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Africa
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| Area | 30,370,000 km2 (11,730,000 sq mi) (2nd) |
|---|---|
| Population | |
| Population density | 46.1/km2 (119.4/sq mi) (2021) |
| GDP (PPP) | $10.77 trillion (2025 est; 4th)[3] |
| GDP (nominal) | $2.82 trillion (2025 est; 5th)[4] |
| GDP per capita | $1,920 (Nominal; 2025 est; 6th)[5] |
| Religions |
|
| Demonym | African |
| Countries | 54 recognised states, 2 partially recognised states, 4 dependent territories |
| Dependencies | External (4) |
| Languages | 1250–3000 native languages |
| Time zones | UTC-1 to UTC+4 |
| Largest cities | Largest urban areas: |
| ^ A: African people often combine the practice of their traditional beliefs with the practice of Abrahamic religions.[7][8] | |
Africa is the world's second-largest and second-most populous continent after Asia. At about 30.3 million km2 (11.7 million square miles) including adjacent islands, it covers 20% of Earth's land area and 6% of its total surface area.[9] With nearly 1.4 billion people as of 2021, it accounts for about 18% of the world's human population. Africa's population is the youngest among all the continents;[10][11] the median age in 2012 was 19.7, when the worldwide median age was 30.4.[12] Based on 2024 projections, Africa's population will exceed 3.8 billion people by 2100.[13] Africa is the least wealthy inhabited continent per capita and second-least wealthy by total wealth, ahead of Oceania. Scholars have attributed this to different factors including geography, climate,[14] corruption,[14] colonialism, the Cold War,[15][16] and neocolonialism. Despite this low concentration of wealth, recent economic expansion and a large and young population make Africa an important economic market in the broader global context, and Africa has a large quantity of natural resources.
Africa straddles the equator and the prime meridian. The continent is surrounded by the Mediterranean Sea to the north, the Arabian Plate and the Gulf of Aqaba to the northeast, the Indian Ocean to the southeast and the Atlantic Ocean to the west. France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Yemen have parts of their territories located on African geographical soil, mostly in the form of islands.
The continent includes Madagascar and various archipelagos. It contains 54 fully recognised sovereign states, eight cities and islands that are part of non-African states, and two de facto independent states with limited or no recognition. This count does not include Malta and Sicily, which are geologically part of the African continent. Algeria is Africa's largest country by area, and Nigeria is its largest by population. African nations cooperate through the establishment of the African Union, which is headquartered in Addis Ababa.
Africa is highly biodiverse;[17] it is the continent with the largest number of megafauna species, as it was least affected by the extinction of the Pleistocene megafauna. However, Africa is also heavily affected by a wide range of environmental issues, including desertification, deforestation, water scarcity, and pollution. These entrenched environmental concerns are expected to worsen as climate change impacts Africa. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has identified Africa as the continent most vulnerable to climate change.[18][19]
The history of Africa is long, complex, and varied, and has often been under-appreciated by the global historical community.[20] In African societies the oral word is revered, and they have generally recorded their history via oral tradition, which has led anthropologists to term them "oral civilisations", contrasted with "literate civilisations" which pride the written word.[a][23]: 142–143 African culture is rich and diverse both within and between the continent's regions, encompassing art, cuisine, music and dance, religion, and dress.
Africa, particularly Eastern Africa, is widely accepted to be the place of origin of humans and the Hominidae clade, also known as the great apes. The earliest hominids and their ancestors have been dated to around 7 million years ago, and Homo sapiens (modern human) are believed to have originated in Africa 350,000 to 260,000 years ago.[b] In the 4th and 3rd millennia BCE Ancient Egypt, Kerma, Punt, and the Tichitt Tradition emerged in North, East and West Africa, while from 3000 BCE to 500 CE the Bantu expansion swept from modern-day Cameroon through Central, East, and Southern Africa, displacing or absorbing groups such as the Khoisan and Pygmies. Some African empires include Wagadu, Mali, Songhai, Sokoto, Ife, Benin, Asante, the Fatimids, Almoravids, Almohads, Ayyubids, Mamluks, Kongo, Mwene Muji, Luba, Lunda, Kitara, Aksum, Ethiopia, Adal, Ajuran, Kilwa, Sakalava, Imerina, Maravi, Mutapa, Rozvi, Mthwakazi, and Zulu. Despite the predominance of states, many societies were heterarchical and stateless.[c] Slave trades created various diasporas, especially in the Americas. From the late 19th century to early 20th century, driven by the Second Industrial Revolution, most of Africa was rapidly conquered and colonised by European nations, save for Ethiopia and Liberia.[32] European rule had significant impacts on Africa's societies, and colonies were maintained for the purpose of economic exploitation and extraction of natural resources. Most present states emerged from a process of decolonisation following World War II, and established the Organisation of African Unity in 1963, the predecessor to the African Union.[33] The nascent countries decided to keep their colonial borders, with traditional power structures used in governance to varying degrees.
Etymology
[edit]Afri was a Latin name used to refer to the inhabitants of what was then known as northern Africa, located west of the Nile river, and in its widest sense referring to all lands south of the Mediterranean, also known as Ancient Libya.[34][35] This name seems to have originally referred to a native Libyan tribe, an ancestor of modern Berbers;[36] see Terence for discussion. The name had usually been connected with the Phoenician word ʿafar meaning "dust",[37] but a 1981 hypothesis[38] has asserted that it stems from the Berber word ifri (plural ifran) meaning "cave", in reference to cave dwellers.[39] The same word[39] may be found in the name of the Banu Ifran from Algeria and Tripolitania, a Berber tribe originally from Yafran (also known as Ifrane) in northwestern Libya,[40] as well as the city of Ifrane in Morocco.
Under Roman rule, Carthage became the capital of the province then named Africa Proconsularis, following the Roman victory over the Carthaginians in the Third Punic War in 146 BC, which also included the coastal part of modern Libya.[41] The Latin suffix -ica can sometimes be used to denote a land (e.g., in Celtica from Celtae, as used by Julius Caesar). The later Muslim region of Ifriqiya, following its conquest of the Byzantine (Eastern Roman) Empire's Exarchatus Africae, also preserved a form of the name.
According to the Romans, Africa lies to the west of Egypt, while "Asia" was used to refer to Anatolia and lands to the east. A definite line was drawn between the two continents by the geographer Ptolemy (85–165 CE), indicating Alexandria along the Prime Meridian and making the isthmus of Suez and the Red Sea the boundary between Asia and Africa. As Europeans came to understand the real extent of the continent, the idea of "Africa" expanded with their knowledge.
Other etymological hypotheses have been postulated for the ancient name "Africa":
- The 1st-century Jewish historian Flavius Josephus (Ant. 1.15) asserted that it was named for Epher, grandson of Abraham according to Gen. 25:4, whose descendants, he claimed, had invaded Libya.
- Isidore of Seville in his 7th-century Etymologiae XIV.5.2. suggests "Africa" comes from the Latin aprica, meaning "sunny".
- Massey, in 1881, stated that Africa is derived from the Egyptian af-rui-ka, meaning "to turn toward the opening of the Ka." The Ka is the energetic double of every person and the "opening of the Ka" refers to a womb or birthplace. Africa would be, for the Egyptians, "the birthplace."[42]
- Michèle Fruyt in 1976 proposed[43] linking the Latin word with africus "south wind", which would be of Umbrian origin and mean originally "rainy wind".
- Robert R. Stieglitz of Rutgers University in 1984 proposed: "The name Africa, derived from the Latin *Aphir-ic-a, is cognate to Hebrew Ophir ['rich']."[44]
- Ibn Khallikan and some other historians claim that the name of Africa came from a Himyarite king called Afrikin ibn Kais ibn Saifi ("Afrikus son of Abraham") who subdued Ifriqiya.[45][46][47]
- Arabic afrīqā (feminine noun) and ifrīqiyā, now usually pronounced afrīqiyā (feminine) 'Africa', from 'afara [' = 'ain, not 'alif] 'to be dusty' from 'afar 'dust, powder' and 'afir 'dried, dried up by the sun, withered' and 'affara 'to dry in the sun on hot sand' or 'to sprinkle with dust'.[48]
- Possibly Phoenician faraqa in the sense of 'colony, separation'.[49]
History
[edit]History in Africa
[edit]In accordance with African cosmology, African historical consciousness viewed historical change and continuity, order and purpose within the framework of man and his environment, the gods, and his ancestors, and he believed himself part of a holistic spiritual entity.[50] In African societies, the historical process is largely a communal one, with eyewitness accounts, hearsay, reminiscences, and occasionally visions, dreams, and hallucinations crafted into narrative oral traditions which are performed and transmitted through generations.[51]: 12 : 48 In oral traditions time is sometimes mythical and social, and ancestors were considered historical actors.[d]: 43–53 Mind and memory shapes traditions, as events are condensed over time and crystallise into clichés.[53]: 11 Oral tradition can be exoteric or esoteric. It speaks to people according to their understanding, unveiling itself in accordance with their aptitudes.[54]: 168 In African epistemology, the epistemic subject "experiences the epistemic object in a sensuous, emotive, intuitive, abstractive understanding, rather than through abstraction alone, as is the case in Western epistemology" to arrive at a "complete knowledge", and as such oral traditions, music, proverbs, and the like were used in the preservation and transmission of knowledge.[55]
Prehistory
[edit]
Africa is considered by most paleoanthropologists to be the oldest inhabited territory on Earth, with the Human species originating from the continent.[56] During the mid-20th century, anthropologists discovered many fossils and evidence of human occupation perhaps as early as seven million years ago (Before present, BP). Fossil remains of several species of early apelike humans thought to have evolved into modern humans, such as Australopithecus afarensis radiometrically dated to approximately 3.9–3.0 million years BP,[57] Paranthropus boisei (c. 2.3–1.4 million years BP)[58] and Homo ergaster (c. 1.9 million–600,000 years BP) have been discovered.[9]
After the evolution of Homo sapiens approximately 350,000 to 260,000 years BP in Africa,[25][26][27][28] the continent was mainly populated by groups of hunter-gatherers.[59][60] These first modern humans left Africa and populated the rest of the globe during the Out of Africa II migration dated to approximately 50,000 years BP, exiting the continent either across Bab-el-Mandeb over the Red Sea,[61][62] the Strait of Gibraltar in Morocco,[63][64] or the Isthmus of Suez in Egypt.[65]
Other migrations of modern humans within the African continent have been dated to that time, with evidence of early human settlement found in Southern Africa, Southeast Africa, North Africa, and the Sahara.[66]
Emergence of civilisation
[edit]

The size of the Sahara has historically been extremely variable, with its area rapidly fluctuating and at times disappearing depending on global climatic conditions.[67] At the end of the Ice ages, estimated to have been around 10,500 BC, the Sahara had again become a green fertile valley, and its African populations returned from the interior and coastal highlands in Africa, with rock art paintings depicting a fertile Sahara and large populations discovered in Tassili n'Ajjer dating back perhaps 10 millennia.[68] However, the warming and drying climate meant that by 5,000 BC, the Sahara region was becoming increasingly dry and hostile. Around 3500 BC, due to a tilt in the Earth's orbit, the Sahara experienced a period of rapid desertification.[69] The population trekked out of the Sahara region towards the Nile Valley below the Second Cataract where they made permanent or semi-permanent settlements. A major climatic recession occurred, lessening the heavy and persistent rains in Central and Eastern Africa. Since this time, dry conditions have prevailed in Eastern Africa and, increasingly during the last 200 years, in Ethiopia.
The domestication of cattle in Africa preceded agriculture and seems to have existed alongside hunter-gatherer cultures. It is speculated that by 6,000 BC, cattle were domesticated in North Africa.[70] In the Sahara-Nile complex, people domesticated many animals, including the donkey and a small screw-horned goat that was common from Algeria to Nubia. Between 10,000 and 9,000 BC, pottery was independently invented in the region of Mali in the savannah of West Africa.[71][72] In the steppes and savannahs of the Sahara and Sahel in Northern West Africa, people possibly ancestral to modern Nilo-Saharan and Mandé cultures started to collect wild millet,[73] around 8,000 to 6,000 BC. Later, gourds, watermelons, castor beans, and cotton were also collected.[74]: 64–75 Sorghum was first domesticated in Eastern Sudan around 4,000 BC, in one of the earliest instances of agriculture in human history. Its cultivation would gradually spread across Africa, before spreading to India around 2000 BC.[75][76]
People around modern-day Mauritania started making pottery and built stone settlements (e.g., Tichitt, Oualata). Fishing, using bone-tipped harpoons, became a major activity in the numerous streams and lakes formed from the increased rains.[77] In West Africa, the wet phase ushered in an expanding rainforest and wooded savanna from Senegal to Cameroon. Between 9,000 and 5,000 BC, Niger–Congo speakers domesticated the oil palm and raffia palm. Black-eyed peas and voandzeia (African groundnuts), were domesticated, followed by okra and kola nuts. Since most of the plants grew in the forest, the Niger–Congo speakers invented polished stone axes for clearing forest.[74]
Around 4,000 BC, the Saharan climate started to become drier at an exceedingly fast pace.[78] This climate change caused lakes and rivers to shrink significantly and caused increasing desertification. This, in turn, decreased the amount of land conducive to settlements and encouraged migrations of farming communities to the more tropical climate of West Africa.[78] During the first millennium BC, a reduction in wild grain populations related to changing climate conditions facilitated the expansion of farming communities and the rapid adoption of rice cultivation around the Niger River.[79][80]
By the first millennium BC, ironworking had been introduced in Northern Africa. Around that time it also became established in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, either through independent invention there or diffusion from the north[81][82] and vanished under unknown circumstances around 500 AD, having lasted approximately 2,000 years,[83] and by 500 BC, metalworking began to become commonplace in West Africa. Ironworking was fully established by roughly 500 BC in many areas of East and West Africa, although other regions did not begin ironworking until the early centuries AD. Copper objects from Egypt, North Africa, Nubia, and Ethiopia dating from around 500 BC have been excavated in West Africa, suggesting that Trans-Saharan trade networks had been established by this date.[78]
4th millennium BC – 6th century AD
[edit]Northeast Africa
[edit]
From 3500 BC, nomes (ruled by nomarchs) coalesced to form the kingdoms of Lower Egypt and Upper Egypt in northeast Africa. Around 3100 BC Upper Egypt conquered Lower Egypt to unify Egypt under the 1st dynasty, with the process of consolidation and assimilation completed by the time of the 3rd dynasty who formed the Old Kingdom of Egypt in 2686 BC.[84]: 62–63 The Kingdom of Kerma emerged around this time to become the dominant force in Nubia, controlling territory as large as Egypt between the 1st and 4th cataracts of the Nile.[85][86]
The 4th dynasty oversaw the height of the Old Kingdom, and constructed many great pyramids. Under the 6th dynasty power gradually decentralised to the nomarchs, culminating in the disintegration of the kingdom, exacerbated by drought and famine, thus commencing the First Intermediate Period in 2200 BC. This shattered state would last until 2055 BC when the 11th dynasty, based in Thebes, conquered the others to form the Middle Kingdom of Egypt, with the 12th dynasty expanding into Lower Nubia at the expense of Kerma.[84]: 68–71 In 1700 BC, the Middle Kingdom fractured in two, ushering in the Second Intermediate Period. The Hyksos, a militaristic people from Palestine, invaded and conquered Lower Egypt, while Kerma coordinated invasions deep into Egypt to reach its greatest extent.[87]
In 1550 BC, the 18th dynasty expelled the Hyksos, and established the New Kingdom of Egypt. Using the advanced military technology the Hyksos had brought, the New Kingdom conquered the Levant from the Canaanites, Mittani, Amorites, and Hittites, and extinguished Kerma, incorporating Nubia into the empire, and sending the Egyptian empire into its golden age.[84]: 73 Internal struggles, drought, famine, and invasions by a confederation of seafaring peoples contributed to the New Kingdom's collapse in 1069 BC, commencing the Third Intermediate Period.[84]: 76–77
Egypt's collapse liberated the more Egyptianised Kingdom of Kush in Nubia, who manoeuvred into power in Upper Egypt and conquered Lower Egypt in 754 BC to form the Kushite Empire. The Kushites ruled for a century and oversaw a revival in pyramid building, until they were driven out of Egypt by the Assyrians in 663 BC in reprisal for their expansion towards the Assyrian Empire.[88] The Assyrians installed a puppet dynasty that later gained independence and once more unified Egypt, until they were conquered by the Achaemenid Empire in 525 BC.[84]: 77 Egypt regained independence under the 28th dynasty in 404 BC but they were reconquered by the Achaemenids in 343 BC. The conquest of Achaemenid Egypt by Alexander the Great in 332 BC marked the beginning of Hellenistic rule and the installation of the Macedonian Ptolemaic dynasty in Egypt.[89]: 119
The Ptolemaics lost their holdings outside of Africa to the Seleucids in the Syrian Wars, expanded into Cyrenaica and subjugated Kush in the 3rd century BC. In the 1st century BC, Ptolemaic Egypt became entangled in a Roman civil war, leading to its conquest by the Romans in 30 BC. The Crisis of the Third Century in the Roman Empire freed the Levantine city state of Palmyra, which conquered Egypt; their brief rule ended when they were reconquered by the Romans. In the midst of this, Kush regained independence from Egypt, and they would persist as a major regional power until, having been weakened from internal rebellion amid worsening climatic conditions, invasions by Aksum and the Noba caused their disintegration into Makuria, Alodia, and Nobatia in the 5th century AD. The Romans managed to hold on to Egypt for the rest of the ancient period.
Horn of Africa
[edit]
In the Horn of Africa, there was the Land of Punt, a kingdom on the Red Sea, likely located in modern-day Eritrea or northern Somaliland.[90] The Ancient Egyptians initially traded via middle-men with Punt until in 2350 BC when they established direct relations. They would become close trading partners for over a millennium. Towards the end of the ancient period, northern Ethiopia and Eritrea bore the Kingdom of D'mt beginning in 980 BC. In modern-day Somalia and Djibouti there was the Macrobian Kingdom, with archaeological discoveries indicating the possibility of other unknown sophisticated civilisations at this time.[91][92] After D'mt's fall in the 5th century BC the Ethiopian Plateau came to be ruled by numerous smaller unknown kingdoms who experienced strong south Arabian influence, until the growth and expansion of Aksum in the 1st century BC.[93] Along the Horn's coast there were many ancient Somali city-states that thrived off of the wider Red Sea trade and transported their cargo via beden, exporting myrrh, frankincense, spices, gum, incense, and ivory, with freedom from Roman interference causing Indians to give the cities a lucrative monopoly on cinnamon from ancient India.[94]
The Kingdom of Aksum grew from a principality into a major power on the trade route between Rome and India through conquering its unfortunately unknown neighbours, gaining a monopoly on Indian Ocean trade in the region. Aksum's rise had them rule over much of the regions from Lake Tana to the valley of the Nile, and they further conquered parts of the ailing Kingdom of Kush, led campaigns against the Noba and Beja peoples, and expanded into South Arabia.[95][96][97] This led the Persian prophet Mani to consider Aksum as one of the four great powers of the 3rd century AD alongside Persia, Rome, and China.[98] In the 4th century AD Aksum's king converted to Christianity and Aksum's population, who had followed syncretic mixes of local beliefs, slowly followed. The end of the 5th century saw Aksum allied with the Byzantine Empire, who viewed themselves as defenders of Christendom, balanced against the Sassanid Empire and the Himyarite Kingdom in Arabia.
Northwest Africa
[edit]

The Maghreb and Ifriqiya were mostly cut off from the cradle of civilisation in Egypt by the Libyan desert, exacerbated by Egyptian boats being tailored to the Nile and not coping well in the open Mediterranean Sea. This caused its societies to develop contiguous to those of Southern Europe, until Phoenician settlements came to dominate the most lucrative trading locations in the Gulf of Tunis.[99]: 247 Phoenician settlements subsequently grew into Ancient Carthage after gaining independence from Phoenicia in the 6th century BC, and they would build an extensive empire and a strict mercantile network, all secured by one of the largest and most powerful navies in the ancient Mediterranean.[99]: 251–253 Carthage would meet its demise in the Punic Wars against the expansionary Roman Republic, however momentum in these wars was not linear, with Carthage initially experiencing considerable success in the Second Punic War following Hannibal's infamous crossing of the alps into northern Italy.[99]: 256–257 Their defeat and subsequent collapse of their empire would produce two further polities in the Maghreb; Numidia, which had assisted the Romans in the Second Punic War, Mauretania, a Mauri tribal kingdom and home of the legendary King Atlas, and various tribes such as Garamantes, Musulamii, and Bavares. The Third Punic War would result in Carthage's total defeat in 146 BC and the Romans established the province of Africa, with Numidia assuming control of many of Carthage's African ports. Towards the end of the 2nd century BC Mauretania fought alongside Numidia's Jugurtha in the Jugurthine War against the Romans after he had usurped the Numidian throne from a Roman ally. Together they inflicted heavy casualties that quaked the Roman Senate, with the war only ending inconclusively when Mauretania's Bocchus I sold out Jugurtha to the Romans.[99]: 258
At the turn of the millennium, they both would face the same fate as Carthage and be conquered by the Romans who established Mauretania and Numidia as provinces of their empire, while Musulamii, led by Tacfarinas, and Garamantes were eventually defeated in war in the 1st century AD however weren't conquered.[100]: 261–262 In the 5th century AD the Vandals conquered north Africa precipitating the fall of Rome. Swathes of indigenous peoples would regain self-governance in the Mauro-Roman Kingdom and its numerous successor polities in the Maghreb, namely the kingdoms of Ouarsenis, Aurès, and Altava. The Vandals ruled Ifriqiya for a century until Byzantine reconquest in the early 6th century AD. The Byzantines and the Berber kingdoms fought minor inconsequential conflicts, such as in the case of Garmul, however largely coexisted.[100]: 284 Further inland to the Byzantine Exarchate of Africa were the Sanhaja in modern-day Algeria, a broad grouping of three groupings of tribal confederations, one of which is the Masmuda grouping in modern-day Morocco, along with the nomadic Zenata; their composite tribes would later go onto shape much of North African history.
