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Existentialism
View on WikipediaExistentialism is a family of philosophical views and inquiry that explore the human individual's struggle to lead an authentic life despite the apparent absurdity or incomprehensibility of existence.[1][2][3] In examining meaning, purpose, and value, existentialist thought often includes concepts such as existential crises, angst, courage, and freedom.[4]
Existentialism is associated with several 19th- and 20th-century European philosophers who shared an emphasis on the human subject, despite often profound differences in thought.[5][6][7] Among the 19th-century figures now associated with existentialism are philosophers Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche, as well as novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky, all of whom critiqued rationalism and concerned themselves with the problem of meaning. The word existentialism, however, was not coined until the mid 20th century, during which it became most associated with contemporaneous philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger, Simone de Beauvoir, Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, Paul Tillich, and more controversially Albert Camus.
Many existentialists considered traditional systematic or academic philosophies, in style and content, to be too abstract and removed from concrete human experience.[8][9] A primary virtue in existentialist thought is authenticity.[10] Existentialism would influence many disciplines outside of philosophy, including theology, drama, art, literature, and psychology.[11]
Existentialist philosophy encompasses a range of perspectives, but it shares certain underlying concepts. Among these, a central tenet of existentialism is that personal freedom, individual responsibility, and deliberate choice are essential to the pursuit of self-discovery and the determination of life's meaning.[12]
Etymology
[edit]The term existentialism (French: L'existentialisme) was coined by the French Catholic philosopher Gabriel Marcel in the mid-1940s.[13][14][15] When Marcel first applied the term to Jean-Paul Sartre, at a colloquium in 1945, Sartre rejected it.[16] Sartre subsequently changed his mind and, on October 29, 1945, publicly adopted the existentialist label in a lecture to the Club Maintenant in Paris, published as L'existentialisme est un humanisme (Existentialism Is a Humanism), a short book that helped popularize existentialist thought.[17] Marcel later came to reject the label himself in favour of Neo-Socratic, in honor of Kierkegaard's essay "On the Concept of Irony".
Some scholars argue that the term should be used to refer only to the cultural movement in Europe in the 1940s and 1950s associated with the works of the philosophers Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Albert Camus.[5] Others extend the term to Kierkegaard, and yet others extend it as far back as Socrates.[18] However, it is often identified with the philosophical views of Sartre.[5]
Definitional issues and background
[edit]The labels existentialism and existentialist are often seen as historical conveniences in as much as they were first applied to many philosophers long after they had died. While existentialism is generally considered to have originated with Kierkegaard, the first prominent existentialist philosopher to adopt the term as a self-description was Sartre. Sartre posits the idea that "what all existentialists have in common is the fundamental doctrine that existence precedes essence", as the philosopher Frederick Copleston explains.[19] According to philosopher Steven Crowell, defining existentialism has been relatively difficult, and he argues that it is better understood as a general approach used to reject certain systematic philosophies rather than as a systematic philosophy itself.[5] In a lecture delivered in 1945, Sartre described existentialism as "the attempt to draw all the consequences from a position of consistent atheism".[20] For others, existentialism need not involve the rejection of God, but rather "examines mortal man's search for meaning in a meaningless universe", considering less "What is the good life?" (to feel, be, or do, good), instead asking "What is life good for?".[21]
Although many outside Scandinavia consider the term existentialism to have originated from Kierkegaard, it is more likely that Kierkegaard adopted this term (or at least the term "existential" as a description of his philosophy) from the Norwegian poet and literary critic Johan Sebastian Cammermeyer Welhaven.[22] This assertion comes from two sources:
- The Norwegian philosopher Erik Lundestad refers to the Danish philosopher Fredrik Christian Sibbern. Sibbern is supposed to have had two conversations in 1841, the first with Welhaven and the second with Kierkegaard. It is in the first conversation that it is believed that Welhaven came up with "a word that he said covered a certain thinking, which had a close and positive attitude to life, a relationship he described as existential".[23] This was then brought to Kierkegaard by Sibbern.
- The second claim comes from the Norwegian historian Rune Slagstad, who claimed to prove that Kierkegaard himself said the term existential was borrowed from the poet. He strongly believes that it was Kierkegaard himself who said that "Hegelians do not study philosophy 'existentially;' to use a phrase by Welhaven from one time when I spoke with him about philosophy."[24]
Concepts
[edit]Existence precedes essence
[edit]Sartre argued that a central proposition of existentialism is that existence precedes essence, which is to say that individuals shape themselves by existing and cannot be perceived through preconceived and a priori categories, an "essence". The actual life of the individual is what constitutes what could be called their "true essence" instead of an arbitrarily attributed essence others use to define them. Human beings, through their own consciousness, create their own values and determine a meaning to their life.[25] This view is in contradiction to Aristotle and Aquinas, who taught that essence precedes individual existence.[26] Although it was Sartre who explicitly coined the phrase, similar notions can be found in the thought of existentialist philosophers such as Heidegger, and Kierkegaard:
The subjective thinker's form, the form of his communication, is his style. His form must be just as manifold as are the opposites that he holds together. The systematic eins, zwei, drei is an abstract form that also must inevitably run into trouble whenever it is to be applied to the concrete. To the same degree as the subjective thinker is concrete, to that same degree his form must also be concretely dialectical. But just as he himself is not a poet, not an ethicist, not a dialectician, so also his form is none of these directly. His form must first and last be related to existence, and in this regard he must have at his disposal the poetic, the ethical, the dialectical, the religious. Subordinate character, setting, etc., which belong to the well-balanced character of the esthetic production, are in themselves breadth; the subjective thinker has only one setting—existence—and has nothing to do with localities and such things. The setting is not the fairyland of the imagination, where poetry produces consummation, nor is the setting laid in England, and historical accuracy is not a concern. The setting is inwardness in existing as a human being; the concretion is the relation of the existence-categories to one another. Historical accuracy and historical actuality are breadth.
— Søren Kierkegaard (Concluding Postscript, Hong pp. 357–358.)
Some interpret the imperative to define oneself as meaning that anyone can wish to be anything. However, an existentialist philosopher would say such a wish constitutes an inauthentic existence – what Sartre would call "bad faith". Instead, the phrase should be taken to say that people are defined only insofar as they act and that they are responsible for their actions. Someone who acts cruelly towards other people is, by that act, defined as a cruel person. Such persons are themselves responsible for their new identity (cruel persons). This is opposed to their genes, or human nature, bearing the blame.
As Sartre said in his lecture Existentialism is a Humanism: "Man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines himself afterwards." The more positive, therapeutic aspect of this is also implied: a person can choose to act in a different way, and to be a good person instead of a cruel person.[27]
Jonathan Webber interprets Sartre's usage of the term essence not in a modal fashion, i.e. as necessary features, but in a teleological fashion: "an essence is the relational property of having a set of parts ordered in such a way as to collectively perform some activity".[28]: 3 [5] For example, it belongs to the essence of a house to keep the bad weather out, which is why it has walls and a roof. Humans are different from houses because—unlike houses—they do not have an inbuilt purpose: they are free to choose their own purpose and thereby shape their essence; thus, their existence precedes their essence.[28]: 1–4
Sartre is committed to a radical conception of freedom: nothing fixes our purpose but we ourselves, our projects have no weight or inertia except for our endorsement of them.[29][30] Simone de Beauvoir, on the other hand, holds that there are various factors, grouped together under the term sedimentation, that offer resistance to attempts to change our direction in life. Sedimentations are themselves products of past choices and can be changed by choosing differently in the present, but such changes happen slowly. They are a force of inertia that shapes the agent's evaluative outlook on the world until the transition is complete.[28]: 5, 9, 66
Sartre's definition of existentialism was based on Heidegger's magnum opus Being and Time (1927). In the correspondence with Jean Beaufret later published as the Letter on Humanism, Heidegger implied that Sartre misunderstood him for his own purposes of subjectivism, and that he did not mean that actions take precedence over being so long as those actions were not reflected upon.[31] Heidegger commented that "the reversal of a metaphysical statement remains a metaphysical statement", meaning that he thought Sartre had simply switched the roles traditionally attributed to essence and existence without interrogating these concepts and their history.[32]
The absurd
[edit]
The notion of the absurd contains the idea that there is no meaning in the world beyond what meaning we give it. This meaninglessness also encompasses the amorality or "unfairness" of the world. This can be highlighted in the way it opposes the traditional Abrahamic religious perspective, which establishes that life's purpose is the fulfillment of God's commandments.[33] To live the life of the absurd means rejecting a life that finds or pursues specific meaning for man's existence since there is nothing to be discovered. According to Albert Camus, the world or the human being is not in itself absurd. The concept only emerges through the juxtaposition of the two; life becomes absurd due to the incompatibility between human beings and the world they inhabit.[33] This view constitutes one of the two interpretations of the absurd in existentialist literature. The second view, first elaborated by Søren Kierkegaard, holds that absurdity is limited to actions and choices of human beings. These are considered absurd since they issue from human freedom, undermining their foundation outside of themselves.[34]
The absurd contrasts with the claim that "bad things don't happen to good people"; to the world, metaphorically speaking, there is no such thing as a good person or a bad person; what happens happens, and it may just as well happen to a "good" person as to a "bad" person.[35] Because of the world's absurdity, anything can happen to anyone at any time and a tragic event could plummet someone into direct confrontation with the absurd. Many of the literary works of Kierkegaard, Beckett, Kafka, Dostoevsky, Ionesco, Miguel de Unamuno, Luigi Pirandello,[36][37][38][39] Sartre, Joseph Heller, and Camus contain descriptions of people who encounter the absurdity of the world.
It is because of the devastating awareness of meaninglessness that Camus claimed in The Myth of Sisyphus that "There is only one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide." Although "prescriptions" against the possible deleterious consequences of these kinds of encounters vary, from Kierkegaard's religious "stage" to Camus' insistence on persevering in spite of absurdity, the concern with helping people avoid living their lives in ways that put them in the perpetual danger of having everything meaningful break down is common to most existentialist philosophers. The possibility of having everything meaningful break down poses a threat of quietism, which is inherently against the existentialist philosophy.[40] It has been said that the possibility of suicide makes all humans existentialists. The ultimate hero of absurdism lives without meaning and faces suicide without succumbing to it.[41]
Facticity
[edit]This section may be too technical for most readers to understand. (November 2020) |
Facticity is defined by Sartre in Being and Nothingness (1943) as the in-itself, which for humans takes the form of being and not being. It is the facts of one's personal life and as per Heidegger, it is "the way in which we are thrown into the world." This can be more easily understood when considering facticity in relation to a person's past: one's past forms the person who exists in the present. However, to reduce a person to their past would ignore the change a person undergoes in the present and future, while saying that one's past is only what one was, would entirely detach it from the present self. A denial of one's concrete past constitutes an inauthentic lifestyle, and also applies to other kinds of facticity (having a human body with all its limitations, identity, values, etc.).[42]
Facticity is a limitation and a condition of freedom. It is a limitation in that a large part of a person's facticity consists of things they did not choose (birthplace, etc.), but a condition of freedom in the sense that one's values most likely depend on these factors. However, even though one's facticity is fixed, it cannot determine a person: they may choose to assign as much value to their facticity as they choose. As an example, consider two men, one of whom has no memory of his past and the other who remembers everything. Both have committed many crimes, but the first man, remembering nothing, leads a rather normal life while the second man, feeling trapped by his past, continues a life of crime, blaming his own past. There is nothing essential about his committing crimes, but he ascribes this meaning to his past.
However, to disregard one's facticity during the evolution of one's sense of self would be a denial of the conditions shaping the present self and would be inauthentic. An example of the focus solely on possible projects without reflecting on one's current facticity would be continually thinking about future possibilities related to being rich (e.g. a better car, bigger house, better quality of life, etc.) without acknowledging the facticity of not currently having the financial means to do so. In this example, considering both facticity and transcendence, an authentic mode of being would be considering future projects that might improve one's current finances (e.g. putting in extra hours, or investing savings) in order to arrive at a real future, or future-facticity of a modest pay rise, further leading to purchase of an affordable car.
Another aspect of facticity is that it entails angst. Freedom "produces" angst when limited by facticity and the lack of the possibility of having facticity to "step in" and take responsibility for something one has done also produces angst.
Another aspect of existential freedom is that one can change one's values. One is responsible for one's values, regardless of society's values. The focus on freedom in existentialism is related to the limits of responsibility one bears, as a result of one's freedom. The relationship between freedom and responsibility is one of interdependency and a clarification of freedom also clarifies that for which one is responsible.[43][44]
Authenticity
[edit]Many noted existentialists consider the theme of authentic existence important. Authenticity involves the idea that one has to "create oneself" and live in accordance with this self. For an authentic existence, one should act as oneself, not as "one's acts" or as "one's genes" or as any other essence requires. The authentic act is one in accordance with one's freedom. A component of freedom is facticity, but not to the degree that this facticity determines one's transcendent choices (one could then blame one's background for making the choice one made [chosen project, from one's transcendence]). Facticity, in relation to authenticity, involves acting on one's actual values when making a choice (instead of, like Kierkegaard's Aesthete, "choosing" randomly), so that one takes responsibility for the act instead of choosing either-or without allowing the options to have different values.[45]
In contrast, the inauthentic is the denial to live[clarification needed] in accordance with one's freedom. This can take many forms, from pretending choices are meaningless or random, convincing oneself that some form of determinism is true, or "mimicry" where one acts as "one should".[citation needed]
How one "should" act is often determined by an image one has, of how one in such a role (bank manager, lion tamer, sex worker, etc.) acts. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre uses the example of a waiter in "bad faith". He merely takes part in the "act" of being a typical waiter, albeit very convincingly.[46] This image usually corresponds to a social norm, but this does not mean that all acting in accordance with social norms is inauthentic. The main point is the attitude one takes to one's own freedom and responsibility and the extent to which one acts in accordance with this freedom.[47]
The Other and the Look
[edit]The Other (written with a capital "O") is a concept more properly belonging to phenomenology and its account of intersubjectivity. However, it has seen widespread use in existentialist writings, and the conclusions drawn differ slightly from the phenomenological accounts. The Other is the experience of another free subject who inhabits the same world as a person does. In its most basic form, it is this experience of the Other that constitutes intersubjectivity and objectivity. To clarify, when one experiences someone else, and this Other person experiences the world (the same world that a person experiences)—only from "over there"—the world is constituted as objective in that it is something that is "there" as identical for both of the subjects; a person experiences the other person as experiencing the same things. This experience of the Other's look is what is termed the Look (sometimes the Gaze).[48]
While this experience, in its basic phenomenological sense, constitutes the world as objective and oneself as objectively existing subjectivity (one experiences oneself as seen in the Other's Look in precisely the same way that one experiences the Other as seen by him, as subjectivity), in existentialism, it also acts as a kind of limitation of freedom. This is because the Look tends to objectify what it sees. When one experiences oneself in the Look, one does not experience oneself as nothing (no thing), but as something (some thing). In Sartre's example of a man peeping at someone through a keyhole, the man is entirely caught up in the situation he is in. He is in a pre-reflexive state where his entire consciousness is directed at what goes on in the room. Suddenly, he hears a creaking floorboard behind him and he becomes aware of himself as seen by the Other. He is then filled with shame for he perceives himself as he would perceive someone else doing what he was doing—as a Peeping Tom. For Sartre, this phenomenological experience of shame establishes proof for the existence of other minds and defeats the problem of solipsism. For the conscious state of shame to be experienced, one has to become aware of oneself as an object of another look, proving a priori, that other minds exist.[49] The Look is then co-constitutive of one's facticity.
Another characteristic feature of the Look is that no Other really needs to have been there: It is possible that the creaking floorboard was simply the movement of an old house; the Look is not some kind of mystical telepathic experience of the actual way the Other sees one (there may have been someone there, but he could have not noticed that person). It is only one's perception of the way another might perceive him.[50]
Angst and dread
[edit]"Existential angst", sometimes called existential dread, anxiety, or anguish, is a term common to many existentialist thinkers. It is generally held to be a negative feeling arising from the experience of human freedom and responsibility.[51][52] The archetypal example is the experience one has when standing on a cliff where one not only fears falling off it, but also dreads the possibility of throwing oneself off. In this experience that "nothing is holding me back", one senses the lack of anything that predetermines one to either throw oneself off or to stand still, and one experiences one's own freedom.[53]
It can also be seen in relation to the previous point how angst is before nothing, and this is what sets it apart from fear that has an object. While one can take measures to remove an object of fear, for angst no such "constructive" measures are possible. The use of the word "nothing" in this context relates to the inherent insecurity about the consequences of one's actions and to the fact that, in experiencing freedom as angst, one also realizes that one is fully responsible for these consequences. There is nothing in people (genetically, for instance) that acts in their stead—that they can blame if something goes wrong. Therefore, not every choice is perceived as having dreadful possible consequences (and, it can be claimed, human lives would be unbearable if every choice facilitated dread). However, this does not change the fact that freedom remains a condition of every action.
Despair
[edit]Despair is generally defined as a loss of hope.[54] In existentialism, it is more specifically a loss of hope in reaction to a breakdown in one or more of the defining qualities of one's self or identity. If a person is invested in being a particular thing, such as a bus driver or an upstanding citizen, and then finds their being-thing compromised, they would normally be found in a state of despair—a hopeless state. For example, a singer who loses the ability to sing may despair if they have nothing else to fall back on—nothing to rely on for their identity. They find themselves unable to be what defined their being.
