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British Raj
British Raj
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Key Information

The British Raj (/rɑː/ RAHJ; from Hindustani rāj, 'reign', 'rule' or 'government')[11] was the colonial rule of the British Crown on the Indian subcontinent,[12] lasting from 1858 to 1947.[13] It is also called Crown rule in India,[14] or direct rule in India.[15] The region under British control was commonly called India in contemporaneous usage and included areas directly administered by the United Kingdom, which were collectively called British India, and areas ruled by indigenous rulers, but under British paramountcy, called the princely states. The region was sometimes called the Indian Empire, though not officially.[16] As India, it was a founding member of the League of Nations and a founding member of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945.[17] India was a participating state in the Summer Olympics in 1900, 1920, 1928, 1932, and 1936.

This system of governance was instituted on 28 June 1858, when, after the Indian Rebellion of 1857, the rule of the East India Company was transferred to the Crown in the person of Queen Victoria[18] (who, in 1876, was proclaimed Empress of India). It lasted until 1947 when the British Raj was partitioned into two sovereign dominion states: the Union of India (later the Republic of India) and Dominion of Pakistan (later the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and People's Republic of Bangladesh in the 1971 Proclamation of Bangladeshi Independence). At the inception of the Raj in 1858, Lower Burma was already a part of British India; Upper Burma was added in 1886, and the resulting union, Burma, was administered as an autonomous province until 1937, when it became a separate British colony, gaining its independence in 1948. It was renamed Myanmar in 1989. The Chief Commissioner's Province of Aden was also part of British India at the inception of the British Raj and became a separate colony known as Aden Colony in 1937 as well.

Geographical extent

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The British Raj extended over almost all present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, except for small holdings by other European nations such as Goa and Pondicherry.[19] This area is very diverse, containing the Himalayan mountains, fertile floodplains, the Indo-Gangetic Plain, a long coastline, tropical dry forests, arid uplands, and the Thar Desert.[20] In addition, at various times, it included Aden (from 1858 to 1937),[21] Lower Burma (from 1858 to 1937), Upper Burma (from 1886 to 1937), British Somaliland (briefly from 1884 to 1898), and the Straits Settlements (briefly from 1858 to 1867). Burma was separated from India and directly administered by the British Crown from 1937 until its independence in 1948. The Trucial States of the Persian Gulf and the other states under the Persian Gulf Residency were theoretically princely states as well as presidencies and provinces of British India until 1947 and used the rupee as their unit of currency.[22][23]

Among other countries in the region, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), which was referred to coastal regions and northern part of the island at that time, was ceded to Britain in 1802 under the Treaty of Amiens. These coastal regions were temporarily administered under Madras Presidency between 1793 and 1798,[24] but, for later periods, the British governors reported to London, and it was not part of the Raj. The kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan, having fought wars with the British, subsequently signed treaties with them and were recognised by the British as independent states.[25][26] The Kingdom of Sikkim was established as a princely state after the Anglo-Sikkimese Treaty of 1861; however, the issue of sovereignty was left undefined.[27] The Maldive Islands were a British protectorate from 1887 to 1965 but not part of British India.[28]

History

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1858–1868: Rebellion aftermath, critiques, and responses

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Although the Indian Rebellion of 1857 had shaken the British enterprise in India, it had not derailed it. Until 1857, the British, especially under Lord Dalhousie, had been hurriedly building an India which they envisaged to be on par with Britain itself in the quality and strength of its economic and social institutions. After the rebellion, they became more circumspect. Much thought was devoted to the causes of the rebellion, and three main lessons were drawn. First, at a practical level, it was felt that there needed to be more communication and camaraderie between the British and Indians—not just between British army officers and their Indian staff but in civilian life as well.[29] The Indian army was completely reorganised: units composed of the Muslims and Brahmins of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, who had formed the core of the rebellion, were disbanded. New regiments, like the Sikhs and Baluchis, composed of Indians who, in British estimation, had demonstrated steadfastness, were formed. From then on, the Indian army was to remain unchanged in its organisation until 1947.[30] The 1861 Census had revealed that the English population in India was 125,945. Of these, only about 41,862 were civilians as compared with about 84,083 European officers and men of the Army.[31] In 1880, the standing Indian Army consisted of 66,000 British soldiers, 130,000 Natives, and 350,000 soldiers in the princely armies.[32]

Second, it was also felt that both the princes and the large land-holders, by not joining the rebellion, had proved to be, in Lord Canning's words, "breakwaters in a storm".[29] They too were rewarded in the new British Raj by being integrated into the British-Indian political system and having their territories guaranteed.[33] At the same time, it was felt that the peasants, for whose benefit the large land reforms of the United Provinces had been undertaken, had shown disloyalty by, in many cases, fighting for their former landlords against the British. Consequently, no more land reforms were implemented for the next 90 years: Bengal and Bihar were to remain the realms of large land holdings (unlike the Punjab and Uttar Pradesh).[34]

Third, the British felt disenchanted with Indian reaction to social change. Until the rebellion, they had enthusiastically pushed through social reform, like the ban on sati by Lord William Bentinck.[35] It was now felt that traditions and customs in India were too strong and too rigid to be changed easily; consequently, no more British social interventions were made, especially in matters dealing with religion,[36] even when the British felt very strongly about the issue (as in the instance of the remarriage of Hindu child widows).[37] This sentiment was exemplified further in Queen Victoria's Proclamation released immediately after the rebellion. The proclamation stated that "We disclaim alike our Right and Desire to impose Our Convictions on any of Our Subjects",[38] demonstrating official British commitment to abstaining from social intervention in India.

1858–1880: Railways, canals, Famine Code

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In the second half of the 19th century, both the direct administration of India by the British crown and the technological change ushered in by the industrial revolution had the effect of closely intertwining the economies of India and Great Britain.[39] In fact, many of the major changes in transport and communications (that are typically associated with Crown Rule of India) had already begun before the Mutiny. Since Dalhousie had embraced the technological change then rampant in Great Britain, India too saw the rapid development of all those technologies. Railways, roads, canals, and bridges were rapidly built in India, and telegraph links were equally rapidly established so that raw materials, such as cotton, from India's hinterland, could be transported more efficiently to ports, such as Bombay, for subsequent export to England.[40] Likewise, finished goods from England were transported back for sale in the burgeoning Indian markets.[41] Unlike Britain, where the market risks for the infrastructure development were borne by private investors, in India, it was the taxpayers—primarily farmers and farm-labourers—who endured the risks, which, in the end, amounted to £50 million.[42] Despite these costs, very little skilled employment was created for Indians. By 1920, with the fourth largest railway network in the world and a history of 60 years of its construction, only ten per cent of the "superior posts" in the Indian Railways were held by Indians.[43]

The rush of technology was also changing the agricultural economy in India: by the last decade of the 19th century, a large fraction of some raw materials—not only cotton but also some food-grains—were being exported to faraway markets.[44] Many small farmers, dependent on the whims of those markets, lost land, animals, and equipment to money-lenders.[44] The latter half of the 19th century also saw an increase in the number of large-scale famines in India. Although famines were not new to the subcontinent, these were particularly severe, with tens of millions dying[citation needed] and with many critics, both British and Indian, laying the blame at the doorsteps of the lumbering colonial administrations.[44] There were also salutary effects: commercial cropping, especially in the newly canalled Punjab, led to increased food production for internal consumption.[45] The railway network provided critical famine relief,[46] notably reduced the cost of moving goods,[46] and helped nascent Indian-owned industry.[45] After the Great Famine of 1876–1878, the Indian Famine Commission report was issued in 1880, and the Indian Famine Codes, the earliest famine scales and programmes for famine prevention, were instituted.[47] In one form or other, they would be implemented worldwide by the United Nations and the Food and Agricultural Organisation well into the 1970s.[citation needed]

1880s–1890s: middle class, Indian National Congress

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By 1880, a new middle class had arisen in India and spread thinly across the country. Moreover, there was a growing solidarity among its members, created by the "joint stimuli of encouragement and irritation".[48] The encouragement felt by this class came from its success in education and its ability to avail itself of the benefits of that education such as employment in the Indian Civil Service. It came too from Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858 in which she had declared, "We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligation of duty which bind us to all our other subjects."[49] Indians were especially encouraged when Canada was granted dominion status in 1867 and established an autonomous democratic constitution.[49] Lastly, the encouragement came from the work of contemporaneous Oriental scholars like Monier Monier-Williams and Max Müller, who in their works had been presenting ancient India as a great civilisation. Irritation, on the other hand, came not just from incidents of racial discrimination at the hands of the British in India but also from governmental actions like the use of Indian troops in imperial campaigns (e.g., in the Second Anglo-Afghan War) and the attempts to control the vernacular press (e.g., in the Vernacular Press Act of 1878).[50]

It was, however, Viceroy Lord Ripon's partial reversal of the Ilbert Bill (1883), a legislative measure that had proposed putting Indian judges in the Bengal Presidency on equal footing with British ones, that transformed the discontent into political action.[51] On 28 December 1885, professionals and intellectuals from this middle-class—many educated at the new British-founded universities in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras, and familiar with the ideas of British political philosophers, especially the utilitarians assembled in Bombay—founded the Indian National Congress. The 70 men elected Womesh Chunder Bonerjee as the first president. The membership consisted of a westernised elite, and no effort was made at this time to broaden the base.[citation needed]

During its first 20 years, the Congress primarily debated British policy toward India. Its debates created a new Indian outlook that held Great Britain responsible for draining India of its wealth. Britain did this, the nationalists claimed, by unfair trade, by the restraint on indigenous Indian industry, and by the use of Indian taxes to pay the high salaries of the British civil servants in India.[52]

Thomas Baring served as Viceroy of India 1872–1876. Baring's major accomplishments came as an energetic reformer who was dedicated to upgrading the quality of government in the British Raj. He began large scale famine relief, reduced taxes, and overcame bureaucratic obstacles in an effort to reduce both starvation and widespread social unrest. Although appointed by a Liberal government, his policies were much the same as viceroys appointed by Conservative governments.[53]

Social reform was in the air by the 1880s. For example, Pandita Ramabai, poet, Sanskrit scholar, and a champion of the emancipation of Indian women, took up the cause of widow remarriage, especially of Brahmin widows, later converted to Christianity.[54] By 1900, reform movements had taken root within the Indian National Congress. Congress member Gopal Krishna Gokhale founded the Servants of India Society, which lobbied for legislative reform (e.g., for a law to permit the remarriage of Hindu child widows) and whose members took vows of poverty, and worked among the untouchable community.[55]

By 1905, a deep gulf opened between the moderates, led by Gokhale, who downplayed public agitation, and the new "extremists" who not only advocated agitation but also regarded the pursuit of social reform as a distraction from nationalism. Prominent among the extremists was Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who attempted to mobilise Indians by appealing to an explicitly Hindu political identity, displayed, for example, in the annual public Ganapati festivals that he inaugurated in western India.[56]

1870s–1906: Muslim social movements, Muslim League

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The overwhelming, but predominantly Hindu, protest against the partition of Bengal and the fear in its wake of reforms favouring the Hindu majority, led the Muslim elite in India to meet with the new viceroy, Lord Minto in 1906 and to ask for separate electorates for Muslims.[41] In conjunction, they demanded proportional legislative representation reflecting both their status as former rulers and their record of cooperating with the British. This led,[citation needed] in December 1906, to the founding of the All-India Muslim League in Dacca. Although Curzon, by now, had resigned his position over a dispute with his military chief Lord Kitchener and returned to England, the League was in favour of his partition plan.[57] The Muslim elite's position, which was reflected in the League's position, had crystallized gradually over the previous three decades, beginning with the revelations of the Census of British India in 1871,[citation needed] which had for the first time estimated the populations in regions of the Muslim majority[57] (for his part, Curzon's desire to court the Muslims of East Bengal had arisen from British anxieties ever since the 1871 census—and in light of the history of Muslims fighting them in the 1857 Mutiny and the Second Anglo-Afghan War—about Indian Muslims rebelling against the Crown).[citation needed] In the three decades since, Muslim leaders across northern India had intermittently experienced public animosity from some of the new Hindu political and social groups.[57] The Arya Samaj, for example, had not only supported Cow Protection Societies in their agitation,[58] but also—distraught at the 1871 Census's Muslim numbers—organized "reconversion" events for the purpose of welcoming Muslims back to the Hindu fold.[57] In 1905, when Tilak and Lajpat Rai attempted to rise to leadership positions in the Congress, and the Congress itself rallied around the symbolism of Kali, Muslim fears increased.[59] It was not lost on many Muslims, for example, that the rallying cry, "Bande Mataram", had first appeared in the novel Anand Math in which Hindus had battled their Muslim oppressors.[59] Lastly, the Muslim elite, and among it Dacca Nawab, Khwaja Salimullah, who hosted the League's first meeting in his mansion in Shahbag, was aware that a new province with a Muslim majority would directly benefit Muslims aspiring to political power.[59]

The first steps were taken toward self-government in British India in the late 19th century with the appointment of Indian counsellors to advise the British viceroy and the establishment of provincial councils with Indian members; the British subsequently widened participation in legislative councils with the Indian Councils Act 1892. Municipal Corporations and District Boards were created for local administration; they included elected Indian members.

The Indian Councils Act 1909, known as the Morley-Minto Reforms (John Morley was the secretary of state for India, and Minto was viceroy)—gave Indians limited roles in the central and provincial legislatures. Upper-class Indians, rich landowners and businessmen were favoured. The Muslim community was made a separate electorate and granted double representation. The goals were quite conservative but they did advance the elective principle.[60]

The partition of Bengal was rescinded in 1911 and announced at the Delhi Durbar at which King George V came in person and was crowned Emperor of India. He announced the capital would be moved from Calcutta to Delhi. This period saw an increase in the activities of revolutionary groups, which included Bengal's Anushilan Samiti and the Punjab's Ghadar Party. However, the British authorities were able to crush violent rebels swiftly, partly because the mainstream of educated Indian politicians opposed violent revolution.[61]

1905–1911: Partition of Bengal, Swadeshi, violence

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The viceroy, Lord Curzon (1899–1905), was unusually energetic in pursuit of efficiency and reform.[62] His agenda included the creation of the North-West Frontier Province; small changes in the civil services; speeding up the operations of the secretariat; setting up a gold standard to ensure a stable currency; creation of a Railway Board; irrigation reform; reduction of peasant debts; lowering the cost of telegrams; archaeological research and the preservation of antiquities; improvements in the universities; police reforms; upgrading the roles of the Native States; a new Commerce and Industry Department; promotion of industry; revised land revenue policies; lowering taxes; setting up agricultural banks; creating an Agricultural Department; sponsoring agricultural research; establishing an Imperial Library; creating an Imperial Cadet Corps; new famine codes; and, indeed, reducing the smoke nuisance in Calcutta.[63]

Trouble emerged for Curzon when he divided the largest administrative subdivision in British India, the Bengal Province, into the Muslim-majority province of Eastern Bengal and Assam and the Hindu-majority province of West Bengal (present-day Indian states of West Bengal, Bihar, and Odisha). Curzon's act, the Partition of Bengal, had been contemplated by various colonial administrations since the time of Lord William Bentinck but was never acted upon. Though some considered it administratively felicitous, it was communally charged. It sowed the seeds of division among Indians in Bengal, transforming nationalist politics as nothing else before it. The Hindu elite of Bengal, among them many who owned land in East Bengal that was leased out to Muslim peasants, protested fervidly.[64]

Following the Partition of Bengal, which was a strategy set out by Lord Curzon to weaken the nationalist movement, Tilak encouraged the Swadeshi movement and the Boycott movement.[65] The movement consisted of the boycott of foreign goods and also the social boycott of any Indian who used foreign goods. The Swadeshi movement consisted of the usage of natively produced goods. Once foreign goods were boycotted, there was a gap which had to be filled by the production of those goods in India itself. Bal Gangadhar Tilak said that the Swadeshi and Boycott movements are two sides of the same coin. The large Bengali Hindu middle-class (the Bhadralok), upset at the prospect of Bengalis being outnumbered in the new Bengal province by Biharis and Oriyas, felt that Curzon's act was punishment for their political assertiveness. The pervasive protests against Curzon's decision took the form predominantly of the Swadeshi ("buy Indian") campaign led by two-time Congress president, Surendranath Banerjee, and involved boycott of British goods.[66]

The rallying cry for both types of protest was the slogan Bande Mataram ("Hail to the Mother"), which invoked a mother goddess, who stood variously for Bengal, India, and the Hindu goddess Kali. Sri Aurobindo never went beyond the law when he edited the Bande Mataram magazine; it preached independence but within the bounds of peace as far as possible. Its goal was Passive Resistance.[67] The unrest spread from Calcutta to the surrounding regions of Bengal when students returned home to their villages and towns. Some joined local political youth clubs emerging in Bengal at the time, some engaged in robberies to fund arms, and even attempted to take the lives of Raj officials. However, the conspiracies generally failed in the face of intense police work.[68] The Swadeshi boycott movement cut imports of British textiles by 25%. The swadeshi cloth, although more expensive and somewhat less comfortable than its Lancashire competitor, was worn as a mark of national pride by people all over India.[69]

1914–1918: First World War, Lucknow Pact, Home Rule leagues

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The First World War would prove to be a watershed in the imperial relationship between Britain and India. Shortly before the outbreak of war, the Government of India had indicated that they could furnish two divisions plus a cavalry brigade, with a further division in case of emergency.[70] Some 1.4 million Indian and British soldiers of the British Indian Army took part in the war, primarily in Iraq and the Middle East. Their participation had a wider cultural fallout as news spread of how bravely soldiers fought and died alongside British soldiers, as well as soldiers from dominions like Canada and Australia.[71] India's international profile rose during the 1920s, as it became a founding member of the League of Nations in 1920 and participated, under the name "Les Indes Anglaises" (British India), in the 1920 Summer Olympics in Antwerp.[72] Back in India, especially among the leaders of the Indian National Congress, the war led to calls for greater self-government for Indians.[71]

