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History of Islam
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The history of Islam is believed, by most historians,[1] to have originated with Muhammad's mission in Mecca and Medina at the start of the 7th century CE,[2][3] although Muslims regard this time as a return to the original faith passed down by the Abrahamic prophets, such as Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, David, Solomon, and Jesus, with the submission (Islām) to the will of God.[4][5][6] According to the traditional account,[2][3][7] the Islamic prophet Muhammad began receiving what Muslims consider to be divine revelations in 610 CE, calling for submission to the one God, preparation for the imminent Last Judgement, and charity for the poor and needy.[5][Note 1] As Muhammad's message began to attract followers (the ṣaḥāba) he also met with increasing hostility and persecution from Meccan elites.[5][Note 2] In 622 CE Muhammad migrated to the city of Yathrib (now known as Medina), where he began to unify the tribes of Arabia under Islam,[9] returning to Mecca to take control in 630[10][11] and order the destruction of all pagan idols.[12][13] By the time Muhammad died c. 11 AH (632 CE), almost all the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula had converted to Islam,[14] but disagreement broke out over who would succeed him as leader of the Muslim community during the Rashidun Caliphate.[2][15][16][17]
The early Muslim conquests were responsible for the spread of Islam.[2][3][7][15] By the 8th century CE, the Umayyad Caliphate extended from al-Andalus in the west to the Indus River in the east. Polities such as those ruled by the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates (in the Middle East and later in Spain and Southern Italy), the Fatimids, Seljuks, Ayyubids, and Mamluks were among the most influential powers in the world. Highly Persianized empires built by the Samanids, Ghaznavids, and Ghurids significantly contributed to technological and administrative developments. The Islamic Golden Age gave rise to many centers of culture and science and produced notable polymaths, astronomers, mathematicians, physicians, and philosophers during the Middle Ages.[3] By the early 13th century, the Delhi Sultanate conquered the northern Indian subcontinent, while Turkic dynasties like the Sultanate of Rum and Artuqids conquered much of Anatolia from the Byzantine Empire throughout the 11th and 12th centuries. In the 13th and 14th centuries, destructive Mongol invasions, along with the loss of population due to the Black Death, greatly weakened the traditional centers of the Muslim world, stretching from Persia to Egypt, but saw the emergence of the Timurid Renaissance and major economic powers such as the Mali Empire in West Africa and the Bengal Sultanate in South Asia.[18][19] Following the deportation and enslavement of the Muslim Moors from the Emirate of Sicily and elsewhere in southern Italy,[20] the Islamic Iberia was gradually conquered by Christian forces during the Reconquista. Nonetheless, in the early modern period, the gunpowder empires—the Ottomans, Timurids, Mughals, and Safavids—emerged as world powers.
During the 19th and early 20th centuries, most of the Muslim world fell under the influence or direct control of the European Great Powers.[3] Some of their efforts to win independence and build modern nation-states over the course of the last two centuries continue to reverberate to the present day, as well as fuel conflict-zones in the MENA region, such as Afghanistan, Central Africa, Chechnya, Iraq, Kashmir, Libya, Palestine, Syria, Somalia, Xinjiang, and Yemen.[21] The oil boom stabilized the Arab States of the Gulf Cooperation Council (comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), making them the world's largest oil producers and exporters, which focus on capitalism, free trade, and tourism.[22][23]
Early sources and historiography
[edit]Most Islamic history was transmitted orally until after the rise of the Abbasid Caliphate.[24] At the same time the study of the earliest periods in Islamic history is made difficult by a lack of sources.[25] The stories were written in the form of “founding conquest stories” based on nostalgia for the golden age then. Humphrey, quoted by Antoine Borrut, explains that the stories related to this period were created according to a pact-betrayal-redemption principle.[26] One of the most important historical sources for which the above-mentioned stories about the birth of Islam were compiled is the work of the Muslim historian Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭabarī (839–923 CE).[27] Although the sources concerning the Sasanian realm of influence for the 6th century AD, which represents the time period before the beginning of Islam according to the traditional understanding, are poor, the sources for the Byzantine provinces of Syria and Iraq in the same period, complemented by Syriac Christian writings, provide a relatively better quality.[28] Regarding the depicting of early Islamic history, four trends are prominent concerning the utilization on available (irrational) sources;

- The descriptive method uses the outlines of Islamic traditions, adjusted for the stories of miracles and faith-centred claims within those sources.[30] Edward Gibbon (1737–1794) and Gustav Weil (1808–1889) represent some of the first historians following the descriptive method.
