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Collaboration with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy
Collaboration with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy
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In World War II, many governments, organizations and individuals collaborated with the Axis powers, "out of conviction, desperation, or under coercion".[1] Nationalists sometimes welcomed German or Italian troops they believed would liberate their countries from colonization. The Danish, Belgian and Vichy French governments attempted to appease and bargain with the invaders in hopes of mitigating harm to their citizens and economies.

Some countries' leaders such as Henrik Werth of Axis member Hungary, cooperated with Italy and Germany because they wanted to regain territories lost during and after World War I, or which their nationalist citizens simply coveted. Others such as France already had their own burgeoning fascist movements and/or antisemitic sentiment, which the invaders validated and empowered. Individuals such as Hendrik Seyffardt in the Netherlands and Theodoros Pangalos in Greece saw collaboration as a path to personal power in the politics of their country. Others believed that Germany would prevail, and wanted to be on the winning side or feared being on the losing one.

Axis military forces recruited many volunteers, sometimes at gunpoint, more often with promises that they later broke, or from among POWs trying to escape appalling and frequently lethal conditions in their detention camps. Other volunteers willingly enlisted because they shared Nazi or fascist ideologies.

Terminology

[edit]

Stanley Hoffmann in 1968 used the term collaborationist to describe those who collaborated for ideological reasons.[2] Bertram Gordon, a professor of modern history, also used the terms collaborationist and collaborator for ideological and non-ideological collaboration.[3] Collaboration described cooperation, sometimes passive, with a victorious power.[4]

Hoffmann saw collaboration as either involuntary, a reluctant recognition of necessity, or voluntary, opportunistic, or greedy. He also categorized collaborationism as "servile", attempting to be useful, or "ideological", full-throated advocacy of the occupier's ideology.[citation needed]

Western Europe

[edit]

Belgium

[edit]
A Vlaamsch Nationaal Verbond (VNV) meeting in Ghent in 1941

Belgium was invaded by Nazi Germany in May 1940[5] and occupied until the end of 1944.

Political collaboration took separate forms across the Belgian language divide. In Dutch-speaking Flanders, the Vlaamsch Nationaal Verbond (Flemish National Union or VNV), clearly authoritarian, anti-democratic and influenced by fascist ideas,[6] became a major player in the German occupation strategy as part of the pre-war Flemish Movement. VNV politicians were promoted to positions in the Belgian civil administration.[7] VNV and its comparatively moderate stance was increasingly eclipsed later in the war by the more radical and pro-German DeVlag movement.[8]

In French-speaking Wallonia, Léon Degrelle's Rexist Party, a pre-war authoritarian and Catholic Fascist political party,[9] became the VNV's Walloon equivalent, although Rex's Belgian nationalism put it at odds with the Flemish nationalism of VNV and the German Flamenpolitik. Rex became increasingly radical after 1941 and declared itself part of the Waffen-SS.

Although the pre-war Belgian government went into exile in 1940, the Belgian civil service remained in place for much of the occupation. The Committee of Secretaries-General, an administrative panel of civil servants, although conceived as a purely technocratic institution, has been accused of helping to implement German occupation policies. Despite its intention of mitigating harm to Belgians, it enabled but could not moderate German policies such as the persecution of Jews and deportation of workers to Germany. It did manage to delay the latter to October 1942.[10] Encouraging the Germans to delegate tasks to the Committee made their implementation much more efficient than the Germans could have achieved by force.[11] Belgium depended on Germany for food imports, so the committee was always at a disadvantage in negotiations.[11]

The Belgian government in exile criticized the committee for helping the Germans.[12][13] The Secretaries-General were also unpopular in Belgium itself. In 1942, journalist Paul Struye described them as "the object of growing and almost unanimous unpopularity."[14] As the face of the German occupation authority, they became unpopular with the public, which blamed them for the German demands they implemented.[12]

After the war, several of the Secretaries-General were tried for collaboration. Most were quickly acquitted. Gérard Romsée [fr], the former secretary-general for internal affairs, was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment, and Gaston Schuind, Judicial Police of Brussels,[15][unreliable source?] was sentenced to five.[16] Many former secretaries-general had careers in politics after the war. Victor Leemans served as a senator from the centre-right Christian Social Party (PSC-CVP) and became president of the European Parliament.[17]

Belgian police have also been accused of collaborating, especially in the Holocaust.[8]

Towards the end of the war, militias of collaborationist parties actively carried out reprisals for resistance attacks or even assassinations.[18] Those assassinations included leading figures suspected of resistance involvement or sympathy,[19] such as Alexandre Galopin, head of the Société Générale, assassinated in February 1944. Among the retaliatory massacres of civilians[18] were the Courcelles massacre, in which 20 civilians were killed by the Rexist paramilitary for the assassination of a Burgomaster, and a massacre at Meensel-Kiezegem, where 67 were killed.[20]

Channel Islands

[edit]

The Channel Islands were the only British-controlled territory in Europe to be occupied by Nazi Germany. The policy of the islands' governments was what they called "correct relations" with the German occupiers. There was no armed or violent resistance by islanders to the occupation.[21] After 1945 allegations of collaboration were investigated.[clarification needed] In November 1946, the UK Home Secretary informed the UK House of Commons[22] that most allegations lacked substance. Only twelve cases of collaboration were considered for prosecution, and the Director of Public Prosecutions ruled them out for insufficient grounds. In particular, it was decided that there were no legal grounds for proceeding against those alleged to have informed the occupying authorities against their fellow citizens.[23][page needed]

On the islands of Jersey and Guernsey, laws[24][25] were passed to retrospectively confiscate the financial gains made by war profiteers and black marketeers. After liberation, British forces had to intervene to prevent revenge attacks on women thought to have fraternized with German soldiers.[26]

Denmark

[edit]
Members of Free Corps Denmark leaving for the Eastern Front from Copenhagen's Hellerup station

When on 9 April 1940, German forces invaded neutral Denmark, they violated a treaty of non-aggression signed the year before, but claimed they would "respect Danish sovereignty and territorial integrity, and neutrality."[27] The Danish government quickly surrendered and remained intact. The parliament maintained control over domestic policy.[28] Danish public opinion generally backed the new government, particularly after the Fall of France in June 1940.[29]

Denmark's government cooperated with the German occupiers until 1943,[30] and helped organize sales of industrial and agricultural products to Germany.[31] The Danish government enacted a number of policies to satisfy Germany and retain the social order. Newspaper articles and news reports "which might jeopardize German-Danish relations" were outlawed[citation needed] and on 25 November 1941, Denmark joined the Anti-Comintern Pact.[32] The Danish government and King Christian X repeatedly discouraged sabotage and encouraged informing on the resistance movement. Resistance fighters were imprisoned or executed; after the war informants were sentenced to death.[33][34][35]

Prior to, during and after the war, Denmark enforced a restrictive refugee policy; it handed over to German authorities at least 21 Jewish refugees who managed to cross the border;[31] 18 of them died in concentration camps, including a woman and her three children.[36] In 2005 prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen officially apologized for these policies.[37]

HQ of the SS-Schalburgkorps in Copenhagen in 1943

Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, German authorities demanded the arrest of Danish communists. The Danish government complied, directing the police to arrest 339 communists listed on secret registers. Of these, 246, including the three communist members of the Danish parliament, were imprisoned in the Horserød camp, in violation of the Danish constitution. On 22 August 1941, the Danish parliament passed the Communist Law, outlawing the Communist Party of Denmark and also communist activities, in another violation of the Danish constitution. In 1943, about half of the imprisoned communists were transferred to Stutthof concentration camp, where 22 of them died.

Industrial production and trade were, partly due to geopolitical reality and economic necessity, redirected towards Germany. Many government officials saw expanded trade with Germany as vital to maintaining social order in Denmark[38] and feared that higher unemployment and poverty could lead to civil unrest, resulting in a crackdown by the Germans.[39] Unemployment benefits could be denied if jobs were available in Germany, so an average of 20,000 Danes worked in German factories through the five years of the war.[40]

The Danish cabinet, however, rejected German demands for legislation discriminating against Denmark's Jewish minority. Demands for a death penalty were likewise rebuffed and so were demands to give German military courts jurisdiction over Danish citizens and for the transfer of Danish army units to the German military.[citation needed]

France

[edit]

Vichy France

[edit]
Leader (Chef) of Vichy France Marshal Philippe Pétain meeting Hitler at Montoire, 24 October 1940. (Hitler's interpreter, Dr Paul Schmidt, stands between them, while Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister, stands to the right.)

After the defeat of France in June 1940, the French Third Republic collapsed and was replaced by the authoritarian French State (État Français), led by First World War hero Marshal Philippe Pétain.[41] The new government was based in Vichy rather than Paris. Prime Minister Paul Reynaud resigned rather than sign the armistice with Germany, after which the National Assembly granted Pétain full powers to draft a new constitution. Instead, he used these powers to establish a regime based on authoritarian and conservative principles.[42]

Pierre Laval and other Vichy ministers initially focused on preserving French sovereignty and repatriating prisoners of war.[43] The regime sought to maintain an illusion of autonomy and avoid direct German military rule. In occupied Paris, German authorities tolerated the activities of several collaborationist groups that publicly criticised Vichy for not going far enough. This served as a pressure tactic, implicitly threatening to replace Vichy leaders who resisted German demands. Until the final months of the occupation, the French State actively supported the economic and strategic objectives of the German authorities.[44]

Collaborationist movements

[edit]
Leaders of the main French collaborationist parties. From left to right: Costantini, Déat, Deloncle and Doriot.

The four main political factions which emerged as leading proponents of radical collaborationism in France were:

These groups were small in size: between 1940 and 1944 fewer than 220,000 people in France and French North Africa joined collaborationist movements.[46][47] In the last six months of the occupation, Déat and Doriot, together with Joseph Darnand, who led the paramilitary Milice, became members of the Vichy government-in-exile at the Sigmaringen enclave in southwestern Germany.[48]

Uniformed collaboration

[edit]

The collaboration of the French police was decisive for the implementation of the Holocaust in occupied France. Germany used French police to maintain order and repress the resistance. The French police were responsible for the census of Jews, their arrest and their assembly in camps from where they were sent abroad to extermination camps. To do this the police requisitioned buses and used the rail network of SNCF trains.[49] In January 1943, Laval established the Milice, a paramilitary police force led by Joseph Darnand that assisted the Gestapo in fighting the Resistance and persecuting Jews, it counted 30,000 members both male and female.[48]

French milice (in uniform with guns) escorting Resistance prisoners in July 1944

In July 1941, the collaborationist parties cooperated in organising and recruiting the Legion of French Volunteers Against Bolshevism (LVF), to fight alongside German forces on the Eastern Front. From July 1941, a total of 5,800 French volunteers served with the LVF until its disbanding in November 1944. On 18 August 1943, German authorities also established the SS Volunteer Sturmbrigade France (Französisches SS-Freiwilligen-Regiment), composed of French recruits for the Waffen-SS.[50] On 13 November 1944, the surviving members of the Sturmbrigade were joined with former LVF fighters, men from the National Socialist Motor Corps' Motorgruppe Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine detachments, and Todt Organsation workers, forming the core of the new Waffen-Grenadier-Brigade der SS "Charlemagne".[51] In February 1945, this brigade was elevated to division status and deployed to eastern Europe and Berlin, with a strength of 7,340 men.[52] According to French historian Pierre Giolitto, around 30,000 Frenchmen served in German military units (including non-combatants) during the war.[48]

Communist party

[edit]

Until the German invasion of Russia on 21 June 1941, the national leadership of the French Communist Party (PCF) remained close to the line defined by the Comintern and the Soviet Union, claiming that "the only legitimate struggle is the revolutionary struggle and not the pseudo-resistance of the Gaullists, pawns of British capitalism".[53][54] Following this logic, relations with the occupier were ambiguous. Ronald Tiersky has described the actions of the French communists during that period as "actively collaborating in certain respects".[55]

Otto Abetz, German ambassador to France

During the early days of the German occupation, the clandestine edition of newspaper L'Humanité called on French workers to fraternise with German soldiers, presenting them not as enemies of the nation but as "class brothers".[56] In June 1940, under instructions from the party leadership, French communist leaders contacted the German authorities[57] and were received by Otto Abetz, the German ambassador in Paris.[58] They requested the permission to republish L'Humanité, which had been suspended in August 1939 by the Daladier government because of its support for the German-Soviet Pact;[59] They also demanded the legalisation of the French Communist Party, dissolved in September 1939.[60] The negotiations were not successful due to the hostility of the German military command and the visceral anti-communism of the Pétain government.[57] Throughout that summer, L'Humanité and the entire communist underground press continued to publish articles preaching "Franco-German brotherhood," denouncing "British imperialism," and depicting de Gaulle as a reactionary and war-mongering soldier.[57]

Following the Wehrmacht invasion of Russia a year later, the PCF completely changed its stance and became one of the key players of the French Resistance.[61][62]

French workers for Germany

[edit]
Departure of STO workers from the Paris-Nord station in 1943

Vichy initially agreed, for every repatriated French prisoner-of-war, to send three French volunteers to work in German factories. When this program (known as la relève) didn't draw enough workers to please the Reich, Vichy began in February 1943 to conscript young Frenchmen (aged 18-20) into the Service du travail obligatoire (STO or Obligatory Labour Service), a compulsory two-year labour draft that resulted in the deportation to German labor camps of 800,000 Frenchmen.[63]

Very unpopular, the STO provoked growing hostility towards the policy of collaboration and led to a great number of young men joining the French Resistance rather than report for it. People began to disappear into forests and mountain wildernesses to join the maquis (rural Resistance).[64][65]

Vichy collaboration in the Holocaust

[edit]
French premier Pierre Laval in Paris with Carl Oberg, the Senior SS and Police Leader in France and Oberg's assistant,Gestapo commander Herbert Hagen.

In the early twentieth century, many Jews viewed France as a nation of justice and opportunity, particularly in light of the eventual exoneration of Alfred Dreyfus.[66] Holocaust historian Susan Zuccotti notes that some Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe even chose France over the United States because they believed it to be a country where the rule of law could prevail, even against antisemitism.[67] By 1940, approximately 330,000 Jews were living in France, and while antisemitic sentiment existed, many Jewish families felt relatively secure and integrated into French society.[68]
This sense of security collapsed following France's defeat and the establishment of the Vichy regime, which played a central role in the implementation of the Holocaust. Acting independently of German orders, it introduced antisemitic laws beginning with the Statut des Juifs on 3 October 1940, followed the next day by a decree authorising the internment of foreign Jews in both occupied and unoccupied zones.[69] Internment camps such as Drancy, Pithiviers, Beaune-la-Rolande and Gurs were administered by French authorities and served as key transit points for deportations to Auschwitz.[70]

Two Jewish women in occupied Paris wearing the compulsory yellow star

The Commissariat-General for Jewish Affairs, created in March 1941, was tasked with preparing and enforcing racial laws, including the seizure of Jewish property.[69] French police under Secretary General René Bousquet organised arrests, beginning with the Green ticket roundup, the first large roundup of foreign Jews in Paris on 14 May 1941.[69] In August 1942, the Bousquet–Oberg accords formalised police cooperation with the SS, and French forces handed over 10,000 stateless Jews from the Southern Zone.[71] That same summer, Prime Minister Pierre Laval proposed that children be deported with their families, claiming that "children should remain with their parents".[71] Deportations from both zones accelerated targeting primarily foreign-born or stateless Jews.[71]

In 1995, President Jacques Chirac officially recognized the responsibility of the French state for the deportation of Jews during the war, in particular, the more than 13,000 victims of the Vel' d'Hiv Roundup of July 1942.[72]

Of the approximately 330,000 Jews living in France in 1940, around 76,000 were deported to Nazi camps.[73][71] According to Serge Klarsfeld, out of the 75,721 Jews deported from France to death camps in Poland, only 2,567 survived.[48] The overall survival rate of Jews in France, around 76 percent, was unusually high compared to other Nazi-occupied countries.[74] Historians attribute this unusually high survival rate to several factors, including Vichy's early focus on foreign Jews, delays in targeting French citizens, and the geographic dispersion of the Jewish population.[74]

Aftermath

[edit]
The Resistance parades women through the streets of Paris — branded, barefoot, bald, and stripped — for consorting with German occupiers ("horizontal collaboration")

As the Liberation spread across France in 1944–45, so did the so-called Wild Purges (l'Épuration sauvage). Resistance groups took summary reprisals, especially against suspected informers and members of Vichy's anti-partisan paramilitary, the Milice. Unofficial courts tried and punished thousands of people accused (sometimes unjustly) of collaborating or consorting with the enemy. Estimates of the numbers of victims differ, but historians agree that the number will never be fully known.[75]

Not every prominent collaborationist survived to see the Liberation. Pétain's former deputy, Admiral François Darlan, was assassinated in December 1942 after coming to terms with the Allies invading North Africa. (See #French North Africa below.) In January 1944. Eugène Deloncle, the former leader of La Cagoule, who had turned towards the German resistance, died in a shoot-out with the German Security Service (SD). In June 1944 (just after D-Day), the Resistance in Paris killed the pro-Axis broadcaster Philippe Henriot in front of his family. And in February 1945, near the very end of the European war, the Germans pressed Jacques Doriot of the PPF to reconcile with his bitter rival, Marcel Déat of the RNP, but Doriot died when the car taking him to meet Déat was strafed by Allied aircraft.[76] Déat himself, however, escaped to Italy, where he died in 1955.

As a formal legal order returned to France, the informal purges were replaced by l'Épuration légale (legal purge). The most notable, and most demanded, convictions were those of Pierre Laval, tried and executed in October 1945, and Marshal Philippe Pétain, whose 1945 death sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment in the island fortress of Yeu in Brittany, where he died in 1951. Joseph Darnand, the Milice leader, was convicted and executed in October 1945.

Several decades later, a few surviving ex-collaborators such as Paul Touvier were tried for crimes against humanity. René Bousquet was rehabilitated and regained some influence in French politics, finance and journalism, but was nonetheless investigated in 1991 for deporting Jews. He was assassinated in 1993 just before his trial would have begun. Maurice Papon served as prefect of the Paris police under President de Gaulle (thus bearing ultimate responsibility for the 1961 Paris massacre) and, 20 years later, as Budget Minister under President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, before Papon's 1998 conviction and imprisonment for crimes against humanity in organizing the deportation of 1,560 Jews from the Bordeaux region to the French internment camp at Drancy.

Luxembourg

[edit]

Luxembourg was invaded by Nazi Germany in May 1940 and remained under German occupation until early 1945. Initially, the country was governed as a distinct region as the Germans prepared to assimilate its Germanic population into Germany itself. The Volksdeutsche Bewegung (VdB) was founded in Luxembourg in 1941 under the leadership of Damian Kratzenberg, a German teacher at the Athénée de Luxembourg.[77] It aimed to encourage the population towards a pro-German position, prior to outright annexation, using the slogan Heim ins Reich. In August 1942, Luxembourg was annexed into Nazi Germany, and Luxembourgish men were drafted into the German military.

Monaco

[edit]

During the Nazi occupation of Monaco, the police arrested and turned over 42 Central European Jewish refugees to the Nazis while also protecting Monaco's own Jews.[78]

Netherlands

[edit]
SS Recruiting poster urging Dutch people to join the fight against Bolshevism

The Germans re-organized the pre-war Dutch police and established a new Communal Police, which helped Germans fight the country's resistance and to deport Jews. The National Socialist Movement in the Netherlands (NSB) had militia units, whose members were transferred to other paramilitaries like the Netherlands Landstorm or the Control Commando. A small number of people greatly assisted the German in their hunt for Jews, including some policemen and the Henneicke Column. Many of them were members of the NSB.[79] The column alone was responsible for the arrest of about 900 Jews.[80][81]

Norway

[edit]
Vidkun Quisling and Jonas Lie inspect the Norwegian Legion

In Norway, the national government, headed by Vidkun Quisling, was installed by the Germans as a puppet regime during the German occupation, while king Haakon VII and the legally elected Norwegian government fled into exile.[82] Quisling encouraged Norwegians to volunteer for service in the Waffen-SS, collaborated in the deportation of Jews, and was responsible for the executions of members of the Norwegian resistance movement.

About 45,000 Norwegian collaborators joined the fascist party Nasjonal Samling (National Union), and about 8,500 of them enlisted in the Hirden collaborationist paramilitary organization. About 15,000 Norwegians volunteered on the Nazi side and 6,000 joined the Germanic SS. In addition, Norwegian police units like the Statspolitiet helped arrest many of Jews in Norway. All but 23 of the 742 Jews deported to concentration camps and death camps were murdered or died before the end of the war. Knut Rød, the Norwegian police officer most responsible for the arrest, detention and transfer of Jewish men, women and children to SS troops at Oslo harbour, was later acquitted during the legal purge in Norway after World War II in two highly publicized trials that remain controversial.[83]

Nasjonal Samling had very little support among the population at large[84] and Norway was one of few countries where resistance during World War II was widespread before the turning point of the war in 1942–43.[citation needed]

After the war, Quisling was executed by firing squad.[85] His name became an international eponym for "traitor".[86]

Eastern Europe

[edit]

Albania

[edit]

After the Italian invasion of Albania, the Royal Albanian Army, police and gendarmerie were amalgamated into the Italian armed forces in the newly created Italian protectorate of Albania.