At the onset of World War I, the reassignment of most of the British army in India to Europe and Mesopotamia, had led the previous viceroy, Lord Harding, to worry about the "risks involved in denuding India of troops".[71] Revolutionary violence had already been a concern in British India; consequently, in 1915, to strengthen its powers during what it saw was a time of increased vulnerability, the Government of India passed the Defence of India Act 1915, which allowed it to intern politically dangerous dissidents without due process, and added to the power it already had under the Indian Press Act of 1910 to imprison journalists without trial and to censor the press.[73] It was under the Defence of India act that the Ali brothers were imprisoned in 1916, and Annie Besant, a European woman, and ordinarily more problematic to imprison, was arrested in 1917.[73] Now, as constitutional reform began to be discussed in earnest, the British began to consider how new moderate Indians could be brought into the fold of constitutional politics and, simultaneously, how the hand of established constitutionalists could be strengthened. However, since the Government of India wanted to ensure against any sabotage of the reform process by extremists, and since its reform plan was devised during a time when extremist violence had ebbed as a result of increased governmental control, it also began to consider how some of its wartime powers could be extended into peacetime.[73]

After the 1906 split between the moderates and the extremists in the Indian National Congress, organised political activity by the Congress had remained fragmented until 1914, when Bal Gangadhar Tilak was released from prison and began to sound out other Congress leaders about possible reunification. That, however, had to wait until the demise of Tilak's principal moderate opponents, Gopal Krishna Gokhale and Pherozeshah Mehta, in 1915, whereupon an agreement was reached for Tilak's ousted group to re-enter the Congress.[71] In the 1916 Lucknow session of the Congress, Tilak's supporters were able to push through a more radical resolution which asked for the British to declare that it was their "aim and intention ... to confer self-government on India at an early date".[71] Soon, other such rumblings began to appear in public pronouncements: in 1917, in the Imperial Legislative Council, Madan Mohan Malaviya spoke of the expectations the war had generated in India, "I venture to say that the war has put the clock ... fifty years forward ... (The) reforms after the war will have to be such, ... as will satisfy the aspirations of her (India's) people to take their legitimate part in the administration of their own country."[71]

The 1916 Lucknow Session of the Congress was also the venue of an unanticipated mutual effort by the Congress and the Muslim League, the occasion for which was provided by the wartime partnership between Germany and Turkey. Since the Turkish Sultan, or Khalifah, had also sporadically claimed guardianship of the Islamic holy sites of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem, and since the British and their allies were now in conflict with Turkey, doubts began to increase among some Indian Muslims about the "religious neutrality" of the British, doubts that had already surfaced as a result of the reunification of Bengal in 1911, a decision that was seen as ill-disposed to Muslims.[74] In the Lucknow Pact, the League joined the Congress in the proposal for greater self-government that was campaigned for by Tilak and his supporters; in return, the Congress accepted separate electorates for Muslims in the provincial legislatures as well as the Imperial Legislative Council. In 1916, the Muslim League had anywhere between 500 and 800 members and did not yet have the wider following among Indian Muslims that it enjoyed in later years; in the League itself, the pact did not have unanimous backing, having largely been negotiated by a group of "Young Party" Muslims from the United Provinces (UP), most prominently, two brothers Mohammad and Shaukat Ali, who had embraced the Pan-Islamic cause;[74] however, it did have the support of a young lawyer from Bombay, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who was later to rise to leadership roles in both the League and the Indian independence movement. In later years, as the full ramifications of the pact unfolded, it was seen as benefiting the Muslim minority élites of provinces like UP and Bihar more than the Muslim majorities of Punjab and Bengal; nonetheless, at the time, the "Lucknow Pact" was an important milestone in nationalistic agitation and was seen as such by the British.[74]

During 1916, two Home Rule Leagues were founded within the Indian National Congress by Tilak and Annie Besant, respectively, to promote Home Rule among Indians, and also to elevate the stature of the founders within the Congress itself.[75] Besant, for her part, was also keen to demonstrate the superiority of this new form of organised agitation, which had achieved some success in the Irish home rule movement, over the political violence that had intermittently plagued the subcontinent during the years 1907–1914.[75] The two Leagues focused their attention on complementary geographical regions: Tilak's in western India, in the southern Bombay presidency, and Besant's in the rest of the country, but especially in the Madras Presidency and in regions like Sind and Gujarat that had hitherto been considered politically dormant by the Congress.[75] Both leagues rapidly acquired new members—approximately thirty thousand each in a little over a year—and began to publish inexpensive newspapers. Their propaganda also turned to posters, pamphlets, and political-religious songs, and later to mass meetings, which not only attracted greater numbers than in earlier Congress sessions, but also entirely new social groups such as non-Brahmins, traders, farmers, students, and lower-level government workers.[75] Although they did not achieve the magnitude or character of a nationwide mass movement, the Home Rule leagues both deepened and widened organised political agitation for self-rule in India. The British authorities reacted by imposing restrictions on the Leagues, including shutting out students from meetings and banning the two leaders from travelling to certain provinces.[75]

1915–1918: return of Gandhi

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Mahatma Gandhi (seated in carriage, on the right, eyes downcast, with black flat-top hat) receiving a big welcome in Karachi in 1916 after his return to India from South Africa

The year 1915 also saw the return of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi to India. Already known in India as a result of his civil liberties protests on behalf of the Indians in South Africa, Gandhi followed the advice of his mentor Gopal Krishna Gokhale and chose not to make any public pronouncements during the first year of his return, but instead spent the year travelling, observing the country at first hand, and writing.[76] Earlier, during his South Africa sojourn, Gandhi, a lawyer by profession, had represented an Indian community, which, although small, was sufficiently diverse to be a microcosm of India itself. In tackling the challenge of holding this community together and simultaneously confronting the colonial authority, he had created a technique of non-violent resistance, which he labelled Satyagraha (or Striving for Truth).[77] For Gandhi, Satyagraha was different from "passive resistance", by then a familiar technique of social protest, which he regarded as a practical strategy adopted by the weak in the face of superior force; Satyagraha, on the other hand, was for him the "last resort of those strong enough in their commitment to truth to undergo suffering in its cause".[77] Ahimsa or "non-violence", which formed the underpinning of Satyagraha, came to represent the twin pillar, with Truth, of Gandhi's unorthodox religious outlook on life.[77] During the years 1907–1914, Gandhi tested the technique of Satyagraha in a number of protests on behalf of the Indian community in South Africa against the unjust racial laws.[77]

Also, during his time in South Africa, in his essay, Hind Swaraj, (1909), Gandhi formulated his vision of Swaraj, or "self-rule" for India based on three vital ingredients: solidarity between Indians of different faiths, but most of all between Hindus and Muslims; the removal of untouchability from Indian society; and the exercise of swadeshi—the boycott of manufactured foreign goods and the revival of Indian cottage industry.[76] The first two, he felt, were essential for India to be an egalitarian and tolerant society, one befitting the principles of Truth and Ahimsa, while the last, by making Indians more self-reliant, would break the cycle of dependence that was perpetuating not only the direction and tenor of the British rule in India, but also the British commitment to it.[76] At least until 1920, the British presence itself was not a stumbling block in Gandhi's conception of swaraj; rather, it was the inability of Indians to create a modern society.[76]

Gandhi at the time of the Kheda Satyagraha, 1918

Gandhi made his political debut in India in 1917 in Champaran district in Bihar, near the Nepal border, where he was invited by a group of disgruntled tenant farmers who, for many years, had been forced into planting indigo (for dyes) on a portion of their land and then selling it at below-market prices to the British planters who had leased them the land.[78] Upon his arrival in the district, Gandhi was joined by other agitators, including a young Congress leader, Rajendra Prasad, from Bihar, who would become a loyal supporter of Gandhi and go on to play a prominent role in the Indian independence movement. When Gandhi was ordered to leave by the local British authorities, he refused on moral grounds, setting up his refusal as a form of individual Satyagraha. Soon, under pressure from the Viceroy in Delhi who was anxious to maintain domestic peace during wartime, the provincial government rescinded Gandhi's expulsion order, and later agreed to an official enquiry into the case. Although the British planters eventually gave in, they were not won over to the farmers' cause, and thereby did not produce the optimal outcome of a Satyagraha that Gandhi had hoped for; similarly, the farmers themselves, although pleased at the resolution, responded less than enthusiastically to the concurrent projects of rural empowerment and education that Gandhi had inaugurated in keeping with his ideal of swaraj. The following year Gandhi launched two more Satyagrahas—both in his native Gujarat—one in the rural Kaira district where land-owning farmers were protesting increased land-revenue and the other in the city of Ahmedabad, where workers in an Indian-owned textile mill were distressed about their low wages. The satyagraha in Ahmedabad took the form of Gandhi fasting and supporting the workers in a strike, which eventually led to a settlement. In Kaira, in contrast, although the farmers' cause received publicity from Gandhi's presence, the satyagraha itself, which consisted of the farmers' collective decision to withhold payment, was not immediately successful, as the British authorities refused to back down. The agitation in Kaira gained for Gandhi another lifelong lieutenant in Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who had organised the farmers, and who too would go on to play a leadership role in the Indian independence movement.[79]

1916–1919: Montagu–Chelmsford reforms

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Montagu
Edwin Montagu, the secretary of state for India, whose report led to the Government of India Act 1919, also known as the Montford Reforms or the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms
Chelmsford
Lord Chelmsford, viceroy of India, who cautioned the British Government to be more responsive to Indian public opinion

In 1916, in the face of new strength demonstrated by the nationalists with the signing of the Lucknow Pact and the founding of the Home Rule leagues, and the realisation, after the disaster in the Mesopotamian campaign, that the war would likely last longer, the new viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, cautioned that the Government of India needed to be more responsive to Indian opinion.[80] Towards the end of the year, after discussions with the government in London, he suggested that the British demonstrate their good faith—in light of the Indian war role—through a number of public actions, including awards of titles and honours to princes, granting of commissions in the army to Indians, and removal of the much-reviled cotton excise duty, but, most importantly, an announcement of Britain's future plans for India and an indication of some concrete steps. After more discussion, in August 1917, the new Liberal secretary of state for India, Edwin Montagu, announced the British aim of "increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire".[80] Although the plan envisioned limited self-government at first only in the provinces—with India emphatically within the British Empire—it represented the first British proposal for any form of representative government in a non-white colony.

Montagu and Chelmsford presented their report in July 1918 after a long fact-finding trip through India the previous winter.[81] After more discussion by the government and parliament in Britain, and another tour by the Franchise and Functions Committee for the purpose of identifying who among the Indian population could vote in future elections, the Government of India Act 1919 (also known as the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms) was passed in December 1919.[81] The new Act enlarged both the provincial and Imperial legislative councils and repealed the Government of India's recourse to the "official majority" in unfavourable votes.[81] Although departments like defence, foreign affairs, criminal law, communications, and income-tax were retained by the Viceroy and the central government in New Delhi, other departments like public health, education, land-revenue, local self-government were transferred to the provinces.[81] The provinces themselves were now to be administered under a new diarchical system, whereby some areas like education, agriculture, infrastructure development, and local self-government became the preserve of Indian ministers and legislatures, and ultimately the Indian electorates, while others like irrigation, land-revenue, police, prisons, and control of media remained within the purview of the British governor and his executive council.[81] The new Act also made it easier for Indians to be admitted into the civil services and the army officer corps.

A greater number of Indians were now enfranchised, although, for voting at the national level, they constituted only 10% of the total adult male population, many of whom were still illiterate.[81] In the provincial legislatures, the British continued to exercise some control by setting aside seats for special interests they considered cooperative or useful. In particular, rural candidates, generally sympathetic to British rule and less confrontational, were assigned more seats than their urban counterparts.[81] Seats were also reserved for non-Brahmins, landowners, businessmen, and college graduates. The principal of "communal representation", an integral part of the Minto–Morley Reforms, and more recently of the Congress-Muslim League Lucknow Pact, was reaffirmed, with seats being reserved for Muslims, Sikhs, Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians, and domiciled Europeans, in both provincial and Imperial legislative councils.[81] The Montagu–Chelmsford reforms offered Indians the most significant opportunity yet for exercising legislative power, especially at the provincial level; however, that opportunity was also restricted by the still limited number of eligible voters, by the small budgets available to provincial legislatures, and by the presence of rural and special interest seats that were seen as instruments of British control.[81] Its scope was unsatisfactory to the Indian political leadership, famously expressed by Annie Besant as something "unworthy of England to offer and India to accept".[82]

1917–1919: Rowlatt Act

[edit]
Sidney Rowlatt, the British judge under whose chairmanship the Rowlatt Committee recommended stricter anti-sedition laws

In 1917, as Montagu and Chelmsford were compiling their report, a committee chaired by a British judge, Sidney Rowlatt, and was tasked with investigating "revolutionary conspiracies", with the unstated goal of extending the government's wartime powers.[80] The Rowlatt Committee comprised four British and two Indian members, including Sir Basil Scott and Diwan Bahadur Sir C. V. Kumaraswami Sastri, the present and future Chief Justices of the High Court of Bombay and the High Court of Madras. It presented its report in July 1918 and identified three regions of conspiratorial insurgency: Bengal, the Bombay presidency, and the Punjab.[80] To combat subversive acts in these regions, the committee unanimously recommended that the government use emergency powers akin to its wartime authority, which included the ability to try cases of sedition by a panel of three judges and without juries, exaction of securities from suspects, governmental overseeing of residences of suspects,[80] and the power for provincial governments to arrest and detain suspects in short-term detention facilities and without trial.[83]

With the end of World War I, there was also a change in the economic climate. By the end of 1919, 1.5 million Indians had served in the armed services in either combatant or non-combatant roles, and India had provided £146 million in revenue for the war.[84] The increased taxes coupled with disruptions in both domestic and international trade had the effect of approximately doubling the index of overall prices in India between 1914 and 1920.[84] Returning war veterans, especially in the Punjab, created a growing unemployment crisis,[85] and post-war inflation led to food riots in Bombay, Madras, and Bengal provinces,[85] a situation that was made only worse by the failure of the 1918–19 monsoon and by profiteering and speculation.[84] The global influenza epidemic and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 added to the general jitters; the former among the population already experiencing economic woes,[85] and the latter among government officials, fearing a similar revolution in India.[86]

Headlines about the Rowlatt Bills (1919) from a nationalist newspaper in India. Although all non-official Indians on the Legislative Council voted against the Rowlatt Bills, the government was able to force their passage by using its majority.[83]

To combat what it saw as a coming crisis, the government now drafted the Rowlatt committee's recommendations into two Rowlatt Bills.[83] Although the bills were authorised for legislative consideration by Edwin Montagu, they were done so unwillingly, with the accompanying declaration, "I loathe the suggestion at first sight of preserving the Defence of India Act in peacetime to such an extent as Rowlatt and his friends think necessary."[80] In the ensuing discussion and vote in the Imperial Legislative Council, all Indian members voiced opposition to the bills. The Government of India was, nevertheless, able to use of its "official majority" to ensure passage of the bills early in 1919.[80] However, what it passed, in deference to the Indian opposition, was a lesser version of the first bill, which now allowed extrajudicial powers, but for a period of exactly three years and for the prosecution solely of "anarchical and revolutionary movements", dropping entirely the second bill involving modification the Indian Penal Code.[80] Even so, when it was passed, the new Rowlatt Act aroused widespread indignation throughout India, and brought Gandhi to the forefront of the nationalist movement.[83]

1919–1929: Jallianwala, non-cooperation

[edit]

The Jallianwala Bagh massacre or "Amritsar massacre", took place in the Jallianwala Bagh public garden in the predominantly Sikh northern city of Amritsar. After days of unrest Brigadier-General Reginald E.H. Dyer forbade public meetings and on Sunday 13 April 1919 fifty British Indian Army soldiers commanded by Dyer began shooting at an unarmed gathering of thousands of men, women, and children without warning. Casualty estimates vary widely, with the Government of India reporting 379 dead, with 1,100 wounded.[87] The Indian National Congress estimated three times the number of dead. Dyer was removed from duty but he became a celebrated hero in Britain among people with connections to the Raj.[88] Historians consider the episode was a decisive step towards the end of British rule in India.[89]

In 1920, after the British government refused to back down, Gandhi began his campaign of non-cooperation, prompting many Indians to return British awards and honours, to resign from the civil services, and to again boycott British goods. In addition, Gandhi reorganised the Congress, transforming it into a mass movement and opening its membership to even the poorest Indians. Although Gandhi halted the non-cooperation movement in 1922 after the violent incident at Chauri Chaura, the movement revived again, in the mid-1920s.