- In the source critical method, scholars compare all available sources in order to identify which informants to the sources are weak and thereby to distinguish spurious material.[31] The work of William Montgomery Watt (1909–2006) and that of Wilferd Madelung (1930–2023) exemplify source-critical study.
- In the tradition critical method, the sources are believed to be based on oral traditions with unclear origins and transmission history, and so are treated very cautiously.[32] Ignác Goldziher (1850–1921) pioneered the tradition critical method, and Uri Rubin (1944–2021) continued this approach.
- The skeptical method doubts nearly all of the material in the traditional sources, regarding any possible historical core as too difficult to decipher from distorted and fabricated material.[33] An early example of the sceptical method was the work of John Wansbrough (1928–2002).
Nowadays, the popularity of the different methods employed varies on the scope of the studies produced. Overview treatments of the history of early Islam tend to take the descriptive approach. Scholars who look at the beginnings of Islam in depth generally follow the source-critical and tradition-critical methods.[34] Until the early 1970s,[35] Non-Muslim scholars of Islamic studies—while not accepting mythical accounts, such as divine intervention—did accept its origin story in most of its details.[36][37]
The quality of historical sources improves after the 8th century CE.[38] Those sources which treated earlier times with a large temporal and cultural gap now begin to give accounts which are more contemporaneous, the quality of genre of available historical accounts improves, and new documentary sources—such as official documents, correspondence and poetry—appear.[38]
Inception
[edit]
Early Islam arose within the historical, social, political, economic, and religious context of late antiquity in the Middle East.[38] Religion in pre-Islamic Arabia may be summarized as follows; Judaism became the dominant religion of the Himyarite Kingdom in Yemen after about 380 CE, while Christianity took root in the Persian Gulf.[39] The second half of the 6th century CE saw political disorder in pre-Islamic Arabia, and communication routes were no longer secure.[40] Religious divisions played an important role in the crisis.[39] There was also a yearning for a more "spiritual form of religion", and "the choice of religion increasingly became an individual rather than a collective issue."[39] While some Arabs were reluctant to convert to a foreign faith, those Abrahamic religions provided "the principal intellectual and spiritual reference points", and Jewish and Christian loanwords from Aramaic began to replace the old pagan vocabulary of Arabic throughout the peninsula.[39] The Ḥanīf ("renunciates"), a group of monotheists that sought to separate themselves both from the foreign Abrahamic religions and the traditional Arab polytheism,[41] were looking for a new religious worldview to replace the pre-Islamic Arabian religions,[41] focusing on "the all-encompassing father god Allah whom they freely equated with the Jewish Yahweh and the Christian Jehovah."[42] In their view, Mecca was originally dedicated to this monotheistic faith that they considered to be the one true religion, established by the patriarch Abraham.[41][42] However, the polytheistic Kaaba temple in Mecca was a popular pilgrimage site and for this reason an important source of income for the surrounding pagan Arabs in those days.[43][44]

According to the traditional account,[2][3][7] the Islamic prophet Muhammad was born in Mecca, an important caravan trading center,[46] around the year 570 CE.[47] His family belonged to the Arab clan of Quraysh, which was the chief tribe of Mecca and a dominant force in Hejaz region.[7][48] They supported the establishment of sacred months in which all violence was prohibited and travel was safe, in order to prevent tribal raids for loot, to sustain the Hajj trade.[43] Like the Ḥanīf, Muhammad practiced Taḥannuth, spending time in seclusion at the Cave Hira in the mountain Jabal al-Nour and "turning away from paganism."[49][50] When he was about 40 years old, he began receiving at mount Hira' what Muslims regard as divine revelations delivered through the angel Gabriel on the Laylat al-Qadr, which would later form the Quran. These inspirations urged him to proclaim a strict monotheistic faith, as the final expression of Biblical prophetism earlier codified in the sacred texts of Judaism and Christianity; to warn his compatriots of the impending Judgement Day; and to castigate social injustices of his city.[51] Muhammad's message won over a handful of followers (the ṣaḥāba) and was met with increasing persecution from Meccan notables.[5][52]