What sets the existentialist notion of despair apart from the conventional definition is that existentialist despair is a state one is in even when they are not overtly in despair. So long as a person's identity depends on qualities that can crumble, they are in perpetual despair—and as there is, in Sartrean terms, no human essence found in conventional reality on which to constitute the individual's sense of identity, despair is a universal human condition. As Kierkegaard defines it in Either/Or: "Let each one learn what he can; both of us can learn that a person's unhappiness never lies in his lack of control over external conditions, since this would only make him completely unhappy."[55] In Works of Love, he says:
When the God-forsaken worldliness of earthly life shuts itself in complacency, the confined air develops poison, the moment gets stuck and stands still, the prospect is lost, a need is felt for a refreshing, enlivening breeze to cleanse the air and dispel the poisonous vapors lest we suffocate in worldliness. ... Lovingly to hope all things is the opposite of despairingly to hope nothing at all. Love hopes all things—yet is never put to shame. To relate oneself expectantly to the possibility of the good is to hope. To relate oneself expectantly to the possibility of evil is to fear. By the decision to choose hope one decides infinitely more than it seems, because it is an eternal decision.
— Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love
Opposition to positivism and rationalism
[edit]Existentialists oppose defining human beings as primarily rational, and, therefore, oppose both positivism and rationalism. Existentialism asserts that people make decisions based on subjective meaning rather than pure rationality. The rejection of reason as the source of meaning is a common theme of existentialist thought, as is the focus on the anxiety and dread that we feel in the face of our own radical free will and our awareness of death. Kierkegaard advocated rationality as a means to interact with the objective world (e.g., in the natural sciences), but when it comes to existential problems, reason is insufficient: "Human reason has boundaries".[56]
Like Kierkegaard, Sartre saw problems with rationality, calling it a form of "bad faith", an attempt by the self to impose structure on a world of phenomena—"the Other"—that is fundamentally irrational and random. According to Sartre, rationality and other forms of bad faith hinder people from finding meaning in freedom. To try to suppress feelings of anxiety and dread, people confine themselves within everyday experience, Sartre asserted, thereby relinquishing their freedom and acquiescing to being possessed in one form or another by "the Look" of "the Other" (i.e., possessed by another person—or at least one's idea of that other person).[57]
Religion
[edit]An existentialist reading of the Bible would demand that the reader recognize that they are an existing subject studying the words more as a recollection of events. This is in contrast to looking at a collection of "truths" that are outside and unrelated to the reader, but may develop a sense of reality/God. Such a reader is not obligated to follow the commandments as if an external agent is forcing these commandments upon them, but as though they are inside them and guiding them from inside. This is the task Kierkegaard takes up when he asks: "Who has the more difficult task: the teacher who lectures on earnest things a meteor's distance from everyday life—or the learner who should put it to use?"[58] Philosophers such as Hans Jonas and Rudolph Bultmann introduced the concept of existentialist demythologization into the field of early Christianity and Christian theology, respectively.[59]
Confusion with nihilism
[edit]Although nihilism and existentialism are distinct philosophies, they are often confused with one another since both are rooted in the human experience of anguish and confusion that stems from the apparent meaninglessness of a world in which humans are compelled to find or create meaning.[60] A primary cause of confusion is that Friedrich Nietzsche was an important philosopher in both fields.
Existentialist philosophers often stress the importance of angst as signifying the absolute lack of any objective ground for action, a move that is often reduced to moral or existential nihilism. A pervasive theme in existentialist philosophy, however, is to persist through encounters with the absurd, as seen in Albert Camus's philosophical essay The Myth of Sisyphus (1942): "One must imagine Sisyphus happy".[61] It is only very rarely that existentialist philosophers dismiss morality or one's self-created meaning: Søren Kierkegaard regained a sort of morality in the religious (although he would not agree that it was ethical; the religious suspends the ethical), and Jean-Paul Sartre's final words in Being and Nothingness (1943): "All these questions, which refer us to a pure and not an accessory (or impure) reflection, can find their reply only on the ethical plane. We shall devote to them a future work."[46]
History
[edit]Precursors
[edit]Some have argued that existentialism has long been an element of European religious thought, even before the term came into use. William Barrett identified Blaise Pascal and Søren Kierkegaard as two specific examples.[62] Jean Wahl also identified William Shakespeare's Prince Hamlet ("To be, or not to be"), Jules Lequier, Thomas Carlyle, and William James as existentialists. According to Wahl, "the origins of most great philosophies, like those of Plato, Descartes, and Kant, are to be found in existential reflections."[63] Precursors to existentialism can also be identified in the works of Iranian Muslim philosopher Mulla Sadra (c. 1571–1635), who would posit that "existence precedes essence" becoming the principle expositor of the School of Isfahan, which is described as "alive and active".[according to whom?]
19th century
[edit]Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
[edit]Kierkegaard is generally considered to have been the first existentialist philosopher.[5][64][65] He proposed that each individual—not reason, society, or religious orthodoxy—is solely tasked with giving meaning to life and living it sincerely, or "authentically".[66][67]
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were two of the first philosophers considered fundamental to the existentialist movement, though neither used the term "existentialism" and it is unclear whether they would have supported the existentialism of the 20th century. They focused on subjective human experience rather than the objective truths of mathematics and science, which they believed were too detached or observational to truly get at the human experience. Like Pascal, they were interested in people's quiet struggle with the apparent meaninglessness of life and the use of diversion to escape from boredom. Unlike Pascal, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche also considered the role of making free choices, particularly regarding fundamental values and beliefs, and how such choices change the nature and identity of the chooser.[68] Kierkegaard's knight of faith and Nietzsche's Übermensch are representative of people who exhibit freedom, in that they define the nature of their own existence. Nietzsche's idealized individual invents his own values and creates the very terms they excel under. By contrast, Kierkegaard, opposed to the level of abstraction in Hegel, and not nearly as hostile (actually welcoming) to Christianity as Nietzsche, argues through a pseudonym that the objective certainty of religious truths (specifically Christian) is not only impossible, but even founded on logical paradoxes. Yet he continues to imply that a leap of faith is a possible means for an individual to reach a higher stage of existence that transcends and contains both an aesthetic and ethical value of life. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were also precursors to other intellectual movements, including postmodernism, and various strands of psychotherapy.[citation needed] However, Kierkegaard believed that individuals should live in accordance with their thinking.[65]
In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche's sentiments resonate the idea of "existence precedes essence." He writes, "no one gives man his qualities-- neither God, nor society, nor his parents and ancestors, nor he himself...No one is responsible for man's being there at all, for his being such-and-such, or for his being in these circumstances or in this environment...Man is not the effect of some special purpose of a will, and end..."[69] Within this view, Nietzsche ties in his rejection of the existence of God, which he sees as a means to "redeem the world." By rejecting the existence of God, Nietzsche also rejects beliefs that claim humans have a predestined purpose according to what God has instructed.
Dostoyevsky
[edit]The first important literary author also important to existentialism was the Russian, Dostoyevsky.[70] Dostoyevsky's Notes from Underground portrays a man unable to fit into society and unhappy with the identities he creates for himself. Sartre, in his book on existentialism Existentialism is a Humanism, quoted Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov as an example of existential crisis. Other Dostoyevsky novels covered issues raised in existentialist philosophy while presenting story lines divergent from secular existentialism: for example, in Crime and Punishment, the protagonist Raskolnikov experiences an existential crisis and then moves toward a Christian Orthodox worldview similar to that advocated by Dostoyevsky himself.[71]
Early 20th century
[edit]In the first decades of the 20th century, a number of philosophers and writers explored existentialist ideas. The Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno y Jugo, in his 1913 book The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Nations, emphasized the life of "flesh and bone" as opposed to that of abstract rationalism. Unamuno rejected systematic philosophy in favor of the individual's quest for faith. He retained a sense of the tragic, even absurd nature of the quest, symbolized by his enduring interest in the eponymous character from the Miguel de Cervantes novel Don Quixote. A novelist, poet and dramatist as well as philosophy professor at the University of Salamanca, Unamuno wrote a short story about a priest's crisis of faith, Saint Manuel the Good, Martyr, which has been collected in anthologies of existentialist fiction. Another Spanish thinker, José Ortega y Gasset, writing in 1914, held that human existence must always be defined as the individual person combined with the concrete circumstances of his life: "Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia" ("I am myself and my circumstances"). Sartre likewise believed that human existence is not an abstract matter, but is always situated ("en situation").[72]
Although Martin Buber wrote his major philosophical works in German, and studied and taught at the Universities of Berlin and Frankfurt, he stands apart from the mainstream of German philosophy. Born into a Jewish family in Vienna in 1878, he was also a scholar of Jewish culture and involved at various times in Zionism and Hasidism. In 1938, he moved permanently to Jerusalem. His best-known philosophical work was the short book I and Thou, published in 1922.[73] For Buber, the fundamental fact of human existence, too readily overlooked by scientific rationalism and abstract philosophical thought, is "man with man", a dialogue that takes place in the so-called "sphere of between" ("das Zwischenmenschliche").[74]
Two Russian philosophers, Lev Shestov and Nikolai Berdyaev, became well known as existentialist thinkers during their post-Revolutionary exiles in Paris. Shestov had launched an attack on rationalism and systematization in philosophy as early as 1905 in his book of aphorisms All Things Are Possible. Berdyaev drew a radical distinction between the world of spirit and the everyday world of objects. Human freedom, for Berdyaev, is rooted in the realm of spirit, a realm independent of scientific notions of causation. To the extent the individual human being lives in the objective world, he is estranged from authentic spiritual freedom. "Man" is not to be interpreted naturalistically, but as a being created in God's image, an originator of free, creative acts.[75] He published a major work on these themes, The Destiny of Man, in 1931.
Gabriel Marcel, long before coining the term "existentialism", introduced important existentialist themes to a French audience in his early essay "Existence and Objectivity" (1925) and in his Metaphysical Journal (1927).[76] A dramatist as well as a philosopher, Marcel found his philosophical starting point in a condition of metaphysical alienation: the human individual searching for harmony in a transient life. Harmony, for Marcel, was to be sought through "secondary reflection", a "dialogical" rather than "dialectical" approach to the world, characterized by "wonder and astonishment" and open to the "presence" of other people and of God rather than merely to "information" about them. For Marcel, such presence implied more than simply being there (as one thing might be in the presence of another thing); it connoted "extravagant" availability, and the willingness to put oneself at the disposal of the other.[77]
Marcel contrasted secondary reflection with abstract, scientific-technical primary reflection, which he associated with the activity of the abstract Cartesian ego. For Marcel, philosophy was a concrete activity undertaken by a sensing, feeling human being incarnate—embodied—in a concrete world.[76][78] Although Sartre adopted the term "existentialism" for his own philosophy in the 1940s, Marcel's thought has been described as "almost diametrically opposed" to that of Sartre.[76] Unlike Sartre, Marcel was a Christian, and became a Catholic convert in 1929.
In Germany, the psychiatrist and philosopher Karl Jaspers—who later described existentialism as a "phantom" created by the public[79]—called his own thought, heavily influenced by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Existenzphilosophie. For Jaspers, "Existenz-philosophy is the way of thought by means of which man seeks to become himself...This way of thought does not cognize objects, but elucidates and makes actual the being of the thinker".[80]
Jaspers, a professor at the university of Heidelberg, was acquainted with Heidegger, who held a professorship at Marburg before acceding to Husserl's chair at Freiburg in 1928. They held many philosophical discussions, but later became estranged over Heidegger's support of National Socialism. They shared an admiration for Kierkegaard,[81] and in the 1930s, Heidegger lectured extensively on Nietzsche. Nevertheless, the extent to which Heidegger should be considered an existentialist is debatable. In Being and Time he presented a method of rooting philosophical explanations in human existence (Dasein) to be analysed in terms of existential categories (existentiale); and this has led many commentators to treat him as an important figure in the existentialist movement.
After the Second World War
[edit]Following the Second World War, existentialism became a well-known and significant philosophical and cultural movement, mainly through the public prominence of two French writers, Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus, who wrote best-selling novels, plays and widely read journalism as well as theoretical texts.[82] These years also saw the growing reputation of Being and Time outside Germany.

Sartre dealt with existentialist themes in his 1938 novel Nausea and the short stories in his 1939 collection The Wall, and had published his treatise on existentialism, Being and Nothingness, in 1943, but it was in the two years following the liberation of Paris from the German occupying forces that he and his close associates—Camus, Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and others—became internationally famous as the leading figures of a movement known as existentialism.[83] In a very short period of time, Camus and Sartre in particular became the leading public intellectuals of post-war France, achieving by the end of 1945 "a fame that reached across all audiences."[84] Camus was an editor of the most popular leftist (former French Resistance) newspaper Combat; Sartre launched his journal of leftist thought, Les Temps Modernes, and two weeks later gave the widely reported lecture on existentialism and secular humanism to a packed meeting of the Club Maintenant. Beauvoir wrote that "not a week passed without the newspapers discussing us";[85] existentialism became "the first media craze of the postwar era."[86]
By the end of 1947, Camus' earlier fiction and plays had been reprinted, his new play Caligula had been performed and his novel The Plague published; the first two novels of Sartre's The Roads to Freedom trilogy had appeared, as had Beauvoir's novel The Blood of Others. Works by Camus and Sartre were already appearing in foreign editions. The Paris-based existentialists had become famous.[83]
Sartre had traveled to Germany in 1930 to study the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger,[87] and he included critical comments on their work in his major treatise Being and Nothingness. Heidegger's thought had also become known in French philosophical circles through its use by Alexandre Kojève in explicating Hegel in a series of lectures given in Paris in the 1930s.[88] The lectures were highly influential; members of the audience included not only Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, but Raymond Queneau, Georges Bataille, Louis Althusser, André Breton, and Jacques Lacan.[89] A selection from Being and Time was published in French in 1938, and his essays began to appear in French philosophy journals.

Heidegger read Sartre's work and was initially impressed, commenting: "Here for the first time I encountered an independent thinker who, from the foundations up, has experienced the area out of which I think. Your work shows such an immediate comprehension of my philosophy as I have never before encountered."[90] Later, however, in response to a question posed by his French follower Jean Beaufret,[91] Heidegger distanced himself from Sartre's position and existentialism in general in his Letter on Humanism.[92] Heidegger's reputation continued to grow in France during the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1960s, Sartre attempted to reconcile existentialism and Marxism in his work Critique of Dialectical Reason. A major theme throughout his writings was freedom and responsibility.
Camus was a friend of Sartre, until their falling-out, and wrote several works with existential themes including The Rebel, Summer in Algiers, The Myth of Sisyphus, and The Stranger, the latter being "considered—to what would have been Camus's irritation—the exemplary existentialist novel."[93] Camus, like many others, rejected the existentialist label, and considered his works concerned with facing the absurd.[94] In the titular book, Camus uses the analogy of the Greek myth of Sisyphus to demonstrate the futility of existence. In the myth, Sisyphus is condemned for eternity to roll a rock up a hill, but when he reaches the summit, the rock will roll to the bottom again. Camus believes that this existence is pointless but that Sisyphus ultimately finds meaning and purpose in his task, simply by continually applying himself to it. The first half of the book contains an extended rebuttal of what Camus took to be existentialist philosophy in the works of Kierkegaard, Shestov, Heidegger, and Jaspers.
Simone de Beauvoir, an important existentialist who spent much of her life as Sartre's partner, wrote about feminist existentialist ethics in her works, including The Second Sex and The Ethics of Ambiguity. Although often overlooked due to her relationship with Sartre,[95] de Beauvoir integrated existentialism with other forms of thinking such as feminism, unheard of at the time, resulting in alienation from fellow writers such as Camus.[71]
Paul Tillich, an important existentialist theologian following Kierkegaard and Karl Barth, applied existentialist concepts to Christian theology, and helped introduce existential theology to the general public. His seminal work The Courage to Be follows Kierkegaard's analysis of anxiety and life's absurdity, but puts forward the thesis that modern humans must, via God, achieve selfhood in spite of life's absurdity. Rudolf Bultmann used Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's philosophy of existence to demythologize Christianity by interpreting Christian mythical concepts into existentialist concepts.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, an existential phenomenologist, was for a time a companion of Sartre. Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception (1945) was recognized as a major statement of French existentialism.[96] It has been said that Merleau-Ponty's work Humanism and Terror greatly influenced Sartre. However, in later years they were to disagree irreparably, dividing many existentialists such as de Beauvoir,[71] who sided with Sartre.
Colin Wilson, an English writer, published his study The Outsider in 1956, initially to critical acclaim. In this book and others (e.g. Introduction to the New Existentialism), he attempted to reinvigorate what he perceived as a pessimistic philosophy and bring it to a wider audience. He was not, however, academically trained, and his work was attacked by professional philosophers for lack of rigor and critical standards.[97]
Influence outside philosophy
[edit]Art
[edit]Film and television
[edit]
Stanley Kubrick's 1957 anti-war film Paths of Glory "illustrates, and even illuminates...existentialism" by examining the "necessary absurdity of the human condition" and the "horror of war".[98] The film tells the story of a fictional World War I French army regiment ordered to attack an impregnable German stronghold; when the attack fails, three soldiers are chosen at random, court-martialed by a "kangaroo court", and executed by firing squad. The film examines existentialist ethics, such as the issue of whether objectivity is possible and the "problem of authenticity".[98] Orson Welles's 1962 film The Trial, based upon Franz Kafka's book of the same name (Der Prozeß), is characteristic of both existentialist and absurdist themes in its depiction of a man (Joseph K.) arrested for a crime for which the charges are neither revealed to him nor to the reader.