West Africa
[edit]

In the western Sahel the rise of settled communities occurred largely as a result of the domestication of millet and of sorghum. Archaeology points to sizable urban populations in West Africa beginning in the 4th millennium BC, which had crucially developed iron metallurgy by 1200 BC, in both smelting and forging for tools and weapons.[101] Extensive east-west belts of deserts, grasslands, and forests from north to south were crucial for the moulding of their respective societies and meant that prior to the accession of trans-Saharan trade routes, symbiotic trade relations developed in response to the opportunities afforded by north–south diversity in ecosystems.[102] Various civilisations prospered in this period. From 4000 BC, the Tichitt culture in modern-day Mauritania and Mali was the oldest known complexly organised society in West Africa, with a four tiered hierarchical social structure.[103] Other civilisations include the Kintampo culture from 2500 BC in modern-day Ghana,[104] the Nok culture from 1500 BC in modern-day Nigeria,[105] the Daima culture around Lake Chad from 550 BC, Djenné-Djenno from 250 BC in modern-day Mali, and the Serer civilisation in modern-day Senegal, which built the Senegambian stone circles from the 3rd century BC. There is also detailed record[106] of Igodomigodo, a small kingdom founded presumably in 40 BC, which would later go on to form the Benin Empire.[107]
Towards the end of the 3rd century AD, a wet period in the Sahel created areas for human habitation and exploitation that had not been habitable for the best part of a millennium, with the Kingdom of Wagadu, the local name of the Ghana Empire, rising out of the Tichitt culture, growing wealthy following the introduction of the camel to the western Sahel, revolutionising the trans-Saharan trade that linked their capital and Aoudaghost with Tahert and Sijilmasa in North Africa.[108] Soninke traditions likely contain content from prehistory, mentioning four previous foundings of Wagadu, and holds that the final founding of Wagadu occurred after their first king did a deal with Bida, a serpent deity who was guarding a well, to sacrifice one maiden a year in exchange for assurance regarding plenty of rainfall and gold supply.[109] Wagadu's core traversed modern-day southern Mauritania and western Mali, and Soninke tradition portrays early Ghana as warlike, with horse-mounted warriors key to increasing its territory and population, although details of their expansion are extremely scarce.[108] Wagadu made its profits from maintaining a monopoly on gold heading north and salt heading south, despite not controlling the gold fields themselves, located in the forest regions.[110] It is probable that Wagadu's dominance on trade allowed for the gradual consolidation of many polities into a confederated state, whose composites stood in varying relations to the core, from fully administered to nominal tribute-paying parity.[111] Based on large tumuli scattered across West Africa dating to this period, it has been stipulated that relative to Wagadu, there were further simultaneous and preceding kingdoms that have unfortunately been lost to time.[112][103]
Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa
[edit]
1 = 2000–1500 BC origin
2 = c. 1500 BC first dispersal
2.a = Eastern Bantu
2.b = Western Bantu
3 = 1000–500 BC Urewe nucleus of Eastern Bantu
4–7 = southward advance
9 = 500–1 BC Congo nucleus
10 = AD 1–1000 last phase[113][114][115]
At the 4th millennium BC the Congo Basin was inhabited by the Bambenga, Bayaka, Bakoya, and Babongo in the west, the Bambuti in the east, and the Batwa who were widely scattered and also present in the Great Lakes region; together they are grouped as Pygmies.[116] On the later-named Swahili coast there were Cushitic-speaking peoples, and the Khoisan (a neologism for the Khoekhoe and San) in the continent's south.
The Bantu expansion constituted a major series of migrations of Bantu peoples from central Africa to eastern and southern Africa and was substantial in the settling of the continent.[117] Commencing in the 2nd millennium BC, the Bantu began to migrate from Cameroon to central, eastern, and southern Africa, laying the foundations for future states such as the Kingdom of Kongo in the Congo Basin, the Empire of Kitara in the African Great Lakes, the Luba Empire in the Upemba Depression, the Kilwa Sultanate in the Swahili coast by crowding out Azania, with Rhapta being its last stronghold by the 1st century AD.[118] These migrations also prefaced the Kingdom of Mapungubwe in the Zambezi basin. After reaching the Zambezi, the Bantu continued southward, with eastern groups continuing to modern-day Mozambique and reaching Maputo in the 2nd century AD. Further to the south, settlements of Bantu peoples who were iron-using agriculturists and herdsmen were well established south of the Limpopo River by the 4th century AD, displacing and absorbing the Khoisan.
By the Chari River south of Lake Chad the Sao civilisation flourished for over a millennium beginning in the 6th century BC, in territory that later became part of present-day Cameroon and Chad. Sao artifacts show that they were skilled workers in bronze, copper, and iron,[119]: 19 with finds including bronze sculptures, terracotta statues of human and animal figures, coins, funerary urns, household utensils, jewellery, highly decorated pottery, and spears.[119]: 19 [120]: 1051 Nearby, around Lake Ejagham in south-west Cameroon, the Ekoi civilisation rose circa 2nd century AD, and are most notable for constructing the Ikom monoliths and developing the Nsibidi script.[121]
9th to 18th centuries
[edit]Pre-colonial Africa possessed as many as 10,000 different states and polities.[123] These included small family groups of hunter-gatherers such as the San people of southern Africa; larger, more structured groups such as the family clan groupings of the Bantu peoples of central, southern, and eastern Africa; heavily structured clan groups in the Horn of Africa; the large Sahelian kingdoms; and autonomous city-states and kingdoms, such as those of the Akan; Edo, Yoruba, and Igbo people in West Africa; and the Swahili coastal trading towns of Southeast Africa.
By the 9th century AD, a string of dynastic states, including the earliest Hausa states, stretched across the sub-Saharan savannah from the western regions to central Sudan. The most powerful of these states were Ghana, Gao, and the Kanem-Bornu Empire. Ghana declined in the eleventh century, but was succeeded by the Mali Empire, which consolidated much of western Sudan in the thirteenth century. Kanem accepted Islam in the eleventh century.
In the forested regions of the West African coast, independent kingdoms grew with little influence from the Muslim north. The Kingdom of Nri, which was ruled by the Eze Nri, was established around the ninth century, making it one of the oldest kingdoms in present-day Nigeri. The Nri kingdom is famous for its elaborate bronzes, found at the town of Igbo-Ukwu.[124]

The Kingdom of Ife, historically the first of these Yoruba city-states or kingdoms, established government under a priestly oba ('king' or 'ruler' in the Yoruba language), called the Ooni of Ife. Ife was noted as a major religious and cultural centre in West Africa and for its unique naturalistic tradition of bronze sculpture. The Ife model of government was adapted by the Oyo Empire, whose obas, called the Alaafins of Oyo, controlled many other Yoruba and non-Yoruba city-states and kingdoms including the Fon Kingdom of Dahomey.
The Almoravids were a Berber dynasty from the Sahara that spread over northwestern Africa and the Iberian peninsula during the eleventh century.[125] The Banu Hilal and Banu Ma'qil were a collection of Arab Bedouin tribes from the Arabian Peninsula who migrated westwards via Egypt between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. Their migration resulted in the fusion of the Arabs and Berbers, where the locals were arabised,[126] and Arab culture absorbed elements of the local culture, under the unifying framework of Islam.[127]
Following the breakup of Mali, a local leader named Sonni Ali (1464–1492) founded the Songhai Empire in the region of middle Niger and the western Sudan and took control of the trans-Saharan trade. Sonni Ali seized Timbuktu in 1468 and Jenne in 1473, building his regime on trade revenues and the cooperation of Muslim merchants. His successor Askia Mohammad I (1493–1528) made Islam the official religion, built mosques, and brought to Gao Muslim scholars, including al-Maghili (d.1504), the founder of an important tradition of Sudanic African Muslim scholarship.[128] By the eleventh century, some Hausa states – such as Kano, Jigawa, Katsina, and Gobir – had developed into walled towns engaging in trade, servicing caravans, and the manufacture of goods. Until the fifteenth century, these small states were on the periphery of the major Sudanic empires of the era, paying tribute to Songhai to the west and Kanem-Borno to the east.
Height of the slave trade
[edit]
Slavery had long been practiced in Africa.[129][130] Between the 15th and the 19th centuries, the Atlantic slave trade took an estimated 7–12 million slaves to the New World.[131][132][133] In addition, more than 1 million Europeans were captured by Barbary pirates and sold as slaves in North Africa between the 16th and 19th centuries.[134]
In West Africa, the decline of the Atlantic slave trade in the 1820s caused dramatic economic shifts in local polities. The gradual decline of slave-trading, prompted by a lack of demand for slaves in the New World, increasing anti-slavery legislation in Europe and America, and the British Royal Navy's increasing presence off the West African coast, obliged African states to adopt new economies. Between 1808 and 1860, the British West Africa Squadron seized approximately 1,600 slave ships and freed 150,000 Africans who were aboard.[135]
Action was also taken against African leaders who refused to agree to British treaties to outlaw the trade, for example against "the usurping King of Lagos", deposed in 1851. Anti-slavery treaties were signed with over 50 African rulers.[136] The largest powers of West Africa (the Asante Confederacy, the Kingdom of Dahomey, and the Oyo Empire) adopted different ways of adapting to the shift. Asante and Dahomey concentrated on the development of "legitimate commerce" in the form of palm oil, cocoa, timber and gold, forming the bedrock of West Africa's modern export trade. The Oyo Empire, unable to adapt, collapsed into civil wars.[137]
Colonialism
[edit]The Scramble for Africa[e] was the invasion, conquest, and colonisation of most of Africa by seven Western European powers driven by the Second Industrial Revolution during the late 19th century and early 20th century in the era of "New Imperialism". Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom were the contending powers.
In 1870, 10% of the continent was formally under European control. By 1914, this figure had risen to almost 90%; the only states retaining sovereignty were Liberia, Ethiopia, Egba,[f] Aussa, Senusiyya,[139] Mbunda,[140] Ogaden/Haud,[141][142] the Dervish State, the Darfur Sultanate,[143] and the Ovambo kingdoms,[144][145] most of which were later conquered.
The 1884 Berlin Conference regulated European colonisation and trade in Africa, and is seen as emblematic of the "scramble".[146] In the last quarter of the 19th century, there were considerable political rivalries between the European empires, which provided the impetus for the colonisation.[147] The later years of the 19th century saw a transition from "informal imperialism" – military influence and economic dominance – to direct rule.[148][149]
With the decline of the European colonial empires in the wake of the two world wars, most African colonies gained independence during the Cold War, and decided to keep their colonial borders in the Organisation of African Unity conference of 1964 due to fears of civil wars and regional instability, placing emphasis on pan-Africanism.[150]Independence struggles
[edit]
Imperial rule by Europeans continued until after the conclusion of World War II, when almost all remaining colonial territories gradually obtained formal independence. Independence movements in Africa gained momentum following World War II, which left the major European powers weakened. In 1951, Libya, a former Italian colony, gained independence. In 1956, Tunisia and Morocco won their independence from France.[151] Ghana followed suit the next year (March 1957),[152] becoming the first of the sub-Saharan colonies to be granted independence. Over the next decade, waves of decolonisation took place across the continent, culminating in the 1960 Year of Africa and the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963.[33]
Portugal's overseas presence in sub-Saharan Africa (most notably in Angola, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and São Tomé and Príncipe) lasted from the 16th century to 1975, after the Estado Novo regime was overthrown in a military coup in Lisbon. Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence from the United Kingdom in 1965, under the white minority government of Ian Smith, but was not internationally recognised as an independent state (as Zimbabwe) until 1980, when black nationalists gained power after a bitter guerrilla war. Although South Africa was one of the first African countries to gain independence, the state remained under the control of the country's white minority, initially through qualified voting rights and from 1956 by a system of racial segregation known as apartheid, until 1994.
Post-colonial Africa
[edit]Today, Africa contains 54 sovereign countries.[citation needed] Since independence, African states have frequently been hampered by instability, corruption, violence, and authoritarianism. The vast majority of African states are republics that operate under some form of the presidential system of rule. However, few of them have been able to sustain democratic governments on a permanent basis—per the criteria laid out by Lührmann et al. (2018), only Botswana and Mauritius have been consistently democratic for the entirety of their post-colonial history. Most African countries have experienced several coups or periods of military dictatorship. Between 1990 and 2018, though, the continent as a whole has trended towards more democratic governance.[153]
Upon independence an overwhelming majority of Africans lived in extreme poverty. The continent suffered from the lack of infrastructural or industrial development under colonial rule, along with political instability. With limited financial resources or access to global markets, relatively stable countries such as Kenya still experienced only very slow economic development. Only a handful of African countries succeeded in obtaining rapid economic growth prior to 1990. Exceptions include Libya and Equatorial Guinea, both of which possess large oil reserves.
Instability throughout the continent after decolonisation resulted primarily from marginalisation of ethnic groups, and corruption. In pursuit of personal political gain, many leaders deliberately promoted ethnic conflicts, some of which had originated during the colonial period, such as from the grouping of multiple unrelated ethnic groups into a single colony, the splitting of a distinct ethnic group between multiple colonies, or existing conflicts being exacerbated by colonial rule (for instance, the preferential treatment given to ethnic Hutus over Tutsis in Rwanda during German and Belgian rule).
Faced with increasingly frequent and severe violence, military rule was widely accepted by the population of many countries as means to maintain order, and during the 1970s and 1980s a majority of African countries were controlled by military dictatorships. Territorial disputes between nations and rebellions by groups seeking independence were also common in independent African states. The most devastating of these was the Nigerian Civil War, fought between government forces and an Igbo separatist republic, which resulted in a famine that killed 1–2 million people. Two civil wars in Sudan, the first lasting from 1955 to 1972 and the second from 1983 to 2005, collectively killed around 3 million. Both were fought primarily on ethnic and religious lines.
Cold War conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union also contributed to instability. Both the Soviet Union and the United States offered considerable incentives to African political and military leaders who aligned themselves with the superpowers' foreign policy. As an example, during the Angolan Civil War, the Soviet and Cuban aligned MPLA and the American aligned UNITA received the vast majority of their military and political support from these countries. Many African countries became highly dependent on foreign aid. The sudden loss of both Soviet and American aid at the end of the Cold War and fall of the USSR resulted in severe economic and political turmoil in the countries most dependent on foreign support.
There was a major famine in Ethiopia between 1983 and 1985, killing up to 1.2 million people, which most historians attribute primarily to the forced relocation of farmworkers and seizure of grain by the communist Derg government, further exacerbated by the civil war.[154][155][156][157] In 1994 a genocide in Rwanda resulted in up to 800,000 deaths, added to a severe refugee crisis and fueled the rise of militia groups in neighbouring countries. This contributed to the outbreak of the first and second Congo Wars, which were the most devastating military conflicts in modern Africa, with up to 5.5 million deaths,[158] making it by far the deadliest conflict in modern African history and one of the costliest wars in human history.[159]
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An animated map shows the order of independence of African nations, 1950–2011.
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Africa's wars and conflicts, 1980–96Major wars/conflicts (>100,000 casualties)Minor wars/conflictsOther conflicts
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Political map of Africa in 2021
Various conflicts between various insurgent groups and governments continue. Since 2003, there has been an ongoing conflict in Darfur (Sudan), which peaked in intensity from 2003 to 2005 with notable spikes in violence in 2007 and 2013–15, killing around 300,000 people total. The Boko Haram Insurgency primarily within Nigeria (with considerable fighting in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon as well) has killed around 350,000 people since 2009. Most African conflicts have been reduced to low-intensity conflicts as of 2022. However, the Tigray War from 2020 to 2022 killed an estimated 300,000–500,000 people, primarily due to famine.
Overall though, violence across Africa has greatly declined in the 21st century, with the end of civil wars in Angola, Sierra Leone, and Algeria in 2002, Liberia in 2003, and Sudan and Burundi in 2005. The Second Congo War, which involved 9 countries and several insurgent groups, ended in 2003. This decline in violence coincided with many countries abandoning communist-style command economies and opening up for market reforms, which over the course of the 1990s and 2000s promoted the establishment of permanent, peaceful trade between neighbouring countries (see Capitalist peace).
Improved stability and economic reforms have led to a great increase in foreign investment into many African nations, mainly from China,[160] which further spurred economic growth. Between 2000 and 2014, annual GDP growth in sub-Saharan Africa averaged 5.02%, doubling its total GDP from $811 billion to $1.63 trillion (constant 2015 USD).[161] North Africa experienced comparable growth rates.[162] A significant part of this growth can also be attributed to the facilitated diffusion of information technologies and specifically the mobile telephone.[163] While several individual countries have maintained high growth rates, since 2014 overall growth has considerably slowed, primarily as a result of falling commodity prices, continued lack of industrialisation, and epidemics of Ebola and COVID-19.[164][165]
Geography
[edit]
Africa is the largest of the three great southward projections from the largest landmass of the Earth. Separated from Europe by the Mediterranean Sea, it is joined to Asia at its northeast extremity by the Isthmus of Suez (transected by the Suez Canal), 163 km (101 mi) wide.[166] Geopolitically, Egypt's Sinai Peninsula east of the Suez Canal is often considered part of Africa as well.[167]
The coastline is 26,000 km (16,000 mi) long, and the absence of deep indentations of the shore is illustrated by the fact that Europe, which covers only 10,400,000 km2 (4,000,000 sq mi) – about a third of the surface of Africa – has a coastline of 32,000 km (20,000 mi).[168] From the most northerly point, Ras ben Sakka in Tunisia (37°21' N), to the most southerly point, Cape Agulhas in South Africa (34°51'15" S), is a distance of approximately 8,000 km (5,000 mi).[169] Cape Verde, 17°33'22" W, the westernmost point, is a distance of approximately 7,400 km (4,600 mi) to Ras Hafun, 51°27'52" E, the most easterly projection that neighbours Cape Guardafui, the tip of the Horn of Africa.[168]
Africa's largest country is Algeria, and its smallest country is Seychelles, an archipelago off the east coast.[170] The smallest nation on the continental mainland is The Gambia.
African plate
[edit]
The African plate, also known as the Nubian plate, is a major tectonic plate that includes most of the continent of Africa (except for its easternmost part) and the adjacent oceanic crust to the west and south. It also includes a narrow strip of Western Asia along the Mediterranean Sea, including much of Israel and Lebanon. It is bounded by the North American plate and South American plate to the west (separated by the Mid-Atlantic Ridge); the Arabian plate and Somali plate to the east; the Eurasian plate, Aegean Sea plate and Anatolian plate to the north; and the Antarctic plate to the south.