In 622 CE, a few years after losing protection with the death of his influential uncle ʾAbū Ṭālib ibn ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib, Muhammad migrated to the city of Yathrib (subsequently called Medina) where he was joined by his followers.[53] Later generations would count this event, known as the hijra, as the start of the Islamic era.[54] The surahs of this period emphasized his place among the long line of Biblical prophets, but also differentiated the message of the Quran from the sacred texts of Christianity and Judaism.[54] Armed conflict with the Arab Meccans and Jewish tribes of the Yathrib area soon broke out.[55] After a series of military confrontations and political manoeuvres, Muhammad was able to secure control of Mecca and allegiance of the Quraysh in 629 CE.[54] In the time remaining until his death in 632 CE, tribal chiefs across the Arabian peninsula entered into various agreements with him, some under terms of alliance, others acknowledging his claims of prophethood and agreeing to follow Islamic practices, including paying the alms levy to his government, which consisted of a number of deputies, an army of believers, and a public treasury.[54]
With an approach that has been developed and popularized recently,[56] Muhammad established a constitutional state in Medina - on the basis of the Quran verses in line with the new concept, and of a treaty in which the rights and duties of the different communities in Medina were determined - and made radical reforms to create an Islamic society.[54] The compatibility of the concept of the state, which essentially has the power to coerce,[57] with religion and prophethood, which are essentially advice,[58] is a controversial issue. (See also:Al-Baqara 256) The real intentions of Muhammad regarding the spread of Islam, its political undertone, and his missionary activity (da'wah) during his lifetime are a contentious matter of debate, which has been extensively discussed both among Muslim scholars and Non-Muslim scholars within the academic field of Islamic studies.[59] Poston Larry states;
Was it in Muhammad's mind to produce a world religion or did his interests lie mainly within the confines of his homeland? Was he solely an Arab nationalist—a political genius intent upon uniting the tribal clans under the banner of a new religion—or was his vision a truly international one, a desire to produce a reformed humanity in the midst of a new world order? These questions are not without significance, for a number of the proponents of contemporary da'wah activity trace their inspiration to the prophet himself.[...] Despite the claims of these writers, it is difficult to prove that Muhammad intended to found a world-encompassing faith superseding the religions of Christianity and Judaism. His original aim appears to have been the establishment of a succinctly Arab brand of monotheism, as indicated by his many references to the Qurʾān as an "Arabic book" and by his accommodations to other monotheistic traditions.[59]
Timeline of Islamic states
[edit]The following timeline can serve as a rough visual guide to the most important polities in the Islamic world prior to World War I. It covers major historical centers of power and culture, including the Arabian peninsula (modern-day Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen), Mesopotamia (modern-day Iraq), Persia (modern-day Iran), Levant (modern-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel/Palestine), Egypt, the Maghreb (north-west Africa), the Sahel, the Swahili Coast, Somalia, southern Iberia (al-Andalus), Transoxania (Central Asia), Hindustan (including modern-day North India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan), and Anatolia (modern-day Turkey). It is necessarily an approximation, since rule over some regions was sometimes divided among different centers of power, and authority in larger polities was often distributed among several dynasties. For example, during the later stages of the Abbasid Caliphate, even the capital city of Baghdad was effectively ruled by other dynasties such as the Buyyids and the Seljuks, while the Ottoman Turks commonly delegated executive authority over outlying provinces to local potentates, such as the Deys of Algiers, the Beys of Tunis, and the Mamluks of Iraq.