The Albanian Fascist Militia formed after the Italian invasion of Albania in April 1939. In the Yugoslav part of Kosovo, it established the Vulnetari (or Kosovars), a volunteer militia of Kosovo Albanians. Vulnetari units often attacked ethnic Serbs and carried out raids against civilian targets.[87][88] They burned down hundreds of Serbian and Montenegrin villages, killed many people, and plundered the Kosovo and neighboring regions.[89]

Baltic states

[edit]

The three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, first invaded by the Soviet Union, were later occupied by Germany and incorporated, together with what had been the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic of the U.S.S.R. (Belarus, see below), into Reichskommissariat Ostland.[90]

Estonia

[edit]

In German plans, Estonia was to become an area for future German settlements, as Estonians themselves were considered high on the Nazi racial scale, with potential for Germanization.[91] Unlike the other Baltic states, the seizure of Estonian territory by German troops was relatively long, from July 7 to December 2, 1941. This period was used by the Soviets to carry out a wave of repression against Estonians. It is estimated that the NKVD's subordinate Destruction battalions killed some 2,000 Estonian civilians,[92] and 50–60,000 people were deported deep into the USSR.[93] 10,000 of them died in the GULAG system within a year.[93] Many Estonians fought against Soviet troops on the German side, hoping to liberate their country. Some 12,000 Estonian partisans took part in the fighting.[94] Of great importance were the 57 Finnish-trained members of the Erna group, who operated behind enemy lines.[94]

Resistance groups were organised by Germans in August 1941 into the Omakaitse (lit.'Self-defence'), which had between 34,000[95] and 40,000 members,[96] mainly based on the Kaitseliit, dissolved by the Soviets.[95] Omakaitse was in charge of clearing the German army's rear of Red Army soldiers, NKVD members, and Communist activists. Within a year its members killed 5,500 Estonian residents.[97] Later, they performed guard duty and fought Soviet partisans flown into Estonia.[97] From among Omakaitse members were recruited Estonian policemen, members of the Estonian Auxiliary Police and officers of the Estonian 20th Waffen-SS Division.[98]

The Germans formed a puppet government, the Estonian Self-Administration, headed by Hjalmar Mäe. This government had considerable autonomy in internal affairs, such as filling police posts.[98] The Security Police in Estonia (SiPo) had a mixed Estonian-German structure (139 Germans and 873 Estonians) and was formally under the Estonian Self-Administration.[99] Estonian police cooperated with Germans in rounding up Jews, Roma, communists and those deemed enemies of existing order or asocial elements. The police also helped to conscript Estonians for forced labor and military service under German command.[100] Most of the small population of Estonian Jews fled before the Germans arrived, with only about a thousand remaining. All of them were arrested by Estonian police and executed by Omakaitse.[101] Members of the Estonian Auxiliary Police and 20th Waffen-SS Division also executed Jewish prisoners sent to concentration and labor camps established by the Germans on Estonian territory.[102]

Immediately after entering Estonia, the Germans began forming volunteer Estonian units the size of a battalion. By January 1942, six Security Groups (battalions No. 181-186, about 4,000 men) had been formed and were subordinate to the Wehrmacht 18th Army.[103] After the one-year contract expired, some volunteers transferred to the Waffen-SS or returned to civilian life, and three Eastern Battalions (No. 658-660) were formed from those who remained.[103] They fought until early 1944, after which their members transferred to the 20th Waffen-SS Division.[103]

Beginning in September 1941, the SS and police command created four Infantry Defence Battalions (No. 37-40) and a reserve and sapper battalion (No. 41-42), which were operationally subordinate to the Wehrmacht. From 1943 they were called Police Battalions, with 3,000 serving in them.[103] In 1944 they were transformed into two infantry battalions and evacuated to Germany in the fall of 1944, where they were incorporated into the 20th Waffen-SS Division.[103]

In the fall of 1941, the Germans also formed eight police battalions (No. 29-36), of which only Battalion No. 36 had a typically military purpose. However, due to shortages, most of them were sent to the front near Leningrad,[104] and were mostly disbanded in 1943. That same year, the SS and police command created five new Security and Defense Battalions (they inherited No. 29-33 and had more than 2,600 men).[105] In the spring of 1943, five Defence Battalions (No. 286-290) were established as compulsory military service units. The 290th Battalion consisted of Estonian Russians. Battalions No. 286, 288 and 289 were used to fight partisans in Belarus.[106]

The recruiting center for the Waffen-SS Estonian Legion

On Aug. 28, 1942, the Germans formed the volunteer Estonian Waffen-SS Legion. Of the approximately 1,000 volunteers, 800 were incorporated into Battalion Narva and sent to Ukraine in the spring of 1943.[107] Due to the shrinking number of volunteers, in February 1943 the Germans introduced compulsory conscription in Estonia. Born between 1919 and 1924 faced the choice of going to work in Germany, joining the Waffen-SS or Estonian auxiliary battalions. 5,000 joined the Estonian Waffen-SS Legion, which was reorganized into the 3rd Estonian Waffen-SS Brigade.[106]

As the Red Army advanced, a general mobilization was announced, officially supported by Estonia's last Prime Minister Jüri Uluots. By April 1944, 38,000 Estonians had been drafted. Some went into the 3rd Waffen-SS Brigade, which was enlarged to division size (20th Waffen-SS Division: 10 battalions, more than 15,000 men in the summer of 1944) and also incorporated most of the already existing Estonian units (mostly Eastern Battalions).[108] Younger men were conscripted into other Waffen-SS units. From the rest, six Border Defense Regiments and four Police Fusilier Battalions (Nos. 286, 288, 291, and 292).[109]

The Estonian Security Police and SD,[110] the 286th, 287th and 288th Estonian Auxiliary Police battalions, and 2.5–3% of the Estonian Omakaitse (Home Guard) militia units (between 1,000 and 1,200 men) took part in rounding up, guarding or killing of 400–1,000 Roma and 6,000 Jews in concentration camps in the Pskov region of Russia and the Jägala, Vaivara, Klooga and Lagedi concentration camps in Estonia.

Guarded by these units, 15,000 Soviet POWs died in Estonia: some through neglect and mistreatment and some by execution.[111]

Latvia

[edit]
Latvian Auxiliary Police assemble a group of Jews, Liepāja, July 1941.

Deportations and murders of Latvians by the Soviet NKVD reached their peak in the days before the capture of Soviet-occupied Riga by German forces.[112] Those that the NKVD could not deport before the Germans arrived were shot at the Central Prison.[112] The RSHA's instructions to their agents to unleash pogroms fell on fertile ground.[112] After the Einsatzkommando 1a and part of Einsatzkommando 2 entered the Latvian capital,[113] Einsatzgruppe A's commander Franz Walter Stahlecker made contact with Viktors Arājs on 1 July and instructed him to set up a commando unit. It was later named Latvian Auxiliary Police or Arajs Kommandos.[114] The members, far-right students and former officers were all volunteers, and free to leave at any time.[114]

The next day, 2 July, Stahlecker instructed Arājs to have the Arājs Kommandos unleash pogroms that looked spontaneous,[112] before the German occupation authorities were properly established.[115] Einsatzkommando-influenced[116] mobs of former members of Pērkonkrusts and other extreme right-wing groups began pillaging and making mass arrests, and killed 300 to 400 Riga Jews. Killings continued under the supervision of SS Brigadeführer Walter Stahlecker, until more than 2,700 Jews had died.[112][115]

The activities of the Einsatzkommando were constrained after the full establishment of the German occupation authority, after which the SS made use of select units of native recruits.[113] German General Wilhelm Ullersperger and Voldemārs Veiss, a well known Latvian nationalist, appealed to the population in a radio address to attack "internal enemies". During the next few months, the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police primarily focused on killing Jews, Communists and Red Army stragglers in Latvia and in neighbouring Byelorussia.[114]

In February–March 1943, eight Latvian battalions took part in the punitive anti-partisan Operation Winterzauber near the Belarus–Latvia border, which resulted in 439 burned villages, 10,000 to 12,000 deaths, and over 7,000 taken for forced labor or imprisoned at the Salaspils concentration camp.[117] This group alone killed almost half of Latvia's Jewish population,[118] about 26,000 Jews, mainly in November and December 1941.[119]

The creation of the Arājs Kommando was "one of the most significant inventions of the early Holocaust",[118] and marked a transition from German-organised pogroms to systematic killing of Jews by local volunteers (former army officers, policemen, students, and Aizsargi).[115] This helped with a chronic German personnel shortage and provided the Germans with relief from the psychological stress of routinely murdering civilians.[115] By the autumn of 1941, the SS had deployed the Latvian Auxiliary Police battalions to Leningrad, where they were consolidated into the 2nd Latvian SS Infantry Brigade.[120] In 1943, this brigade, which later became the 19th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (2nd Latvian), was consolidated with the 15th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (1st Latvian) to become the Latvian Legion.[120] Although the Latvian Legion was a formally volunteer Waffen-SS unit, it was voluntary only in name; approximately 80–85% of its men were conscripts.[121]

Lithuania

[edit]
Lithuanian LSP policeman with Jewish prisoners, Vilnius, 1941

Prior to the German invasion, some leaders in Lithuania and in exile believed Germany would grant the country autonomy, as they had the Slovak Republic. The German intelligence service Abwehr believed that it controlled the Lithuanian Activist Front, a pro-German organization based at the Lithuanian embassy in Berlin.[122] Lithuanians formed the Provisional Government of Lithuania on their own initiative, but Germany did not recognize it diplomatically, or allow Lithuanian ambassador Kazys Škirpa to become prime minister, instead actively thwarting his activities. The provisional government disbanded, since it had no power and it had become clear that the Germans came as occupiers not liberators from Soviet occupation, as initially thought. By 1943, the German opinion of Lithuanians was that they had failed to show allegiance to them.[123] When the Germans called-up Lithuanians for military service in spring 1943, Lithuanians protested against it by making the call-up produce dismally low numbers, which angered the German occupiers.[123]

Units under Algirdas Klimaitis and supervised by SS Brigadeführer Walter Stahlecker started pogroms in and around Kaunas on 25 June 1941.[124][125] Lithuanian collaborators killed hundreds of thousands of Jews, Poles and Gypsies.[126] According to Lithuanian-American scholar Saulius Sužiedėlis, an increasingly antisemitic atmosphere clouded Lithuanian society, and antisemitic LAF émigrés "needed little prodding from 'foreign influences'".[127] He concluded that Lithuanian collaboration was "a significant help in facilitating all phases of the genocidal program . . . [and that] the local administration contributed, at times with zeal, to the destruction of Lithuanian Jewry".[128] Elsewhere, Sužiedėlis similarly emphasised that Lithuania's "moral and political leadership failed in 1941, and that thousands of Lithuanians participated in the Holocaust",[129] though he warned that "[u]ntil buttressed by reliable accounts providing time, place and at least an approximate number of victims, claims of large-scale pogroms before the advent of the German forces must be treated with caution".[130]

In 1941, the Lithuanian Security Police was created, subordinate to Nazi Germany's Security Police and Criminal Police.[131] Of the 26 Lithuanian Auxiliary Police Battalions, 10 were involved in the Holocaust.[clarification needed] On August 16, the head of the Lithuanian police, Vytautas Reivytis [lt], ordered the arrest of Jewish men and women with Bolshevik activities: "In reality, it was a sign to kill everyone."[132] The Special SD and German Security Police Squad in Vilnius killed 70,000 Jews in Paneriai and other places.[131][clarification needed] In Minsk, the 2nd Battalion shot about 9,000 Soviet prisoners of war, and in Slutsk it massacred 5,000 Jews.

In March 1942, in Poland, the 2nd Lithuanian Battalion guarded the Majdanek concentration camp.[133] In July 1942, the 2nd Battalion participated in the deportation of Jews from the Warsaw Ghetto to Treblinka extermination camp.[134] In August–October 1942, some of the Lithuanian police battalions were in Belarus and Ukraine: the 3rd in Molodechno, the 4th in Donetsk, the 7th in Vinnytsa, the 11th in Korosten, the 16th in Dnepropetrovsk, the 254th in Poltava and the 255th in Mogilev (Belarus).[135][unreliable source?] One battalion was also used to put down the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in 1943.[133]

The participation of the local populace was a key factor in the Holocaust in Nazi-occupied Lithuania[136] which resulted in the near total decimation of Lithuanian Jews living in the Nazi-occupied Lithuanian territories that would. From 25 July 1941, participation was under the Generalbezirk Litauen of Reichskommissariat Ostland. Out of approximately 210,000[137] Jews, (208,000 according to the Lithuanian pre-war statistical data)[138] an estimated 195,000–196,000 perished before the end of World War II (wider estimates are sometimes published); most from June to December 1941.[137][139] The events happening in the USSR's western regions occupied by Nazi Germany in the first weeks after the German invasion (including Lithuania – see map) marked the sharp intensification of the Holocaust.[140][141][142]

Bulgaria

[edit]

Czechoslovakia

[edit]
Partition of Czecho-Slovakia, 1938-39: Sudentenland in medium shade of purple (mauve); cessions to Hungary in beige.

Sudetenland

[edit]

Konrad Henlein, a populist strongman who represented the sizable German minority of the Sudetenland border region, actively sought a Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia.[143] and his efforts arguably triggered the Munich Agreement[144] After the invasion he administered the Nazi deportations that sent Jews to Theresienstadt Ghetto, almost none of whom survived. For example, 42,000 people, mostly Czech Jews, were deported from Theresienstadt in 1942, of whom only 356 survivors are known.[145] Henlein also tried to expel all Czechs from the Sudetenland, but the neighbouring Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia refused to accept them and he was informed that the need of the area's factories for labour outweighed such ethnic policies.[146]

Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia

[edit]

When the Germans annexed Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939, they created the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia from the Czech part of pre-war Czechoslovakia[147] It had its own military forces, including a 12-battalion 'government army', police and gendarmerie. Most members of the 'government army' were sent to Northern Italy in 1944 as labourers and guards.[148][unreliable source?] Whether or not the government army was a collaborationist force has been debated. Its commanding officer, Jaroslav Eminger, was tried and acquitted on charges of collaboration following World War II.[149] Some members of the force engaged in active resistance operations while in the army, and, in the waning days of the conflict, elements of the army joined in the Prague uprising.[150]

Slovak Republic

[edit]

The Slovak Republic (Slovenská Republika) was a quasi-independent ethnic Slovak state which existed from 14 March 1939 to 8 May 1945 as an ally and client state of Nazi Germany. The Slovak Republic existed on roughly the same territory as present-day Slovakia (except for the southern and eastern parts). It bordered Germany, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, German-occupied Poland, and Hungary.

Greece

[edit]

Germany put a collaborationist government in place in Greece. Prime ministers Georgios Tsolakoglou, Konstantinos Logothetopoulos and Ioannis Rallis[151] all cooperated with Axis authorities. Greece exported agricultural products, especially tobacco, to Germany, and Greek "volunteers" worked in German factories.[152]

While efforts by Major General Georgios Bakos to recruit a Greek volunteer legion to fight in the Eastern Front failed,[153] the collaborationist government of Ioannis Rallis created armed paramilitary forces such as the Security Battalions[154] to fight the EAM/ELAS resistance[155] Former dictator, General Theodoros Pangalos, saw the Security Battalions as a way to make a political comeback, and most of the Hellenic Army officers recruited in April 1943 were republicans in some way associated with Pangalos.[156]

Greek National-Socialist parties like George S. Mercouris' Greek National Socialist Party of the ESPO organization, or such openly anti-semitic organisations as the National Union of Greece, helped German authorities fight the Greek resistance, and identify and deport Greek Jews.[157] The BUND Organization and its leader Aginor Giannopoulos trained a battalion of Greek volunteers who fought in SS and Brandenburgers units.

During the Axis occupation, a number of Cham Albanians set up their own administration and militia in Thesprotia, Greece, under the Balli Kombëtar organization, and actively collaborated with first Italian and then German occupation forces, committing a number of atrocities.[158][better source needed] In one incident on 29 September 1943, Nuri and Mazzar Dino, Albanian paramilitary leaders, instigated the mass execution of all Greek officials and notables in Paramythia.[159]

Bulgaria was interested in acquiring Thessalonica and western Macedonia and hoped to gain the allegiance of the 80,000 Slavs who lived there at the time.[160] The appearance of Greek partisans there persuaded Axis forces to allow the formation of Ohrana collaborationist detachments.[160] The organization initially recruited 1,000 to 3,000 armed men from the Slavophone community in the west of Greek Macedonia.[161]

An Aromanian political and paramilitary force, the Roman Legion, led by Aromanian nationalists Alcibiades Diamandi and Nicolaos Matussis, also collaborated with Italian forces.[citation needed]

Hungary

[edit]

In April 1941, in order to regain territory and under German pressure, Hungary allowed the Wehrmacht across its territory in the invasion of Yugoslavia. Hungarian prime minister Pál Teleki wanted to maintain a pro-Allies neutral stance,[162] but could no longer stay out of the war. British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden threatened to break diplomatic relations if Hungary did not actively resist the passage of German troops across its territory. General Henrik Werth, chief of the Hungarian General Staff, made a private arrangement with the German High Command, unsanctioned by the Hungarian government, to transport German troops across Hungary. Teleki, unable to stop these events, committed suicide on April 3, 1941.[162] After the war the Hungarian People's Court sentenced Werth to death for war crimes.[163]

Hungary joined the war on April 11, after the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia.[citation needed]

It is not clear whether the 10,000–20,000 Jewish refugees (from Poland and elsewhere) were counted in the January 1941 census. They, and about 20,000 people who could not prove legal residency since 1850, were deported to southern Poland. According to Nazi German reports, a total of 23,600 Jews were murdered, including 16,000 who had earlier been expelled from Hungary[164] between July 15 and August 12, 1941, and either abandoned there or handed over to the Germans. In practice, the Hungarians deported many people whose families had lived in the area for generations. In some cases, applications for residency permits were allowed to pile up without action by Hungarian officials until after the deportations had been carried out. The vast majority (16,000) of those deported were massacred in the Kamianets-Podilskyi massacre at the end of August.[165][a]

In the massacres in Újvidék (Novi Sad) and nearby villages, 2,550–2,850 Serbs, 700–1,250 Jews and 60–130 others were murdered by the Hungarian Army and "Csendőrség" (gendarmerie) in January 1942. Those responsible, Ferenc Feketehalmy-Czeydner, Márton Zöldy [hu], József Grassy, László Deák and others, were later tried in Budapest in December 1943 and were sentenced, but some escaped to Germany.[citation needed]

During the war, Jews were called up to serve in unarmed "labour service" (munkaszolgálat) units which repaired bombed railroads, built airports or cleaned up minefields at the front barehanded. Approximately 42,000 Jewish labour service troops were killed on the Soviet front in 1942–43, of whom about 40% perished in Soviet POW camps.[citation needed] Many died as a result of harsh conditions on the Eastern Front and cruel treatment by their Hungarian sergeants and officers. Another 4,000 forced laborers died in the copper mine of Bor, Serbia. But Miklós Kállay, prime minister beginning on March 9, 1942, and Regent Miklós Horthy refused to allow the deportation of Hungarian Jews to German extermination camps in occupied Poland. This lasted until German troops occupied Hungary and forced Horthy to oust Kállay.[citation needed]

Following the German occupation of Hungary on March 19, 1944, Jews from the provinces were deported to the Auschwitz concentration camp; between May and July that year, 437,000 Jews were sent there from Hungary, most of them gassed on arrival.[169]

Poland

[edit]
Polish resistance poster announcing the execution of several Polish and Ukrainian collaborators and blackmailers (szmalcowniks), September 1943

Unlike some other German-occupied European countries, occupied Poland did not have a government that collaborated with the Nazis.[170][171] The Polish government did not surrender,[172] but instead went into exile, first in France, then in London, while evacuating the armed forces via Romania and Hungary and by sea to allied France and Great Britain.[173][174][175] German-occupied Polish territory was either annexed outright by Nazi Germany or placed under German administration as the General Government.[176]

Shortly after the German Invasion of Poland in September 1939, the Nazi authorities ordered the mobilization of prewar Polish officials and Polish police (Blue Police), who were ordered to report for duty under threat of severe penalties.[177][178][179] Apart from serving as a regular police force dealing with criminal activities, the Blue Police was used by the Germans also to combat smuggling and resistance, to round up łapanka, random civilians, for forced labor, and to apprehend Jews (German: Judenjagd, "hunting Jews")[180] and participate in their extermination. Polish policemen were instrumental in implementing the Nazi policy of centralising Jews in ghettos and, from 1942 onwards, liquidating the ghettos.[181] In the late autumn and early winter of 1941, shooting Jews, including women and children, became one of their many activities at the orders of the German occupiers.[182] After an initial phase of hesitation, Polish policemen became familiar with Nazi brutality and, according to Jan Grabowski, sometimes "surpassed their German teachers."[183] While many officials and police followed German orders, some acted as agents for the Polish resistance.[184][185]