The visit, in 1928, of the British Simon Commission, charged with instituting constitutional reform in India, resulted in widespread protests throughout the country.[90] Earlier, in 1925, non-violent protests of the Congress had resumed too, this time in Gujarat, and led by Patel, who organised farmers to refuse payment of increased land taxes; the success of this protest, the Bardoli Satyagraha, brought Gandhi back into the fold of active politics.[90]

At its annual session in Lahore, the Indian National Congress, under the presidency of Jawaharlal Nehru, issued a demand for Purna Swaraj (Hindustani language: "complete independence"), or Purna Swarajya. The declaration was drafted by the Congress Working Committee, which included Gandhi, Nehru, Patel, and Chakravarthi Rajagopalachari. Gandhi subsequently led an expanded movement of civil disobedience, culminating in 1930 with the Salt Satyagraha, in which thousands of Indians defied the tax on salt, by marching to the sea and making their own salt by evaporating seawater. Although, many, including Gandhi, were arrested, the British government eventually gave in, and in 1931 Gandhi travelled to London to negotiate new reform at the Round Table Conferences.[citation needed]

Government of India Act, 1935

[edit]

In local terms, British control rested on the Indian Civil Service (ICS), but it faced growing difficulties. Fewer and fewer young men in Britain were interested in joining, and the continuing distrust of Indians resulted in a declining base in terms of quality and quantity. By 1945 Indians were numerically dominant in the ICS and at issue was divided loyalty between the Empire and independence.[91] The finances of the Raj depended on land taxes, and these became problematic in the 1930s. Epstein argues that after 1919 it became harder and harder to collect the land revenue. The Raj's suppression of civil disobedience after 1934 temporarily increased the power of the revenue agents but after 1937 they were forced by the new Congress-controlled provincial governments to hand back confiscated land. Again the outbreak of war strengthened them, in the face of the Quit India movement the revenue collectors had to rely on military force and by 1946–47 direct British control was rapidly disappearing in much of the countryside.[92]

In 1935, after the Round Table Conferences, Parliament passed the Government of India Act 1935, which authorised the establishment of independent legislative assemblies in all provinces of British India, the creation of a central government incorporating both the British provinces and the princely states, and the protection of Muslim minorities. The future Constitution of independent India was based on this act.[93] However, it divided the electorate into 19 religious and social categories, e.g., Muslims, Sikhs, Indian Christians, Depressed Classes, Landholders, Commerce and Industry, Europeans, Anglo-Indians, etc., each of which was given separate representation in the Provincial Legislative Assemblies. A voter could cast a vote only for candidates in his own category.[citation needed]

The 1935 Act provided for more autonomy for Indian provinces, with the goal of cooling off nationalist sentiment. The act provided for a national parliament and an executive branch under the purview of the British government, but the rulers of the princely states managed to block its implementation. These states remained under the full control of their hereditary rulers, with no popular government. To prepare for elections Congress built up its grass roots membership from 473,000 in 1935 to 4.5 million in 1939.[94]

In the 1937 elections Congress won victories in seven of the eleven provinces of British India.[95] Congress governments, with wide powers, were formed in these provinces. The widespread voter support for the Indian National Congress surprised Raj officials, who previously had seen the Congress as a small elitist body.[96] The British separated Burma Province from British India in 1937 and granted the colony a new constitution calling for a fully elected assembly, with many powers given to the Burmese, but this proved to be a divisive issue as a ploy to exclude Burmese from any further Indian reforms.[97]

1939–1945: World War II

[edit]

With the outbreak of World War II in 1939, the viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, declared war on India's behalf without consulting Indian leaders, leading the Congress provincial ministries to resign in protest. The Muslim League, in contrast, supported Britain in the war effort and maintained its control of the government in three major provinces, Bengal, Sind and the Punjab.[18]

While the Muslim League had been a small elite group in 1927 with only 1300 members, it grew rapidly once it became an organisation that reached out to the masses, reaching 500,000 members in Bengal in 1944, 200,000 in Punjab, and hundreds of thousands elsewhere.[98] Jinnah now was well positioned to negotiate with the British from a position of power.[99] Jinnah repeatedly warned that Muslims would be unfairly treated in an independent India dominated by the Congress. On 24 March 1940 in Lahore, the League passed the "Lahore Resolution", demanding that, "the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."[100] Although there were other important national Muslim politicians such as Congress leader Ab'ul Kalam Azad, and influential regional Muslim politicians such as A. K. Fazlul Huq of the leftist Krishak Praja Party in Bengal, Fazl-i-Hussain of the landlord-dominated Punjab Unionist Party, and Abd al-Ghaffar Khan of the pro-Congress Khudai Khidmatgar (popularly, "red shirts") in the North West Frontier Province,[101] the British, over the next six years, were to increasingly see the League as the main representative of Muslim India.

The Congress was secular and strongly opposed to having any religious state.[98] It insisted there was a natural unity to India, and repeatedly blamed the British for "divide and rule" tactics based on prompting Muslims to think of themselves as alien from Hindus.[citation needed] Jinnah rejected the notion of a united India, and emphasised that religious communities were more basic than an artificial nationalism. He proclaimed the Two-Nation Theory,[102] stating at Lahore on 23 March 1940:

[Islam and Hinduism] are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality ... The Hindu and Muslim belong to two different religions, philosophies, social customs and literature [sic]. They neither intermarry nor interdine together and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different ... To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state.[103]

While the regular Indian army in 1939 included about 220,000 native troops, it expanded tenfold during the war,[104] and small naval and air force units were created. Over two million Indians volunteered for military service in the British Army. They played a major role in numerous campaigns, especially in the Middle East and North Africa. Casualties were moderate (in terms of the world war), with 24,000 killed; 64,000 wounded; 12,000 missing (probably dead), and 60,000 captured at Singapore in 1942.[105]

London paid most of the cost of the Indian Army, which erased India's national debt; it ended the war with a surplus of £1,300 million. In addition, heavy British spending on munitions produced in India (such as uniforms, rifles, machine-guns, field artillery, and ammunition) led to a rapid expansion of industrial output, such as textiles (up 16%), steel (up 18%), and chemicals (up 30%). Small warships were built, and an aircraft factory opened in Bangalore. The railway system, with 700,000 employees, was taxed to the limit as demand for transportation soared.[106]

The British government sent the Cripps mission in 1942 to secure Indian nationalists' co-operation in the war effort in exchange for a promise of independence as soon as the war ended. Top officials in Britain, most notably Prime Minister Winston Churchill, did not support the Cripps Mission and negotiations with the Congress soon broke down.[107]

Congress launched the Quit India Movement in July 1942 demanding the immediate withdrawal of the British from India or face nationwide civil disobedience. On 8 August the Raj arrested all national, provincial and local Congress leaders, holding tens of thousands of them until 1945. The country erupted in violent demonstrations led by students and later by peasant political groups, especially in Eastern United Provinces, Bihar, and western Bengal. The large wartime British Army presence crushed the movement in a little more than six weeks;[108] nonetheless, a portion of the movement formed for a time an underground provisional government on the border with Nepal.[108] In other parts of India, the movement was less spontaneous and the protest less intensive; however, it lasted sporadically into the summer of 1943.[109]

Earlier, Subhas Chandra Bose, who had been a leader of the younger, radical, wing of the Indian National Congress in the late 1920s and 1930s, had risen to become Congress President from 1938 to 1939.[110] However, he was ousted from the Congress in 1939 following differences with the high command,[111] and subsequently placed under house arrest by the British before escaping from India in early 1941.[112] He turned to Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan for help in gaining India's independence by force.[113] With Japanese support, he organised the Indian National Army, composed largely of Indian soldiers of the British Indian Army who had been captured by the Japanese in the Battle of Singapore. As the war turned against them, the Japanese came to support a number of puppet and provisional governments in the captured regions, including those in Burma, the Philippines and Vietnam, and in addition, the Provisional Government of Azad Hind, presided by Bose.[113]

Bose's effort, however, was short-lived. In mid-1944 the British Army first halted and then reversed the Japanese U-Go offensive, beginning the successful part of the Burma Campaign. Bose's Indian National Army largely disintegrated during the subsequent fighting in Burma, with its remaining elements surrendering with the recapture of Singapore in September 1945. Bose died in August from third degree burns received after attempting to escape in an overloaded Japanese plane which crashed in Taiwan,[114] which many Indians believe did not happen.[115][116][117] Although Bose was unsuccessful, he roused patriotic feelings in India.[118]

1946–1947: Independence, Partition

[edit]

In January 1946, a number of mutinies broke out in the armed services, starting with that of RAF servicemen frustrated with their slow repatriation to Britain.[119] The mutinies came to a head with mutiny of the Royal Indian Navy in Bombay in February 1946, followed by others in Calcutta, Madras, and Karachi. Although the mutinies were rapidly suppressed, they spurred the new Labour government in Britain to action, and leading to the Cabinet Mission to India led by the secretary of state for India, Lord Pethick Lawrence, and including Sir Stafford Cripps, who had visited four years before.[119]

Also in early 1946, new elections were called in India. Earlier, at the end of the war in 1945, the colonial government had announced the public trial of three senior officers of Bose's defeated Indian National Army who stood accused of treason. Now as the trials began, the Congress leadership, although ambivalent towards the INA, chose to defend the accused officers.[120] The subsequent convictions of the officers, the public outcry against the convictions, and the eventual remission of the sentences, created positive propaganda for the Congress, which only helped in the party's subsequent electoral victories in eight of the eleven provinces.[121] The negotiations between the Congress and the Muslim League, however, stumbled over the issue of the partition. Jinnah proclaimed 16 August 1946, Direct Action Day, with the stated goal of highlighting, peacefully, the demand for a Muslim homeland in British India. The following day Hindu-Muslim riots broke out in Calcutta and quickly spread throughout British India. Although the Government of India and the Congress were both shaken by the course of events, in September, a Congress-led interim government was installed, with Jawaharlal Nehru as united India's prime minister.[122]

Later that year, the British Exchequer exhausted by the recently concluded World War II, and the Labour government conscious that it had neither the mandate at home, the international support, nor the reliability of native forces for continuing to control an increasingly restless British India,[123][124] decided to end British rule of India, and in early 1947 Britain announced its intention of transferring power no later than June 1948.[18]

As independence approached, the violence between Hindus and Muslims in the provinces of Punjab and Bengal continued unabated. With the British army unprepared for the potential for increased violence, the new viceroy, Louis Mountbatten, advanced the date for the transfer of power, allowing less than six months for a mutually agreed plan for independence.[125][18] With the partition of India, the end of the British rule in India in August 1947 saw the creation of two separate states of India and Pakistan.[126]

On 15 August 1947, the new Dominion of Pakistan (later Islamic Republic of Pakistan), with Muhammad Ali Jinnah as the governor-general; and the Dominion of India, (later Republic of India) with Jawaharlal Nehru as the prime minister, and the viceroy, Louis Mountbatten, staying on as its first governor-general came into being; with official ceremonies taking place in Karachi on 14 August and New Delhi on 15 August. This was done so that Mountbatten could attend both ceremonies.[127]

The great majority of Indians remained in place with independence, but in border areas millions of people (Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu) relocated across the newly drawn borders. In Punjab, where the new border lines divided the Sikh regions in half, there was much bloodshed; in Bengal and Bihar, where Gandhi's presence assuaged communal tempers, the violence was more limited. In all, somewhere between 250,000 and 500,000 people on both sides of the new borders, among both the refugee and resident populations of the three faiths, died in the violence.[128]

Timeline of major events, legislation, and public works

[edit]
Period Presiding Viceroy Major events, legislation, public works
1 November 1858 –
21 March 1862
Viscount Canning[129] 1858 reorganisation of British Indian Army (contemporaneously and hereafter Indian Army)
Construction begins (1860): University of Bombay, University of Madras, and University of Calcutta
Indian Penal Code passed into law in 1860.
Upper Doab famine of 1860–1861
Indian Councils Act 1861
Establishment of Archaeological Survey of India in 1861
James Wilson, financial member of Council of India, reorganises customs, imposes income tax, creates paper currency.
Indian Police Act 1861: creation of the Imperial Police, later known as the Indian Police Service.
21 March 1862 –
20 November 1863
Earl of Elgin Viceroy dies prematurely in Dharamsala in 1863
12 January 1864 –
12 January 1869
Sir John Lawrence, Bt[130] Anglo-Bhutan Duar War (1864–1865)
Orissa famine of 1866
Rajputana famine of 1869
Creation of Department of Irrigation.
Creation of the Imperial Forestry Service in 1867 (now the Indian Forest Service).
"Nicobar Islands annexed and incorporated into India 1869"
12 January 1869 –
8 February 1872
Earl of Mayo[131] Creation of Department of Agriculture (now Ministry of Agriculture)
Major extension of railways, roads, and canals
Indian Councils Act 1870
Creation of Andaman and Nicobar Islands as a Chief Commissionership (1872).
Assassination of Lord Mayo in the Andamans.
3 May 1872 –
12 April 1876
Lord Northbrook[131] Deaths in Bihar famine of 1873–1874 prevented by import of rice from Burma.
Gaikwad of Baroda dethroned for misgovernment; dominions passed to a child prince.
Indian Councils Act 1874
Visit of the Prince of Wales, the future Edward VII, in 1875–76.
12 April 1876 –
8 June 1880
Lord Lytton Baluchistan established as a Chief Commissionership
Queen Victoria (in absentia) proclaimed Empress of India at Delhi Durbar of 1877.
Great Famine of 1876–1878: 5.25 million dead; reduced relief offered at expense of Rs. 80 million.
Creation of Famine Commission of 1878–80 under Sir Richard Strachey.
Indian Forest Act of 1878
Second Anglo-Afghan War.
8 June 1880 –
13 December 1884
Marquess of Ripon[132] End of Second Anglo-Afghan War.
Repeal of Vernacular Press Act of 1878. Compromise on the Ilbert Bill.
Local Government Acts extend self-government from towns to country.
University of Punjab established in Lahore in 1882
Famine Code promulgated in 1883 by the Government of India.
Creation of the Education Commission. Creation of indigenous schools, especially for Muslims.
Repeal of import duties on cotton and of most tariffs. Railway extension.
13 December 1884 –
10 December 1888
Earl of Dufferin[133][134] Passage of Bengal Tenancy Bill
Third Anglo-Burmese War.
Joint Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission appointed for the Afghan frontier. Russian attack on Afghans at Panjdeh (1885). The Great Game in full play.
Report of Public Services Commission of 1886–87, creation of the Imperial Civil Service (later the Indian Civil Service (ICS), and today the Indian Administrative Service)
University of Allahabad established in 1887
Queen Victoria's Jubilee, 1887.
10 December 1888 –
11 October 1894
Marquess of Lansdowne[135] Strengthening of NW Frontier defence. Creation of Imperial Service Troops consisting of regiments contributed by the princely states.
Gilgit Agency leased in 1899
British Parliament passes Indian Councils Act 1892, opening the Imperial Legislative Council to Indians.
Revolution in princely state of Manipur and subsequent reinstatement of ruler.
High point of The Great Game. Establishment of the Durand Line between British India and Afghanistan,
Railways, roads, and irrigation works begun in Burma. Border between Burma and Siam finalised in 1893.
Fall of the rupee, resulting from the steady depreciation of silver currency worldwide (1873–93).
Indian Prisons Act of 1894
11 October 1894 –
6 January 1899
Earl of Elgin Reorganisation of Indian Army (from Presidency System to the four Commands).
Pamir agreement Russia, 1895
The Chitral Campaign (1895), the Tirah campaign (1896–97)
Indian famine of 1896–1897 beginning in Bundelkhand.
Bubonic plague in Bombay (1896), Bubonic plague in Calcutta (1898); riots in wake of plague prevention measures.
Establishment of Provincial Legislative Councils in Burma and Punjab; the former a new Lieutenant Governorship.
6 January 1899 –
18 November 1905
Lord Curzon of Kedleston[136][137] Creation of the North-West Frontier Province under a Chief Commissioner (1901).
Indian famine of 1899–1900.
Return of the bubonic plague, 1 million deaths
Financial Reform Act of 1899; Gold Reserve Fund created for India.
Punjab Land Alienation Act
Inauguration of Department (now Ministry) of Commerce and Industry.
Death of Queen Victoria (1901); dedication of the Victoria Memorial Hall, Calcutta as a national gallery of Indian antiquities, art, and history.
Coronation Durbar in Delhi (1903); Edward VII (in absentia) proclaimed Emperor of India.
Francis Younghusband's British expedition to Tibet (1903–04)
North-Western Provinces (previously Ceded and Conquered Provinces) and Oudh renamed United Provinces in 1904
Reorganisation of Indian Universities Act (1904).
Systemisation of preservation and restoration of ancient monuments by Archaeological Survey of India with the Indian Ancient Monument Preservation Act.
Inauguration of agricultural banking with Cooperative Credit Societies Act of 1904
Partition of Bengal; new province of East Bengal and Assam under a Lieutenant-Governor.
Census of 1901 gives the total population at 294 million, including 62 million in the princely states and 232 million in British India.[138] About 170,000 are Europeans. 15 million men and 1 million women are literate. Of those school-aged, 25% of the boys and 3% of the girls attend. There are 207 million Hindus, and 63 million Muslims, along with 9 million Buddhists (in Burma), 3 million Christians, 2 million Sikhs, 1 million Jains, and 8.4 million who practise animism.[139]
18 November 1905 –
23 November 1910
Earl of Minto[60] Creation of the Railway Board
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907
Indian Councils Act 1909 (also Minto–Morley Reforms)
Appointment of Indian Factories Commission in 1909.
Establishment of Department of Education in 1910 (now Ministry of Education)
23 November 1910 –
4 April 1916
Lord Hardinge of Penshurst Visit of King George V and Queen Mary in 1911: commemoration as Emperor and Empress of India at last Delhi Durbar
King George V announces creation of new city of New Delhi to replace Calcutta as capital of India.
Indian High Courts Act 1911
Indian Factories Act of 1911
Construction of New Delhi, 1912–1929
World War I, Indian Army in: Western Front, Belgium, 1914; German East Africa (Battle of Tanga, 1914); Mesopotamian campaign (Battle of Ctesiphon, 1915; Siege of Kut, 1915–16); Battle of Galliopoli, 1915–16
Passage of Defence of India Act 1915
4 April 1916 –
2 April 1921
Lord Chelmsford Indian Army in: Mesopotamian campaign (Fall of Baghdad, 1917); Sinai and Palestine campaign (Battle of Megiddo, 1918)
Passage of Rowlatt Act, 1919
Government of India Act 1919 (also Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms)
Jallianwala Bagh massacre, 1919
Third Anglo-Afghan War, 1919
University of Rangoon established in 1920.
Indian Passport Act of 1920: British Indian passport introduced
2 April 1921 –
3 April 1926
Earl of Reading University of Delhi established in 1922.
Indian Workers Compensation Act of 1923
3 April 1926 –
18 April 1931
Lord Irwin Indian Trade Unions Act of 1926, Indian Forest Act, 1927
Appointment of Royal Commission of Indian Labour, 1929
Indian Constitutional Round Table Conferences, London, 1930–32, Gandhi–Irwin Pact, 1931.
18 April 1931 –
18 April 1936
Earl of Willingdon New Delhi inaugurated as capital of India, 1931.
Indian Workmen's Compensation Act of 1933
Indian Factories Act of 1934
Royal Indian Air Force created in 1932.
Indian Military Academy established in 1932.
Government of India Act 1935
Creation of Reserve Bank of India
18 April 1936 –
1 October 1943
Marquess of Linlithgow Indian Payment of Wages Act of 1936
Burma administered independently after 1937 with creation of new cabinet position Secretary of State for India and Burma, and with the Burma Office separated off from the India Office
Indian Provincial Elections of 1937
Cripps' mission to India, 1942.
Indian Army in Mediterranean, Middle East and African theatres of World War II (North African campaign): (Operation Compass, Operation Crusader, First Battle of El Alamein, Second Battle of El Alamein. East African campaign, 1940, Anglo-Iraqi War, 1941, Syria–Lebanon campaign, 1941, Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, 1941)
Indian Army in Battle of Hong Kong, Battle of Malaya, Battle of Singapore
Burma campaign of World War II begins in 1942.
1 October 1943 –
21 February 1947
Viscount Wavell Indian Army becomes, at 2.5 million men, the largest all-volunteer force in history.
World War II: Burma Campaign, 1943–45 (Battle of Kohima, Battle of Imphal)
Bengal famine of 1943
Indian Army in Italian campaign (Battle of Monte Cassino)
British Labour Party wins UK General Election of 1945 with Clement Attlee becoming prime minister.
1946 Cabinet Mission to India
Indian Elections of 1946.
21 February 1947 –
15 August 1947
Viscount Mountbatten of Burma Indian Independence Act 1947 of the British Parliament enacted on 18 July 1947.
Radcliffe Award, August 1947
Partition of India, August 1947
India Office and position of Secretary of State for India abolished; ministerial responsibility within the United Kingdom for British relations with India and Pakistan transferred to the Commonwealth Relations Office.