- Dates are approximate, consult particular articles for details.
Rashidun Caliphate
[edit]After the death of Muhammad in 632 CE, his community needed to appoint a new leader, giving rise to the title of caliph (Arabic: خَليفة, romanized: khalīfa, lit. 'successor').[2][7][15] Thus, the subsequent Islamic empires were known as "caliphates",[2][7][60] and a series of four caliphs governed the early Islamic empire: Abū Bakr (632–634), ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (Umar І, 634–644), ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān (644–656), and ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (656–661). These leaders are known as the rāshidūn ("rightly-guided") caliphs in Sunnī Islam.[7] They oversaw the initial phase of the early Muslim conquests, advancing through Persia, the Levant, Egypt, and North Africa.[7]
Alongside the growth of the Umayyad Caliphate, the major political development within early Islam in this period was the sectarian split and political divide between Kharijite, Sunnī, and Shīʿa Muslims; this had its roots in a dispute over the succession for the role of caliph.[2][16] Sunnīs believed the caliph was elective and any Muslim from the Arab clan of Quraysh, the tribe of Muhammad, might serve as one.[17] Shīʿītes, on the other hand, believed the title of caliph should be hereditary in the bloodline of Muhammad,[61] and thus all the caliphs, with the exceptions of Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib and his firstborn son Ḥasan, were actually illegitimate usurpers.[17] However, the Sunnī sect emerged as triumphant in most regions of the Muslim world, with the exceptions of Iran and Oman. Muhammad's closest companions (ṣaḥāba), the four "rightly-guided" caliphs who succeeded him, continued to expand the Islamic empire to encompass Jerusalem, Ctesiphon, and Damascus, and sending Arab Muslim armies as far as the Sindh region.[62] The early Islamic empire stretched from al-Andalus (Muslim Iberia) to the Punjab region under the reign of the Umayyad dynasty.

After Muhammad's death, Abū Bakr, one of his closest associates, was chosen as the first caliph ("successor"). Although the office of caliph retained an aura of religious authority, it laid no claim to prophecy.[7][63] A number of tribal Arab leaders refused to extend the agreements made with Muhammad to Abū Bakr, ceasing payments of the alms levy and in some cases claiming to be prophets in their own right.[63] Abū Bakr asserted his authority in a successful military campaign known as the Ridda wars, whose momentum was carried into the lands of the Byzantine and Sasanian empires.[64] By the end of the reign of the second caliph ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, the Arab Muslim armies, whose battle-hardened ranks were now swelled by the defeated rebels[65] and former imperial auxiliary troops,[66] invaded the eastern Byzantine provinces of Syria and Egypt, while the Sasanids lost their western territories, with the rest of Persia to follow soon afterwards.[63]

ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb improved the administration of the fledgling Islamic empire, ordering improvement of irrigation networks, and playing a role in foundation of cities like Basra. To be close to the poor, he lived in a simple mud hut without doors and walked the streets every evening. After consulting with the poor, ʿUmar established the Bayt al-mal,[68][69][70] a welfare institution for the Muslim and Non-Muslim poor, needy, elderly, orphans, widows, and the disabled. The Bayt al-mal ran for hundreds of years under the Rāshidūn Caliphate in the 7th century CE and continued through the Umayyad period and well into the Abbasid era. ʿUmar also introduced child benefit for the children and pensions for the elderly.[71][72][73][74] When he felt that a governor or a commander was becoming attracted to wealth or did not meet the required administrative standards, he had him removed from his position.[75] The expansion was partially halted between 638 and 639 CE during the years of great famine and plague in Arabia and the Levant, respectively, but by the end of ʿUmar's reign, Syria, Egypt, Mesopotamia, and much of Persia were incorporated into the early Islamic empire.