Some of the collaborators – szmalcowniks – blackmailed Jews and their Polish rescuers and acted as informers, turning in Jews and Poles who hid them, and reporting on the Polish resistance.[186] Many prewar Polish citizens of German descent voluntarily declared themselves Volksdeutsche ("ethnic Germans"), and some of them committed atrocities against the Polish population and organized large-scale looting of property.[187][188]

The Germans set up Jewish-run governing bodies in Jewish communities and ghettosJudenrāte (Jewish councils) that served as self-enforcing intermediaries to manage Jewish communities and ghettos; and Jewish Ghetto Police (Jüdischer Ordnungsdienst), which functioned as auxiliary police to maintaining order and combating crime.[189]

The Polish Underground State's wartime underground courts investigated 17,000 Poles who collaborated with the Germans; about 3,500 were sentenced to death.[190][191]

Romania

[edit]
See also Responsibility for the Holocaust (Romania), Antonescu and the Holocaust, Porajmos#Persecution in other Axis countries[broken anchor].
Sephardic temple in Bucharest after it was plundered and torched in 1941

According to an international commission report released by the Romanian government in 2004, between 280,000 and 380,000 Jews died on Romanian soil, in the war zones of Bessarabia, Bukovina, and in territories formerly occupied by Soviets that came under Romanian control (Transnistria Governorate). Of the 25,000 Romani deported to concentration camps in Transnistria, 11,000 died.[192]

Though much of the killing was committed in the war zone by Romanian and German troops, in the Iaşi pogrom of June 1941 over 13,000 Jews died in trains traveling back and forth across the countryside.[193]

Half of the estimated 270,000 to 320,000 Jews living in Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Dorohoi County were murdered or died between June 1941 and the spring of 1944. Of these, between 45,000 and 60,000 Jews were killed in Bessarabia and Bukovina by Romanian and German troops[194][195] within months of the entry of the country into the war during 1941. Even after the initial killings, Jews in Moldavia, Bukovina and Bessarabia were subject to frequent pogroms, and were concentrated into ghettos from which they were sent to camps in Transnistria built and run by the Romanian authorities.[citation needed]

Romanian soldiers and gendarmes also worked with the Einsatzkommandos, German killing squads, tasked with massacring Jews and Roma in conquered territories, the local Ukrainian militia, and the SS squads of local Ukrainian Germans (Sonderkommando Russland and Selbstschutz). Romanian troops were in large part responsible for the 1941 Odessa massacre, in which from October 18, 1941, to mid-March 1942 Romanian soldiers, gendarmes and police, killed up to 25,000 Jews and deported more than 35,000.[192]

The lowest respectable mortality estimates run to about 250,000 Jews and 11,000 Roma in these eastern regions.[citation needed]

Nonetheless, half of the Jews living within the pre-Barbarossa borders survived the war, although they were subject to a wide range of harsh conditions, including forced labor, financial penalties, and discriminatory laws. All Jewish property was nationalized.

A report commissioned and accepted by the Romanian government in 2004 on the Holocaust concluded:[192]

Of all the allies of Nazi Germany, Romania bears responsibility for the deaths of more Jews than any country other than Germany itself. The murders committed in Iasi, Odessa, Bogdanovka, Domanovka, and Peciora, for example, were among the most hideous murders committed against Jews anywhere during the Holocaust. Romania committed genocide against the Jews. The survival of Jews in some parts of the country does not alter this reality.

Yugoslavia

[edit]

On 25 March 1941, under considerable pressure, the Yugoslav government agreed to the signing of the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany, guaranteeing Yugoslavia's neutrality. The agreement was extremely unpopular in Serbia and led to massive street demonstrations.[196] Two days later, on 27 March, Serb military officers led by general Dušan Simović overthrew the regency and placed 17-year-old King Peter on the throne.[197] Furious at the temerity of the Serbs, Hitler ordered the invasion of Yugoslavia.[198] On 6 April 1941, without a declaration of war, combined German and Italian military armies invaded. Eleven days later Yugoslavia capitulated and was subsequently partitioned among the Axis states.[199]

map of Axis-held Yugoslavia
Map of the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia

Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia

[edit]
Serbian Volunteer Corps

Under German military occupation Serbia was at first directly administered by Nazis, then by a puppet government led by General Milan Nedić.[201] The main function of the government was to maintain internal order under the authority of the German Command with the use of local paramilitary units.[202] The Wehrmacht Operations Staff never considered raising a unit to serve in the German armed forces.[203] By mid 1943, the collaborationist forces in Serbia, (Serbian and ethnic Russian units), numbered between 25,000 and 30,000.[203][204]

Serbian units
[edit]

Serbian collaborationist organizations the Serbian State Guard (SDS) and the Serbian Border Guard (SGS) reached a combined 21,000 men at their peak. The Serbian Volunteers Corps (SDK), the party militia of the fascist Yugoslav National Movement led by Dimitrije Ljotić, reached 9,886 men; its members helped guard and run concentration camps and fought the Yugoslav Partisans and the Chetniks alongside the Germans. In October 1941, the Serbian Volunteer Corps participated in the Kragujevac massacre, arresting and delivering hostages to the Wehrmacht.[205] The members of the Serbian Volunteer Corps had to take an oath stating that they would fight to death against both Communists and Chetniks.[203]

Collaborationist Belgrade Special Police helped German units round up Jewish citizens for deportation to concentration camps. By the summer of 1942, most Serbian Jews had been exterminated.[206] By the end of 1942 the Special Police had 240 agents and 878 police guards under the command of the Gestapo.[204] After the liberation of the country in October 1944, the collaborationist forces retreated with the German army and were later absorbed into the Waffen-SS.[207]

Collaborationist Chetniks with German soldiers

Almost from the start, two rival guerrilla movements, the Chetniks and the Partisans, engaged in a bloody civil war with each other, in addition to fighting against the occupying forces. Some Chetniks collaborated with the Axis occupation to fight the rival Partisan resistance, whom they viewed as their primary enemy, by establishing modus vivendi or operating as "legalised" auxiliary forces under Axis control.[208][209][210][211]

In August 1941 Kosta Pećanac put himself and his Chetniks at the disposal of Milan Nedić's government, becoming the occupation regime's 'legal Chetniks'.[212] At the peak of their strength in mid-May 1942, the two legal Chetnik auxiliary forces numbered 13,400 men; these detachments were dissolved by the end of 1942.[203] Pećanac was captured and executed by forces loyal to his Chetnik rival Draža Mihailović in 1944. As no single Chetnik organization existed,[212] other Chetnik units engaged independently in marginal[213] resistance activities and avoided accommodations with the enemy.[208][214] Over a period of time, and in different parts of the country, some Chetnik groups were drawn progressively[213][215] into opportunist agreements: first with the Nedić forces in Serbia, then with the Italians in occupied Dalmatia and Montenegro, with some of the Ustaše forces in northern Bosnia, and after the Italian capitulation, also with the Germans directly.[216] In some regions Chetniks collaborated "extensively and systematically", which they called "using the enemy".[216][217][218]

Ethnic Russian units
[edit]

The Auxiliary Police Troop and the Russian Protective Corps were paramilitary units raised in the German-occupied territory of Serbia, composed exclusively of anti-communist White émigrés or Volksdeutsche from Russia, under the command of General Mikhail Skorodumov (around 400 and 7,500 men respectively by December 1942).[219] The force reached a peak size of 11,197 by September 1944.[220] Unlike the Serbian units, the Russian Protective Corps was part of the German armed forces and its members took the Hitler Oath.[203]

Banat
[edit]
The 7th SS Volunteer Mountain Division Prinz Eugen manned by Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) primarily from the Serbian Banat

Between April 1941 and October 1944, the Serbian half of the Banat was under German military occupation as an administrative unit of the Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia. Its daily administration and security were left up to its 120,000 Volksdeutsche, who represented 20% of the local population. In the Banat, security, anti-partisan warfare, and border patrols, were exclusively carried out by the Volksdeutsche in the Deutsche Mannschaft. In 1941, the Banat Auxiliary Police force was created to serve in concentration camps. It had 1,552 members by February 1943.[221] It was affiliated with the Ordnungspolizei and included some 400 Hungarians. The Gestapo in the Banat employed local ethnic Germans as agents. Banat Jews were deported and exterminated with the full participation of the Banat German leadership, the Banat Police and many ethnic German civilians.[221]

According to German sources, as of 28 December 1943, the Volksdeutsche minority of the Banat had contributed 21,516 men to the Waffen SS, the auxiliary police, and the Banat police.[199]

The 700,000 Volksdeutsche who lived in Yugoslavia[222] were the basis for the 7th SS Volunteer Mountain Division Prinz Eugen, which towards the war's end included other ethnicities. The division's soldiers brutally punished civilians accused of working with partisans in both occupied Serbia and the Independent State of Croatia, going so far as to raze entire villages.[223][failed verification]

Montenegro

[edit]

The Italian governorate of Montenegro was established as an Italian protectorate with the support of Montenegrin separatists known as Greens. The Lovćen Brigade, the militia of the Greens, collaborated with the Italians. Other collaborationist units included local Chetniks, police, gendarmerie and Sandžak Muslim militia.[224]

Kosovo

[edit]

Most of Kosovo and the western part of southern Serbia (Juzna Srbija, included in Zeta Banovina) was annexed to Albania by fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.[225] Kosovar Albanians were recruited into Albanian paramilitary groups known as the Vulnetari, set up to assist Italian fascists maintain order,[226] many Serbs and Jews were expelled from Kosovo and sent to internment camps in Albania.[227][page needed]

The Balli Kombëtar militias, or Ballistas, were volunteer Albanian nationalistic groups that started as a resistance movement, then collaborated with the Axis Powers in hopes of seeing Greater Albania created.[228] Military units were formed within the militias, among them the Kosovo Regiment, raised in Kosovska Mitrovica as a Nazi auxiliary military unit after Italian capitulation.[229][page needed] According to German reports, in early 1944 some 20,000 Albanian guerrillas led by Xhafer Deva fought the Partisans alongside the Wehrmacht in Albania and Kosovo.[199]

Macedonia

[edit]

In Bulgaria-annexed Vardar Macedonia, the occupation authority organized the Ohrana into auxiliary security forces. On 11 March 1943, Skopje's entire Jewish population was deported to the gas chambers of Treblinka concentration camp.[230]

Slovene Lands

[edit]
Italian-sponsored Slovene Anti-Communist Volunteer Militia

The Axis powers divided the Slovene Lands into three zones. Germany occupied the largest, northern part. Italy annexed the southern part, and Hungary annexed the northeast part, Prekmurje.[231] As in the rest of Yugoslavia, the Nazis used the Slovene Volksdeutsche to further their aims, in groups like the Deutsche Jugend (German Youth) which was used as an auxiliary military force for guard duty and fighting the partisans, and the Slovenian National Defense Corps.[231]

The Slovene Home Guard (Domobranci) was a collaborationist force formed in September 1943 in the Province of Ljubljana (then a part of Italy). It was led by former general Leon Rupnik but had limited autonomy, and at first, functioned as an auxiliary police force that assisted the Germans in anti-partisan actions.[232] Later, it gained more autonomy and conducted most of the anti-partisan operations in Ljubljana. Much of the Guard's equipment was Italian (confiscated when Italy dropped out of the war in 1943), although German weapons and equipment were used as well, especially later in the war. Similar, but much smaller units, were also formed in the Littoral (Primorska) and Upper Carniola (Gorenjska). The Blue Guard, also known as the Slovene Chetniks, was an anti-communist militia led by Karl Novak and Ivan Prezelj.[233]

The Anti-Communist Volunteer Militia (MVAC), was under Italian authority. One of the biggest components of the MVAC was the Civic Guards (Vaške Straže [sl]),[232] a Slovene volunteer military organization formed by the Italian Fascist authorities to fight the partisans, as well as some collaborationist Chetniks units. The Legion of Death (Legija Smrti), was another Slovene anti-partisan armed unit formed after the Blue Guard joined the MVAC.[231]

Independent State of Croatia

[edit]

On 10 April 1941, a few days before Yugoslavia's capitulation, Ante Pavelić's Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was established as an Axis-affiliated state, with Zagreb as capital.[234] Between 1941 and 1945, the fascist Ustaše regime collaborated with Nazi Germany, and engaged in independent persecution. According to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, this resulted in the deaths of approximately 30,000 Jews, between 25,000 and 30,000 Roma, and between 320,000 and 340,000 ethnic Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia,[235] in camps like the infamous Jasenovac concentration camp.[236][237]

The 13th Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Handschar (1st Croatian), created in February 1943, and the 23rd Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Kama (2nd Croatian), created in January 1944, were manned by Croats and Bosniaks as well as local Germans. Earlier in the war, Pavelić formed a Croatian Legion for the Eastern Front and attached it to the Wehrmacht. Volunteer pilots joined the Luftwaffe as Pavelić did not want to get his army directly involved for both propaganda reasons (Domobrans/Home Guards were a "chieftain of Croatian values, never attacking and only defending") and due to a safeguarding need for political flexibility with the Soviet Union.

Haj Amin al-Husseini gives the Nazi salute while reviewing a unit of Bosnian SS volunteers in 1943 with Waffen-SS General Sauberzweig.

Pavelić proclaimed that Croats were the descendants of Goths, to eliminate the leadership's inferiority complex and be better viewed by the Germans. The Poglavnik stated that "Croats are not Slavs, but Germanic by blood and race".[238] Nazi German leadership was indifferent to this claim.[citation needed]

Bosnia

[edit]

In 1941 Bosnia became an integral part of the Independent State of Croatia. Bosnian Muslims were considered Croats of Islamic confession.[239]

Soviet Union

[edit]

Before the German invasion

[edit]

State-to-state collaboration, enabled by the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939, began with the Soviet invasion of Poland in September 1939, which was followed later that month by the Red Army's participation in a joint military parade in Brześć in occupied Poland[240] and the signing in Moscow of the German–Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty. High levels of each nation's secret police subsequently conducted the Gestapo–NKVD conferences in Zakopane and Kraków, but also in Brześć, Lwów and Przemyśl in 1939–1940, enabling both parties to share intelligence about Polish resistance and exchange Polish prisoners.[241][242]

Joint Wehrmacht and Red Army parade in Brest at end of invasion of Poland. Center: Maj. Gen. Heinz Guderian. Right: Brig. Semyon Krivoshein.

After the German invasion

[edit]

Operation Barbarossa began on 22 June 1941 and, by November 1942, Nazi Germany had occupied around 750,000 sq mi (1,900,000 km2) of the Soviet Union.[243] By November 1944, the German forces had been forced out of the pre-World War II Soviet territory.[243]

According to the American historian Jeffrey Burds, out of the three million armed collaborators with Nazi Germany in Europe, as many as 2.5 million originated from the Soviet Union, and by 1945, every eighth German soldier had previously been a pre-war Soviet citizen.[244] Antony Beevor writes that 1 to 1.5 million men from the territory of the USSR served militarily under the Germans.[245] Regardless, the precise number will never be known.[246][dubiousdiscuss] The people from the Soviet Union served in the Wehrmacht under a wide array of units: Hiwi, Security units, Russian Liberation Army (ROA), KONR, Ukrainian Liberation Army, various independent Russian units (SS-Verband Drushina [ru], RNNA, RONA, 1st Russian National Army) and the Eastern Legions.[243]

Toward's the war's end, the SS Main Office and the Ostministerium began conflicting over the Eastern Legions and Cossack units.[247] The former tried to control all non-German troops fighting in the Wehrmacht, while the latter had its own policy towards the military units, which was helped by the national committees whose patron it was.[247] Most national committees refused to subordinate themselves and the associated military units to Andrey Vlasov's Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KONR) and its armed forces (ROA), instead choosing to declare national armies, e.g. Caucasian Liberation Army and National Army of Turkestan.[247] However, through the help of his patrons in the SS Main Office, Vlasov became their ostensibly leader by April 1945 and all national committees and related troops were nominally subordinated to him.[247]

General Andrey Vlasov (centre), accompanied by a German general, inspects a detachment of the Russian Liberation Army.

According to Antony Beevor, those serving under the Germans were "often extraordinarily naïve and ill-informed."[245] Many viewed their service under the Germans as just serving in another military service and a way to ensure food for themselves, which they preferred to being maltreated and starved in a prisoner-of-war camp.[245]

The Waffen-SS recruited from many nationalities living in the Soviet Union, and the German government attempted to enroll Soviet citizens voluntarily for the Ostarbeiter program. Originally this effort worked well, but the news of the terrible conditions faced by workers dried up the flow of new volunteers and the program became forcible.[248]

Hiwis

[edit]

Already from the very first days, individual deserters and prisoners from the Red Army were offering their help to the Germans in auxiliary duties such as, but not limited to, cooking, driving, and medical assistance.[246] There were also Soviet civilians that joined supply units and construction battalions.[243] Both military and civilian auxiliaries were called Hiwis (German abbreviation for auxiliary volunteer) with the former Soviets soldiers frequently wearing their Red Army uniforms without any Soviet insignia.[243] After two months service, they were permitted to wear German uniforms with insignia and ranks, which made veteran Hiwis almost indistinguishable from the regular German soldiers, although their promotion up the ranks was very limited.[243]

Hitler reluctantly gave permission in September 1941 to recruit people from the Soviet Union as unarmed voluntary assistants, but in practice this was frequently ignored and many of them served in frontline units.[243] Sometimes many of the men of German units consisted of the Hiwis, for example, half of the 134th Infantry Division and a quarter of the 6th Army consisted of Hiwis in late 1942.[243] The Red Army authorities estimated that more than a million served in the Wehrmacht as Hiwis.[245]

Volunteer freiwillige troops of the Turkestan Legion in France, 1943
Ingrian Wehrmacht volunteers of the 664th Eastern Battalion, 1943

Eastern Legions

[edit]

The failure of the Axis powers to immediately defeat the Soviet Union in late 1941 led the Wehrmacht to resort to new sources of manpower necessary for a protracted war.[247] In November–December 1941, Hitler ordered the formation of four Eastern Legions: Turkestan, Georgian, Armenian and Caucasian Mohammedan.[247] In August 1942, the "Regulations on Local Auxiliary Formations in the East" singled out the Turkic peoples and the Cossacks as "equal allies fighting shoulder to shoulder with German soldiers against Bolshevism in composition of special combat units."[247] The incorporation of eastern battalions into German divisions guarding the Atlantic Wall in Western Europe caused problems as they were totally unfit to fight against the Western Allies and the battalions were actually a burden on the weakened divisions that they were supposed to replenish.[249] Between 275,000 and 350,000 "Muslim and Caucasian" volunteers and conscripts served in the Wehrmacht.[250]

Ethnic groups from the USSR Estimates of people that served in the Wehrmacht
Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Turkmens

and other ethnic groups of Central Asia

~70,000[247]
Azerbaijanis <40,000[247]
North Caucasians <30,000[247]
Georgians 25,000[247]
Armenians 20,000[247]
Volga Tatars 12,500[247]
Crimean Tatars 10,000[247]
Kalmyks 7,000[247]
Cossacks 70,000[247]
Total 280,000[247]

Between early 1942 and late 1943, the Kommando der Ostlegionen in Polen formed a total of 54 battalions, but this was not the only place where such units were being created:[251]

Eastern Legion Battalions formed by Kommando der Ostlegionen in Polen[251]
Legion No. of battalions formed
Turkestan 15
Armenian 9
Georgian 8
Azerbaijani 8
Idel-Ural (Volga Finns and Tartars) 7
North Caucasian 7
Total 54

Russia

[edit]
Soldiers wearing the shoulder patches of Gen. Andrey Vlasov's Russian Liberation Army ("РОА"), 1944

In Russia proper, ethnic Russians governed the semi-autonomous Lokot Autonomy in Nazi-occupied Russia.[252] On 22 June 1943, a parade of the Wehrmacht and Russian collaborationist forces was welcomed and positively received in Pskov. The entry of Germans into Pskov was labelled "Liberation day" by occupying authorities, and the old Russian tricolor flag was included in the parade.[253]

Kalmykians

[edit]

The Kalmykian Cavalry Corps was composed of about 5,000 Kalmyks who chose to join the retreating Germans in 1942 rather than remain in Kalmykia as the German Army retreated before the Red Army.[254] Joseph Stalin subsequently declared the Kalmyk population as a whole to be German collaborators in 1943 and ordered mass deportations to Siberia, causing great loss of life.[255]

Belarus

[edit]

In Byelorussia under German occupation, local pro-independence politicians attempted to use the Nazis to re-establish an independent Belarusian state, which was conquered by the Bolsheviks in 1919. A Belarusian representative body, the Belarusian Central Council, was created under German control in 1943 but had no real power and concentrated mainly on managing social issues and education. Belarusian national military units (the Byelorussian Home Defence) were only created a few months before the end of the German occupation.