Neon Genesis Evangelion is a Japanese science fiction animation series created by the anime studio Gainax and was both directed and written by Hideaki Anno. Existential themes of individuality, consciousness, freedom, choice, and responsibility are heavily relied upon throughout the entire series, particularly through the philosophies of Jean-Paul Sartre and Søren Kierkegaard. Episode 16's title, "The Sickness Unto Death, And..." (死に至る病、そして, Shi ni itaru yamai, soshite) is a reference to Kierkegaard's book, The Sickness Unto Death.
Some contemporary films dealing with existentialist issues include Melancholia, Fight Club, I Heart Huckabees, Waking Life, The Matrix, Ordinary People, Life in a Day, Barbie, and Everything Everywhere All at Once.[99] Likewise, films throughout the 20th century such as The Seventh Seal, Ikiru, Taxi Driver, the Toy Story films, Pokémon: The First Movie, The Great Silence, Ghost in the Shell, Harold and Maude, High Noon, Easy Rider, One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest, A Clockwork Orange, Groundhog Day, Apocalypse Now, Badlands, and Blade Runner also have existentialist qualities.[100]
Notable directors known for their existentialist films include Ingmar Bergman, Bela Tarr, Robert Bresson, Jean-Pierre Melville, François Truffaut, Jean-Luc Godard, Michelangelo Antonioni, Akira Kurosawa, Terrence Malick, Stanley Kubrick, Andrei Tarkovsky, Éric Rohmer, Wes Anderson, Woody Allen, and Christopher Nolan.[101] Charlie Kaufman's Synecdoche, New York focuses on the protagonist's desire to find existential meaning.[102] Similarly, in Kurosawa's Red Beard, the protagonist's experiences as an intern in a rural health clinic in Japan lead him to an existential crisis whereby he questions his reason for being. This, in turn, leads him to a better understanding of humanity. The French film, Mood Indigo (directed by Michel Gondry) embraced various elements of existentialism.[citation needed] The film The Shawshank Redemption, released in 1994, depicts life in a prison in Maine, United States to explore several existentialist concepts.[103]
Literature
[edit]
Existential perspectives are also found in modern literature to varying degrees, especially since the 1920s. Louis-Ferdinand Céline's Journey to the End of the Night (Voyage au bout de la nuit, 1932) celebrated by both Sartre and Beauvoir, contained many of the themes that would be found in later existential literature, and is in some ways, the proto-existential novel. Jean-Paul Sartre's 1938 novel Nausea[104] was "steeped in Existential ideas", and is considered an accessible way of grasping his philosophical stance.[105] Between 1900 and 1960, other authors such as Albert Camus, Franz Kafka, Rainer Maria Rilke, T. S. Eliot, Yukio Mishima, Hermann Hesse, Luigi Pirandello,[36][37][39][106][107][108] Ralph Ellison,[109][110][111][112] and Jack Kerouac composed literature or poetry that contained, to varying degrees, elements of existential or proto-existential thought. The philosophy's influence even reached pulp literature shortly after the turn of the 20th century, as seen in the existential disparity witnessed in Man's lack of control of his fate in the works of H. P. Lovecraft.[113]
Theatre
[edit]Sartre wrote No Exit in 1944, an existentialist play originally published in French as Huis Clos (meaning In Camera or "behind closed doors"), which is the source of the popular quote, "Hell is other people." (In French, "L'enfer, c'est les autres"). The play begins with a Valet leading a man into a room that the audience soon realizes is in hell. Eventually he is joined by two women. After their entry, the Valet leaves and the door is shut and locked. All three expect to be tortured, but no torturer arrives. Instead, they realize they are there to torture each other, which they do effectively by probing each other's sins, desires, and unpleasant memories.
Existentialist themes are displayed in the Theatre of the Absurd, notably in Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot, in which two men divert themselves while they wait expectantly for someone (or something) named Godot who never arrives. They claim Godot is an acquaintance, but in fact, hardly know him, admitting they would not recognize him if they saw him. Samuel Beckett, once asked who or what Godot is, replied, "If I knew, I would have said so in the play." To occupy themselves, the men eat, sleep, talk, argue, sing, play games, exercise, swap hats, and contemplate suicide—anything "to hold the terrible silence at bay".[114] The play "exploits several archetypal forms and situations, all of which lend themselves to both comedy and pathos."[115] The play also illustrates an attitude toward human experience on earth: the poignancy, oppression, camaraderie, hope, corruption, and bewilderment of human experience that can be reconciled only in the mind and art of the absurdist. The play examines questions such as death, the meaning of human existence and the place of God in human existence.
Tom Stoppard's Rosencrantz & Guildenstern Are Dead is an absurdist tragicomedy first staged at the Edinburgh Festival Fringe in 1966.[116] The play expands upon the exploits of two minor characters from Shakespeare's Hamlet. Comparisons have also been drawn to Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot, for the presence of two central characters who appear almost as two halves of a single character. Many plot features are similar as well: the characters pass time by playing Questions, impersonating other characters, and interrupting each other or remaining silent for long periods of time. The two characters are portrayed as two clowns or fools in a world beyond their understanding. They stumble through philosophical arguments while not realizing the implications, and muse on the irrationality and randomness of the world.
Jean Anouilh's Antigone also presents arguments founded on existentialist ideas.[117] It is a tragedy inspired by Greek mythology and the play of the same name (Antigone, by Sophocles) from the fifth century BC. In English, it is often distinguished from its antecedent by being pronounced in its original French form, approximately "Ante-GŌN." The play was first performed in Paris on 6 February 1944, during the Nazi occupation of France. Produced under Nazi censorship, the play is purposefully ambiguous with regards to the rejection of authority (represented by Antigone) and the acceptance of it (represented by Creon). The parallels to the French Resistance and the Nazi occupation have been drawn. Antigone rejects life as desperately meaningless but without affirmatively choosing a noble death. The crux of the play is the lengthy dialogue concerning the nature of power, fate, and choice, during which Antigone says that she is, "... disgusted with [the]...promise of a humdrum happiness." She states that she would rather die than live a mediocre existence.
Critic Martin Esslin in his book Theatre of the Absurd pointed out how many contemporary playwrights such as Samuel Beckett, Eugène Ionesco, Jean Genet, and Arthur Adamov wove into their plays the existentialist belief that we are absurd beings loose in a universe empty of real meaning. Esslin noted that many of these playwrights demonstrated the philosophy better than did the plays by Sartre and Camus. Though most of such playwrights, subsequently labeled "Absurdist" (based on Esslin's book), denied affiliations with existentialism and were often staunchly anti-philosophical (for example Ionesco often claimed he identified more with 'Pataphysics or with Surrealism than with existentialism), the playwrights are often linked to existentialism based on Esslin's observation.[118]
Activism
[edit]Black existentialism explores the existence and experiences of Black people in the world.[119] Classical and contemporary thinkers include C.L.R James, Frederick Douglass, W.E.B DuBois, Frantz Fanon, Angela Davis, Cornel West, Naomi Zack, bell hooks, Stuart Hall, Lewis Gordon, and Audre Lorde.[120]
Psychoanalysis and psychotherapy
[edit]A major offshoot of existentialism as a philosophy is existentialist psychology and psychoanalysis, which first crystallized in the work of Otto Rank, Freud's closest associate for 20 years. Without awareness of the writings of Rank, Ludwig Binswanger was influenced by Freud, Edmund Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre. A later figure was Viktor Frankl, who briefly met Freud as a young man.[121] His logotherapy can be regarded as a form of existentialist therapy. The existentialists would also influence social psychology, antipositivist micro-sociology, symbolic interactionism, and post-structuralism, with the work of thinkers such as Georg Simmel[122] and Michel Foucault. Foucault was a great reader of Kierkegaard even though he almost never refers to this author, who nonetheless had for him an importance as secret as it was decisive.[123]
An early contributor to existentialist psychology in the United States was Rollo May, who was strongly influenced by Kierkegaard and Otto Rank. One of the most prolific writers on techniques and theory of existentialist psychology in the US is Irvin D. Yalom. Yalom states that
Aside from their reaction against Freud's mechanistic, deterministic model of the mind and their assumption of a phenomenological approach in therapy, the existentialist analysts have little in common and have never been regarded as a cohesive ideological school. These thinkers—who include Ludwig Binswanger, Medard Boss, Eugène Minkowski, V. E. Gebsattel, Roland Kuhn, G. Caruso, F. T. Buytendijk, G. Bally, and Victor Frankl—were almost entirely unknown to the American psychotherapeutic community until Rollo May's highly influential 1958 book Existence—and especially his introductory essay—introduced their work into this country.[124]
A more recent contributor to the development of a European version of existentialist psychotherapy is the British-based Emmy van Deurzen.[125]: 142–144
Anxiety's importance in existentialism makes it a popular topic in psychotherapy. Therapists often offer existentialist philosophy as an explanation for anxiety. The assertion is that anxiety is manifested of an individual's complete freedom to decide, and complete responsibility for the outcome of such decisions. Psychotherapists using an existentialist approach believe that a patient can harness his anxiety and use it constructively. Instead of suppressing anxiety, patients are advised to use it as grounds for change. By embracing anxiety as inevitable, a person can use it to achieve his full potential in life. Humanistic psychology also had major impetus from existentialist psychology and shares many of the fundamental tenets. Terror management theory, based on the writings of Ernest Becker and Otto Rank, is a developing area of study within the academic study of psychology. It looks at what researchers claim are implicit emotional reactions of people confronted with the knowledge that they will eventually die.[126]
Also, Gerd B. Achenbach has refreshed the Socratic tradition with his own blend of philosophical counseling; as did Michel Weber with his Chromatiques Center in Belgium.[citation needed]
Criticisms
[edit]General criticisms
[edit]Walter Kaufmann criticized "the profoundly unsound methods and the dangerous contempt for reason that have been so prominent in existentialism."[127] Logical positivist philosophers, such as Rudolf Carnap and A. J. Ayer, assert that existentialists are often confused about the verb "to be" in their analyses of "being".[128] Specifically, they argue that the verb "is" is transitive and pre-fixed to a predicate (e.g., an apple is red) (without a predicate, the word "is" is meaningless), and that existentialists frequently misuse the term in this manner. Colin Wilson has stated in his book The Angry Years that existentialism has created many of its own difficulties: "We can see how this question of freedom of the will has been vitiated by post-romantic philosophy, with its inbuilt tendency to laziness and boredom, we can also see how it came about that existentialism found itself in a hole of its own digging, and how the philosophical developments since then have amounted to walking in circles round that hole."[129]
Sartre's philosophy
[edit]Many critics argue Sartre's philosophy is contradictory. Specifically, they argue that Sartre makes metaphysical arguments despite his claiming that his philosophical views ignore metaphysics. Herbert Marcuse criticized Being and Nothingness for projecting anxiety and meaninglessness onto the nature of existence itself: "Insofar as Existentialism is a philosophical doctrine, it remains an idealistic doctrine: it hypostatizes specific historical conditions of human existence into ontological and metaphysical characteristics. Existentialism thus becomes part of the very ideology which it attacks, and its radicalism is illusory."[130]
In Letter on Humanism, Heidegger criticized Sartre's existentialism:
Existentialism says existence precedes essence. In this statement he is taking existentia and essentia according to their metaphysical meaning, which, from Plato's time on, has said that essentia precedes existentia. Sartre reverses this statement. But the reversal of a metaphysical statement remains a metaphysical statement. With it, he stays with metaphysics, in oblivion of the truth of Being.[131]
See also
[edit]References
[edit]Citations
[edit]- ^ "existentialism". Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary. Merriam-Webster.
- ^ "existentialism". Dictionary.com Unabridged (Online). n.d.
- ^ "existentialism". Cambridge Dictionaries (Online). Cambridge University Press. n.d.
- ^ Solomon 1974, pp. 1–2.
- ^ a b c d e f Crowell 2020.
- ^ Macquarrie, John (1972). Existentialism. New York: Penguin. pp. 14–15.
- ^ Honderich, Ted, ed. (1995). Oxford Companion to Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 259. ISBN 978-0-19-866132-0.
- ^ Breisach, Ernst (1962). Introduction to Modern Existentialism. New York: Grove Press. p. 5.
- ^ Kaufmann, Walter (1956). Existentialism: From Dostoyevesky to Sartre. New York: Meridian. p. 12.
- ^ Flynn 2006, p. xi.
- ^ Guignon, Charles B.; Pereboom, Derk (2001). Existentialism: Basic Writings. Hackett Publishing. p. xiii. ISBN 978-0-87220-595-6 – via Google Books.
- ^ Kleinman, Paul (2013). Philosophy 101: from Plato and Socrates to ethics and metaphysics, an essential primer on the history of thought. Adams Media. ISBN 978-1-4405-6767-4. OCLC 869368682.
- ^ Cooper 1990, p. 1.
- ^ Flynn 2006, p. 89.
- ^ Daigle, Christine (2006). Existentialist Thinkers and Ethics. McGill-Queen's University Press. p. 5.
- ^ Ann Fulton, Apostles of Sartre: Existentialism in America, 1945–1963, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1999, p. 12-13 & 18–19.
- ^ L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme (Editions Nagel, 1946); English Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism (Eyre Methuen, 1948).
- ^ Crowell, Steven (2011). The Cambridge Companion to Existentialism. Cambridge. p. 316.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) - ^ Copleston, F. C. (January 1948). "Existentialism". Philosophy. 23 (84): 19–37. doi:10.1017/S0031819100065955. ISSN 0031-8191. JSTOR 3747384. S2CID 262276911.
- ^ See James Wood's introduction to Sartre, Jean-Paul (2000). Nausea. London: Penguin Classics. p. vii. ISBN 978-0-141-18549-1.
- ^ Abulof, Uriel. "Episode 1: The Jumping Off Place [MOOC lecture]". Uriel Abulof, Human Odyssey to Political Existentialism (HOPE). edX/Princeton. Archived from the original on 5 August 2021. Retrieved 12 January 2021.
- ^ Klempe, Hroar (October 2008). "Welhaven og psykologien: Del 2. Welhaven peker fremover" [Welhaven and psychology: Part 2. Welhaven points forward]. Tidsskrift for Norsk Psykologforening (in Norwegian Bokmål). 45 (10). Retrieved 2022-07-14.
- ^ Lundestad, 1998, p. 169.
- ^ Slagstad, 2001, p. 89.
- ^ (Dictionary) "L'existencialisme" – see "l'identité de la personne" (in French).
- ^ "Aquinas: Metaphysics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy". Retrieved 2022-11-10.
- ^ Baird, Forrest E.; Walter Kaufmann (2008). From Plato to Derrida. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall. ISBN 978-0-13-158591-1.
- ^ a b c Webber, Jonathan (2018). Rethinking Existentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: publisher location (link) - ^ Burnham, Douglas. "Existentialism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 16 November 2020.
- ^ Cox, Gary (2008). The Sartre Dictionary. Continuum. pp. 41–42.
- ^ Heidegger, Martin (1993). David Farrell Krell (ed.). Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964) (Revised and expanded ed.). San Francisco, California: Harper San Francisco. ISBN 0-06-063763-3. OCLC 26355951.
- ^ Heidegger, Martin (1993). David Farrell Krell (ed.). Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of thinking (1964) (Revised and expanded ed.). San Francisco, California: Harper San Francisco. pp. 243. ISBN 0-06-063763-3. OCLC 26355951.
- ^ a b Wartenberg 2008.
- ^ Michelman, Stephen (2010). The A to Z of Existentialism. Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. p. 27. ISBN 978-0-8108-7589-0.
- ^ Crowell 2020, 3.1 Anxiety, Nothingness, the Absurd.
- ^ a b Bassnett, Susan; Lorch, Jennifer (March 18, 2014). Luigi Pirandello in the Theatre. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-35114-5. Retrieved 26 March 2015 – via Google Books.
- ^ a b Thompson, Mel; Rodgers, Nigel (2010). Understanding Existentialism: Teach Yourself. Hodder & Stoughton. ISBN 978-1-4441-3421-6 – via Google Books.
- ^ Caputi, Anthony Francis (1988). Pirandello and the Crisis of Modern Consciousness. University of Illinois Press. ISBN 978-0-252-01468-0 – via Google Books.
- ^ a b Mariani, Umberto (2010). Living Masks: The Achievement of Pirandello. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-1-4426-9314-2. Retrieved 26 March 2015 – via Google Books.
- ^ Sartre, Jean-Paul (1946). Existentialism is a Humanism. Retrieved 2010-03-08 – via Marxists Internet Archive.
- ^ Keen, E. (1973). "Suicide and Self-Deception". Psychoanalytic Review. 60 (4): 575–85. PMID 4772778.
- ^ Crowell 2020, 2.1 Facticity and Transcendence.
- ^ Crowell 2020, 3. Freedom and Value.
- ^ Crowell 2020, 3.2 The Ideality of Values.
- ^ Crowell 2020, 2.3 Authenticity.
- ^ a b Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Routledge Classics (2003).