Local populations of Jews and indigenous Christians, who lived as religious minorities and were forced to pay the jizya tax under the Muslim rule in order to finance the wars with Byzantines and Sasanids, often aided Muslims to take over their lands from the Byzantines and Persians, resulting in exceptionally speedy conquests.[76][77] As new areas were conquered, they also benefited from free trade with other areas of the growing Islamic empire, where, to encourage commerce, taxes were applied to wealth rather than trade.[78] The Muslims paid zakat on their wealth for the benefit of the poor. Since the Constitution of Medina, drafted by the Islamic prophet Muhammad, the Jews and the Christians continued to use their own laws and had their own judges.[79][80]
In 639 CE, ʿUmar appointed Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan as the governor of Syria after the previous governor died in a plague along with 25,000 other people.[81][82] To stop the Byzantine harassment from the sea during the Arab–Byzantine wars, in 649 Muawiyah set up a navy, with ships crewed by Monophysite Christians, Egyptian Coptic Christians, and Jacobite Syrian Christians sailors and Muslim troops, which defeated the Byzantine navy at the Battle of the Masts in 655 CE, opening up the Mediterranean Sea to Muslim ships.[83][84][85][86]

Early Muslim armies stayed in encampments away from cities because ʿUmar feared that they may get attracted to wealth and luxury, moving away from the worship of God, accumulating wealth and establishing dynasties.[75][87][88][89] Staying in these encampments away from the cities also ensured that there was no stress on the local populations which could remain autonomous. Some of these encampments later grew into cities like Basra and Kufa in Iraq and Fustat in Egypt.[90]
When ʿUmar was assassinated in 644 CE, ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān, second cousin and twice son-in-law of Muhammad, became the third caliph. As the Arabic language is written without vowels, speakers of different Arabic dialects and other languages recited the Quran with phonetic variations that could alter the meaning of the text. When ʿUthmān became aware of this, he ordered a standard copy of the Quran to be prepared. Begun during his reign, the compilation of the Quran was finished some time between 650 and 656 CE, and copies were sent out to the different centers of the expanding Islamic empire.[91] After Muhammad's death, the old tribal differences between the Arabs started to resurface. Following the Roman–Persian wars and the Byzantine-Sasanian wars, deep-rooted differences between Iraq (formerly under the Sasanian Empire) and Syria (formerly under the Byzantine Empire) also existed. Each wanted the capital of the newly established Islamic empire to be in their area.[92]
As ʿUthmān became very old, Marwan I, a relative of Muawiyah slipped into the vacuum, becoming his secretary and slowly assuming more control. When ʿUthmān was assassinated in 656 CE, ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad, assumed the position of caliph and moved the capital to Kufa in Iraq. Muawiyah I, the governor of Syria, and Marwan I demanded arrest of the culprits. Marwan I manipulated every one and created conflict, which resulted in the first Muslim civil war (the "First Fitna"). ʿAlī was assassinated by the Kharijites in 661 CE. Six months later, ʿAlī's firstborn son Ḥasan made a peace treaty with Muawiyah I, in the interest of peace. In the Hasan–Muawiya treaty, Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī handed over power to Muawiyah I on the condition that he would be just to the people and not establish a dynasty after his death.[93][94] Muawiyah I subsequently broke the conditions of the agreement and established the Umayyad dynasty, with a capital in Damascus.[95] Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī, by then Muhammad's only surviving grandson, refused to swear allegiance to the Umayyads; he was killed in the Battle of Karbala the same year, in an event still mourned by Shīʿa Muslims on the Day of Ashura. Political unrest called the second Muslim civil war (the "Second Fitna") continued, but Muslim rule was extended under Muawiyah I to Rhodes, Crete, Kabul, Bukhara, and Samarkand, and expanded into North Africa. In 664 CE, Arab Muslim armies conquered Kabul,[96] and in 665 CE pushed further into the Maghreb.[97]
Umayyad Caliphate
[edit]
The Umayyad dynasty (or Ommiads), whose name derives from Umayya ibn Abd Shams, the great-grandfather of the first Umayyad caliph, ruled from 661 to 750 CE. Although the Umayyad family came from the city of Mecca, Damascus was the capital. After the death of Abdu'l-Rahman ibn Abu Bakr in 666,[98][99] Muawiyah I consolidated his power. Muawiyah I moved his capital to Damascus from Medina, which led to profound changes in the empire. In the same way, at a later date, the transfer of the Caliphate from Damascus to Baghdad marked the accession of a new family to power.