British India and the princely states

[edit]

India during the British Raj was made up of two types of territory: British India and the Native States (or Princely States).[140] In its Interpretation Act 1889, the British Parliament adopted the following definitions in Section 18:

(4.) The expression "British India" shall mean all territories and places within Her Majesty's dominions which are for the time being governed by Her Majesty through the Governor-General of India or through any governor or other officer subordinates to the Governor-General of India.

(5.) The expression "India" shall mean British India together with any territories of any native prince or chief under the suzerainty of Her Majesty exercised through the Governor-General of India, or through any governor or other officer subordinates to the Governor-General of India.[1]

In general, the term "British India" had been used (and is still used) to refer also to the regions under the rule of the British East India Company in India from 1600 to 1858.[141] The term has also been used to refer to the "British in India".[142]

The terms "Indian Empire" and "Empire of India" (like the term "British Empire") were not used in legislation. The monarch was officially known as Empress or Emperor of India and the term was often used in Queen Victoria's Queen's Speeches and Prorogation Speeches. In addition, an order of knighthood, the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, was set up in 1878.

Suzerainty over 175 princely states, some of the largest and most important, was exercised (in the name of the British Crown) by the central government of British India under the viceroy; the remaining approximately 500 states were dependents of the provincial governments of British India under a governor, lieutenant-governor, or chief commissioner (as the case might have been).[143] A clear distinction between "dominion" and "suzerainty" was supplied by the jurisdiction of the courts of law: the law of British India rested upon the laws passed by the British Parliament and the legislative powers those laws vested in the various governments of British India, both central and local; in contrast, the courts of the Princely States existed under the authority of the respective rulers of those states.[143]

Major provinces

[edit]

At the turn of the 20th century, British India consisted of eight provinces that were administered either by a governor or a lieutenant-governor.

Areas and populations (excluding the dependent Native States) c. 1907[144]
Province of British India
(and present-day territories)
Total area Population in 1901
(millions)
Chief administrative
officer
Assam
(Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland)
130,000 km2
(50,000 sq mi)
6 Chief Commissioner
Bengal
(Bangladesh, West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand and Odisha)
390,000 km2
(150,000 sq mi)
75 Lieutenant-Governor
Bombay
(Sindh and parts of Maharashtra, Gujarat and Karnataka)
320,000 km2
(120,000 sq mi)
19 Governor-in-Council
Burma
(Myanmar)
440,000 km2
(170,000 sq mi)
9 Lieutenant-Governor
Central Provinces and Berar
(Madhya Pradesh and parts of Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh and Odisha)
270,000 km2
(100,000 sq mi)
13 Chief Commissioner
Madras
(Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and parts of Kerala, Karnataka, Odisha and Telangana)
370,000 km2
(140,000 sq mi)
38 Governor-in-Council
Punjab
(Punjab Province, Islamabad Capital Territory, Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Chandigarh and the National Capital Territory of Delhi)
250,000 km2
(97,000 sq mi)
20 Lieutenant-Governor
United Provinces
(Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand)
280,000 km2
(110,000 sq mi)
48 Lieutenant-Governor

During the partition of Bengal (1905–1913), the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam was created as a Lieutenant-Governorship. In 1911, East Bengal was reunited with Bengal, and the new provinces in the east became: Assam, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa.[144]

Minor provinces

[edit]

In addition, there were a few minor provinces that were administered by a chief commissioner:[145]

Minor province of British India
(and present day territories)
Total area in km2
(sq mi)
Population in 1901
(in thousands)
Chief administrative
officer
Ajmer-Merwara
(parts of Rajasthan)
7,000
(2,700)
477 ex officio Chief Commissioner
Andaman and Nicobar Islands
(Andaman and Nicobar Islands)
78,000
(30,000)
25 Chief Commissioner
British Baluchistan
(Balochistan)
120,000
(46,000)
308 ex officio Chief Commissioner
Coorg Province
(Kodagu district)
4,100
(1,600)
181 ex officio Chief Commissioner
North West Frontier Province
(Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)
41,000
(16,000)
2,125 Chief Commissioner

Princely states

[edit]

A Princely State, also called a Native State or an Indian State, was a British vassal state in India with an indigenous nominal Indian ruler, subject to a subsidiary alliance.[146] There were 565 princely states when India and Pakistan became independent from Britain in August 1947. The princely states did not form a part of British India (i.e. the presidencies and provinces), as they were not directly under British rule. The larger ones had treaties with Britain that specified which rights the princes had; in the smaller ones the princes had few rights. Within the princely states external affairs, defence and most communications were under British control.[citation needed] The British also exercised a general influence over the states' internal politics, in part through the granting or withholding of recognition of individual rulers. Although there were nearly 600 princely states, the great majority were very small and contracted out the business of government to the British. Some two hundred of the states had an area of less than 25 square kilometres (10 square miles).[146] The last vestige of the Mughal Empire in Delhi which was under Company authority prior to the advent of British Raj was finally abolished and seized by the Crown in the aftermath of the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 for its support to the rebellion.[147][148]

The princely states were grouped into agencies and residencies. The standard list of Princely States, the Alqabnamah, began alphabetically with Abu Dhabi.[23] The list also features Bhutan, Bahrain, and Ajman as "Protectorates" of the Viceroy, and features Nepal as an "independent state", with the Aga Khan also appearing as a prince without any land.[149]

Organisation

[edit]
Sir Charles Wood (1800–1885) was President of the Board of Control of the East India Company from 1852 to 1855; he shaped British education policy in India, and was Secretary of State for India from 1859 to 1866.

Following the Indian Rebellion of 1857 (usually called the Indian Mutiny by the British), the Government of India Act 1858 made changes in the governance of India at three levels:

  1. in the imperial government in London,
  2. in the central government in Calcutta, and
  3. in the provincial governments in the presidencies (and later in the provinces).[150]

In London, it provided for a cabinet-level Secretary of State for India and a fifteen-member Council of India, whose members were required, as one prerequisite of membership, to have spent at least ten years in India and to have done so no more than ten years before.[151] Although the secretary of state formulated the policy instructions to be communicated to India, he was required in most instances to consult the Council, but especially so in matters relating to spending of Indian revenues. The Act envisaged a system of "double government" in which the Council ideally served both as a check on excesses in imperial policy-making and as a body of up-to-date expertise on India. However, the secretary of state also had special emergency powers that allowed him to make unilateral decisions, and, in reality, the Council's expertise was sometimes outdated.[152] From 1858 until 1947, twenty-seven individuals served as Secretary of State for India and directed the India Office; these included: Sir Charles Wood (1859–1866), the Marquess of Salisbury (1874–1878; later British prime minister), John Morley (1905–1910; initiator of the Minto–Morley Reforms), E. S. Montagu (1917–1922; an architect of the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms), and Frederick Pethick-Lawrence (1945–1947; head of the 1946 Cabinet Mission to India). The size of the Advisory Council was reduced over the next half-century, but its powers remained unchanged. In 1907, for the first time, two Indians were appointed to the Council.[153] They were K.G. Gupta and Syed Hussain Bilgrami.

Lord Canning, the last Governor-General of India under Company rule and the first viceroy of India under Crown rule
Lord Salisbury was Secretary of State for India from 1874 to 1878.

In Calcutta, the governor-general remained head of the Government of India and now was more commonly called the viceroy on account of his secondary role as the Crown's representative to the nominally sovereign princely states; he was, however, now responsible to the secretary of state in London and through him to Parliament. A system of "double government" had already been in place during the Company's rule in India from the time of Pitt's India Act of 1784. The governor-general in the capital, Calcutta, and the governor in a subordinate presidency (Madras or Bombay) was each required to consult his advisory council; executive orders in Calcutta, for example, were issued in the name of "Governor-General-in-Council" (i.e. the Governor-General with the advice of the Council). The Company's system of "double government" had its critics, since, from the time of the system's inception, there had been intermittent feuding between the governor-general and his Council; still, the Act of 1858 made no major changes in governance.[153] However, in the years immediately thereafter, which were also the years of post-rebellion reconstruction, Viceroy Lord Canning found the collective decision making of the Council to be too time-consuming for the pressing tasks ahead, so he requested the "portfolio system" of an Executive Council in which the business of each government department (the "portfolio") was assigned to and became the responsibility of a single council member.[153] Routine departmental decisions were made exclusively by the member, but important decisions required the consent of the governor-general and, in the absence of such consent, required discussion by the entire Executive Council. This innovation in Indian governance was promulgated in the Indian Councils Act 1861.

If the Government of India needed to enact new laws, the Councils Act allowed for a Legislative Council—an expansion of the Executive Council by up to twelve additional members, each appointed to a two-year term—with half the members consisting of British officials of the government (termed official) and allowed to vote, and the other half, comprising Indians and domiciled Britons in India (termed non-official) and serving only in an advisory capacity.[154] All laws enacted by Legislative Councils in India, whether by the Imperial Legislative Council in Calcutta or by the provincial ones in Madras and Bombay, required the final assent of the secretary of state in London; this prompted Sir Charles Wood, the second secretary of state, to describe the Government of India as "a despotism controlled from home".[153] Moreover, although the appointment of Indians to the Legislative Council was a response to calls after the 1857 rebellion, most notably by Sayyid Ahmad Khan, for more consultation with Indians, the Indians so appointed were from the landed aristocracy, often chosen for their loyalty, and far from representative.[155] Even so, the "...  tiny advances in the practice of representative government were intended to provide safety valves for the expression of public opinion, which had been so badly misjudged before the rebellion".[156] Indian affairs now also came to be more closely examined in the British Parliament and more widely discussed in the British press.[157]

With the promulgation of the Government of India Act 1935, the Council of India was abolished with effect from 1 April 1937 and a modified system of government enacted. The secretary of state for India represented the Government of India in the UK. He was assisted by a body of advisers numbering from 8–12 individuals, at least half of whom were required to have held office in India for a minimum of 10 years, and had not relinquished office earlier than two years prior to their appointment as advisers to the secretary of state.[158]

The viceroy and governor-general of India, a Crown appointee, typically held office for five years though there was no fixed tenure, and received an annual salary of Rs. 250,800 p.a. (£18,810 p.a.).[158][159] He headed the Viceroy's Executive Council, each member of which had responsibility for a department of the central administration. From 1 April 1937, the position of Governor-General in Council, which the viceroy and governor-general concurrently held in the capacity of representing the Crown in relations with the Indian princely states, was replaced by the designation of "HM Representative for the Exercise of the Functions of the Crown in its Relations with the Indian States", or the "Crown Representative". The Executive Council was greatly expanded during the Second World War, and in 1947 comprised 14 members (secretaries), each of whom earned a salary of Rs. 66,000 p.a. (£4,950 p.a.).

Until 1946, the viceroy held the portfolio for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, as well as heading the Political Department in his capacity as the Crown representative. Each department was headed by a secretary excepting the Railway Department, which was headed by a Chief Commissioner of Railways under a secretary.[160]

The viceroy and governor-general was also the head of the bicameral Indian Legislature, consisting of an upper house (the Council of State) and a lower house (the Legislative Assembly). The viceroy was the head of the Council of State, while the Legislative Assembly, which was first opened in 1921, was headed by an elected president (appointed by the Viceroy from 1921 to 1925). The Council of State consisted of 58 members (32 elected, 26 nominated), while the Legislative Assembly comprised 141 members (26 nominated officials, 13 others nominated and 102 elected). The Council of State existed in five-year periods and the Legislative Assembly for three-year periods, though either could be dissolved earlier or later by the Viceroy. The Indian Legislature was empowered to make laws for all persons resident in British India including all British subjects resident in India, and for all British Indian subjects residing outside India. With the assent of the King-Emperor and after copies of a proposed enactment had been submitted to both houses of the British Parliament, the Viceroy could overrule the legislature and directly enact any measures in the perceived interests of British India or its residents if the need arose.[160]

Effective from 1 April 1936, the Government of India Act created the new provinces of Sind (separated from the Bombay Presidency) and Orissa (separated from the Province of Bihar and Orissa). Burma and Aden became separate Crown Colonies under the Act from 1 April 1937, thereby ceasing to be part of the Indian Empire. From 1937 onwards, British India was divided into 17 administrations: the three Presidencies of Madras, Bombay and Bengal, and the 14 provinces of the United Provinces, Punjab, Bihar, the Central Provinces and Berar, Assam, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Orissa, Sind, British Baluchistan, Delhi, Ajmer-Merwara, Coorg, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Panth Piploda. The Presidencies and the first eight provinces were each under a governor, while the latter six provinces were each under a chief commissioner. The viceroy directly governed the chief commissioner provinces through each respective chief commissioner, while the Presidencies and the provinces under governors were allowed greater autonomy under the Government of India Act.[161] Each Presidency or province headed by a governor had either a provincial bicameral legislature (in the Presidencies, the United Provinces, Bihar and Assam) or a unicameral legislature (in the Punjab, Central Provinces and Berar, NWFP, Orissa and Sind). The governor of each presidency or province represented the Crown in his capacity, and was assisted by a ministers appointed from the members of each provincial legislature. Each provincial legislature had a life of five years, barring any special circumstances such as wartime conditions. All bills passed by the provincial legislature were either signed or rejected by the governor, who could also issue proclamations or promulgate ordinances while the legislature was in recess, as the need arose.[162]

Each province or presidency comprised a number of divisions, each headed by a commissioner and subdivided into districts, which were the basic administrative units and each headed by a district magistrate, collector or deputy commissioner; in 1947, British India comprised 230 districts.[162]

Economy

[edit]
[edit]
One Mohur depicting Queen Victoria (1862)

All three sectors of the economy—agriculture, manufacturing, and services—accelerated in the postcolonial India. In agriculture a huge increase in production took place in the 1870s. The most important difference between colonial and postcolonial India was the use of land surplus with productivity-led growth by using high-yielding variety seeds, chemical fertilizers and more intensive application of water. All these three inputs were subsidised by the state.[163] The result was, on average, no long-term change in per capita income levels, though cost of living had grown higher. Agriculture was still dominant, with most peasants at the subsistence level. Extensive irrigation systems were built, providing an impetus for switching to cash crops for export and for raw materials for Indian industry, especially jute, cotton, sugarcane, coffee and tea.[164] India's global share of GDP fell drastically from above 20% to less than 5% in the colonial period.[165] Historians have been bitterly divided on issues of economic history, with the Nationalist school (following Nehru) arguing that India was poorer at the end of British rule than at the beginning and that impoverishment occurred because of the British.[166]

Mike Davis writes that much of the economic activity in British India was for the benefit of the British economy and was carried out relentlessly through repressive British imperial policies and with negative repercussions for the Indian population. This is reified in India's large exports of wheat to Britain: despite a major famine that claimed between 6 and 10 million lives in the late 1870s, these exports remained unchecked. A colonial government committed to laissez-faire economics refused to interfere with these exports or provide any relief.[167]

Industry

[edit]

With the end of the state-granted monopoly of the East India Trading Company in 1813, the importation into India of British manufactured goods, including finished textiles, increased dramatically, from approximately 1 million yards of cotton cloth in 1814 to 13 million in 1820, 995 million in 1870, to 2050 million by 1890. The British imposed "free trade" on India, while continental Europe and the United States erected stiff tariff barriers ranging from 30% to 70% on the importation of cotton yarn or prohibited it entirely. As a result of the less expensive imports from more industrialized Britain, India's most significant industrial sector, textile production, shrank, such that by 1870–1880 Indian producers were manufacturing only 25%–45% of local consumption. Deindustrialization of India's iron industry was even more extensive during this period.[168]

Jamsetji Tata (1839–1904) began his industrial career in 1877 with the Central India Spinning, Weaving, and Manufacturing Company in Bombay. While other Indian mills produced cheap coarse yarn (and later cloth) using local short-staple cotton and cheap machinery imported from Britain, Tata did much better by importing expensive longer-stapled cotton from Egypt and buying more complex ring-spindle machinery from the United States to spin finer yarn that could compete with imports from Britain.[169]

In the 1890s, he launched plans to move into heavy industry using Indian funding. The Raj did not provide capital, but, aware of Britain's declining position against the US and Germany in the steel industry, it wanted steel mills in India. It promised to purchase any surplus steel Tata could not otherwise sell.[170] The Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO), now headed by his son Dorabji Tata (1859–1932), began constructing its plant at Jamshedpur in Bihar in 1908, using American technology, not British.[171] According to The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, TISCO became the leading iron and steel producer in India, and "a symbol of Indian technical skill, managerial competence, and entrepreneurial flair".[169] The Tata family, like most of India's big businessmen, were Indian nationalists but did not trust the Congress because it seemed too aggressively hostile to the Raj, too socialist, and too supportive of trade unions.[172]

Railways

[edit]
The railway network of India in 1871, all major cities, Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, as well as Delhi, are connected.
The railway network of India in 1909, when it was the fourth largest railway network in the world
"The most magnificent railway station in the world", says the caption of the stereographic tourist picture of Victoria Terminus, Bombay, which was completed in 1888.

