life of Colin Campbell, Lord Clyde, UK: History Press, p. 496, ISBN 978-0-7509-5685-7, archived from the original on 21 February 2016, retrieved 26 November 2015.
- Jain, Meenakshi (2010), Parallel Pathways: Essays On Hindu-Muslim Relations (1707–1857), Delhi: Konark, ISBN 978-8122007831.
- Keene, Henry George (1883), Fifty-Seven. Some account of the administration of Indian Districts during the revolt of the Bengal Army, London: W.H. Allen, p. 145.
- Kulke, Hermann; Rothermund, Dietmar (2004), A History of India (4th ed.), London: Routledge, xii, 448, ISBN 978-0-415-32920-0.
- Leasor, James (1956), The Red Fort, London: W. Lawrie, p. 377, ISBN 978-0-02-034200-7, archived from the original on 1 February 2020, retrieved 8 January 2012
{{citation}}: ISBN / Date incompatibility (help). - Majumdar, R.C.; Raychaudhuri, H.C.; Datta, Kalikinkar (1967), An Advanced History of India (3rd ed.), London: Macmillan, p. 1126.
- Markovits, Claude, ed. (2004), A History of Modern India 1480–1950, London: Anthem, p. 607, ISBN 978-1-84331-152-2.
- Metcalf, Thomas R. (1997), Ideologies of the Raj, Cambridge University Press, p. 256, ISBN 978-0-521-58937-6.
- Mukherjee, Rudrangshu (2002), Awadh in Revolt 1857–1858: A Study of Popular Resistance (2nd ed.), London: Anthem, ISBN 978-1-84331-075-4.
- Palmer, Julian A.B. (1966), The Mutiny Outbreak at Meerut in 1857, Cambridge University Press, p. 175, ISBN 978-0-521-05901-5.
- Ray, Rajat Kanta (2002), The Felt Community: Commonality and Mentality before the Emergence of Indian Nationalism, Oxford University Press, p. 596, ISBN 978-0-19-565863-7.
- Robb, Peter (2002), A History of India, Basingstoke: Palgrave, p. 344, ISBN 978-0-333-69129-8.
- Roy, Tapti (1994), The politics of a popular uprising: Bundelkhand 1857, Delhi: Oxford University Press, p. 291, ISBN 978-0-19-563612-3.
- Stanley, Peter (1998), White Mutiny: British Military Culture in India, 1825–1875, London: Hurst, p. 314, ISBN 978-1-85065-330-1.
- Stein, Burton (2001), A History of India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, p. 432, ISBN 978-0-19-565446-2.
- Stokes, Eric (1980), The Peasant and the Raj: Studies in Agrarian Society and Peasant Rebellion in Colonial India, Cambridge University Press, p. 316, ISBN 978-0-521-29770-7.
- Stokes, Eric; Bayly, C.A. (1986), The Peasant Armed: The Indian Revolt of 1857, Oxford: Clarendon, p. 280, ISBN 978-0-19-821570-7.
- Taylor, P.J.O. (1997), What really happened during the mutiny: a day-by-day account of the major events of 1857–1859 in India, Delhi: Oxford University Press, p. 323, ISBN 978-0-19-564182-0.
- Wolpert, Stanley (2004), A New History of India (7th ed.), Oxford University Press, p. 530, ISBN 978-0-19-516678-1.
Articles in journals and collections
[edit]- Alam Khan, Iqtidar (May–June 2013), "The Wahabis in the 1857 Revolt: A Brief Reappraisal of Their Role", Social Scientist, 41 (5/6): 15–23, JSTOR 23611115
- Alavi, Seema (February 1993), "The Company Army and Rural Society: The Invalid Thanah 1780–1830", Modern Asian Studies, 27 (1), Cambridge University Press: 147–178, doi:10.1017/S0026749X00016097, JSTOR 312880, S2CID 143566845
- Baker, David (1991), "Colonial Beginnings and the Indian Response: The Revolt of 1857–58 in Madhya Pradesh", Modern Asian Studies, 25 (3): 511–543, doi:10.1017/S0026749X00013913, JSTOR 312615, S2CID 146482671
- Blunt, Alison (July 2000), "Embodying war: British women and domestic defilement in the Indian "Mutiny", 1857–8", Journal of Historical Geography, 26 (3): 403–428, doi:10.1006/jhge.2000.0236
- Dutta, Sunasir; Rao, Hayagreeva (July 2015). "Infectious diseases, contamination rumours and ethnic violence: Regimental mutinies in the Bengal Native Army in 1857 India". Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 129: 36–47. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.10.004. S2CID 141583862.
- English, Barbara (February 1994), "The Kanpur Massacres in India in the Revolt of 1857", Past & Present (142), Oxford University Press: 169–178, doi:10.1093/past/142.1.169, JSTOR 651200
- Klein, Ira (July 2000), "Materialism, Mutiny and Modernization in British India", Modern Asian Studies, 34 (3), Cambridge University Press: 545–580, doi:10.1017/S0026749X00003656, JSTOR 313141, S2CID 143348610
- Lahiri, Nayanjot (June 2003), "Commemorating and Remembering 1857: The Revolt in Delhi and Its Afterlife", World Archaeology, 35 (1), Taylor & Francis: 35–60, doi:10.1080/0043824032000078072, JSTOR 3560211, S2CID 159530372
- Mukherjee, Rudrangshu (August 1990), "'Satan Let Loose upon Earth': The Kanpur Massacres in India in the Revolt of 1857", Past & Present (128), Oxford University Press: 92–116, doi:10.1093/past/128.1.92, JSTOR 651010
- Mukherjee, Rudrangshu (February 1994), "The Kanpur Massacres in India in the Revolt of 1857: Reply", Past & Present (1), Oxford University Press: 178–189, doi:10.1093/past/142.1.178, JSTOR 651201
- Rao, Parimala V. (3 March 2016). "Modern education and the revolt of 1857 in India". Paedagogica Historica. 52 (1–2): 25–42. doi:10.1080/00309230.2015.1133668. S2CID 146864929.
- Roy, Tapti (February 1993), "Visions of the Rebels: A Study of 1857 in Bundelkhand", Modern Asian Studies, 27 (1), Cambridge University Press: 205–228 (Special Issue: How Social, Political and Cultural Information Is Collected, Defined, Used and Analyzed), doi:10.1017/S0026749X00016115, JSTOR 312882, S2CID 144558490
- Singh, Hira. (2013) "Class, Caste, Colonial Rule, and Resistance: The Revolt of 1857 in India", in Marxism and Social Movements (Brill, 2013). 299–316.
- Stokes, Eric (December 1969), "Rural Revolt in the Great Rebellion of 1857 in India: A Study of the Saharanpur and Muzaffarnagar Districts", The Historical Journal, 12 (4), Cambridge University Press: 606–627, doi:10.1017/s0018246x00010554, JSTOR 2638016, S2CID 159820559
- Washbrook, D. A. (2001), "India, 1818–1860: The Two Faces of Colonialism", in Porter, Andrew (ed.), Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 395–421, ISBN 978-0-19-924678-6
{{citation}}: CS1 maint: publisher location (link)
Historiography and memory
[edit]- Bates, Crispin, ed. Mutiny at the Margins: New Perspectives on the Indian Uprising of 1857 (5 vol. Sage Publications India, 2013–14). online guide Archived 16 February 2016 at the Wayback Machine; With illustrations, maps, selected text and more.
- Chakravarty, Gautam. The Indian Mutiny and the British Imagination (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- Deshpande, Prachi. "The Making of an Indian Nationalist Archive: Lakshmibai, Jhansi, and 1857". journal of Asian studies 67#3 (2008): 855–879.
- Erll, Astrid (2006). "Re-writing as re-visioning: Modes of representing the 'Indian Mutiny' in British novels, 1857 to 2000" (PDF). European Journal of English Studies. 10 (2): 163–185. doi:10.1080/13825570600753485. S2CID 141659712.
- Frykenberg, Robert E. (2001), "India to 1858", in Winks, Robin (ed.), Oxford History of the British Empire: Historiography, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 194–213, ISBN 978-0-19-924680-9
{{citation}}: CS1 maint: publisher location (link) - Pati, Biswamoy (12–18 May 2007). "Historians and Historiography: Situating 1857". Economic and Political Weekly. 42 (19): 1686–1691. JSTOR 4419570.
- Perusek, Darshan (Spring 1992). "Subaltern Consciousness and the Historiography of the Indian Rebellion of 1857". Novel: A Forum on Fiction. 25 (3). Duke University Press: 286–301. doi:10.2307/1345889. JSTOR 1345889.
- Wagner, Kim A. (October 2011). "The Marginal Mutiny: The New Historiography of the Indian Uprising of 1857". History Compass. 9 (10): 760–766. doi:10.1111/j.1478-0542.2011.00799.x.
Other histories
[edit]- Mishra, Amaresh. 2007. War of Civilisations: The Long Revolution (India AD 1857, 2 Vols.), ISBN 978-81-291-1282-8
- Ward, Andrew. Our Bones Are Scattered. New York: Holt & Co., 1996.
First person accounts and classic histories
[edit]- Parag Tope, "Tatya Tope's Operation Red Lotus", Publisher: Rupa Publications India
- Barter, Captain Richard The Siege of Delhi. Mutiny memories of an old officer, London, The Folio Society, 1984.
- Campbell, Sir Colin. Narrative of the Indian Revolt. London: George Vickers, 1858.
- Collier, Richard. The Great Indian Mutiny. New York: Dutton, 1964.
- Forrest, George W. A History of the Indian Mutiny, William Blackwood and Sons, London, 1904. (4 vols)
- Fitchett, W. H., B.A., LL.D., A Tale of the Great Mutiny, Smith, Elder & Co., London, 1911.
- Hodson, William Stephen Raikes. 12 Years of a Soldier's Life In India. Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1860.
- Inglis, Julia Selina, Lady, 1833–1904, The Siege of Lucknow: a Diary, London: James R. Osgood, McIlvaine & Co., 1892. Online at A Celebration of Women Writers.
- Innes, Lt. General McLeod: The Sepoy Revolt, A.D. Innes & Co., London, 1897.
- Kaye, John William. A History of the Sepoy War In India (3 vols). London: W.H. Allen & Co., 1878.
- Kaye, Sir John & Malleson, G. B.: The Indian Mutiny of 1857, Rupa & Co., Delhi, (1st edition 1890) reprint 2005.
- Khan, Syed Ahmed (1859), Asbab-e Baghawat-e Hind, Translated as The Causes of the Indian Revolt, Allahabad, 1873
- Malleson, Colonel G. B. The Indian Mutiny of 1857. New York: Scribner & Sons, 1891.
- Marx, Karl & Freidrich Engels. The First Indian War of Independence 1857–1859. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959.
- Pandey, Sita Ram, From Sepoy to Subedar, Being the Life and Adventures of Subedar Sita Ram, a Native Officer of the Bengal Native Army, Written and Related by Himself, trans. Lt. Col. Norgate, (Lahore: Bengal Staff Corps, 1873), ed. James Lunt, (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1970).
- Raikes, Charles: Notes on the Revolt in the North-Western Provinces of India, Longman, London, 1858.
- Roberts, Field Marshal Lord, Forty-one Years in India, Richard Bentley, London, 1897
- Forty-one years in India at Project Gutenberg
- Russell, William Howard, My Diary in India in the years 1858–9, Routledge, London, 1860, (2 vols.)
- Thomson, Mowbray (Capt.), The Story of Cawnpore, Richard Bentley, London, 1859.