As the state grew, the state expenses increased. Additionally the Bayt al-mal and the Welfare State expenses to assist the Muslim and the non-Muslim poor, needy, elderly, orphans, widows, and the disabled, increased, the Umayyads asked the new converts (mawali) to continue paying the poll tax. The Umayyad rule, with its wealth and luxury also seemed at odds with the Islamic message preached by Muhammad.[100][101][102] All this increased discontent.[103][104] The descendants of Muhammad's uncle Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib rallied discontented mawali, poor Arabs, and some Shi'a against the Umayyads and overthrew them with the help of the general Abu Muslim, inaugurating the Abbasid dynasty in 750, which moved the capital to Baghdad.[105] A branch of the Ummayad family fled across North Africa to Al-Andalus, where they established the Caliphate of Córdoba, which lasted until 1031 before falling due to the Fitna of al-Andalus. The Bayt al-mal, the Welfare State then continued under the Abbasids.

At its largest extent, the Umayyad dynasty covered more than 5,000,000 square miles (13,000,000 km2) making it one of the largest empires the world had yet seen,[106] and the fifth largest contiguous empire ever.
Muawiyah beautified Damascus, and developed a court to rival that of Constantinople. He expanded the frontiers of the empire, reaching the edge of Constantinople at one point, though the Byzantines drove him back and he was unable to hold any territory in Anatolia. Sunni Muslims credit him with saving the fledgling Muslim nation from post-civil war anarchy. However, Shia Muslims accuse him of instigating the war, weakening the Muslim nation by dividing the Ummah, fabricating self-aggrandizing heresies[107] slandering the Prophet's family[108] and even selling his Muslim critics into slavery in the Byzantine empire.[109] One of Muawiyah's most controversial and enduring legacies was his decision to designate his son Yazid as his successor. According to Shi'a doctrine, this was a clear violation of the treaty he made with Hasan ibn Ali. In 682, Yazid restored Uqba ibn Nafi as the governor of North Africa. Uqba won battles against the Berbers and Byzantines.[110] From there Uqba marched thousands of miles westward towards Tangier, where he reached the Atlantic coast, and then marched eastwards through the Atlas Mountains.[111] With about 300 cavalrymen, he proceeded towards Biskra where he was ambushed by a Berber force under Kaisala. Uqba and all his men died fighting. The Berbers attacked and drove Muslims from north Africa for a period.[112] Weakened by the civil wars, the Umayyad lost supremacy at sea, and had to abandon the islands of Rhodes and Crete. Under the rule of Yazid I, some Muslims in Kufa began to think that if Husayn ibn Ali the descendant of Muhammad was their ruler, he would have been more just. He was invited to Kufa but was later betrayed and killed. Imam Husain's son, Imam Ali ibn Husain, was imprisoned along with Husain's sister and other ladies left in Karbala war. Due to opposition by public they were later released and allowed to go to their native place Medina. One Imam after another continued in the generation of Imam Husain but they were opposed by the Caliphs of the day as their rivals till Imam Abdullah al-Mahdi Billah came in power as first Caliph of Fatimid in North Africa when Caliphate and Imamate came to same person again after Imam Ali. These Imams were recognized by Shia Islam taking Imam Ali as first Caliph/Imam and the same is institutionalized by the Safavids and many similar institutions named now as Ismaili, Twelver, etc.