British India built a modern railway system in the late 19th century, which was the fourth largest in the world. At first the railways were privately owned and operated. They were run by British administrators, engineers and craftsmen. At first, only the unskilled workers were Indians.[173]

The East India Company (and later the colonial government) encouraged new railway companies backed by private investors under a scheme that would provide land and guarantee an annual return of up to 5% during the initial years of operation. The companies were to build and operate the lines under a 99-year lease, with the government having the option to buy them earlier.[174] Two new railway companies, the Great Indian Peninsular Railway (GIPR) and the East Indian Railway Company (EIR) began to construct and operate lines near Bombay and Calcutta in 1853–54. The first passenger railway line in North India, between Allahabad and Kanpur, opened in 1859. Eventually, five British companies came to own all railway business in India,[175] and operated under a profit maximization scheme.[176] Further, there was no government regulation of these companies.[175]

In 1854, Governor-General Lord Dalhousie formulated a plan to construct a network of trunk lines connecting the principal regions of India. Encouraged by the government guarantees, investment flowed in and a series of new rail companies was established, leading to rapid expansion of the rail system in India.[177] Soon several large princely states built their own rail systems and the network spread to the regions that became the modern-day states of Assam, Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh. The route mileage of this network increased from 1,349 to 25,495 kilometres (838 to 15,842 mi) between 1860 and 1890, mostly radiating inland from the three major port cities of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta.[178]

After the Sepoy Rebellion in 1857, and subsequent Crown rule over India, the railways were seen as a strategic defense of the European population, allowing the military to move quickly to subdue native unrest and protect Britons.[179] The railway thus served as a tool of the colonial government to control India as they were "an essential strategic, defensive, subjugators and administrative 'tool'" for the Imperial Project.[180]

Most of the railway construction was done by Indian companies supervised by British engineers.[181] The system was heavily built, using a broad gauge, sturdy tracks and strong bridges. By 1900 India had a full range of rail services with diverse ownership and management, operating on broad, metre and narrow gauge networks. In 1900, the government took over the GIPR network, while the company continued to manage it.[181] During the First World War, the railways were used to transport troops and grain to the ports of Bombay and Karachi en route to Britain, Mesopotamia, and East Africa.[citation needed] With shipments of equipment and parts from Britain curtailed, maintenance became much more difficult; critical workers entered the army; workshops were converted to making munitions; the locomotives, rolling stock, and track of some entire lines were shipped to the Middle East. The railways could barely keep up with the increased demand.[182] By the end of the war, the railways had deteriorated for lack of maintenance and were not profitable. In 1923, both GIPR and EIR were nationalised.[183][184]

Headrick shows that until the 1930s, both the Raj lines and the private companies hired only European supervisors, civil engineers, and even operating personnel, such as locomotive engineers. The hard physical labor was left to the Indians. The colonial government was chiefly concerned with the welfare of European workers, and any Indian deaths were "either ignored or merely mentioned as a cold statistical figure."[185][186] The government's Stores Policy required that bids on railway contracts be made to the India Office in London, shutting out most Indian firms.[184] The railway companies purchased most of their hardware and parts in Britain. There were railway maintenance workshops in India, but they were rarely allowed to manufacture or repair locomotives.[187]

After independence in 1947, forty-two separate railway systems, including thirty-two lines owned by the former Indian princely states, were amalgamated to form a single nationalised unit named the Indian Railways.

India provides an example of the British Empire pouring its money and expertise into a very well-built system designed for military purposes (after the Rebellion of 1857), in the hope that it would stimulate industry. The system was overbuilt and too expensive for the small amount of freight traffic it carried. Christensen (1996), who looked at colonial purpose, local needs, capital, service, and private-versus-public interests, concluded that making the railways a creature of the state hindered success because railway expenses had to go through the same time-consuming and political budgeting process as did all other state expenses. Railway costs could therefore not be tailored to the current needs of the railways or of their passengers.[188]

Irrigation

[edit]

The British Raj invested heavily in infrastructure, including canals and irrigation systems.[189] The Ganges Canal reached 560 kilometres (350 miles) from Haridwar to Cawnpore (now Kanpur), and supplied thousands of kilometres of distribution canals. By 1900 the Raj had the largest irrigation system in the world. One success story was Assam, a jungle in 1840 that by 1900 had 1,600,000 hectares (4,000,000 acres) under cultivation, especially in tea plantations. In all, the amount of irrigated land rose eightfold. Historian David Gilmour says:[190]

By the 1870s the peasantry in the districts irrigated by the Ganges Canal were visibly better fed, housed and dressed than before; by the end of the century the new network of canals in the Punjab had produced an even more prosperous peasantry there.

Economic impact of the Raj

[edit]

Historians continue to debate whether the long-term intention of British rule was to accelerate the economic development of India, or to distort and delay it. In 1780, the conservative British politician Edmund Burke raised the issue of India's position: he vehemently attacked the East India Company, claiming that Warren Hastings and other top officials had ruined the Indian economy and society. Indian historian Rajat Kanta Ray (1998) continues this line of attack, saying the new economy brought by the British in the 18th century was a form of "plunder" and a catastrophe for the traditional economy of the Mughal Empire.[191] Ray accuses the British of depleting the food and money stocks and of imposing high taxes that helped cause the terrible Bengal famine of 1770, which killed a third of the people of Bengal.[192]

P. J. Marshall shows that recent scholarship has reinterpreted the view that the prosperity of the formerly benign Mughal rule gave way to poverty and anarchy.[193] He argues the British takeover did not make any sharp break with the past, which largely delegated control to regional Mughal rulers and sustained a generally prosperous economy for the rest of the 18th century. Marshall notes the British went into partnership with Indian bankers and raised revenue through local tax administrators and kept the old Mughal rates of taxation.

The East India Company inherited an onerous taxation system that took one-third of the produce of Indian cultivators.[191] Instead of the Indian nationalist account of the British as alien aggressors, seizing power by brute force and impoverishing all of India, Marshall presents the interpretation (supported by many scholars in India and the West) that the British were not in full control but instead were players in what was primarily an Indian play and in which their rise to power depended upon excellent co-operation with Indian elites.[193] Marshall admits that much of his interpretation is still highly controversial among many historians.[194]

Demography

[edit]
The 1921 census of British India shows 69 million Muslims and 217 million Hindus out of a total population of 316 million.

The population of the territory that became the British Raj was 100 million by 1600 and remained nearly stationary until the 19th century. The population of the Raj reached 255 million according to the first census taken in 1881 of India.[195][196][197][198]

Studies of India's population since 1881 have focused on such topics as total population, birth and death rates, growth rates, geographic distribution, literacy, the rural and urban divide, cities of a million, and the three cities with populations over eight million: Delhi, Greater Bombay, and Calcutta.[199]

Mortality rates fell in the 1920–1945 era, primarily due to biological immunisation. Other factors included rising incomes and better living conditions, improved nutrition, a safer and cleaner environment, and better official health policies and medical care.[200]

Severe overcrowding in the cities caused major public health problems, as noted in an official report from 1938:[201]

In the urban and industrial areas ... cramped sites, the high values of land and the necessity for the worker to live in the vicinity of his work ... all tend to intensify congestion and overcrowding. In the busiest centres houses are built close together, eave touching eave, and frequently back to back .... Space is so valuable that, in place of streets and roads, winding lanes provide the only approach to the houses. Neglect of sanitation is often evidenced by heaps of rotting garbage and pools of sewage, whilst the absence of latrines enhance the general pollution of air and soil.

Famines, epidemics, and public health

[edit]
Child who starved to death during the Bengal famine of 1943

During the British Raj, India experienced a large number of major famines, including the Great Famine of 1876–1878, in which 6.1 million to 10.39 million Indians perished[202] and the Indian famine of 1899–1900, in which 1.25 to 10 million Indians perished.[203] The first cholera pandemic began in Bengal, then spread across India by 1820. Ten thousand British troops and countless Indians died during this pandemic.[citation needed] Estimated deaths in India between 1817 and 1860 exceeded 15 million. Another 23 million died between 1865 and 1917.[204] The Third plague pandemic which started in China in the middle of the 19th century, eventually spread to all inhabited continents and killed 10 million Indians in India alone.[205] Waldemar Haffkine, who mainly worked in India, became the first microbiologist to develop and deploy vaccines against cholera and bubonic plague. In 1925 the Plague Laboratory in Bombay was renamed the Haffkine Institute.

Fevers ranked as one of the leading causes of death in India in the 19th century.[206] Britain's Sir Ronald Ross, working in the Presidency General Hospital in Calcutta, finally proved in 1898 that mosquitoes transmit malaria, while on assignment in the Deccan at Secunderabad, where the Centre for Tropical and Communicable Diseases is now named in his honour.[207]

In 1881 there were around 120,000 leprosy patients. The central government passed the Lepers Act of 1898, which provided legal provision for forcible confinement of people with leprosy in India.[208] Under the direction of Mountstuart Elphinstone a program was launched to propagate smallpox vaccination.[209] Mass vaccination in India resulted in a major decline in smallpox mortality by the end of the 19th century.[210] In 1849 nearly 13% of all Calcutta deaths were due to smallpox.[211] Between 1868 and 1907, there were approximately 4.7 million deaths from smallpox.[212]

Sir Robert Grant directed his attention to establishing a systematic institution in Bombay for imparting medical knowledge to the natives.[213] In 1860, Grant Medical College became one of the four recognised colleges for teaching courses leading to degrees (alongside Elphinstone College, Deccan College and Government Law College, Mumbai).[193]

Education

[edit]
The University of Calcutta, established in 1857, is one of the three oldest modern state universities in India.
The University of Lucknow, founded by the British in 1867

Universities in Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras were established in 1857, just before the Rebellion. By 1890 some 60,000 Indians had matriculated, chiefly in the liberal arts or law. About a third entered public administration, and another third became lawyers. The result was a very well educated professional state bureaucracy. By 1887 of 21,000 mid-level civil services appointments, 45% were held by Hindus, 7% by Muslims, 19% by Eurasians (European father and Indian mother), and 29% by Europeans. Of the 1000 top-level civil services positions, almost all were held by Britons, typically with an Oxbridge degree.[214] The government, often working with local philanthropists, opened 186 universities and colleges of higher education by 1911; they enrolled 36,000 students (over 90% men). By 1939 the number of institutions had doubled and enrolment reached 145,000. The curriculum followed classical British standards of the sort set by Oxford and Cambridge and stressed English literature and European history. Nevertheless, by the 1920s the student bodies had become hotbeds of Indian nationalism.[215]

See also

[edit]

Notes

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References

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Bibliography

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The British Raj, also known as Crown rule in India, was the period of direct colonial administration by the British Crown over the Indian subcontinent, commencing in 1858 after the Government of India Act transferred authority from the East India Company following the 1857 rebellion and concluding with the partition and independence of India and Pakistan in 1947. This era encompassed direct rule over provinces comprising about three-fifths of the territory and population, alongside indirect governance of over 560 princely states through treaties and subsidies, spanning roughly 4.2 million square kilometers at its peak. Governed by a viceroy appointed by the British monarch and advised by an executive council, the Raj centralized authority in Calcutta until 1911 and then Delhi, implementing uniform legal codes, extensive railway networks exceeding 40,000 miles by 1909, and irrigation systems that boosted agricultural output despite recurrent famines. Economic policies facilitated the export of raw materials like cotton and indigo to Britain while importing manufactured goods, contributing to a debated "drain of wealth" estimated by contemporaries at £1 billion over decades, though infrastructure investments and administrative stability enabled population growth from 200 million in 1871 to over 350 million by 1941. The Raj's defining characteristics included efforts to modernize through English education, civil service reforms via competitive exams opened to Indians in 1853, and famine relief codes post-1870s crises, yet it faced persistent resistance, from the 1857 uprising to the formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885, culminating in mass civil disobedience and wartime strains that precipitated decolonization. Controversies persist over its legacy, with empirical assessments highlighting unified governance that quelled endemic warfare among fragmented polities, alongside causal links between export-focused agriculture and famine mortality exceeding 30 million in events like the 1876-1878 and 1943 Bengal crises, underscoring trade-offs in imperial resource allocation.

Establishment and Governance

Origins under the East India Company

The English East India Company received a royal charter from Queen Elizabeth I on 31 December 1600, establishing it as a joint-stock enterprise with a monopoly on English trade to the East Indies, primarily targeting spices, cotton, and silk. Initially operating through armed merchant voyages for commercial gain, the Company secured its first foothold in India with a trading factory at Surat in 1612, following imperial permission from the Mughal emperor Jahangir. This was followed by Fort St. George at Madras in 1639, the acquisition of Bombay in 1668 as part of a royal dowry, and Fort William at Calcutta around 1696, forming the nuclei of the three presidencies that anchored British commercial interests amid competition with Portuguese, Dutch, and French rivals. By the mid-18th century, the Company's focus shifted from pure trade to territorial acquisition, driven by the need to protect commercial routes and exploit political fragmentation in the Mughal Empire's decline. This gradual subduing of India from the mid-18th to mid-19th century relied on wars, alliances, diplomacy, divide-and-rule tactics exploiting local rivalries, and advantages in superior military organization and technology. The Battle of Plassey on 23 June 1757 exemplified this evolution: Robert Clive, commanding approximately 3,000 Company troops and allied sepoys, defeated a much larger force under Nawab Siraj-ud-Daulah of Bengal through superior discipline, artillery, and the defection of key subordinates like Mir Jafar, whom Clive had bribed. The victory granted the Company effective control over Bengal's revenues, formalized by the 1765 diwani grant from Mughal emperor Shah Alam II, yielding annual revenues exceeding £3 million and enabling further military expansion without direct reliance on London funding. Subsequent conquests, fueled by reinvested trade profits and private armies that leveraged Indian sepoys, encompassed victories in the Anglo-Mysore Wars (1767–1799) against Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan, and the Anglo-Maratha Wars (1775–1818), which subdued the Maratha Confederacy and integrated regions like Punjab by 1849 after the Anglo-Sikh Wars. These gains transformed the Company from a trading entity into a de facto sovereign power ruling over 200 million subjects by 1857 with fewer than 100,000 total Britons including civilians, military, and administrators, spanning roughly two-thirds of the subcontinent through direct administration or subsidiary alliances. To sustain this expansion, the Company experimented with revenue systems grounded in direct assessment to maximize fiscal extraction while stabilizing agrarian output. The Permanent Settlement of 1793, enacted by Governor-General Lord Cornwallis in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, fixed land revenue at 89% of rental income payable to zamindars (landholders) in perpetuity, aiming to create a loyal intermediary class incentivized to invest in agriculture but often resulting in tenant exploitation and revenue shortfalls during famines. In contrast, the ryotwari system, pioneered by Thomas Munro and implemented across Madras Presidency from 1820, assessed taxes directly on individual ryots (peasant cultivators) at rates around 45–55% of produce value, promoting state oversight but imposing heavy administrative burdens and indebtedness. Early governance also involved suppressing endemic disorders to secure trade and travel routes, establishing rudimentary rule of law. Company officials targeted thuggee—organized gangs ritualistically strangling travelers for plunder—through systematic intelligence; William Henry Sleeman, appointed superintendent of the Thuggee and Dacoity Department in 1835, orchestrated operations from 1836 onward that captured over 4,500 thugs, executed hundreds, and dismantled networks operating across central India, reducing such depredations by the early 1840s. Similar efforts curbed maritime piracy in the Indian Ocean, with naval patrols under Company command protecting merchant shipping and coastal revenues. These measures, while coercive, causal enabled the extension of commercial security that underpinned further conquests.

Transition to Direct Crown Rule (1857–1858)

The Indian Rebellion of 1857 erupted on May 10 in Meerut, triggered primarily by sepoy discontent over the introduction of the Enfield rifle, whose cartridges were rumored to be greased with a mixture of cow and pig fat, violating Hindu and Muslim religious taboos respectively, as soldiers were required to bite the casings to load them. This grievance compounded broader resentments from East India Company policies, including the Doctrine of Lapse under Governor-General Dalhousie, which annexed princely states like Jhansi without natural heirs, disregarding adoption customs and eroding native sovereignty. Economic pressures, such as heavy land revenue demands displacing peasants and favoring British interests, further fueled unrest among troops and civilians, though the uprising remained confined to northern and central regions like Delhi, Kanpur, Lucknow, and Jhansi, with minimal participation from southern or eastern India due to fragmented leadership and loyalist princely states. British forces, reinforced from overseas, recaptured key centers through sieges and campaigns lasting into 1858, employing harsh reprisals including summary executions and village burnings to deter further resistance; approximately 6,000 British personnel and civilians perished, contrasted with over 100,000 Indian combatants and non-combatants killed in the fighting and its aftermath. The rebellion exposed the East India Company's administrative overreach and military vulnerabilities, prompting Parliament to enact the Government of India Act on August 2, 1858, which abolished the Company's governing powers, transferred territorial control and revenues to the British Crown, and established a Secretary of State for India accountable to Parliament, with the Governor-General redesignated as Viceroy. Queen Victoria's Proclamation of November 1, 1858, formalized the transition, pledging non-interference in Indian religions, customs, and princely rights—explicitly reversing the Doctrine of Lapse—and assuring equal opportunities in civil service without racial prejudice, though implementation favored British appointees. Lord Canning, previously Governor-General during the rebellion, was appointed the first Viceroy, overseeing the shift to direct Crown rule amid ongoing pacification efforts.