- Trevelyan, Sir George Otto, Cawnpore, Indus, Delhi, (first edition 1865), reprint 2002.
- Wilberforce, Reginald G, An Unrecorded Chapter of the Indian Mutiny, Being the Personal Reminiscences of Reginald G. Wilberforce, Late 52nd Infantry, Compiled from a Diary and Letters Written on the Spot London: John Murray 1884, facsimile reprint: Gurgaon: The Academic Press, 1976.
Tertiary sources
[edit]- "Indian Mutiny". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Online. Indian Mutiny | History, Causes, Effects, Summary, & Facts | Britannica. 23 March 1998.
External links
[edit]- Detailed Map: The revolt of 1857–1859, Historical Atlas of South Asia, Digital South Asia Library, hosted by the University of Chicago
- Development of Situation-January to July 1857 – Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin from Washington, DC defencejounal.com
- The Indian Mutiny BritishEmpire.co.uk
- Karl Marx, New York Tribune, 1853–1858, The Revolt in India marxists.org
Indian Rebellion of 1857
View on GrokipediaBackground and Context
East India Company's Expansion in India
The British East India Company, granted a royal charter on 31 December 1600 by Queen Elizabeth I, began as a joint-stock enterprise aimed at exploiting trade opportunities in spices, textiles, indigo, and saltpeter from the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia.[11] Initially confined to commercial activities, the Company established trading factories at Surat in 1612 and expanded coastal presence through Mughal imperial farmans permitting duty-free trade.[12] Its monopoly on English trade to the East, renewed periodically by Parliament, facilitated accumulation of capital but faced competition from Dutch and French rivals until the mid-18th century.[13] The Company's shift from trader to territorial sovereign accelerated during the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), as European conflicts spilled into India. The decisive Battle of Plassey on 23 June 1757, where Robert Clive's forces of approximately 3,000 defeated Nawab Siraj-ud-Daulah's 50,000-strong army through betrayal by Mir Jafar, installed a puppet nawab and granted the Company zamindari rights over 24 Parganas near Calcutta.[14] This victory was consolidated by the Battle of Buxar on 22 October 1764, leading to the 1765 Treaty of Allahabad, which conferred diwani (revenue collection) rights over Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa—territories yielding an annual revenue of about 2.6 million pounds sterling—while the Mughal emperor retained nominal sovereignty.[15] These gains transformed the Company into a de facto ruler, funding further military expeditions with Indian revenues rather than London dividends.[16] Subsequent decades saw systematic expansion through warfare and diplomacy. The Anglo-Mysore Wars (1767–1799) diminished Tipu Sultan's kingdom, with the 1799 siege of Seringapatam annexing half of Mysore's territory after his death.[17] The three Anglo-Maratha Wars (1775–1818) fragmented the Maratha Confederacy, culminating in the 1818 Treaty of Gwalior that subordinated remaining principalities. Governor-General Richard Wellesley's subsidiary alliance policy, initiated in 1798, required Indian rulers to disband native armies, host British troops, and pay subsidies, effectively converting allies like Hyderabad and Awadh into protected states under Company oversight.[13] By the 1830s, direct or indirect control extended over much of the Deccan and Gangetic plain. Lord Dalhousie's tenure as Governor-General from 1848 to 1856 epitomized aggressive annexationism via the Doctrine of Lapse, which denied recognition of adopted heirs in princely states lacking natural male successors, invoking paramountcy to eschew lapsed territories.[18] This policy seized Satara (1848), Sambalpur (1849), Bhagat (1850), Udaipur (1852), Jhansi (1853), and Nagpur (1854), incorporating over 100,000 square miles and millions of subjects. Awadh was annexed in 1856 on charges of misadministration, displacing its king despite treaty obligations.[19] Combined with victories in the Anglo-Sikh Wars (1845–1849), which annexed Punjab, these measures expanded Company domains to encompass roughly two-thirds of the subcontinent by 1857, ruling approximately 180 million people through a bureaucracy and an army of over 230,000, predominantly Indian sepoys.[20] This unchecked growth, prioritizing revenue maximization over local legitimacy, sowed seeds of resentment among displaced elites and disrupted traditional successions.[21]Socio-Political Landscape Pre-1857
By the early 19th century, following the death of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707, the Indian subcontinent exhibited significant political fragmentation, with the Mughal Empire reduced to a nominal entity centered in Delhi while regional powers such as the Marathas, Sikhs, Nizams of Hyderabad, and Nawabs of Bengal and Awadh asserted autonomy through constant warfare and shifting alliances.[22] This era of decentralized authority, marked by frequent conflicts among over 500 princely states and kingdoms, created a landscape vulnerable to external intervention, as local rulers prioritized survival over unified resistance.[23] The British East India Company capitalized on this disunity, transitioning from a trading entity to a territorial sovereign through military conquests, including victories at Plassey in 1757 and Buxar in 1764, which granted diwani rights over Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa.[12] By the 1850s, the Company directly administered the presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, encompassing roughly two-thirds of the subcontinent's territory and population via a combination of direct rule, subsidiary alliances that subordinated states like Hyderabad in 1798, and aggressive annexations under Governor-General Lord Dalhousie from 1848 to 1856, such as Punjab in 1849 and Oudh in 1856.[24] [25] These policies enforced British paramountcy, with Indian rulers retaining internal autonomy only under Company oversight, fostering resentment among displaced elites while integrating diverse regions under a centralized revenue and judicial system. Socially, Indian society remained stratified by the varna system, comprising Brahmins (priests and scholars), Kshatriyas (warriors and rulers), Vaishyas (merchants and farmers), and Shudras (laborers), further subdivided into thousands of endogamous jatis that dictated occupation, marriage, and social interactions, with Dalits outside this framework facing exclusion.[26] Over 80% of the population lived in rural agrarian communities dominated by village hierarchies led by zamindars and headmen, where caste, kinship, and religious affiliations—predominantly Hinduism (majority) and Islam (significant minority)—reinforced communal boundaries amid linguistic and regional diversity.[27] British administrative reforms, including permanent settlement in Bengal from 1793, disrupted traditional land tenure by empowering revenue collectors over hereditary elites, exacerbating rural indebtedness and social tensions without yet eroding caste rigidity, though nascent reform efforts like Raja Rammohan Roy's campaigns against sati in the 1820s hinted at emerging challenges to orthodoxy.[28]Causes of the Rebellion
Military Discontent in the Bengal Army
The Bengal Army, the largest of the three presidency armies under the East India Company, comprised approximately 135,000 Indian sepoys (infantry) and sowars (cavalry) in 1857, vastly outnumbering the 24,000 European troops within its establishment, while overall British troops in India numbered approximately 34,000-40,000; with recruits predominantly drawn from high-caste Hindu communities such as Brahmins and Rajputs in rural regions of Bihar, Oudh, and the North-Western Provinces.[20][29] This composition fostered a sense of entitlement among sepoys, who viewed military service as a hereditary profession tied to caste status, but it also amplified grievances when Company policies clashed with traditional expectations.[30] A primary source of discontent was the General Service Enlistment Act of 1856, enacted by Governor-General Lord Canning, which mandated that all new recruits pledge willingness to serve overseas, including in territories beyond the Indian subcontinent.[31] High-caste sepoys regarded sea voyages as ritually polluting, entailing loss of caste purity due to contact with unclean water and foreigners, a belief rooted in orthodox Hinduism; while exemptions applied to serving soldiers, the act signaled potential future extensions and disrupted recruitment from conservative rural families, exacerbating fears of cultural erosion.[32][30] Compounding this, the 1856 annexation of Oudh—home to many sepoys—disrupted traditional land revenue systems and allowances, as taluqdars (local landowners) from whom soldiers often hailed lost estates, leading to economic hardship and resentment toward British administrative overreach.[33] Sepoys also harbored deep frustrations over pay, pensions, and promotions, where European officers and troops received preferential treatment, including higher salaries, faster advancements, and better postings, while Indian soldiers faced stagnant wages—often insufficient for subsistence—and limited upward mobility beyond subaltern ranks.[20][34] This racial hierarchy was evident in command structures, where British officers increasingly distanced themselves from sepoys culturally, ignoring caste sensitivities in drill, diet, and discipline, which prior commanders had accommodated to maintain loyalty.[35] Such disparities fueled a perception of systemic discrimination, with sepoys viewing themselves as underpaid mercenaries rather than honored warriors, contributing to sporadic earlier mutinies like those at Barrackpore in 1824 and 1844 over similar service impositions.[36] Overall, these military-specific issues, rather than isolated religious fears, formed the core of Bengal Army unrest, priming regiments for collective defiance when combined with broader policy triggers.[30]Political Annexations and Administrative Policies
The Doctrine of Lapse, formulated by Governor-General Lord Dalhousie during his tenure from 1848 to 1856, declared that princely states lacking a natural-born male heir upon the ruler's death would eschew to British East India Company control, disregarding adoptions not pre-approved by British authorities.[37] This policy systematically expanded British territory by annexing Satara in 1848, Jaitpur and Sambalpur in 1849, Baghat in 1850, Jhansi in 1853, and Nagpur in 1854.[38] By nullifying succession rights and extinguishing hereditary pensions, these annexations alienated Indian nobility, whose loss of autonomy and economic privileges fueled political discontent among elites and their military retainers.[39] Complementing the Doctrine, the 1856 annexation of the Kingdom of Awadh proceeded not via lapse but under allegations of maladministration by Nawab Wajid Ali Shah, whom Dalhousie deposed on February 7 via proclamation.[40] This incorporated a vast, revenue-rich province—spanning over 24,000 square miles and home to influential taluqdars—directly into Company administration, contravening prior subsidiary alliance treaties that had preserved nominal sovereignty.[20] Sepoys in the Bengal Army, disproportionately recruited from Awadh and Oudh regions, viewed the move as perfidious, as it dispossessed their kin of lands and titles, eroding traditional loyalties and amplifying perceptions of British rapacity.[20] These interventions marked a departure from earlier restraint under policies like the Permanent Settlement, prioritizing territorial consolidation over alliances and provoking unified opposition from dispossessed rulers, such as Jhansi's Rani Lakshmibai, whose kingdom's lapse exemplified the doctrine's arbitrary application.[38] Administrative overreach, including summary revenue assessments and interference in internal affairs, further strained relations, as evidenced by petitions from annexed states decrying violations of sanads (deeds of succession).[39] Collectively, such measures undermined the Company's legitimacy, transforming latent princely grievances into active resistance during the 1857 upheaval.[39]Economic Grievances and Land Reforms
The British East India Company's land revenue systems prioritized maximum extraction, often demanding 50-60% of agricultural produce, which strained peasants and landowners across regions and fostered long-term resentment culminating in the 1857 rebellion.[41] These policies disrupted traditional tenure arrangements, commodified land, and led to widespread indebtedness as cultivators faced coercive collections amid fluctuating harvests and famines.[28] In Bengal, the Permanent Settlement of 1793 under Governor-General Lord Cornwallis fixed revenue liabilities with zamindars as perpetual intermediaries, initially set at approximately 89% of estimated rental value, compelling them to impose rack-rents on tenants through subinfeudation and harsh enforcement.[42] This system incentivized short-term exploitation over investment, resulting in tenant evictions, soil degradation, and peasant resistance movements, though direct ties to 1857 were muted in the region due to entrenched zamindar loyalty to British revenue guarantees.[42] The Ryotwari system, implemented from the 1820s in Madras and Bombay presidencies by Thomas Munro, assessed revenue directly on individual ryots (cultivators) based on soil surveys, with periodic upward revisions that ignored local realities and forced cash crop shifts, heightening vulnerability to market fluctuations and moneylender traps.[43] Similarly, the Mahalwari system in the North-Western Provinces from 1833 collected from village bodies (mahals), but arbitrary high assessments—often exceeding sustainable yields—and joint liability bred intra-community conflicts and evasion, amplifying agrarian distress.[44] The annexation of Awadh in February 1856 on grounds of misgovernment, followed by the Summary Settlement later that year, exemplified acute economic disruption: taluqdars, hereditary landholders controlling vast estates, were required to prove uninterrupted possession from 1801 and 1841, leading to the confiscation of over 20,000 square miles of land reclassified as government property, with survivors facing reduced tenures and new cesses.[45][46] Disarmed and divested of forts and privileges, these taluqdars—many with sepoy relatives in the Bengal Army—allied with rebels, supplying resources and mobilizing peasants aggrieved by lost protections and intensified taxation under the new regime.[47] In Awadh, where the rebellion spread rapidly, this convergence of elite and subaltern grievances transformed localized economic harms into coordinated resistance against British administrative overreach.[46]Religious Sensitivities and Cultural Clashes