The period under Muawiya II was marked by civil wars (Second Fitna). This would ease in the reign of Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan, a well-educated and capable ruler. Despite the many political problems that impeded his rule, all important records were translated into Arabic. In his reign, a currency for the Muslim world was minted. This led to war with the Byzantine Empire under Justinian II (Battle of Sebastopolis) in 692 in Asia Minor. The Byzantines were decisively defeated by the Caliph after the defection of a large contingent of Slavs. The Islamic currency was then made the exclusive currency in the Muslim world.[citation needed] He reformed agriculture and commerce.[citation needed] Abd al-Malik consolidated Muslim rule and extended it, made Arabic the state language, and organized a regular postal service.

Under Al-Walid, the caliphate empire stretched from the Iberian Peninsula to India. Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf played a crucial role in the organization and selection of military commanders. Al-Walid paid great attention to the expansion of an organized military, building the strongest navy in the Umayyad era. This tactic was crucial for the expansion to the Iberian Peninsula. His reign is considered to be the apex of Islamic power.
Sulayman ibn Abd al-Malik was hailed as caliph the day al-Walid died. He appointed Yazid ibn al-Muhallab governor of Mesopotamia. Sulayman ordered the arrest and execution of the family of al-Hajjaj, one of two prominent leaders (the other was Qutayba ibn Muslim) who had supported the succession of al-Walid's son Yazid, rather than Sulayman. Al-Hajjaj had predeceased al-Walid, so he posed no threat. Qutaibah renounced allegiance to Sulayman, though his troops rejected his appeal to revolt. They killed him and sent his head to Sulayman. Sulayman did not move to Damascus on becoming Caliph, remaining in Ramla. Sulayman sent Maslama ibn Abd al-Malik to attack the Byzantine capital (siege of Constantinople). The intervention of Bulgaria on the Byzantine side proved decisive. The Muslims sustained heavy losses. Sulayman died suddenly in 717.
Yazid II came to power on the death of Umar II. Yazid fought the Kharijites, with whom Umar had been negotiating, and killed the Kharijite leader Shawdhab. In Yazid's reign, civil wars began in different parts of the empire.[113] Yazid expanded the Caliphate's territory into the Caucasus, before dying in 724. Inheriting the caliphate from his brother, Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik ruled an empire with many problems. He was effective in addressing these problems, and in allowing the Umayyad empire to continue as an entity. His long rule was an effective one, and renewed reforms introduced by Umar II. Under Hisham's rule, regular raids against the Byzantines continued. In North Africa, Kharijite teachings combined with local restlessness to produce the Berber Revolt. He was also faced with a revolt by Zayd ibn Ali. Hisham suppressed both revolts. The Abbasids continued to gain power in Khurasan and Iraq. However, they were not strong enough to make a move yet. Some were caught and punished or executed by eastern governors. The Battle of Akroinon, a decisive Byzantine victory, was during the final campaign of the Umayyad dynasty.[114] Hisham died in 743.

Al-Walid I began the next stage of Islamic conquests. Under him the early Islamic empire reached its farthest extent. He reconquered parts of Egypt from the Byzantine Empire and moved on into Carthage and across to the west of North Africa. Muslim armies under Tariq ibn Ziyad crossed the Strait of Gibraltar and began to conquer the Iberian Peninsula using North African Berber armies. The Visigoths of the Iberian Peninsula were defeated when the Umayyad conquered Lisbon. The Iberian Peninsula was the farthest extent of Islamic control of Europe (they were stopped at the Battle of Tours). In the east, Islamic armies under Muhammad ibn al-Qasim made it as far as the Indus Valley.