Many Belarusian collaborators retreated with German forces in the wake of the Red Army advance. In January 1945, the 30th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (1st Belarusian) was formed from the remains of Belarusian military units. The division participated in a small number of battles in France but demonstrated active disloyalty to the Nazis and saw mass desertion.[citation needed]

Ukraine

[edit]

Transcaucasia

[edit]
Armenian soldiers, Lager Schwarzsee
Azerbaijani Legion in combat gear. The unit helped suppress the Warsaw Uprising in August 1944

Ethnic Armenian, Georgian, Turkic and Caucasian forces deployed by the Germans consisted primarily of Soviet Red Army POWs assembled into ill-trained legions.[citation needed] Among these battalions were 18,000 Armenians, 13,000 Azerbaijanis, 14,000 Georgians, and 10,000 men from the "North Caucasus."[256] American historian Alexander Dallin notes that the Armenian and Georgian Legions were sent to the Netherlands as a result of Hitler's distrust of them, and many later deserted.[257] Author Christopher Ailsby called the Turkic and Caucasian forces formed by the Germans "poorly armed, trained and motivated", and "unreliable and next to useless".[256]

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (the Dashnaks) was suppressed in Armenia when the First Republic of Armenia was conquered by the Russian Bolsheviks in the 1920 Red Army invasion of Armenia and thus ceased to exist. During World War II, some of the Dashnaks saw an opportunity to regain Armenia's independence. The Armenian Legion under Drastamat Kanayan participated in the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and the Caucasus.[258] On 15 December 1942, the Armenian National Council was granted official recognition by Alfred Rosenberg, the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. The president of the Council was Ardasher Abeghian, its vice-president was Abraham Guilkhandanian, and it numbered among its members Garegin Nzhdeh and Vahan Papazian. Until the end of 1944, the organization published a weekly journal, Armenian, edited by Viken Shantn, who also broadcast on Radio Berlin with the aid of Dr. Paul Rohrbach.[259]

Ciscaucasia

[edit]

In January 1940, encouraged by the Soviet failures in the Winter War against Finland, Chechen ex-communist intellectual Hasan Israilov and his brother Hussein had established a guerrilla base in the mountains of south-eastern Chechnya, where they worked to organize a unified guerrilla movement to prepare an armed insurrection against the Soviets. By early February 1940, Israilov's rebels took over several auls in Shatoysky District. The rebel government was established in Israilov's native village of Galanchozh.[260] They then defeated the NKVD's punitive detachments sent against them, capturing modern weapons.[261]

After the German invasion in the USSR in June 1941, the brothers convened 41 different meetings in summer 1941 to recruit local supporters under the name "Provisional Popular Revolutionary Government of Chechen-Ingushetia", and by the end of midsummer of that year they had over 5,000 guerrillas and at least 25,000 sympathizers organized into five military districts encompassing Grozny, Gudermes and Malgobek. In some areas, up to 80% of men were involved in the insurrection. It is known that the Soviet Union used carpet bombing tactics against the revolutionaries, causing losses primarily to the civilian population.[260] Massive Soviet bombing air raids twice targeted Chechen-Ingush mountain villages in the spring of 1942, completely devastating several auls and killing most of their inhabitants, including large numbers of elderly and children.[261]

By January 28, 1942, Israilov had decided to extend the uprising from Chechens and Ingush to eleven of the dominant ethnic groups in the Caucasus by forming the Special Party of Caucasus Brothers (OKPB), with the aim of an 'armed struggle with Bolshevik barbarism and Russian despotism'. In February 1942, another Chechen ex-communist, Mairbek Sheripov, organized a rebellion in Shatoi and tried to take Itum-Kale. His forces united with Israilov's army relying on the expected arrival of the German Wehrmacht. In neighbouring Dagestan rebels also took the neighbourhoods of Novolakskaya and Dylym. The insurrection provoked many Chechen and Ingush soldiers of the Red Army to desert. Some sources claim that the total number of the mountaineers deserting reached 62,750, exceeding the number of mountaineer fighters in the Red Army.[262] In fact, this figure refers to the whole North Caucasus for the whole period of the war.[263]

On August 25, 1942, nine German-trained saboteurs from Abwehr's Nordkaukasisches Sonderkommando Schamil landed near the village of Berzhki in the area of Galashki, where they recruited 13 local Chechens for their cause. Later in August and September, a total of 40 German agents were dropped in various locations. All of these groups received active assistance from up to 100 Chechens.[citation needed] Their mission was to seize the Grozny petroleum refinery in order to prevent its destruction by the retreating Soviets, and to hold it until the German First Panzer Army arrived. However, the German offensive stalled after capturing only the ethnic-Russian town of Malgobek in Ingushetia.[261] The Germans made concerted efforts to coordinate with Israilov, but his refusal to cede control of his revolutionary movement to the Germans, and his continued insistence on German recognition of Chechen independence, led many Germans to consider Israilov as unreliable, and his plans unrealistic. Although the Germans were able to undertake covert operations in Chechnya—such as the sabotage of Grozny oil fields—attempts at a German–Chechen alliance floundered.[262]

Collaboration beyond Europe with the European Axis powers

[edit]

Egypt and the Palestine mandate

[edit]

The well-publicized Arab-Jewish clash in Mandatory Palestine from 1936 to 1939, and the rise of Nazi Germany, began to affect Jewish relations with Egyptian society, despite the fact that the number of active Zionists was small.[264] Local militant and nationalistic societies, like the Young Egypt Party and the Society of Muslim Brothers, circulated false reports claiming that Jews and the British were destroying holy places in Jerusalem, and other reports that hundreds of Arab women and children were being killed.[265][undue weight?discuss] Some of this antisemitism was fueled by an association between Hitler's regime and anti-imperialist Arab activists. One activist, Haj Amin al-Husseini, received Nazi funds for the Muslim Brotherhood to print and distribute thousands of anti-Semitic propaganda pamphlets.[265]

In the 1940s the situation worsened. Sporadic pogroms began in 1942.[undue weight?discuss][citation needed]

Israel

[edit]

French colonial empire

[edit]

France retained its colonial empire, and the terms of the armistice shifted the balance of power of France's reduced military resources away from metropolitan France and towards its overseas possessions, especially French North Africa. Although in 1940, most French colonies except for the French Equatorial Africa had rallied to Vichy France, this changed during the war. By 1943, all French colonies, except for Japanese-controlled French Indochina, were under the control of the Free French.[266] French Equatorial Africa in particular played a key role.[267]

French North Africa

[edit]

Concerned that the French fleet might fall into German hands, the British Royal Navy sank or disabled most of it in the July 1940 attack on the Algerian naval port at Mers-el-Kébir, which poisoned Anglo-French relations and led to Vichy reprisals.[268] When Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of French North Africa, began on 8 November 1942 with landings in Morocco and Algeria, Vichy forces initially resisted, killing 479 and wounding 720. Admiral François Darlan appointed himself High Commissioner of France (head of civil government) for North and West Africa, then ordered Vichy forces there to stop resisting and co-operate with the Allies, which they did.[269][270][page needed]

Admiral François Darlan (1881–1942)

Most Vichy figures were arrested, including Darlan and General Alphonse Juin,[271] chief commander in North Africa. Both were released, and US General Dwight D. Eisenhower accepted Darlan's self-appointment. This infuriated de Gaulle, who refused to recognise Darlan. Darlan was assassinated on Christmas Eve 1942 by a French monarchist. German Wehrmacht forces in North Africa established the Kommando Deutsch-Arabische Truppen, composed of two battalions of Arab volunteers of Tunisian origin, an Algerian battalion and a Moroccan battalion.[272] The four units had total of 3,000 men; with German cadres.[273]

Morocco
[edit]

In 1940, Résident Général Charles Noguès implemented antisemitic decrees coming from Vichy excluding Moroccan Jews from working as doctors, lawyers or teachers.[274][275] [276] All Jews living elsewhere were required to move to the Jewish quarters, called mellahs,[274] Vichy anti-semitic propaganda encouraged boycotting Jews,[274] and pamphlets were pinned to Jewish shops.[274] These laws put Moroccan Jews in an uncomfortable position "between an indifferent Muslim majority and an antisemitic settler class."[275] Sultan Mohammed V reportedly refused to sign off on "Vichy's plan to ghettoize and deport Morocco's quarter of a million Jews to the killing factories of Europe," and, in an act of defiance, insisted on inviting all the rabbis of Morocco to the 1941 throne celebrations.[277]

Tunisia
[edit]

Many Tunisians took satisfaction in France's defeat by Germany in June 1940,[278] but little else. Despite his commitment to ending the French protectorate, the pragmatic independence leader Habib Bourguiba abhorred the Axis state ideologies.[279] and feared any short-term benefit would come at the cost of long-term tragedy.[279] After the Second Armistice at Compiègne, Pétain sent a new Resident-General to Tunis, Admiral Jean-Pierre Esteva. Arrests followed of Taieb Slim [fr] and Habib Thameur [fr], central figures in the Neo-Destour party. Bey Muhammad VII al-Munsif moved towards greater independence in 1942, but when the Free French forced out the Axis powers in 1943, they accused him of collaborating with Vichy and deposed him.

French Equatorial Africa

[edit]

The federation of colonies in French Equatorial Africa (AEF or Afrique-Équatoriale française) rallied to the cause of De Gaulle after Félix Éboué of Chad joined him in August 1940. The exception was Gabon, which remained Vichy French until 12 November 1940, when it surrendered to the invading Free French. The federation became the strategic centre of Free French activities in Africa.

Syria and the Lebanon (League of Nations mandates)

[edit]
Captured French Martin 167F at Aleppo 1941

The Vichy government's Armée du Levant (Army of the Levant) under General Henri Dentz had regular metropolitan colonial troops and troupes spéciales (special troops, indigenous Syrian and Lebanese soldiers).[280] Dentz had seven infantry battalions of regular French troops at his disposal, and eleven infantry battalions of "special troops", including at least 5,000 cavalry in horsed and motorized units, two artillery groups and supporting units.[280] The French had 90 tanks (according to British estimates), the Armée de l'air had 90 aircraft (increasing to 289 aircraft after reinforcement) and the Marine nationale (French Navy) had two destroyers,a sloop and three submarines.[281][282]

The Royal Air Force attacked the airfield at Palmyra, in central Syria, on 14 May 1941, after a reconnaissance mission spotted German and Italian aircraft. Attacks against German and Italian aircraft staging through Syria continued: Vichy French forces shot down a Blenheim bomber on 28 May, killing the crew, and forced down another on 2 June.[283] French Morane-Saulnier M.S.406 fighters also escorted German Junkers Ju 52 aircraft into Iraq on 28 May.[283] Germany permitted French aircraft en route from Algeria to Syria to fly over Axis-controlled territory and refuel at the German-controlled Eleusina air base in Greece.[284]

After the Armistice of Saint Jean d'Acre, on 14 July 1941, 37,736 Vichy French prisoners of war survived, who mostly chose to be repatriated rather than join the Free French.

Lebanese Christians
[edit]

In opposition to the French Mandate over Lebanon in the late 1930s and early 1940s, Pierre Gemayel and the Phalangist Party (which was modeled after the Spanish Falange and Italian Fascist parties) openly admired Nazi Germany and believed that they could eventually liberate Lebanon from French rule.[285]

Foreign volunteers

[edit]

French military volunteers

[edit]
Waffen-SS recruiting center in Calais, Northern France photographed shortly after liberation by the Allies.
Légion des Volontaires fighting with the Axis on the Russian front.

French volunteers formed the Legion of French Volunteers Against Bolshevism (LVF), Légion impériale, SS-Sturmbrigade Frankreich and finally in 1945 the 33rd Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS Charlemagne (1st French), which was among the final defenders of Berlin.[286][287][288]

Volunteers from British India

[edit]

The Indian Legion (Legion Freies Indien, Indische Freiwilligen Infanterie Regiment 950 or Indische Freiwilligen-Legion der Waffen-SS) was created in August 1942, recruiting chiefly from disaffected British Indian Army prisoners of war captured by Axis forces in the North African campaign. Most were supporters of the exiled nationalist and former president of the Indian National Congress Subhas Chandra Bose. The Royal Italian Army formed a similar unit of Indian prisoners of war, the Battaglione Azad Hindoustan. (A Japanese-supported puppet state, Azad Hind, was also established in far-eastern India with the Indian National Army as its military force.)[289][290]

Non-German units of the Waffen-SS

[edit]
Deutsch-Arabische Legion (Arab volunteers), 1943

By the end of World War II, 60% of the Waffen-SS was made up of non-German volunteers from occupied countries.[citation needed] The predominantly Scandinavian 11th SS Volunteer Panzergrenadier Division Nordland along with remnants of French, Italian, Spanish and Dutch volunteers were the last defenders of the Reichstag in Berlin.[291][292]

The Nuremberg Trials, in declaring the Waffen-SS a criminal organisation explicitly excluded conscripts, who had committed no crimes.[293] In 1950, The U.S. High Commission in Germany and the U.S. Displaced Persons Commission clarified the U.S. position on the Baltic Waffen-SS Units, considering them distinct from the German SS in purpose, ideology, activities and qualifications for membership.

Business collaboration

[edit]
Dehomag (German IBM subsidiary) D11 tabulating machine, used by Germany in implementing the Jewish Holocaust
1945 poster of the French Communist Party, claiming that "the men of the trusts sold the country to Hitler," and urging that their wealth be confiscated and their businesses nationalised; however, only Renault was nationalised.

A number of international companies have been accused of having collaborated with Nazi Germany before their home countries' entry into World War II, though it has been debated whether the term "collaboration" is applicable to business dealings outside the context of overt war.[294][who?]

American companies that had dealings with Nazi Germany included Ford Motor Company,[295] Coca-Cola,[296][297] and IBM.[298][unreliable source?][299][300]

Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. acted for German tycoon Fritz Thyssen, who helped finance Hitler's rise to power.[301] The Associated Press (AP) supplied images for a propaganda book called The Jews in the USA, and another titled The Subhuman.[302]

In December 1941, when the United States entered the war against Germany, 250 American firms owned more than $450 million of German assets.[303] Major American companies with investments in Germany included General Motors, Standard Oil, IT&T, Singer, International Harvester, Eastman Kodak, Gillette, Coca-Cola, Kraft, Westinghouse, and United Fruit.[303] Many major Hollywood studios have also been accused of collaboration, in making or adjusting films to Nazi tastes prior to the U.S. entry into the war.[294]

German financial operations worldwide were facilitated by banks such as the Bank for International Settlements, Chase and Morgan, and Union Banking Corporation.[303]

Robert A. Rosenbaum writes: "American companies had every reason to know that the Nazi regime was using IG Farben and other cartels as weapons of economic warfare"; and he noted that

"as the US entered the war, it found that some technologies or resources could not be procured, because they were forfeited by American companies as part of business deals with their German counterparts."[304]

After the war, some of those companies reabsorbed their temporarily detached German subsidiaries, and even received compensation for war damages from the Allied governments.[303]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia

Collaboration with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy during World War II involved the active assistance provided by governments, political groups, militias, and individuals in occupied Europe and Axis-aligned states to the German and Italian regimes, including support for military operations, administrative governance, economic exploitation, and the implementation of racial policies such as antisemitic legislation and deportations. This cooperation took diverse forms, from puppet administrations like Vichy France, where leaders such as Philippe Pétain and Pierre Laval facilitated the internment and deportation of approximately 76,000 Jews to German camps, to local police auxiliaries in Eastern Europe who aided in roundups and mass shootings. In the Balkans, collaboration extended to Fascist Italy's occupations, where local forces, including Slovenian guards trained under Italian command, assisted in suppressing resistance and maintaining control over annexed territories.
Military collaboration was particularly extensive on the Eastern Front, where over two million non-Germans served in the and , often motivated by anti-communist sentiments amid the German invasion of the , with volunteers from countries like under Vidkun Quisling's regime contributing to units such as the . In Axis satellites like Croatia's regime, involved independent atrocities, including the killing of around 25,000 Jews and tens of thousands of Serbs at camps like Jasenovac, alongside coordination with both German and Italian forces. While Western European emphasized pragmatic administration and opportunism, Eastern variants frequently aligned with shared anti-Bolshevik and antisemitic ideologies, enabling the scale of through local participation. itself, as an initial Axis partner, enacted racial laws in 1938 but resisted mass deportations until German occupation in 1943, reflecting uneven commitment among collaborators. Postwar, such cooperation led to trials and purges, though assessments varied by national narratives and the geopolitical context of emerging divisions.

Terminology and Definitions

Distinctions Among Forms of Collaboration

Collaboration with and encompassed varied forms, primarily distinguished by historians as pragmatic collaboration versus ideological collaborationism. Pragmatic collaboration involved reluctant or necessity-driven cooperation by state institutions or individuals to mitigate occupation hardships, maintain limited autonomy, or ensure administrative continuity, as seen in the French regime's negotiations with German authorities from July 1940 onward to preserve nominal sovereignty. In contrast, collaborationism denoted active, voluntary endorsement of Axis ideologies, often by domestic extremist groups seeking radical societal overhaul aligned with or , such as the Italian Fascist Republicans in the Salò Republic after , who integrated into German-led operations against partisans. This dichotomy, articulated by in 1968, underscores that pragmatic forms prioritized national survival amid defeat, whereas collaborationism pursued transnational fascist renewal, frequently at the expense of prior loyalties. Werner Rings' 1982 typology further refines these into four categories: neutral collaboration, involving minimal compliance without enthusiasm; tactical collaboration, opportunistic acts for immediate personal or local gains like black-market access; conditional collaboration, bargaining for concessions such as reduced requisitions; and unconditional collaboration, total ideological fusion with Axis goals, including propagation of racial policies. In occupied Norway, for instance, tactical forms manifested in business dealings with German firms for profit, while unconditional collaboration appeared in Vidkun Quisling's Nasjonal Samling party, which by 1942 administered police auxiliaries aiding deportations. For Fascist Italy's occupations in the Balkans from 1941, conditional collaboration involved local elites trading intelligence for autonomy, distinct from unconditional support by units like the Albanian Fascist Militia. Military collaboration represented a distinct active form, characterized by voluntary enlistment in Axis formations beyond , driven by or adventurism; by mid-1943, over 300,000 non-Germans had joined divisions, including Dutch, Belgian, and Ukrainian battalions fighting on the Eastern Front. Economic collaboration, often pragmatic, included industrial output for German war needs, such as French firms supplying 40% of occupation costs via taxes and labor by 1942, while administrative collaboration entailed local officials facilitating governance, like Lithuanian auxiliaries in 1941 pogroms. These forms intersected but differed in intent and scope, with ideological strains amplifying participation in atrocities, whereas pragmatic ones rarely extended beyond self-preservation.

Differentiation from Coercion, Resistance, and Neutrality

Collaboration entailed voluntary alignment with or , often driven by ideological affinity, , or opportunism, exceeding the minimal compliance required for survival under occupation. Historians such as Robert O. Paxton have emphasized that in cases like , collaboration represented an initiative by local authorities to pursue independent authoritarian policies in tandem with , rather than mere subservience imposed by German directives. This distinguishes it from , where actions stemmed from direct threats of violence, imprisonment, or reprisals against families and communities; for instance, Nazi policies in occupied compelled over 20 million individuals into forced labor through terror tactics, including summary executions for non-compliance, rendering such participation devoid of genuine agency. In historiographical terms, collaborationism—ideological endorsement of fascist doctrines, as seen in groups like France's Parti Populaire Français—contrasts with pragmatic collaboration, yet both involved proactive choices absent in coerced scenarios, where compliance was a survival reflex rather than endorsement. Accommodation, a gradated form of passive to occupier demands without active detriment to one's population, occupied an intermediate space; in Nazi-occupied , local officials in areas like Janów Lubelski initially accommodated German requisitions to avert mass reprisals, evolving toward resistance as opportunities arose, unlike outright collaboration that facilitated Axis exploitation for personal advancement. Resistance, by contrast, comprised deliberate acts of —ranging from gathering to —that directly undermined Axis control, often at great personal risk, as institutionalized in structures like Poland's Underground State, which excluded collaborators and targeted them explicitly. Neutrality, primarily viable for uninvaded states like or , implied official abstention from belligerency; in occupied territories, purported neutrality dissolved into coerced accommodation or selective collaboration, as occupiers blurred lines through economic dependencies and punitive measures, rendering true non-engagement illusory for most populations. These differentiations, grounded in empirical assessments of intent and outcome, reveal collaboration's causal role in enabling Axis dominance, distinct from survival-driven responses shaped by overwhelming force.