The introduction of the Pattern 1853 Enfield rifle in the Bengal Army, requiring soldiers to bite open paper cartridges rumored to be greased with a mixture of cow tallow and pork lard, deeply offended Hindu sepoys due to the cow's sacred status and Muslim sepoys due to porcine prohibition, exacerbating existing distrust of British intentions toward Indian faiths.[48][49] Although British investigations later confirmed vegetable-based grease was intended, the unchecked spread of these rumors from late 1856 onward unified disparate religious groups in the army against perceived desecration, serving as a proximate catalyst amid broader grievances.[50] British missionary endeavors and proselytizing efforts by East India Company officers fueled apprehensions among sepoys and civilians that Christianity would be imposed, eroding traditional Hindu and Muslim practices; reports from the period highlight how evangelical activities, including Bible distribution in schools and military chapels, were interpreted as precursors to forced conversions, particularly after the 1813 Charter Act allocated funds for missions.[20] Sepoys, predominantly high-caste Hindus from Awadh and Bihar, viewed these as existential threats to dharma and Islamic purity, with rumors of baptismal rites involving beef consumption amplifying paranoia despite no formal policy of coercion. Administrative reforms under governors-general like William Bentinck and James Dalhousie, while aimed at curbing abuses, were perceived as cultural overreach; the 1829 abolition of sati (widow immolation) under Bentinck's Regulation XVII, though targeting a practice involving an estimated 8,000-8,500 annual cases pre-ban, alienated orthodox Hindus who saw it as an assault on scriptural traditions, even as it saved lives.[51] The suppression of thuggee—ritual strangler cults—via William Sleeman's campaigns from 1830, which executed or imprisoned over 4,500 thugs by 1840, was framed by British accounts as moral progress but resented as interference in indigenous social orders.[52] The Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act of 1856, legalizing remarriage for widows and promoted by reformers like Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar, clashed with prevailing customs barring it for upper-caste women, heightening fears of Western erosion of caste purity and family norms.[53] These clashes reflected a pattern of British utilitarianism prioritizing efficiency over accommodation, with policies like railway construction and telegraph lines seen by some Indians as omens of homogenization that disregarded pilgrimage routes and caste segregation; yet empirical evidence suggests such sensitivities were selectively amplified by rumor networks, as not all regions or regiments revolted uniformly, indicating intersection with military and economic factors rather than religion alone as causal primacy.[54][55]Outbreak of the Mutiny
The Enfield Rifle Cartridge Incident
The British East India Company began issuing the Pattern 1853 Enfield rifle-musket to units of the Bengal Army in early 1857, replacing the less accurate smoothbore Brown Bess muskets previously in use.[56] This rifled weapon offered improved range and accuracy, but its ammunition consisted of combustible paper cartridges enclosing black powder and a .577-inch Minié ball, which required greasing for reliable loading into the rifled barrel.[56] To load the Enfield, sepoys tore the cartridge open with their teeth, poured the powder into the barrel, and rammed the greased bullet home, a process that risked oral contact with the lubricant.[20] Among the predominantly Hindu and Muslim troops, fears arose that the grease contained animal fats ritually taboo to their faiths—cow tallow, considered sacred and polluting to Hindus, or pig lard, deemed impure by Muslims.[20] Although British ordnance manuals specified alternatives like beeswax and vegetable oils, local arsenal practices often employed unspecified tallow-based mixtures, amplifying suspicions of deliberate defilement amid broader anxieties over Christian proselytism and cultural erosion.[57] [58] The cartridge issue first provoked open resistance in February 1857 at Berhampore, where sepoys of the 19th Bengal Native Infantry regiment refused to touch or train with the new ammunition, citing religious scruples; the unit was disarmed without immediate violence but disbanded as a warning.[1] Similar objections spread through the Bengal Army's 74 regular infantry regiments and cavalry units, where high-caste recruits viewed the rifle's demands as an assault on their purity and status.[20] British officers dismissed initial complaints, enforcing drills and court-martials, which only deepened resentment; assurances that sepoys could prepare their own grease proved inadequate and were distrusted.[58] This simmering grievance erupted at Meerut on May 9, 1857, when 85 troopers of the 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry, imprisoned for refusing the cartridges, prompted their comrades to seize arms, kill officers, and march on Delhi the following day, igniting the rebellion.[20] While the greased cartridge served as the proximate trigger—exploiting genuine ritual sensitivities—it reflected deeper military inequities, such as pay disparities and overseas service fears, rather than standing alone as the cause; post-rebellion inquiries confirmed the ammunition's role in catalyzing mutiny among troops already alienated by Company policies.[1][58]Mutiny at Meerut and Spread to Delhi
The mutiny commenced on 10 May 1857 in Meerut, a major British garrison approximately 40 miles northeast of Delhi, when sepoys of the Bengal Army openly rebelled against their officers.[1] Eighty-five troopers from the 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry, imprisoned the previous day for refusing to use Enfield rifle cartridges suspected of being greased with animal fat offensive to Hindu and Muslim religious sensibilities, were liberated by their comrades who then incited broader revolt.[20] The uprising rapidly involved sepoys from the 11th and 20th Native Infantry regiments, who joined the cavalry in attacking and killing British officers attempting to restore order, including their commanding officer Colonel Finnis, shot on the parade ground.[20] [59] The mutineers proceeded to storm the local jail, releasing over 1,200 prisoners, including convicts, before looting the cantonment, burning European bungalows, and setting fires that destroyed much of the European quarter.[59] With minimal resistance due to the surprise and Sunday timing, which left many British civilians and soldiers unprepared, the rebels—numbering several thousand including cavalry, infantry, and local sympathizers—marched toward Delhi that same evening, seeking a symbolic figurehead to legitimize their cause.[60] [20] Arriving in Delhi on 11 May, the Meerut contingent linked with discontented sepoys of the 38th Native Infantry stationed there, overwhelming the city's defenses and initiating a massacre of British residents, soldiers, and Christian missionaries, with estimates of dozens to over a hundred Europeans killed in the initial violence.[20] [1] The rebels coerced the elderly Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah II, a nominal figure under British protection, to accept leadership, proclaiming him Emperor of India on or around 13 May as a rallying point to frame the uprising as a restoration of pre-colonial sovereignty rather than mere military indiscipline.[20] This act transformed the localized mutiny into a broader anti-British movement, drawing initial support from Delhi's diverse population despite the emperor's reluctance and advanced age of 82.[60] The fall of Delhi, a key political and symbolic center, alarmed British authorities and prompted reinforcements, but also ignited copycat revolts elsewhere by signaling vulnerability in the East India Company's control.[1]Early Rebel Leadership and Mobilization
On 10 May 1857, following the refusal of 85 sowars of the 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry to use greased cartridges and their subsequent imprisonment, sepoys from multiple regiments at Meerut—including the 11th and 20th Bengal Native Infantry—mutinied, killing British officers and freeing the prisoners before marching toward Delhi.[1] The force, estimated at several thousand, covered roughly 40 miles overnight, arriving at the city gates in the early morning of 11 May.[1] The mutineers entered Delhi, overcame minimal resistance from the small British garrison, and targeted European residents and officials, resulting in the deaths of dozens, including women and children, as they sought to eliminate symbols of Company authority.[61] By midday, contingents reached the Red Fort, where they confronted Bahadur Shah Zafar, the 82-year-old titular Mughal emperor living under British pension and confinement.[61] Coerced by the sepoys and urged by his sons Mirza Mughal and Mirza Shah Abbas, Zafar was proclaimed Emperor of India, transforming the sepoy uprising into a broader challenge to British rule under a veneer of restored Mughal legitimacy.[62] This proclamation served as a rallying mechanism for mobilization, invoking dynastic continuity to attract recruits from princely states, disaffected landowners, and other garrisons, though Zafar's role remained largely symbolic due to his frailty and inexperience in command.[62] Initial governance in rebel-held Delhi relied on improvised councils of sepoy non-commissioned officers and Mughal courtiers, lacking centralized authority or strategic coordination, which hindered effective organization.[3] Proclamations issued in Zafar's name exhorted Hindu and Muslim subjects to unite against the "firangis" (foreigners), emphasizing religious grievances while attempting to bridge communal divides, though internal disputes over leadership soon emerged.[63] By late May and early June, reinforcements from mutinies in nearby areas bolstered Delhi's defenses, but effective military direction awaited the arrival of experienced officers; for instance, subadar Bakht Khan from Bareilly reached the city around 1 July with artillery and troops, assuming de facto command and imposing discipline amid growing anarchy.[64] The early phase thus highlighted the rebels' reliance on spontaneous sepoy initiative and symbolic figureheads rather than a pre-planned hierarchy, enabling rapid seizure of key centers but exposing vulnerabilities to British counter-mobilization.[3]Progression of the Rebellion
Siege and Defense of Delhi
Following the mutiny at Meerut on 10 May 1857, approximately 3,000 mutinous sepoys and cavalry arrived at Delhi on 11 May, where they were joined by local mobs in killing British officers, civilians, and Indian Christians, while compelling the nominal Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah II to serve as their figurehead leader.[2] [65] Bakht Khan, a subadar from the 73rd Native Infantry, emerged as the effective military commander, organizing rebel defenses within the city's walls and coordinating forces numbering 40,000 to 70,000, primarily Bengal Army mutineers supplemented by irregulars and urban recruits.[65] [64] A British relief force of about 4,000 men under Major-General George Anson reached the Delhi Ridge on 8 June after defeating mutineers at Badli-ki-Serai, establishing a defensive perimeter overlooking the city but lacking artillery and numbers for immediate assault.[2] [65] Command passed to Brigadier-General John Barnard after Anson's death from cholera on 5 July, during which period the British force, reduced by disease and heat to under 3,000 effectives including European infantry, loyal Sikh and Gurkha troops, repelled multiple rebel sorties, notably a large attack on 23 June that inflicted around 1,000 mutineer casualties against 160 British losses.[2] [65] Further reinforcements, including a siege train of 32 heavy guns and 2,000 men from Punjab under Brigadier-General John Nicholson, arrived on 14 August, bringing the total British-led force to approximately 9,000 combatants—3,000 British troops augmented by Sikh, Punjabi Muslim, and Gurkha allies—enabling the establishment of batteries to breach the city walls.[2] [66] Overall command shifted to Major-General Archdale Wilson in July, who coordinated the investment despite internal debates over assault timing, as rebel forces under Bakht Khan maintained discipline through courts-martial but suffered from supply shortages and internal factionalism.[65] The decisive assault commenced on 14 September with three columns totaling 2,800 men under Nicholson's direction exploding the Kashmir Gate and advancing through breaches toward the Jama Masjid and Red Fort, though Nicholson sustained a fatal gunshot wound while rallying troops that day.[65] [66] Street-to-street fighting persisted for six days amid barricades and house-to-house combat, with British forces capturing key positions by 20 September, after which mutineer resistance collapsed, Bakht Khan fled, and Bahadur Shah surrendered; Nicholson died of his wounds on 23 September.[2] [65] [66] British casualties during the siege totaled 3,854, including 1,347 in the final assault phase, while mutineer losses exceeded 5,000 killed or wounded, with the recapture of Delhi marking a turning point that demoralized rebels across northern India and enabled British reconcentration on other fronts.[65] [2]Events in Kanpur