- ^ "Sartre, Jean Paul: Existentialism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy". Retrieved 2022-11-10.
- ^ Crowell 2020, 2.2 Alienation.
- ^ Sartre, Jean Paul (1992). "Chapter 1". Being and Nothingness. Translated by Barnes, Hazel E. New York: Washington Square Press. ISBN 978-0-230-00673-7.
- ^ "Sartre, Jean Paul: Existentialism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy". Retrieved 2024-06-14.
- ^ Plesa, Patric (2021-07-14). "Reassessing Existential Constructs and Subjectivity: Freedom and Authenticity in Neoliberalism". Journal of Humanistic Psychology: 002216782110320. doi:10.1177/00221678211032065. ISSN 0022-1678.
- ^ Aho 2023.
- ^ "Soren Kierkegaard and The Psychology of Anxiety". 2018-02-20. Retrieved 2024-05-07.
- ^ "despair – definition of despair by the Free Online Dictionary, Thesaurus and Encyclopedia". Tfd.com. Retrieved 2010-03-08.
- ^ Either/Or Part II p. 188 Hong.
- ^ Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers Vol. 5, p. 5.
- ^ "Ethics - Existentialism". Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 2020-05-28.
- ^ Kierkegaard, Soren. Works of Love. Harper & Row, Publishers. New York, N.Y. 1962. p. 62.
- ^ Sariel, Aviram. "Jonasian Gnosticism." Harvard Theological Review 116.1 (2023): 91-122.
- ^ Alan Pratt (April 23, 2001). "Nihilism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Embry–Riddle University. Retrieved November 18, 2018.
- ^ Camus, Albert. "The Myth of Sisyphus". NYU.edu.
- ^ Barrett 1958, pp. 97, 133–157.
- ^ Wahl, Jean André (1949). A Short History of Existentialism. New York: Philosophical Library. pp. 32–33.
- ^ Marino 2004, p. ix.
- ^ a b McDonald, Lippitt & Evans 2017.
- ^ Watts, Michael (2003). Kierkegaard. Oneworld. pp. 4–6. ISBN 978-1-85168-317-8.
- ^ Lowrie, Walter (1969). Kierkegaard's attack upon "Christendom". Princeton. pp. 37–40.
- ^ Luper 2000, pp. 4–5, 11.
- ^ Nietzsche, Friedrich; Kaufmann, Walter (1994). The portable Nietzsche. Penguin books (Repr. of the 1954 ed. publ. by The Viking Press, New York ed.). New York: Penguin. ISBN 978-0-14-015062-9.
- ^ Hubben, William. Dostoyevsky, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Kafka, Jabber-wacky, Scribner, 1997.
- ^ a b c Rukhsana, Akhter (June 2014). Existentialism and Its Relevance to the Contemporary System of Education in India: Existentialism and Present Educational Scenario. Hamburg: Anchor Academic. ISBN 978-3-95489-277-8. OCLC 911266433.
- ^ Pitari, Paolo (7 August 2020). "The Influence of Sartre's "What Is Literature?" on David Foster Wallace's Literary Project". Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction. 61 (4): 423–439. doi:10.1080/00111619.2020.1729690. hdl:10278/3730293. Retrieved 22 December 2024.
- ^ Buber, Martin (1970). I and Thou. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. United States: Charles Scribner's Sons. ISBN 978-0-684-71725-8.
- ^ Maurice S. Friedman, Martin Buber. The Life of Dialogue, University of Chicago Press, 1955, p. 85.
- ^ Ernst Breisach, Introduction to Modern Existentialism, New York (1962), pp. 173–76.
- ^ a b c Samuel M. Keen, "Gabriel Marcel" in Paul Edwards (ed.) The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Macmillan Publishing Co, 1967.
- ^ John Macquarrie, Existentialism, Pelican, 1973, p. 110.
- ^ John Macquarrie, Existentialism, Pelican, 1973, p. 96.
- ^ Karl Jaspers, "Philosophical Autobiography" in Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers The Library of Living Philosophers IX, Tudor Publishing Company, 1957, p. 75/11.
- ^ Karl Jaspers, "Philosophical Autobiography" in Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers The Library of Living Philosophers IX, Tudor Publishing Company, 1957, p. 40.
- ^ Karl Jaspers, "Philosophical Autobiography" in Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers The Library of Living Philosophers IX, Tudor Publishing Company, 1957, p. 75/2 and following.
- ^ Baert, Patrick (2015). The Existentialist Moment: The Rise of Sartre as a Public Intellectual. Polity Press.
- ^ a b Ronald Aronson, Camus and Sartre, University of Chicago Press, 2004, Chapter 3 passim.
- ^ Ronald Aronson, Camus and Sartre, University of Chicago Press, 2004, p. 44.
- ^ Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, quoted in Ronald Aronson, Camus and Sartre, University of Chicago Press, 2004, p. 48.
- ^ Ronald Aronson, Camus and Sartre, University of Chicago Press, 2004, p. 48.
- ^ Rüdiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, Harvard University Press, 1998, p. 343.
- ^ Entry on Kojève in Martin Cohen (editor), The Essentials of Philosophy and Ethics (Hodder Arnold, 2006, p. 158); see also Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit (Cornell University Press, 1980).
- ^ Entry on Kojève in Martin Cohen (editor), The Essentials of Philosophy and Ethics (Hodder Arnold, 2006, p. 158).
- ^ Martin Heidegger, letter, quoted in Rüdiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger – Between Good and Evil (Harvard University Press, 1998, p. 349).
- ^ Rüdiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger – Between Good and Evil (Harvard University Press, 1998, p. 356).
- ^ William J. Richardson, Martin Heidegger: From Phenomenology to Thought (Martjinus Nijhoff, 1967, p. 351).
- ^ Messud, Claire (2014). "A New 'L'Étranger'". The New York Review of Books. 61 (10). Retrieved 1 June 2014.
- ^ Camus 1968.
- ^ Bergoffen, Debra (September 2010). "Simone de Beauvoir". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ^ Madison, G. B., in Robert Audi's The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 559).
- ^ K. Gunnar Bergström, An Odyssey to Freedom University of Uppsala, 1983, p. 92. Colin Stanley, Colin Wilson, a Celebration: Essays and Recollections Cecil Woolf, 1988, p. 43.
- ^ a b Holt, Jason. "Existential Ethics: Where do the Paths of Glory Lead?". In The Philosophy of Stanley Kubrick. By Jerold J. Abrams. Published 2007. University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 0-8131-2445-X
- ^ "Existential & Psychological Movie Recommendations". Existential-therapy.com. Archived from the original on 2010-01-07. Retrieved 2010-03-08.
- ^ "Existentialism in Film". Uhaweb.hartford.edu. Archived from the original on 2010-01-13. Retrieved 2010-03-08.
- ^ "Existentialist Adaptations – Harvard Film Archive". Hcl.harvard.edu. Archived from the original on 2011-01-27. Retrieved 2010-03-08.
- ^ Chocano, Carina (2008-10-24). "Review: 'Synecdoche, New York'". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 2008-11-17.
- ^ For an examination of the existentialist elements within the film, see Philosophy Now, issue 102, accessible here (link), accessed 3 June 2014.
- ^ Sartre, Jean-Paul (2000) [1938]. Nausea. Translated by Baldick, Robert. London: Penguin.
- ^ Earnshaw, Steven (2006). Existentialism: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum. p. 75. ISBN 0-8264-8530-8.
- ^ Cincotta, Madeleine Strong (1989). Luigi Pirandello: The Humorous Existentialist. University of Wollongong Press. ISBN 978-0-86418-090-2. Retrieved 26 March 2015.
- ^ Bassanese, Fiora A. (Jan 1, 1997). Understanding Luigi Pirandello. University of South Carolina Press. ISBN 978-0-585-33727-2. Retrieved 26 March 2015.
existential.
- ^ DiGaetani, John Louis (Jan 25, 2008). Stages of Struggle: Modern Playwrights and Their Psychological Inspirations. McFarland. ISBN 978-0-7864-8259-7. Retrieved 26 March 2015.
- ^ Graham, Maryemma; Singh, Amritjit (1995). Conversations with Ralph Ellison. University of Mississippi Press. ISBN 978-0-87805-781-8. Retrieved 26 March 2015.
- ^ Cotkin, George (2005). Existential American. JHU Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-8200-5. Retrieved 26 March 2015.
- ^ Thomas, Paul Lee (2008). Reading, Learning, Teach Ralph Ellison. Peter Lang. ISBN 978-1-4331-0090-1. Retrieved 26 March 2015.
- ^ Jackson, Lawrence Patrick (2007). Ralph Ellison: Emergence of Genius. University of Georgia Press. ISBN 978-0-8203-2993-2. Retrieved 26 March 2015.
- ^ Gurnow, Michael (2008-10-15). "Zarathustra . . . Cthulhu . Meursault: Existential Futility in H.P. Lovecraft's 'The Call of Cthulhu'". The Horror Review. Archived from the original on October 6, 2014. Retrieved 2015-02-17.
- ^ The Times, 31 December 1964. Quoted in Knowlson, J., Damned to Fame: The Life of Samuel Beckett (London: Bloomsbury, 1996), p. 57
- ^ Cronin, A., Samuel Beckett The Last Modernist (London: Flamingo, 1997), p. 391
- ^ Michael H. Hutchins (14 August 2006). "A Tom Stoppard Bibliography: Chronology". The Stephen Sondheim Reference Guide. Retrieved 2008-06-23.
- ^ Wren, Celia (12 December 2007). "From Forum, an Earnest and Painstaking 'Antigone'". Washington Post. Retrieved 2008-04-07.
- ^ Kernan, Alvin B. The Modern American Theater: A Collection of Critical Essays. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967.
- ^ Bassey, Magnus O. (2007). "What is Africana Critical Theory or Black Existential Philosophy?". Journal of Black Studies. 37 (6): 914–935. doi:10.1177/0021934705285563. ISSN 0021-9347. JSTOR 40034961. S2CID 145250815.
- ^ Gordon, Lewis R. (2000-04-11). Existentia Africana: Understanding Africana Existential Thought. New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203900758. ISBN 978-0-203-90075-8.
- ^ Frankl, Viktor (2000). Recollections: An Autobiography. Massachusetts: Perseus Publishing. p. 51.
- ^ Šajda 2011, p. 38.
- ^ Flynn, Thomas R. Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason. p. 323.
- ^ Yalom, Irvin D. (1980). Existential Psychotherapy. New York: Basic Books (Subsidiary of Perseus Books, L.L.C. p. 17. ISBN 0-465-02147-6. Note: The copyright year has not changed, but the book remains in print.
- ^ Kass, Sarah A. (April 2014). "Don't Fall Into Those Stereotype Traps: Women and the Feminine in Existential Therapy". Journal of Humanistic Psychology. 54 (2) (published 11 March 2013): 131–157. doi:10.1177/0022167813478836.
- ^ "Terror Management Theory – Ernest Becker Foundation". ernestbecker.org. Retrieved 2022-11-10.
- ^ Kaufmann, Walter Arnold, From Shakespeare To Existentialism (Princeton University Press 1979), p. xvi.
- ^ Carnap, Rudolf, Uberwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache [Overcoming Metaphysics by the Logical Analysis of Speech], Erkenntnis (1932), pp. 219–41. Carnap's critique of Heidegger's "What is Metaphysics."
- ^ Colin, Wilson, The Angry Years (2007), p. 214
- ^ Marcuse, Herbert. "Sartre's Existentialism". Printed in Studies in Critical Philosophy. Translated by Joris De Bres. London: NLB, 1972. p. 161.
- ^ Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism", in Basic Writings: Nine Key Essays, plus the Introduction to Being and Time , trans. David Farrell Krell (London, Routledge; 1978), p. 208. Google Books.
Bibliography
[edit]- Aho, Kevin (6 January 2023). "Existentialism". In Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. Retrieved 2024-11-18.
- Barrett, William (1958). Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (1st ed.). Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books. OCLC 14597959. OL 6247210M.
- Camus, Albert (1968). "No, I am not an existentialist . . . [from an interview by Jeanine Delpech in Les Nouvelles littéraires, 15 November 1945]". In Thody, Philip (ed.). Lyrical and Critical Essays. Translated by Kennedy, Ellen Conroy. New York: Vintage Books. pp. 345–348. OCLC 160250.
- Cooper, David E. (1990). Existentialism: A Reconstruction (1st ed.). Oxford, England & Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. ISBN 978-0-631-16191-2.
- Crowell, Steven (9 June 2020) [first published 23 August 2004]. "Existentialism". In Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. Retrieved 2024-11-18.
- Flynn, Thomas R. (2006). Existentialism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford, England & New York, NY: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-280428-0.
- Luper, Steven (2000). Luper, Steven (ed.). Existing: An Introduction to Existential Thought. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company. ISBN 978-0-7674-0587-4.
- Marino, Gordon (2004). "Introduction". In Marino, Gordon (ed.). Basic Writings of Existentialism. New York: Modern Library. pp. ix–xvi. ISBN 978-0-375-75989-5.
- McDonald, William; Lippitt, John; Evans, C. Stephen (10 November 2017) [first published 3 December 1996]. "Søren Kierkegaard". In Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. Retrieved 2024-11-18.
- Šajda, Peter (2011). "Martin Buber: "No-One Can so Refute Kierkegaard as Kierkegaard Himself"". In Stewart, Jon (ed.). Kierkegaard and Existentialism. Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources. Vol. 9. Farnham, England & Burlington, VT: Ashgate. pp. 33–62. ISBN 978-1-4094-2641-7.
- Solomon, Robert C., ed. (1974). Existentialism (1st ed.). New York: Modern Library. ISBN 978-0-394-31704-5.
- Wartenberg, Thomas E. (2008). Existentialism: A Beginner's Guide (ebook ed.). Oxford, England: Oneworld (published 2011). ISBN 978-1-78074-020-1.
External links
[edit]- Fieser, James; Dowden, Bradley (eds.). "Existentialism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 2161-0002. OCLC 37741658.