Between 60 million years ago and 10 million years ago, the Somali plate began rifting from the African plate along the East African Rift.[171] Since the continent of Africa consists of crust from both the African and the Somali plates, some literature refers to the African plate as the Nubian plate to distinguish it from the continent as a whole.[172]Climate
[edit]The climate of Africa ranges from tropical to subarctic on its highest peaks. Its northern half is primarily desert, or arid, while its central and southern areas contain both savanna plains and dense jungle (rainforest) regions. In between, there is a convergence, where vegetation patterns such as sahel and steppe dominate. Africa is the hottest continent on Earth and 60% of the entire land surface consists of drylands and deserts.[173] The record for the highest-ever recorded temperature, in Libya in 1922 (58 °C (136 °F)), was discredited in 2013.[174][175]
Climate change
[edit]
Climate change in Africa is a serious threat as Africa is one of the most vulnerable regions to the effects of climate change, despite contributing the least to causing it. Climate change is causing increasingly erratic rainfall patterns, more frequent extreme weather events including droughts, floods, and rising sea surface temperatures in Africa. These changes threaten food and water security, biodiversity, public health, and economic development.[176][177] Africa is currently warming faster than the rest of the world on average.[178]
Climate change intensifies existing socioeconomic vulnerabilities. Large segments of the African population depend on climate-sensitive livelihoods such as agriculture (55 - 62% of the workforce in sub-Saharan Africa)[179] and already live in poverty, heightening their exposure to shocks. Health outcomes worsen as heat stress, vector-borne diseases (such as malaria and dengue), and malnutrition become more prevalent. Over half (56%) of the over 2,000 recorded public health incidents in Africa between 2001 and 2021 were connected to climate change.[180] Resource scarcity contributes to displacement and conflict, particularly in fragile regions. Urban areas, often characterized by informal settlements, face heightened risks from flooding and extreme heat.[176]Ecology and biodiversity
[edit]
Africa has over 3,000 protected areas, with 198 marine protected areas, 50 biosphere reserves, and 80 wetlands reserves. Significant habitat destruction, increases in human population and poaching are reducing Africa's biological diversity and arable land. Human encroachment, civil unrest and the introduction of non-native species threaten biodiversity in Africa. This has been exacerbated by administrative problems, inadequate personnel and funding problems.[173]
Deforestation is affecting Africa at twice the world rate, according to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).[181] According to the University of Pennsylvania African Studies Center, 31% of Africa's pasture lands and 19% of its forests and woodlands are classified as degraded, and Africa is losing over four million hectares of forest per year, which is twice the average deforestation rate for the rest of the world.[173] Some sources claim that approximately 90% of the original, virgin forests in West Africa have been destroyed.[182] Over 90% of Madagascar's original forests have been destroyed since the arrival of humans 2000 years ago.[183] About 65% of Africa's agricultural land suffers from soil degradation.[184]
Fauna
[edit]
Africa boasts perhaps the world's largest combination of density and "range of freedom" of wild animal populations and diversity, with wild populations of large carnivores (such as lions, hyenas, and cheetahs) and herbivores (such as buffalo, elephants, camels, and giraffes) ranging freely on primarily open non-private plains. It is also home to a variety of "jungle" animals including snakes and primates and aquatic life such as crocodiles and amphibians. In addition, Africa has the largest number of megafauna species, as it was least affected by the extinction of the Pleistocene megafauna.
Environmental issues
[edit]Politics
[edit]African Union
[edit]
Northern Region , Southern Region , Eastern Region , Western Regions A and B , Central Region
The African Union (AU) is a continental union consisting of 55 member states. The union was formed, with Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as its headquarters, on 26 June 2001. The union was officially established on 9 July 2002[187] as a successor to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). In July 2004, the African Union's Pan-African Parliament (PAP) was relocated to Midrand, in South Africa, but the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights remained in Addis Ababa.
The African Union, not to be confused with the AU Commission, is formed by the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which aims to transform the African Economic Community, a federated commonwealth, into a state under established international conventions. The African Union has a parliamentary government, known as the African Union Government, consisting of legislative, judicial and executive organs. It is led by the African Union President and Head of State, who is also the President of the Pan-African Parliament. A person becomes AU President by being elected to the PAP, and subsequently gaining majority support in the PAP. The powers and authority of the President of the African Parliament derive from the Constitutive Act and the Protocol of the Pan-African Parliament, as well as the inheritance of presidential authority stipulated by African treaties and by international treaties, including those subordinating the Secretary General of the OAU Secretariat (AU Commission) to the PAP. The government of the AU consists of all-union, regional, state, and municipal authorities, as well as hundreds of institutions, that together manage the day-to-day affairs of the institution.
Extensive human rights abuses still occur in several parts of Africa, often under the oversight of the state. Most of such violations occur for political reasons, often as a side effect of civil war. Countries where major human rights violations have been reported in recent times include the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Ivory Coast.
Boundary conflicts
[edit]List of states and territories
[edit]The countries in this table are categorised according to the scheme for geographic subregions used by the United Nations, and data included are per sources in cross-referenced articles. Where they differ, provisos are clearly indicated.
| Arms | Flag | Name of region[g] and territory, with flag |
Area (km2) |
Population[192] | Year | Density (per km2) |
Capital | Name(s) in official language(s) | ISO 3166-1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| North Africa | |||||||||
| Algeria | 2,381,740 | 46,731,000 | 2022 | 17.7 | Algiers | الجزائر (al-Jazāʾir)/Algérie | DZA | ||
| Egypt[h] | 1,001,450 | 82,868,000 | 2012 | 83 | Cairo | مِصر (Miṣr) | EGY | ||
| Libya | 1,759,540 | 6,310,434 | 2009 | 4 | Tripoli | ليبيا (Lībiyā) | LBY | ||
| Morocco | 446,550 | 35,740,000 | 2017 | 78 | Rabat | المغرب (al-maḡrib)/ⵍⵎⵖⵔⵉⴱ (lmeɣrib)/Maroc | MAR | ||
| Sudan | 1,861,484 | 30,894,000 | 2008 | 17 | Khartoum | Sudan/السودان (as-Sūdān) | SDN | ||
| Tunisia | 163,610 | 10,486,339 | 2009 | 64 | Tunis | تونس (Tūnis)/Tunest/Tunisie | TUN | ||
| Western Sahara[i] | 266,000 | 405,210 | 2009 | 2 | El Aaiún | الصحراء الغربية (aṣ-Ṣaḥrā' al-Gharbiyyah)/Taneẓroft Tutrimt/Sáhara Occidental | ESH | ||
| East Africa | |||||||||
| Burundi | 27,830 | 8,988,091 | 2009 | 323 | Gitega | Uburundi/Burundi/Burundi | BDI | ||
| Comoros | 2,170 | 752,438 | 2009 | 347 | Moroni | Komori/Comores/جزر القمر (Juzur al-Qumur) | COM | ||
| Djibouti | 23,000 | 828,324 | 2015 | 22 | Djibouti | Yibuuti/جيبوتي (Jībūtī)/Djibouti/Jabuuti | DJI | ||
| Eritrea | 121,320 | 5,647,168 | 2009 | 47 | Asmara | Eritrea | ERI | ||
| Ethiopia | 1,127,127 | 84,320,987 | 2012 | 75 | Addis Ababa | ኢትዮጵያ (Ītyōṗṗyā)/Itiyoophiyaa/ኢትዮጵያ/Itoophiyaa/Itoobiya/ኢትዮጵያ | ETH | ||
| French Southern Territories (France) | 439,781 | 100 | 2019 | — | Saint Pierre | Terres australes et antarctiques françaises | FRA-TF | ||
| Kenya | 582,650 | 39,002,772 | 2009 | 66 | Nairobi | Kenya | KEN | ||
| Madagascar | 587,040 | 20,653,556 | 2009 | 35 | Antananarivo | Madagasikara/Madagascar | MDG | ||
| Malawi | 118,480 | 14,268,711 | 2009 | 120 | Lilongwe | Malaŵi/Malaŵi | MWI | ||
| Mauritius | 2,040 | 1,284,264 | 2009 | 630 | Port Louis | Mauritius/Maurice/Moris | MUS | ||
| Mayotte (France) | 374 | 223,765 | 2009 | 490 | Mamoudzou | Mayotte/Maore/Maiôty | MYT | ||
| Mozambique | 801,590 | 21,669,278 | 2009 | 27 | Maputo | Moçambique/Mozambiki/Msumbiji/Muzambhiki | MOZ | ||
| Réunion (France) | 2,512 | 743,981 | 2002 | 296 | Saint Denis | La Réunion | FRA-RE | ||
| Rwanda | 26,338 | 10,473,282 | 2009 | 398 | Kigali | Rwanda | RWA | ||
| Seychelles | 455 | 87,476 | 2009 | 192 | Victoria | Seychelles/Sesel | SYC | ||
| Somalia | 637,657 | 9,832,017 | 2009 | 15 | Mogadishu | 𐒈𐒝𐒑𐒛𐒐𐒘𐒕𐒖 (Soomaaliya) /الصومال (aṣ-Ṣūmāl) | SOM | ||
| Somaliland | 176,120 | 5,708,180 | 2021 | 25 | Hargeisa | Soomaaliland/صوماليلاند (Ṣūmālīlānd) | |||
| South Sudan | 619,745 | 8,260,490 | 2008 | 13 | Juba | South Sudan | SSD | ||
| Tanzania | 945,087 | 44,929,002 | 2009 | 43 | Dodoma | Tanzania/Tanzania | TZA | ||
| Uganda | 236,040 | 32,369,558 | 2009 | 137 | Kampala | Uganda/Yuganda | UGA | ||
| Zambia | 752,614 | 11,862,740 | 2009 | 16 | Lusaka | Zambia | ZMB | ||
| Zimbabwe | 390,580 | 11,392,629 | 2009 | 29 | Harare | Zimbabwe | ZWE | ||
| Central Africa | |||||||||
| Angola | 1,246,700 | 12,799,293 | 2009 | 10 | Luanda | Angola | AGO | ||
| Cameroon | 475,440 | 18,879,301 | 2009 | 40 | Yaoundé | Cameroun/Kamerun | CMR | ||
| Central African Republic | 622,984 | 4,511,488 | 2009 | 7 | Bangui | Ködörösêse tî Bêafrîka/République centrafricaine | CAF | ||
| Chad | 1,284,000 | 10,329,208 | 2009 | 8 | N'Djamena | تشاد (Tšād)/Tchad | TCD | ||
| Republic of the Congo | 342,000 | 4,012,809 | 2009 | 12 | Brazzaville | Congo/Kôngo/Kongó | COG | ||
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | 2,345,410 | 69,575,000 | 2012 | 30 | Kinshasa | République démocratique du Congo | COD | ||
| Equatorial Guinea | 28,051 | 633,441 | 2009 | 23 | Malabo | Guinea Ecuatorial/Guinée Équatoriale/Guiné Equatorial | GNQ | ||
| Gabon | 267,667 | 1,514,993 | 2009 | 6 | Libreville | Gabon | GAB | ||
| São Tomé and Príncipe | 1,001 | 212,679 | 2009 | 212 | São Tomé | São Tomé e Príncipe | STP | ||
| Southern Africa | |||||||||
| Botswana | 600,370 | 1,990,876 | 2009 | 3 | Gaborone | Botswana/Botswana | BWA | ||
| Eswatini | 17,363 | 1,123,913 | 2009 | 65 | Mbabane | eSwatini/Eswatini | SWZ | ||
| Lesotho | 30,355 | 2,130,819 | 2009 | 70 | Maseru | Lesotho/Lesotho | LSO | ||
| Namibia | 825,418 | 2,108,665 | 2009 | 3 | Windhoek | Namibia | NAM | ||
| South Africa | 1,219,912 | 51,770,560 | 2011 | 42 | Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Pretoria[j] | yaseNingizimu Afrika/yoMzantsi-Afrika/Suid-Afrika/Afrika-Borwa/Aforika Borwa/Afrika Borwa/Afrika Dzonga/yeNingizimu Afrika/Afurika Tshipembe/yeSewula Afrika | ZAF | ||
| West Africa | |||||||||
| Benin | 112,620 | 8,791,832 | 2009 | 78 | Porto-Novo | Bénin | BEN | ||
| Burkina Faso | 274,200 | 15,746,232 | 2009 | 57 | Ouagadougou | Burkina Faso | BFA | ||
| Cape Verde | 4,033 | 429,474 | 2009 | 107 | Praia | Cabo Verde/Kabu Verdi | CPV | ||
| The Gambia | 11,300 | 1,782,893 | 2009 | 158 | Banjul | The Gambia | GMB | ||
| Ghana | 239,460 | 23,832,495 | 2009 | 100 | Accra | Ghana | GHA | ||
| Guinea | 245,857 | 10,057,975 | 2009 | 41 | Conakry | Guinée | GIN | ||
| Guinea-Bissau | 36,120 | 1,533,964 | 2009 | 43 | Bissau | Guiné-Bissau | GNB | ||
| Ivory Coast | 322,460 | 20,617,068 | 2009 | 64 | Abidjan,[k] Yamoussoukro | Côte d'Ivoire | CIV | ||
| Liberia | 111,370 | 3,441,790 | 2009 | 31 | Monrovia | Liberia | LBR | ||
| Mali | 1,240,000 | 12,666,987 | 2009 | 10 | Bamako | Mali/Maali/مالي (Mālī)/𞤃𞤢𞥄𞤤𞤭 (Maali)/ߡߊߟߌ (Mali) | MLI | ||
| Mauritania | 1,030,700 | 3,129,486 | 2009 | 3 | Nouakchott | موريتانيا (Mūrītānyā) | MRT | ||
| Niger | 1,267,000 | 15,306,252 | 2009 | 12 | Niamey | Niger | NER | ||
| Nigeria | 923,768 | 166,629,000 | 2012 | 180 | Abuja | Nigeria | NGA | ||
| Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha (United Kingdom) | 420 | 7,728 | 2012 | 13 | Jamestown | Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha | SHN | ||
| Senegal | 196,190 | 13,711,597 | 2009 | 70 | Dakar | Sénégal | SEN | ||
| Sierra Leone | 71,740 | 6,440,053 | 2009 | 90 | Freetown | Sierra Leone | SLE | ||
| Togo | 56,785 | 6,019,877 | 2009 | 106 | Lomé | Togo | TGO | ||
| Africa Total | 30,368,609 | 1,001,320,281 | 2009 | 33 | |||||
Other territories
[edit]This list contains nine territories that are administered as incorporated areas of a primarily non-African country but that belong geographically to the African continent.
| Flag | Map | English short, formal names, and ISO | Ruling power | Status[citation needed] | Domestic short name(s) and formal name(s) |
Capital | Population | Area[citation needed] | Currency |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Canary Islands Autonomous Region of the Canary Islands ES-CN |
Autonomous community of Spain | Spanish: Islas Canarias | Santa Cruz and Las Palmas[193] Spanish: Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Las Palmas de Gran Canaria |
2,207,225 | 7,447 km2 (2,875 sq mi) | euro | |||
| Ceuta Autonomous City of Ceuta ES-CE |
Autonomous city of Spain | Spanish: Ceuta—Ciudad autónoma de Ceuta | Ceuta Spanish: Ceuta |
84,843 | 28 km2 (11 sq mi) | euro | |||
| Madeira Autonomous Region of Madeira PT-30 |
Autonomous Region of Portugal | Portuguese: Madeira—Região Autónoma da Madeira | Funchal Portuguese: Funchal |
267,785 | 828 km2 (320 sq mi) | euro | |||
| Mayotte Mayotte Region YT |
Overseas region and constituent part of the French Republic | French: Mayotte—Région Mayotte | Mamoudzou French: Mamoudzou |
266,380 | 374 km2 (144 sq mi) | euro | |||
| Melilla Autonomous City of Melilla ES-ML |
Autonomous city of Spain | Spanish: Melilla—Ciudad autónoma de Melilla | Melilla Spanish: Melilla |
84,714 | 20 km2 (8 sq mi) | euro | |||
| Pelagie Islands |
Archipelago of Italy | Italian: Isole Pelagie Sicilian: Ìsuli Pilaggî |
Lampedusa e Linosa[l] Italian: Lampedusa e Linosa Sicilian: Lampidusa e Linusa[194] |
6,304 | 21.4 km2 (8 sq mi) | euro | |||
| Plazas de soberanía |
Overseas territory of Spain | Spanish: Plazas de soberanía | N/A | 74 | 0.59 km2 (0.23 sq mi) | euro | |||
| Réunion Réunion Region RE |
Overseas region and constituent part of the French Republic | French: Réunion—Région Réunion | Saint-Denis French: Saint-Denis |
889,918 | 2,512 km2 (970 sq mi) | euro | |||
| Socotra Archipelago |
Governorate of Yemen | Arabic: أرخبيل سقطرى (ʾArḫabīl Suquṭrā) |
Hadibu Arabic: اديبو (Ḥādībū) |
60,550 | 3,974.64 km2 (1,535 sq mi) | Yemeni rial |
Economy
[edit]

Although it has abundant natural resources, Africa remains the world's poorest and least-developed continent (other than Antarctica), the result of a variety of causes that may include corrupt governments that have often committed serious human rights violations, failed central planning, high levels of illiteracy, low self-esteem, lack of access to foreign capital, legacies of colonialism, the slave trade, the Cold War, and frequent tribal and military conflict (ranging from guerrilla warfare to genocide).[195] Its total nominal GDP remains behind that of the United States, China, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, India and France. According to the United Nations' Human Development Report in 2003, the bottom 24 ranked nations (151st to 175th) were all African.[196]
Poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, inadequate water supply and sanitation, and poor health affect a large proportion of the people who reside on the African continent. In August 2008, the World Bank[197] announced revised global poverty estimates based on a new international poverty line of $1.25 per day (versus the previous measure of $1.00). Eighty-one percent of the sub-Saharan African population was living on less than $2.50 (PPP) per day in 2005, compared with 86% for India.[198]
Sub-Saharan Africa is the least successful region of the world in reducing poverty ($1.25 per day); some 50% of the population living in poverty in 1981 (200 million people), a figure that rose to 58% in 1996 before dropping to 50% in 2005 (380 million people). The average poor person in sub-Saharan Africa is estimated to live on only 70 cents per day, and was poorer in 2003 than in 1973,[199] indicating increasing poverty in some areas. Some of it is attributed to unsuccessful economic liberalisation programmes spearheaded by foreign companies and governments, but other studies have cited bad domestic government policies more than external factors.[200][201]
Africa is now at risk of being in debt once again, particularly in sub-Saharan African countries. The last debt crisis in 2005 was resolved with help from the heavily indebted poor countries scheme (HIPC). The HIPC resulted in some positive and negative effects on the economy in Africa. About ten years after the 2005 debt crisis in sub-Saharan Africa was resolved, Zambia fell back into debt. A small reason was due to the fall in copper prices in 2011, but the bigger reason was that a large amount of the money Zambia borrowed was wasted or pocketed by the elite.[202]
From 1995 to 2005, Africa's rate of economic growth increased, averaging 5% in 2005. Some countries experienced still higher growth rates, notably Angola, Sudan and Equatorial Guinea, all of which had recently begun extracting their petroleum reserves or had expanded their oil extraction capacity.
In a recently published analysis based on World Values Survey data, the Austrian political scientist Arno Tausch maintained that several African countries, most notably Ghana, perform quite well on scales of mass support for democracy and the market economy.[203]
The following table shows the projected nominal GDP and GDP per capita (at Purchasing Power Parity) in 2025 by the IMF.[204]
| Rank | Country | GDP (nominal, in 2025) millions of USD |
GDP per capita (PPP, in 2025) in international dollars |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | 2,834,002 | 7,373 | |
| 1 | 410,338 | 15,989 | |
| 2 | 347,342 | 21,668 | |
| 3 | 268,885 | 18,525 | |
| 4 | 188,271 | 6,792 | |
| 5 | 165,835 | 11,266 | |
| 6 | 131,673 | 7,534 | |
| 7 | 117,457 | 4,398 | |
| 8 | 113,343 | 10,234 | |
| 9 | 94,483 | 8,111 | |
| 10 | 88,332 | 8,417 | |
| 11 | 85,977 | 4,371 | |
| 12 | 79,119 | 1,884 | |
| 13 | 64,277 | 3,896 | |
| 14 | 56,291 | 14,779 | |
| 15 | 56,011 | 5,760 |
Tausch's global value comparison based on the World Values Survey derived the following factor analytical scales: 1. The non-violent and law-abiding society 2. Democracy movement 3. Climate of personal non-violence 4. Trust in institutions 5. Happiness, good health 6. No redistributive religious fundamentalism 7. Accepting the market 8. Feminism 9. Involvement in politics 10. Optimism and engagement 11. No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics. The spread in the performance of African countries with complete data, Tausch concluded "is really amazing". While one should be especially hopeful about the development of future democracy and the market economy in Ghana, the article suggests pessimistic tendencies for Egypt and Algeria, and especially for Africa's leading economy, South Africa. High human inequality, as measured by the UNDP's Human Development Report's Index of Human Inequality, impairs the development of human security. Tausch also maintains that the certain recent optimism, corresponding to economic and human rights data, emerging from Africa, is reflected in the development of a civil society.