The mutiny at Kanpur erupted on 5 June 1857, as sepoys of the 2nd Bengal Light Cavalry and supporting infantry units rebelled against their British officers, subsequently placing themselves under the command of Nana Sahib, the adopted heir of the deposed Peshwa Baji Rao II, who assumed leadership of the rebel forces in the region.[67] These mutineers, numbering several thousand, quickly besieged the British garrison commanded by Major-General Sir Hugh Wheeler, which consisted of roughly 400-500 personnel including European soldiers, loyal Indian troops, civilians, women, and children; the defenders had withdrawn to a hastily improvised entrenchment of mud walls and barrack rooms south of the city, vulnerable to artillery fire due to its proximity to rebel positions.[2] [1] The siege endured from 6 to 27 June under sweltering summer conditions, with rebel guns inflicting steady attrition through shelling and musketry, compounded by acute shortages of potable water—drawn at peril from a single contaminated well—and provisions, leading to high mortality from wounds, dysentery, heatstroke, and exhaustion; British casualties during this phase exceeded 200, reducing the garrison to a fraction of its initial strength.[2] [67] On 27 June, after intermediaries conveyed Nana Sahib's pledge of safe passage down the Ganges to Allahabad in exchange for surrender, Wheeler capitulated, and the remnants—primarily non-combatants—marched under truce to Satichaura Ghat, a riverside landing where boats awaited.[67] [1] As the British boarded the vessels on 27 June, concealed rebel artillery batteries and infantry unleashed a barrage, annihilating the escorting men in a premeditated betrayal; fewer than a dozen escaped the slaughter, while approximately 120-200 women and children were seized and conveyed back to the city for confinement.[2] [67] The captives, comprising British, Eurasian, and Anglo-Indian families, were interned in the Bibighar (House of the Ladies), a small outbuilding ill-suited for such numbers, where overcrowding and deprivation persisted until 15 July, when, amid reports of approaching British reinforcements, they were put to the sword by rebel-affiliated butchers and swordsmen acting on directives linked to Nana Sahib's council; over 200 victims perished in the carnage, their remains mutilated and cast into a nearby well.[68] [1] A relief column dispatched from Allahabad under Brigadier-General Henry Havelock, comprising about 1,500-2,000 British and loyal sepoy troops, repelled Nana Sahib's blocking forces in consecutive victories at Fatehpur on 12 July, Aung on 13 July, and Pandu Nadi on 15 July, enabling entry into Kanpur on 16 July with minimal losses despite numerically superior opposition.[2] [1] Havelock's troops secured the city against immediate counterattack, pursued fleeing rebels to Bithur—Nana Sahib's former seat—on 19 July, destroying his palace and arsenal, though the leader himself evaded capture and retreated toward the Nepalese frontier.[67] Upon unearthing the Bibighar well's contents, confirming the massacre's scale, subordinate commander Colonel James Neill instituted rigorous reprisals, ordering the summary execution of hundreds of apprehended rebels—irrespective of direct involvement—via hanging from trees and banyan branches, forced labor in well-clearing, or firing squads, alongside the demolition of Satichaura Ghat as a punitive monument.[2] [68] These measures restored British control over Kanpur by late July, though sporadic rebel activity persisted until Tantia Tope's failed bid to retake the city in November, ultimately quashed on 6 December.[1]Siege of Lucknow
The Siege of Lucknow commenced on 30 June 1857, following the mutiny of sepoy regiments in the city and their victory over British forces at the Battle of Chinhat earlier that month.[2] Brigadier-General Sir Henry Lawrence, the British chief commissioner of Awadh, directed approximately 1,600 troops—half of whom were loyal Indian soldiers—and a comparable number of civilians to withdraw into the fortified Residency compound, a complex of buildings spanning about 1,000 yards.[2] Rebel forces, numbering in the thousands under leaders including Begum Hazrat Mahal (the widow of the deposed Nawab of Awadh) and various sepoy commanders, encircled the position with artillery and infantry, initiating a prolonged bombardment and assaults that persisted intermittently for months.[69] Lawrence organized defenses including earthworks, batteries, and counter-siege measures, but sustained rebel shelling proved devastating; he himself was mortally wounded by a mortar shell on 4 July 1857 and died two days later.[69] [2] Command passed to Lieutenant-Colonel John Inglis, who commanded roughly 855 British soldiers, 712 loyal Indian troops, and 153 civilian volunteers, while protecting 1,280 non-combatants including women and children confined to the Residency's inner areas.[70] Rebel tactics included mining operations to breach walls, countered by British sappers under Captain Peter Fulton who tunneled to detonate charges preemptively, particularly around the Redan Battery in August 1857.[69] By late September, after 87 days, the garrison had suffered 483 killed or wounded, with supplies critically low and morale strained by disease, heat, and constant fire.[71] The first relief force, led by Major-General Henry Havelock and Major-General Sir James Outram, advanced from Cawnpore with 3,179 troops including British and Sikh units, defeating rebels at Alumbagh on 23 September and storming positions en route, but incurring 535 casualties in the process.[71] They breached the Residency perimeter on 25 September 1857, linking with Inglis's defenders, yet the combined force—now numbering around 3,000 effectives—proved insufficient to evacuate the vulnerable civilians amid reinforced rebel lines estimated at tens of thousands.[70] [2] Outram assumed overall command, fortifying a larger perimeter that included the Residency and Bailey Guard, but this initiated a second siege phase lasting until mid-November, marked by intensified rebel assaults and British sorties.[70] Lieutenant-General Sir Colin Campbell executed the final relief on 14–19 November 1857 with 4,500 men, employing a flanking maneuver to storm the Secundra Bagh palace where his troops bayoneted approximately 2,000–2,500 rebels in close-quarters fighting.[2] This breakthrough enabled the evacuation of the Residency garrison and civilians to the Alambagh camp outside the city by 22 November, ending the siege proper after nearly five months of encirclement.[2] [71] British forces then withdrew to consolidate, returning in force from 2–21 March 1858 under Campbell and Outram—now reinforced to over 20,000 including Indian allies—to systematically recapture Lucknow, clearing rebel strongholds like the Kaisarbagh and Imambara, dispersing remaining insurgents.[70] Total defender losses across the sieges exceeded 1,000 including civilians, while rebel casualties ran into the thousands from combat, disease, and British artillery; precise figures remain uncertain due to incomplete records, though the engagements underscored the rebels' numerical superiority offset by disorganized command and British firepower.[71] [2]Rebellion in Jhansi and Central India
The mutiny in Jhansi erupted on 5 June 1857 when elements of the local Bengal Native Infantry garrison rebelled, seizing the fort and massacring approximately 60 European officers, civilians, and their Indian servants who had sought refuge there.[72] [2] The Rani of Jhansi, Lakshmibai, whose state had been annexed by the British in 1854 under the Doctrine of Lapse despite her adoption of a successor, initially attempted to negotiate with the mutineers and protect British lives, but accusations from British authorities held her responsible for the killings after the rebels reneged on offers of safe passage.[2] [73] With British reprisals looming, Lakshmibai assumed command of the rebel forces, organizing defenses and suppressing internal disorder to consolidate control over Jhansi.[74] In September 1857, rebel forces under Lakshmibai repelled an invasion by troops from the neighboring princely state of Orchha, which had remained loyal to the British, demonstrating effective use of the fort's fortifications and local militia in defensive operations.[72] By early 1858, British Central India Field Force under Sir Hugh Rose advanced on Jhansi with around 4,300 troops, including European infantry, Sikh and Baluchi auxiliaries, and artillery.[75] The siege commenced on 20 March 1858, involving heavy bombardment that breached the city walls; after a failed rebel sortie on 27 March, British forces stormed the town on 3 April, incurring about 100 killed and 250 wounded, while inflicting roughly 5,000 casualties on the defenders through assault and subsequent pursuits.[75] [72] Lakshmibai escaped during the chaos with a small escort, evading capture and linking up with rebel commander Tantia Tope at Kalpi.[2] Tantia Tope, a Maratha general aligned with Nana Sahib from Kanpur, coordinated rebel operations across Central India, providing military expertise to fragmented sepoy and princely contingents lacking formal training.[76] After defeats at Kalpi in May 1858, Tope and Lakshmibai shifted to Gwalior, capturing the fortress on 1 June through surprise and local support, temporarily establishing a rebel stronghold with access to artillery and treasury funds.[77] British forces under Rose pursued, defeating the rebels in a series of engagements from 16 to 20 June; Lakshmibai was killed on 17 June during a cavalry charge near Kotah-ki-Serai, where she fought mounted and armed with sword and pistol.[72] [2] Tope escaped, conducting guerrilla warfare in ravines and villages until his capture on 7 April 1859 near Shivpuri, after which he was tried and executed on 18 April.[77] The fall of Gwalior marked the effective end of organized resistance in Central India, as British reinforcements and loyal native troops overwhelmed scattered rebel bands through superior mobility and firepower.[2]Regional Uprisings in Bihar, Punjab, and Beyond
In Bihar, the rebellion manifested prominently through the leadership of Kunwar Singh, an 80-year-old zamindar from Jagdispur in the Bhojpur region, who mobilized local forces against British authority following the mutiny of sepoy regiments at Dinapore (modern Danapur). On July 25, 1857, three regiments of the Bengal Native Infantry stationed at Dinapore revolted, killing British officers and marching toward Arrah, where they joined Singh's irregulars to besiege approximately 60 Europeans and loyal Indian troops entrenched in the Arrah House from July 27 to 30.[78][79] The siege was relieved by a force under Major Vincent Eyre, but Singh evaded capture and sustained guerrilla operations across Bihar, disrupting British supply lines and communications until his death from battle wounds on April 26, 1858.[80] Uprisings also erupted in nearby areas like Gaya and Jagdispur, where Singh's brother Amar Singh coordinated with local rajas and peasants, though British reinforcements from Bengal eventually suppressed coordinated resistance by mid-1858.[81] Punjab experienced limited and swiftly contained mutinies among sepoy units, largely due to recent British annexation in 1849, ongoing recruitment of Sikh irregulars loyal to the Crown, and deep-seated Sikh antagonism toward Mughal restoration symbolized by the Delhi rebels. On July 7, 1857, the 14th Native Infantry at Jhelum mutinied, freeing prisoners and attempting to flee toward Delhi, but British and Sikh forces pursued and dispersed them, with many mutineers killed in skirmishes.[82] Similarly, at Ajnala near Amritsar, sepoys of the 26th Native Infantry revolted in early July, murdering their commanding officer and seeking refuge, only to face retaliation from local villagers and police, resulting in the deaths of approximately 282 rebels whose remains were reportedly discovered in a mass grave.[83] Isolated unrest occurred at Rawalpindi and Phillaur, but Punjab's administration under figures like John Lawrence mobilized Sikh and Pathan troops to secure key garrisons such as Lahore and Peshawar, preventing widespread escalation and enabling redeployment of loyal forces to suppress rebellions elsewhere.[82] Beyond these provinces, sporadic uprisings flared in regions like Rohilkhand, where Khan Bahadur Khan declared independence at Bareilly in May 1857, rallying Muslim taluqdars and mutinous sepoys to hold the city until its recapture by British columns in April 1858 after prolonged guerrilla resistance. In Bundelkhand excluding Jhansi, chieftains such as those in Orchha and Datia initially remained neutral but faced internal revolts that British-allied forces quelled by leveraging princely contingents. Pockets of rebellion also emerged in the Central Provinces and Rajputana, involving tribal levies and disaffected landowners, though these lacked coordination with major centers and were subdued through rapid punitive expeditions by mid-1858, contributing to the overall fragmentation of rebel efforts outside the Gangetic heartland.[84]Opposition and British Loyalists