- Existentialism on In Our Time at the BBC
- The Existential Primer
- Introducing Existentialism
by Richard Appignanesi & Oscar Zárate (Icon Books, 2001)
Existentialism
View on GrokipediaDefinition and Origins
Etymology and Terminology
The term "existentialism" derives from the Latin existentia, meaning "existence" or "state of being," with the philosophical suffix -ism indicating a doctrine or system centered on that concept.[8] The German form Existentialismus first appeared in 1919, drawing from Søren Kierkegaard's 19th-century Danish emphasis on the "condition of existence" (Existents-Forhold) as a subjective, lived reality rather than abstract speculation.[8] In French, l'existentialisme was coined by Catholic philosopher Gabriel Marcel around 1943 to denote reflective approaches prioritizing concrete human participation in being, though Marcel later repudiated the term's association with atheistic variants and viewed it as a misnomer for his "neo-Socratic" method.[1] Jean-Paul Sartre adopted and popularized the label in his 1946 lecture Existentialism Is a Humanism, framing it as a humanistic philosophy of radical freedom, despite his own ambivalence toward systematizing it as a school.[9] Key terminology in existentialism contrasts existence—the contingent, temporal fact of individual human being-with its-situatedness and choices—with essence, a fixed, universal nature or purpose presumed in traditional metaphysics.[1] Sartre's axiom "existence precedes essence," articulated in 1943's Being and Nothingness, posits that humans, lacking innate design, define themselves through actions amid indeterminacy, inverting Aristotelian teleology where essence dictates existence.[1] Precursors like Kierkegaard used existence (Eksistents) to describe the knight of faith's passionate leap beyond rational certainty, while Friedrich Nietzsche's Übermensch (overman) embodies self-overcoming against nihilistic voids, though he critiqued systematic labels.[8] Other pivotal terms include the absurd, Camus's 1942 coinage in The Myth of Sisyphus for the irrational clash between humanity's craving for order and the universe's indifference, demanding lucid revolt without suicide or false hope.[10] Facticity denotes inescapable givens like birth, body, and historical context, per Sartre and Heidegger's Dasein (being-there), which grounds thrownness (Geworfenheit) into a world not of one's making.[1] Authenticity (Eigentlichkeit in Heidegger's 1927 Being and Time) urges owning one's projects amid possibilities, opposing bad faith (mauvaise foi), Sartre's term for denying freedom through self-deceptive roles, as in waiters performing "waiter-ness."[1] Angst or dread (Angst in Kierkegaard and Heidegger), traces to awareness of nothingness and choice's vertigo, distinct from fear of specific threats.[10] Many thinkers rejected "existentialism" as overly journalistic or reductive: Heidegger deemed it a misinterpretation of his ontology, Camus disavowed it for implying futile questing, and Kierkegaard predated the term while scorning Hegelian abstraction.[1] This terminological fluidity reflects existentialism's resistance to doctrinal unity, prioritizing lived confrontation over lexical precision.[1]Definitional Challenges and Scope
Existentialism resists precise delineation as a philosophical school due to the disparate methodologies and conclusions of its associated thinkers, who share thematic concerns with human existence but diverge sharply in ontology and ethics. Precursors such as Søren Kierkegaard, writing in the 1840s, emphasized subjective faith amid despair without invoking the term, while Friedrich Nietzsche, in works from the 1870s to 1890s, critiqued traditional morality and proclaimed the death of God, anticipating existential themes yet rejecting systematic philosophy.[9] This retrospective labeling, applied in the 20th century, overlooks such variances; for instance, Kierkegaard's Christian individualism contrasts with Nietzsche's atheistic vitalism, complicating any unified doctrinal core.[11] The movement's emergence as a label stems from post-World War I contexts, with philosophers like Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger in the 1920s exploring Dasein (being-there) through phenomenology, yet Heidegger explicitly distanced himself from existentialism.[1] Further definitional hurdles arise from internal contradictions: atheistic variants, as articulated by Jean-Paul Sartre in his 1946 lecture Existentialism is a Humanism, assert radical freedom in a godless universe, positing that "existence precedes essence" and individuals must invent values.[9] In contrast, theistic strands, including Gabriel Marcel's "mystery" over "problem" in the 1940s or Kierkegaard's leap of faith, integrate transcendence, rendering existentialism more a loose attitude toward absurdity and authenticity than a coherent system.[11] Albert Camus, in The Myth of Sisyphus (1942), rejected the label outright, favoring revolt against the absurd over Sartrean commitment, highlighting how self-identification falters amid overlapping influences like phenomenology and humanism.[12] These tensions—between optimism in self-creation and pessimism in meaninglessness—defy reduction to essential tenets, as no single proposition binds figures from diverse eras and convictions. The scope of existentialism thus extends beyond academic philosophy to interrogate lived reality, influencing literature (e.g., Fyodor Dostoevsky's 1860s-1880s explorations of guilt and redemption), psychology (via existential therapy's focus on personal responsibility since the 1950s), and even theology, where it challenges rational proofs for God.[13] Yet boundaries remain porous; it overlaps with absurdism, nihilism critiques, and anti-essentialism but excludes positivist or rationalist frameworks prioritizing universal laws over individual contingency.[2] This breadth, while enriching, amplifies definitional fluidity, as existentialism functions less as a delimited theory than a response to modernity's perceived crises of alienation and freedom, evident in its post-1945 cultural resonance amid wartime disillusionment.[11]Core Concepts
Existence Precedes Essence
The dictum "existence precedes essence" encapsulates a core reversal in existentialist thought, most explicitly formulated by Jean-Paul Sartre in his October 1945 lecture Existentialism is a Humanism, published in 1946.[14][5] Sartre contrasts human existence with that of artifacts: for a manufactured item like a paper cutter, essence—its designed purpose and properties—is determined by its creator prior to its existence, but for humans, no such preconceived nature exists.[14] Humans, Sartre argues, "first of all exist, encounter themselves, surge up in the world—and define themselves afterwards" through free choices and projects.[14] This principle inverts classical metaphysics, including Aristotelian views where essence defines a thing's potentiality before actuality, and theological traditions positing a divine archetype for humanity.[5][15] In an atheistic framework, Sartre contends, the absence of a creator God eliminates any fixed human blueprint, leaving individuals to forge their essence amid contingency and freedom.[14] Existence thus imposes radical responsibility: one cannot appeal to innate traits, societal norms, or external forces to justify actions, as all values originate from human decisions.[14][16] Sartre's formulation builds on ideas in his 1943 Being and Nothingness, where consciousness (pour-soi) transcends fixed being (en-soi), but the lecture popularized the phrase to defend existentialism against charges of despair.[5] It affirms human agency, rejecting determinism while acknowledging the anguish of unguided self-creation.[15] Critics, including some contemporaries like Marcel, noted tensions with Sartre's later Marxist commitments, which imply historical and material constraints on freedom, yet the principle remains central to atheistic existentialism's emphasis on subjective meaning-making.[5] In Christian variants, such as Kierkegaard's, faith leaps beyond reason to define essence, but Sartre's version denies transcendent anchors, prioritizing immanent action.[1]The Absurd and Confronting Meaninglessness
In existential philosophy, the absurd denotes the profound dissonance between humanity's innate quest for inherent meaning, order, and purpose in existence and the universe's indifferent, irrational silence that offers none. Albert Camus articulated this concept most explicitly in his 1942 essay The Myth of Sisyphus, positing the absurd not as a mere intellectual puzzle but as a visceral confrontation arising when rational human expectations meet an unresponsive reality.[7] [17] This recognition, Camus argued, constitutes the fundamental philosophical problem, prompting the question of whether life warrants continuation in the face of such apparent futility.[18] Camus distinguished the absurd from nihilism by emphasizing its dynamic tension rather than passive negation; it emerges specifically from the human condition's demand for coherence clashing with empirical evidence of cosmic contingency and lack of teleology.[19] Unlike Søren Kierkegaard's earlier invocation of the absurd as a paradoxical leap of faith transcending reason, Camus rejected supernatural resolutions, viewing religious belief as a form of "philosophical suicide" that evades the absurd through illusory transcendence.[7] In this framework, confronting meaninglessness demands lucid awareness without delusion, as denial—whether through habitual distraction or dogmatic ideology—perpetuates inauthenticity.[20] Responses to the absurd, per Camus, bifurcate into evasion or revolt. Physical suicide terminates the confrontation but concedes defeat to meaninglessness, while metaphysical escapes, such as appeals to divine order or eternal truths, falsify the human condition's isolation.[18] Instead, Camus advocated revolt: a defiant, conscious affirmation of life through maximal living, passion, and creation, scorning the absurd without expecting resolution.[21] This stance aligns with existentialist themes of freedom, where individuals bear responsibility for forging value amid contingency, though Camus critiqued fellow existentialists like Jean-Paul Sartre for overemphasizing subjective essence-creation as sufficient against objective absurdity.[19] The mythical figure of Sisyphus exemplifies this ethos; eternally condemned to roll a boulder uphill only for it to descend, he embodies futile repetition yet achieves heroism through imagined happiness in defiant persistence—"One must imagine Sisyphus happy."[21] This image underscores causal realism in absurd confrontation: actions persist without cosmic justification, yet human consciousness imbues them with subjective intensity, transforming mechanical drudgery into revolt against meaninglessness. Empirical parallels appear in historical accounts of human resilience amid catastrophe, such as wartime defiance, where individuals sustain purpose sans overarching narrative.[17] Thus, the absurd compels not despair but heightened engagement with existence's raw contingencies.Facticity, Freedom, and Responsibility
In existentialist thought, particularly Jean-Paul Sartre's formulation, facticity denotes the contingent, given features of human existence that precede personal choice, such as one's physical body, historical circumstances, and social position.[15] These elements represent the unalterable "thrownness" into a specific situation, influencing but not dictating future possibilities. Sartre contrasts facticity with the projective transcendence of consciousness, which continually exceeds and reinterprets these givens.[15] Sartre posits radical freedom as inherent to human pour-soi (for-itself) being, enabling negation of facticity through deliberate choice rather than deterministic causation or fatalism. In Being and Nothingness (1943), he asserts that individuals are "condemned to be free," obligated to act amid constraints without external essence dictating outcomes, thereby rejecting fatalism in favor of human agency.[22] This freedom manifests in the perpetual ability to reinterpret past facts and select future orientations, allowing individuals to create meaning through choices that transcend inherited circumstances, rather than appealing to situation as evasion.[23] Responsibility follows inescapably from this freedom, as one bears sole authorship for choices that forge personal meaning and values via radical agency, extensible to universal implications. Sartre argues that denying this accountability constitutes mauvaise foi (bad faith), a self-deception masking liberty's vertigo.[22] Anguish arises from recognizing facticity's limits alongside freedom's demand for authentic self-creation, unmitigated by appeals to biology, society, or history.[23] While Sartre's atheistic existentialism centers these concepts on human autonomy, precursors like Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) evoke responsibility through subjective truth and the "leap of faith" confronting despairing facticity, though oriented toward divine relation rather than secular invention.[15] This interplay underscores existentialism's insistence on causal agency rooted in conscious projection over passive endurance of givens.Authenticity versus Bad Faith
In Jean-Paul Sartre's philosophy, particularly as developed in Being and Nothingness published in 1943, bad faith represents a form of self-deception wherein individuals deny their inherent freedom by adopting fixed roles or external determinants as excuses for their actions.[5] [15] Sartre describes bad faith as a refusal to acknowledge the for-itself's capacity for negation and choice, instead pretending to be an in-itself object determined by facticity or social expectations.[22] This deception is not mere error but a deliberate lie to oneself, enabling escape from the anguish of absolute responsibility.[24] A classic illustration of bad faith is the waiter who performs his duties with exaggerated precision, embodying the role to the point of identifying himself entirely with it, as if his essence precedes his existence and limits his choices to those of a waiter.[5] [25] Another example involves a woman on a date who allows a man's advances without committing or rejecting them, thereby suspending her freedom in ambiguity to avoid decision.[5] These cases demonstrate how bad faith permeates everyday life, allowing individuals to evade the nausea of contingency by clinging to illusory solidity.[15] Authenticity, in contrast, demands resolute recognition of one's radical freedom and the continuous project of self-creation, rejecting predefined essences or alibis.[26] Sartre posits that authentic existence involves owning the consequences of choices without recourse to external justifications, thereby affirming the priority of existence over essence.[22] [15] This stance confronts the void of nothingness inherent in consciousness, transforming potential despair into purposeful action.[5] While Sartre's framework emphasizes atheistic individualism, precursors like Martin Heidegger's notion of Eigentlichkeit—authentic resoluteness in the face of death—shares the call to transcend "das Man" (the they-self) but grounds it in ontological care rather than Sartrean nothingness.[26] Søren Kierkegaard, earlier, linked authenticity to subjective truth and passionate commitment, often via a leap of faith, differing from Sartre's secular rejection of transcendence.[1] The tension between authenticity and bad faith underscores existentialism's ethical core: freedom entails responsibility, and denial of this leads to inauthentic living marked by resentment or conformity.[15] Sartre argued that while bad faith is pervasive, authenticity remains possible through vigilant self-awareness, though it demands perpetual vigilance against self-lulling mechanisms.[22] This dichotomy critiques societal pressures toward role conformity, urging individuals to invent themselves amid absurdity.[24]
Angst, Dread, and Despair
In existential philosophy, angst (Angst), dread, and despair denote profound moods that disclose the human confrontation with freedom, finitude, and the absence of predetermined meaning, prompting a potential turn toward authentic self-relation. Søren Kierkegaard, writing under the pseudonym Anti-Climacus in The Sickness Unto Death (1849), defines despair as "the sickness unto death," a spiritual affliction arising from the self's failure to synthesize its dual aspects—finitude and infinitude, necessity and possibility, body and soul—into unity before God.[27] This disrelation manifests in three forms: ignorance of one's self (unconscious despair), despair at not willing to be oneself (weakness, such as worldly conformism or escapist fantasy), and defiant willing to be oneself apart from God (demonic isolation).[28] Kierkegaard equates despair with sin, arguing it permeates all human existence unless cured through faith's leap, which restores the self via relational dependence on the divine; he contends that apparent contentment often masks this underlying sickness, as true selfhood requires acknowledging one's creaturely limits.[29] Martin Heidegger, in Being and Time (1927), elevates angst to a foundational attunement (Befindlichkeit) that unveils Dasein's (human existence's) thrownness into a world stripped of intrinsic significance, revealing "the nothing" and the call to authentic being-toward-death.[30] Unlike fear, which targets specific threats within the world, angst lacks an object, inducing a uncanny uncanniness (Unheimlichkeit) where everyday "they-self" (das Man) dissolves, exposing individual finitude and the possibility of resolute choice amid care (Sorge).[31] Heidegger positions angst methodologically as a mood that disrupts fallenness into idle talk and curiosity, enabling disclosure of primordial temporality and guilt, though he notes its latency even in inauthentic modes, where it manifests diluted as fear.[32] This dread, for Heidegger, does not paralyze but individuates, urging anticipation of death as the ownmost possibility that structures authentic existence. Jean-Paul Sartre, building on Heidegger in Being and Nothingness (1943), reframes these moods as anguish (angoisse), the vertigo induced by radical freedom: humans, as pour-soi (for-itself consciousness), precede any essence, bearing total responsibility for actions without divine or naturalistic excuses, confronting the contingency of being (en-soi).[33] Anguish arises in recognizing this "condemned to be free" condition—exemplified by the gambler's dread over choices or the witness to a comrade's suicide grasping universal suicide's option—often evaded through bad faith, self-deception denying freedom's weight.[34] Sartre links dread to nausea from facticity's absurdity, where nothing guarantees values, yet insists this horror motivates lucid commitment, contrasting Kierkegaard's theistic resolution; he attributes similar experiential roots to dread as Heidegger's objectless anxiety but secularizes it toward ethical invention amid abandonment.[35] Across these thinkers, such moods underscore existentialism's causal emphasis: not pathological symptoms but revelatory responses to ungrounded existence, demanding active affirmation over evasion.The Other, the Look, and Social Alienation
In Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness (1943), the concept of "the Other" refers to the existence of other conscious beings whose presence fundamentally alters one's subjective experience of freedom.[22] Sartre argues that the Other is encountered not merely as an object in the world but as a subject who negates one's own projects, transforming the self from a free, for-itself consciousness into an object-for-others.[15] This recognition arises through "the Look," a phenomenological moment where one becomes aware of being observed, evoking emotions like shame or pride that reveal the object's status imposed by the gaze.[36] The Look exemplifies intersubjectivity as inherently conflictual: when caught in the act—such as a person peering through a keyhole who suddenly hears footsteps—the observer realizes their freedom is threatened, as the Other's gaze spatializes and objectifies them, reducing their fluid possibilities to a fixed being-in-itself.[22] Sartre describes this as a reciprocal structure; each participant alternately looks and is looked at, leading to a perpetual struggle for mastery over the other's freedom.[37] Pride or shame in this encounter stems from the partial coincidence of one's self-conception with the image projected by the Other, highlighting the inescapable judgment inherent in social existence.[15] This dynamic fosters social alienation, as authentic relations with others prove elusive amid mutual objectification. Sartre posits that the Other's presence inevitably limits one's transcendence, engendering sadomasochistic patterns where one seeks either to dominate or submit to the gaze.[22] In his 1944 play No Exit, this culminates in the declaration "Hell is other people," illustrating how interpersonal judgments eternally fix individuals as objects, trapping them in a cycle of alienation without physical torment.[38] Sartre clarifies that this "hell" arises not from inherent malevolence but from the ontological conflict of freedoms, where escape from the Other's defining gaze is impossible, rendering social bonds sources of perpetual estrangement rather than solidarity.[39]Philosophical Underpinnings and Distinctions
Opposition to Rationalism, Positivism, and Essentialism