Administrative Structure and Princely States

The administrative framework of the British Raj established a hierarchical system with executive authority vested in the Viceroy, who served as the Governor-General and direct representative of the British Crown in India. Under the Government of India Act 1858, the Viceroy was appointed for a typical term of five years and operated under the oversight of the Secretary of State for India, a British Cabinet member responsible for policy direction through the India Office in London. The Secretary was supported by a Council of India, consisting of up to 15 members with experience in Indian affairs, ensuring accountability to Parliament while maintaining centralized control over key decisions such as foreign policy and military matters. The Indian Civil Service (ICS) formed the administrative backbone, recruited via competitive examinations introduced in 1853 to prioritize merit and intellectual rigor over nepotism or patronage. Initially dominated by British examinees due to the London-based testing and linguistic barriers, the ICS remained a compact elite, numbering approximately 800 to 1,000 officers in the 1870s and expanding only modestly to around 980 by 1947 despite India's growing population exceeding 300 million. This lean structure facilitated efficient governance through a district-level hierarchy, where ICS officers collected revenue, maintained order, and implemented policies, relying on subordinate Indian services for routine functions. At the provincial level, British India was divided into major provinces like Bengal, Bombay, Madras, and Punjab, each headed by a governor or lieutenant-governor appointed by the Viceroy. The Government of India Act 1919 introduced dyarchy in these provinces, dividing responsibilities into "transferred" subjects—such as education, public health, and agriculture—managed by Indian ministers accountable to elected provincial councils, and "reserved" subjects—like finance, justice, and police—retained under direct executive control. This partial devolution aimed to foster administrative experience among Indians while preserving British authority over core functions, though implementation varied and often highlighted tensions in divided governance. Over 565 princely states, covering about 40% of the subcontinent's territory, operated under indirect rule through the doctrine of paramountcy, whereby British suzerainty ensured control over defense, foreign relations, and succession while allowing rulers internal autonomy in exchange for loyalty and tribute. Originating from subsidiary alliances forged during the East India Company era—requiring states to host British troops funded by local subsidies—this system, continued post-1858, integrated disparate polities into a unified imperial framework, averting fragmentation by co-opting hereditary elites and minimizing direct administrative costs. The 1858 proclamation to Indian princes reaffirmed these arrangements, pledging non-interference in internal affairs absent misrule, which sustained stability across diverse regions until 1947. The British legal framework in India under the Raj sought to impose uniformity on a patchwork of Mughal-era fiqh interpretations, regional customs, and princely edicts that often resulted in inconsistent application and executive overreach by local rulers. This codification effort, accelerating after 1858, drew from English common law principles such as codified offenses and evidentiary standards to mitigate arbitrary judgments prevalent in pre-colonial systems where punishments varied widely by locale and whim of authorities. Central to this was the Indian Penal Code (IPC), drafted primarily by Thomas Babington Macaulay as Law Member of the Governor-General's Council between 1834 and 1837, and enacted on October 6, 1860, effective from January 1, 1862. The IPC defined 511 offenses with graded punishments, replacing ad hoc tribal or caste-based reprisals with standardized categories like murder (Section 302, punishable by death or life imprisonment) and theft (Sections 378–382), applicable across British territories irrespective of religion or community. Complementing it was the Code of Criminal Procedure, first consolidated in 1882 and substantially amended in 1898 to govern arrests, trials, and appeals, ensuring procedural consistency over the prior mosaic of provincial regulations. Judicial infrastructure was formalized through the Indian High Courts Act of 1861, which established apex courts in Calcutta (July 1, 1862), Bombay, and Madras by amalgamating Supreme Courts and Sadar Courts, with original and appellate jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters. These courts incorporated English writs, including habeas corpus—introduced earlier in 1774 via Calcutta's Supreme Court but extended under the High Courts to challenge unlawful detentions against executive orders. The framework emphasized a partial separation of judicial from executive functions, with High Court judges appointed by the Crown and insulated from local political pressures, though district magistracy retained combined roles until later reforms. Targeted interventions addressed egregious customs, such as the Bengal Sati Regulation (XVII) of December 4, 1829, which criminalized widow immolation—previously tolerated under Hindu rites in some regions—and imposed penalties up to life imprisonment, with enforcement intensified post-1858 across Raj domains. Similarly, the Female Infanticide Prevention Act of 1870 mandated registration of births in high-risk communities like Rajputs, curbing selective killings estimated at thousands annually in northwestern provinces prior to intervention. These measures supplanted unchecked local vendettas, fostering evidentiary trials over summary executions common in fragmented pre-Raj dispensations. Overall, the system prioritized rule-bound adjudication to curb caprice inherent in Mughal devolution to zamindars and qazis, where edicts like the Fatawa-e-Alamgiri coexisted uneasily with village panchayats, often yielding disparate outcomes for identical acts. While princely states retained internal judiciaries under subsidiary alliances—subject to British oversight for capital cases—the core provinces saw codified law reduce interpretive variances, as evidenced by the IPC's application in over 100,000 annual convictions by the 1880s, though critics noted its Eurocentric framing overlooked indigenous nuances.

Territorial Extent and Organization

Core Provinces and Boundaries

The directly administered territories of the British Raj, known as British India proper, originated as coastal trading enclaves under the East India Company, including Fort William in Bengal (established 1690), Fort St. George in Madras (1639), and Bombay (ceded 1668). These evolved into the three foundational presidencies—Bengal, Madras, and Bombay—which by the early 19th century controlled vast inland regions through subsidiary alliances and direct conquests. Subsequent expansions incorporated annexed princely states and frontier regions, such as Punjab following its annexation on 29 March 1849 after the Second Anglo-Sikh War, and Awadh (Oudh) on 7 February 1856 under the Doctrine of Lapse. By 1901, the core provinces encompassed Bengal (including Bihar and Orissa), Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, Punjab (including the Northwest Frontier after its provincial status in November 1901), the Central Provinces and Berar, Assam, Burma (fully annexed by 1 January 1886 after the Third Anglo-Burmese War), and smaller units like Ajmer-Merwara and Coorg. These provinces covered roughly 865,000 square miles, housing approximately 238 million inhabitants as per the 1901 Census of India, constituting about 60% of the subcontinent's territory under direct Crown administration. The northwestern boundary with Afghanistan was formalized by the Durand Line, agreed on 12 November 1893 between British India and Afghan Emir Abdur Rahman Khan, extending from the Hindu Kush to the Indus River to delineate tribal territories and counter Russian influence. Management of the Northwest Frontier involved a mix of direct provincial control in settled districts and indirect agency oversight of Pashtun tribes to secure the border against incursions. In the east, the boundary with China was vaguely defined along the Himalayas, while Burma's incorporation extended control to the Irrawaddy Delta and beyond, with its frontier against Siam (Thailand) stabilized by the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. This territorial configuration reflected a progression from mercantile footholds to strategic dominance, prioritizing defensible frontiers and revenue-yielding heartlands.

Integration of Princely States

Prior to the Indian Rebellion of 1857, the East India Company pursued annexation through the Doctrine of Lapse, which allowed seizure of princely states lacking a natural male heir, leading to the incorporation of territories such as Satara in 1848 and Jhansi in 1853. This policy, aggressively applied under Governor-General Lord Dalhousie, contributed to grievances that fueled the uprising. Following the rebellion, the British Crown abandoned systematic annexation, with Lord Canning formally withdrawing the Doctrine of Lapse in 1859 to prioritize stability and loyalty from native rulers who had often supported the British during the revolt. Instead, the policy of paramountcy asserted British supremacy over external affairs while granting internal autonomy to rulers, provided they abstained from misrule or aggression. Under paramountcy, intervention occurred only in cases of gross maladministration, as exemplified by the deposition of Malhar Rao Gaekwad, ruler of Baroda, in 1875. Accused of misrule, corruption, and plotting to poison the British Resident Colonel Robert Phayre, Gaekwad was tried by a commission and removed by order of Viceroy Lord Northbrook, with his nephew Sayajirao Gaekwad III installed as successor; this action underscored British oversight without routine interference. Approximately 565 princely states, encompassing roughly 40 percent of the subcontinent's land area and 23 percent of its population, were integrated through this framework rather than direct conquest. British control was exercised via residencies and political agencies, where Residents or Agents—diplomatic officials posted in major states like Hyderabad and Mysore—advised rulers, mediated disputes, and enforced treaties, ensuring alignment with imperial interests. Economic integration supplemented political oversight, with many states paying fixed tributes or subsidies to the British government, often in exchange for military protection under subsidiary alliances; these payments formed a portion of imperial revenue, though varying by state and treaty terms. By upholding hereditary rulers as buffers against disorder, paramountcy averted the balkanization seen in the 18th-century successor states after Mughal decline, where regional powers fragmented into warring entities; this hierarchical stability facilitated unified administration across diverse territories, reducing the costs and risks of outright subjugation.

Military and Security Apparatus

Following the Indian Rebellion of 1857, the British Crown assumed direct control over the East India Company's military forces, transferring approximately 238,000 Indian troops and 45,000 British soldiers into a restructured imperial army designed to prioritize loyalty and prevent future uprisings. The Peel Commission of 1859 recommended key reforms, including an increased ratio of European to native troops—aiming for no more than two Indians per European in cavalry and infantry—and a shift toward recruiting from "martial races" perceived as reliable, such as Sikhs, Gurkhas, and Punjabi Muslims, who had aided British suppression of the rebellion. This policy emphasized "class regiments" composed of single ethnic or caste groups to minimize internal dissent, with Punjab emerging as a primary recruitment ground post-1857 due to its strategic location and demonstrated fidelity. The three presidency armies (Bengal, Bombay, and Madras) persisted initially but underwent progressive unification, culminating in the formation of a single Indian Army by 1895 under a Commander-in-Chief, enhancing centralized command for internal security and frontier defense. Native units were professionalized through standardized training, artillery attachments, and officer commissions limited to British personnel, while auxiliary forces like Gurkha rifles—recruited from Nepal since the early 19th century but expanded post-1857—provided specialized mountain warfare capabilities. By the early 20th century, the army's strength stabilized around 150,000-200,000 regulars, with Sikhs and Gurkhas forming disproportionate shares of elite infantry due to their combat record against rebels. Complementing the army, the security apparatus included a reorganized police system under the Indian Police Act of 1861, which established a hierarchical structure led by an Inspector-General with magisterial powers, focused on crime prevention, detection, and suppressing unrest through district-level stations manned by Indian constables under British superintendents. Intelligence capabilities evolved with the creation of the Central Special Branch in 1887, later the Intelligence Bureau, which collated reports from police and military sources to monitor seditious activities, though it remained primarily a compilation agency until the 1930s. These networks proved effective in preempting localized threats, contributing to the absence of successful large-scale invasions or territorial losses from 1858 until 1947. Military and security expenditures consumed a substantial portion of the budget, with central revenues allocating approximately 40% to defense in the late colonial period, reflecting the priority on maintaining order amid vast territory and diverse populations—a burden critiqued by Indian nationalists for diverting funds from development. This investment underpinned the apparatus's empirical success in sustaining internal stability, as evidenced by the containment of tribal frontier raids and princely state insurrections without ceding core imperial control.

Economic Policies and Development

Fiscal Systems and Revenue Extraction

The primary source of revenue for the British Raj was land revenue, which accounted for roughly 50-60% of total government income throughout much of the period, with figures reaching 60% as early as 1841 before gradually declining as alternative taxes expanded. This revenue was extracted through regionally varied systems, including the Permanent Settlement in Bengal (introduced 1793), which fixed zamindari obligations at approximately 89-90% of collections payable to the state and empowered zamindars as hereditary landlords, entrenching rural elites but often leading to tenant exploitation and stagnation in agricultural productivity due to fixed demands and limited incentives for improvements. Ryotwari or mahalwari arrangements in other provinces assessed peasants or village collectives directly at rates typically demanding 45-55% of gross agricultural produce. Salt taxation supplemented this, yielding an average of Rs. 60 million annually from the early 19th century and comprising about 10% of revenue by 1858, rising to 13% by the mid-1930s amid monopoly controls and smuggling prevention measures like the Great Hedge. These extraction rates drew criticism for burdening agrarian producers, yet empirical comparisons reveal parallels with pre-colonial Mughal practices, where land demands often reached one-third to one-half of output, equivalent to 15% or more of national income—a baseline the British inherited and moderated over time to sustain collection without systemic collapse. Fiscal sustainability hinged on regular assessments tying revenue to realized yields, avoiding the Mughal tendency toward arbitrary escalations that eroded incentives; British adjustments, such as periodic revisions under ryotwari, maintained stability by aligning demands with cultivable output amid variable monsoons and soil fertility. Central budgets frequently recorded surpluses—enabled by conservative expenditure on non-military items—which were directed toward capital accumulation, including debt servicing and transfers to London-based sterling accounts that grew substantially by the early 20th century, reflecting export surpluses rather than unilateral outflows. Per capita revenue extraction remained low and stable, with government revenue per head hovering below levels that would signal unsustainable drain, as evidenced by aggregate figures showing no sharp escalation despite population growth from 250 million in 1871 to over 350 million by 1941. This restraint, coupled with reinvestment of surpluses into productive assets, supported long-term viability, though regional variations—higher burdens in permanently settled areas versus fluctuating ryotwari zones—highlighted causal tensions between fixed demands and agrarian volatility, occasionally precipitating indebtedness without broader fiscal insolvency. By the interwar period, sterling balances held in London exceeded £1 billion, embodying accumulated fiscal prudence that buffered external shocks but fueled debates over repatriation controls.

Infrastructure Expansion: Railways and Irrigation

Railway development in British India commenced in 1853 with the inauguration of the first passenger line from Bombay to Thane, spanning 34 kilometers. By 1947, the network had expanded to approximately 65,000 kilometers of route length, facilitating the movement of goods and people across the subcontinent. This infrastructure integrated disparate markets, reducing interregional trade costs by an estimated 73 percent and boosting overall trade volumes. Freight tonnage on Indian railways experienced substantial growth from 1900 to 1940, with net ton-miles reaching 26 billion by 1946-47, reflecting increased commercial activity and export of commodities like cotton and grains to ports. Initially financed through a guarantee system promising British investors a 5 percent return regardless of profitability, the railways transitioned toward self-sustaining operations as traffic volumes rose, covering costs through fares and freight charges after the early subsidy phase. Prior to British intervention, India lacked any rail infrastructure, perpetuating reliance on inefficient bullock carts and river transport that limited economic scale. Irrigation projects under the Raj, particularly canal networks, expanded cultivable land and supported agricultural stability. The Ganges Canal system, completed in phases from the 1840s to 1854, irrigated over 2 million acres in the Upper Ganges Doab by the early 20th century, with extensions adding further acreage. The Agra Canal, operational by 1878, exemplified efforts to harness perennial rivers for drought-prone regions, though later adapted primarily for irrigation over navigation. The Famine Codes of 1880, formalized following the Famine Commission under Viceroy Lord Ripon, integrated railways and canals into relief strategies, enabling rapid grain distribution and labor migration to avert mass starvation during scarcity. These codes emphasized pre-positioning food stocks along rail lines and using irrigation to buffer crop failures, contributing to fewer severe famines post-1880 compared to earlier decades. By linking interior production areas to coastal export hubs and famine relief points, such infrastructure mitigated the spatial mismatches that exacerbated pre-railway vulnerabilities.

Industrial and Agricultural Transformations

The expansion of cash crop cultivation marked a key agricultural transformation during the British Raj, driven by global demand and integration into international markets. Cotton production surged, particularly during the American Civil War (1861–1865), when exports from Bombay rose sharply to supply British mills, with acreage under cotton expanding from approximately 4.5 million acres in 1850 to over 10 million by 1900 in response to export incentives. Jute cultivation similarly grew in Bengal, from negligible levels in the early 19th century to over 1 million acres by 1900, fueling Dundee's jute industry through organized procurement systems. Opium, monopolized by the British East India Company via the Bengal Agency in Bengal and Bihar, involved coercive contracts and advances that compelled millions of peasants to cultivate opium poppy, with output peaking at around 58,000 chests annually by the 1830s for export to China, though production later stabilized at 4,000–5,000 chests by the early 20th century amid international restrictions. Indigo, initially expanded under coercive systems in Bihar until the 1860s backlash, transitioned to voluntary cultivation with yields boosted by hybrid seeds introduced in the 1890s, reaching 1.2 million acres by 1910 before synthetic dyes reduced demand. These shifts prioritized export-oriented farming over subsistence, with cash crops occupying about 15–20% of arable land by 1930, supported by improved seeds and selective extension services that raised average yields for cotton and jute by 20–30% in key regions between 1900 and 1940, though unevenly distributed due to soil and market access variations. While traditional handloom weaving declined—cotton cloth production from looms fell from 80% of total output in 1850 to under 20% by 1930 as imported and mill yarn displaced local spinning—this deindustrialization in textiles was linked to competition from British machine-made goods and policies favoring raw material exports over manufacturing, resulting in widespread loss of artisanal livelihoods. The sector adapted by incorporating factory yarn, sustaining rural employment for millions. Industrial development centered on textiles, with Bombay emerging as a hub: the number of cotton mills rose from 13 in 1870 to 82 by 1900, employing over 100,000 workers and producing 1.5 billion yards of cloth annually by 1914, capturing 60% of the domestic market from British imports. This mill growth, financed by Parsi and Gujarati entrepreneurs, offset handloom losses through economies of scale and tariff protections post-1894, with output expanding at 5–7% annually in the early 20th century despite global competition. Empirical reconstructions indicate real GDP growth averaged approximately 1% per year from 1900 to 1947, reflecting productivity gains in these sectors rather than outright stagnation, as corroborated by sector-specific output indices showing agriculture contributing 0.5–0.7% and industry 0.3–0.4% to aggregate expansion.

Debates on Economic Drain and Growth Metrics

Dadabhai Naoroji articulated the drain theory in his 1901 book Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, positing that Britain's colonial administration extracted wealth from India through mechanisms such as home charges (payments for administrative expenses in Britain), pensions to retired officials, and profits repatriated by European employees, without commensurate returns in goods or services. Naoroji estimated this annual drain at approximately 200–300 million rupees, equivalent to a significant portion of India's public revenue, arguing it perpetuated poverty by funding Britain's fiscal deficits and industrial expansion at India's expense. This perspective, echoed by contemporaries like Romesh Chunder Dutt, framed colonial rule as systematically impoverishing India, with unrequited export surpluses—India exporting commodities worth more than it imported—serving as the primary channel for the transfer. Critiques of the drain theory, advanced by economic historians like Tirthankar Roy, contend that such outflows were offset by inflows of capital, technology, and institutional expertise that stimulated long-term growth. Roy argues that remittances represented payments for imported skills, management, and capital investments, including those fostering market integration and specialization, rather than pure extraction; he dismisses the notion of export surpluses as "drain" as economically incoherent, noting India's commodity exports balanced invisible imports like shipping and insurance services provided by Britain. Empirical assessments indicate these transfers constituted less than 1% of India's GDP annually, far below levels that would explain stagnation, with home charges and pensions comprising a minor fraction of export earnings after accounting for reciprocal benefits such as legal frameworks enforcing property rights and contract sanctity, which enabled commercial expansion. Critics also highlight colonial policies' role in exacerbating famines, with scholarly estimates of excess mortality from starvation and related diseases ranging from 30 to 100 million during the 19th and early 20th centuries, though the extent attributable to policy versus climatic factors remains debated. Angus Maddison's historical GDP reconstructions show India's per capita income rising modestly from $533 (in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars) in 1870 to $673 by 1913, suggesting incremental growth amid global industrialization, attributable in part to colonial policies promoting trade openness and low tariffs that averaged near zero. Recent econometric analyses in the 2020s have further challenged exaggerated drain claims, such as Utsa Patnaik's 2018 assertion of a $45 trillion transfer (in present-day value) from 1765 to 1938, which relies on compounding trade surpluses without deducting countervailing investments or services; critics highlight methodological flaws, including arbitrary interest imputation and neglect of India's agency in global markets, where specialization in cash crops like cotton and jute generated surpluses that funded domestic reinvestments. These studies emphasize causal factors beyond extraction—such as pre-existing Malthusian traps, variable monsoon agriculture, and endogenous policy choices—for India's relative economic divergence, while crediting Raj-era institutions for laying foundations of modern fiscal discipline and market-oriented reforms that post-independence economies built upon. Nationalist interpretations, while highlighting real asymmetries, often overlook how colonial integration into world trade spurred productivity gains in export sectors, with evidence from commodity booms indicating net positive effects on regional economies despite uneven distribution.