Historical Context and Motivations

Pre-War Fascist Sympathies and Ideological Alignment

In the aftermath of , Benito Mussolini's establishment of a fascist regime in following the in October 1922 served as a model for authoritarian nationalist movements across , which praised its suppression of socialist unrest, imposition of corporatist economic structures, and cult of the leader as antidotes to perceived democratic weaknesses and Bolshevik threats. These sympathies manifested in ideological borrowings such as exaltation of violence for national regeneration, rejection of parliamentary pluralism, and emphasis on hierarchical social order, often explicitly citing Mussolini's success in restoring "discipline" amid 's 1920s strikes and instability. By the early 1930s, Adolf Hitler's seizure of power in amplified this alignment, as Nazi and resonated with local ultranationalists, though initially held greater appeal for its non-racial, statist focus. In , pre-war fascist-leaning leagues like the , formed in 1927 to aid disabled veterans, evolved into a mass organization under , attracting up to 700,000 adherents by 1936 through paramilitary displays and advocacy for strong executive authority modeled on fascist Italy's squadristi tactics. Similarly, Jacques Doriot's Parti Populaire Français, founded in 1936 after his expulsion from the , openly emulated Nazi organizational methods and received covert funding from Italian agents, peaking at around 100,000 members by 1939 while promoting anti-Semitic and anti-communist platforms aligned with Axis ideologies. Belgian Rexist movement under , launched in 1930 as a Catholic-inspired anti-parliamentary force, drew inspiration from Mussolini's 1929 Lateran Accords with the Vatican and garnered 11.5% of the vote in during the 1937 local elections, reflecting admiration for fascist reconciliation of and traditionalism. Further north, the Dutch National Socialist Movement (NSB), established by in 1931, initially mirrored Italian Fascism's before shifting toward Hitlerian racialism, achieving 7.9% of the national vote (approximately 300,000 ballots) in the 1935 elections amid economic depression-fueled discontent. In , the National Socialist Danish Workers' Party, founded in 1930, echoed Nazi anti-Versailles rhetoric and mustered about 1.8% of the vote (31,000 supporters) in the 1939 parliamentary elections, while its Norwegian counterpart, Vidkun Quisling's created in 1933, secured 2.2% (41,845 votes) in 1936 before declining due to internal scandals. These groups, though electorally marginal—rarely exceeding 10% support—fostered networks of intellectuals, veterans, and disaffected elites who viewed Axis regimes as exemplars of efficient governance, laying ideological groundwork for wartime accommodation despite their pre-1939 failures to overthrow liberal systems. Such alignments were not mere mimicry but rooted in shared causal responses to interwar crises: , , and Soviet Comintern agitation, which fascists framed as justifying decisive, untrammeled state power over individualistic .

Anti-Communism as Primary Driver

The launch of Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941, transformed the motivations for collaboration across occupied Europe, positioning the Axis powers as a bulwark against Soviet communism. Prior to this invasion, collaboration was often limited to administrative or opportunistic roles, but the perceived Bolshevik threat—amplified by recent Soviet occupations in Poland, the Baltics, and Finland—prompted a surge in active military participation from Western and Eastern Europeans alike. Nazi propaganda effectively portrayed the Eastern Front as a crusade against "Judeo-Bolshevism," resonating with longstanding anti-communist sentiments rooted in the interwar Red Scare and fears of revolutionary upheaval. This ideological alignment drove the recruitment of tens of thousands of foreign volunteers into German-led formations, particularly the and auxiliary units deployed against the . In , for example, approximately 6,000 men joined Freikorps Danmark and later SS-Division Nordland, explicitly motivated by opposition to Soviet expansion rather than full endorsement of National Socialism; many were non-Nazis who viewed the conflict as a against . Similar patterns emerged in with the Den Norske Legion, in the via the SS Legion Niederlande, and in through the Legion Wallonie, where volunteers numbered in the thousands and focused recruitment appeals on anti-Bolshevik themes. In , the Légion des Volontaires Français contre le Bolchévisme, formed in July 1941, fielded around 5,800 men over the course of the war, serving primarily on the Eastern Front to halt communist advances. Even in , fueled , as seen in the , which sent over 45,000 volunteers to the starting in July 1941 under Franco's regime, justified as repayment for German aid in the but framed domestically as eternal enmity toward . These efforts reflected a pragmatic calculus: for many collaborators, the immediate Soviet menace—evidenced by the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact's fallout and Stalin's purges—outweighed Axis atrocities, sustaining participation until battlefield reversals like Stalingrad in 1943 eroded enthusiasm. Historians emphasize that while opportunism and nationalism played roles, provided the causal primacy for voluntary military , distinguishing it from coerced compliance.

Pragmatic Calculations and Survival Imperatives

In , pragmatic collaboration frequently stemmed from calculations aimed at preserving national administrations, economic stability, and civilian lives amid overwhelming Axis military superiority. Danish leaders, after the German invasion on April 9, 1940, implemented a "cooperation policy" that permitted the retention of the Danish government, monarchy, and under German supervision, thereby avoiding the direct military governance imposed in or . This strategy sustained food supplies, limited , and deferred harsher measures until public unrest and forced its abandonment on August 29, 1943, when dissolved the and instituted . Proponents argued it mitigated occupation brutality, as experienced fewer deportations and executions compared to neighbors, with only about 6,000 targeted versus systematic elsewhere. Vichy France exemplified survival-driven imperatives following the June 22, 1940, armistice, which ceded northern and western territories to German control while granting Marshal Philippe Pétain's regime authority over the southern unoccupied zone and colonies. Pétain's administration complied with German demands for resources and labor—such as the Service du Travail Obligatoire dispatching over 600,000 workers to Germany by 1944—to position Vichy as a protective buffer against total annexation and to retain nominal sovereignty. This approach, rationalized as shielding the French populace from direct Nazi rule, facilitated administrative continuity but increasingly entangled Vichy in implementing anti-Jewish statutes and suppressing resistance, reflecting a trade-off where partial accommodation averted immediate chaos. In the , civil servants' widespread continuation of pre-occupation duties under the German civil administration ensured public order and economic functionality, with over 90% of bureaucrats remaining in post by 1941 to manage , , and local governance. This pragmatic adherence, driven by fears of reprisals and institutional collapse, enabled the Germans to exploit Dutch efficiency for policies like Jewish registration, yet it also preserved societal structures that later aided resistance networks. Such imperatives underscored a broader pattern where occupied elites weighed compliance against the risks of non-cooperation, often prioritizing short-term stability over long-term moral costs in environments of .

Coercive Structures and Opportunistic Participation

Occupation authorities in Nazi-controlled established coercive frameworks that compelled local populations and administrations to participate in the Axis , often under threats of reprisals, executions, or economic devastation. German military governors and SS units demanded continuity in civil services, policing, and resource extraction to minimize administrative burdens on occupiers, enforcing compliance through decrees that penalized non-cooperation with dissolution of local governments or punishments. For instance, in , directives required municipal officials to register populations, enforce , and suppress resistance, with failure risking immediate replacement by more pliable collaborators or direct German oversight. A primary mechanism of coercion was the imposition of forced labor systems to sustain the German economy and military production. Between 1939 and 1945, exploited approximately 20 million foreign civilians from occupied territories as forced laborers, with numbers peaking at over 7 million in the Reich by 1944. In , the regime's (STO), enacted on February 16, 1943, conscripted men born between 1920 and 1922, resulting in the deportation of around 650,000 workers to despite initial voluntary "relève" schemes that failed to meet quotas. Similar programs in and the Netherlands involved compulsory recruitment, where evasion led to arrests, fines, or family liabilities, blurring lines between voluntary enlistment and duress as masked underlying threats. Opportunistic participation emerged within these structures, where individuals or elites exceeded minimal compliance to secure personal or institutional advantages, such as career preservation, financial gain, or protection from Soviet threats. Traditional ruling classes in occupied often viewed collaboration as a means to maintain pre-war hierarchies and privileges, cooperating beyond necessity to favor with occupiers. figures engaged in "" processes, acquiring expropriated Jewish properties at undervalued prices, with thousands of such transactions recorded across and the by 1942. Philosopher later categorized these as "opportunistic collaborators," distinct from ideological adherents, motivated by self-interest rather than conviction, though narratives sometimes conflated them to amplify moral condemnation.

Collaboration in Western Occupied Territories

Belgium and Luxembourg

Following the German invasion of on May 10, 1940, which culminated in King Leopold III's surrender on May 28, the country fell under a administration that preserved elements of the Belgian while suppressing resistance. emerged from pre-existing fascist and nationalist movements, driven by , ethnic separatism, and ideological affinity with rather than widespread opportunism. The , a Walloon Catholic-fascist group led by , pivoted sharply toward pro-German alignment after the occupation, with Degrelle publicly advocating integration into a Nazi-led as a means of national revival. In August 1941, Degrelle established the Légion Wallonie, drawing initial volunteers from Rexist ranks; by October, 860 men had deployed to the Eastern Front as part of the Wehrmacht's 562nd Infantry Regiment, motivated primarily by the fight against . The unit later expanded into the 28th SS Volunteer Grenadier Division Wallonien, reaching brigade strength of around 3,000–4,000 by 1943 through further recruitment amid escalating Soviet advances. Flemish collaboration centered on the Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (VNV), a nationalist party that garnered 15% of the national vote in the 1939 elections and explicitly endorsed German occupation under leader Staf de Clercq, who proclaimed it a liberation from Belgian centralism toward a pan-Germanic state. Following de Clercq's death in late 1942, successor Hendrik Elias deepened ties, facilitating recruitment into the (later 27th SS Volunteer Grenadier Division Langemarck). VNV members participated in auxiliary roles, including and anti-Jewish measures, though internal rivalries with the more radical DeVlag group fragmented Flemish efforts. In total, roughly 25,000 served in German formations on the Eastern Front, comprising volunteers in units and Wehrmacht legions; this figure reflects ideological commitment over coercion, as participation often involved public enlistment rallies and anti-communist framing. Economic collaboration, such as labor recruitment for German industry, affected broader populations under duress, but active political and military alignment remained confined to a minority, belied by postwar narratives inflating its prevalence to justify purges. In Luxembourg, invaded concurrently on May 10, 1940, and formally annexed to the in August 1942 under Gauleiter , collaboration was marginal and overshadowed by passive resistance and exile government efforts. The Bewegung (VdB), a Nazi-aligned group, attracted a small following among ethnic German sympathizers and opportunists, promoting Germanization through cultural suppression and recruitment into organizations like the SA (approximately 1,100 members) and NSKK (around 1,500). Voluntary military collaboration was limited; a few hundred Luxembourgers enlisted in units for the Eastern Front, often citing anti-Bolshevik motives, distinct from the mass Wehrmacht conscription of 8,000–10,000 men born 1920–1927 starting August 1942, which many evaded or resisted as an illegitimate imposition. Overall, active collaborators numbered in the low thousands, a tiny fraction of the 300,000-strong population, with most Luxembourgers rejecting Nazification through strikes, underground networks, and loyalty to Grand Duchess Charlotte's exile.

Denmark and Norway

Denmark was occupied by on April 9, 1940, following a swift invasion that met minimal resistance due to the Danish military's decision to avoid prolonged conflict. The Danish government adopted a of cooperation, allowing it to retain nominal sovereignty and administrative functions until August 29, 1943, when escalating sabotage and strikes prompted Germany to impose direct . This approach involved negotiating ad hoc agreements with German authorities to sustain Danish institutions, including the monarchy under King Christian X, police, and , while facilitating economic contributions such as agricultural exports to Germany, which supported the Axis . Although framed as pragmatic preservation of autonomy, the enabled limited , including tolerance of pro-Nazi groups and drives, though ideological alignment remained marginal among the population. A smaller but active element of Danish collaboration manifested in volunteer formations for the Eastern Front. The (Frikorps Danmark), established in July 1941 under Christian Peder Kryssing, drew approximately 6,000 volunteers motivated primarily by , serving in the against Soviet forces until its disbandment in 1943. Overall, around 5,500 Danes joined units, participating in operations like the , where they suffered high casualties. Internally, the Schalburg Corps, a Danish SS auxiliary formed in 1943, conducted counter-insurgency and reprisal actions against resistance, led by figures like , reflecting opportunistic and ideological participation amid coercion. Norway faced simultaneous invasion on April 9, 1940, leading to a two-month campaign before full German control under Reichskommissar Josef Terboven. Vidkun Quisling, head of the fascist Nasjonal Samling (NS) party founded in 1933, seized the moment to declare himself prime minister on the invasion day, though his initial coup collapsed within days due to lack of support; Hitler established a puppet regime under Quisling from February 1, 1942, to May 1945. The NS regime enforced Nazi policies, including economic mobilization for Germany—such as nickel exports from occupied mines—and anti-Jewish measures, facilitating the deportation of 773 Norwegian Jews to Auschwitz in 1942-1943, with approximately half perishing. Despite compulsory civil service participation, NS membership peaked at around 45,000 in a population of 3 million, indicating limited voluntary ideological buy-in, though administrative collaboration in ministries and police aided German governance. Norwegian collaboration extended to military volunteers, exemplified by the Norwegian Legion (Den Norske Legion), formed June 29, 1941, which recruited about 1,200 men for Waffen-SS service on the Eastern Front, later absorbed into SS Division Nordland. Total Norwegian SS volunteers numbered roughly 6,000, driven by anti-Bolshevik fervor and promises of Nordic racial solidarity, though desertions and post-war trials revealed mixed motivations including opportunism. Quisling's government promoted these units publicly, as seen in send-offs emphasizing a "common enemy" in Bolshevism, aligning with broader Axis anti-communist ideology.

France and Vichy Regime

Following the Franco-German armistice signed on June 22, 1940, France was divided into an occupied northern and western zone under direct German control and an unoccupied southern zone governed by the Vichy regime led by Marshal Philippe Pétain, established on July 10, 1940, after the National Assembly granted him full powers. The Vichy government pursued a policy of collaboration with Nazi Germany, formalized after Pétain's meeting with Adolf Hitler at Montoire-sur-le-Loir on October 24, 1940, where Pétain publicly pledged cooperation, stating on October 30, 1940, that "this collaboration must continue." This approach was driven by ideological alignment with authoritarianism, anti-communism, and a belief that accommodation would secure better terms for France, including potential territorial revisions. Vichy's "National Revolution" ideology emphasized traditional values, family, and anti-parliamentarism, rejecting the Third Republic's , and facilitated active beyond mere compliance with occupation demands. Economically, Vichy supplied with resources equivalent to 42% of all foreign aid received by the from occupied territories, including food, industrial output, and forced labor under the (STO) introduced in February 1943, which compelled over 600,000 French workers to by 1944. Militarily, Vichy supported units like the Légion des Volontaires Français contre le Bolchévisme (LVF), formed in July 1941 with official encouragement, sending approximately 6,000 volunteers to fight on the Eastern Front alongside German forces. The paramilitary Milice Française, created in January 1943 under , numbered up to 30,000 members by 1944 and collaborated in suppressing resistance, conducting arrests, and aiding deportations. In racial policies, Vichy preemptively enacted anti-Semitic legislation independent of German orders, including the Statut des Juifs on , 1940, which excluded from public office, , and professions, affecting over 100,000 French and defining Jewishness by descent rather than religion. This was followed by of Jewish property, of thousands in camps like Gurs, and active participation in roundups; French police arrested 13,152 in the Vél d'Hiv operation on July 16-17, 1942, in occupied , handing them to German authorities. Overall, Vichy facilitated the deportation of 75,721 from between 1942 and 1944, primarily foreign-born but including 11,000 French citizens, with French officials organizing transports even from the unoccupied zone after German occupation in November 1942. While approximately 75% of 's pre-war Jewish population survived—higher than in most occupied Western countries due to factors like decentralized geography and some local resistance—this outcome occurred despite Vichy's initiatives, which exceeded initial German expectations in scope and enthusiasm.

Netherlands and Channel Islands

The German invasion of the began on 10 May 1940, leading to the capitulation of Dutch forces on 15 May after the bombing of ; was appointed to oversee the occupation administration. The Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging (NSB), led by , emerged as the primary fascist organization aligning with Nazi ideology, with its membership expanding under occupation to support German policies. Mussert was designated "Leider van het Nederlandse Volk" on 29 June 1940, though real authority remained with Seyss-Inquart, limiting NSB influence to and auxiliary roles. Military collaboration involved approximately 22,000 to 25,000 Dutch volunteers enlisting in the , primarily motivated by following the 1941 German invasion of the , serving on the Eastern Front in units like the SS Volunteer Legion Netherlands. These volunteers, including formations such as the 34th SS Volunteer Grenadier Division "Landstorm Nederland," participated in combat against Soviet forces and were integrated into German command structures. Administrative cooperation facilitated , with Dutch civil servants and police aiding in the registration and deportation of ; of the pre-war Jewish population of about 140,000, roughly 107,000 were deported, resulting in over 75% mortality, the highest rate in due to efficient bureaucratic compliance and limited evasion opportunities. Post-war investigations identified around 425,000 suspected collaborators, including NSB members and those who joined German forces, leading to trials under the Special Jurisdiction, though many cases involved opportunistic participation rather than deep ideological commitment. The , , , and smaller islets—were occupied by German forces from July 1940 until May 1945, the only British territories under Axis control during . Local governments, led by bailiffs such as Victor Carey in and Alexander Coutanche in , adopted a policy of pragmatic cooperation to maintain civil order and mitigate reprisals, handling routine administration under German military oversight while swearing oaths of allegiance to privately. This approach involved compliance with occupation decrees, including curfews, resource rationing, and fortification labor using external forced workers, but avoided formation of puppet regimes or ideological groups. Collaboration remained limited and largely non-ideological, manifesting in isolated acts such as informing on resistance activities or economic dealings with occupiers; a small number of islanders worked in German administrative roles or as , while interpersonal relations, including , occurred but were not systematically organized. Approximately 2,000 , mostly recent refugees, faced to camps like Auschwitz, facilitated by local registries under duress, though the islands' small pre-war Jewish community and evacuations reduced direct involvement. Post-liberation, around 20 individuals were prosecuted for , primarily for marketeering or minor aiding, reflecting the emphasis on over active support for Nazi goals.

Monaco and Other Microstates

Monaco maintained formal neutrality at the outset of under Prince Louis II, but its strategic location led to occupation by Italian forces on November 11, 1942, following the Axis invasion of . After Italy's armistice with the Allies in September 1943, German troops occupied from September 9, 1943, to September 3, 1944, establishing a consulate and initiating limited cooperation, such as joint radio broadcasts with and . Prince Louis II, prioritizing the principality's survival and autonomy, acquiesced to Axis administrative demands without active ideological alignment, resulting in the deportation of approximately 42 Jewish civilians to concentration camps, though the prince personally sheltered some individuals and resisted broader requisitions. This pragmatic accommodation reflected the microstate's vulnerability rather than voluntary collaboration, as evidenced by its evasion of full incorporation into or Axis structures despite proximity to France. San Marino, governed by the since 1923, exhibited ideological sympathy toward Mussolini's regime but adhered to neutrality throughout most of the war, declining to join Italy's belligerency in 1940. The fascist leadership provided rhetorical support for Axis and hosted Italian fascists, yet avoided military contributions or territorial concessions, maintaining a small militia focused on internal security. In late 1944, as Allied forces advanced, San Marino briefly became a battleground in the campaign, with Axis troops retreating through its territory; the republic declared war on on , 1944, aligning with the Allies only after occupation threats materialized. This late shift underscored opportunistic survival tactics amid fascist domestic rule, without substantive pre-1944 such as troop deployments or resource extraction for the Axis. Andorra and exemplified stricter neutrality, escaping occupation due to their mountainous isolation and ties to neutral powers. , co-principality under French and Spanish oversight, hosted no Axis forces and relied on informal militias for defense, with minimal economic or political engagement beyond routes exploited by both sides independently of state policy. , aligned economically with , rejected most applications—admitting only 230—while granting asylum to pro-Axis Russian émigrés post-war, but provided no material aid, intelligence, or personnel to or . In both cases, the absence of collaboration stemmed from geographic obscurity and lack of coercive pressure, rather than principled opposition, enabling passive non-involvement amid Axis dominance in .