Indian Princes and Groups Who Remained Loyal
Several Indian princes maintained allegiance to the British East India Company during the 1857 rebellion, providing troops, supplies, and strategic support that proved instrumental in suppressing the uprising. These rulers, whose territories had largely escaped recent annexations under the Doctrine of Lapse, viewed continued British paramountcy as a safeguard for their sovereignty amid the chaos of sepoy mutinies and regional revolts. Their loyalty stemmed from pragmatic calculations: subsidiary alliances ensured military protection, while joining rebels risked forfeiture of thrones to more aggressive adversaries like the resurgent Mughals or Maratha remnants.[85][86] Jayajirao Scindia, Maharaja of Gwalior, exemplified this stance by aligning with British forces despite a mutiny among his own contingent in June 1857, which briefly joined rebels under Tatya Tope. Scindia personally refused to endorse the rebellion, supplying intelligence and later dispatching loyal troops to aid British operations in Central India, including against Rani Lakshmibai's forces at Gwalior in 1858. His fidelity preserved Gwalior's independence, contrasting with annexed states like Jhansi.[85][87][88] Tukojirao Holkar II, Maharaja of Indore, upheld loyalty even as mutineers attacked the British residency in Indore on July 1, 1857, forcing him to seek refuge with Company forces. He subsequently contributed contingents from his state to British campaigns in Central India, helping secure regions like Sagar and Narmada territories against rebel incursions. Holkar's adherence, despite internal dissent, reinforced British control over Malwa.[89][85][90] Afzal-ud-Daulah, the Nizam of Hyderabad (Asaf Jah V), who ascended in 1857, provided critical stability in the Deccan by mobilizing irregular forces and resources to counter potential spillover from Bengal mutinies. His allegiance prevented Hyderabad from becoming a rebel base, allowing British reinforcements to focus northward; this support was pivotal after Delhi's fall, as it diverted no additional threats from the south.[91][92] In Punjab, Sikh princes such as Narinder Singh, Maharaja of Patiala, actively dispatched over 10,000 troops to assist in recapturing Delhi by September 1857, including forces that helped breach rebel defenses. Rulers of allied states like Jind and Nabha similarly contributed cavalry and infantry, motivated by historical Sikh antagonism toward Mughal restoration under Bahadur Shah II. These groups' involvement stemmed from recent British favoritism post-annexation of Punjab in 1849, positioning them as beneficiaries of the status quo.[93][94] Other notable loyalists included Ranbir Singh of Jammu and Kashmir, who supplied Dogra troops for northern operations, and Jung Bahadur of Nepal, whose Gurkha battalions—numbering around 8,000—bolstered British sieges at Lucknow and elsewhere starting in 1857. Beyond princes, loyal Indian groups encompassed unminted sepoy units in Madras and Bombay presidencies, which numbered tens of thousands and remained disciplined, as well as Punjabi Sikhs and Rajput zamindars who furnished local intelligence and levies, viewing the rebellion as a Bengal-centric disruption unlikely to favor their interests.[95][96]Role of Sikh, Gurkha, and Other Non-Rebel Forces
Non-rebel native forces, including Sikh, Gurkha, and Punjabi Muslim troops, played a crucial role in suppressing the Indian Rebellion of 1857 by providing the British East India Company with reliable manpower from regions outside the primary mutiny centers in Bengal and Awadh. These groups, recently incorporated into British service following the Anglo-Sikh Wars (1845–1849) and the Anglo-Nepalese War (1814–1816), demonstrated loyalty motivated by pragmatic interests: Sikhs viewed the Bengal sepoys—predominantly Hindu and Muslim—as historical adversaries and feared a revival of Mughal dominance under Bahadur Shah II, while Gurkhas, recruited as mercenaries under treaty arrangements with Nepal, maintained discipline amid the unrest. Punjabi Muslims and frontier tribesmen, such as Pathans, similarly opposed the rebels due to ethnic rivalries and recent enlistment incentives that bypassed grievances like the Enfield rifle cartridge issue.[20][97] In Punjab, administered by Chief Commissioner John Lawrence, Sikh regiments under British officers swiftly quelled potential mutinies among scattered Bengal units and suppressed local uprisings, securing the province as a vital base for reinforcements by mid-1857. Approximately 20,000 Sikh and Punjabi troops were mobilized from Punjab, enabling the dispatch of the Flying Column under John Nicholson to relieve Delhi in September 1857; these forces outnumbered British troops in key engagements, comprising about two-thirds of the assault column that breached Delhi's defenses on September 14, 1857. Sikh soldiers, including units like the Ferozepore Sikhs, distinguished themselves in street fighting, leveraging their martial traditions honed against Afghan incursions to counter rebel irregulars effectively.[2][98] Gurkha battalions, such as the Sirmoor Battalion (precursor to the 2nd King Edward VII's Own Gurkha Rifles) and the Nusseree Battalion, remained steadfast and participated in the Siege of Delhi, where they endured heavy casualties while holding positions and storming breaches alongside Sikh allies. The Sirmoor Battalion, stationed at Nahan, repelled rebel advances in the Himalayan foothills before joining the main relief effort, earning recognition for loyalty that included two members receiving the Indian Order of Merit. Gurkha troops also supported operations in the Doab region, contributing to the recapture of Agra and the containment of guerrilla activities through their renowned close-quarters combat prowess with the khukuri knife.[99][97] Other non-rebel forces, including Baluchi and Pathan levies from the North-West Frontier, bolstered British efforts in Oudh and Rohilkhand by guarding supply lines and engaging rebels in skirmishes, such as the suppression of uprisings near Bareilly in May 1858. These contingents, often irregulars loyal due to subsidies and opposition to Awadh's Muslim nobility, numbered in the thousands and prevented the rebellion's spread westward, allowing British commanders like Colin Campbell to focus on major sieges. Their collective fidelity not only compensated for mutinied Bengal Army units—estimated at over 50,000 strong—but also facilitated the rebellion's containment within 18 months, underscoring the fragmented nature of Indian military allegiances along ethnic and regional lines.[2][20]Suppression of the Rebellion
British Reinforcements and Strategic Responses
The British response to the rebellion emphasized rapid mobilization of loyal forces from Punjab and other peripheral regions, where recent conquests had fostered alliances with Sikh, Gurkha, and Punjabi irregular troops less inclined to mutiny. Punjab's Lieutenant-Governor John Lawrence played a pivotal role in suppressing unrest there and assembling reinforcements, dispatching over 20,000 troops—including Sikhs, Pathans, and Baluchis—eastward to counter the rebels, prioritizing the recapture of Delhi as the rebellion's symbolic and strategic hub.[2] This approach leveraged recent Sikh Wars' outcomes, where British favoritism toward Sikhs as a martial counterweight to Bengal sepoys proved causally effective in maintaining loyalty amid the uprising.[20] For the Delhi campaign, initial besieging forces under Brigadier-General John Barnard numbered around 2,000 Europeans and loyal Indians by June 1857, strained by disease and casualties, but were bolstered on August 14 by Punjab reinforcements under Brigadier John Nicholson, comprising approximately 4,200 men equipped with a siege train of 32 heavy guns.[100] [101] Nicholson's column, including British infantry, Sikh pioneers, and artillery, enabled the assault on September 14, 1857, reflecting a strategy of concentrating firepower to breach fortified positions rather than prolonged attrition.[2] Archdale Wilson assumed command after Barnard's death, coordinating the operation that expelled rebels by September 20, though mopping up continued into the following year.[31] In central India, strategic priorities shifted to relieving besieged garrisons at Kanpur and Lucknow. Sir Colin Campbell, appointed Commander-in-Chief in July 1857, arrived in Calcutta on August 13 and reached Cawnpore by November 3 with reinforcements, organizing a force of about 4,500 men—including Highlanders, Sikhs, and artillery—for the second relief of Lucknow starting November 14.[102] [8] Campbell's cautious tactics emphasized evacuation of non-combatants before full assault, withdrawing the garrison on November 22 amid heavy rebel opposition, which delayed decisive recapture until March 1858 but preserved British morale and logistics.[103] Troop arrivals from Britain began supplementing local efforts from late 1857, with the initial British garrison in India totaling only 35,000 scattered soldiers at the rebellion's onset, necessitating reliance on indigenous allies until sea voyages delivered European regiments—such as the 37th Regiment—by early 1858, shifting composition toward a European-heavy army post-rebellion.[20] Overall, Governor-General Charles Canning's oversight integrated these responses into a phased reconquest, avoiding overextension by securing supply lines from Punjab and Madras while exploiting rebel disunity.[104]Key Battles and Recaptures
The British advance towards Delhi commenced with the Battle of Badli-ki-Serai on June 8, 1857, where a force of approximately 2,000 British and loyal Indian troops under Brigadier-General Sir Henry Barnard engaged and defeated an estimated 7,000-10,000 rebel sepoys positioned across the Grand Trunk Road six miles northwest of the city. The rebels, commanded by local leaders including Mirza Mahmoud Khan, held fortified entrenchments with artillery but were outmaneuvered by British flanking movements and artillery fire, resulting in the capture of all their guns and a rebel retreat towards Delhi; British casualties numbered around 60 killed and 150 wounded, while rebel losses exceeded 500 killed.[65][105] This victory secured the Ridge position for the subsequent siege, disrupting rebel supply lines and morale.[71] In the Doab region, the Battle of Agra on October 10, 1857, marked a critical British counteroffensive against rebel forces that had besieged the city earlier in the year. A relief column under Major Robert Greathed, comprising about 1,500 troops including elements of the 9th Lancers and 64th Regiment, clashed with 5,000-7,000 mutineers led by Rao Shib Singh at Sacheta village near Agra. British cavalry charges and infantry assaults routed the rebels, killing around 1,500 and capturing their camp and artillery, with British losses limited to 33 killed and 140 wounded.[71] This engagement reopened communication lines to Agra Fort, enabling its full recapture and preventing the rebels from consolidating control over the Yamuna-Ganges corridor.[2] Further north in Rohilkhand, the Battle of Bareilly from May 5-6, 1858, facilitated the recapture of this rebel stronghold, a major center of resistance under Khan Bahadur Khan. A British column of 4,000-5,000 troops led by Sir Colin Campbell advanced against 15,000-20,000 defenders entrenched around the city, employing coordinated artillery barrages and infantry assaults to breach positions; the rebels suffered heavy casualties, estimated at over 2,000 killed, while British losses were about 200.[71][106] The victory dismantled the rebel administration in Bareilly by mid-May, scattering surviving forces and securing British dominance in the region through the destruction of rebel arsenals and execution of leaders.[104] The campaign in Central India culminated in the Battle of Gwalior on June 17-19, 1858, where British forces under Major-General Sir Hugh Rose recaptured the fortress city from a confederation of rebels including Tatya Tope and remnants from Jhansi. Rose's 6,000 troops first defeated 20,000 rebels at Morar cantonment on June 16, capturing artillery, before storming Gwalior's defenses; the assaults resulted in over 5,000 rebel casualties, including the death of Rani Lakshmibai during earlier fighting at Kotah-ki-Serai, against British losses of around 100 killed and 400 wounded.[2][71] This decisive engagement ended organized resistance in the area, as the fall of Gwalior's fortifications prompted mass surrenders and fragmented the remaining rebel armies into guerrilla bands.[107] These battles underscored the British advantage in disciplined firepower and reinforcements from Punjab and loyal princely states, contrasting with the rebels' initial numerical superiority but eventual disunity and logistical failures.[2] Recaptures often involved systematic assaults on fortified positions, followed by punitive measures to deter resurgence, though rebel forces inflicted significant attrition through ambushes and attrition warfare.[65]End of Major Hostilities