Social and Demographic Changes

Population Dynamics and Urbanization

The population of British India, encompassing both directly administered provinces and princely states under British paramountcy, expanded significantly during the period of direct Crown rule from 1858 to 1947, reflecting a combination of natural increase, administrative stabilization, and resilience against environmental and epidemiological pressures. Pre-census estimates placed the total at approximately 200 million around 1800, though some scholarly assessments suggest figures as low as 159 million due to incomplete territorial coverage and data limitations in early Company records. The first systematic census in 1871-1872 enumerated about 256 million within British-administered territories, rising to 287 million by 1881, 315 million in 1921, and reaching 389 million in the 1941 census, which excluded some princely states but captured the core demographic trends. This growth, averaging 0.8-1% annually in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, was moderated by recurrent epidemics like plague and influenza, as well as monsoon-dependent agricultural yields that influenced food availability and mortality rates independent of policy interventions. British administrative measures, including the establishment of vital registration and vaccination campaigns against smallpox from the 1880s, contributed to partial stabilization by curbing certain infectious diseases, though overall mortality remained high due to limited sanitation infrastructure and reliance on seasonal monsoons for subsistence agriculture. Population density varied regionally, with the Gangetic plain sustaining higher concentrations through alluvial fertility, while arid zones like Rajasthan experienced slower growth tied to erratic rainfall patterns rather than extractive fiscal policies alone. Natural fertility rates, estimated at 5-6 births per woman, drove expansion, but causal factors such as inter-regional peace under British hegemony reduced pre-colonial warfare losses, outweighing localized disruptions from revenue assessments in sustaining long-term demographic recovery. Urbanization proceeded modestly, with the urban population share increasing from roughly 8-10% in the mid-19th century to 11.4% by the 1901 census, concentrated in port cities stimulated by trade and administrative hubs rather than widespread industrialization. Calcutta's population surged from under 1 million in 1872 to approximately 2.1 million by 1941, driven by jute mills and bureaucratic concentration, while Bombay grew from 644,000 in 1872 to 1.5 million in 1941, fueled by cotton exports and textile factories. These centers exhibited higher growth rates—up to 2-3% annually—compared to rural stagnation, but overall urban expansion was constrained by rural pull factors like agrarian opportunities during favorable monsoons. Internal and external migration patterns reshaped demographics, with over 1.6 million Indians recruited as indentured laborers to plantations in Assam, Mauritius, and the Caribbean between 1834 and 1917, often under contracts that prioritized male recruits for manual toil. This led to pronounced sex ratio imbalances, such as 972 females per 1,000 males overall in 1901 but as low as 500-600 in migrant-heavy regions like Assam's tea districts, exacerbating social strains without corresponding female migration incentives. Urban inflows from rural hinterlands further skewed ratios in Bombay and Calcutta, where male laborers dominated informal sectors, though return migration and family reunions partially mitigated long-term distortions by the 1930s.

Public Health, Epidemics, and Famine Responses

The British Raj inherited a subcontinent with longstanding vulnerabilities to epidemics and famines, including dense populations, inadequate sanitation, and recurrent droughts exacerbated by monsoon variability. Pre-colonial records indicate frequent famines, with numerous episodes documented across regions under Mughal and earlier rule, often due to similar climatic triggers without systematic relief mechanisms. British administrations faced intensified pressures from population growth and global climatic events, such as El Niño-induced droughts, but introduced institutional responses like sanitary commissions and famine codes to mitigate crises. Bubonic plague arrived in Bombay in 1896, sparking the third pandemic's major outbreak in India, which persisted into the 1920s and claimed approximately 12.5 million lives by official counts, though underreporting likely occurred in rural areas. British responses included quarantine, rat extermination campaigns, and the Indian Medical Service's deployment, though initial resistance from locals hampered efforts; sanitation improvements, such as urban cleanups in affected cities, gradually reduced urban incidence. Cholera, endemic since at least the early 19th century, prompted water filtration initiatives, including slow sand filters in Bombay by the 1880s, and broader public health measures that contributed to a decline in epidemics by the early 20th century, particularly in Bengal where sanitary revolutions curbed waterborne transmission. Major famines under the Raj, such as the Great Famine of 1876–78 triggered by severe drought across southern and central India, resulted in 5–10 million excess deaths amid crop failures, with initial responses criticized for prioritizing fiscal restraint under Viceroy Lytton. Subsequent codes, formalized in 1883 and expanded under Viceroy Ripon, established graded scales of scarcity—from mild distress to full famine—mandating relief works, grain imports, and public distribution to prevent starvation, marking a shift from ad hoc aid. The 1896–1900 famines, again drought-driven, saw railways play a pivotal role in transporting relief supplies, lowering costs and enabling distribution that averted higher mortality compared to pre-railway eras lacking such infrastructure; empirical analyses link expanded rail networks to the overall decline in famine severity post-1900 by integrating markets and facilitating imports. The 1943 Bengal famine, killing around 3 million, stemmed from wartime disruptions including a 1942 cyclone damaging rice crops, hyperinflation, hoarding by intermediaries, and shipping shortages amid Japanese threats and Allied priorities, rather than deliberate policy-induced genocide. Churchill's government approved over 100,000 tons of wheat shipments from Australia and Iraq despite U-boat risks, alongside local procurement drives, though bureaucratic delays and provincial mismanagement compounded the crisis; claims of intentional withholding overlook these aid efforts and the broader context of global war logistics. These responses, while imperfect, reflected evolving colonial policies prioritizing empirical assessment and infrastructural intervention over pre-British reliance on royal granaries or inaction.

Educational Reforms and Literacy Initiatives

The introduction of Western-style education in British India began with the Anglicist-Orientalist debate, culminating in Thomas Babington Macaulay's Minute on Education dated February 2, 1835, which argued for prioritizing English-language instruction over traditional Sanskrit and Arabic learning to produce a class of Indians "Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect." This policy shift, approved by Governor-General Lord William Bentinck, allocated government funds primarily to English education, aiming to create intermediaries for colonial administration while deeming indigenous systems inadequate for modern governance. Sir Charles Wood's Despatch of 1854, often termed the Magna Carta of English education in India, outlined a structured system emphasizing vernacular languages at the primary level, Anglo-vernacular schools for secondary education, and universities for higher learning to disseminate Western knowledge while fostering mass literacy. Implementing this, the universities of Calcutta (established January 24, 1857), Bombay, and Madras (both September 1857) were founded as examining and affiliating bodies modeled on the University of London, initially without teaching functions but granting degrees to promote standardized higher education. The Hunter Education Commission of 1882, appointed under Viceroy Lord Ripon, further emphasized primary education expansion through local bodies, recommending grants-in-aid for indigenous and missionary schools, curriculum reforms for practical subjects, and teacher training to address the neglect of vernacular primary instruction post-1854. Literacy rates, measured via decennial censuses starting in 1872, rose from approximately 3.2% in 1872 to 16.1% by 1941, reflecting gradual penetration of schooling amid population growth and resource constraints, though female literacy lagged significantly at under 7% in 1941. Christian missionaries contributed substantially, establishing thousands of schools—particularly for lower castes and girls—by the late 19th century, often receiving government grants under Hunter's recommendations; their emphasis on moral and vocational training complemented state efforts but prioritized conversion alongside literacy. These initiatives expanded access beyond elite Brahminical pathshalas and madrasas, which served limited numbers pre-colonially, though overall enrollment remained low due to rural poverty and cultural resistance. The reforms fostered an English-educated elite integral to the Indian Civil Service and professional fields, with English proficiency enabling bureaucratic efficiency and legal codification; by 1900, Indians comprised over half of subordinate civil posts. Scientific education, introduced via university curricula in mathematics, physics, and engineering, produced figures like Jagadish Chandra Bose and C.V. Raman, laying groundwork for technological adaptation despite initial elitism that prioritized liberal arts over mass technical training. Critiques of overemphasis on higher education at primary expense—evident in stagnant rural literacy—hold merit, yet the system's causal role in modernizing administrative capacity and scientific literacy outweighed traditional limits, enabling India's post-independence institutional continuity.

Cultural and Religious Reforms

The Bengal Sati Regulation of 1829, enacted under Governor-General Lord William Bentinck, criminalized the Hindu practice of sati, whereby widows self-immolated on their husbands' funeral pyres, making it punishable as culpable homicide. This reform, supported by Indian reformer Raja Ram Mohan Roy, targeted a ritual defended by some orthodox Hindus as voluntary but often involving coercion or social pressure, with British records documenting hundreds of cases annually in Bengal prior to the ban. Enforcement relied on local policing and judicial oversight, leading to a sharp decline in reported incidents, though sporadic occurrences persisted in princely states outside direct British control. British authorities also addressed female infanticide, prevalent among high-caste groups like Rajputs in northwestern India due to economic burdens of dowry and limited marriage prospects for daughters. Regulations from the 1830s onward imposed surveillance and penalties on communities, culminating in the Female Infanticide Prevention Act of 1870, which mandated birth registrations and vaccinations to monitor girl children. Administrative reports and early censuses indicated reductions; for instance, in Jaipur state under British influence, estimated annual killings of 200-300 female infants in the early 19th century fell to negligible levels by the 1880s through quarterly checks on households. The Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act of 1856 legalized remarriage for Hindu widows, overturning customary prohibitions that enforced lifelong asceticism or social ostracism, and preserved their inheritance rights upon remarriage. Championed by Bengali reformer Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar and enacted under Governor-General Lord Dalhousie, the law aimed to mitigate widow mistreatment, including ritual humiliation and economic dependence, though uptake remained low due to entrenched social stigma, with fewer than 1,000 registered remarriages in the first decade. Decennial censuses, commencing in 1871 under British direction, systematically enumerated castes and tribes, imposing rigid classifications on identities that pre-colonial sources describe as fluid, context-dependent affiliations often transcending hereditary bounds. Administrators like H.H. Risley prioritized varna hierarchies and jati endogamy for administrative convenience, fostering self-conscious caste associations and petitions for reclassification to access jobs or reservations, thereby solidifying boundaries that empirical records suggest were more permeable prior to colonial enumeration. Christian missionary efforts, facilitated by the Charter Act of 1813, focused on education and Bible translation but yielded limited conversions, comprising under 1% of India's population by 1901 per census figures, constrained by indigenous resistance and perceptions of proselytization as tied to colonial dominance. Post-1857 Rebellion, the Government of India's policy shifted to strict non-interference in religious practices, as affirmed in Queen Victoria's 1858 Proclamation, which pledged respect for native customs to avert further unrest, thereby curtailing aggressive evangelism and preserving Hindu and Muslim traditions against internal reformist pressures. This approach prioritized stability over cultural homogenization, with exceptions only for practices empirically linked to abuse, as in earlier bans.

Nationalist Movements and Political Reforms

Early Elite Mobilization (1880s–1910s)

The Indian National Congress was established on 28 December 1885 in Bombay by Allan Octavian Hume, a retired British civil servant, in collaboration with Indian elites including W.C. Bonnerjee, who presided over the first session attended by 72 delegates. This organization emerged as a platform for educated Indians—largely urban professionals, lawyers, and landowners who had benefited from British-introduced legal, administrative, and educational systems—to articulate grievances through petitions and resolutions while maintaining loyalty to the Raj. Early sessions focused on moderate constitutional demands, such as holding civil service examinations simultaneously in India and London to enable greater Indian entry into the Indian Civil Service, where Indians held only about 1% of higher positions by the 1880s despite comprising the population majority. These elites sought expanded legislative councils with elected majorities and reduced military expenditure, framing their appeals as constructive contributions to efficient governance rather than outright opposition. The partition of Bengal on 16 October 1905 by Viceroy Lord Curzon, dividing the province into a Hindu-majority west and Muslim-majority east ostensibly for administrative reasons but perceived as a divide-and-rule tactic to weaken Bengali nationalism, intensified elite mobilization. This provoked the Swadeshi movement, led by moderates like Surendranath Banerjee and extremists like Bal Gangadhar Tilak, which promoted boycotts of British goods, indigenous production, and bonfires of foreign cloth, blending economic self-reliance with political protest but remaining confined to urban elites and students without mass peasant involvement. In parallel, concerns over Hindu dominance in Congress activities prompted the founding of the All-India Muslim League on 30 December 1906 in Dhaka, initiated by Muslim landowners and professionals like Aga Khan III and Nawab Salimullah, to safeguard minority interests, secure separate electorates, and promote loyalty to British rule amid fears of democratic majoritarianism. During World War I, escalating demands for self-governance led to the Home Rule Leagues: Tilak launched one in April 1916 in Poona, targeting Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Berar with membership fees of 4 annas, while Annie Besant founded the All-India Home Rule League in September, emphasizing propaganda through newspapers like New India. These efforts pressured the government for dominion status within the Empire, drawing on wartime British promises of postwar reforms. The Lucknow Pact of December 1916, negotiated between Congress president Ambica Charan Mazumdar and League leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah during sessions in Lucknow, marked a temporary Hindu-Muslim elite alliance, conceding one-third Muslim seats in the central legislature, separate electorates, and provincial weightage, while jointly demanding elected majorities in legislative councils—reflecting pragmatic communal bargaining among beneficiaries of British pluralism rather than unified anti-colonial fervor.

World Wars and Constitutional Advances

Over 1.3 million Indian servicemen, including combatants and non-combatants, served in World War I across multiple fronts such as Mesopotamia, France, and East Africa, with approximately 74,000 fatalities recorded. This substantial mobilization, drawn largely from rural and martial communities under British recruitment policies, demonstrated empirical loyalty to the Raj amid wartime exigencies, though it strained local economies through conscription-like pressures and resource diversion. In partial acknowledgment of these contributions, the Government of India Act 1919—stemming from the Montagu-Chelmsford Report—introduced dyarchy at the provincial level, bifurcating administrative subjects into "transferred" spheres (e.g., education, agriculture, public health) managed by elected Indian ministers responsible to legislative councils, and "reserved" domains (e.g., finance, irrigation, police, justice) retained under executive councils headed by British governors. This system aimed to foster responsible self-governance incrementally while preserving British oversight on core security and fiscal matters, expanding elected seats in provincial legislatures from about 36,000 under the 1909 Morley-Minto Reforms to over 1.5 million. Tensions persisted, however, as the Rowlatt Acts of February 1919 empowered authorities to detain suspects without trial and curb civil liberties indefinitely, provoking widespread protests interpreted by officials as seditious. These culminated in the Jallianwala Bagh incident on 13 April 1919, when Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer ordered troops to fire on an unarmed crowd in Amritsar, Punjab, killing at least 379 and wounding over 1,200 by official counts, though Indian estimates exceeded 1,000 deaths; the event underscored repressive responses to dissent but did not derail overall Indian military allegiance, as recruitment continued unabated. World War II saw even greater Indian involvement, with the army swelling to over 2.5 million volunteers by 1945—the largest such force in history—mobilized through incentives like pay and pensions amid Viceroy Linlithgow's unilateral declaration of war on India's behalf in September 1939, which fueled nationalist grievances. Economic pressures intensified, including wartime inflation exceeding 300% in some commodities, food shortages, and a net drain of resources via imperial financing mechanisms, yet volunteer rates from provinces like Punjab and the North-West Frontier remained high, reflecting a mix of economic compulsion, martial traditions, and localized loyalties over pan-Indian ideology. Building on prior reforms, the Government of India Act 1935 delineated a federal framework dividing powers into federal, provincial, and concurrent lists, with 59 federal subjects (e.g., defense, currency), 54 provincial ones (e.g., police, education post-dyarchy evolution), and granted full provincial autonomy by abolishing dyarchy while establishing elected ministries responsible to legislatures; though the all-India federation never materialized due to princely states' non-accession, it devolved significant authority to 11 provinces, enfranchising about 35 million voters and laying groundwork for post-war dominion status discussions. These advances, causally tied to wartime demonstrations of Indian capacity and fidelity, incrementally shifted governance toward representative institutions, albeit within imperial constraints prioritizing stability over full sovereignty.