The continent is believed to hold 90% of the world's cobalt, 90% of its platinum, 50% of its gold, 98% of its chromium, 70% of its tantalite,[205] 64% of its manganese and one-third of its uranium.[206] The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has 70% of the world's coltan, a mineral used in the production of tantalum capacitors for electronic devices such as cell phones. The DRC also has more than 30% of the world's diamond reserves.[207] Guinea is the world's largest exporter of bauxite.[208] As the growth in Africa has been driven mainly by services and not manufacturing or agriculture, it has been growth without jobs and without reduction in poverty levels. In fact, the food security crisis of 2008, which took place on the heels of the global financial crisis, pushed 100 million people into food insecurity.[209]
In recent years, China has built increasingly stronger ties with African nations and is Africa's largest trading partner. In 2007, Chinese companies invested a total of US$1 billion in Africa.[160]
A Harvard University study led by professor Calestous Juma showed that Africa could feed itself by making the transition from importer to self-sufficiency. "African agriculture is at the crossroads; we have come to the end of a century of policies that favoured Africa's export of raw materials and importation of food. Africa is starting to focus on agricultural innovation as its new engine for regional trade and prosperity."[210]
Electricity generation
[edit]The main source of electricity is hydropower, which contributes significantly to the current installed capacity for energy.[211] The Kainji Dam is a typical hydropower resource generating electricity for all the large cities in Nigeria as well as their neighbouring country, Niger.[212] Hence, the continuous investment in the last decade, which has increased the amount of power generated.[211]
Infrastructure
[edit]Water resources
[edit]Water development and management are complex in Africa due to the multiplicity of trans-boundary water resources (rivers, lakes and aquifers).[211] Around 75% of sub-Saharan Africa falls within 53 international river basin catchments that traverse multiple borders.[213][211] This particular constraint can also be converted into an opportunity if the potential for trans-boundary cooperation is harnessed in the development of the area's water resources.[211] A multi-sectoral analysis of the Zambezi River, for example, shows that riparian cooperation could lead to a 23% increase in firm energy production without any additional investments.[213][211] A number of institutional and legal frameworks for transboundary cooperation exist, such as the Zambezi River Authority, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol, Volta River Authority and the Nile Basin Commission.[211] However, additional efforts are required to further develop political will, as well as the financial capacities and institutional frameworks needed for win-win multilateral cooperative actions and optimal solutions for all riparians.[211]
Demographics
[edit]- Nigeria (15.4%)
- Ethiopia (8.37%)
- Egypt (7.65%)
- Democratic Republic of the Congo (6.57%)
- Tanzania (4.55%)
- South Africa (4.47%)
- Kenya (3.88%)
- Uganda (3.38%)
- Algeria (3.36%)
- Other (42.4%)
Africa is considered by anthropologists to be the most genetically diverse continent as a result of being the longest inhabited.[214][215][216] Africa's population has rapidly increased over the last 40 years, and is consequently relatively young. In some African states, more than half the population is under 25 years of age.[217] The total number of people in Africa increased from 229 million in 1950 to 630 million in 1990.[218] As of 2021, the population of Africa is estimated at 1.4 billion.[1][2] Africa's total population surpassing other continents is fairly recent; African population surpassed Europe in the 1990s, while the Americas was overtaken sometime around the year 2000.[219] This increase in number of babies born in Africa compared to the rest of the world is expected to reach approximately 37% in the year 2050; while in 1990 sub-Saharan Africa accounted for only 16% of the world's births.[220]
The total fertility rate (children per woman) for Sub-Saharan Africa is 4.7 as of 2018, the highest in the world.[221] All countries in sub-Saharan Africa had TFRs (average number of children) above replacement level in 2019 and accounted for 27.1% of global livebirths.[222] In 2021, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 29% of global births.[223]
Speakers of Bantu languages (part of the Niger–Congo family) are the majority in southern, central and southeast Africa. The Bantu-speaking peoples from the Sahel progressively expanded over most of sub-Saharan Africa.[224] But there are also several Nilotic groups in South Sudan and East Africa, the mixed Swahili people on the Swahili Coast, and a few remaining indigenous Khoisan ("San" or "Bushmen") and Pygmy peoples in Southern and Central Africa, respectively. Bantu-speaking Africans also predominate in Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, and are found in parts of southern Cameroon. In the Kalahari Desert of Southern Africa, the distinct people known as the Bushmen (also "San", closely related to, but distinct from "Hottentots") have long been present. The San are physically distinct from other Africans and are the indigenous people of southern Africa.[citation needed] Pygmies are the pre-Bantu indigenous peoples of central Africa.[225]
The peoples of West Africa primarily speak Niger–Congo languages, belonging mostly to its non-Bantu branches, though some Nilo-Saharan and Afro-Asiatic speaking groups are also found. The Niger–Congo-speaking Yoruba, Igbo, Fulani, Akan, and Wolof ethnic groups are the largest and most influential. In the central Sahara, Mandinka or Mande groups are most significant. Chadic-speaking groups, including the Hausa, are found in more northerly parts of the region nearest to the Sahara, and Nilo-Saharan communities, such as the Songhai, Kanuri and Zarma, are found in the eastern parts of West Africa bordering Central Africa.
| Map of Africa indicating Human Development Index (2018). | ||
|
The peoples of North Africa consist of three main indigenous groups: Berbers in the northwest, Egyptians in the northeast, and Nilo-Saharan-speaking peoples in the east. The Arabs who arrived in the 7th century AD introduced the Arabic language and Islam to North Africa. The Semitic Phoenicians (who founded Carthage) and Hyksos, the Indo-Iranian Alans, the Indo-European Greeks, Romans, and Vandals settled in North Africa as well. Significant Berber communities remain within Morocco and Algeria in the 21st century, while, to a lesser extent, Berber speakers are also present in some regions of Tunisia and Libya.[226] The Berber-speaking Tuareg and other often-nomadic peoples are the principal inhabitants of the Saharan interior of North Africa. In Mauritania, there is a small but near-extinct Berber community in the north and Niger–Congo-speaking peoples in the south, though in both regions Arabic and Arab culture predominates. In Sudan, although Arabic and Arab culture predominate, it is mostly inhabited by groups that originally spoke Nilo-Saharan, such as the Nubians, Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa, who, over the centuries, have variously intermixed with migrants from the Arabian peninsula. Small communities of Afro-Asiatic-speaking Beja nomads can also be found in Egypt and Sudan.[227]
In the Horn of Africa, some Ethiopian and Eritrean groups (like the Amhara and Tigrayans, collectively known as Habesha) speak languages from the Semitic branch of the Afro-Asiatic language family, while the Oromo and Somali speak languages from the Cushitic branch of Afro-Asiatic.
Prior to the decolonisation movements of the post-World War II era, Europeans were represented in every part of Africa.[228] Decolonization during the 1960s and 1970s often resulted in the mass emigration of white settlers—especially from Algeria and Morocco (1.6 million pieds-noirs in North Africa),[229] Kenya, Congo,[230] Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola.[231] Between 1975 and 1977, over a million colonials returned to Portugal alone.[232] Nevertheless, white Africans remain an important minority in many African states, particularly Zimbabwe, Namibia, Réunion, and South Africa.[233] The country with the largest white African population is South Africa.[234] Dutch and British diasporas represent the largest communities of European ancestry on the continent today.[235]
European colonisation also brought sizable groups of Asians, particularly from the Indian subcontinent, to British colonies. Large Indian communities are found in South Africa, and smaller ones are present in Kenya, Tanzania, and some other southern and southeast African countries. The large Indian community in Uganda was expelled by the dictator Idi Amin in 1972, though many have since returned. The islands in the Indian Ocean are also populated primarily by people of Asian origin, often mixed with Africans and Europeans. The Malagasy people of Madagascar are an Austronesian people, but those along the coast are generally mixed with Bantu, Arab, Indian and European origins. Malay and Indian ancestries are also important components in the group of people known in South Africa as Cape Coloureds (people with origins in two or more races and continents). During the 20th century, small but economically important communities of Lebanese[160] have also developed in the larger coastal cities of West and East Africa, respectively.[236]
Alternative estimates of African population, 1–2018 AD (in thousands)
[edit]Source: Maddison and others (University of Groningen)[237]
| Year[237] | 1 | 1000 | 1500 | 1600 | 1700 | 1820 | 1870 | 1913 | 1950 | 1973 | 1998 | 2018 | 2100 (projected) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Africa | 16 500 | 33 000 | 46 000 | 55 000 | 61 000 | 74 208 | 90 466 | 124 697 | 228 342 | 387 645 | 759 954 | 1 321 000[238] | 3 924 421[239] |
| World | 230 820 | 268 273 | 437 818 | 555 828 | 603 410 | 1 041 092 | 1 270 014 | 1 791 020 | 2 524 531 | 3 913 482 | 5 907 680 | 7 500 000[240] | 10 349 323[239] |
Shares of Africa and world population, 1–2020 AD (% of world total)
[edit]Source: Maddison and others (University of Groningen)[237]
| Year[237] | 1 | 1000 | 1500 | 1600 | 1700 | 1820 | 1870 | 1913 | 1950 | 1973 | 1998 | 2020 | 2100 (projected) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Africa | 7.1 | 12.3 | 10.5 | 9.9 | 10.1 | 7.1 | 7.1 | 7.0 | 9.0 | 9.9 | 12.9 | 18.2[238] | 39.4[241] |
Religion
[edit]
While Africans profess a wide variety of religious beliefs, the majority of the people respect African religions or parts of them. However, in formal surveys or census, most people will identify with major religions that came from outside the continent, mainly through colonisation. There are several reasons for this, the main one being the colonial idea that African religious beliefs and practices are not good enough. Religious beliefs and statistics on religious affiliation are difficult to come by since they are often a sensitive topic for governments with mixed religious populations.[242][243] According to the World Book Encyclopedia, Islam and Christianity are the two largest religions in Africa. Islam is most prevalent in Northern Africa, and is the state religion of many North African countries, such as Algeria, where 99% of the population practices Islam.[244] The majority of people in most governments in Southern, Southeast, and Central Africa, as well as in a sizable portion of the Horn of Africa and West Africa, identify as Christians. The Coptic Christians constitute a sizable minority in Egypt, and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church is the largest church in Ethiopia, with 36 million and 51 million adherents.[245] According to Encyclopædia Britannica, 45% of the population are Christians, 40% are Muslims, and 10% follow traditional religions.[citation needed] A small number of Africans are Hindu, Buddhist, Confucianist, Baháʼí, or Jewish. There is also a minority of people in Africa who are irreligious.
Languages
[edit]By most estimates, well over a thousand languages (UNESCO has estimated around two thousand) are spoken in Africa.[246] Most are of African origin, though some are of European or Asian origin. Africa is the most multilingual continent in the world, and it is not rare for individuals to fluently speak not only multiple African languages, but one or more European ones as well.[further explanation needed] There are four major groups indigenous to Africa:

- The Afroasiatic languages are a language family of about 240 languages and 285 million people widespread throughout the Horn of Africa, North Africa, the Sahel, and Southwest Asia.
- The Nilo-Saharan languages consist of a group of several possibly related families,[247] spoken by 30 million people between 100 languages. Nilo-Saharan languages are spoken by ethnic groups in Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, and northern Tanzania.
- The Niger-Congo language family covers much of sub-Saharan Africa. In terms of number of languages, it is the largest language family in Africa and perhaps one of the largest in the world.
- The Khoisan languages form a group of three unrelated[248] families and two isolates and number about fifty in total. They are mainly spoken in Southern Africa by approximately 400,000 people.[249] Many of the Khoisan languages are endangered. The Khoi and San peoples are considered the original inhabitants of this part of Africa.
Following the end of colonialism, nearly all African countries adopted official languages that originated outside the continent, although several countries also granted legal recognition to indigenous languages (such as Swahili, Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa). In numerous countries, English and French (see African French) are used for communication in the public sphere such as government, commerce, education and the media. Arabic, Portuguese, Afrikaans and Spanish are examples of languages that trace their origin to outside of Africa, and that are used by millions of Africans today, both in the public and private spheres. Italian is spoken by some in former Italian colonies in Africa. German is spoken in Namibia, as it was a former German protectorate. In total, at least a fifth of Africans speak the former colonial languages.[250][251][252][m] Moreover, in recent years some African countries have been considering removing their official former colonial languages, such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger which removed French as an official language in the 2020s in favour of native languages,[253] while also renaming colonial street names.[254][255]
Health
[edit]| over 15% 5–15% 2–5% 1–2% 0.5–1% 0.1–0.5% not available |
More than 85% of individuals in Africa use traditional medicine as an alternative to often expensive allopathic medical health care and costly pharmaceutical products. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Heads of State and Government declared the 2000s decade as the African Decade on African traditional medicine in an effort to promote The WHO African Region's adopted resolution for institutionalising traditional medicine in health care systems across the continent.[256] Public policy makers in the region are challenged with consideration of the importance of traditional/indigenous health systems and whether their coexistence with the modern medical and health sub-sector would improve the equitability and accessibility of health care distribution, the health status of populations, and the social-economic development of nations within sub-Saharan Africa.[257]
AIDS in post-colonial Africa is a prevalent issue. Although the continent is home to about 15.2 percent of the world's population,[258] more than two-thirds of the total infected worldwide—some 35 million people—were Africans, of whom 15 million have already died.[259] Sub-Saharan Africa alone accounted for an estimated 69 percent of all people living with HIV[260] and 70 percent of all AIDS deaths in 2011.[261] In the countries of sub-Saharan Africa most affected, AIDS has raised death rates and lowered life expectancy among adults between the ages of 20 and 49 by about twenty years.[259] Furthermore, the life expectancy in many parts of Africa has declined, largely as a result of the HIV/AIDS epidemic with life-expectancy in some countries reaching as low as thirty-four years.[262]
Culture
[edit]
Some aspects of traditional African cultures have become less practised in recent years as a result of neglect and suppression by colonial and post-colonial regimes. For example, African customs were discouraged, and African languages were prohibited in mission schools.[263] Leopold II of Belgium attempted to "civilize" Africans by discouraging polygamy and witchcraft.[263]
Obidoh Freeborn posits that colonialism is one element that has created the character of modern African art.[264] According to authors Douglas Fraser and Herbert M. Cole, "The precipitous alterations in the power structure wrought by colonialism were quickly followed by drastic iconographic changes in the art."[265] Fraser and Cole assert that, in Igboland, some art objects "lack the vigor and careful craftsmanship of the earlier art objects that served traditional functions."[265] Author Chika Okeke-Agulu states that "the racist infrastructure of British imperial enterprise forced upon the political and cultural guardians of empire a denial and suppression of an emergent sovereign Africa and modernist art."[266] Editors F. Abiola Irele and Simon Gikandi comment that the current identity of African literature had its genesis in the "traumatic encounter between Africa and Europe."[267] On the other hand, Mhoze Chikowero believes that Africans deployed music, dance, spirituality, and other performative cultures to (re)assert themselves as active agents and indigenous intellectuals, to unmake their colonial marginalisation and reshape their own destinies.[268]
There is now a resurgence in the attempts to rediscover and revalue African traditional cultures, under such movements as the African Renaissance, led by Thabo Mbeki, Afrocentrism, led by a group of scholars, including Molefi Asante, as well as the increasing recognition of traditional spiritualism through decriminalisation of Vodou and other forms of spirituality.
As of March 2023, 98 African properties are listed by UNESCO as World Heritage Sites. Among these proprieties, 54 are cultural sites, 39 are natural sites and 5 are mixed sites. The List Of World Heritage in Danger includes 15 African sites.[269]
Visual art
[edit]


African art refers to works of visual art, including works of sculpture, painting, metalwork, and pottery, originating from the various peoples of the African continent and influenced by distinct, indigenous traditions of aesthetic expression.
While the various artistic traditions of such a large and diverse continent display considerable regional and cultural variety, there are consistent artistic themes, recurring motifs, and unifying elements across the broad spectrum of the African visual expression.[270] As is the case for every artistic tradition in human history, African art was created within specific social, political, and religious contexts. Likewise, African art was often created not purely for art's sake, but rather with some practical, spiritual, and/or didactic purpose in mind. In general, African art prioritizes conceptual and symbolic representation over realism, aiming to visualize the subject's spiritual essence.[271]
Ethiopian art, heavily influenced by Ethiopia's long-standing Christian tradition,[272] is also different from most African art, where Traditional African religion (with Islam prevalent in the north east and north west presently) was dominant until the 20th century.[273] African art includes prehistoric and ancient art, the Islamic art of West Africa, the Christian art of East Africa, and the traditional artifacts of these and other regions. Many African sculptures were historically made of wood and other natural materials that have not survived from earlier than a few centuries ago, although rare older pottery and metal figures can be found in some areas.[274] Some of the earliest decorative objects, such as shell beads and evidence of paint, have been discovered in Africa, dating to the Middle Stone Age.[275][276][277]
Masks are important elements in the art of many people, along with human figures, and are often highly stylized. There exist diverse styles, which can often be observed within a single context of origin and may be influenced by the intended use of the object. Nevertheless, broad regional trends are discernible. Sculpture is most common among "groups of settled cultivators in the areas drained by the Niger and Congo rivers" in West Africa.[278] Direct images of deities are relatively infrequent, but masks in particular are or were often made for ritual ceremonies. Since the late 19th century, there has been an increasing amount of African art in Western collections, the finest pieces of which are displayed as part of the history of colonization.
African art had an important influence on European Modernist art,[279] which was inspired by their interest in abstract depiction.[271] It was this appreciation of African sculpture that has been attributed to the very concept of "African art", as seen by European and American artists and art historians.[280]Architecture
[edit]
Like other aspects of the culture of Africa, the architecture of Africa is exceptionally diverse. Throughout the history of Africa, Africans have developed their own local architectural traditions. In some cases, broader regional styles can be identified, such as the Sudano-Sahelian architecture of West Africa. A common theme in traditional African architecture is the use of fractal scaling: small parts of the structure tend to look similar to larger parts, such as a circular village made of circular houses.[281]
African architecture in some areas has been influenced by external cultures for centuries, according to available evidence. Western architecture has influenced coastal areas since the late 15th century and is now an important source of inspiration for many larger buildings, particularly in major cities.
African architecture uses a wide range of materials, including thatch, stick/wood, mud, mudbrick, rammed earth, and stone. These material preferences vary by region: North Africa for stone and rammed earth, the Horn of Africa for stone and mortar, West Africa for mud/adobe, Central Africa for thatch/wood and more perishable materials, Southeast and Southern Africa for stone and thatch/wood.Cinema
[edit]This article may incorporate text from a large language model. (September 2025) |

Cinema of Africa covers both the history and present of the making or screening of films on the African continent, and also refers to the persons involved in this form of audiovisual culture. It dates back to the early 20th century, when film reels were the primary cinematic technology in use. As there are more than 50 countries with audiovisual traditions, there is no one single 'African cinema'. Both historically and culturally, there are major regional differences between North African and sub-Saharan cinemas, and between the cinemas of different countries.[282]
The cinema of Egypt and the cinema of Tunisia are also among the oldest in the world. Cinema of Egypt in particular is the most established and flourishing industry in Africa.[283][284] Pioneers Auguste and Louis Lumière screened their films in Alexandria, Cairo, Tunis, Susa, Libya and Hammam-Lif, Tunisia in 1896.[285][286] Albert Samama Chikly is often cited as the first producer of indigenous African cinema, screening his own short documentaries in the casino of Tunis as early as December 1905.[287] The first film to be produced was the 1923's Barsoum Looking for a Job in Egypt.[288][289] Alongside his daughter Haydée Tamzali, Chikly would go on to produce important early milestones such as 1924's The Girl from Carthage. In 1927, Egypt produced Laila, the first feature-length film produced by Aziza Amir and directed by Stephan Rosti and Wedad Orfi. In 1935, the Studio Misr in Cairo began producing mostly formulaic comedies and musicals, but also films like Kamal Selim's The Will (1939). Egyptian cinema flourished in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, considered its Golden Age.[290] Youssef Chahine's seminal Cairo Station (1958) laid the foundation for Arab film.[291]Music
[edit]This article may require copy editing for grammar, style, cohesion, tone, or spelling. (April 2024) |
The continent of Africa is vast and its music is diverse, with different regions and nations having many distinct musical traditions. African music includes genres such as makwaya, highlife, mbube, township music, jùjú, fuji, jaiva, afrobeat, afrofusion, mbalax, Congolese rumba, soukous, ndombolo, makossa, kizomba, taarab and others.[292] African music also uses a large variety of instruments from all across the continent. The music and dance of the African diaspora, formed to varying degrees on African musical traditions, include American music like Dixieland jazz, blues, jazz, and many Caribbean genres, such as calypso (see kaiso) and soca. Latin American music genres such as cumbia, salsa music, son cubano, rumba, conga, bomba, samba and zouk were founded on the music of enslaved Africans, and have in turn influenced African popular music.[292][293]
Like the music of Asia, India and the Middle East, it is a highly rhythmic music. The complex rhythmic patterns often involve one rhythm played against another to create a polyrhythm. The most common polyrhythm plays three beats on top of two, like a triplet played against straight notes. Sub-Saharan African music traditions frequently rely on percussion instruments of many varieties, including xylophones, djembes, drums, and tone-producing instruments such as the mbira or "thumb piano".[293][294]Dance
[edit]Sports
[edit]
Fifty-four African countries have football teams in the Confederation of African Football. Egypt has won the African Cup seven times, and a record-making three times in a row. Cameroon, Nigeria, Morocco, Senegal, Ghana, and Algeria have advanced to the knockout stage of recent FIFA World Cups. Morocco, at the 2022 World Cup in Qatar was the first African nation to reach the semi-finals of the FIFA Men's World Cup. South Africa hosted the 2010 World Cup tournament, becoming the first African country to do so. The top clubs in each African football league play the CAF Champions League, while lower-ranked clubs compete in CAF Confederation Cup.