By mid-1858, British forces under Sir Hugh Rose had recaptured Jhansi in late March, prompting rebel leaders including Rani Lakshmibai and Tantia Tope to shift their remaining organized forces toward Gwalior, a strategic princely state whose ruler Jayajirao Scindia remained loyal to the British but whose troops partially defected to the rebels on June 1.[2] The rebels briefly seized control of Gwalior's fortifications, swelling their ranks with local contingents, but British counteroffensives commenced immediately, with cavalry engagements at Morar on June 16 scattering rebel units and inflicting heavy casualties.[5] Rani Lakshmibai, leading a countercharge during the fighting near Kotah-ki-Serai on June 17, sustained fatal wounds from British lancers and artillery fire; she died that evening or the following day, her body cremated by loyal followers to prevent desecration.[108] Rose's infantry and artillery then assaulted Gwalior's defenses, capturing the city on June 20 after breaching the walls and overcoming rebel artillery positions, effectively dismantling the last major rebel stronghold and organized military formation.[2] This victory, involving approximately 4,000 British and loyal Indian troops against up to 20,000 rebels, marked the collapse of coordinated sepoy and princely resistance in central India, with rebel losses exceeding 1,500 killed or wounded in the final engagements.[5] Scattered guerrilla bands persisted in remote areas, notably under Tantia Tope, who evaded capture through Rajasthan and central India for nearly a year by leveraging alliances with local chieftains like Man Singh of Narwar. Tope's forces, reduced to irregular bands of 300–500 men, conducted hit-and-run raids but lacked the resources for sustained operations. He was betrayed and arrested on April 7, 1859, near Shivpuri, tried by court-martial for rebellion and murder, and hanged on April 18, 1859, effectively ending all significant armed opposition.[109] British authorities proclaimed the cessation of hostilities on July 8, 1859, after mopping-up operations confirmed no viable rebel concentrations remained.[31]Atrocities, Casualties, and Human Cost
Rebel Massacres and Violence Against Civilians
The Indian Rebellion of 1857 saw widespread violence by rebels against British civilians, including deliberate massacres that targeted non-combatants, particularly women and children, in multiple locations. These acts occurred amid the initial mutinies and uprisings, often following the killing of British military officers, as crowds and rebel forces attacked European settlements. Such violence contributed to the escalation of the conflict, prompting severe British reprisals.[1] In Meerut, the rebellion ignited on May 10, 1857, when mutinous sepoys, after shooting their officers, joined by local mobs, targeted British civilians. Reports indicate that at least eight European men, eight women, and eight children were killed in the ensuing chaos, with homes looted and burned. The violence extended to the European quarter, where families were assaulted and murdered before the rebels marched to Delhi.[1] Upon reaching Delhi on May 11, 1857, the Meerut mutineers and local supporters massacred the British community there. Approximately 50 British men were killed outright, while women and children were initially imprisoned in harsh conditions; many later perished from neglect or subsequent violence. Rebel forces, including cavalry, systematically eliminated British officers and residents, with eyewitness accounts describing indiscriminate slaughter in the streets and buildings.[1] The most notorious incident unfolded in Cawnpore (Kanpur) during the siege from June 5 to July 15, 1857, led by Nana Sahib. After British forces under General Wheeler surrendered on promises of safe passage, around 200 surviving men were killed by gunfire and drowning at Satichaura Ghat on July 15. Later that day, the Bibighar Massacre saw over 200 women and children hacked to death with swords or shot, their bodies thrown into a well; this act, ordered by rebel leaders, symbolized the deliberate targeting of defenseless civilians.[110][1] Similar atrocities occurred elsewhere, such as in Jhansi on June 5, 1857, where forces under Rani Lakshmibai killed British officers, civilians, and even some Indian servants sheltering in the fort, with estimates of dozens slain. In Allahabad and other garrisons, rebels executed European families upon seizing control. These events, documented in contemporary British dispatches and military records, involved not only mutineers but also civilian insurgents motivated by anti-colonial fervor, religious zeal, or plunder, resulting in hundreds of British civilian deaths across northern India by mid-1857.[2][1]British Retaliatory Measures and Executions
Following the massacres of British women and children at Cawnpore in June 1857, British commanders authorized indiscriminate reprisals against suspected rebels and sympathizers to exact vengeance and restore order through terror.[1] These measures often bypassed formal trials, employing summary executions via drumhead courts-martial, with methods including hanging, shooting, and blowing from cannons—a Mughal-era practice revived to mutilate bodies and preclude Hindu beliefs in reincarnation by scattering remains.[2] [1] In Cawnpore, after its recapture on 16 July 1857, Colonel James Neill directed punitive squads to round up captives, forcing Hindu suspects to consume beef or Muslims pork before flogging, hanging, or cannon execution; others were compelled to lick blood from the Bibighar massacre site under threat of bayoneting.[1] Neill's earlier march from Benares to Allahabad in June accounted for nearly 6,000 Indian deaths through shootings, stabbings, burnings of villages, and hangings of those deemed complicit.[1] The rallying cry "Remember Cawnpore" fueled these actions, extending to thousands hanged across the district, including innocents, as reprisals blurred lines between combatants and civilians.[2] [1] After Delhi's recapture on 21 September 1857, Brigadier-General John Nicholson's forces unleashed a similar reign of terror, executing hundreds of mutineers and civilians without trial en route and during the city's ransacking, with widespread looting and killings persisting for weeks.[2] Blowing from guns occurred routinely, as at Ferozepore on 13 June 1857, where twelve sepoys were blasted apart publicly alongside two hangings to deter mutiny.[111] In Lucknow and other centers, post-relief operations under Sir Colin Campbell in late 1857 and early 1858 involved mass hangings and cannon executions of convicted rebels, contributing to the rebellion's suppression by mid-1858.[2] Governor-General Charles Canning sought to temper excesses—earning the derisive nickname "Clemency Canning"—but field commanders prioritized rapid deterrence amid fears of prolonged insurgency.[1]Overall Death Toll and Demographic Impact
British and European fatalities during the rebellion totaled approximately 6,000, encompassing both military personnel and civilians targeted in initial mutineer attacks.[112] This figure aligns with British administrative records, though some military histories cite up to 13,000 deaths among British and loyal allied forces in combat.[1] Indian combatant losses were substantially higher, with around 40,000 mutineers killed through battles, summary executions, and forced marches.[1] Civilian deaths on the Indian side, stemming from rebel violence, British reprisals against villages suspected of aiding insurgents, and disease outbreaks amid disrupted food supplies, are estimated in the hundreds of thousands; historian Douglas Peers calculates roughly 800,000 Indians killed in reprisal actions alone.[113] More expansive claims, including those by Amaresh Misra positing nearly 10 million deaths over the subsequent decade from direct violence and economic fallout, rely on inferred population shortfalls but face skepticism from contemporaries like Saul David, who peg the toll in the hundreds of thousands and attribute some declines to emigration rather than extermination.[114] The rebellion exacted a profound demographic toll, particularly in the Gangetic plain and Central India, where pre-conflict regional data compared against the 1871 census indicate sharp population drops attributable to mortality and flight from punitive campaigns.[113] War-induced agricultural collapse fueled famines from 1857 to 1859, claiming millions of lives across affected provinces and spurring mass out-migration, with hundreds of thousands departing as indentured workers to British colonies in Mauritius, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia to evade starvation and reprisals.[115] These shifts entrenched vulnerabilities in rural demographics, delaying recovery in rebel-aligned areas for years.[115]Immediate Consequences
Dissolution of the East India Company
The Government of India Act 1858, enacted by the British Parliament in direct response to the Indian Rebellion of 1857, stripped the East India Company of its administrative, military, and territorial authority over India.[13] [116] The legislation, which received royal assent on 2 August 1858, vested all powers previously exercised by the Company—including governance of its Indian possessions, control of revenues, and command of its armies—directly in the British Crown.[117] [118] Parliament attributed the rebellion's outbreak to the Company's mismanagement and overreach, viewing its semi-private structure as inadequate for stable imperial control.[119] Under the Act's provisions, the Company's Court of Directors and Board of Control were abolished, with a new Secretary of State for India appointed to oversee administration from London, supported by a 15-member Council of India.[13] [120] The Governor-General of India, retitled Viceroy, became the Crown's direct representative, ensuring unified command without the Company's commercial interests interfering in policy.[2] This transfer liquidated the Company's role as a de facto sovereign entity, ending nearly a century of its progressive expansion from trade monopoly to territorial ruler since the Regulating Act of 1773.[121] Queen Victoria's proclamation, issued on 1 November 1858 and read publicly across India, formalized the handover, pledging religious tolerance, equal legal treatment for Indians and Europeans, and an end to territorial annexations by lapse or otherwise.[2] [120] While the Company retained limited trading functions until its complete financial wind-up via the East India Stock Dividend Redemption Act of 1873—leading to formal dissolution on 1 June 1874—the 1858 Act marked the irreversible termination of its political dominance in India.[121] This shift prioritized accountable Crown governance over the Company's profit-driven decisions, which had fueled grievances like the greased cartridge issue and Doctrine of Lapse contributing to the 1857 revolt.[116]Transfer to Direct Crown Rule
The Indian Rebellion of 1857 exposed the vulnerabilities of East India Company governance, prompting the British Parliament to enact the Government of India Act 1858 on 2 August 1858, which abolished the Company's administrative authority over India and vested it directly in the British Crown.[120] This legislation transferred all territories, revenues, and responsibilities previously held by the Company to the Crown, marking the end of Company rule and the inception of the British Raj under direct imperial oversight.[122] The Governor-General of India was redesignated as Viceroy, with Charles Canning, who had served as Governor-General during the rebellion, assuming the inaugural role as Viceroy in November 1858.[123] To formalize the transition and reassure Indian rulers and subjects, Queen Victoria issued a proclamation on 1 November 1858, read publicly across India, pledging non-interference in religious practices, confirmation of treaties with native princes, and equal treatment under the law regardless of creed.[124] The proclamation emphasized the Crown's commitment to promoting peace, justice, and the welfare of its Indian subjects, while repudiating any notions of reconquest or annexation beyond existing boundaries.[125] It also established a Secretary of State for India in London, supported by a 15-member Council of India, to oversee administration from Britain, thereby centralizing policy-making and reducing the autonomy previously enjoyed by Company officials.[120] Although the East India Company ceased direct governance in 1858, its commercial operations persisted under Crown supervision until its formal dissolution by Parliament on 1 June 1874, after which its remaining assets were liquidated.[13] This shift to Crown rule aimed to stabilize imperial control through more accountable parliamentary oversight, reflecting lessons from the rebellion's widespread discontent with Company policies such as the Doctrine of Lapse and cultural insensitivities.[122] The transition preserved princely states' autonomies where treaties existed but subordinated them to British paramountcy, fostering a dual system of direct and indirect rule that endured until 1947.[123]Military Reorganization and Policy Shifts