Collaboration in Southern and Mediterranean Europe

Greece and Italian Occupied Zones

In the Italian-occupied zones of , which encompassed approximately half the country's territory including the , , , , much of the , and various Aegean islands following the Axis conquest in May 1941, collaboration primarily took the form of administrative rather than widespread or ideological alignment. Italian authorities retained numerous Greek civil servants, prefects, and local officials to manage daily , resource requisitioning, and public order, fostering a of pragmatic brokerage where Greek intermediaries—often local elites, lawyers, and notables—facilitated interactions between occupiers and populations. This structure, evident from 1941 onward, prioritized functionality amid economic exploitation and conditions, with Italian policies extracting agricultural produce and labor while relying on Greek personnel to mitigate resistance and administrative disruptions. Such cooperation was driven by survival imperatives in the face of occupation hardships, including the 1941-1942 that killed an estimated 250,000-300,000 across zones, rather than fervent fascist sympathy; Italian leniency compared to German harshness initially reduced overt opposition, making outright resistance or collaboration less binary. Local administrations under Italian command suppressed early partisan activity passively through police forces, which continued pre-occupation roles, and economic concessions like black-market facilitation, though armed Greek units loyal to remained negligible until later shifts. The central collaborationist governments—starting with Tsolakoglou's cabinet formed on April 30, 1941, and recognized across Axis zones—provided nominal legitimacy, but Italian zones operated semi-autonomously with provincial councils incorporating compliant to handle taxation and . The Italian armistice with the Allies on September 8, 1943, led to German seizure of these zones, intensifying collaboration dynamics as former Italian territories integrated into German administrative control. Under Prime Minister , appointed April 1943, the —collaborationist paramilitary units numbering up to 20,000 by mid-1944—expanded operations into ex-Italian areas, recruiting disaffected policemen, ex-soldiers, and anti-communists to counter the communist-dominated EAM-ELAS resistance, which dominated . These battalions, armed and trained by , conducted anti-partisan sweeps and protected supply lines, reflecting causal pressures from escalating civil strife and EAM's dominance in rural Italian zones prior to 1943, though their efficacy was limited by internal desertions and post-liberation reprisals.

Albania and Montenegro under Italian Rule

Italian forces invaded on , , achieving occupation within days and prompting King Zog I to abdicate and flee to exile. A puppet regime was promptly installed under Shefqet , a wealthy landowner and former political figure, while King of assumed the Albanian crown, formalizing a between the two kingdoms. 's government collaborated with Italian viceroy Francesco Jacomoni to integrate Albania's military—totaling around 15,000 troops—into Italian command structures, merge economies via a , and absorb diplomatic functions into Italy's foreign service. This collaboration extended to local elites who cooperated in administrative roles and fascist propaganda efforts, enabling Italian demographic policies that resettled over 11,000 Italian colonists in by 1941 to assert cultural and economic dominance. Vërlaci's administration enacted laws aligning Albanian institutions with fascist models, including the formation of an as the sole legal political entity, though underlying tensions from economic exploitation and cultural suppression fueled growing nationalist resistance by 1942. The structure persisted until Italy's with the Allies on September 8, 1943, after which German forces intervened to prevent collapse. In Montenegro, Italian occupation followed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia's capitulation on April 17, 1941, with Italy annexing the Adriatic coastal region and establishing over an area of approximately 13,812 square kilometers populated by about 360,000 people. To legitimize control, Italy sponsored a short-lived puppet , proclaiming independence on July 12, 1941, under nationalist leader , who collaborated by drafting a subordinating Montenegrin sovereignty to Italian protection and suppressing anti-fascist elements. Drljević's regime, backed by Italian arms and advisors, aimed to rally local federalists against Yugoslav unity but collapsed amid a mass uprising on July 13, 1941, involving up to 30,000 rebels who targeted Italian garrisons and officials. Italy responded by dissolving the puppet kingdom and imposing the direct Governorate of Montenegro under civil commissioner Alessandro Biancini, relying on from opportunistic local militias, including Chetnik detachments led by figures like , who received Italian supplies to combat communist partisans in joint operations that stabilized Italian rear areas through 1943. This pragmatic alliance, driven by mutual interests against partisan expansion, involved arming roughly 5,000-10,000 local auxiliaries and coordinating intelligence, though it fragmented as Italian defeats mounted, culminating in the governorate's handover to German control after September 1943.

Yugoslavia and Italian Administrative Divisions

Following the Axis on April 6, 1941, occupied and annexed substantial territories, creating administrative divisions to consolidate control and exploit resources amid widespread resistance. These included the in northwestern , the along the Adriatic coast, and the Governorate of in the southeast. Italian policy emphasized annexation where Italian irredentist claims were strong, such as and , while treating as a with nominal under Italian oversight. emerged primarily as pragmatic alliances against communist partisans, involving local militias and Chetnik groups, though uprisings like the July 1941 Montenegrin revolt initially challenged Italian authority before selective pacts were formed. In the , established by royal decree on May 3, 1941, and integrated into the Kingdom of Italy's Adriatic Littoral, Italian forces under the II Army Corps imposed direct rule, erecting barbed wire barriers around by February 22, 1942, to isolate the city from partisan-held countryside. Local Slovene elites formed advisory bodies, but collaboration intensified through the Anti-Communist Volunteer Militia (Milizia Volontaria Anti-Comunista, MVAC), or White Guard, organized in 1942 to suppress resistance; this force, numbering several thousand by mid-1943, conducted joint operations with Italian troops against Tito's partisans. General , a former Yugoslav officer, led MVAC units and coordinated with Italian command, viewing the alliance as a bulwark against rather than full ideological alignment. Such cooperation fragmented Slovene society, with MVAC prioritizing anti-partisan raids over broader Axis goals, though it waned after Italy's armistice when German forces assumed control. The Governorate of Dalmatia, proclaimed on October 15, 1941, encompassed islands and coastal strips from Zadar to Dubrovnik, fulfilling longstanding Fascist claims to ancient Roman territories; Italian civilian governor Giuseppe Bastianini oversaw exploitation, deporting over 4,000 Slavs to concentration camps by 1942 while promoting Italian settlement. Collaboration was limited and opportunistic, with some Dalmatian Italians and Croat auxiliaries aiding in anti-partisan sweeps, but resistance dominated, including partisan attacks that killed hundreds of Italian troops. Italian strategy relied on divide-and-rule tactics, arming select Chetnik bands sporadically, yet the governorate saw minimal institutionalized local forces compared to other zones, as Italian commanders prioritized direct military control amid NDH claims to the interior. In the , initially a zone from April 1941, authorities installed a puppet regime under , proclaiming "independence" on July 13, 1941, tied to King Victor Emanuel III via Queen Elena's Montenegrin heritage; however, a mass uprising on the same day, involving up to 30,000 rebels, overran garrisons before Italian reinforcements suppressed it by autumn, executing thousands. crystallized in 1942, as Italian General Alessandro Biancini negotiated pacts with leader , arming his forces—estimated at 5,000-10,000 men—for joint operations against partisans, including the disarmament of communist units in exchange for autonomy. These agreements, formalized by March 1942, reflected Italian desperation amid , with Chetniks providing intelligence and manpower for offensives like Operation Weiss in early 1943, though tensions arose over Italian demands for full subordination. By Italy's capitulation, such alliances had stabilized Italian hold temporarily but fueled post-war reprisals against collaborators.

Collaboration in Eastern Europe and the Balkans

Baltic States

The Soviet occupation of the began in June 1940, following secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, with full annexation and repression intensifying by 1941, including mass deportations of perceived anti-Soviet elements on June 14, 1941, which targeted elites, nationalists, and families, fostering widespread anti-Bolshevik sentiment. The German invasion via on June 22, 1941, prompted local uprisings as Balts viewed the as liberators from Soviet terror, leading to the formation of provisional governments and auxiliary forces that cooperated with Nazi authorities in securing the region and implementing occupation policies. In , the coordinated a June uprising, declaring independence on , 1941, though Nazi officials dissolved the within weeks to impose direct control. Lithuanian nationalists initiated pogroms independently of initial German orders, notably the from June 25–29, 1941, where crowds tortured and murdered around 3,800 at sites like the Lietūkis garage. Lithuanian battalions, numbering over 10,000 men by late 1941, played a central role in , conducting mass shootings, guarding the and ghettos, and aiding A in killing over 195,000 of Lithuania's 208,000 by war's end, often driven by local and revenge against perceived Soviet collaborators. In Latvia, units formed immediately after German arrival, assisting in the roundup and execution of , with the — a 300–500-man SD special unit led by , established in July 1941—directly responsible for at least 26,000 Jewish deaths through shootings in Riga forests, anti-partisan sweeps, and operations like the on November 30 and December 8, 1941, where 25,000 were killed. The , conscripted from March 1943 into the 15th and 19th Divisions, mobilized approximately 100,000 men, who fought primarily against Soviet forces on the Eastern Front, viewing service as defense against communist reconquest despite initial voluntary elements. In , Omakaitse self-defense militias, organized in July 1941 with up to 40,000 members under German oversight, arrested communists and , participating in executions at sites like Klooga camp, contributing to the near-total eradication of Estonia's 4,000 by February 1942 through shootings and deportations. Estonian collaboration centered on the , recruited voluntarily from August 1942 with promises of independence, expanding into the 20th Waffen Grenadier Division (1st Estonian) in May 1944 via conscription, fielding about 15,000 troops in battles like to halt Soviet advances, motivated by national survival rather than ideological alignment with . Overall, Baltic facilitated Nazi control and but was rooted in pragmatic anti-Soviet resistance, with local forces enabling rapid implementation of extermination policies amid the dual occupations.

Poland and General Government

The General Government (Generalgouvernement), established by German decree on October 26, 1939, encompassed the central and eastern portions of occupied Poland not directly annexed into the , administered from under Governor-General . This territory, intended as a reservoir of forced labor and raw materials for the Nazi , featured a rigidly hierarchical German-led that incorporated limited Polish auxiliary personnel primarily for enforcement and local governance tasks, though power-sharing was minimal and Poles were systematically marginalized or exploited. Frank's regime, formalized through the October 12, 1939, decree, prioritized exploitation over autonomy, with Polish involvement confined to subordinate roles amid policies of cultural suppression, mass executions, and of over 1.5 million Poles for labor by 1944. The most prominent form of Polish collaboration within the General Government was the Polish (Policja Polska Generalnego Gubernatorstwa, or Granatowa Policja), reorganized from pre-war Polish forces in late under direct German oversight and threats of execution for non-compliance. Comprising approximately 13,000 to 17,000 officers by 1941, drawn largely from former , the Blue Police enforced occupation decrees, including curfews, anti-partisan sweeps, and roundups for forced labor transports to , which affected over 2 million Poles. While initially coerced, many units operated with autonomy, routinely exceeding German directives by participating in pogroms, guarding ghettos, and aiding deportations; archival records document their role in the deaths of thousands of , often through independent extortion, shootings, or handovers to units without explicit orders. Beyond policing, collaboration extended to select local administrators and economic functionaries who managed , collection, and agricultural quotas under German district chiefs (Kreishauptleute), though such roles were opportunistic and survival-driven rather than ideological; for instance, some Polish mayors in smaller towns facilitated requisitions supporting the Wehrmacht's logistics. Limited political collaboration occurred among fringe groups, such as attempts to recruit highlanders in the region as a pseudo-ethnic buffer against Polish unity, though these efforts yielded few volunteers and collapsed by amid resistance sabotage. Archival analyses, including those by historian , underscore the Blue Police's proactive complicity in implementation—contrasting with Polish institutional narratives emphasizing coercion—based on survivor testimonies and perpetrator records from over 200 localities, revealing systemic participation in hiding for or summary executions. Toward the war's end, certain (NSZ) factions, motivated by , coordinated tactical operations with German units against advancing Soviet forces in 1944-1945, including intelligence-sharing, though the NSZ broadly opposed Nazi rule. Overall, collaboration in the General Government remained circumscribed compared to resistance networks like the Home Army, which numbered over 300,000 by 1944 and executed collaborators; German policies of terror, including the 1941 decree imposing death for aiding Jews, constrained voluntary alignment, yet auxiliary forces like the Blue Police enabled the regime's repressive apparatus, contributing to the murder of 3 million Polish Jews and broader demographic engineering. Postwar trials convicted hundreds of Blue Police members, with evidence from German and Polish archives confirming their dual role in occupation enforcement and occasional defiance, such as smuggling aid to the underground.

Czechoslovakia and Protectorate Areas

On March 15, 1939, German forces occupied the Czech provinces of and , establishing the of and the following day under nominal Czech presidency of , who cooperated with the Nazi administration by signing decrees aligning with German policies, including anti- measures. The government maintained administrative functions, with Czech officials and police assisting in enforcement of German directives, contributing to the persecution of approximately 118,000 , of whom Czech collaborators directly killed around 7,000. Economic collaboration was substantial, as German authorities integrated Czech industries into the Reich's war machine; the Škoda Works, a major armaments producer, manufactured tanks, , and components critical to the German effort, with output sustaining operations on multiple fronts until Allied bombings intensified in 1944. Prominent figures like , appointed Minister of Education in September 1942, actively promoted Nazi ideology through broadcasts and youth , urging Czech alignment with the and denouncing resistance as treasonous. Simultaneously, Slovakia declared independence on March 14, 1939, under President Jozef Tiso's Hlinka's , signing a protection treaty with on March 23 that ensured military and economic subordination in exchange for autonomy from Hungarian claims. The Slovak state joined the , dispatching the —initially comprising two infantry divisions and air units totaling about 45,000 men—to the Eastern Front in alongside , where it secured rear areas and engaged Soviet forces until withdrawn for re-equipment in 1943, after which smaller security units continued service. Slovak collaboration extended to the Holocaust, with the Tiso regime enacting anti- laws in 1941 and agreeing in March 1942 to deport over 70,000 Slovak to German camps, funding the transports at 500 Reichsmarks per person while confiscating their property to bolster state finances. This participation, driven by ideological alignment and economic incentives, marked as Nazi Germany's first Slavic ally in the invasion of the , though internal dissent culminated in the of August 1944, suppressed by German intervention.

Hungary, Romania, and Axis Allies

Hungary, under Regent , aligned with the to pursue territorial revisionism following the , which had stripped it of significant lands after . On November 20, 1940, Hungary signed the , formalizing its alliance with , , and . This enabled Hungary to participate in the Axis in April 1941, securing the Bachka and Baranja regions, and to declare war on the on June 27, 1941, shortly after began. Hungarian forces, including the Mobile Corps and later the Second Hungarian Army of approximately 200,000 troops, were deployed to the Eastern Front, suffering catastrophic losses—over 80% casualties—at the Battle of Voronezh in due to inadequate equipment and Soviet encirclement. Collaboration deepened with Germany's occupation of on March 19, 1944, which ousted the relatively moderate prime minister and installed the pro-Nazi government. Between May and July 1944, Hungarian authorities, in coordination with German SS forces under , deported 437,402 from provincial areas to Auschwitz-Birkenau, where most were murdered upon arrival. Horthy attempted to halt these deportations on July 7, 1944, amid Allied advances, but a German-backed coup in October 1944 under led to intensified domestic killings, with approximately 15,000 massacred in alone by early 1945. Overall, Hungarian collaboration facilitated the deaths of around 565,000 , driven by antisemitic enacted since 1938 and wartime opportunism, though Horthy's regime had initially resisted full-scale extermination. Romania, under Marshal Ion Antonescu's dictatorship established via a royal coup on September 6, 1940, allied with to reclaim territories lost in 1940 to the USSR and . Antonescu committed Romanian forces to starting June 22, 1941, deploying the Third and Fourth Armies—totaling over 600,000 troops—alongside German units to recover and Northern , and to advance toward and the . Romanian troops played a key role in the siege of in October 1941, where they implemented harsh occupation policies, including mass executions and ghettos that contributed to the deaths of tens of thousands of . Antonescu's regime pursued autonomous antisemitic measures, resulting in the of June 26–28, 1941, where Romanian military and civilians killed at least 13,266 Jews, and systematic deportations and killings in , , and , where an estimated 150,000–250,000 Jews perished from shootings, starvation, and disease between 1941 and 1942. Unlike Hungary's later deportations to German camps, Romania's actions were largely self-directed, though coordinated with German goals; Antonescu rejected full participation in the for Jews but enabled it in regained territories. By 1943, mounting losses—over 300,000 Romanian soldiers killed or missing on the Eastern Front—prompted Antonescu to seek an exit, culminating in his overthrow on August 23, 1944, and Romania's switch to the Allies. Total Romanian Jewish deaths under the regime numbered approximately 280,000–380,000, reflecting a blend of territorial , , and indigenous . Among other , under and under provided auxiliary divisions like the Slovak Mobile Division and Croatian Black Legion for the Eastern Front, while , though against the USSR, permitted German transit and enacted affecting over 11,000 deportees to Treblinka in 1943. These minor allies contributed smaller contingents— around 45,000 troops total—but amplified Axis manpower and facilitated local persecutions aligned with German racial policies.

Bulgaria and Non-Belligerent Cooperation

Bulgaria acceded to the on March 1, 1941, aligning with and amid territorial incentives for southern Dobruja's recovery and promises of further Balkan gains, though Tsar Boris III had initially pursued neutrality. This alignment facilitated non-combat support, including granting German forces transit rights through Bulgarian territory in February 1941 to stage the invasion of Greece, bypassing potential delays via Romania. Following the Axis conquests, Bulgarian troops occupied Eastern Macedonia, , and parts of from April 1941, administering these areas under German oversight and suppressing local resistance, which indirectly conserved manpower for other fronts. Despite the alliance, Bulgaria adopted a posture toward the after Operation Barbarossa's launch on June 22, 1941, with Tsar Boris III rejecting Adolf Hitler's demands during personal meetings in 1942 and 1943 to dispatch troops to the Eastern Front, influenced by widespread pro-Russian public sentiment and Orthodox cultural affinities. preserved diplomatic ties with until their rupture in June 1944 and delayed a formal until September 5, 1944, following Soviet advances; no Bulgarian divisions fought the prior to this. This selective restraint did not preclude economic concessions, as exploited 's trade dependency—absorbing over 70 percent of its exports by 1940 through clearing agreements that favored imports of machinery and arms in exchange for Bulgarian , grains, and metals, deepening Sofia's alignment without full military commitment. In occupied territories, Bulgarian authorities cooperated with German anti-Jewish measures, agreeing in March 1943 to deport roughly 11,000 from , Macedonia, and to German custody for extermination at Treblinka, contrasting with resistance to similar demands for within pre-1941 Bulgarian borders. Such actions underscored pragmatic collaboration to secure Axis favor, even as Boris III's regime limited broader entanglement; following his sudden death on August 28, 1943—rumored by some to result from Nazi pressure over these refusals—successor governments under Dobri Bozhilov and Ivan Bagryanov maintained this equilibrium until Soviet offensives forced a pivot in September 1944.

Collaboration in the Soviet Union and Eastern Front

Pre-Barbarossa Soviet-German Relations

The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, signed on August 23, 1939, between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, formalized a ten-year non-aggression agreement that included a secret protocol dividing Eastern Europe into spheres of influence. The protocol assigned Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland to the Soviet sphere, while Poland was partitioned along the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San, with eastern Poland allocated to the USSR and western portions to Germany. This arrangement facilitated mutual non-interference in territorial acquisitions and enabled both powers to pursue expansion without immediate conflict. Following the pact, Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, prompting the Soviet Union to enter from the east on September 17, leading to the rapid partition of the country in line with the secret protocol. On September 22, 1939, German and Soviet forces conducted a joint in Brest-Litovsk to mark the handover of the eastern sector to Soviet control, symbolizing their temporary alignment. Accompanying this was the German-Soviet Commercial Agreement of August 19, 1939, under which Germany extended a 200 million credit to the USSR in exchange for Soviet exports of raw materials, including 1 million tons of feed grains and , 900,000 tons of , and 100,000 tons of over two years. Soviet territorial gains proceeded with German acquiescence: mutual assistance pacts with the in 1939–1940 paved the way for Soviet occupation and of , , and between June 15 and August 9, 1940, incorporating them as Soviet republics. Trade relations intensified, with the USSR supplying Germany critical resources like , , and grain—totaling an estimated 597.9 million Reichsmarks in exports by —vital for the German , while receiving German machinery and technical expertise. A further credit agreement in February 1940 expanded this exchange, sustaining economic collaboration despite ideological antagonism. In November 1940, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov visited Berlin from November 12 to 14 for talks with Adolf Hitler and Joachim von Ribbentrop, where Germany proposed Soviet adherence to the Tripartite Pact as an Axis partner, offering influence in the Balkans but clashing over Soviet interests in Finland and the Black Sea region. These discussions highlighted growing frictions, as Soviet demands for bases in Bulgaria and security guarantees conflicted with German strategic aims, foreshadowing the pact's fragility. Nonetheless, material deliveries continued unabated until the German invasion on June 22, 1941, underscoring the pragmatic, non-ideological nature of the pre-Barbarossa entente.