In recent years, the continent has progressed in terms of state-of-the-art basketball facilities, which have been built in cities such as Cairo, Dakar, Johannesburg, Kigali, Luanda and Rades.[303] The number of African basketball players who drafted into the U.S. NBA has experienced growth in the 2010s.[304]
Cricket is popular in some African nations. South Africa and Zimbabwe have Test status, while Kenya is the leading non-test team and previously had One-Day International cricket (ODI) status (from 10 October 1997, until 30 January 2014). The three countries jointly hosted the 2003 Cricket World Cup. Namibia is the other African country to have played in a World Cup. Morocco, in northern Africa, hosted the 2002 Morocco Cup, but the national team has never qualified for a major tournament.
Rugby is popular in several southern African nations. Namibia and Zimbabwe have appeared on multiple occasions at the Rugby World Cup, while South Africa is the most successful national team at the Rugby World Cup, having won the tournament on four occasions, in 1995, 2007, 2019, and 2023.[305]
Traditional sports were strictly marginalised during the colonial era, and many are dying or have gone extinct under the pressure of modernisation, however lots remain popular despite not having formal governmental recognition or support.[306][307]: 193–194 Some examples are Senegalese wrestling, Dambe, Nguni stick-fighting, and Savika.
See also
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ This characterisation has come under criticism by some African scholars, as it implies conflict between the oral and written. They instead contend that in reality, the characterisation is defined by the interaction between three ways of expression and diffusion: the oral, the written, and the printed word.[21] Bethwell Allan Ogot notes that images of Africa composed by Western writers have often been in terms of "opposites" and how they differ from "us".[22]
- ^ Attributed to multiple sources:[24][25][26][27][28][29]
- ^ In stateless societies, oral histories centred around clan histories.[30] John Lonsdale famously said that "the most distinctively African contribution to human history could be said to have been precisely the civilized art of living fairly peaceably together not in states".[31]
- ^ In these cases, time's duration is not as it affects the fate of the individual, but the pulse of the social group. It is not a river flowing in one direction from a known source to a known outlet. Generally, traditional African time involves eternity in both directions, unlike Christians who consider eternity to operate in one direction. In African animism, time is an arena where both the group and the individual struggle for their vitality. The goal is to improve their situation, thus being dynamic. Bygone generations remain contemporary, and as influential as they were during their lifetime, if not more so. In these circumstances causality operates in a forward direction from past to present and from present to future, however direct intervention can operate in any direction.[52]: 44, 49
- ^ Also known as the Partition of Africa, the Conquest of Africa, or the Rape of Africa
- ^ The Egba United Government, a government of the Egba people, was legally recognised by the British as independent until being annexed into the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria in 1914.[138]
- ^ Continental regions as per UN categorizations/map
- ^ Egypt is generally considered a transcontinental country in Northern Africa (UN region) and Western Asia; population and area figures are for African portion only, west of the Suez Canal.
- ^ The territory of Western Sahara is claimed by the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and Morocco. The SADR is recognised as a sovereign state by the African Union. Morocco claims the entirety of the country as its Southern Provinces. Morocco administers 4/5 of the territory while the SADR controls 1/5. Morocco's annexation of this territory has not been recognised internationally.
- ^ Bloemfontein is the judicial capital of South Africa, while Cape Town is its legislative seat, and Pretoria is the country's administrative seat.
- ^ Yamoussoukro is the official capital of Ivory Coast, while Abidjan is the de facto seat.
- ^ Geographically part of the archipelago (Lampedusa and Lampione) belongs to the African continent; politically and administratively, the islands fall within the Province of Agrigento in Sicily
- ^ The previous three references show that there a total of 130 million English speakers, 120 million French speakers, and over 30 million Portuguese speakers in Africa, making them about 20% of Africa's 2022 population of 1.4 billion people.
References
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- Shillington, Kevin (2005). History of Africa. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-333-59957-0.
- Southall, Roger; Melber, Henning (2009). A New Scramble For Africa?: Imperialism, Investment and Development. University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
- Welsh-Asante, Kariamu (2009). African Dance. Infobase Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4381-2427-8.
Further reading
[edit]- Asante, Molefi (2007). The History of Africa. US: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-77139-9.
- Clark, J. Desmond (1970). The Prehistory of Africa. London, England: Thames and Hudson. ISBN 978-0-500-02069-2.
- Crowder, Michael (1978). The Story of Nigeria. London, England: Faber. ISBN 978-0-571-04947-9.
- Davidson, Basil (1966). The African Past: Chronicles from Antiquity to Modern Times. Harmondsworth: Penguin. OCLC 2016817.
- Gordon, April A.; Gordon, Donald L. (1996). Understanding Contemporary Africa. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 978-1-55587-547-3.
- Khapoya, Vincent B. (1998). The African experience: an introduction. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. ISBN 978-0-13-745852-3.
- Moore, Clark D., and Ann Dunbar (1968). Africa Yesterday and Today, in series, The George School Readings on Developing Lands. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Naipaul, V.S. The Masque of Africa: Glimpses of African Belief. Picador, 2010. ISBN 978-0-330-47205-0
- Wade, Lizzie (2015). "Drones and satellites spot lost civilizations in unlikely places". Science. doi:10.1126/science.aaa7864.
External links
[edit]General information
- Africa web resources provided by GovPubs at the University of Colorado Boulder Libraries
- Africa at the Encyclopædia Britannica
- Africa: Human Geography at the National Geographic Society
- African & Middle Eastern Reading Room from the United States Library of Congress
- Africa South of the Sahara from Stanford University
- Aluka digital library of scholarly resources from and about Africa
History
- The Story of Africa from BBC World Service
- . Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 1 (11th ed.). 1911. pp. 320–358.
Africa
View on GrokipediaEtymology
Derivation and historical usage
The name "Africa" derives from the Latin Africa, originally denoting a specific region in North Africa centered around the site of ancient Carthage in present-day Tunisia.[7] This usage emerged among the Romans following their conflicts with Carthage, with the term likely originating from Afri, the name applied to a Berber tribe or indigenous people inhabiting the coastal areas near the city, from which the adjectival form Afer ("of the Afri") developed.[8] [9] The Romans formalized Africa as the name of their province Africa Proconsularis in 146 BC, after the Third Punic War and the destruction of Carthage, encompassing territories previously under Carthaginian control and extending inland to include parts of modern Tunisia and eastern Algeria.[10] In earlier Greek accounts, such as those by Herodotus in the 5th century BC, the equivalent region and much of the continent were termed Libya, without reference to Africa, reflecting a distinction in nomenclature where Greeks broadly applied Libya to lands west of Egypt.[11] Roman authors like Pliny the Elder, writing in the 1st century AD, continued to use Africa for the northern provinces while noting the Greek preference for Libya to describe adjacent coastal and interior territories.[12] By the late Roman period and into the early medieval era, Africa occasionally extended in usage to broader North African contexts, but its application to the entire continental landmass solidified only during the European Age of Discovery in the 15th and 16th centuries. Portuguese explorers, navigating southward along the Atlantic coast from 1415 onward, increasingly mapped sub-Saharan regions under the generalized label Africa, influenced by classical precedents, leading to its widespread adoption for the full continent by the 17th century in European cartography and literature.[13] [14]Geography
Geological foundations and plates
The African Plate constitutes the primary tectonic unit encompassing nearly the entire continent of Africa, extending from the mid-Atlantic Ridge in the west to the Indian Ocean in the east, and ranking as the fourth-largest plate on Earth. This plate includes both continental and oceanic crust, with its interior characterized by relative tectonic stability due to the dominance of ancient cratonic blocks. The plate's boundaries feature divergent zones, notably where it separates from the Arabian Plate along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, and from the Somali subplate within the East African Rift system, driving extensional tectonics without significant subduction elsewhere.[15][16] Africa's geological stability derives from Precambrian cratons—ancient, rigid crustal nuclei formed primarily during the Archean and Proterozoic eons (over 2.5 billion years ago)—which form the continent's core and resist deformation. Major cratons include the Kaapvaal and Zimbabwe in the south, Congo in the center, West African in the northwest, and Tanzania in the east; these structures, comprising metamorphosed igneous and sedimentary rocks, have endured with minimal alteration for billions of years, contributing to Africa's subdued topography and limited orogenic (mountain-building) activity compared to continents like Eurasia. These cratons underlie about 40% of the continent's surface and exhibit thick lithospheric roots extending up to 200-400 kilometers, enhancing resistance to mantle convection and plate-scale disruption.[17][18][19] Precambrian formations within these cratons host extensive mineral endowments, including banded iron formations (BIFs) from the Paleoproterozoic era (approximately 2.4-2.0 billion years ago), which represent chemical sediments deposited in ancient marine basins under oxygen-poor conditions. In southern Africa, such as the Kaapvaal Craton, these include vast iron oxide deposits alongside Archean greenstone belts rich in gold and chromium, formed through volcanic and sedimentary processes in stable intracratonic settings. Similar assemblages occur in the Congo Craton's BIFs and West African Craton's Paleoproterozoic belts, reflecting episodic global oxygenation events rather than localized tectonics.[20][21][19] In contrast to the cratonic heartland, the East African Rift marks an active divergent boundary where the Somali Plate is separating from the Nubian Plate (the African Plate's main block) at rates of 6-7 mm per year, initiating continental breakup potentially leading to new ocean basin formation. Seismic data reveal ongoing extensional faulting and magmatism since the Eocene (about 45 million years ago), with heightened activity in the Afar Depression and Tanzanian divergence zone, including earthquake swarms and deeper hypocenters indicating lithospheric thinning. This rifting, driven by mantle upwelling, represents the primary modern tectonic dynamism on the continent, though it affects only a fraction of the plate's expanse.[22][23][24]Landforms and physical regions
Africa's topography is characterized by extensive plateaus averaging 600 to 1,000 meters in elevation, forming the continent's dominant structural feature, with relief shaped by ancient Precambrian cratons and younger tectonic activity. These plateaus are dissected by rift systems, escarpments, and sedimentary basins, creating barriers that have historically channeled human pathways along lowlands and river corridors rather than direct overland routes.[25][26] The Sahara expanse, the largest hot desert on Earth, covers much of North Africa north of the equator, consisting of flat-lying sand sheets, gravel plains, and elevated massifs with minimal topographic variation, its hyper-arid conditions restricting settlement to linear oases aligned with subsurface aquifers or seasonal wadis. Southward, the Sahel transition zone marks a semi-arid belt of low-relief savanna plateaus, where shallow soils and erratic hydrology form a gradual topographic decline from Saharan ergs to wetter equatorial lowlands, facilitating pastoral mobility but exposing margins to dune encroachment.[4][27] In East Africa, the Ethiopian Highlands constitute the continent's largest continuous elevated region, with surfaces predominantly above 1,500 meters and peaks exceeding 4,000 meters, drained by radial river networks that cascade through fault-block escarpments, promoting isolated highland pockets suited for terrace-based water management amid steep gradients. The adjacent Great Rift Valley, a tectonic depression extending over 6,000 kilometers from the Red Sea to the Zambezi River, features steep-walled grabens, volcanic highlands, and intramontane basins at elevations from below sea level to over 2,000 meters, its longitudinal alignment directing hydrological flow into soda lakes and limiting east-west traversal. The Horn of Africa's arid plateaus rise to 1,000-2,000 meters, shadowed by the highlands and incised by seasonal gullies that concentrate runoff in coastal wadis.[27][28] Central Africa's Congo Basin forms a vast low-lying depression averaging 400 meters elevation, encompassing sedimentary plains and swampy floodplains fed by equatorial rivers, its saucer-like hydrology pooling vast water volumes that spill over rim escarpments during high flows. Western river systems, such as the Niger at approximately 4,100 kilometers, exhibit meandering courses through inland deltas with expansive floodplains prone to annual inundations that redistribute sediments across clay-rich soils, enabling flood-recession cropping in trough zones. The Congo River, second-longest in Africa at around 4,700 kilometers, maintains high-volume discharge from perennial rainforest catchments, with braided channels susceptible to localized flooding that shapes alluvial deposition patterns. The Nile, Africa's longest river at 6,650 kilometers, integrates monsoon-driven White Nile perennial flow with seasonal Blue Nile floods, historically depositing silts in its lower basin to support hydraulic agriculture despite upstream arid traverses.[29] Coastal versus inland divides are pronounced, with narrow littoral plains often hemmed by abrupt escarpments rising hundreds of meters to interior plateaus, as in West Africa's Fouta Djallon scarp or East Africa's Pare Mountains, constraining accessibility and fostering settlement gradients from maritime ports to elevated hinterlands. In Southern Africa, the Karoo basins comprise intermontane depressions at 500-1,000 meters amid folded ranges, their endorheic drainage and silcrete caps yielding shallow ephemeral lakes that alternate with deflation hollows, while the encircling Great Escarpment drops sharply to coastal lows, reinforcing physiographic separation between temperate plateaus and subtropical margins.[25]Climate zones and variability
Africa's climate zones are primarily classified under the Köppen-Geiger system, with tropical climates (A) covering about two-thirds of the continent, arid zones (B) dominating the north and southwest, and smaller temperate Mediterranean zones (C) along the northern and southern coasts. The equatorial region, spanning the Congo Basin and parts of West Africa, features tropical rainforest (Af) and monsoon (Am) subtypes characterized by consistently high temperatures averaging 25–28°C year-round and annual precipitation often exceeding 2,000 mm, driven by the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ). Tropical savanna (Aw/As) climates prevail in much of sub-Saharan Africa, with distinct wet seasons from monsoonal rains (600–1,500 mm annually) and dry winters, supporting grasslands but prone to seasonal water deficits.[30] Arid desert (BWh) zones encompass the Sahara in the north and the Namib and Kalahari in the southwest, where annual precipitation falls below 250 mm and daytime temperatures frequently surpass 40°C, with minimal vegetation limited by extreme aridity. The Sahel, a semi-arid belt (BSh) south of the Sahara stretching from Senegal to Sudan, receives 200–600 mm of erratic rainfall, marking a transitional zone between desert and savanna with high interannual variability that historically fosters both pastoralism and vulnerability to famine. Mediterranean climates (Csa/Csb) occur along North Africa's Atlas Mountains and the Cape region of South Africa, featuring mild, wet winters (400–800 mm precipitation) and hot, dry summers, with average temperatures ranging from 10–15°C in winter to 25–30°C in summer.[31][32] Climate variability in Africa stems largely from natural forcings, including seasonal ITCZ shifts and ocean-atmosphere oscillations like El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO). The West African monsoon, peaking June to September, delivers most regional rainfall but exhibits fluctuations tied to Atlantic sea surface temperatures and Indian Ocean dynamics, independent of long-term trends. El Niño events, occurring every 2–7 years, suppress Sahelian precipitation by altering Walker circulation, leading to droughts such as those in the 1970s and 1980s that reduced rainfall by up to 30% below norms and triggered famines affecting millions. La Niña phases conversely enhance monsoon strength, causing floods in East Africa.[33][34] Historical records reveal multi-decadal shifts, with the Medieval Climate Anomaly (circa 900–1300 CE) associated with wetter conditions in the west Sahel, evidenced by lake level rises and pollen data indicating expanded vegetation that facilitated agricultural intensification and the rise of empires like Ghana. Such variability underscores causal links to solar insolation and ocean cycles rather than uniform anthropogenic forcing. In recent years, the 2023–2024 El Niño amplified droughts across southern Africa, resulting in widespread crop failures and livestock losses, with maize yields dropping by over 20% in countries like Zimbabwe and Malawi. As of September 2025, persistent erratic patterns, including prolonged dry spells in East Africa, contribute to acute food insecurity affecting 105 million people in East and Southern regions, compounded by localized floods but rooted in natural oscillatory drivers.[35][36][37]Biodiversity, ecosystems, and fauna
Africa exhibits exceptional faunal diversity, hosting approximately 1,100 mammal species—about one-quarter of the global total—and over 2,000 bird species, with fossil records indicating many lineages originated on the continent during the Miocene epoch, reflecting periods of relative evolutionary isolation following the breakup of Gondwana.[38][39] The continent's ecosystems, shaped by ancient climatic stability and topographic barriers like the East African Rift, support high concentrations of large herbivores and predators, with sub-Saharan regions alone documenting thousands of vertebrate occurrences across grid-based inventories.[40] Savannas, encompassing roughly 40% of Africa's land area and spanning East, Central, and Southern regions, sustain iconic megafauna assemblages including the "Big Five"—African lion (Panthera leo), leopard (Panthera pardus), African elephant (Loxodonta africana), Cape buffalo (Syncerus caffer), and rhinoceros species (Ceratotherium simum and Diceros bicornis)—whose persistence traces to Pliocene adaptations amid grassland expansions, as evidenced by fossil faunas showing continuity of proboscidean and perissodactyl lines.[41][42] These open woodlands and grasslands harbor over 80 antelope species, contributing to Africa's unparalleled diversity of large mammals compared to other continents, where such concentrations diminished more severely post-Pleistocene.[38][43] The Congo Basin rainforest, the world's second-largest tropical forest at approximately 1.5 million square kilometers, functions as a premier biodiversity hotspot with over 400 mammal species, more than 1,000 birds, and 700 fish, including endemics like the okapi (Okapia johnstoni), a giraffid adapted to dense understory and confined to the Democratic Republic of Congo since its discovery in 1901.[44][45] This region's isolation by surrounding savannas and rivers has preserved archaic lineages, with genomic and fossil data underscoring limited gene flow and high vertebrate endemism akin to island-like refugia.[46] While Africa's mammal richness exceeds that of other tropical landmasses, vascular plant diversity totals around 45,000 species across 30 million square kilometers—lower than the Neotropics' 90,000 in half the area—with endemism skewed southward to biomes like the Cape Floristic Region rather than widespread in equatorial forests.[47][48] Recent inventories highlight pressures on these systems: elephant poaching remains the primary mortality factor for forest elephants, classified critically endangered, while rhino poaching rates fell to 2.15% of populations in 2024, the lowest since 2011 per IUCN assessments.[49][50] Habitat surveys indicate savanna vegetation loss at 0.24% annually in southern Africa from 2014–2018, correlating with raptor population declines across 88% of monitored species over two to four decades.[51][52]Environmental degradation and resource pressures
Africa's environmental degradation is primarily driven by rapid population growth and ineffective governance, which amplify unsustainable land use practices rather than external climatic factors alone. With Africa's population exceeding 1.4 billion in 2023 and projected to reach 2.5 billion by 2050, demand for arable land, fuelwood, and grazing has intensified resource extraction, leading to widespread habitat loss and soil depletion.[53] [54] Weak institutional enforcement of land management exacerbates these pressures, as subsistence farming and pastoralism expand without regenerative measures.[55] In the Congo Basin, the world's second-largest rainforest, deforestation accelerated by 12.5% in 2023 compared to the 2018-2020 baseline, primarily from smallholder slash-and-burn agriculture to clear land for crops amid population-driven food needs.[56] Logging concessions further facilitate forest loss by opening access roads, enabling illegal conversion, though industrial mining contributes less than localized farming.[57] Annual tree cover loss reached approximately 0.5 million hectares in the Democratic Republic of Congo alone by 2022, underscoring how governance failures in regulating concessions compound demographic strains.[58] Desertification in the Sahel region affects over 65% of degraded land due to overgrazing by expanding livestock herds, which strip vegetation and expose soils to erosion during infrequent but intense rains.[59] Population growth has increased herd sizes beyond carrying capacity, with pastoralists moving southward and intensifying pressure on marginal lands, resulting in annual soil loss rates of 20-30 tons per hectare in parts of Mali and Niger.[60] Poor governance, including inadequate rangeland rotation policies, perpetuates this cycle, as herders prioritize short-term survival over sustainable stocking densities.[61] Water scarcity exacerbates inter-state tensions, notably along the Nile River, where Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), operational since 2020, has heightened disputes with downstream Egypt and Sudan over flow reductions during filling phases.[62] Egypt, reliant on the Nile for 97% of its freshwater, views potential 25% flow cuts as existential, while Ethiopia asserts upstream rights to harness hydropower for its 120 million citizens; unresolved trilateral talks as of 2025 reflect governance gridlock prioritizing national sovereignty over basin-wide allocation.[63] Such conflicts arise from population-fueled demand outpacing equitable resource sharing, rather than isolated climatic variability.[64] International climate finance inflows to Africa reached $43.7 billion in 2021/22, up 48% from 2019/20, yet yield limited mitigation of local degradations due to misallocation toward adaptation (32% of flows) amid persistent mismanagement.[65] Narratives emphasizing global emissions overlook how domestic factors like unchecked expansion of informal agriculture dominate degradation drivers, with funds often absorbed by debt servicing—$163 billion projected for 2024—reducing on-ground impact.[66] Empirical assessments indicate that without addressing governance deficits, such aid fails to reverse trends tied to endogenous population dynamics.[67]History
Prehistoric origins and early human dispersal