Existentialism critiques rationalism for overemphasizing universal reason and systematic deduction at the expense of individual subjectivity and lived paradox. Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), a Danish philosopher and precursor to existential thought, targeted Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's (1770–1831) dialectical rationalism, which sought to subsume personal existence into an all-encompassing logical whole. In Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments (published 1846 under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus), Kierkegaard argued that such systems abstract away the concrete individual's inward passion and decision, rendering truth not as objective knowledge but as subjective appropriation—"truth is subjectivity"—where the how of belief matters more than the what.[40] He contended that rationalism fails to address existential realities like faith, which demands a "leap" transcending probabilistic reasoning, as infinite certainty clashes irreconcilably with finite human conditions.[41] The movement similarly rejects positivism's confinement of meaningful knowledge to sensory data and scientific verification, as systematized by Auguste Comte (1798–1857) in his six-volume Course in Positive Philosophy (1830–1842), which prioritized empirical laws over metaphysical speculation. Existentialists maintain that this framework objectifies consciousness, reducing it to observable phenomena and ignoring its projective freedom, intentionality, and confrontation with nothingness. Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), in Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960), lambasted "positivist reason" as fragmented and ahistorical, incapable of grasping human praxis as a totalizing process; it treats individuals as inert facts rather than agents shaping history through negation and choice, thus perpetuating alienation under scientistic pretensions.[42][43] Central to existentialism's opposition is its inversion of essentialism, the Aristotelian doctrine—formalized in Metaphysics (circa 350 BCE)—that essence (a fixed nature or telos) precedes and defines existence. Thinkers like Sartre and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) argued no such preexistent blueprint governs humans, thrusting responsibility onto the self to forge meaning amid contingency. Nietzsche's "death of God" parable in The Gay Science (section 125, 1882) announced the demise of transcendent essences rooted in Christian-Platonic metaphysics, exposing a nihilistic abyss where values must be affirmatively willed rather than discovered.[44] Sartre distilled this into "existence precedes essence" in his 1946 lecture Existentialism is a Humanism, asserting that humans emerge without purpose—like a paper-cutter designed for utility—and subsequently author their essence via free projects, rejecting deterministic or divine predetermination.[16] This anti-essentialist stance underscores radical freedom but evokes dread, as choices lack external validation, compelling authentic self-definition over conformity to supposed universals.[45]Differentiation from Nihilism and Related Movements
Existentialism distinguishes itself from nihilism primarily through its affirmative response to the absence of objective meaning, emphasizing individual agency in creating subjective value rather than resigning to meaninglessness. Nihilism, as articulated by thinkers like Friedrich Nietzsche in The Will to Power (compiled posthumously in 1901), posits that traditional values, morality, and purpose are unfounded illusions, particularly following the cultural "death of God" that undermines metaphysical foundations.[46] This leads to a passive or destructive stance where actions lack ultimate significance, potentially fostering despair or indifference.[47] In contrast, existentialists such as Jean-Paul Sartre argue in Being and Nothingness (1943) that humans, "condemned to be free," must invent their essence through authentic choices amid absurdity, transforming potential nihilistic void into personal responsibility.[48] Nietzsche himself, often mislabeled a nihilist due to his critique of Christian morality in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883–1885), rejected passive nihilism as a decadent failure and advocated overcoming it via the "will to power"—an active affirmation of life through self-overcoming and value-creation, prefiguring existentialist themes without fully endorsing subjective invention as Sartre would.[49] Søren Kierkegaard, in works like The Sickness Unto Death (1849), differentiates by positing faith as a subjective "leap" beyond rational despair, where the individual's relation to the infinite provides existential purpose against nihilistic leveling of distinctions.[50] Thus, while both recognize the collapse of absolute truths, existentialism counters nihilism's inertia with demands for authenticity and commitment, viewing inaction as "bad faith." From absurdism, a related movement exemplified by Albert Camus in The Myth of Sisyphus (1942), existentialism diverges by rejecting perpetual revolt without resolution; Camus accepts the absurd clash between human desire for meaning and silent universe but urges defiant living, whereas core existentialists like Sartre insist on projecting values onto existence to forge coherence.[48] Nihilism, by comparison, halts at devaluation without such constructive or rebellious imperatives, rendering it epistemologically defeatist where existentialism remains praxis-oriented.[51] This demarcation underscores existentialism's causal emphasis on human freedom as the origin of normativity, not mere reaction to void.Religious and Theological Dimensions
Christian Existentialism and Faith as Leap
Christian existentialism centers on the individual's subjective encounter with God, emphasizing faith as a personal decision amid uncertainty and paradox rather than rational proof. Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), often regarded as the founder of this strand, critiqued systematic theology and Hegelian philosophy for reducing Christianity to objective knowledge, arguing instead that true faith demands passionate commitment in the face of life's absurdities.[3] In works like Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), Kierkegaard asserts that "truth is subjectivity," meaning religious truth resides in the inward appropriation of doctrine by the individual, not in detached verification.[3] The "leap of faith" represents Kierkegaard's core response to the limits of reason in grasping divine paradoxes, such as the Incarnation—God becoming man—which defies logical synthesis. This leap involves resolutely choosing belief despite evidential insufficiency or apparent contradiction, moving from the ethical sphere (universal norms) to the religious (absolute relation to the absolute).[52] Kierkegaard distinguishes it from mere belief or optimism, portraying it as a risky, existential act that embraces possibility where understanding falters, countering skepticism by affirming faith's transformative power over despair.[53] In Fear and Trembling (1843), published under the pseudonym Johannes de silentio, Kierkegaard illustrates the leap through Abraham's trial in Genesis 22, where God commands the sacrifice of Isaac. Abraham, the "knight of faith," suspends ethical duty (not murdering one's child) for obedience to God, believing "by virtue of the absurd" that he will both fulfill the command and receive Isaac back.[54] This teleological suspension of the ethical highlights faith's paradox: the particular individual relates absolutely to the universal God, achieving infinite resignation followed by a finite return to everyday life through trust in divine provision.[3] Kierkegaard's framework influenced later Christian thinkers, such as Gabriel Marcel (1889–1973), who developed existential fidelity as a hopeful commitment beyond evidence, and Paul Tillich (1886–1965), who echoed the leap in confronting the "ultimate concern" amid doubt. Yet Kierkegaard warned against cheapening faith into cultural conformity, insisting it confronts sin, anxiety, and the offense of Christianity's claims, requiring continual renewal rather than once-for-all assurance.[3] This emphasis on subjective risk underscores Christian existentialism's divergence from rationalist apologetics, prioritizing lived passion over propositional certainty.[52]Atheistic Existentialism and Rejection of Transcendence
Atheistic existentialism, primarily associated with Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus, posits that the non-existence of God eliminates any transcendent source of meaning, purpose, or essence for human life.[14] In this framework, individuals confront a universe devoid of inherent order or divine plan, compelling them to forge their own values through authentic choices amid radical freedom.[14] Sartre articulated this position in his 1946 essay "Existentialism is a Humanism," originally a 1945 lecture, where he described existentialism as deriving its principles from a consistent atheistic stance, rejecting any preordained human nature derived from a creator.[14][55] Central to Sartre's rejection of transcendence is the axiom that "existence precedes essence," meaning humans exist without a predetermined purpose and must define themselves through actions, bearing full responsibility for the consequences.[14] Without God, there is no external moral authority or afterlife to provide absolution or ultimate justification, leaving individuals in a state of anguish over their boundless freedom and the potential meaninglessness of their projects.[14] This view contrasts sharply with religious existentialism by denying any "leap of faith" toward transcendence, insisting instead that meaning arises solely from immanent human endeavors and intersubjective relations.[55] Sartre emphasized that atheistic existentialism affirms human dignity through this self-creation, though it demands confronting the "nausea" of contingency without recourse to illusions of eternal significance.[14] Albert Camus, while disputing the existentialist label, contributed to atheistic thought via absurdism, which underscores the rejection of transcendence in response to the "absurd" conflict between humanity's craving for clarity and the universe's irrational silence. In his 1942 essay "The Myth of Sisyphus," Camus framed philosophical suicide—such as religious belief—as an evasion of the absurd, advocating instead a defiant lucidity and revolt through living fully in the present without hoping for transcendent resolution. He rejected both nihilistic despair and escapist transcendence, proposing that acceptance of the absurd enables passionate commitment to earthly life, exemplified by Sisyphus finding happiness in his futile labor. This stance aligns with Sartre's atheism but prioritizes experiential rebellion over systematic ontology, maintaining that no divine or metaphysical order redeems human suffering.[56] Simone de Beauvoir extended atheistic existentialism into ethics, arguing in her 1947 work "The Ethics of Ambiguity" that freedom's ambiguity—arising from the absence of transcendent guarantees—necessitates reciprocal recognition of others' freedoms without appealing to absolute values.[57] Her atheism, solidified by age 14, informed a philosophy where moral action stems from situated human projects rather than divine command, critiquing transcendence as a form of bad faith that denies life's concrete ambiguities.[58] Overall, these thinkers collectively dismantle reliance on transcendence, grounding existential authenticity in the finite, self-determined human condition.[14]Conflicts with Orthodox Religion and Moral Absolutism
Existentialism's core tenets of radical individual freedom and subjective meaning-making inherently conflict with orthodox religious doctrines, which rely on divine revelation, scriptural authority, and communal dogma to prescribe human purpose and conduct. Orthodox traditions, particularly in Christianity, assert an objective cosmic order governed by God's eternal truths, where human existence derives meaning from alignment with divine will rather than personal invention. In contrast, existentialists maintain that individuals must confront an absurd or indifferent universe without predefined essence, creating values through authentic choices—a view that undermines religious claims to transcendent absolutes. This tension manifests in both atheistic and theistic variants of existentialism, as even faith-based forms prioritize personal anguish and decision over institutional orthodoxy.[2] Atheistic existentialists like Jean-Paul Sartre explicitly rejected Christianity's theistic framework, arguing it fosters inauthenticity by deferring responsibility to a divine judge and promising otherworldly salvation. Sartre critiqued religious morality as a form of "bad faith," where believers evade freedom by attributing essence and ethics to God, thereby denying the human condition's contingency and burden of self-definition. In his 1946 lecture Existentialism is a Humanism, Sartre declared that without God, "everything is permitted" not as license for chaos but as a call to invent morality through action, directly challenging Christian prohibitions rooted in immutable divine commands. This stance provoked ecclesiastical condemnation, with critics like Pope Pius XII in 1950 decrying existentialism's subjectivism as eroding moral foundations.[59][60] Friedrich Nietzsche's pronouncement of "God is dead" in The Gay Science (1882) encapsulated existentialism's assault on orthodox religion, portraying it as a moribund force whose decline—accelerated by Enlightenment rationalism and scientific advances—exposes humanity to nihilistic void unless vital new values emerge from within. Nietzsche lambasted Christian morality as "slave morality," born of ressentiment among the weak, who invert noble instincts like power and self-assertion into vices, stifling life's affirmative forces under guilt and pity. In On the Genealogy of Morality (1887), he traced this ethic's origins to Judaism and early Christianity, viewing it as a psychological revolt that prioritizes equality and meekness over hierarchical excellence, thus conflicting with any absolutist system enforcing universal humility before God.[61][4] Even Christian existentialism, as in Søren Kierkegaard's writings, clashes with orthodox institutionalism by insisting on subjective truth and a "leap of faith" transcending rational proofs or ecclesiastical mediation. Kierkegaard assailed the 19th-century Danish state church for reducing Christianity to bourgeois complacency and objective doctrine, devoid of the passionate inwardness required for genuine discipleship. In works like Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), he argued that objective certainty dilutes faith's paradox—believing absurdities like the Incarnation—contrasting sharply with orthodoxy's emphasis on creedal conformity and historical verification over individual dread and commitment. This critique positioned Kierkegaard against Hegelian systematics and Lutheran establishment, favoring existential appropriation of truth as "how the subject relates himself to it" rather than propositional assent.[62] Regarding moral absolutism, existentialism repudiates the notion of timeless, universal principles independent of human contingency, positing ethics as emergent from freedom rather than antecedent essence. Moral absolutists, often drawing from religious or rationalist sources like Kant, claim acts such as lying or murder are intrinsically wrong, binding all agents irrespective of situation. Existentialists counter that such absolutes presuppose a God-given or rationally derived order, which their ontology denies; instead, values arise in the "nothingness" of choice, demanding authentic responsibility amid anguish. Sartre illustrated this by rejecting Kantian imperatives as evasive, insisting morality cannot be universalized without bad faith, while Nietzsche urged a "transvaluation" of values to affirm life over absolutist constraints. This relativism—where good and evil are human constructs—antagonizes absolutism's causal realism of objective duties, potentially leading to ethical vertigo but empowering individual agency.[1][63]Historical Development
Precursors in Earlier Thought
Socrates (c. 469–399 BCE) laid early groundwork for existential themes through his insistence on the examined life, stating in Plato's Apology that "the unexamined life is not worth living," thereby prioritizing individual self-inquiry and ethical authenticity over societal conventions or abstract universals.[64] His method of dialectical questioning and confrontation with death—exemplified by his calm acceptance of execution by hemlock in 399 BCE—highlighted personal responsibility and the limits of human knowledge, influencing later existential emphases on subjective truth and freedom in the face of uncertainty.[65] Søren Kierkegaard, a foundational existential thinker, praised Socrates as authoring "the best chapter of existential philosophy" for this inward focus and ironic humility.[65] Stoic philosophers, such as Epictetus (c. 50–135 CE), further developed ideas of personal agency, asserting in his Enchiridion (c. 125 CE) that individuals control only their judgments and responses to external events, not the events themselves, fostering a sense of autonomy amid inevitable suffering and mortality.[66] This dichotomy between what is up to us and what is not resonated with existentialist notions of authentic choice and resilience against absurdity, as Epictetus, a former slave, endured physical hardship while advocating mental freedom.[66] In the Renaissance, Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) advanced subjective reflection in his Essays (1580), probing the instability of human reason, the vanity of pursuits, and the inevitability of death, urging readers to "learn to die" through philosophical preparation.[67] His skeptical humanism, emphasizing personal experience over dogmatic certainty, inspired existentialist explorations of the self, with thinkers like Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus drawing on Montaigne's introspective approach to contingency and freedom.[68] Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), in his Pensées (published posthumously in 1670), articulated the wretchedness of human existence without divine faith, describing diversion as a futile escape from awareness of mortality and infinity, and proposing the wager as a pragmatic response to inescapable uncertainty.[69] Pascal's portrayal of the heart's reasons beyond logic and the dread of nothingness anticipated existentialist motifs of anguish and the leap beyond rational evidence, directly influencing 20th-century figures through his vivid depiction of the human condition's fragility.[70]19th-Century Foundations
The 19th-century foundations of existentialism emerged from critiques of Hegelian rationalism and Enlightenment optimism, emphasizing individual subjectivity, freedom, and the limits of objective knowledge. Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), a Danish philosopher, pioneered these ideas by asserting that "truth is subjectivity," meaning authentic existence requires personal passion and commitment rather than detached universality.[71] In his Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), published under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard argued that ethical and religious truths demand a "leap of faith"—a subjective decision transcending rational evidence—to achieve genuine individuality amid despair and anxiety.[72] He outlined three stages of life: the aesthetic (pleasure-seeking), ethical (duty-bound), and religious (faith-leap), where the religious stage resolves existential paradoxes through paradoxical commitment.[73] Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), a German philologist and philosopher, extended this inward turn by diagnosing the cultural consequences of secularization. In The Gay Science (1882), he declared "God is dead," observing that the decline of Christian belief since the 18th-century Enlightenment had eroded absolute moral foundations, risking nihilism as Europeans confronted value vacuums.[74] Nietzsche viewed this not merely as loss but as liberation, positing the "will to power" as life's fundamental, creative drive—evident in human striving beyond mere survival—urging individuals to affirm existence through self-overcoming and value-creation, as elaborated in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883–1885).[75] His critique targeted "slave morality" rooted in resentment, advocating instead aristocratic affirmation of earthly life against transcendental illusions.[76] Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoyevsky (1821–1881) contributed through literary explorations of psychological turmoil and moral freedom without divine guarantees. In Notes from Underground (1864), the nameless narrator rejects 19th-century utopian rationalism—such as Chernyshevsky's deterministic progress—asserting spiteful free will as essential to human dignity, even if self-destructive, highlighting alienation and the absurdity of rational self-interest.[77] This anticipates existential rebellion against systems denying individuality. In The Brothers Karamazov (1879–1880), Ivan Karamazov's "Grand Inquisitor" chapter posits that "if God does not exist, everything is permitted," dramatizing moral chaos and the burden of freedom in a godless world, while the novel affirms faith's redemptive role amid suffering.[78] Dostoyevsky's Orthodox Christian perspective infused these themes with tension between despair and redemption, influencing later existential portrayals of authentic choice.[79] These thinkers—Kierkegaard and Dostoyevsky theistic, Nietzsche atheistic—converged on the individual's solitary confrontation with meaninglessness, rejecting collectivist or essentialist frameworks for personal responsibility and authenticity, thus seeding 20th-century existentialism despite their disparate conclusions.[80]Kierkegaard’s Subjective Truth and Individual Leap
Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), a Danish philosopher and theologian, developed concepts central to existential thought in pseudonymous works published in the 1840s, critiquing Hegelian rationalism and emphasizing personal appropriation of truth.[53] In Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments (1846), written under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard posits that "subjective truth" prioritizes the individual's inward passion over detached objectivity when confronting existential realities like one's relation to God.[81] This formulation, "truth is subjectivity," asserts that objective uncertainty about matters of ultimate concern—held fast through subjective commitment—marks authentic truth, distinguishing it from mere factual correspondence or systematic proofs.[81] Kierkegaard illustrates this by contrasting pagan approximation of Socratic ignorance with Christian faith's requirement for infinite passion toward an objectively uncertain paradox, such as the Incarnation.[81] Kierkegaard's "individual leap" emerges prominently in Fear and Trembling (1843), under the pseudonym Johannes de silentio, analyzing Abraham's biblical trial in Genesis 22 as a paradigm of faith.[82] Abraham embodies the "knight of faith," who performs a teleological suspension of the ethical—prioritizing divine command over universal moral norms—through infinite resignation of Isaac followed by a leap of belief in the absurd that God will restore him.[82] This leap defies rational mediation, requiring solitary resolve amid anguish and paradox, as no communal ethic or probabilistic reasoning can bridge the gap to transcendent commitment.[53] Unlike aesthetic or ethical stages of existence, the religious stage demands this personal, non-transferable venture into uncertainty, underscoring human finitude and the isolation of authentic decision.[83] These ideas interconnect: subjective truth demands the leap as the subjective thinker's dialectical passion, rejecting objective assurances for lived inwardness, thus founding existentialism's focus on individual authenticity over collective or rational certainties.[84] Kierkegaard's approach, rooted in Christian paradox, anticipates later existential themes by privileging existential risk and personal responsibility in truth-seeking.[85]Nietzsche’s Will to Power and Death of God