Post-Invasion Auxiliary Forces and Hiwis

Following the launch of on June 22, 1941, German forces captured over 3 million Soviet prisoners of war by the end of that year, many of whom faced starvation and disease in camps due to deliberate neglect under policies. To alleviate manpower shortages in logistics, construction, and rear-area security amid high attrition rates—exceeding 200,000 casualties in the first months—German commanders pragmatically recruited auxiliaries from these prisoners and local civilians, designating them Hilfswillige (Hiwis, or "voluntary helpers"). Initially banned by Hitler in December 1941 as ideologically impure, the practice persisted unofficially and was tacitly expanded by commands, driven by operational necessity rather than racial doctrine, with recruits often motivated by survival amid Soviet POW mortality rates approaching 60% in 1941. By mid-1942, Hiwis numbered approximately 150,000 integrated into frontline divisions for non-combat roles such as driving, cooking, and fortification work, supplementing German service troops redeployed to combat; this grew to around 600,000 by mid-1943 across the Eastern Front , constituting up to 25% of some units' effective strength, as seen in the 6th Army at Stalingrad where over 50,000 Hiwis supported operations before the encirclement. An additional 200,000 served in auxiliary police formations under or local command, conducting anti-partisan sweeps in occupied territories like and Belorussia, where recruitment drew from anti-Bolshevik sentiments rooted in Stalin's collectivization famines and purges, which had depopulated regions and fostered resentment against rule. These forces, often armed with captured Soviet equipment, freed German units for offensive duties but were plagued by desertions, estimated at 10-20% annually, due to inadequate pay (typically rations and 1-2 Reichsmarks daily) and fears of . Auxiliary units extended beyond Hiwis to include self-defense militias () formed in summer 1941 from ethnic Germans and locals in the Baltic and Ukrainian borderlands, totaling 100,000-150,000 by autumn, tasked with securing supply lines against stragglers and early partisan bands; in Belorussia alone, over 70,000 joined district-level police by 1942, per German administrative records, reflecting pragmatic alliances against perceived Soviet tyranny rather than ideological affinity for National Socialism. While some auxiliaries participated in atrocities, such as the execution of commissars or Jewish civilians during operations, their primary function remained logistical support, with German oversight limiting combat integration until late-war Osttruppen formations; post-1943, as Soviet advances intensified, Hiwi reliability waned, prompting disbandments and executions for suspected , underscoring the opportunistic nature of much amid mutual distrust.

Ukrainian and Belarusian Nationalist Movements

Ukrainian nationalist movements, particularly the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), established contacts with in as a against Polish and Soviet rule, viewing the Germans as potential liberators for Ukrainian . The OUN split in 1940 into the Bandera-led OUN-B faction, which pursued radical tactics, and the more moderate OUN-M under Andriy Melnyk; both factions cooperated with German intelligence and military preparations prior to . OUN members formed auxiliary battalions such as Nachtigall and , which advanced alongside units into in June 1941, assisting in initial occupations and security roles. On June 30, 1941, OUN-B leaders in proclaimed the Act of Restoration of Ukrainian Statehood, anticipating German recognition, but Nazi authorities rejected it and arrested on July 5, 1941, along with other OUN-B figures, imprisoning them in until late 1944. Despite this rift, Ukrainian nationalists continued limited collaboration through units, where OUN affiliates participated in anti-partisan and guard duties, including in occupied territories; by 1943, preparations formed the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the (1st Galician), recruiting approximately 80,000 volunteers initially, with 25,000 ultimately serving against Soviet forces on the Eastern Front starting 1943. The (UPA), established in October 1942 under OUN-B command led by , initially received tacit German tolerance in for anti-Soviet operations but shifted to against German forces by early 1943, prioritizing independence over sustained Axis alignment. Belarusian nationalist efforts were more fragmented and opportunistic, lacking the OUN's pre-war organizational depth, with collaboration driven primarily by anti-Bolshevik sentiments amid brutal Soviet repressions. The (BCR), a Nazi-sponsored puppet body, was formed on December 22, 1943, in under , aiming to administer local affairs and mobilize support for German defenses as Soviet advances loomed. The BCR oversaw auxiliary formations like the Belarusian Regional Defense Corps, which expanded to 21,628 members by April 1944, engaging in anti-partisan sweeps and rear security against Soviet guerrillas. Belarusian nationalists also contributed smaller volunteer contingents to units, such as elements integrated into the 30th Waffen Grenadier Division, but these efforts yielded limited autonomy, as German policy subordinated local aspirations to needs, dissolving the BCR upon retreat in July 1944. Overall, Belarusian collaboration remained subordinate and less ideologically fervent than Ukrainian variants, reflecting weaker national cohesion and greater reliance on German directives for survival against both Nazi exploitation and Soviet retribution.

Russian and Caucasian Separatist Units

The (ROA), commanded by former Soviet General following his capture at the in July 1942, represented a key anti-Bolshevik formation among ethnic . Officially activated in under the for the Liberation of the Peoples of —a entity nominally independent from direct German control—the ROA drew primarily from Soviet prisoners of war disillusioned with Stalin's regime, promising liberation from communism rather than subordination to Nazi ideology. At its maximum, the ROA mustered around 50,000 personnel across two divisions, though effective combat strength remained limited due to late formation, inadequate arming, and internal tensions with German overseers; it engaged Soviet forces only in near , suffering heavy losses before Vlasov's capture and execution in 1946. Preceding the ROA, the Waffen-Sturm-Brigade der SS RONA (Russian National Liberation People's Army), led by , emerged in 1942 within the German-occupied as a force combating . Expanding to 10,000–20,000 volunteers by mid-1943 through recruitment of anti-communist Russians, including ex-POWs and locals, the brigade conducted brutal counterinsurgency operations in and , earning a reputation for atrocities against civilians. Deployed to suppress the in August 1944, RONA units looted and massacred non-combatants, prompting Kaminski's execution by German authorities on August 28, 1944, for insubordination; remnants were absorbed into Vlasov's forces. Cossack detachments, drawing from Don, Kuban, Terek, and Siberian ethnic groups with historical aspirations, formed significant Russian-aligned units against Soviet rule. The 1st Cossack Cavalry Division, established in May 1943 under German auspices, integrated existing Cossack squadrons like Major Ivan Kononov's 436th Infantry Regiment—defectors from the in August 1941—and grew to approximately 25,000 horsemen by 1944, specializing in anti-partisan sweeps in and . Reorganized as the in late 1944, these units emphasized traditional Cossack grievances against Bolshevik collectivization, though subordinated to command; they fought until May 1945, with survivors facing forced repatriation and execution under Stalin's Order No. 270. Caucasian separatists, motivated by desires for independence from Moscow amid Stalin's deportations and policies, contributed to the Wehrmacht's through ethnic-specific legions recruited from POW camps and communities. The , initiated in December 1941 as the Kaukasische-Mohammedanische Legion, comprised Azerbaijani Muslims opposing Soviet and , forming battalions that served in rear-security roles on the Eastern Front and later in against Allied landings. Ranging from 10,000 to 20,000 volunteers across multiple regiments, these units participated in operations like the 1944 suppression of the , reflecting pragmatic alliances against communism despite Nazi racial hierarchies. The Georgian Legion, activated in from Soviet Georgian POWs and anti-Soviet exiles, fielded around 30,000 personnel in 13 of roughly 800 men each, deployed for anti-partisan duties in , the , and the sector. Georgian nationalists viewed as a pathway to post-war sovereignty, with units like the 822nd Georgian Battalion engaging in combat from onward, though high desertion rates and German mistrust limited frontline roles. Smaller Armenian and North Caucasian contingents paralleled these efforts; the , formed in 1942 as the 812th Battalion, numbered several thousand who fought on the Eastern Front, driven by revanche for Soviet policies and hopes of liberating from Bolshevik control. North Caucasian groups, including and Ingush in Mohammedan legions, provided auxiliary battalions totaling thousands, focused on local uprisings during the 1942 German advance into the , but were hampered by Stalin's preemptive 1944 deportations of entire peoples. Overall, these Caucasian units within the —totaling over 175,000 Eastern volunteers broadly—prioritized ethnic over ideological alignment with , though German exploitation eroded trust and effectiveness.

Transcaucasian and Central Asian Volunteers

Volunteers from Transcaucasia—encompassing ethnic , , and —and were recruited into German military formations primarily from Soviet prisoners of war captured after in June 1941, with recruitment intensifying during the 1942 advance into the under Operation Fall Blau. These individuals, often motivated by resentment toward Soviet policies such as forced collectivization, deportations, and ethnic purges, joined units within the Wehrmacht's structure, enticed by German propaganda promising national independence from Bolshevik rule upon victory. Formations were organized into legions or battalions for rear-area security, anti-partisan operations, and labor support, though some saw frontline deployment; estimates suggest tens of thousands participated, though desertions and poor discipline were common due to inadequate training and unfulfilled autonomy pledges. The Georgian Legion, established in May 1942 from émigré nationalists and POWs under figures like Shalva Maghlakelidze, grew to approximately 30,000 personnel organized into 13 field battalions, each comprising up to 800 men in five companies, with additional integrated into North Caucasian and units. Deployed mainly on the Eastern Front for guard duties and against partisans, elements fought in and the , where the 822nd Battalion mutinied in April 1945 during the uprising, killing German officers and continuing guerrilla actions until May. Armenian volunteers formed the 812th Infantry Battalion in 1942, led by (Dro) and , expanding into the with recruitment drives yielding around 20,000 men by 1944, focused on combating Soviet forces to secure Armenian autonomy. These units conducted training in Poland and , participating in anti-partisan sweeps in the and , though their effectiveness was hampered by internal divisions and reliance on German command; post-war, many leaders evaded Soviet retribution through Western intercession. Azerbaijani units, initially part of the from December 1941 and later formalized as the under Abdülhamid Jahangiroglu, numbered in the tens of thousands, with battalions like the 111th deployed for occupation duties in and the suppression of the 1944 alongside forces. Recruited from POWs and exiles seeking to revive the 1918 , they guarded infrastructure and fought partisans, but suffered high attrition from combat and Soviet reprisals. Central Asian volunteers, predominantly from , , , , and , coalesced into the starting in 1942 under Veli Kayum Khan, comprising former POWs who opted for service to evade execution and pursue anti-Soviet independence amid memories of the Basmachi revolt. Organized into battalions like the 795th and 796th for sentry and labor roles in , , and , with limited Eastern Front combat, the legion reached several thousand strong but faced morale issues from broken German promises of sovereignty; survivors post-1945 endured forced and purges under Stalin's Order No. 270.

Collaboration with Fascist Italy in Non-European Territories

North Africa and Egyptian Sympathies

In Libya, annexed as an Italian colony in 1911 and intensified under fascist rule from 1922, local Arab elites and tribal leaders were co-opted into administrative roles and auxiliary forces to support colonial governance and military efforts, including the formation of units like the that aided Axis logistics during the 1940-1943 . This collaboration, often pragmatic amid repression, aligned with Mussolini's vision of Libya as the "fourth shore" of , where fascist infrastructure projects and settlement policies integrated select indigenous elements to bolster control against British advances. Egyptian sympathies for the Axis stemmed from widespread anti-British resentment over colonial influence, despite Egypt's nominal independence under the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which allowed British bases. The Young Egypt society (Misr al-Fatat), a nationalist group founded in and modeled on fascist organizations, openly admired Mussolini's and Hitler's regimes for their authoritarian efficiency and anti-imperial rhetoric, expressing support during the late and early war years as a means to challenge the status quo. King Farouk I, ruling from 1936, harbored pro-Axis leanings, appointing cabinets under figures like Ali Maher Pasha that tolerated German intelligence activities and resisted full Allied alignment, prompting a British on February 4, 1942, that forced the dismissal of the government and installation of pro-Allied Prime Minister Mustafa al-Nahhas to secure Egypt's war effort loyalty. Segments of the , founded in 1928, viewed as potential liberators from British dominance, with leader initially endorsing neutrality but allowing members to sympathize with Germany's anti-colonial broadcasts targeting during Erwin Rommel's 1941-1942 offensive. This sentiment reflected broader nationalist hopes that Axis success could expedite independence, though it waned after defeats at in late 1942 shifted toward the Allies. German , amplified by figures like exiled Palestinian leader Haj Amin al-Husseini, further fueled these views by framing the war as a against Western imperialism, resonating with Egyptian Islamists despite the Brotherhood's official non-belligerence.

French Colonial Administrations

Vichy French colonial administrations, operating in territories including (Algeria, , and ) and the mandates ( and ), adhered to the terms of the armistices with both and , which included oversight by Italian armistice commissions. These commissions, active in , monitored demilitarization efforts and conducted among Italian settler communities—approximately 126,000 individuals in the region—while engaging in to undermine French authority. However, Vichy governors prioritized defending colonial against Italian territorial ambitions, such as claims on , rather than pursuing proactive collaboration; Italian threats prompted Vichy to expand its in and from 100,000 to 120,000 men by early 1941, leveraging German mediation to counter Italian demands for severe restrictions. In the , High Commissioner General authorized Axis forces, including Italian aircraft, to access Syrian and Lebanese airfields and facilities under a May 1941 accord with , facilitating and operations to support the pro-Axis Rashid Ali government in against British forces. This permission, extended amid 's naval disputes with Britain, enabled approximately 20 German and Italian flights daily through and airports, aiding the transfer of munitions and personnel until Allied intervention in Operation Exporter (June–July 1941), during which troops numbering around 40,000 resisted Free French and British advances to preserve mandate control. Such facilitation indirectly advanced Italian strategic interests in the Mediterranean and , though it stemmed from coerced compliance rather than ideological alignment with Mussolini's regime. Colonial administrators extended Vichy domestic policies, including the October 1940 Statut des Juifs, to indigenous populations—impacting over 375,000 Jews in alone through professional exclusions and —mirroring Axis racial ideologies without direct Italian involvement. In , adjacent to , Vichy reinforced the fortifications (spanning 20 km wide and 30 km deep) as a defensive bulwark against potential Italian incursions, reflecting pre-war tensions rather than cooperation; no joint military operations occurred prior to the Axis occupation of following in November 1942. In and sub-Saharan colonies, Italian influence remained negligible, with administrative focus on maintaining order amid Japanese encroachments or British threats, underscoring the asymmetric nature of Vichy's Axis relations—deeper with Germany, defensive toward Italy.

Middle Eastern Mandates and Arab Nationalists

Arab nationalist leaders in the British and French mandates of the Middle East during World War II often viewed Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy as potential allies against European colonial powers, driven by opposition to British and French administration. In the British Mandate of Palestine, Haj Amin al-Husayni, appointed Grand Mufti of Jerusalem in 1921, emerged as a prominent figure opposing Zionist immigration and British rule; he initiated contacts with Fascist Italy as early as 1933 and later with Nazi Germany, seeking support for Arab independence. Following the suppression of the 1936–1939 Arab Revolt, al-Husayni fled British arrest warrants in 1937, finding refuge in French Mandate Lebanon before moving to the Kingdom of Iraq in 1941. In , which had gained formal in but remained under significant British influence via treaty obligations, , a nationalist , staged a on April 3, 1941, overthrowing the pro-British regency and government with support from the pro-Axis "" officers. Al-Gaylani's regime aligned with the Axis, receiving military equipment and officials from and during the ensuing from May 2 to 31, 1941, which aimed to secure Iraqi oil fields and counter British forces. Al-Husayni actively backed this pro-Axis government from , broadcasting appeals for Arab support against Britain, but after British victory and restoration of the monarchy, he escaped to in May 1941 and subsequently to in October 1941. From , al-Husayni traveled to , where he met on November 28, 1941, urging German intervention against Britain in the and expressing shared opposition to Jewish national aspirations. In , al-Husayni established a operation, including the establishment of the in 1941 from Arab volunteers and POWs, and he contributed to Arabic-language radio broadcasts from promoting Axis causes and anti-Jewish rhetoric, such as a speech aired on December 23, 1942, calling for Arab mobilization against Allied forces. He also facilitated the recruitment of Muslim volunteers for units, including influencing the formation of the 13th SS Division on February 13, 1943, primarily Bosnian Muslims but aligned with his pan-Islamic appeals. Regarding the French Mandates of and , under French control after , pro-Axis sympathies existed among some Arab nationalists, but direct was limited; authorities permitted limited German intelligence operations and potential transit for Axis forces, prompting the Allied Syria-Lebanon Campaign from June 8 to July 14, 1941, to secure the region against further Axis influence. Al-Husayni's activities from exile thus represented the most prominent instance of Arab nationalist engagement with the Axis in the mandates, motivated by anti-colonial goals rather than ideological alignment with Nazi or Fascist doctrines.

Military and Volunteer Contributions

Foreign Legionnaires and Waffen-SS Units

Following the German invasion of the on June 22, 1941, Nazi authorities launched recruitment drives in occupied , framing service in the as participation in a pan-European crusade against . These efforts targeted ideologically aligned individuals, including fascists, anti-communists, and nationalists disillusioned with their governments' neutrality or occupation policies. Foreign volunteers formed specialized legions and were integrated into larger SS divisions, primarily deployed on the Eastern Front. By war's end, Western European contingents numbered tens of thousands, with Dutch volunteers comprising the largest group at 23,000–25,000, followed by approximately 10,000 Flemish Belgians, 6,000 , 6,000 , and several thousand Frenchmen. In Denmark, Freikorps Danmark was established on July 29, 1941, drawing from members of the Danish National Socialist Workers' Party and other sympathizers; around 1,200 men departed for training in that autumn, later merging into the 11th SS Infantry Brigade and SS Division Wiking. Overall, about 5,500–6,000 served in units, suffering heavy casualties in battles such as Demyansk in 1942. Norwegian recruitment yielded the , formed June 29, 1941, under Vidkun Quisling's influence, with initial volunteers numbering over 1,200; these were absorbed into SS Division Nord by 1943, contributing to operations in and northern amid total Norwegian enlistment of roughly 6,000. Dutch volunteers formed the in July 1941, initially under command before transferring to as the SS Volunteer Panzergrenadier Division Nederland; over 20,000 served, engaging in fierce fighting at Leningrad and the Mius River in 1942–1943, with survivors reorganized into the 23rd SS Division Nederland by 1944. In Belgium, Flemish recruits joined the 27th SS Volunteer Grenadier Division Langemarck, while Walloon units began as the in the on July 7, 1942, with 800–1,600 men transferred to SS Sturmbrigade Wallonien in 1943 under , participating in the Cherkassy Pocket defense; total Belgian volunteers exceeded 15,000, split along linguistic lines. French collaborationists initially organized the Légion des Volontaires Français contre le Bolchévisme (LVF) in the on July 8, 1941, with 2,800–6,000 enlistees deployed near in 1941–1942, incurring 50% casualties; remnants joined SS Sturmbrigade Frankreich in 1943, evolving into the 33rd Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS Charlemagne by 1945, which mustered about 7,500 men for defense of . Regarding French Foreign Legionnaires, defections were limited; while some German-born legionnaires in French service repatriated to the around 1941, broader Legion units remained aligned with French forces, though individual volunteers from Legion backgrounds augmented SS ranks sporadically. These units exemplified Axis efforts to internationalize the , yet their effectiveness waned as supplemented volunteers and defeats mounted from 1943 onward.

Axis-Aligned National Armies

Romania mobilized the largest national army among Axis satellite states, deploying approximately 325,000 troops—organized into the 3rd and 4th Armies—for the opening phases of Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941, alongside German forces to reclaim Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina annexed by the Soviet Union in June 1940. These units advanced through southern Ukraine, capturing Odessa after a prolonged siege from August to October 1941 that cost over 90,000 Romanian casualties, and later supported operations in Crimea and the Donbass region, providing critical flank security for Army Group South amid Germany's manpower shortages. By 1942, Romanian strength on the Eastern Front peaked at around 600,000, including reserves and garrisons, though equipment shortages—relying on obsolete French and Czech arms—and harsh winter conditions led to vulnerabilities exposed during the Soviet Uranus offensive at Stalingrad, where the encircled Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies suffered over 150,000 killed or captured in December 1942–January 1943. Hungary committed its Second Army, totaling about 200,000 troops plus 50,000 auxiliaries, to the Eastern Front in early 1942 under German high command to bolster defenses along the Don River during the Stalingrad campaign, motivated by Regent Miklós Horthy's territorial revanchism from the 1920 Treaty of Trianon and shared anti-Bolshevik aims. The army, comprising nine infantry brigades, two cavalry brigades, and supporting units with limited mechanization, engaged Soviet forces in defensive roles but collapsed under the weight of Operation Little Saturn in December 1942, resulting in roughly 100,000 dead, 35,000 wounded, and 60,000 prisoners, with remnants withdrawing amid total disarray by January 1943. Hungarian forces later reformed for occupation duties in Ukraine but incurred further heavy losses, contributing to domestic political shifts toward the pro-Axis Arrow Cross regime in October 1944. Slovakia, established as a after the 1939 dismemberment of , dispatched an of about 45,000 men—including the 1st Division and a Fast Motorized Group—to the Eastern Front in July 1941 following its on the USSR, primarily for anti-partisan sweeps in and initial advances near . Under President Jozef Tiso's clerical-fascist government, these units, equipped with German-supplied weapons and totaling around 2,000 vehicles, transitioned to roles by 1942 amid high attrition—over 2,500 killed in the first year—and growing internal dissent, culminating in the of August 1944 that prompted partial army defections to Soviet-aligned partisans. The Independent State of Croatia (NDH), proclaimed in April under Ante Pavelić's regime, fielded a national army (Domobran) of up to 130,000 by , collaborating with German and Italian forces to suppress in the while maintaining internal security against Serb and communist insurgents. Though not deploying large formations to the Eastern Front, Croatian troops integrated into mixed Axis commands for occupation duties in , and contributed personnel to units like the 13th SS Division, with total NDH forces suffering around 50,000 combat deaths amid ethnic dynamics that blurred regular army roles with militia atrocities. Bulgaria's army, aligned with the Axis via the on March 1, 1941, under Tsar Boris III, focused on occupation forces of about 250,000 in annexed Macedonian, , and regions from and , enforcing Axis control without direct Eastern Front commitments until a coerced on the USSR on September 5, 1944. Bulgarian units provided logistical support to German operations in the but resisted deeper involvement against Soviet forces, reflecting royal maneuvering to preserve autonomy, with the army later clashing with invading troops after a September 1944 coup shifted alignment to the Allies. These national armies collectively supplied over 1 million troops to Axis efforts by 1942, compensating for German shortages but often hampered by inferior training, logistics, and command frictions that exacerbated defeats on the Eastern Front.