In response to the widespread disloyalty demonstrated by sepoy units during the rebellion, the British government established the Peel Commission in 1859, chaired by Sir Laurence Peel, to examine and reform the army's structure for greater reliability and to avert future uprisings.[126] The commission's recommendations, implemented progressively through the 1860s, emphasized bolstering European troop strength and diversifying Indian recruitment to fragment potential cohesion among native soldiers.[127] The Bengal Army, which had formed the core of the rebel forces with approximately 120,000 sepoys, underwent drastic reduction; only about 8,000 were retained, with the rest disbanded or court-martialed, prompting a purge that halved the overall Indian infantry strength initially.[128] European troop numbers were rapidly expanded from around 40,000 pre-rebellion to over 65,000 by 1863, shifting the ratio from roughly one European per six Indians to a target of one per three in critical regions like the North-Western Provinces, ensuring British forces could suppress localized mutinies without awaiting reinforcements.[24] Native artillery units were entirely disbanded in 1861, with Indians prohibited from handling ordnance or manning guns, a role reserved exclusively for British Royal Artillery units to eliminate risks of ammunition diversion to rebels.[24] Recruitment policies pivoted toward the "martial races" theory, formalized post-1857, prioritizing enlistment from Punjabis, Sikhs, Gurkhas from Nepal, and frontier tribes deemed inherently warlike and less prone to sedition, while curtailing intakes from the Brahmin-dominated Bengal regiments and Oudh areas that had spearheaded the revolt.[129] This selective approach, which by 1870 saw Punjab supplying over 40% of new sepoy recruits despite comprising a fraction of India's population, embodied a deliberate divide-and-rule strategy to pit ethnic loyalties against pan-Indian solidarity, as articulated in British administrative dispatches acknowledging the threat of a unified native army.[127] Pay scales were raised for loyalist groups, and class-based companies—grouping soldiers by caste or region—were introduced to preserve internal divisions and monitor dissent.[128] Command structures were centralized under the Governor-General (now Viceroy), with the three presidency armies (Bengal, Bombay, Madras) retained but coordinated via a unified Indian Army command from 1895 onward, though immediate post-rebellion emphasis fell on embedding British officers in all senior roles and cantonmenting troops away from civilian populations to curb fraternization.[130] These shifts, costing millions in annual upkeep but justified by the rebellion's £40 million economic toll, prioritized defensive stability over expansionist offensives, marking a transition from Company-era adventurism to Crown-managed containment.Long-Term Effects and Legacy
Administrative and Legal Reforms in India
The Government of India Act 1858, enacted by the British Parliament on August 2, 1858, marked the primary administrative reform following the rebellion by abolishing the East India Company's governing powers and vesting them directly in the British Crown.[131][123] This shift created the position of Secretary of State for India, a Cabinet-level official accountable to Parliament and supported by a 15-member Council of India, while redesignating the Governor-General as Viceroy to symbolize unified imperial authority.[120] The act centralized administration under the Viceroy, who retained control over executive and legislative functions, aiming to address the decentralized mismanagement exposed by the uprising's rapid spread across Company territories.[132] Accompanying the act, Queen Victoria's Proclamation of November 1, 1858, articulated reform principles, pledging non-interference in Indian religious practices, equal treatment under law regardless of creed, and an end to territorial annexations, thereby reversing aggressive expansion policies like the Doctrine of Lapse that had alienated princely states.[123] Administratively, these changes reinforced British oversight in the Indian Civil Service by prioritizing European recruitment and loyalty tests, while provincial governance saw the appointment of lieutenant governors in non-presidency areas like Punjab and Oudh to enhance local control without devolving power.[133] The Indian Councils Act 1861 further modified the Viceroy's legislative council by adding five to twelve non-official members, including Indians for the first time, though their role remained advisory and limited to legislation, reflecting cautious steps toward consultation rather than representation.[134] On the legal front, the rebellion prompted accelerated codification to impose uniform laws and curb arbitrary judicial practices that had contributed to native grievances. The Indian Penal Code (IPC), drafted in the 1830s under Thomas Macaulay but enacted on October 6, 1860, and effective from January 1, 1862, established a comprehensive criminal code applicable across British India, defining offenses like sedition in Section 124A to safeguard colonial authority amid fears of renewed unrest.[135] Complementing this, the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) of 1861 standardized arrest, trial, and evidence procedures, while the Indian High Courts Act 1861 created chartered high courts in Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, merging supreme courts with lower judicatures to streamline appeals and enforce consistency.[136] These measures prioritized imperial security over indigenous customs, with provisions like extraterritorial jurisdiction for Europeans underscoring the reforms' intent to protect British personnel, as evidenced by exemptions from district trials until later adjustments.[137] Overall, the reforms fortified centralized control and legal predictability, reducing the scope for localized abuses that had ignited the 1857 revolt, though they entrenched British dominance without conceding substantive self-governance.[138]Shifts in British Imperial Attitudes
The Indian Rebellion of 1857 compelled British imperial authorities to reassess their governance model in India, moving from pre-rebellion confidence in aggressive territorial expansion and social reforms to a post-rebellion emphasis on prudence, stability, and limited intervention. The uprising exposed the fragility of Company rule, where policies like James Andrew Broun-Ramsay, 1st Marquess of Dalhousie's Doctrine of Lapse (1848–1856) had annexed princely states such as Jhansi and Satara without natural heirs, alienating native rulers and fueling perceptions of arbitrary despotism. This interventionist approach, rooted in utilitarian ideals of modernization, contributed to sepoys' grievances over cultural insensitivities, including the rumored use of animal fat in Enfield rifle cartridges introduced in 1857, which offended Hindu and Muslim religious taboos. The rebellion's suppression, involving over 6,000 British casualties and an estimated 100,000 Indian deaths, underscored the risks of overreach, leading to a doctrinal pivot toward conservative paternalism that viewed Indians as requiring firm but culturally sensitive guidance rather than forced Westernization.[139] Queen Victoria's Proclamation of 1 November 1858, issued upon the transfer of power from the East India Company to direct Crown rule via the Government of India Act 1858, encapsulated this attitudinal realignment by explicitly renouncing interference in Indian religion, caste, or customs. The document assured subjects that "none be in anywise favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious opinions, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the Law," and pledged security to princely states against annexation if loyalty was demonstrated. This conciliatory rhetoric, drafted under Prime Minister Lord Palmerston's administration, aimed to rebuild trust with Indian elites, contrasting sharply with prior evangelical-driven reforms like the 1856 Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, which had provoked backlash. British officials, including Governor-General Charles Canning, who earned the derisive nickname "Clemency Canning" for advocating measured reprisals over indiscriminate vengeance, implemented policies favoring indirect rule through loyal native intermediaries, thereby mitigating risks of renewed unrest.[140][141] In the ensuing decades, this paternalistic framework manifested in military and administrative caution, with recruitment shifting to "martial races" like Sikhs and Gurkhas deemed reliably loyal—evidenced by the 1858 deployment of 35,000 Sikh troops against rebels—while European forces increased from 45,000 in 1857 to over 65,000 by 1863 to ensure dominance. Social policies retreated from proselytization; missionary activities persisted but faced curbs, as seen in the 1863 withdrawal of state support for conversions amid fears of replicating 1857 triggers. Overall, British attitudes hardened into a blend of racial superiority and pragmatic deference to indigenous structures, prioritizing imperial longevity over ideological transformation, though underlying exploitative motives remained evident in sustained revenue extraction averaging £20–25 million annually post-1858. This evolution reflected causal lessons from the rebellion's empirical failures, tempering liberal hubris with conservative realism to sustain control until the 20th century.[142][139]Influence on Indian Society and Economy
The rebellion prompted a significant shift in British policy towards greater non-interference in Indian religious and social customs, as articulated in Queen Victoria's Proclamation of 1858, which pledged respect for native traditions and forbade forced conversions or reforms perceived as cultural impositions.[143] This reversal from earlier Company-era interventions, such as the promotion of widow remarriage and missionary activities, helped preserve traditional hierarchies like the caste system and princely autonomies, stabilizing rural social structures but stalling progressive changes amid fears of renewed unrest.[139] Militarily and socially, recruitment policies reoriented towards "martial races" in regions like Punjab and the North-West Frontier, favoring Sikhs, Gurkhas, and Pathans over higher castes from Bengal and Awadh implicated in the revolt, which altered power dynamics within Indian communities and elevated peasant soldier classes through land grants and pensions.[29] Concurrently, the establishment of universities in Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras in 1857, under Crown auspices, fostered an English-educated middle class, numbering around 100,000 by the 1880s, which introduced Western legal and administrative norms while sowing seeds of nationalist consciousness through exposure to Enlightenment ideas.[139] However, deepened racial segregation—manifest in British confinement to hill stations and cantonments—exacerbated social divides, with intermarriage rates dropping near zero post-rebellion and fostering mutual distrust.[29] Economically, the £40 million cost of suppression (equivalent to roughly 10% of India's annual revenue) necessitated fiscal reorganization, including centralized taxation and debt management under the new Indian Civil Service, which prioritized revenue extraction over development.[132] The abandonment of expansionist doctrines like lapse preserved over 500 princely states covering 40% of territory, maintaining diverse land tenures such as zamindari systems and shielding local economies from uniform British overhaul.[139] Infrastructure investments accelerated for strategic control, with railway mileage surging from 838 miles in 1860 to 15,842 by 1880, linking ports to interiors and facilitating troop deployment while inadvertently boosting agricultural exports—cotton and jute volumes doubled by 1870—and market integration, though primarily benefiting British commerce via guaranteed returns on capital.[144] Telegraphs, expanding to 11,000 miles by 1870, similarly enhanced administrative efficiency but reinforced extractive patterns, as surplus revenues funded imperial deficits rather than local industrialization, perpetuating deindustrialization trends where Indian textile handloom output fell 50% from pre-rebellion levels.[139] Irrigation projects in Punjab, rewarding loyal recruits, increased canal-irrigated land to 14 million acres by 1900, mitigating some famine risks but tying peasants to cash crops like wheat for export.[29]Nomenclature and Terminology Debates
Origins of Key Terms