The earliest evidence of hominins, the lineage leading to modern humans, originates in Africa, with fossil discoveries spanning the late Miocene and Pliocene epochs. Sahelanthropus tchadensis, dated to between 7 and 6 million years ago (mya) via biostratigraphic correlation and faunal analysis in Chad's Djurab Desert, represents one of the oldest potential hominins, exhibiting a combination of ape-like and derived traits such as a reduced canine-premolar honing complex.[68] In East Africa, key sites like the Afar region of Ethiopia yield Ardipithecus ramidus fossils dated to approximately 4.4 mya through argon-argon radiometric dating of volcanic tuffs, showing partial bipedalism alongside arboreal adaptations.[69] Australopithecus species, such as A. afarensis (exemplified by the "Lucy" skeleton), date to 3.9–3.2 mya in the same region, confirmed by potassium-argon and argon-argon methods, and display fully bipedal lower limb morphology with a foramen magnum position indicative of upright posture.[70] These findings establish East Africa as a primary center for early hominin diversification. Environmental changes, particularly the expansion of C4 grasslands and savannas during the Miocene-Pliocene transition around 8–5 mya, drove adaptations like bipedalism. Linked to global cooling and regional aridification evidenced by pollen records and isotopic analysis of paleosols, this "savanna hypothesis" posits that open habitats selected for energy-efficient terrestrial locomotion over quadrupedalism, as bipedal gait reduces caloric expenditure for long-distance travel in patchy woodlands.[71] Fossil faunas from sites like Laetoli, Tanzania, corroborate mixed woodland-savanna mosaics coexisting with early bipedal trackways dated to 3.66 mya.[72] By the early Pleistocene, hominins in Africa developed the Oldowan lithic industry, the earliest known stone tool technology, emerging around 2.6 mya in East Africa. Artifacts from sites like Gona, Ethiopia, and Ledi-Geraru, dated via argon-argon on tephra layers, consist of simple flakes, cores, and choppers produced by direct percussion on quartzite or basalt cobbles, likely used for scavenging and processing animal carcasses or plants.[73] Associated with Homo habilis or late Australopithecus/P. boisei, these tools reflect cognitive advances in planning and manual dexterity but remained rudimentary, persisting with minimal innovation for over a million years across eastern and southern Africa.[74] The dispersal of anatomically modern Homo sapiens from Africa aligns with the "Out-of-Africa" model, substantiated by mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) phylogenies tracing non-African lineages to African haplogroup L3. Fossil evidence places H. sapiens origins around 300,000 years ago in sites like Jebel Irhoud, Morocco, and Omo Kibish, Ethiopia (dated 233,000–195,000 years ago via uranium-series and electron spin resonance on teeth).[75] Genetic coalescent analyses of mtDNA indicate major dispersals between 70,000 and 50,000 years ago via a southern coastal route along the Indian Ocean, with rapid expansion evidenced by low non-African genetic diversity and star-like phylogeny.[76] [77] Earlier dispersals around 120,000–75,000 years ago are suggested by mtDNA sub-clades and Levantine fossils, though these appear limited in scope compared to the later pulse.[78] This model, corroborated by Y-chromosome and autosomal data, underscores Africa's role as the source of global human populations, with dispersals facilitated by climatic ameliorations increasing connectivity.[79]Ancient civilizations and technological plateaus
![Ancient Egypt map-en.svg.png][center] The Nile Valley hosted some of Africa's earliest complex societies, with ancient Egypt emerging around 3100 BCE following the unification under Narmer, leading to the development of hieroglyphic writing, monumental architecture, and centralized administration. During the Old Kingdom (c. 2686–2181 BCE), pharaohs oversaw the construction of large-scale pyramids, such as the Step Pyramid of Djoser (c. 2670 BCE) and the Great Pyramid of Giza (c. 2560 BCE), which required advanced quarrying, transportation, and engineering techniques involving ramps and levers, supporting a population of millions through Nile-dependent agriculture.[80][81] To the south, the Kingdom of Kush in Nubia (c. 2500 BCE–350 CE) developed parallel achievements, including pyramid construction—over 200 smaller pyramids at sites like Meroë—and iron smelting by the 6th century BCE, predating widespread European adoption. Kushite rulers conquered Egypt during the 25th Dynasty (c. 744–656 BCE), adopting and adapting Egyptian religious and architectural practices while maintaining distinct Nubian elements in art and governance, centered on trade in gold, ivory, and slaves across the Nile and Red Sea.[82][83] ![Sculpture_nok-Nigeria_(1)[float-right] In West Africa, the Nok culture of central Nigeria (c. 1500 BCE–500 CE) represents an early sub-Saharan technological advance, with evidence of iron smelting from bloomeries dating to around 500 BCE, enabling improved tools for farming and clearing dense forests in the savanna. Nok settlements featured terracotta sculptures depicting humans and animals, suggesting social complexity, but lacked urban centers or widespread writing, relying on oral traditions amid dispersed villages.[84][85] Further east, the Kingdom of Aksum (c. 100–940 CE) in the Ethiopian highlands established a trade network linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, minting gold coins inscribed in Ge'ez script by the 3rd century CE and erecting massive stelae up to 33 meters tall, reflecting hydraulic engineering for agriculture and monumental stonework. Aksum adopted Christianity in the 4th century CE under King Ezana, but its technologies, including plows and terraced farming, did not diffuse broadly southward due to highland isolation. Despite these innovations—such as independent ironworking in Nok and Kush—African civilizations south of the Sahara exhibited technological plateaus, with no evidence of wheeled transport adoption before European contact in the 19th century, unlike in Eurasia where wheels facilitated trade and warfare from c. 3500 BCE. The wheel, known in ancient Egypt for pottery but not vehicles south of the desert, failed to spread due to the Sahara's barrier to diffusion, combined with tsetse fly infestation limiting draft animals like oxen in equatorial zones, and rugged terrain favoring human porterage over carts.[86][87] Sub-Saharan plow use remained limited pre-contact, with hoe-based agriculture dominating due to fragile tropical soils prone to erosion under plowing, and the absence of widespread scripting beyond Aksum's Ge'ez, hindering administrative scalability outside the fertile Nile corridor. Geographic factors, including the Sahara's expanse severing north-south exchanges—contrasting Eurasia's east-west land bridges that eased latitude-matched crop and tech diffusion—contributed to these limits, as did ecological fragmentation from rainforests and rivers without navigable connections. Nile dependence in Egypt fostered hydraulic despotism but constrained expansion beyond floodplains, while sub-Saharan isolation preserved local adaptations without cumulative Eurasian-style advancements.[88][89]Medieval kingdoms, trade, and internal slaveries
In West Africa, the medieval period saw the rise of powerful empires centered on trans-Saharan trade networks, where gold from southern mines was exchanged for salt from northern deserts, alongside ivory, kola nuts, and slaves. The Ghana Empire, flourishing from roughly the 6th to 13th centuries CE, controlled key routes in present-day Mauritania, Senegal, and Mali, amassing wealth through taxes on caravans that could number up to 10,000 camels.[90] [91] Its capital, Koumbi Saleh, hosted Arab merchants who described rulers with vast gold reserves and armies of 200,000, including cavalry.[92] This empire declined due to internal strife and invasions, paving the way for the Mali Empire (c. 1226–1610 CE), founded by Sundiata Keita after defeating the Sosso in 1235.[93] The Mali Empire expanded trade under Mansa Musa, whose 1324 pilgrimage to Mecca involved a caravan so laden with gold—estimated at 12 tons—that it depressed Cairo's gold prices for over a decade.[92] Timbuktu emerged as a scholarly hub with mosques and universities attracting Islamic jurists.[94] Successor Songhai (c. 1464–1591 CE), under Askia Muhammad, controlled similar routes, with Gao as a trade nexus exporting up to 1 ton of gold annually by the 16th century.[95] These states relied on pastoral Fulani herders for mobility and tribute, but economies emphasized extraction and taxation over diversified manufacturing.[96] In East Africa, Swahili city-states along the coast from Somalia to Mozambique thrived from the 8th to 15th centuries via Indian Ocean commerce, linking African interiors to Arabia, Persia, India, and China.[97] Ports like Kilwa, exporting gold from Great Zimbabwe (peaking c. 11th–15th centuries) and ivory, imported ceramics, textiles, and beads; Kilwa minted copper coins and built coral-stone mosques by 1300 CE.[98] Trade volumes included thousands of elephant tusks annually, fostering urban elites who adopted Islam for commercial ties.[99] Islam's expansion in medieval Africa combined trade with conquest: Arab forces conquered North Africa by 711 CE, imposing jizya taxes that incentivized conversions among Berbers, who then raided southward.[100] In West Africa, merchants introduced the faith peacefully from the 8th century, with rulers like Ghana's converting selectively for alliances, though Almoravid invasions (c. 1076) accelerated adoption via military pressure.[101] Swahili elites embraced Islam by the 10th century for trade benefits, blending it with Bantu traditions.[102] Pre-colonial African societies practiced internal slavery systems, capturing war prisoners, debtors, and criminals for labor, military service, or domestic roles, distinct from hereditary chattel but integral to kingdoms.[103] [104] In Sahelian empires, slaves worked goldfields or as porters on caravans, comprising up to 20% of populations in some states; Kanem-Bornu (c. 9th–19th centuries) used slave soldiers in cavalry.[105] These practices, rooted in kinship raids rather than racial ideology, supplied early trans-Saharan markets, with estimates of 6,000–7,000 slaves exported yearly by the 10th century.[106] Technological development in these kingdoms emphasized pastoral mobility for herding cattle and camels, supporting trade but limiting sedentary innovation; iron tools persisted from earlier eras without advances like wheeled transport or intensive plowing, constraining agricultural surpluses beyond riverine zones.[107] Reliance on human labor and tribute sustained hierarchies, with little evidence of mechanical or metallurgical breakthroughs comparable to contemporaneous Eurasian states.[108]Atlantic slave trade and African complicity
The Atlantic slave trade, spanning from roughly 1500 to the 1860s, involved the embarkation of approximately 12.5 million Africans onto ships bound primarily for the Americas, based on shipping records compiled in the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database.[109] Mortality during the Middle Passage reduced the number who disembarked to around 10.7 million, with the trade concentrated in West and Central Africa from ports like Ouidah and Luanda.[109] European demand drove the volume, but the supply chain depended on African intermediaries who controlled inland capture and coastal delivery, countering narratives attributing the trade solely to external agency.[110] African kingdoms exercised significant agency in supplying captives, often through organized raids and wars targeting rival groups or non-combatants, which they exchanged for European goods including textiles, alcohol, and especially firearms.[111] The Kingdom of Dahomey, under rulers like Agaja (r. 1718–1740), conquered coastal trade routes and supplied tens of thousands of war prisoners annually to European buyers, using proceeds to fund military expansion and annual customs involving sacrificial executions that spared some captives for export.[112] Similarly, the Ashanti Empire in present-day Ghana profited by selling judicial offenders, debtors, and enemies captured in conflicts, amassing wealth that reinforced centralized authority and imported iron bars for weaponry.[113] Other polities, including Oyo and the Kingdom of Whydah, participated by monopolizing access to interior slaves, with European traders rarely venturing beyond fortified coastal factories due to disease and hostility.[111] This participation fostered a self-reinforcing economic cycle, where firearms traded for slaves enhanced raiders' capabilities, prompting escalated conflicts to meet European quotas and sustain imports.[114] Analysis of 18th-century British records reveals that above-equilibrium gunpowder shipments to Africa correlated with subsequent spikes in slave exports, indicating a "guns-for-slaves" dynamic that intensified predation without Europeans directly conducting most captures.[115] Kingdoms like Dahomey integrated muskets into armies of thousands, enabling dominance over neighbors and perpetuating warfare; by the late 1700s, British exports alone included over 40 tons of powder yearly for this exchange.[116] The trade induced localized depopulation, with simulations estimating a net population loss of 1–2 million in West Africa from exports, warfare mortality, and fertility disruptions, though aggregate continental figures remain debated due to sparse pre-trade censuses.[117] Regions like the Bight of Benin saw male shortages from selective captures of prime-age adults, shifting labor burdens and exacerbating vulnerability to raids, yet these built on endemic pre-1500 hierarchies of enslavement and intertribal conflict rather than originating solely from Atlantic demand.[118] Assertions of uniquely catastrophic long-term psychological or social ruptures often overlook empirical continuities in African polities' coercive structures, with data linking trade intensity more directly to inhibited trust and development than to invented pathologies.[119]European colonialism: conquests and infrastructures
The Scramble for Africa, spanning roughly from the 1880s to 1914, involved the rapid conquest and partition of the continent by European powers including Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, and Spain, driven by economic interests in resources and strategic rivalries. By 1914, European control extended over nearly 90% of Africa's territory, up from about 10% in 1870, achieved through military expeditions leveraging superior firepower such as breech-loading rifles and machine guns against local forces armed primarily with spears and muskets. The Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 formalized this process among 14 states, establishing rules for claiming territory via "effective occupation" without African input, resulting in arbitrary borders that often bisected ethnic groups and ignored pre-existing polities.[120][121] Conquests succeeded due to technological disparities, European acclimatization via quinine against malaria, and exploitation of African divisions through alliances with rival chiefs, as seen in Britain's defeat of the Ashanti Empire in 1874 and the Zulu Kingdom in 1879, or France's penetration of the Sahel. Pacification campaigns, such as the German suppression of the Herero and Nama uprising in 1904–1908, involved brutal tactics including forced labor and concentration camps, yet overall intertribal slave raids and endemic warfare declined under imposed colonial monopolies on violence, fostering relative stability that contributed to population recovery. Africa's population, estimated at around 100 million circa 1900 after slave trade depredations, grew modestly from the 1890s and accelerated post-1920 due to reduced mortality from conflict and imported sanitation, reaching over 200 million by mid-century.[122][123] Infrastructure development focused on extraction, with European powers constructing approximately 100,000 kilometers of railways by the 1940s to link interior mines and plantations to coastal ports for exporting commodities like copper, rubber, and cocoa. Examples include Britain's Uganda Railway (1896–1901) spanning 1,000 kilometers from Mombasa to Lake Victoria, and France's Dakar-Niger line completed in 1924, which together comprised over 80% of Africa's rail network built before independence. Ports such as those at Lagos, Cape Town, and Algiers were expanded with dredging and quays to handle steamship traffic, while limited roads and telegraphs supported administration; these systems, though extractive, integrated remote areas into global markets, enabling cash crop booms and per capita income rises in colonies like Gold Coast and Southern Rhodesia relative to 1885 baselines.[124][125][126] Health interventions included vaccination drives against smallpox, which curbed epidemics in regions like British West Africa by the early 20th century, alongside basic hygiene and urban sanitation that lowered infant mortality despite forced labor systems like the French prestations. Colonial legal frameworks introduced codified property rights and contract enforcement in settler areas such as Kenya and Algeria, reducing arbitrary seizures compared to pre-colonial chiefly systems, though enforcement favored Europeans. Literacy rates, near zero in most sub-Saharan societies pre-1880 outside Islamic script zones, climbed to 5–10% by independence through mission and state schools teaching European languages, laying foundations for administrative elites. These developments, amid resource outflows, yielded net demographic and connectivity gains verifiable in export volumes and vital statistics, contrasting with stagnant pre-colonial metrics.[127][128]Decolonization movements and immediate aftermath
Decolonization in Africa accelerated following World War II, driven by nationalist movements that pressured European powers to grant independence through negotiations and, in some cases, armed struggle. The process began in North Africa with Libya achieving sovereignty on December 24, 1951, under United Nations supervision after Italian and British administration, followed by Morocco and Tunisia in 1956 through agreements with France that preserved monarchical and republican structures respectively. Sub-Saharan Africa's wave commenced with Ghana's independence from Britain on March 6, 1957, under Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah, who positioned the former Gold Coast as a vanguard for continental liberation and invoked pan-Africanist ideals of unity to transcend colonial boundaries.[129][130][131] The 1960 "Year of Africa" saw 17 nations, primarily French and Belgian colonies, attain independence, including Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, often via elite-led pacts negotiated at constitutional conferences that transferred power to urban-educated leaders while maintaining administrative continuity. These movements emphasized rhetorical unity and anti-imperialism, inspired by pan-African congresses, yet frequently overlooked deep ethnic and tribal cleavages entrenched by colonial divide-and-rule policies, favoring centralized nation-state models over federal arrangements that might have accommodated diverse groups. Nkrumah's Convention People's Party, for instance, mobilized mass support through promises of rapid development and African socialism, but sidelined regional ethnic tensions in pursuit of a singular national identity.[132][133][134] Initial post-independence years brought optimism, with the founding of the Organization of African Unity in 1963 to promote solidarity and non-interference, alongside brief economic expansions in many states that inherited late-colonial infrastructures and commodity booms. Average annual GDP growth across sub-Saharan Africa reached about 4 percent in the first decade after 1960, fueled by investments in agriculture, mining, and basic industries, though per capita gains were modest due to rapid population increases. However, early signals of fragility emerged, as weakly institutionalized states grappled with power vacuums; Togo experienced sub-Saharan Africa's first post-colonial coup on January 13, 1963, when soldiers, demobilized without pensions after French Togoland's 1960 independence, assassinated President Sylvanus Olympio amid grievances over economic policies and military neglect.[135][136][137]Post-colonial governance failures and economic experiments
Following independence, many African states adopted one-party systems that entrenched authoritarian rule and facilitated kleptocratic practices, where ruling elites captured state resources for personal gain. Examples include Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), where post-colonial consolidation of power under a single party enabled systemic embezzlement, diverting mineral revenues into private accounts.[138] These structures stifled political competition and accountability, contributing to governance instability evidenced by over 200 coup attempts or successes since the 1960s, with at least 106 succeeding, primarily in sub-Saharan nations.[139] [140] Economic policies in the 1960s–1980s often featured nationalizations and socialist experiments, which disrupted production and invited inefficiency. In Tanzania, Julius Nyerere's Ujamaa villages policy, implemented from 1967, forcibly collectivized agriculture, leading to output declines, food shortages, and GDP per capita stagnation; by the late 1970s, the country relied heavily on foreign aid, with agricultural productivity falling as farmers resisted coerced relocations.[141] [142] Similarly, Zimbabwe's fast-track land reforms from 2000, seizing commercial farms without compensation, halved agricultural output and triggered hyperinflation peaking at 79.6 billion percent monthly in 2008, as export earnings from tobacco and other crops collapsed, exacerbating fiscal deficits financed by money printing.[143] Nationalizations elsewhere, such as Zaire's 1973–1974 measures expropriating foreign firms, yielded short-term gains but long-term mismanagement, with mining output plummeting and corruption entrenching elite rent-seeking.[144] International structural adjustment programs (SAPs) imposed by the IMF and World Bank from the 1980s aimed to reverse these failures through privatization, devaluation, and liberalization, yielding partial recoveries in some cases—like Ghana's GDP growth averaging 5.4% annually from 1986–1992—but often at the cost of rising poverty, wage erosion, and social unrest due to subsidy cuts and user fees for essentials.[145] [146] Growth divergences emerged: resource-poor reformers like Botswana sustained stability, while kleptocratic states lagged, with sub-Saharan Africa's per capita GDP contracting 0.7% annually in the 1980s amid debt crises and terms-of-trade shocks.[147] By 2025, despite over $2.6 trillion in foreign aid since 1960, authoritarian tendencies persist, with sub-Saharan Africa's average Corruption Perceptions Index score at 33/100, reflecting entrenched bribery and fund diversion that undermine institutional reforms.[148] [149] Aid inflows have inadvertently propped up rent-seeking elites, delaying accountability and perpetuating low growth in many states, as evidenced by stalled democratization post-SAPs and recurrent coups in aid-dependent nations.[150][151]Politics and Governance
Sovereign states and dependencies
Africa consists of 54 sovereign states recognized as full members of the United Nations, having achieved independence primarily through bilateral treaties, unilateral declarations, or multilateral agreements following the dissolution of colonial empires after World War II.[152] These states maintain defined borders largely inherited from colonial partitions, with sovereignty affirmed by mutual recognition among UN members, though some face internal challenges to effective control.[153] The states are conventionally grouped into five subregions for geographical, cultural, and economic analysis: North Africa (including the Maghreb), West Africa, East Africa, Central Africa, and Southern Africa.[154] North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia. Mauritania and Sudan are sometimes included in this grouping due to shared Arab-Berber cultural ties and Saharan geography, though Mauritania aligns more with West Africa in some frameworks.[1] West Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. This region encompasses 16 states bound by historical ties to Atlantic trade routes and Sahelian ecosystems.[1] East Africa: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Comprising 18 states, this subregion features diverse island nations and Great Lakes countries with sovereignty rooted in post-1960s decolonization pacts.[1] Central Africa: Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe. Nine states define this equatorial zone, with borders often delineated by 1880s Berlin Conference agreements later modified by independence treaties.[1] Southern Africa: Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa. Five landlocked or semi-enclaved states form this subregion, their sovereignty established via 19th- and 20th-century protectorate transitions and apartheid-era settlements.[1] In addition to sovereign states, Africa includes dependencies and disputed territories administered by non-African powers or contested entities. Notable examples are Réunion and Mayotte, overseas departments of France under the 1946 French Constitution and subsequent referenda; Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha, a British Overseas Territory governed by the 1833 Charter and modern UK Overseas Territories Acts; and Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla, retained under the 1668 Treaty of Lisbon and affirmed in Spain's 1978 Constitution.[155] Western Sahara remains a non-self-governing territory per UN listing since 1963, with no administering power after Spain's 1976 withdrawal under the Madrid Accords; Morocco controls about 80% of the area via military occupation since 1975, but the UN maintains its status as disputed, rejecting full sovereignty claims despite recognitions by the US in 2020 and Belgium in 2025 of Morocco's autonomy plan as a potential framework.[156][157] The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic claims the territory and holds limited recognition from 46 states, primarily in Africa, but lacks UN membership.[155] Among sovereign states, Somalia exemplifies metrics of state failure, topping the 2024 Fragile States Index with a score of 111.3 out of 120, reflecting profound deficits in security, economic viability, and governmental legitimacy due to prolonged clan-based fragmentation and insurgent control over significant territory since the 1991 central government collapse.[158] No new sovereign recognitions or territorial changes have occurred in Africa as of October 2025, maintaining the established count of 54 UN members.[159]Regional integration efforts and their limitations