Gandhian Campaigns and Communal Tensions

Mahatma Gandhi launched the Non-Cooperation Movement on September 4, 1920, calling for the boycott of British goods, educational institutions, courts, and titles to protest post-World War I policies like the Rowlatt Acts and the Jallianwala Bagh massacre. The campaign allied with the Khilafat Movement, led by Muslim leaders seeking to preserve the Ottoman Caliphate after its defeat in the war, aiming to forge Hindu-Muslim unity against colonial rule through non-violent satyagraha. Participation surged, with millions returning titles, resigning government jobs, and burning foreign cloth, though economic boycotts disrupted local industries reliant on British trade and led to temporary unemployment in urban sectors. The alliance fractured amid escalating communal violence, as pre-existing Hindu-Muslim divides—evident in historical conflicts predating British rule, such as temple destructions and regional riots under Mughal and earlier eras—resurfaced despite Gandhi's efforts. Incidents like the 1921 Moplah Rebellion in Malabar saw Khilafat supporters attack Hindus, killing thousands and revealing underlying sectarian tensions that the joint front failed to suppress. On February 5, 1922, the Chauri Chaura incident in Uttar Pradesh saw protesters burn a police station, killing 22 officers, prompting Gandhi to suspend the movement on February 12, arguing that non-violence had been compromised and mass readiness insufficient. This withdrawal disappointed radicals, highlighting the campaign's achievements in mass politicization—evidenced by widespread school and court boycotts—but also its economic costs, including halted legal proceedings and educational disruptions affecting thousands. Gandhi revived mass action with the Civil Disobedience Movement, epitomized by the Salt March from March 12 to April 5, 1930, when he led 78 followers on a 240-mile trek from Sabarmati to Dandi, culminating in the illegal production of salt on April 6 to defy the British salt monopoly tax. This act ignited nationwide defiance, with over 60,000 arrests by year's end, including Gandhi's on May 5, and boycotts of liquor and foreign cloth that boosted indigenous khadi production but strained export-dependent economies in regions like Bombay. While fostering self-reliance and global sympathy for India's cause, the movement's tactics amplified communal rifts, as Muslim participation waned post-Khilafat abolition in 1924, paving the way for separate electorates under the 1935 Government of India Act. The Quit India Movement, resolved on August 8, 1942, with Gandhi's "Do or Die" call for immediate British withdrawal amid World War II, escalated tactics into widespread strikes and sabotage despite his arrest the next day, alongside leaders like Nehru and Patel. Underground networks coordinated disruptions to railways and telegraphs, resulting in over 100,000 imprisonments and property damage estimated in millions of rupees, though violence in Bihar and Maharashtra deviated from non-violence, leading to hundreds of deaths from clashes. Economically, factory shutdowns and hartals paralyzed commerce, exacerbating wartime inflation and shortages, yet the campaign underscored British vulnerability, pressuring concessions post-war. Communal tensions peaked with the Muslim League's Direct Action Day on August 16, 1946, proclaimed by Jinnah to demand Pakistan, triggering the Great Calcutta Killings where Hindu-Muslim clashes over four days claimed 4,000 to 10,000 lives, mostly civilians hacked or burned in street violence. These riots, rooted in demographic fears and irredentist claims rather than solely British divide-and-rule—given historical precedents like 18th-century Maratha-Mughal wars—spread to Noakhali and Bihar, killing thousands more and entrenching partition demands. Gandhian campaigns, while mobilizing masses against colonialism and eroding elite deference, inadvertently deepened fractures by politicizing religious identities, as initial unity efforts yielded to competitive communalism, contributing causally to the 1947 partition's violence displacing 15 million. Critics, including economists assessing boycott data, note short-term growth stalls from disrupted trade, contrasting with long-term awareness gains but underscoring non-violence's limits against entrenched divisions.

Path to Independence and Partition (1940s)

The Cripps Mission, dispatched by the British government in March 1942, sought Indian cooperation for the ongoing World War II effort by proposing dominion status for India after the conflict's conclusion, alongside a constituent assembly and the right of individual provinces to opt out of the union. The Indian National Congress rejected the plan on April 10, 1942, deeming it insufficient for immediate power transfer and overly restrictive on wartime governance, while the Muslim League opposed it for failing to guarantee separate Muslim-majority states. This impasse prompted the Congress to launch the Quit India Movement on August 8, 1942, calling for the British exit and resulting in widespread arrests and suppression. Following Japan's defeat in 1945 and Britain's Labour government election, the Cabinet Mission arrived in India on March 24, 1946, to devise a framework for independence while preserving unity. The plan outlined a federal union with a central government handling foreign affairs, defense, and communications; three provincial groups (A: Hindu-majority, B and C: Muslim-majority) for regional autonomy; and an interim executive council drawn from elected representatives. The Muslim League initially accepted on June 6, 1946, viewing the groupings as a path to effective partition, but withdrew acceptance in July after interpreting Congress reservations on compulsory grouping as a threat to Muslim sovereignty. Congress provisionally endorsed the plan but opposed the League's veto-like demands in the interim government, amid escalating distrust fueled by the League's "Direct Action Day" call on August 16, 1946, which ignited the Great Calcutta Killings and subsequent riots claiming thousands of lives. With negotiations stalled, Viceroy Lord Mountbatten, appointed in February 1947, assessed the communal deadlock as insurmountable within the June 1948 deadline set by Prime Minister Attlee. The Mountbatten Plan, announced on June 3, 1947, proposed partitioning British India into two dominions—India and Pakistan—effective August 15, 1947, with Punjab and Bengal divided along religious majorities via boundary commissions, and princely states empowered to accede to either or remain independent. Both Congress and the League accepted the plan amid fears of anarchy, leading to the Indian Independence Act passed by Parliament on July 18, 1947, which ended British suzerainty and formalized the dominions. The partition triggered unprecedented communal violence, with estimates of deaths ranging from 200,000 to 2 million, primarily in Punjab where retaliatory massacres displaced 12 to 18 million people across religious lines. This catastrophe arose from irreconcilable positions: Congress leaders like Nehru and Patel envisioned a secular united India, while Muslim League head Jinnah's two-nation theory posited Hindus and Muslims as distinct peoples requiring separation to avert minority subjugation, a view hardened by electoral gains in 1946 and prior riots demonstrating the fragility of coexistence without external arbitration. British efforts, including the Cabinet Mission's rejection of outright Pakistan in favor of grouped autonomy, underscored attempts at unity, but endogenous communal mobilizations—intensified by separate electorates since 1909 and League propaganda—rendered a single post-colonial state untenable absent coercive central control, which the Raj had provided but independence precluded.

Military Engagements and Security

Indian Army Composition and Role

The Indian Army under the British Raj was structured as a multi-ethnic force, drawing recruits primarily from designated "martial races" such as Sikhs, Gurkhas, Pathans, and other Punjabi groups, a policy formalized after the 1857 rebellion to foster loyalty through ethnic diversity and perceived warrior traditions. This approach built on the East India Company's armies, which leveraged large numbers of Indian sepoys under a small cadre of British officers. This recruitment emphasized northern and northwestern Indian communities, with Punjab alone supplying a disproportionate share of personnel by the interwar period, reflecting a deliberate shift away from the predominantly Bengali composition that had contributed to the 1857 unrest. By October 1939, the standing army numbered approximately 205,000 men, comprising Indian sepoys, non-combatant followers, and a cadre of British officers, with the force maintained at a peacetime scale focused on internal security and frontier defense. The composition featured far more Indian troops than British, enabling effective control with minimal British military presence. Officer ranks remained predominantly British until the post-World War I era, when Indianization accelerated; prior to 1918, Indians were largely limited to viceroy's commissioned or subordinate roles, with British officers holding nearly all King's commissions in a ratio that ensured command authority. From 1918, select Indians gained access to the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, with an initial quota of ten annual places reserved for training as King's Commissioned Indian Officers, marking the start of gradual indigenization amid pressures for reform. Modernization efforts included enhanced logistics through integrated supply systems and railway-dependent mobilization, which supported the army's operational efficiency across diverse terrains. Post-1857 reforms, including balanced ethnic recruitment and stricter discipline, resulted in no large-scale mutinies over the subsequent eight decades, a stark contrast to the frequent revolts in pre-British Indian armies under Mughal or regional rulers, where sepoys often mutinied over pay or succession disputes. This stability underscored the force's role as a reliable instrument of imperial control, reliant on calibrated loyalty rather than coercion alone, and allowed fewer than 100,000 total Britons, including civilians and military personnel, to rule a population of 200–300 million by leveraging Indian sepoys throughout the East India Company and Crown periods.

Suppression of Internal Threats

The suppression of Thuggee, a network of hereditary gangs specializing in ritual strangulation and robbery along travel routes, exemplified early British pacification campaigns against organized banditry. Under Captain William Henry Sleeman's direction from the 1830s, special police units and the Thuggee and Dacoity Suppression Acts of 1836–1848 facilitated the conviction of approximately 2,000 to 4,500 suspects between 1826 and 1848, with many executions and life sentences dismantling the groups' operations. By 1839, Sleeman reported the near-eradication of Thuggee practices, which had previously claimed thousands of victims annually across central India. This campaign, reliant on approver testimonies and intelligence networks, transitioned fragmented pre-colonial lawlessness into centralized enforcement, reducing highway predation that had hindered trade. Efforts extended to dacoity—gang robberies often involving violence—and regional unrest, where British authorities documented declines in such crimes following the expansion of police and judicial systems. In Bengal, dacoity incidents fell sharply after around 1815 as Company rule imposed consistent patrols and punitive expeditions, contrasting with the episodic feudal responses of prior regimes. Similar reductions occurred in western India, where anti-banditry operations curbed nomadic robber bands, though challenges persisted in remote areas until railway networks and telegraphs enabled rapid response. These measures established a monopoly on coercive force, correlating with safer internal commerce and lower reported violent crimes compared to the 18th-century Mughal decline. Frontier pacification addressed tribal incursions from the North-West, where Pashtun raids threatened settled districts. The Tirah Campaign of October 1897 to May 1898, involving over 35,000 British and Indian troops under General William Lockhart, targeted Afridi and Orakzai strongholds after attacks on the Khyber Pass, destroying villages and imposing fines to deter future aggression. Such expeditions, numbering dozens across the 19th century, quelled intermittent threats, fostering relative stability that supported administrative extension into tribal zones. The 1921 Moplah Rebellion in Malabar, triggered by tenant grievances but escalating into anti-British and communal violence, prompted a decisive military response. British forces, deploying Gurkha and Assam Rifles units, suppressed the uprising by late 1921, killing over 2,300 rebels and arresting around 45,000, while confining thousands in camps. This operation restored order amid widespread arson and killings, underscoring the reliance on overwhelming force to reassert control in agrarian flashpoints. Collectively, these suppressions quantified success through plummeting rebellion frequencies and bandit convictions, enabling the Raj's focus on governance over constant insurgency.

Imperial Wars and Indian Contributions

During the First World War, British India supplied over 1.3 million troops to Allied forces, marking one of the largest mobilizations from a single colony. These soldiers fought in key theaters such as Mesopotamia, where Indian divisions bore the brunt of campaigns against Ottoman forces, and the Western Front in France and Belgium, enduring trench warfare alongside British units from 1914 onward. The effort resulted in at least 74,000 Indian fatalities and over 67,000 wounded, with total casualties exceeding 140,000. Indian contributions extended beyond manpower, including munitions production and logistical support from ports like Bombay and Karachi, which facilitated the deployment of expeditionary forces. In the Second World War, Indian participation scaled dramatically, with the British Indian Army expanding to approximately 2.5 million personnel by 1945, the largest all-volunteer force in history. Troops engaged in diverse campaigns, including the North African theater against Axis forces from 1940 to 1943, the Italian Campaign from 1943 to 1945, and the Burma Campaign from 1942 to 1945, where Indian divisions played pivotal roles in recapturing territory from Japanese occupation. Casualties totaled around 87,000 killed, alongside 34,000 wounded and over 67,000 taken prisoner. The Indian Air Force and Navy also contributed, with squadrons operating in Southeast Asia and merchant shipping supporting Allied supply lines across the Indian Ocean. Economically, British India financed substantial portions of the British war efforts through direct expenditures, resource extraction, and accumulated sterling balances treated as de facto loans. In the First World War, undivided India's contributions equated to nearly £34 billion in present-day terms, covering troop maintenance, equipment, and wartime loans to Britain. For the Second World War, India's sterling balances reached £1.3 billion by 1945, representing frozen assets from exports and fiscal impositions that effectively subsidized British deficits, with total aid across both conflicts exceeding £2 billion in historical values. These burdens, imposed amid wartime inflation and resource diversion, strained the Indian economy and amplified grievances. The scale of Indian sacrifices in imperial wars provided nationalists with leverage, as mass enlistment exposed the contradictions of colonial loyalty and fueled demands for self-determination. Post-1945, returning veterans and the economic toll—coupled with unfulfilled promises of reforms—intensified pressures on Britain, hastening constitutional negotiations and the eventual transfer of power in 1947.

Legacy and Historiographical Debates

Institutional and Infrastructural Endowments

The British Raj established a centralized administrative framework that unified diverse regions previously fragmented under Mughal decline and princely states, creating a single imperial structure governed from Calcutta and later Delhi. This system integrated over 500 princely states through subsidiary alliances and direct rule over provinces, fostering coordinated governance across the subcontinent. The Indian Civil Service (ICS), formalized in the 19th century, served as the administrative backbone, recruiting merit-based officials via competitive exams to ensure impartiality and efficiency in revenue collection, law enforcement, and public works. Post-independence, India's civil services inherited this model, adapting the ICS into the Indian Administrative Service, which continues to manage federal and state administration. Infrastructure development under the Raj laid foundational networks absent in pre-colonial eras dominated by localized trade routes and river navigation. Railway construction commenced in 1853 with the first line from Bombay to Thane, expanding to approximately 14,500 kilometers by 1880 linking major ports like Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta to interior regions, facilitating commerce and troop movement. By 1909, the network ranked as the world's fourth largest, with over 35,000 miles of track by 1947, forming the core of modern India's rail system that handles bulk freight and passenger traffic today. Irrigation projects, primarily state-initiated, included extensive canal systems such as the Ganges Canal completed in 1854, irrigating millions of acres and boosting agricultural productivity in arid Punjab and United Provinces, a scale unmatched pre-Raj. The Raj introduced codified rule of law through acts like the Indian Penal Code of 1860 and evidence procedures, establishing uniform courts that protected property rights and contracts, contrasting with arbitrary pre-colonial feudal justice. English emerged as an administrative and educational lingua franca following the 1835 policy of English-medium instruction, enabling cross-regional communication among elites and facilitating post-1947 democratic institutions by providing a neutral medium amid linguistic diversity. These endowments provided India at independence with integrated systems—railways spanning continents, bureaucratic continuity, legal uniformity, and linguistic unity—that exceeded fragmented pre-Raj capabilities and served as baselines for sustained post-colonial growth.

Critiques of Exploitation and Policy Failures

Critics of British Raj economic policies have pointed to high land revenue demands as a key source of peasant strain, with systems like the Permanent Settlement in Bengal fixing rates at approximately 10/11ths of rental income passed to zamindars, often resulting in effective collections exceeding 50% of produce in practice and leading to widespread indebtedness among ryots. These rigid assessments, unlike more flexible pre-colonial arrangements, exacerbated vulnerability during crop shortfalls, as revenue was collected in cash regardless of yields, prompting moneylender exploitation and land alienation. Racial discrimination manifested in administrative and judicial spheres, exemplified by the backlash against the Ilbert Bill of 1883, which sought to empower Indian district magistrates and sessions judges to try Europeans in rural areas, thereby challenging the existing exemption of British subjects from Indian judicial oversight. European planters and officials in Bengal mobilized petitions and public meetings, decrying the measure as an assault on "European prestige" and fearing loss of racial privileges, leading to its dilution through amendments that preserved exemptions in key cases. This episode underscored systemic barriers to Indian advancement in civil services, where Europeans dominated higher posts despite Indian Civil Service exam access post-1853, with Indians comprising only about 20% of the service by 1900 due to practical hurdles like London-based examinations. Policy failures contributed to recurrent crises, notably the 1943 Bengal famine, which killed an estimated 2-3 million despite adequate aggregate food supplies, stemming from wartime disruptions including cyclone damage to boats, Japanese occupation threats inflating hoarding, and British prioritization of military shipping that denied imports of rice from Burma and Australia until late 1943. Provincial government inaction on price controls and distribution, compounded by export policies favoring Allied needs, transformed scarcity into mass starvation, as analyzed through entitlement failures where rural laborers lost purchasing power amid inflation exceeding 300% in staples. Industrial development lagged under Raj policies favoring raw material exports and British manufactures, with India's global manufacturing share dropping from around 25% in 1750 to under 2% by 1900, driven by tariff asymmetries that imposed duties on Indian cotton goods entering Britain while allowing cheap Lancashire imports into India virtually duty-free until modest protections in the 1920s. This deindustrialization, particularly in textiles, reduced artisan employment and urban handicrafts, as British productivity gains undercut handloom viability without commensurate investment in Indian factories beyond railways serving export needs. The Great Depression amplified these vulnerabilities, with agricultural prices collapsing—wheat falling nearly 50% between 1928 and 1934—triggering debt defaults, rural suicides, and urban unemployment as export demand for jute and cotton evaporated. British monetary policies, including the 1931 rupee devaluation to sterling without corresponding stimulus, failed to revive trade, prolonging stagnation as India's export earnings halved from 1929 levels, exposing the colony's integration into imperial markets without safeguards against global shocks.

Comparative Assessments and Modern Perspectives

Economic historian Tirthankar Roy has argued that India's economy experienced decline under the Mughal Empire prior to British dominance, with per capita income falling steadily from around 1600 onward due to factors including political fragmentation and agrarian stagnation, contrasting with absolute growth in output and population under the Raj despite slower per capita advances. Zareer Masani similarly contends that famines in India were recurrent phenomena driven by geographical vulnerabilities such as monsoonal variability and climatic extremes, predating colonial rule and not uniquely exacerbated by it, with British-era Famine Codes from the 1880s onward implementing systematic relief measures that largely prevented mass starvation except in wartime anomalies like 1943. Contemporary scholarship challenges narratives akin to those popularized by Shashi Tharoor, which posit a massive "drain" of wealth from India to Britain impoverishing the subcontinent; empirical reconstructions of balance-of-payments data indicate no net resource outflow after accounting for investments in infrastructure, military protection, and administrative services provided by Britain, with Roy's analyses showing that claims of deindustrialization overlook pre-existing Mughal-era contractions in manufacturing shares relative to global trade shifts. The Raj's enduring geopolitical legacy includes forging administrative unity across a subcontinent prone to balkanization, integrating disparate princely states and regions into a cohesive territorial framework that persists in modern India's boundaries and federal structure, averting the splintering seen in post-Mughal fragmentation. In terms of human rights, British legal reforms curtailed entrenched caste-based tyrannies, such as prohibiting sati (widow immolation) in 1829 and suppressing practices like thuggee ritual murder and female infanticide, establishing principles of due process and individual rights that supplanted arbitrary princely despotisms and ritual oppressions, though caste hierarchies were codified in censuses for administrative purposes. These institutional shifts, per recent reassessments, laid foundations for egalitarian legal norms amid pre-colonial social rigidities.

References

  1. https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Despatch_of_1854%2C_on_General_Education_in_India
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