The term "Sepoy Mutiny" originated in British colonial reports during the uprising's early stages, specifically referencing the insubordination and armed revolt by Indian sepoys—native infantrymen in the East India Company's army—at Meerut on May 10, 1857, where 85 troopers of the 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry refused orders, leading to executions that sparked the broader outbreak.[145] This framing, echoed in contemporaneous dispatches and military correspondence, portrayed the events as a localized military rebellion rather than a widespread political challenge, aligning with the Company's initial underestimation of the revolt's scope, which soon spread to Delhi and beyond involving princely states and civilian populations.[146] Closely related, "Indian Mutiny" gained prevalence in British historiography shortly thereafter, appearing in parliamentary papers and press accounts by mid-1857, such as those documenting the seizure of Delhi by mutineers on May 11, and solidified in post-rebellion analyses that emphasized betrayal by enlisted troops over systemic grievances like annexation policies or cultural intrusions.[147] This nomenclature persisted in Western narratives into the 20th century, reflecting a perspective that minimized the rebellion's nationalist elements in favor of viewing it as an act of indiscipline punishable under military law, with over 100,000 Indian troops involved across Bengal, Oudh, and central India.[148] In Indian nationalist discourse, the counter-term "First War of Independence" emerged in the early 20th century, first systematically articulated by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in his 1909 book The Indian War of Independence, which reinterpreted the 1857 events as an organized anti-colonial struggle uniting Hindus, Muslims, and rulers against foreign domination, drawing on figures like Bahadur Shah II proclaimed as emperor in Delhi.[149] Savarkar's work, written during his imprisonment and smuggled out, challenged the mutiny label by citing evidence of pre-planned coordination, such as chapati distribution rumors and cartridge controversies, framing it as the inaugural bid for sovereignty rather than mere soldierly unrest, though British authorities banned the book for sedition.[150] Additional descriptors like "Great Rebellion" appeared in some 19th-century British texts to convey the event's scale—encompassing sieges at Lucknow and Cawnpore with estimated 6,000 British casualties and far higher Indian losses—but retained a pejorative tone, while "Revolt of 1857" arose in mid-20th-century scholarship as a more neutral alternative acknowledging both military and civilian dimensions without endorsing either mutiny or independence narratives.[151] These terminological origins highlight interpretive divides: British sources prioritized empirical accounts of troop defections, whereas nationalist reframings emphasized causal factors like the Doctrine of Lapse annexations affecting 20 princely states, underscoring how nomenclature shapes causal understanding of the rebellion's drivers.Evolution of Usage Over Time
The term "Sepoy Mutiny" emerged contemporaneously with the outbreak on May 10, 1857, in British military dispatches and press reports from Meerut, framing the initial sepoy insurrection as a betrayal by Indian troops under East India Company command.[152] This nomenclature quickly generalized to "Indian Mutiny" in British accounts by mid-1857, encompassing the spread to Delhi and civilian unrest, as evidenced in official correspondence and early histories like those compiled in the Parliamentary Papers of 1857-1858, which emphasized disciplinary failure over coordinated rebellion.[153] By the late 19th century, British imperial narratives solidified "Mutiny" as the dominant label, appearing in works such as John William Kaye's History of the Sepoy War in India (1864-1876), which portrayed the events as a localized military revolt rather than a proto-national uprising, reflecting colonial priorities of restoring order and justifying reprisals.[1] This usage persisted into the early 20th century in Western scholarship, underscoring the absence of unified political objectives among rebels, who included disparate groups seeking restoration of prior rulers like the Mughals rather than modern independence. The reframing as "First War of Indian Independence" originated with Vinayak Damodar Savarkar's 1909 book The Indian War of Independence, which reinterpreted the mutiny as an organized anti-colonial struggle, drawing on primary sources like rebel proclamations to argue for intentional sovereignty aims despite evidentiary limits on coordination.[154] This nationalist terminology proliferated in India during the independence movement of the 1920s-1940s, adopted by figures like Jawaharlal Nehru, and became entrenched post-1947 in Indian textbooks and state commemorations, such as the 1957 centenary celebrations, to symbolize early resistance against British rule.[155] In post-colonial global historiography from the 1970s onward, neutral descriptors like "Indian Rebellion of 1857" or "Revolt of 1857" gained prevalence in academic works, balancing acknowledgment of widespread uprisings—including princely states and peasantry—against the mutiny's military origins, while critiquing both mutiny minimization of civilian agency and independence-war overstatement of nationalist unity, as supported by archival analyses of fragmented rebel alliances.[113] This shift reflects empirical revisions prioritizing causal factors like economic grievances and cultural clashes over ideological narratives, though "Mutiny" endures in some British military histories and "First War" in Indian civic discourse.[156]Historiographical Interpretations
Contemporary British Perspectives
Contemporary British observers predominantly characterized the uprising as the "Sepoy Mutiny" or "Indian Mutiny," viewing it as a localized revolt by disloyal native troops rather than a coordinated national independence movement.[157][158] Initial accounts emphasized military grievances, particularly the rumored use of animal fat-greased cartridges offending Hindu and Muslim sepoys' religious sensibilities, as the primary trigger, while downplaying broader socio-economic or annexation-related causes.[9] British newspapers, such as The Times and The Illustrated London News, reacted with outrage upon receiving delayed reports of the Meerut outbreak on May 10, 1857, and subsequent massacres at Cawnpore and Lucknow, sensationalizing tales of British women and children killed to evoke public horror and demands for retribution.[159][160] Coverage often depicted Indian rebels as barbaric fanatics driven by primitive impulses, contrasting sharply with portrayals of British resilience and civilization, which fueled a wave of enlistments and charitable funds for victims.[157][161] Parliamentary debates in July 1857 reflected this sentiment, with MPs questioning the East India Company's administration and calling for swift military suppression, though some urged inquiries into underlying administrative failures.[162][163] Governor-General Charles Canning, in office from 1856, adopted a more measured stance amid calls for wholesale reprisals, advocating legal proceedings over indiscriminate vengeance to preserve long-term stability and counter rising racial animosities; this earned him the derisive nickname "Clemency Canning" from critics seeking harsher measures.[9][164] Queen Victoria, informed through dispatches, expressed sympathy for British sufferers but condemned excessive retaliatory violence against Indian civilians, emphasizing in private correspondence that "there is no hatred to a people" and urging justice without "the stain of blood" on Britain's name.[165][9] By late 1857, as relief forces recaptured Delhi on September 20 and Lucknow in November, perspectives shifted toward seeing the event as a cautionary failure of Company rule, prompting demands for direct Crown oversight to prevent recurrence.[158][9]Nationalist and Post-Colonial Views
Indian nationalist historians in the early 20th century reinterpreted the 1857 rebellion as the "First War of Independence," emphasizing it as a deliberate, coordinated struggle against British imperialism rather than a mere sepoy mutiny. Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, in his 1909 book The Indian War of Independence, argued that the uprising was premeditated, involving secret communications like the distribution of chapatis and lotus flowers as signals of conspiracy, and unified leadership under figures such as Bahadur Shah II, whom rebels proclaimed emperor in Delhi on May 11, 1857.[166][167] Savarkar portrayed the conflict as a national effort spanning Hindu and Muslim participants, driven by opposition to British annexations under the Doctrine of Lapse and cultural intrusions like the greased cartridge issue, which he claimed symbolized broader threats to Indian sovereignty.[168] This nationalist framing, influenced by earlier figures like V.K. Chiplunkar and Bal Gangadhar Tilak, served to inspire the independence movement by constructing 1857 as a foundational act of resistance, elevating local rulers like Rani Lakshmibai of Jhansi—who led forces against British recapture of her state in March 1858—as proto-national heroes.[166] However, Savarkar's interpretation, rooted in his Hindutva ideology, overstated unity; empirical records show the rebellion was regionally confined, with no participation from southern India or Punjab, and significant Indian loyalty to the British, including Sikh and Gurkha troops who aided suppression, totaling over 100,000 native allies by 1858.[169] Post-independence Indian historiography, including official centenary commemorations in 1957, perpetuated this view, naming it the "Revolt of 1857" in textbooks to underscore anti-colonial agency, though it glossed over internal divisions such as communal tensions and princely states' opportunistic motives.[170] Post-colonial scholars, drawing on frameworks like Edward Said's Orientalism (1978), depict the rebellion as an inevitable response to British cultural hegemony and economic disruption, framing events like the Meerut mutiny on May 10, 1857, as emblematic of subaltern resistance against colonial "othering" of Indian traditions.[171] Interpretations in this vein, prevalent in academia since the late 20th century, highlight how British policies—such as land revenue systems displacing 1857-era zamindars—aided capitalist extraction, positioning the uprising as proto-nationalist despite its failure to achieve pan-Indian coordination.[172] Yet, these analyses, often shaped by institutions exhibiting systemic ideological biases toward anti-Western narratives, underemphasize verifiable data on the revolt's limited scope—confined to the Gangetic plain and Central India, affecting fewer than 20% of British-held territories—and the role of pre-existing Indian hierarchies in fueling grievances rather than emergent nationalism.[173] Such views prioritize discursive power dynamics over causal factors like sepoy pay disparities (e.g., Bengal Native Infantry receiving 7 rupees monthly versus British 50) and localized fears of forced conversion, which records from British and neutral observers confirm as primary triggers.[170]Modern Empirical and Revisionist Analyses
Revisionist historians have increasingly portrayed the 1857 uprising not as a unified national revolution but as a fragmented series of mutinies and local revolts, driven by disparate grievances rather than a coherent anti-colonial ideology. Scholars like Kim A. Wagner argue that the event's scope was marginal, confined largely to the Bengal Army's sepoy regiments in northern and central India, with participation limited to specific regions such as the Doab, Oudh, and Bihar, while Punjab, the south, and princely states like Hyderabad remained largely unaffected or actively supported British forces through loyal contingents of Sikhs, Gurkhas, and Rajputs. This view challenges earlier nationalist framings by emphasizing the absence of coordinated leadership, shared objectives, or mass civilian mobilization beyond opportunistic alliances with disaffected taluqdars and princes seeking to reverse annexations under the Doctrine of Lapse. Empirical mapping of rebel-held territories reveals control over key cities like Delhi and Lucknow for brief periods, but no sustained pan-Indian challenge, underscoring its localized character.[174][113] Economic analyses grounded in archival revenue records highlight how British land tenure reforms exacerbated peasant indebtedness and elite dispossession, fueling participation among rural intermediaries. The Permanent Settlement in Bengal and Ryotwari system in other areas imposed rigid high assessments that, combined with export-oriented cash crop shifts, left ryots vulnerable; data from colonial gazetteers indicate revenue demands often exceeded 50-70% of produce in Oudh talukas, prompting widespread arrears and evictions by 1857. Revisionists such as Tirthankar Roy note that while sepoy pay grievances—stemming from European units' preferential treatment and fears of overseas postings violating caste norms—ignited the initial Meerut mutiny on May 10, 1857, broader unrest reflected merchant and zamindar anxieties over insecure property rights amid Company expansion, rather than abstract nationalism. Famines, numbering twelve major instances between 1770 and 1857, compounded these pressures, eroding traditional subsistence economies without corresponding infrastructure investments.[175][176] Causal assessments prioritize military and administrative overreach as precipitating factors, with the greased cartridge rumor serving as a catalyst but not sole cause; empirical reviews of sepoy petitions from the 1850s reveal persistent complaints about promotion blocks for Indians and cultural insensitivities, amplified by rapid British conquests that annexed 250,000 square miles between 1848 and 1856. Modern scholarship rejects conspiracy theories, attributing the revolt's rapid spread to communication networks along Grand Trunk Road but its failure to ideological disunity—evident in conflicting proclamations, such as Bahadur Shah II's Mughal restoration appeals clashing with Rani Lakshmibai's local sovereignty claims—and British tactical advantages, including telegraphic coordination and loyal Indian auxiliaries comprising over 100,000 troops by 1858. These analyses caution against anachronistic projections of 20th-century nationalism, viewing 1857 instead as a pre-modern backlash against disruptive colonial governance, with long-term empirical legacies in heightened British caution toward reforms.[177][113]References
- https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dictionary_of_Indian_Biography/Indore%2C_Sir_Takoji_Rao_Holkar_II%2C_Maharaja_of