The African Union (AU), launched on July 9, 2002, in Durban, South Africa, as the successor to the Organization of African Unity, seeks to foster continental integration through political, economic, and security cooperation among its 55 member states.[160] It coordinates eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs), including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which serve as building blocks for broader continental efforts.[160] Despite these structures, integration remains superficial, as evidenced by the African Regional Integration Index (ARII), which scores continental performance at a low average of 0.327 out of 1 across dimensions like trade, infrastructure, and free movement. Agenda 2063, adopted by the AU in January 2015, outlines an ambitious vision for a unified, prosperous Africa by promoting seamless integration, including a single market and enhanced peacekeeping capabilities.[161] The First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2014–2023) targeted milestones in these areas, but assessments reveal significant enforcement gaps, with uneven progress hampered by non-binding decisions and member state non-compliance.[162] The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), signed in March 2018 and entering provisional force in 2019, exemplifies rhetorical commitments, aiming to liberalize 97% of intra-African tariffs to boost trade.[163] Yet, as of 2023, tariff reductions remain incomplete, persistent non-tariff barriers (such as border delays and regulatory divergences) stifle flows, and intra-African trade lingers at 15–18% of total exports—far below Asia's 59% or Europe's 68%.[164][165] Security integration efforts, integral to AU mandates, have similarly faltered due to logistical and financial shortfalls. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), deployed to Darfur in 2004 amid genocide alerts, struggled with inadequate funding, equipment shortages, and unpaid troops, failing to halt violence or disarm militias effectively before transitioning to the UN-AU hybrid UNAMID in 2007.[166][167] AU operations often depend on external donors for over 90% of budgets, underscoring self-reliance deficits.[168] Broader limitations stem from elite-driven dynamics, where RECs function more as forums for ruling classes to secure patronage networks than mechanisms addressing grassroots economic or ethnic realities.[169] Overlapping REC memberships—some states belong to three or more—exacerbate fragmentation, while national sovereignty overrides supranational enforcement, perpetuating protectionism and weak institutions.[170] ARII data highlights REC disparities, with the EAC leading at 0.537 but others like the Economic Community of Central African States scoring below 0.4, reflecting stalled infrastructure and policy harmonization.[171] These patterns indicate that integration rhetoric outpaces causal drivers like rule of law and reduced tribal parochialism, yielding minimal trade gains despite decades of protocols.[172]Ongoing conflicts, insurgencies, and boundary disputes
Africa experiences more than 35 active non-international armed conflicts as of 2025, many rooted in ethnic militias, religious extremism, and resource competition rather than solely colonial-era boundaries.[173] These insurgencies have driven over 20 million conflict-related internal displacements continent-wide, with violence enabling warlord control over food supplies and exacerbating famines through targeted blockades and agricultural sabotage.[174] In the Sahel, jihadist groups including Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) have expanded southward into Benin-Niger-Nigeria borderlands by 2025, leveraging religious ideology to recruit from marginalized ethnic communities and conducting deadlier civilian attacks that displace populations and fuel localized famines.[175][176] Operations in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger alone have intensified ethnic Fulani grievances against state forces, resulting in thousands of fatalities annually from ambushes and reprisals.[177] Sudan's civil war, erupting in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces, has killed over 150,000 civilians by October 2025, with ethnic-targeted massacres in Darfur—particularly against non-Arab groups—driving 14 million displacements and famine declarations in besieged areas where warlords hoard aid.[178][179] At least 3,384 civilians died from direct violence in the first half of 2025, mostly in Darfur, underscoring how ethnic militias exploit communal divisions for territorial control.[180] The Democratic Republic of the Congo's eastern conflicts, ongoing since the 1990s, have caused approximately 6 million deaths from combat, disease, and starvation, propelled by ethnic Hutu-Tutsi rivalries and armed groups vying for coltan and gold mines.[181] In 2025, M23 rebels—backed by external actors and drawing on Tutsi self-defense claims—advanced on Goma, killing 7,000 since January and displacing 450,000, while destroying 90 camps and enabling warlords to monopolize resource extraction amid famine risks.[182][183] Boundary disputes compound tensions, as in Ethiopia-Somalia clashes over Gedo region, where Ethiopian forces' 2025 incursions into ethnic Somali areas provoked Somali federal deployments, risking escalation tied to irredentist claims rather than mere demarcation lines.[184][185] The Malawi-Tanzania dispute over Lake Malawi's northeastern boundary persists into 2025, with Malawi asserting full lake sovereignty per 1890 colonial treaties and Tanzania invoking median-line principles under UN conventions, heightening risks over fishing and oil resources without active hostilities but amid rising diplomatic friction.[186][187]Authoritarian tendencies, coups, and democratic deficits
Africa exhibits widespread authoritarian tendencies, with Freedom House classifying 27 of 54 countries as "Not Free" and 20 as "Partly Free" in its 2025 Freedom in the World report, reflecting limited political rights and civil liberties across the continent. In 2024, political rights and civil liberties deteriorated in 21 African countries while improving in only 8, marking continued democratic deficits amid weak institutional checks.[188] Post-Arab Spring uprisings in 2010–2011, initial democratic openings in North Africa reversed sharply; Egypt reinstated military rule under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi after 2013, while Tunisia experienced backsliding under President Kais Saïed's 2021 power consolidation and 2024 constitutional referendum, eroding judicial independence and opposition voices.[189] A surge of military coups in the 2020s underscores these deficits, with at least nine successful takeovers since 2020, primarily in West and Central Africa.[190] Key instances include Mali's coups on August 18, 2020, and May 24, 2021, ousting President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta amid jihadist insurgencies; Burkina Faso's on January 24 and September 30, 2022, toppling President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré; Niger's on July 26, 2023, against President Mohamed Bazoum; and Gabon's on August 30, 2023, ending the Bongo family's 55-year rule.[191] These juntas often cite governance failures and insecurity as pretexts, yet they have suspended constitutions, detained opponents, and aligned with external actors like Russia, perpetuating authoritarian military rule rather than restoring civilian democracy.[192] Electoral processes frequently feature manipulations and opposition suppression, undermining nominal multiparty systems. Incumbents in countries like Uganda and Rwanda have amended constitutions to remove term limits—Uganda's Yoweri Museveni securing a sixth term in 2021 amid opposition arrests, and Rwanda's Paul Kagame winning 99% in 2024 after jailing critics.[193] In Zimbabwe, the 2023 elections involved voter intimidation, ballot irregularities, and media blackouts targeting the Citizens Coalition for Change, as documented by observers.[194] Nigeria's 2023 presidential vote faced allegations of rigging and violence, with opposition parties decrying electronic transmission failures and ethnic biases.[195] Such tactics, enabled by weak rule of law and independent judiciaries, allow strongmen to entrench power through patronage and coercion, eroding public trust in democratic institutions.[196] Variations exist, with Botswana exemplifying relative stability through consistent multiparty elections since independence in 1966, including a peaceful 2024 contest where the ruling Botswana Democratic Party retained power amid credible oversight, earning a "Free" rating of 72/100 from Freedom House.[197] In contrast, neighboring Zimbabwe scores 28/100 as "Not Free," with ZANU–PF's dominance since 1980 involving land seizures, hyperinflation under Robert Mugabe, and ongoing suppression under Emmerson Mnangagwa, illustrating how ethnic patronage and security force loyalty sustain authoritarianism absent robust legal constraints.[194] These divergences highlight that strong institutions and elite circulation, rather than resource wealth alone, mitigate strongman rule, though even stable cases face risks from incumbency advantages.[198]Corruption, patronage, and institutional weaknesses
Sub-Saharan Africa consistently ranks lowest on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, with an average score of 33 out of 100 in 2024, indicating widespread perceptions of public sector corruption compared to the global average of 43.[149] This reflects entrenched rent-seeking behaviors where public office serves private gain over collective welfare, distorting resource allocation and stifling economic productivity.[199] Elite capture exemplifies these dynamics, particularly in resource-rich states where revenues from extractive industries are diverted to ruling networks rather than public investment. In Angola, oil accounts for over 90% of export earnings, yet much of this wealth has been siphoned by political elites through opaque contracts and state-owned enterprises; investigations revealed that from 1992 to 2018, billions in oil-linked funds were funneled to companies controlled by figures like Isabel dos Santos, daughter of former president José Eduardo dos Santos, via mechanisms such as inflated procurement and offshore transfers.[200] [201] Angola's 2024 CPI score of 32 underscores the persistence of such practices, where nepotism and cronyism in the oil sector prioritize loyalty over competence.[199] Nepotism and tribal favoritism further erode institutional meritocracy, as leaders appoint kin or co-ethnics to key positions, fostering inefficiency and resentment across diverse societies. In Kenya, ethnic patronage networks have historically dominated public sector hiring and contracting, with studies showing that infrastructure projects and civil service roles favor the president's ethnic group, reducing overall governance quality and investor confidence.[202] Similar patterns in Nigeria and other multi-ethnic states amplify tribal divisions, where resource distribution hinges on political allegiance rather than need or ability, perpetuating cycles of underperformance in bureaucracies ill-equipped for impartial administration.[203] Foreign aid exacerbates these issues through fungibility, allowing recipient governments to redirect funds toward graft while aid covers routine expenditures; Africa has received approximately $2.6 trillion in official development assistance since 1960, yet absolute poverty numbers have risen, with sub-Saharan rates showing minimal decline relative to population growth and per capita GDP stagnating or falling in many periods.[204] [205] This disconnect arises as aid inflows enable elite consumption without corresponding institutional reforms, with empirical analyses linking unmonitored transfers to heightened corruption rather than poverty alleviation.[148] Attempts at reform, such as establishing anti-corruption commissions, frequently prove performative, lacking independence and serving as tools for selective enforcement against rivals rather than systemic change. In countries like Zambia and Uganda, these bodies have prosecuted low-level offenders while shielding high-level patrons, undermined by underfunding, political interference, and failure to address elite impunity, resulting in negligible impact on corruption indices over decades.[206] [207] Such agencies often prioritize optics over accountability, reinforcing patronage by co-opting anti-corruption rhetoric into elite survival strategies.[208]Economy
Macroeconomic trends and growth projections
Africa's aggregate nominal GDP is estimated at approximately $2.8 trillion for 2025, reflecting modest expansion from prior years amid persistent structural challenges.[209] Real GDP growth for the continent is projected at 3.8 percent in 2025 by the World Bank, up from 3.5 percent in 2024, while the African Development Bank forecasts 3.9 percent, with potential acceleration to 4 percent in 2026 despite headwinds such as geopolitical tensions, elevated debt levels, and volatile commodity prices.[6][210] These projections indicate resilience following the COVID-19 downturn, where growth rebounded from lows around 3 percent in 2023 to higher rates driven by public investment and commodity exports, though per capita GDP growth remains subdued at about 1.5 percent in 2025 due to rapid population expansion outpacing economic gains.[211][212] Significant divergences characterize growth across countries, underscoring uneven development and policy variances. Ethiopia, for instance, is anticipated to achieve 7.2 percent real GDP growth in 2025, supported by agricultural recovery and infrastructure initiatives, contrasting with slower or contracting performances elsewhere, such as Botswana's projected -0.9 percent amid mining sector pressures.[213][214] Zimbabwe exemplifies volatility, with 2024 growth dipping to 1.7 percent due to drought impacts on agriculture and hydropower, though a rebound to 6 percent is expected in 2025 contingent on favorable weather and mining output.[215][216] Such disparities highlight Africa's exposure to external shocks, including commodity price fluctuations—oil, metals, and agriculture dominate exports—and limited intra-continental trade, which accounted for only 16 percent of total African trade in recent estimates, hampering diversification and scale economies.[217] Despite aggregate growth, poverty metrics reveal limited trickle-down effects, with extreme poverty rates hovering around 35-40 percent in sub-Saharan Africa under the $2.15 daily threshold, affecting over 400 million people continent-wide and persisting even amid commodity booms due to governance inefficiencies, inequality, and jobless expansion.[218][219] Per capita income stagnation—real GDP per capita growth at 0.9 percent in 2024—exacerbates this, as demographic pressures from high fertility rates dilute gains, projecting continued vulnerability unless structural reforms enhance productivity and trade integration.[211] Projections beyond 2025 suggest potential upside to 4.3 percent growth if global conditions stabilize, but risks from debt servicing, climate events, and protectionist trade policies could cap outcomes below historical averages.[220]Natural resources extraction and the resource curse
Africa possesses vast reserves of oil, minerals, diamonds, and other commodities, with extraction forming the backbone of export revenues in many nations. In Nigeria, petroleum products constituted approximately 90% of total merchandise exports in 2022, while Angola's oil exports accounted for over 95% of its export earnings during the same period. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), minerals such as copper and cobalt represented about 75% of exports in recent years, underscoring extreme dependency that exposes economies to global price fluctuations. This reliance manifests in the resource curse, where abundant natural endowments correlate with slower economic diversification and growth compared to resource-poor peers. Empirical analyses of sub-Saharan Africa reveal that resource-rich countries experienced lower per capita GDP growth rates since 2000 than other developing regions, attributable to factors including revenue volatility, rent-seeking, and institutional erosion rather than mere abundance.[221] A key mechanism is Dutch disease, involving real currency appreciation from resource inflows, which erodes competitiveness in non-resource sectors like manufacturing and agriculture; in Angola, econometric evidence confirms this deindustrialization effect, with the kwanza's strength post-oil booms correlating to manufacturing decline.[222] Case studies illustrate mismanagement and volatility: Nigeria's oil wealth has fueled corruption and conflict without proportional poverty reduction, with per capita income stagnating amid elite capture. Angola exemplifies GDP volatility, where oil-dependent growth rates swung from over 10% in high-price years to negative territory during downturns like 2014-2016, despite reserves enabling potential stability.[223] In the DRC, diamond and mineral rents exacerbate governance failures, with extraction benefiting warlords and foreign actors over public investment.[224] Exacerbating the curse, deals with China and BRICS partners often prioritize extraction volume over transparency, bypassing robust governance. In 2025, China-Africa trade in resources like cobalt and copper intensified, with deals exchanging mining rights for infrastructure loans that limit local revenue capture and fiscal accountability.[225][226] Such arrangements, while boosting short-term output, perpetuate dependency by channeling rents away from diversification efforts.| Country | Primary Resource | Approximate Export Share (Recent Years) | Key Curse Manifestation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nigeria | Oil | 90%+ | Corruption, stalled diversification[223] |
| Angola | Oil | 95%+ | GDP volatility, Dutch disease[222] |
| DRC | Minerals (copper, cobalt, diamonds) | 75%+ | Conflict financing, weak institutions[224] |
Agriculture, industry, and informal sectors
Agriculture employs a majority of Africa's workforce, with approximately 53% of total employment in Sub-Saharan Africa modeled by the International Labour Organization as of 2023, predominantly in low-productivity subsistence farming that relies on rain-fed systems and rudimentary tools.[227] Crop yields remain significantly below global averages, with cereal production at about 1.7 tonnes per hectare compared to the worldwide figure exceeding 3.5 tonnes per hectare, attributable to factors including nutrient-poor soils, limited access to improved seeds and fertilizers, and inadequate mechanization.[228] This productivity gap has persisted, with yields increasing at roughly half the global rate, exacerbating food insecurity despite accounting for up to 20-30% of GDP in many agrarian economies.[229] Industrial development has stalled, with manufacturing contributing less than 12% to Africa's GDP in 2023, far below the levels in successfully industrializing regions like East Asia.[230] Post-independence policies favoring import-substitution industrialization (ISI), implemented in countries such as Nigeria and Ghana from the 1960s onward, aimed to foster domestic production through tariffs and state-led enterprises but largely failed due to inefficiencies, over-reliance on protected markets lacking competition, and mismanagement that led to chronic underutilization of capacity and fiscal burdens.[231] [232] These efforts resulted in minimal structural transformation, as industries remained oriented toward assembly rather than value-added processing, constrained further by policy distortions and skill shortages. The informal sector dominates employment, encompassing over 80% of non-agricultural jobs in many African countries and up to 85% continent-wide, characterized by unregulated micro-enterprises in trade, services, and artisanal activities that evade formal taxation and regulation.[233] [234] This prevalence stems from barriers to formalization, including high compliance costs and weak enforcement, leading to lost revenue—estimated at 20-40% of potential tax base—and limited access to credit or technology, perpetuating low productivity cycles.[235] Efforts to enhance agricultural resilience, such as pilots for drought-tolerant maize and sorghum varieties under initiatives like the Africa Climate-Smart Agriculture Alliance, have expanded in 2024-2025 but face low adoption rates below 20% among smallholders due to seed affordability issues, extension service gaps, and farmer risk aversion amid uncertain markets.[236] [237] These programs, often donor-funded, have reached hundreds of thousands in pilot areas like East Africa but struggle with scaling, as evidenced by stalled yield improvements in staple crops despite targeted varietal releases.[238]Infrastructure deficits and investment barriers
Sub-Saharan Africa's electrification rate stood at approximately 48% in 2021, leaving over 600 million people without access, far below the global average of over 90%.[239] Frequent power outages exacerbate this deficit, imposing economic losses estimated at 2-8% of GDP annually across the region due to disrupted manufacturing, reduced productivity, and reliance on costly backup generators.[240] These reliability issues deter foreign direct investment (FDI) by increasing operational risks and costs for investors in energy-dependent sectors.[6] Road infrastructure remains sparse, with Africa's average road density at about one-fifth that of Asia, measuring roughly 20-30 km per 100 sq km of land area compared to over 100 km in many Asian countries.[241] Paved roads constitute less than 20% of the network in most countries, hindering intra-regional trade and market access. Port inefficiencies compound transport bottlenecks; African ports rank low on the World Bank's Logistics Performance Index, with container vessel turnaround times often exceeding those in Asia by 2-3 days, driven by congestion, inadequate berthing, and customs delays.[242] These gaps elevate logistics costs to 15-20% of goods value, compared to under 10% globally, further discouraging FDI in export-oriented industries.[243] Key barriers to infrastructure investment include insecure land tenure systems, which complicate property rights and project siting, as customary land holdings often lack formal titles, leading to disputes and delays.[244] Bureaucratic hurdles, such as protracted permitting processes and opaque regulatory approvals, extend project timelines by years and inflate costs, with administrative barriers cited as a primary deterrent to FDI inflows.[245] Chinese Belt and Road Initiative financing, totaling over $120 billion in loans to African governments since 2013, has funded ports, railways, and power plants but often resulted in incomplete projects and mounting debt burdens.[246] Examples include stalled rail lines in Ethiopia and underutilized infrastructure in Kenya, where repayment obligations strain fiscal resources without commensurate economic returns, amplifying investor caution toward similar large-scale ventures.[247]Foreign aid, debt traps, and policy missteps