Friedrich Nietzsche first articulated the declaration "God is dead" in section 125 of The Gay Science, published in 1882, through the parable of a madman who laments that humanity has killed God by undermining faith through rational inquiry and moral critique.[86] This phrase encapsulates Nietzsche's diagnosis of modernity: the erosion of Christian metaphysics and morality as dominant frameworks, resulting from Enlightenment skepticism and scientific progress, which leaves Western culture without transcendent anchors for meaning and value.[4] Nietzsche viewed this "death" not as a triumphant atheism but as a profound crisis, foreseeing widespread nihilism—the devaluation of all values—unless individuals actively forge new ones grounded in earthly vitality rather than divine command.[76] Central to Nietzsche's response to this void is the concept of the will to power (Wille zur Macht), which he presented as the underlying principle of all life and human striving, manifesting as an instinctual drive to overcome obstacles, expand influence, and achieve mastery rather than mere preservation or pleasure-seeking.[4] Developed across works like Beyond Good and Evil (1886) and On the Genealogy of Morality (1887), and elaborated in unpublished notes compiled posthumously as The Will to Power (1901), this doctrine interprets phenomena from biology to psychology as expressions of power dynamics, where growth occurs through resistance and self-overcoming.[76] In the wake of God's death, the will to power offers a path beyond nihilism by redirecting human energy toward affirmative, creative pursuits—exemplified in the ideal of the Übermensch (overman), who legislates values from strength rather than resentment or tradition.[75] These ideas position Nietzsche as a key precursor to existentialism, emphasizing radical individual responsibility in a godless universe devoid of inherent purpose, where existence precedes essence and authenticity demands confronting the abyss of meaninglessness.[76] Unlike later existentialists such as Sartre, who stressed freedom amid absurdity, Nietzsche's framework prioritizes hierarchical power affirmation over egalitarian humanism, critiquing egalitarian impulses as symptoms of decadence born from slave morality.[87] His warnings about cultural collapse post-deicide influenced existential themes of authenticity and revolt against nihilism, though he rejected systematic philosophy in favor of perspectivism, urging eternal recurrence as a test of life's worthiness.[74]Dostoyevsky’s Psychological and Moral Explorations
Fyodor Dostoyevsky, born in 1821 and died in 1881, delved into the human psyche through novels that anticipated existential concerns with individual freedom, moral responsibility, and the void left by declining faith.[88] His portrayals of characters grappling with internal torment and ethical dilemmas highlighted the irrationality of human behavior, rejecting deterministic views of rationality dominant in 19th-century thought.[89] In Notes from Underground (1864), the unnamed narrator embodies spiteful rebellion against utilitarian rationalism, asserting conscious inertia and the value of free will even when self-destructive. This work is regarded as an early fictional exploration of existential themes, where the protagonist's hyper-consciousness leads to isolation and a defiant affirmation of human unpredictability over harmonious systems.[89] Dostoyevsky illustrates how excessive reason can paralyze action, paving the way for authentic choice amid absurdity.[90] Crime and Punishment (1866) examines moral psychology through Rodion Raskolnikov, who murders to transcend conventional ethics via a Napoleonic superhuman ideal, only to suffer profound guilt and psychological breakdown. The novel probes conscience as an innate force transcending rational justification, with Raskolnikov's path to redemption via suffering underscoring Dostoyevsky's view of ethical struggle as essential to humanity.[91] This internal conflict reveals causal links between actions, remorse, and spiritual renewal, challenging secular moral frameworks.[88] The Brothers Karamazov (1880) intensifies moral inquiries through Ivan Karamazov's intellectual rebellion, encapsulated in the premise that "if God does not exist, everything is permitted," questioning absolute morality without divine grounding.[92] Ivan's "Grand Inquisitor" poem critiques freedom's burden, suggesting humans prefer security over autonomous choice, while Alyosha represents faith's redemptive potential amid familial chaos and patricide. Dostoyevsky thus explores how moral ambiguity arises from rejecting transcendence, yet insists on personal accountability through suffering and love.[93] Dostoyevsky's narratives emphasize psychological realism, depicting characters' subconscious drives and ethical quandaries as drivers of existential authenticity, influencing later thinkers by demonstrating freedom's paradoxical pain and necessity.[94] His Orthodox Christian backdrop tempers atheistic despair, positing suffering as a path to moral clarity rather than nihilistic void.[95]Early 20th-Century Phenomenology and Existential Turn
Edmund Husserl founded phenomenology in the early 20th century as a method for rigorously describing the structures of conscious experience, independent of assumptions about external reality. His Logical Investigations (1900–1901) critiqued psychologism and laid groundwork for intentionality as the directedness of consciousness toward objects, while Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (1913) introduced the epoché, or phenomenological reduction, which brackets the "natural attitude" to focus on phenomena as they appear.[96] [97] Husserl aimed to establish philosophy as a foundational science, transcending empirical psychology by examining essences through intuitive fulfillment.[96] This phenomenological framework, disseminated through Husserl's Göttingen and Freiburg circles, prompted an existential turn by the 1920s, as thinkers like Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers shifted emphasis from static transcendental consciousness to dynamic, situated human existence amid finitude and historicity. Heidegger, Husserl's protégé, radicalized phenomenology by critiquing its oversight of temporality and everyday being-in-the-world, foregrounding ontology over epistemology.[1] Jaspers, approaching from psychopathology, integrated phenomenological description with existential illumination of "limit situations" like death and guilt, which shatter illusions of self-sufficiency and reveal authentic freedom.[98] This turn rejected Husserl's ideal of a presuppositionless science for a hermeneutics of concrete life, influencing interwar philosophy by prioritizing thrownness, anxiety, and decision over pure description.[99]Heidegger’s Being and Time
Sein und Zeit (Being and Time), published in 1927, represents Martin Heidegger's attempt to revive the question of the meaning of Being through a fundamental ontology centered on the analysis of human existence, termed Dasein.[6] The work, which remained incomplete with only the first division and parts of the second published, critiques traditional metaphysics for overlooking the temporal structure of Being and instead employs phenomenology to disclose the pre-ontological understanding of Being inherent in Dasein.[100] Heidegger argues that Dasein—literally "being-there"—is the unique entity that inquires into its own Being, distinguishing it from mere objects (present-at-hand) or tools (ready-to-hand) by its existential structure of being-in-the-world.[6] Central to the analysis is the concept of Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein), which rejects Cartesian dualism by positing that Dasein is primordially embedded in a meaningful context of practical concerns and relations, rather than a detached subject observing an external world.[101] This worldly involvement manifests in everyday concern (Besorgen) with equipment and solicitude (Fürsorge) toward others, but Dasein is also characterized by thrownness (Geworfenheit)—its factical situatedness in a world not of its choosing—and projection (Entwurf) toward future possibilities.[6] The unifying existentiale of Dasein is care (Sorge), encompassing its past thrownness, present absorption, and future-oriented understanding, which reveals the temporal ecstatic nature of existence.[6] Heidegger delineates two modes of Dasein's Being: inauthentic and authentic. Inauthenticity arises in the mode of fallenness (Verfallen), where Dasein loses itself in the anonymous "they" (das Man), conforming to idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity, thereby fleeing from its own finitude.[102] Authenticity, by contrast, emerges through anxiety (Angst), which discloses the nothingness of the world and Dasein's being-towards-death—its unique, non-relativistic possibility that individuates it and calls for resolute anticipation of this end, enabling ownership of one's existence (Eigentlichkeit).[103] This call of conscience urges Dasein to authentic resoluteness (Entschlossenheit), aligning choices with its historical heritage rather than superficial novelty.[6] Though often associated with existentialism for its emphasis on individual existence, anxiety, and authenticity, Being and Time prioritizes ontological inquiry over ethical or humanistic prescriptions, influencing later thinkers like Jean-Paul Sartre while Heidegger himself rejected existentialist interpretations as anthropocentric dilutions of the question of Being.[1] The work's dense, neologistic style and unfinished state—intended to culminate in a destruction of the history of ontology—have sparked extensive debate, with critics noting its departure from empirical verification toward hermeneutic phenomenology.[104]Jaspers and the Encompassing
Karl Jaspers, a German-Swiss philosopher and psychiatrist (1883–1969), advanced existential thought through his systematic philosophy outlined in the three-volume Philosophie published in 1932, where he introduced the concept of the Encompassing (Das Umgreifende) as the ultimate horizon of human being.[105][106] This notion posits the Encompassing not as a static entity but as the dynamic, pre-reflective whole that subsumes all modes of reality, transcending the fragmented perspectives of rational cognition and empirical science.[105][107] Jaspers argued that ordinary understanding operates within limited horizons, but the Encompassing reveals itself when these limits are confronted, integrating subject and object in a manner irreducible to dialectical synthesis or objective analysis.[105] The Encompassing operates through three primary modes: the world, encompassing objective spatiotemporal reality accessible via science and perception; existence (Dasein), the subjective sphere of personal freedom, decision, and historical individuality; and transcendence, the cipher-like disclosure of the unconditioned beyond immanence, encountered non-objectifiably.[105][108] Jaspers maintained that these modes are not hierarchical but interdependent, with existence serving as the site where the human self engages the Encompassing through authentic willing and communication, rather than abstract theorizing.[105] He critiqued overly rationalistic philosophies, including aspects of Heidegger's ontology, for failing to adequately address this encompassing unity, emphasizing instead the ethical imperative of intersubjective truth-seeking amid inevitable relativity.[105] Central to accessing the Encompassing are boundary situations (Grenzsituationen), unavoidable existential limits such as death, suffering, guilt, struggle, and chance, which dismantle illusions of rational mastery and compel confrontation with one's finitude.[98][109] In these moments—enumerated by Jaspers as early as his 1919 Psychology of Worldviews and elaborated in 1932—one experiences the failure of explanatory frameworks, yielding a disclosure of existence's ground in the Encompassing and fostering "philosophical faith" as an attitude of humble openness rather than dogmatic belief.[110][111] Jaspers viewed such situations not as pathological but as essential for authentic selfhood, distinguishing his existentialism from atheistic variants by preserving space for transcendent ciphers without collapsing into metaphysics.[98][112] This framework underscores human freedom as enacted in historical time, oriented toward possible historical situations where the Encompassing manifests through communicative reason.[105]Mid-20th-Century French Existentialism
Mid-20th-century French existentialism developed in the intellectual milieu of post-World War II Paris, where philosophers grappled with human freedom and responsibility amid widespread disillusionment. This strand of thought, often atheistic, built on phenomenological influences from thinkers like Heidegger while emphasizing radical individual agency in an indifferent universe. Key figures including Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Albert Camus articulated views on existence preceding essence, the burden of choice, and confrontation with absurdity, influencing literature, theater, and ethics during the 1940s and 1950s.[113] The movement gained prominence through Sartre's systematic ontology and public defenses, de Beauvoir's ethical extensions, and Camus's literary explorations of revolt, though tensions arose over responses to meaninglessness—creation via commitment for Sartre versus defiant acceptance for Camus. Sartre's collaboration with de Beauvoir exemplified a shared commitment to humanism, positing that humans define themselves through actions without predetermined purpose. Camus, initially aligned but later divergent, rejected systematic existentialism in favor of absurdism, leading to a public rift by 1952 over political and philosophical divergences.[114]Sartre and de Beauvoir’s Humanism
Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness, published in 1943, laid the foundational ontology for French existentialism, distinguishing between being-in-itself (inert objects) and being-for-itself (consciousness as nothingness, perpetually negating and projecting freedom).[113] Sartre argued that "existence precedes essence," meaning humans exist first and must create their own values through choices, incurring anguish from absolute responsibility without excuses like God or nature.[115] He introduced "bad faith" as self-deception denying this freedom, such as adopting fixed roles to evade decision-making.[113] In his 1945 lecture "Existentialism is a Humanism," delivered on October 29 in Paris and published in 1946, Sartre defended the philosophy against accusations of despair, asserting it empowers individuals to forge meaning optimistically, as "man is nothing else but what he makes of himself."[115] This humanistic turn framed existentialism as a doctrine of action, where authentic commitment to projects defines humanity, rejecting determinism.[116] Simone de Beauvoir extended these ideas ethically in The Ethics of Ambiguity (1947), arguing that human freedom entails ambiguity—simultaneous subjectivity and relation to others—condemning subjugation of others as denying their freedom, akin to bad faith.[117] She critiqued oppressive structures that limit transcendence, positing ethics arises from reciprocal recognition of freedoms rather than abstract universals. In The Second Sex (1949), de Beauvoir applied existential analysis to women's condition, stating "one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman," highlighting how social immanence hinders female projects, urging transcendence through authentic choices.[117] Their partnership integrated personal and philosophical life, with de Beauvoir's works reinforcing Sartre's humanism while addressing interpersonal and gendered dimensions of freedom.[118]Camus’s Myth of Sisyphus
Albert Camus's The Myth of Sisyphus, published in 1942, posed the problem of suicide as the fundamental philosophical question in response to the absurd—the clash between humanity's demand for order and the universe's silence.[119] Camus rejected "philosophical suicide" through leaps of faith or illusions, advocating lucid recognition of absurdity without escape.[120] He proposed revolt as living defiantly, scorning the absurd while maximizing experiences like quantity of life over illusory quality, exemplified by Sisyphus eternally pushing his boulder yet finding happiness in conscious struggle.[119] Unlike Sartre's emphasis on creating subjective meaning through commitments, Camus denied the efficacy of such invention, viewing it as evasion; instead, authentic response lies in perpetual confrontation and scorn toward meaninglessness.[121] This absurdism influenced Camus's novels like The Stranger (1942), portraying detached protagonists illuminating human isolation. The divergence culminated in Camus's 1945 preface to The Myth distancing from Sartrean existentialism, and their 1952 break over Camus's rejection of revolutionary violence for humane limits.[114][122]Sartre and de Beauvoir’s Humanism
Jean-Paul Sartre delivered the lecture "Existentialism is a Humanism" on October 29, 1945, at Club Maintenant in Paris, which was later published in 1946 as a defense of atheistic existentialism against charges of pessimism and nihilism.[14] In it, Sartre argued that existentialism qualifies as a humanism because it places humans at the center of meaning-making in an absurd universe devoid of divine purpose, asserting that "existence precedes essence," meaning individuals exist first and define their essence through free choices rather than any predetermined nature.[14] This radical freedom entails anguish, as each person's actions legislate values for all humanity, imposing responsibility without excuse in the absence of God or external moral absolutes.[14] Simone de Beauvoir, Sartre's lifelong intellectual companion since their 1929 pact, extended this humanist framework in her 1947 work The Ethics of Ambiguity, where she emphasized the reciprocal nature of freedom and the ethical imperative to combat oppression without falling into abstract universalism or totalitarian subjugation.[16] De Beauvoir critiqued Sartre's early formulation for underemphasizing situational constraints on freedom, introducing the concept of human existence as inherently ambiguous—torn between facticity (given circumstances) and transcendence (projective freedom)—thus grounding existential humanism in concrete ethical relations rather than isolated individualism.[123] Their shared atheistic stance rejected traditional humanism's reliance on religious or rationalist essences, positing instead that humans must invent values through authentic projects, rejecting "bad faith" denials of liberty.[14] This humanism manifested in their post-World War II advocacy for personal authenticity amid reconstruction, influencing literature and ethics by prioritizing human agency over deterministic ideologies, though Sartre later distanced himself from the lecture's popularized version, deeming it insufficiently rigorous in addressing metaphysical depths from Being and Nothingness (1943).[124] De Beauvoir applied these principles to gender in The Second Sex (1949), arguing women's oppression stems from imposed roles rather than innate essence, aligning with existentialism's call for women to transcend through self-definition.[16] Critics, however, contend this overlooks biological and social causal factors limiting purported absolute freedom, rendering the humanism more aspirational than empirically grounded, as human behavior often follows evolved patterns rather than pure invention.[125] Despite such challenges, Sartre and de Beauvoir's version framed existentialism as an optimistic doctrine of human potential, countering accusations of despair by insisting that in forlornness lies the dignity of self-creation.[14]Camus’s Myth of Sisyphus
The Myth of Sisyphus, published in French as Le Mythe de Sisyphe in 1942, constitutes Albert Camus's foundational essay on absurdism, commencing with the assertion that suicide represents the sole truly serious philosophical problem, as it interrogates whether life merits continuation amid evident meaninglessness.[126] Camus delineates the absurd as originating from the irreconcilable clash between humanity's innate quest for order, unity, and clarity against the world's irrational silence and indifference, yielding neither inherent purpose nor rational justification for existence.[7] This recognition, far from precipitating despair, demands rejection of escapist "philosophical suicide"—such as religious faith or ideological leaps that fabricate illusory meaning—and instead mandates lucid confrontation without appeal.[21] Camus derives three principal responses to the absurd: revolt, entailing perpetual refusal to acquiesce to meaninglessness; freedom, unburdened by transcendent hopes or eternal verities; and passion, the intense maximization of earthly experiences in defiant awareness of futility.[21] He exemplifies the absurd hero through figures like the seducer (Don Juan), the actor, and the conqueror, each embodying quantity over illusory quality in a finite life, and extends this to artistic creation, where form imposes defiant order on chaos without claiming ultimate truth.[7] Critiquing existentialist contemporaries, Camus contends that authentic absurd living precludes any metaphysical commitment, including Sartre's emphasis on radical freedom as self-creation, prioritizing instead unyielding consciousness over invention.[126] The essay culminates in the mythic figure of Sisyphus, condemned by the gods to eternally roll a boulder uphill only for it to descend repeatedly, symbolizing the human condition's repetitive, futile toil devoid of cosmic rationale.[21] Yet Camus portrays Sisyphus as triumphant during his descent, fully cognizant of his fate's absurdity, scorning the gods through conscious defiance rather than delusion, thereby attaining a measure of sovereignty over circumstance.[7] "One must imagine Sisyphus happy," Camus concludes, affirming that happiness emerges not despite the absurd but through its unflinching embrace, rendering the struggle itself sufficient justification for persistence.[126] This stance underscores Camus's divergence from orthodox existentialism, emphasizing stoic rebellion over subjective authenticity or historical progress.[21]Post-War Evolution and Decline