Volunteers from Neutral and Allied Territories

Spain dispatched the largest volunteer force from a neutral nation via the Blue Division, formally designated the 250th Infantry Division under Wehrmacht command. Recruitment commenced on June 24, 1941, immediately after Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, with enlistment offices closing on July 6 due to overwhelming response exceeding quotas; approximately 47,000 Spaniards served across rotations, though frontline strength averaged 18,000-22,000. The initial contingent departed Spain on July 13, 1941, arriving near Novgorod by October 12 for deployment against Soviet forces besieging Leningrad, where it participated in operations like the defense of the Volkhov River line and assaults at the Neva Gulf. Withdrawn on October 20, 1943, amid Allied diplomatic pressure on Francisco Franco, the division suffered roughly 5,000 killed and 8,700 wounded, earning praise from German commanders for combat effectiveness despite logistical challenges and ideological frictions. Motivations centered on anti-communist fervor, repayment for German support in the Spanish Civil War, and Falangist zeal, though desertions and internal dissent occurred. Sweden, maintaining strict neutrality, contributed 175-200 volunteers to the , with estimates reaching 315 including reserves; these men, often from nationalist or rural backgrounds, enlisted from late 1940 onward, serving primarily in the 5th SS Panzer Division Wiking and later the 11th SS Panzergrenadier Division Nordland on the Eastern Front. Deployed in battles from to , Swedish units endured high attrition, with over 100 fatalities recorded by war's end in 1945. Enlistment defied Swedish laws prohibiting foreign service, driven by perceptions of as an existential threat to Nordic civilization rather than mere adventurism, as evidenced by volunteer testimonies emphasizing ideological commitment over economic incentives. Postwar, many faced minimal repercussions due to amnesties, though Swedish authorities prosecuted recruiters. Switzerland supplied a smaller cohort of around 350-400 volunteers to the and , contravening federal neutrality edicts; these recruits, frequently from German-speaking cantons, joined from 1941, integrating into units like the 5th SS Wiking and auxiliary roles. Motivations included anti-communist ideology and personal Germanic affinity, with some achieving officer ranks despite Swiss prohibitions on military emigration. Finnish volunteers, numbering 1,408 from 1941-1943, augmented SS Wiking despite Finland's independent against the USSR; these men, exempt from Finnish conscription, fought in and before disbandment amid shifting alliances. From Allied territories, the British Free Corps (Britisches Freikorps), a Waffen-SS propaganda unit, recruited approximately 50-60 British and Dominion prisoners of war starting in December 1943, peaking at 27 active members by mid-1944; it conducted no frontline combat, serving instead for broadcasts and training in occupied Netherlands and Germany until dissolution in April 1945. Propaganda efforts by figures like John Amery yielded limited success, with most "volunteers" motivated by POW hardships or opportunism rather than conviction, as internal SS reports noted high desertion risks and morale issues. American cases were exceedingly rare, with fewer than a dozen documented volunteers, typically German-descended individuals or POWs who briefly joined auxiliary SS roles before internment or defection by U.S. forces in 1945. Irish participation from neutral Éire remained marginal militarily, limited to isolated cases like two former British Army POWs who transferred to SS units in 1943, amid broader IRA-Abwehr intelligence ties rather than mass volunteering. Volunteers to from these territories were negligible, with no organized contingents recorded; sporadic individuals from or neutrals aided Italian colonial efforts in pre-1941, but Axis integration post-1939 subordinated such activity to German-led structures. Overall, neutral contributions dwarfed those from Allied lands, reflecting geographic proximity, anti-Soviet sentiment, and regime tolerances absent in belligerent Allied states' stricter oversight.

Economic and Industrial Collaboration

Resource Extraction and Labor Programs

Collaborationist regimes in occupied Europe facilitated labor programs that supplied millions of workers to the Axis war economies, often under the guise of or exchange for prisoners of war. In , the (STO), legislated on February 16, 1943, mandated two years of labor in for men born in 1920, 1921, and 1922, leading to the conscription and transport of approximately 650,000 French workers by war's end. This built on the earlier Relève initiative of June 1942, where volunteers were recruited in exchange for releasing one French POW per three workers sent to , though volunteer rates fell short, prompting compulsory measures under Prime Minister . In , the administration from 1942 onward cooperated with German occupation authorities to mobilize labor for projects, including fortifications and industries, while suppressing strikes and resistance in the . Economic extended to extracting key raw materials; Norwegian output of aluminum, , and —critical for German armaments—increased under regulated exports, with aluminum production reaching 25,000 tons annually by through joint oversight. Such efforts ensured steady supplies despite Allied blockades, with fish and shipping also directed toward . Resource extraction in collaborationist contexts prioritized Axis needs, yielding substantial transfers from occupied territories. Across Western and , local administrations under German directives requisitioned agricultural surpluses, industrial outputs, and minerals, contributing an estimated 93.6 billion Reichsmarks to the Nazi economy via occupation payments, unpaid labor, and looted goods between 1939 and 1945. In , policies diverted , , and foodstuffs—such as 1.5 million tons of wheat annually—to , framed as reparations for armistice terms. Fascist Italy's occupations in the and involved analogous programs, where puppet regimes in and aided in labor drafts for road-building and mining, extracting and chrome ore shipped to Italian factories. These operations, often enforced through local collaborators, supported Italy's drive but yielded lower efficiencies compared to German-directed efforts in , with colonial forced labor in and focusing on like the Addis Ababa-Djibouti using tens of thousands of indigenous workers under Italian oversight.

Corporate Partnerships and Technology Transfers

In occupied , automotive manufacturers formed key partnerships with Nazi authorities to produce vehicles for the , often negotiating terms that preserved managerial control and access to resources amid shortages. Ford France, operating under Vichy oversight, manufactured approximately 100,000 trucks and other military vehicles between 1941 and 1944, utilizing its Poissy and plants to supply Axis while resisting full expropriation through diplomatic leverage with German occupation officials. , directed by founder Louis Renault after his 1940 arrest, shifted production to German-ordered trucks and engines, delivering over 30,000 units by 1944, though internal records indicate sporadic such as defective parts to mitigate output. These arrangements exemplified pragmatic industrial adaptation, where French firms traded output for operational leeway, contributing to Axis mobility without equivalent resistance efforts in production lines. Technology transfers occurred through coerced or opportunistic sharing of engineering expertise and patents in occupied territories. In , German firms like Daimler-Benz accessed Renault's designs and tooling for truck modifications, integrating them into supply chains by mid-1942. Kodak-Pathé's facilities in and provided photographic and optical technologies for German reconnaissance equipment, with local management facilitating transfers of film processing know-how under occupation edicts. Such exchanges extended to the , where Dutch firms supplied precision components; however, systematic data on Norwegian or Belgian cases remains sparse, with Norsk Hydro's aluminum refining processes adapted for aircraft under German-Norwegian joint ventures from 1940 onward, yielding over 100,000 tons of aluminum by 1943. Fascist Italy's corporate engagements were more extractive in occupied and , focusing on raw materials over advanced transfers, though Italian conglomerates like Ansaldo partnered with local enterprises for munitions assembly post-1941 invasions, incorporating Balkan metallurgical techniques into artillery production. These limited initiatives paled against German efforts, as Italy prioritized colonial resource flows from , with minimal reciprocal technology diffusion to Axis partners. Overall, partnerships prioritized short-term Axis sustainment over innovation, reflecting occupiers' dominance in enforcing compliance through threats of seizure, though select firms gained continuity by demonstrating "essential" contributions.

Agricultural and Infrastructure Support

In , the government's policy of cooperation during the 1940–1943 occupation facilitated extensive agricultural exports to , addressing critical shortages in the Nazi food supply amid wartime . Denmark provided large quantities of dairy products, , and —key items in German diets—with exports including over 26,000 tons of and alongside milk derivatives in the early occupation phase, escalating to supply roughly 15–20% of Germany's imported animal fats by mid-war. This output was enabled by Danish administrative continuity and German incentives like , which prioritized extraction over direct control, thereby sustaining Denmark's relative autonomy in exchange for material support to the Axis effort. Vichy France similarly structured its agricultural sector to fulfill German demands, with the Pétain regime implementing centralized distribution from September 1940 to channel foodstuffs northward. Requisitions included , , and , meeting initial Nazi levies of up to 58% of output in 1940 and contributing to occupation costs exceeding 400 billion francs by 1944, part of which covered food transfers. German agronomists oversaw exploitation in both France and eastern acquisitions like , but Vichy's voluntary organizational framework—contrasting harsher eastern coercion—delivered comparable yields per hectare through quota systems and anti-black market measures, bolstering German caloric intake despite domestic French shortages averaging 1,180 kcal daily. Infrastructure collaboration emphasized logistical sustainment over new , with occupied governments maintaining rail, road, and port networks for Axis supply chains. In , coordinated with the Société Nationale des Chemins de fer Français () to prioritize German freight, transporting agricultural goods and over 1 million workers eastward while repairing bombing damage to ensure uninterrupted flows. Danish officials upheld harbor facilities and roadways under occupation directives, incorporating forced labor from sectors to support transit without full dismantling of civil . These efforts, pragmatic responses to occupation realities, extended German operational reach but drew on local expertise and resources, distinguishing collaborative Western models from exploitative eastern policies where infrastructure served primarily extraction and pacification.

Post-War Consequences and Historiographical Debates

Purges, Trials, and Amnesty Movements

Following the liberation of in 1944–1945, purges targeted individuals accused of with and , encompassing both extrajudicial violence and formal proceedings. In , the épuration sauvage—spontaneous retribution by Resistance groups and civilians—resulted in approximately 9,000 to 10,000 summary executions of suspected collaborators between and early 1945, often involving public humiliations such as head-shaving before . These acts were concentrated in areas with strong Resistance presence, driven by vengeance for deportations and atrocities, though they frequently lacked and included innocents targeted for personal or political grudges. Official purges followed, with the establishing courts to investigate ; by 1949, over 300,000 cases were processed, leading to 6,763 death sentences (many commuted) and widespread dégradation nationale stripping civil from tens of thousands. In Norway, the legal purge operated from May 1945 to August 1948, prosecuting over 90,000 individuals for treasonous acts like joining or aiding German forces; 101 received death sentences, with 46 executions carried out, including on October 24, 1945, for his role in the puppet government and facilitation of deportations. and the Netherlands saw similar national tribunals: convicted around 50,000, executing 64 by 1950, while Dutch courts sentenced 108 to death (64 executed), reintroducing specifically for . Italy's post-Mussolini reckoning included the 1945 execution of by partisans, followed by military tribunals that convicted thousands of fascists, but enforcement was uneven due to civil war remnants and the monarchy's prior alignment. Amnesty movements emerged in the late 1940s amid reconstruction needs and emerging priorities, prioritizing societal reintegration over exhaustive retribution. passed amnesty laws in 1951 and 1954, pardoning most recipients of dégradation nationale and reducing sentences for mid-level collaborators, influenced by Catholic figures like Jean-Marie Desgranges who argued for Christian forgiveness to heal divisions; by 1954, over 17,000 had been amnestied, reflecting pragmatic concerns that prolonged purges hindered economic recovery and anti-communist unity. In , the 1946 Togliatti amnesty—enacted by Communist Justice Minister —freed thousands of fascist convicts, justified as essential for but criticized for shielding regime enablers to consolidate leftist power. granted partial amnesties by 1947 for lesser offenses, commuting most remaining death sentences and restoring rights to many, as foreign collaborators were often pardoned to avoid diplomatic friction. These efforts, while stabilizing polities, perpetuated debates over , with Western amnesties contrasting harsher Soviet bloc purges where collaboration trials served Stalinist consolidation, often executing or imprisoning tens of thousands without appeal.

Resistance Myths versus Collaboration Realities

Post-World War II national narratives in occupied often amplified resistance to while downplaying , constructing myths of widespread heroism to promote unity and victim status. In countries like , , the , and , these accounts granted full victim legitimacy, obscuring active by significant societal segments in administration, , and . Empirical assessments indicate that accommodation and dominated, with resistance comprising a small minority; for example, in , legal purges post-1945 targeted collaborators but reinforced hegemonic resistance memory, sidelining evidence of enthusiastic participation in Nazi-aligned activities. In , collaboration extended beyond coercion, encompassing voluntary deportations of 77,000 Jews to Nazi death camps between 1942 and 1944, facilitated by French police and bureaucracy without consistent German oversight. The regime under pursued ideological alignment with National Socialism, enacting anti-Semitic laws and labor independently; post-liberation, Charles de Gaulle's government propagated a resistance myth to unify the nation, suppressing collaboration's scope until historiographical shifts in the 1970s revealed Vichy's proactive role. This narrative distortion persisted in academia, where left-leaning interpretations minimized complicity to emphasize anti-fascist struggle, despite archival data showing majority public acquiescence. Eastern Europe's collaboration often stemmed from anti-communist imperatives, viewing Nazi forces as bulwarks against Soviet expansion; in , Chetnik forces under shifted from initial resistance in 1941 to tactical alliances with German and Italian troops by 1942, including joint anti-partisan offensives and arms exchanges to combat communist rivals. Serbian courts rehabilitated Mihailović in 2015 based on declassified documents confirming such pacts, challenging communist-era myths of unalloyed Chetnik heroism. Similarly, in the and , local auxiliaries numbering tens of thousands aided German security operations, motivated by recent Soviet atrocities like the 1939-1940 occupations and , with collaboration rates exceeding active resistance participation. Historiographical debates underscore how resistance myths facilitated amnesty for collaborators and marginalized anti-communist rationales, with modern —drawing from declassified archives—quantifying collaboration's scale: in , up to 5% of the population faced post-war trials for aiding occupation, yet broader economic integration proceeded smoothly. These realities reveal causal drivers like self-preservation, ideological affinity, and strategic anti-Bolshevism over moral resistance, contrasting sanitized post-war accounts that prioritized partisan legacies aligned with emerging dynamics.

Anti-Communist Rationales in Modern Scholarship

In the collaboration, particularly in , scholars since the have highlighted as a central rationale, rooted in the visceral experiences of Soviet repression prior to the German invasion. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939, enabled Soviet annexations of eastern , the , and parts of , accompanied by mass deportations—such as the June 1941 action in that targeted over 30,000 individuals—and executions that killed tens of thousands, including the of approximately 22,000 Polish officers in 1940. These events, documented in declassified Soviet archives post-1991, engendered widespread perceptions of as an existential threat, prompting local elites and populations to view German forces as temporary liberators upon Operation Barbarossa's launch on June 22, 1941. Historians argue this context explains initial enthusiasm for collaboration, framing it not merely as opportunism but as a defensive response to Soviet atrocities exceeding 1 million deaths in alone during the of 1932–1933 and subsequent purges. John A. Armstrong's seminal analysis of "" in posits that groups like the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) engaged in collaboration as a strategic anti-Soviet maneuver, prioritizing the destruction of Bolshevik structures over ideological affinity with . Armstrong distinguishes this from Western European collaborationism, noting how Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Belarusian actors leveraged German occupation to settle scores with communism, evidenced by the rapid formation of units that numbered over 300,000 across the region by late 1941 and assisted in anti-partisan operations. Modern extensions of this view, informed by post-Cold War sources, emphasize that such rationales persisted despite German betrayals, as seen in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army's (UPA) dual warfare against both occupiers after 1943, sustaining anti-communist resistance into the 1950s with an estimated 400,000 fighters at peak. This scholarship counters earlier narratives that conflated all collaboration with fascism, attributing the oversight to Cold War-era alignments that minimized Soviet crimes to bolster anti-Nazi consensus. In Belarus, Leonid Grenkevich's examination frames —manifest in units like the Belarusian Home Guard, which grew to 70,000 by 1944—as driven by anti-Bolshevik survival instincts amid the German scorched-earth policies and ' terror, which claimed 345,000 civilian lives. Scholars contend this motivation aligned with Nazi portraying the Eastern Front as a crusade against Judeo-Bolshevism, resonating in regions scarred by collectivization famines and purges that liquidated over 100,000 "kulaks" in during . Recent works, drawing on eyewitness accounts and German records, quantify how anti-communist volunteers from occupied territories bolstered divisions, such as the 20th Waffen Grenadier Division of , which mobilized 15,000 men explicitly against Soviet reconquest. While acknowledging complicity in actions, these analyses prioritize causal realism: 's scale in —encompassing 1.2 million non-German auxiliaries—stemmed from empirical fears of Soviet domination, later validated by the USSR's post-1945 imposition of regimes that caused 20 million excess deaths across the bloc. For collaboration with , anti-communist rationales appear more attenuated, confined to anti-partisan efforts in occupied and , where Italian forces armed local militias like the Slovenian Blue Guard against Tito's communist-led partisans, who controlled 60% of the terrain by 1943. Italian historiography, post-1989, has revisited the (RSI) as an anti-communist bulwark, with volunteers numbering 200,000 fighting Bolshevik influences, though primarily motivated by loyalty to Mussolini rather than ideological anti-Stalinism. This contrasts with Eastern patterns, as lacked direct pre-war Soviet occupation, limiting the rationale's depth.

Comparative Assessments of Axis versus Soviet Occupations

In , particularly in regions like , the , and eastern , prior Soviet occupations from 1939 to 1941 generated profound resentment through mass deportations, executions, and engineered famines, influencing local populations to initially view Axis forces as potential liberators upon their arrival in 1941. The , a man-made famine in Soviet from 1932 to 1933, resulted in approximately 3.9 million direct excess deaths due to starvation policies enforced by Joseph Stalin's regime, decimating rural populations and eroding trust in Soviet authority. In the , Soviet forces deported around 34,000 from , 60,000 from , and 75,000 from between 1940 and 1941, targeting perceived class enemies and nationalists in operations that comprised 1-2% of local populations in key waves, such as the June 14, 1941, action affecting over 40,000 individuals just days before . These actions, documented in declassified Soviet archives and survivor testimonies, created a causal dynamic where collaboration with Axis powers—through auxiliary police, militias, and anti-partisan units—emerged as a pragmatic response to avert renewed Soviet domination, rather than ideological alignment with National Socialism. Axis occupations, while initially welcomed in some quarters for dismantling Soviet structures, rapidly devolved into racial extermination and exploitation under doctrines like , which envisioned the depopulation of lands for German settlement, leading to an estimated 5-7 million civilian deaths from 1941 to 1944 through famine, reprisals, and . In contrast, Soviet repressions in occupied from to involved the of over 1 million Poles to labor camps, with death tolls exceeding 100,000 from executions (including the of 22,000 Polish officers) and harsh internment conditions, policies aimed at liquidating Polish elites and imposing collectivization. Scholarly analyses highlight that Soviet tactics emphasized ideological conformity and class warfare, resulting in demographic losses comparable to Axis racial policies in pre-1941 phases—such as the Holodomor's scale rivaling early Nazi starvation operations—but with Axis brutality intensified by explicit genocidal intent toward and , as evidenced by of over 1 million executions in alone. This distinction underscores why collaboration persisted in anti-communist enclaves, even as Axis governance alienated broader populations through forced labor and scorched-earth retreats. Historiographical debates reveal systemic underemphasis on Soviet occupation horrors in Western academia until post-Cold War archival access, partly attributable to alliances during World War II and a focus on Nazi uniqueness, which obscured parallels in totalitarian control and mass terror. Quantitative comparisons indicate Soviet policies inflicted higher cumulative civilian tolls in pre-invasion phases (e.g., 20 million total under Stalin, per democide estimates), fostering narratives of Axis collaboration as defensive nationalism against Bolshevik expansionism, though both regimes' causal mechanisms—state terror to consolidate power—yielded similar outcomes in suppressed dissent and economic plunder. Recent scholarship, drawing from primary sources like NKVD records, reframes collaboration not as moral equivalence but as rational calculus in dual-occupation zones, where Soviet return evoked greater existential dread due to prior genocidal precedents like the 1941 western Ukrainian prison massacres claiming 20,000-30,000 lives. Such assessments prioritize empirical victim counts over ideological framing, revealing how source biases in Soviet-era historiography minimized these dynamics to exalt anti-fascist resistance.

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