Africa receives substantial foreign aid, with official development assistance (ODA) from all donors totaling $73.6 billion in 2023, yet empirical analyses indicate persistent dependency cycles rather than sustainable development.[248] Critics such as economist Dambisa Moyo argue in Dead Aid that aid inflows over the past 30 years correlate with negative average annual growth rates of -0.2% in the most aid-dependent African countries, fostering corruption, disincentivizing domestic revenue mobilization, and entrenching elite patronage networks that prioritize donor appeasement over productive investment.[249] Similarly, William Easterly's work highlights how aid often props up inefficient bureaucracies without addressing root institutional failures, leading to repeated cycles of inflows without corresponding poverty reduction or governance reforms.[250] Public debt burdens exacerbate these issues, with Africa's average debt-to-GDP ratio projected to reach 64% by 2025, and more than 20 countries already exceeding 60% in recent years—a threshold signaling sustainability risks.[251] [252] Chinese lending, which constitutes about 12% of Africa's $696 billion external debt stock as of 2020, has drawn scrutiny for opacity in terms and collateral arrangements, complicating debt restructuring and contributing to distress in cases like Zambia and Ethiopia where repayments strain fiscal capacity.[253] [254] While not the majority creditor, the non-transparent nature of these loans—often tied to resource-backed deals—limits multilateral oversight and has fueled debates on debt traps, though outright defaults remain rare due to geopolitical leniency rather than economic viability.[255] [256] Domestic policy errors compound aid and debt vulnerabilities, as seen in recurrent use of price controls that distort markets and trigger shortages. In Zimbabwe, extensive price caps in the 2000s amid hyperinflation led to widespread goods scarcities, black market proliferation, and agricultural output collapse, as producers withheld supply below cost-recovery levels.[257] Ghana's historical price controls on essentials similarly resulted in rationing and smuggling, undermining food security despite initial aims to curb inflation.[258] Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) on targeted interventions, such as cash transfers or deworming, demonstrate localized efficacy in improving outcomes like school attendance, but macro-level aid evaluations reveal limited spillover to broad growth, underscoring that policy distortions often nullify micro-gains.[259] Rare counterexamples, such as Rwanda's post-1994 genocide recovery, illustrate that aid effectiveness hinges on robust institutions rather than volume alone. Rwanda received over $15 billion in aid since 1994, achieving average GDP growth of 7-8% annually through disciplined fiscal policies, anti-corruption enforcement, and market-oriented reforms under President Paul Kagame, which prioritized accountability and private sector incentives over unchecked disbursements.[260] [261] This contrasts with aid-heavy peers, where weak rule of law dissipates inflows into patronage, affirming causal links between institutional quality and developmental outcomes.[262]Demographics
Population size, growth rates, and projections
Africa's population is estimated at 1.56 billion as of October 2025, according to elaborations of United Nations data.[263] This figure reflects the continent's position as the second most populous after Asia, with sub-Saharan Africa accounting for the bulk of the growth due to sustained high birth rates and declining mortality.[264] The annual population growth rate averaged 2.4% in recent years, the highest of any major world region, outpacing Asia's 0.8% and Europe's near-zero rate.[265] This rapid expansion results from a young demographic structure, with a median age of 19.3 years—nearly half the global average of 30.9—yielding a broad base of childbearing women.[266] The total fertility rate (TFR) across Africa averages 4.2 children per woman as of 2023, far exceeding the replacement level of 2.1.[267] Causal factors include low contraceptive prevalence rates, often below 30% in sub-Saharan countries, stemming from limited access to family planning services, inadequate healthcare infrastructure, and supply chain disruptions in rural areas.[268] Cultural preferences for larger families persist in agrarian societies, where children provide labor for subsistence farming and social security in the absence of robust pension systems or state welfare.[269] High infant and child mortality rates, averaging 45 deaths per 1,000 live births in sub-Saharan Africa, also incentivize higher parity to ensure surviving offspring, though improvements in vaccination and basic sanitation have begun to moderate this effect. United Nations projections under the medium variant anticipate Africa's population reaching 2.5 billion by 2050, more than doubling from 2020 levels and comprising nearly 25% of the global total.[270] This trajectory assumes gradual TFR declines to around 3.0 by mid-century, contingent on expanded education for girls—which correlates inversely with fertility—and urbanization trends that raise opportunity costs of childrearing.[264] However, national censuses often undercount populations, with studies estimating that one in three Africans may have been missed in the 2020 census round, particularly children under five and rural residents due to logistical challenges, insecurity, and nomadic lifestyles.[271] United Nations estimates incorporate adjustments for such undercounts using vital registration, surveys, and demographic modeling, though skeptics argue these may still lowball growth in high-fertility zones like the Sahel.[272] Alternative analyses, drawing on satellite imagery and mobile data, suggest potential upward revisions of 10-20% in some countries' baselines.[273]| Year | Projected Population (billions, UN medium variant) | Annual Growth Rate (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 1.56 | 2.4 |
| 2050 | 2.5 | ~2.0 (declining) |
Ethnic diversity, tribalism, and social fragmentation
Africa is home to over 3,000 distinct ethnic groups, each often maintaining distinct languages, customs, and social structures that predate colonial boundaries.[275][276] This unparalleled diversity stems from millennia of migrations, including the Bantu expansion beginning around 3,000 years ago, when Bantu-speaking peoples migrated from West-Central Africa southward and eastward, introducing agriculture, ironworking, and new demographic patterns that displaced or assimilated indigenous hunter-gatherer and pastoralist populations across sub-Saharan regions.[277] In contrast, North Africa features a historical overlay of Berber, Arab, and Semitic influences, with Arab migrations from the 7th century onward reshaping demographics through conquest and intermarriage, resulting in Arab-Berber majorities amid smaller indigenous groups.[278] These patterns have entrenched primordial ethnic loyalties, where kinship and tribal affiliations prioritize group survival over abstract national identities, fostering social fragmentation in post-colonial states. Tribalism manifests as nepotism in political and military spheres, where leaders allocate resources, positions, and security forces preferentially to co-ethnics, exacerbating exclusion and resentment.[279] In armies and bureaucracies, ethnic stacking—filling officer corps or ministries with kin—undermines meritocracy and institutional trust, often sparking mutinies or defections during power transitions.[280] Empirical analyses link such practices to civil wars, as ethnic favoritism incentivizes rival groups to arm against perceived domination, with studies showing ethnic polarization (e.g., two dominant groups competing) more predictive of violence than mere fractionalization.[281] High ethnic diversity correlates with conflict onset when combined with resource competition or weak states, as fragmented societies struggle to enforce impartial governance, leading to localized insurgencies that escalate nationally.[282] In Nigeria, encompassing over 250 ethnic groups dominated by Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo, competition among these blocs has fueled recurrent violence, including the 1967–1970 Biafran War, which killed over 1 million, and ongoing clashes over land and power-sharing.[283][284] Ethnic quotas in politics, intended to balance representation, instead entrench identity-based patronage, hindering cohesive policy-making. In Rwanda, despite fewer major groups—Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%), and Twa (1%) pre-1994—politicized ethnic identities triggered the 1994 genocide, claiming 800,000 lives, illustrating how even limited diversity, when mobilized via propaganda and exclusionary elites, overrides shared cultural ties.[285] These cases underscore criticisms that identity politics, rooted in tribal primordialism, impedes national cohesion by subordinating merit and universal rules to group solidarity, perpetuating cycles of vengeance and state fragility.[286]Languages, education, and human capital gaps
Africa hosts over 2,000 distinct languages, contributing to profound linguistic fragmentation that complicates communication, administration, and education across the continent.[287] This diversity stems from numerous ethnic groups and historical migrations, with major families including Niger-Congo, Afroasiatic, and Nilo-Saharan. Colonial legacies introduced lingua francas such as French in West and Central Africa, English in Southern and Eastern regions, Portuguese in Lusophone countries, and Arabic in the North, often serving as official languages despite limited native proficiency among populations. Indigenous languages like Swahili have emerged as regional bridges, particularly in East Africa where it functions as a trade and educational medium for over 100 million speakers.[288] Adult literacy rates in sub-Saharan Africa stand at approximately 69% as of 2024, reflecting uneven progress amid high enrollment but persistent quality deficits.[289] Functional literacy remains lower, with many unable to apply basic reading and numeracy skills due to rote-based instruction and multilingual classrooms where teaching occurs in non-native tongues. International assessments underscore these gaps: in TIMSS and SACMEQ evaluations, sub-Saharan students score at the bottom globally, with mathematics proficiency often equivalent to below-basic PISA levels (around 300-400 points versus the OECD's 500 benchmark), indicating minimal attainment even after several years of schooling.[290][291] These outcomes persist despite governments allocating about 5% of GDP to education—among the highest regional shares worldwide—highlighting inefficiencies rather than underfunding as the core issue.[292] Teacher absenteeism exacerbates human capital shortfalls, with rates ranging from 15% to 45% in sub-Saharan contexts, resulting in reduced instructional time and wasted resources equivalent to billions in foregone learning.[293] Factors include inadequate monitoring, low accountability, and competing demands like farming or political duties, which undermine even expanded access efforts. By 2025, digital divides compound these challenges, as only about 4% of sub-Saharan schools have basic internet connectivity, limiting exposure to online resources and widening disparities between urban elites and rural majorities.[294] This infrastructure lag perpetuates low skill acquisition, constraining Africa's demographic dividend and perpetuating cycles of underproductivity in a global economy demanding advanced competencies.[295]Health crises: diseases, fertility, and life expectancy
Sub-Saharan Africa bears the overwhelming burden of global infectious disease cases, with tropical pathogens thriving in the region's equatorial climate and stagnant water sources that facilitate vector proliferation, such as mosquitoes for malaria. In 2023, Africa accounted for approximately 95% of the world's 263 million malaria cases and 97% of the 597,000 malaria deaths, predominantly among children under five.[296][297] Similarly, sub-Saharan Africa hosts about 67% of the global 40.8 million people living with HIV, with ongoing transmission fueled by limited access to antiretrovirals and behavioral factors in high-prevalence areas.[298] These epidemics, compounded by neglected tropical diseases like schistosomiasis and onchocerciasis, contribute to an average life expectancy of around 63 years across Africa, significantly below the global average of 73 years, with healthy life expectancy lagging further at 56.5 years in the WHO African Region as of 2021.[299][300] High fertility rates exacerbate health strains, as Africa's total fertility rate stands at 4.0 children per woman, among the highest globally, partly as a demographic response to elevated child mortality where parents compensate for expected losses.[301] Infant mortality remains acute at about 47 deaths per 1,000 live births continent-wide, driven primarily by preventable causes including diarrhea, pneumonia, and malaria linked to inadequate sanitation and clean water access, which affect over 40% of the population without basic facilities.[302][303] This interplay sustains a cycle: high child death rates prompt larger families, overwhelming under-resourced health systems and perpetuating poverty traps through resource dilution per capita. Progress has occurred in targeted interventions, such as the certification of Africa as free of wild poliovirus in 2020 following mass vaccination campaigns that reduced cases from thousands annually to zero for indigenous strains, though circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus outbreaks persist in under-vaccinated areas due to sanitation deficits.[304] Vaccine rollouts have also curbed measles and other vaccine-preventable diseases, contributing to a gradual decline in under-five mortality. However, setbacks from antimicrobial resistance in malaria parasites and historical governance failures—such as South Africa's denial of HIV's viral causation under President Thabo Mbeki from 1999 to 2008, which delayed antiretroviral distribution and cost an estimated 300,000 lives—underscore how institutional distrust and weak state capacity hinder responses.[305][306] Causal factors rooted in geography, including year-round vector breeding in tropical wetlands, interact with policy lapses like inconsistent funding and corruption in health ministries, amplifying disease persistence despite available interventions.[307]Urbanization, migration pressures, and youth bulges
Africa's urbanization rate reached 45.5% in 2024, with projections indicating a continued rapid increase toward 50% by 2025, driven primarily by rural-to-urban migration and natural population growth in cities.[308] This pace positions Africa as the world's fastest-urbanizing continent, with urban populations expected to double from 700 million to 1.4 billion by 2050, absorbing 80% of the continent's demographic expansion.[309] However, this growth has fostered extensive slum proliferation, as infrastructure lags behind influxes; in Lagos, Nigeria—a megacity with 16–21 million residents—over 70% of the population resides in informal settlements characterized by inadequate housing, sanitation, and services.[310][311] Compounding urbanization strains is Africa's pronounced youth bulge, where individuals aged 15–24 constitute a significant share of the population—projected to represent 42% of global youth by 2030—exacerbated by high fertility rates and limited job creation.[312] Youth unemployment in sub-Saharan Africa averaged 9.95% in 2024 per ILO estimates, though rates exceed 20% in many countries like Nigeria and surpass 50% in Southern African nations such as South Africa, often fueling social unrest, protests, and irregular migration attempts.[313][314] This demographic pressure incentivizes outflows, including a documented brain drain of approximately 70,000 skilled professionals annually, depriving sectors like healthcare and engineering of talent while remittances from emigrants reached $96.4 billion in 2024, equivalent to 5.2% of Africa's GDP.[315][316] Migration pressures extend to internal displacements, with conflicts and climate-induced events displacing 19.3 million people in sub-Saharan Africa in 2024 alone, contributing to a continental total of 35 million internally displaced persons—a threefold rise over 15 years.[317][318] These movements often converge on urban centers, intensifying slum expansion and resource competition, while external emigration reflects unmet economic opportunities amid the youth surplus, with skilled outflows disproportionately affecting lower-income nations despite potential remittance gains.[319][320]Culture and Society
Kinship systems, traditions, and social norms
African kinship systems predominantly feature extended family and clan structures, often patrilineal or matrilineal, encompassing multiple generations and emphasizing collective obligations over individual autonomy.[321] These arrangements foster social cohesion and mutual support but can constrain personal economic agency by enforcing resource redistribution within kin networks, as evidenced in anthropological studies of West and East African societies where individualism is subordinated to group welfare.[322] In patrilineal systems, common in much of sub-Saharan Africa, lineage ties dictate inheritance and residence, reinforcing clan-based decision-making that prioritizes familial alliances over solitary pursuits.[323] Polygyny, the practice of one man marrying multiple wives, persists in approximately 11% of sub-Saharan Africa's population, with higher historical rates exceeding 60% in countries like Burkina Faso and Senegal, though prevalence has declined due to urbanization and legal reforms.[324] [325] Bridewealth payments, involving transfers of livestock, cash, or goods from the groom's kin to the bride's family, characterize marriage in about 90% of African societies, serving to validate unions and compensate for the loss of female labor but often imposing financial strains that perpetuate intergenerational dependencies.[326] These norms integrate marriage into broader clan strategies, limiting individual choice in partner selection and resource allocation. Kinship obligations, manifesting as informal "taxes" on earnings, significantly dilute personal savings and investment by compelling individuals to share income with extended relatives, as demonstrated in Kenyan village studies where such pressures reduced entrepreneurial investment by up to 30% and lowered firm productivity.[327] In South African Zulu communities, traditional sharing norms correlate with higher consumption and lower asset accumulation among poorer households, perpetuating poverty traps through expectations of redistribution that discourage risk-taking for individual gain.[328] This collectivist framework, rooted in anthropological precedents of reciprocity, hampers the emergence of individualism essential for market-driven growth, as kin claims override personal financial planning in rural and urban settings alike.[329] Witchcraft beliefs, embedded in social norms across many African communities, frequently precipitate accusations leading to vigilantism, with estimates of 300 to 500 witchcraft-related killings annually in regions like Tanzania, often targeting elderly women or those perceived as envious kin.[330] In Ghana, such accusations have driven mob violence and displacements, with over 70% of residents in certain witch camps being women banished after spousal deaths, reflecting tensions within extended families where supernatural explanations resolve disputes over resources or misfortune.[331] Gender norms vary but include practices like female genital mutilation (FGM), affecting over 144 million girls and women primarily in pockets of East, West, and North Africa, such as Somalia (98% prevalence) and Guinea (97%), intended to enforce chastity and marriageability within clan contexts.[332] Despite these constraints, female labor force participation in sub-Saharan Africa averages 57%, with women comprising about 50% of agricultural workers and trends showing gradual increases driven by economic necessities in informal sectors.[333] [334] This rise indicates adaptive shifts in norms, where women increasingly contribute to household economies beyond traditional domestic roles, though kinship expectations continue to channel their earnings toward collective needs.Religions: indigenous, Abrahamic influences, and syncretism
Africa's religious composition is characterized by a substantial presence of both Abrahamic faiths and indigenous traditions, with approximately 45% of the population identifying as Christian, 40% as Muslim, and 15% adhering to traditional or folk religions, often in syncretic forms.[335] This distribution arises from centuries of Islamic expansion via trade and conquest in North and West Africa since the 7th century, contrasted with Christianity's growth through European colonialism and missionary activity from the 15th century onward, predominantly in sub-Saharan regions.[336] Indigenous beliefs, centered on animism, ancestor veneration, and interactions with spirits and natural forces, predate these influences and continue to shape daily practices across the continent, even where formal adherence to monotheistic religions predominates.[337] Indigenous African religions emphasize a worldview of interconnected spiritual forces, including reverence for ancestors as intermediaries between the living and the divine, and rituals to maintain cosmic balance, which clash with Abrahamic emphases on exclusive monotheism and scriptural authority. These traditions persist at rates of 10-15% in explicit practice but influence broader cultural norms, such as beliefs in witchcraft and divination, which correlate with social conflicts and resistance to modernization in rural areas.[338] In sub-Saharan Africa, Christianity has expanded rapidly, with Pentecostalism emerging as the fastest-growing segment since the late 20th century, drawing adherents through experiential worship, prosperity theology, and promises of deliverance from poverty and illness amid economic instability.[339] By 2020, Pentecostals and charismatics constituted a significant portion of the region's 62% Christian population, fueled by indigenous-led churches that adapt to local contexts.[336] Islam's influence is strongest in North Africa and parts of the Sahel, where Sharia law governs personal and criminal matters in countries like Nigeria's northern states, Sudan, and Somalia, often enabling extremist interpretations that reject secular governance.[340] This has facilitated groups like Boko Haram, which since 2009 has waged insurgency in Nigeria to impose a strict caliphate, killing tens of thousands and displacing millions through attacks on education and non-Muslims, rooted in opposition to Western influences deemed un-Islamic.[341] Such extremism highlights worldview clashes, as Sharia's hudud punishments and theocratic demands conflict with pluralistic or Christian-majority southern regions, exacerbating north-south divides.[176] Syncretism is widespread, with many Christians and Muslims incorporating ancestor veneration, spirit consultations, and protective charms into their practices, blurring strict doctrinal lines and sustaining indigenous elements under Abrahamic veneers.[337] For instance, in West Africa, Islamic marabouts blend Quranic recitations with traditional herbalism and divination, while southern African Christians may honor forebears alongside Christ, fostering hybrid rituals that prioritize communal harmony over theological purity. This blending often dilutes Abrahamic exclusivity, contributing to persistent polytheistic undertones. Empirically, religious adherence correlates with elevated fertility rates, as devout communities in sub-Saharan Africa—particularly Muslims and evangelical Christians—exhibit total fertility rates exceeding 4-5 children per woman, resisting contraception due to pronatalist interpretations of scripture and cultural norms that view large families as divine blessings or ancestral duties.[338][342] Similarly, religious fault lines underpin conflict patterns, with Muslim-Christian clashes in Nigeria, Central African Republic, and Ethiopia accounting for significant violence, where incompatible views on governance, land, and conversion fuel insurgencies and communal riots.[176] These dynamics underscore causal tensions between indigenous pluralism and Abrahamic absolutism, hindering unified social cohesion.Arts, literature, music, and oral traditions
African artistic traditions originated in prehistoric rock paintings, with Saharan sites like Tassili n'Ajjer featuring imagery spanning approximately 10,000 years that illustrates ancient pastoral and hunter-gatherer societies.[343] Wooden masks and sculptures served essential roles in rituals across sub-Saharan groups, embodying spirits or ancestors during dances and ceremonies to mediate between human and supernatural realms, such as the Bambara people's Chi Wara headdresses used in agricultural fertility rites.[344] These artifacts, often carved from wood or cast in bronze as in Igbo-Ukwu examples from the 9th century, emphasized communal functions over individual expression, tied to initiation, healing, or judicial proceedings.[345] Oral traditions dominated pre-colonial cultural transmission, preserved by griots—professional historians and performers in West African societies—who recited genealogies, moral lessons, and historical events through song and narrative.[346] The Epic of Sundiata, recounting the 13th-century founding of the Mali Empire by Sundiata Keita around 1210, exemplifies this genre, blending fact with legend to affirm Mande identity and leadership legitimacy via memorized performances passed across generations.[347] Written literature remained scarce until European contact introduced scripts, limiting textual records and privileging auditory memory over documentation, which griots maintained without reliance on literacy.[346] Post-colonial literature marked a shift, with Chinua Achebe's Things Fall Apart (published June 17, 1958) depicting pre-colonial Igbo life and colonial disruption, achieving sales exceeding 20 million copies and establishing a counter-narrative to European portrayals of Africa.[348][349] Wole Soyinka, the first African Nobel laureate in Literature (1986), advanced drama and critique of authoritarianism through works like Death and the King's Horseman (1975), drawing on Yoruba mythology and political realism.[350] In music, Fela Kuti pioneered Afrobeat in the late 1960s in Nigeria, fusing highlife, jazz, and Yoruba percussion to satirize corruption, influencing global genres while amassing over 50 albums.[351] Contemporary expressions include Nollywood, Nigeria's video film sector producing over 2,500 titles annually as of recent estimates, surpassing Bollywood's approximately 1,800 films in 2024 output volume through low-cost, direct-to-video production focused on local narratives.[352][353] This industry, emerging in the 1990s, prioritizes accessibility and cultural specificity over high budgets, generating revenues around $6.4 billion yearly despite infrastructural constraints.[352]