Following World War II, existentialism gained widespread popularity in France and beyond, fueled by the era's disillusionment with traditional values, the revelations of totalitarian atrocities, and a pervasive sense of absurdity in human existence. Jean-Paul Sartre's 1946 lecture Existentialism is a Humanism drew large crowds in Paris, encapsulating the movement's emphasis on individual freedom and responsibility amid societal collapse, while Albert Camus's The Plague (1947) allegorized resistance to oppression through everyday defiance. This period saw existential themes permeate literature, theater, and intellectual discourse, with Sartre founding the journal Les Temps Modernes in 1945 to promote engaged literature that addressed political realities without surrendering to ideology. However, internal fractures emerged, notably the 1952 public rupture between Sartre and Camus, triggered by Camus's The Rebel (1951), which critiqued revolutionary violence and totalitarianism; Sartre, defending Soviet communism as a necessary historical force, accused Camus of naive moralism in a scathing review, marking a shift where Sartre increasingly subordinated existential authenticity to Marxist collectivism.[127][128] In the United States, existentialism influenced post-war veterans and academics, as seen in Yale Divinity School discussions around 1946-1948, where it reframed free will against the backdrop of atomic warfare and existential dread, emphasizing human agency over deterministic theology. Yet, by the late 1950s, the movement's evolution toward political activism—exemplified by Sartre's support for decolonization movements and his 1960 Critique of Dialectical Reason, which attempted to reconcile existentialism with historical materialism—diluted its focus on individual ontology, alienating purists and exposing tensions between personal authenticity and collective action. Camus's 1957 Nobel Prize highlighted a more apolitical strand, but his death in a 1960 car accident symbolized the waning of existentialism's heroic phase.[129] The decline accelerated in the 1960s as structuralism, led by figures like Claude Lévi-Strauss and Roland Barthes, critiqued existentialism's anthropocentric emphasis on subjective freedom, arguing that human behavior was shaped by underlying linguistic and cultural structures beyond individual control. This shift, prominent in French intellectual circles by 1960, portrayed existentialism as overly dramatic and insufficiently scientific, prioritizing myth over empirical analysis of systems. By the 1970s, post-structuralism and analytic philosophy further marginalized it, viewing its relativism as philosophically untenable amid rising interest in linguistics, semiotics, and objective methodologies; existentialism's association with Sartre's controversial Stalinist apologetics in the 1950s also eroded its credibility, contributing to its eclipse as a dominant school.[130][131]Criticisms and Controversies
Philosophical and Logical Critiques
Critiques from the analytic tradition, particularly logical positivism, portray existentialism as engaging in unverifiable metaphysical assertions that fail the criterion of empirical significance, rendering them pseudopropositions rather than meaningful philosophy. Rudolf Carnap, in his 1931 analysis, specifically targeted Heidegger's claim in "What is Metaphysics?" that "the nothing itself nothings" as an example of empty, emotive rhetoric masquerading as profundity, emblematic of continental philosophy's drift into mysticism over logic.[132] This dismissal extended to existentialism's broader rejection of systematic reasoning, viewing its emphasis on lived experience (Erlebnis) as antithetical to precise conceptual analysis.[133] Sartre's core tenet that "existence precedes essence" invites charges of internal contradiction, as the assertion itself universalizes a defining trait for human being—namely, the capacity to self-define—thus smuggling in an essential structure prior to contingent existence, undermining the very anti-essentialism it proclaims.[134] This logical tension arises because denying any pre-given human nature requires positing one (radical freedom and responsibility) to explain agency, creating a performative inconsistency where the thesis presupposes what it negates.[59] Further inconsistencies plague Sartre's account of freedom, particularly the concept of mauvaise foi (bad faith), wherein individuals are said to freely deny their freedom through self-deception, yet such denial remains a free act, rendering the condemnation of inauthenticity incoherent—if freedom is absolute and inescapable, no choice can be inherently "bad" without invoking external norms Sartre rejects.[135] Critics argue this dissolves ethical accountability into paradox, as Sartre's existential psychoanalysis presumes objective criteria for authenticity (e.g., lucid recognition of nothingness) while insisting values are invented, leading to an unstable foundation for moral judgment.[59][136] Existentialism's privileging of subjective anguish over objective essences or teleology has been faulted for irrationalism, as it subordinates reason to arbitrary will, ignoring Aristotelian observations of inherent human capacities (e.g., rational deliberation as a natural end) evident in biological and psychological data, such as evolutionary adaptations for social cooperation documented since Darwin's 1871 The Descent of Man.[134] Philosophers like Bertrand Russell echoed this by decrying Heideggerian obscurantism as "life-weary Romanticism" that evades logical scrutiny, fostering a cult of vagueness incompatible with truth-seeking inquiry.[137] These critiques highlight existentialism's vulnerability to charges of solipsism, where radical individualism negates intersubjective universals required for coherent discourse or ethics.Critiques of Individualism and Relativism
Critics of existentialism argue that its emphasis on radical individual autonomy fosters an atomistic view of the self, detached from communal traditions and interdependencies essential to human flourishing. Alasdair MacIntyre contends that Nietzschean existentialism, by rejecting objective moral facts and intuitionism, aligns with emotivism—a doctrine where ethical assertions merely express subjective preferences—leading to moral fragmentation and criterionless individual choices that prioritize personal will over shared rational norms.[138] This perspective, MacIntyre maintains, exacerbates modern ethical incoherence by treating morality as a war of isolated wills, undermining the narrative unity provided by historical practices and virtues.[138] The philosophy's denial of inherent human nature or transcendent values further invites charges of moral relativism, as individuals purportedly create meaning and ethics ex nihilo, rendering judgments arbitrary and ungrounded in universal principles. Detractors highlight that Jean-Paul Sartre's framework in Existentialism is a Humanism (1946), while claiming to avoid solipsism through universalizable projects, lacks a non-subjective basis for validation, reducing ethics to strategic maximization of freedom without resolving concrete moral dilemmas.[125] [139] Such subjectivism, critics assert, equates to preference-based decision-making, where "authenticity" justifies any coherent self-narrative, potentially excusing antisocial or self-destructive acts under the guise of personal responsibility.[140] Religious thinkers have echoed these concerns, viewing existentialist individualism as eroding objective moral order. Pope Pius XII, in the encyclical Humani Generis (August 12, 1950), condemned existentialism as a "fictitious philosophic theory" that promotes excessive subjectivism, distorting theology by prioritizing existential experience over rational demonstration of divine truths and natural law.[141] [142] Communitarian philosophers extend this by arguing that existentialism's abstract, unencumbered self ignores how identities and values emerge from embedded social relations, rendering "authentic" choices not truly free but illusory without communal context.[143] Empirically, this relativism correlates with observed declines in shared civic norms, as individual authenticity supplants collective accountability in post-traditional societies.[138]Political Appropriations and Failures
Existentialism's core tenets of radical individual freedom and personal responsibility were frequently appropriated for political ends, particularly in post-war France, where thinkers like Jean-Paul Sartre sought to fuse them with Marxist collectivism. This synthesis, outlined in Sartre's 1960 work Critique of Dialectical Reason, posited that individual praxis could align with historical class struggle, yet it subordinated existential authenticity to deterministic materialist dialectics, diluting the philosophy's anti-systemic individualism.[144][145] Such appropriations often failed to resolve inherent tensions, as collective ideologies imposed external structures that negated the absolute freedom central to existential thought. Existentialism has also seen subtle and sporadic appropriations by right-wing thinkers and movements. Martin Heidegger's emphasis on authenticity and rootedness has appealed to far-right groups, including nationalists, who cite these concepts—often linked to his Nazi affiliations—as anti-globalization and anti-modernist tools. Some conservatives and libertarians have sporadically invoked existentialist personal responsibility to critique welfare states, promoting self-reliance against societal blame. However, existentialism's rebellious individualism predominantly aligns with left-leaning thought, requiring significant adaptations for right-wing uses.[6][146]Sartre’s Marxism and Collectivist Deviations
Sartre, never a formal member of the French Communist Party, vocally defended Soviet communism through the 1940s and 1950s, viewing it as a necessary bulwark against capitalism despite documented atrocities. In 1954, shortly after Stalin's death, he visited the Soviet Union and publicly claimed to observe "complete freedom of criticism," downplaying ongoing repressions even as reports of the Gulag system—forced labor camps holding millions since the 1930s—circulated widely in the West.[147][148] Sartre explicitly refused to condemn the Gulag as a pretext for anti-Soviet agitation, arguing in Les Temps Modernes that focusing on Soviet flaws distracted from imperialist threats, a stance that prioritized ideological solidarity over empirical accountability.[149] This Marxist turn manifested in collectivist deviations from existentialism's individualism, as Sartre justified revolutionary violence—including Stalinist terror—as dialectically required for human emancipation. His support extended to endorsing the 1955 Bandung Conference's anti-colonialism and later regimes like Mao's China, where cultural revolutions echoed totalitarian controls antithetical to authentic choice.[150][128] These positions alienated purist existentialists, revealing a failure: existentialism's subjective ethics crumbled under utilitarian ends-justify-means rationales, enabling apologetics for systems that systematically denied the very freedom Sartre philosophized.[151]Resistance to Totalitarianism versus Ideological Excess
Albert Camus exemplified resistance to totalitarianism, rejecting both Nazi occupation—through his Combat resistance newspaper from 1944—and Soviet communism, which he deemed metaphysical rebellion turned oppressive myth. His 1951 The Rebel critiqued historicist ideologies like Marxism for sanctifying murder in pursuit of abstract futures, arguing that true rebellion affirms limits and human solidarity without totalitarian excess.[152][153] The 1952 public feud with Sartre crystallized this divide: Sartre's scathing review in Les Temps Modernes branded Camus's anti-communism as reactionary, while Camus countered that Sartre's defense of historical necessity excused gulags and purges, betraying existential responsibility.[128][151] Sartre only renounced communists after the 1956 Hungarian uprising, crushed by Soviet tanks killing thousands, yet persisted in socialist activism, highlighting ideological excess over consistent anti-totalitarianism. Camus's stance, though marginalized by pro-Soviet intellectuals, better preserved existentialism's humanistic core against collectivist appropriations that empirically failed, as evidenced by the Soviet system's collapse in 1991 amid economic stagnation and human rights abuses affecting over 20 million deaths under Stalin alone.[147][154]Sartre’s Marxism and Collectivist Deviations
Jean-Paul Sartre's engagement with Marxism intensified after World War II, marking a shift from the individualistic focus of his early existentialist works toward a synthesis emphasizing collective praxis. In his 1946 essay Materialism and Revolution, Sartre critiqued orthodox Marxism for its deterministic view of history while seeking to integrate existentialist notions of freedom into dialectical materialism.[154] This culminated in Search for a Method (1957) and Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960), where he proposed an "existential Marxism" that prioritized human agency in historical processes over mechanical economic determinism.[155] However, this framework subordinated the radical individual freedom central to Being and Nothingness (1943) to group dynamics and class struggle, positing that individual actions contribute to "totalizations" in fused groups during revolutionary moments, such as the storming of the Bastille.[156] Sartre's collectivist deviations manifested in his political commitments, including early defense of the Soviet Union despite documented atrocities under Stalin, such as the Great Purge (1936–1938) that executed over 680,000 people.[157] He remained a vocal supporter of the French Communist Party until publicly denouncing the Soviet invasion of Hungary on November 9, 1956, following the suppression of the uprising that resulted in approximately 2,500 Hungarian deaths.[147] [158] Even after this break, Sartre signed the Manifesto of the 121 in 1960, endorsing insubordination against French forces in the Algerian War (1954–1962), framing anti-colonial violence as necessary for collective liberation.[144] Critics, including Albert Camus, argued that Sartre's Marxist turn contradicted existentialism's emphasis on personal authenticity and rebellion against absurd structures, instead endorsing totalitarian-leaning ideologies that prioritized the proletariat's historical role over individual conscience. Camus's rift with Sartre in 1952 stemmed from such disagreements, with Camus rejecting communism's collectivist ends justifying violent means.[151] In Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre described "seriality"—passive conformity in masses—and "practico-inert" fields where human projects become alienated structures, yet his solution relied on dialectical reason emerging from collective scarcity rather than irreducible individual choice, diluting existentialism's anti-essentialist core.[159] This integration, while innovative, empirically faltered as Sartre overlooked causal evidence of Marxist regimes' failures, such as the Soviet famines killing millions in the 1930s, in favor of theoretical reconciliation.[160] Sartre's later activism, including co-founding Les Temps Modernes to propagate engaged literature and support for Maoist groups in the 1970s, further illustrated collectivist priorities, where individual ethical responsibility yielded to revolutionary solidarity.[156] Such deviations highlighted tensions in existentialism: while Sartre claimed Marxism as the "untranscendable horizon" of thought in 1960, his framework risked bad faith by aligning subjective freedom with objective historical forces, a causal mismatch evident in the persistent individual alienation under collectivist systems he championed.[161]Resistance to Totalitarianism versus Ideological Excess
Albert Camus exemplified existentialism's potential as a bulwark against totalitarianism through his rejection of communist ideology's revolutionary violence. In his 1951 work The Rebel, Camus argued that metaphysical rebellion against injustice must avoid the historical pattern of revolts devolving into totalitarian systems, as seen in the Soviet purges and gulags under Stalin, where ends justified oppressive means.[128] This stance precipitated his public break with Jean-Paul Sartre in July 1952, after Sartre's journal Les Temps Modernes published a scathing review accusing Camus of bourgeois moralism and insufficient commitment to proletarian struggle.[153] Camus's emphasis on individual revolt without ideological absolutism positioned existential authenticity as antithetical to collectivist tyrannies that suppress personal freedom. Karl Jaspers similarly embodied resistance to Nazi totalitarianism, prioritizing existential communication and ethical responsibility over regime compliance. Dismissed from his Heidelberg University professorship in 1937 due to his Jewish wife's heritage, Jaspers refused to divorce her despite Nazi pressure and continued private philosophical work, including drafts on axial age thinkers.[105] Postwar, in The Question of German Guilt (1946), he delineated forms of culpability—criminal, political, moral, and metaphysical—urging Germans to confront collective complicity in Nazi crimes without excusing individual agency, thereby applying existential self-examination to national reckoning.[162] In contrast, ideological excesses marred existentialism when thinkers subordinated individual freedom to political dogmas. Sartre's fusion of existentialism with Marxism, elaborated in Search for a Method (1957) and Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960), justified violence as a dialectical necessity for historical progress toward communism, defending Soviet totalitarianism as a stage in class liberation despite its suppression of dissent.[163][122] He viewed gulags and purges as regrettable but instrumental, prioritizing collective praxis over authentic individual choice, which critics argue betrayed existentialism's core anti-totalitarian ethos. Martin Heidegger's Nazism represented another deviation, intertwining his ontology of Being and Time (1927) with völkisch ideology. Joining the Nazi Party on May 1, 1933, and serving as Freiburg University Rector until April 1934, Heidegger enforced Gleichschaltung (coordination) by purging Jewish faculty and delivering speeches aligning Dasein's resoluteness with the "National Socialist revolution."[6] His postwar "turn" (Kehre) distanced from overt politics but failed to repudiate Nazi commitments, revealing how existential themes of authenticity could rationalize authoritarian submission rather than resist it.[164] This tension underscores existentialism's vulnerability: its valorization of radical freedom resisted totalitarian erasure of the self yet invited excesses when co-opted by ideologues promising authentic communal being.Broader Influences and Applications
In Literature, Art, and Theater
Existential themes profoundly influenced 20th-century literature, manifesting in narratives of alienation, absurdity, and individual responsibility amid a meaningless universe. Precursors like Fyodor Dostoevsky's Notes from Underground (1864) featured a protagonist embracing spiteful irrationality against deterministic rationalism, prefiguring existential emphasis on subjective freedom.[165] Franz Kafka's The Trial (1925) depicted Josef K.'s futile struggle against an opaque bureaucratic system, illustrating existential dread and the absurdity of unaccountable authority.[166] Jean-Paul Sartre's Nausea (1938) captured the protagonist's visceral confrontation with existence's contingency, evoking "nausea" as awareness of objects' superfluous being.[167] Albert Camus' The Stranger (1942) portrayed Meursault's emotional detachment and condemnation for nonconformity, underscoring the absurd conflict between human desire for meaning and an indifferent world—though Camus distanced himself from Sartrean existentialism.[165][168] In theater, existentialism spurred plays examining freedom's burdens and interpersonal conflicts. Sartre's No Exit (1944) confined characters in a room where mutual judgments create inescapable torment, encapsulated in the line "Hell is other people," highlighting bad faith and the gaze's objectifying power.[169] Camus' Caligula (1944) dramatized the titular emperor's pursuit of limitless freedom through capricious acts, revealing its descent into nihilistic excess.[169] The Theatre of the Absurd, drawing from existential motifs without fully endorsing revolt against absurdity, emerged post-World War II; Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot (1953) depicted two tramps in endless, purposeless anticipation, embodying the human condition's futility and breakdown of rational discourse.[170] Eugène Ionesco's The Chairs (1952) satirized empty communication through invisible guests, amplifying existential isolation. Visual art engaged existentialism more obliquely, prioritizing subjective perception and the visceral encounter with existence over narrative representation. Postwar movements explored alienation and sensory immediacy; for instance, artists like Alberto Giacometti rendered elongated, isolated figures symbolizing human fragility and solitude in works such as Man Pointing (1947), reflecting existential concerns with embodiment and death's proximity.[171] Existential aesthetics, as articulated by philosophers like Sartre, viewed art as disclosing freedom's anguish, influencing abstract expressionism's emphasis on authentic gesture amid contingency, though direct causal links remain interpretive rather than doctrinal.[172][173]