Al-Walid II saw political intrigue during his reign. Yazid III spoke out against his cousin Walid's "immorality" which included discrimination on behalf of the Banu Qays Arabs against Yemenis and non-Arab Muslims, and Yazid received further support from the Qadariya and Murji'iya (believers in human free will).[115] Walid was shortly thereafter deposed in a coup.[116] Yazid disbursed funds from the treasury and acceded to the Caliph. He explained that he had rebelled on behalf of the Book of God and the Sunna. Yazid reigned for only six months, while various groups refused allegiance and dissident movements arose, after which he died. Ibrahim ibn al-Walid, named heir apparent by his brother Yazid III, ruled for a short time in 744, before he abdicated. Marwan II ruled from 744 until he was killed in 750. He was the last Umayyad ruler to rule from Damascus. Marwan named his two sons Ubaydallah and Abdallah heirs. He appointed governors and asserted his authority by force. Anti-Umayyad feeling was very prevalent, especially in Iran and Iraq. The Abbasids had gained much support. Marwan's reign as caliph was almost entirely devoted to trying to keep the Umayyad empire together. His death signalled the end of Umayyad rule in the East, and was followed by the massacre of Umayyads by the Abbasids. Almost the entire Umayyad dynasty was killed, except for the talented prince Abd al-Rahman who escaped to the Iberian Peninsula and founded a dynasty there.
Abbasid Caliphate
[edit]
The Abbasid dynasty rose to power in 750, consolidating the gains of the earlier Caliphates. Initially, they conquered Mediterranean islands including the Balearics and, after, in 827 the Southern Italy.[117] The ruling party had come to power on the wave of dissatisfaction with the Umayyads, cultivated by the Abbasid revolutionary Abu Muslim.[118][119] Under the Abbasids Islamic civilization flourished. Most notable was the development of Arabic prose and poetry, termed by The Cambridge History of Islam as its "golden age".[120] Commerce and industry (considered a Muslim Agricultural Revolution) and the arts and sciences (considered a Muslim Scientific Revolution) also prospered under Abbasid caliphs al-Mansur (ruled 754–775), Harun al-Rashid (ruled 786–809), al-Ma'mun (ruled 809–813) and their immediate successors.[121] Many non-Muslims, such as Christians, Jews and Sabians,[122] contributed to the Islamic civilization in various fields,[123][124] and the institution known as the House of Wisdom employed Christian and Persian scholars to both translate works into Arabic and to develop new knowledge.[125][122]

The capital was moved from Damascus to Baghdad, due to the importance placed by the Abbasids upon eastern affairs in Persia and Transoxania.[121] At this time the caliphate showed signs of fracture amid the rise of regional dynasties. Although the Umayyad family had been killed by the revolting Abbasids, one family member, Abd ar-Rahman I, escaped to Spain and established an independent caliphate there in 756. In the Maghreb, Harun al-Rashid appointed the Arab Aghlabids as virtually autonomous rulers, although they continued to recognize central authority. Aghlabid rule was short-lived, and they were deposed by the Shiite Fatimid dynasty in 909. By around 960, the Fatimids had conquered Abbasid Egypt, building a capital there in 973 called "al-Qahirah" (meaning "the planet of victory", known today as Cairo).
During its decline, the Abbasid Caliphate disintegrated into minor states and dynasties, such as the Tulunid and the Ghaznavid dynasty. The Ghaznavid dynasty was a Muslim dynasty established by Turkic slave-soldiers from another Islamic empire, the Samanid Empire. In Persia the Ghaznavids snatched power from the Abbasids.[126][127] Abbasid influence had been consumed by the Great Seljuq Empire (a Muslim Turkish clan which had migrated into mainland Persia) by 1055.[121] Two other Turkish tribes, the Karahanids and the Seljuks, converted to Islam during the 10th century. Later, they were subdued by the Ottomans, who share the same origin and language. The Seljuks played an important role in the revival of Sunnism when Shi'ism increased its influence. The Seljuk military leader Alp Arslan (1063 – 1072) financially supported sciences and literature and established the Nezamiyeh university in Baghdad.[128]
Expansion continued, sometimes by force, sometimes by peaceful proselytising.[117] The first stage in the conquest of India began just before the year 1000. By some 200 (from 1193 to 1209) years later, the area up to the Ganges river had fallen. In sub-Saharan West Africa, Islam was established just after the year 1000. Muslim rulers were in Kanem starting from sometime between 1081 and 1097, with reports of a Muslim prince at the head of Gao as early as 1009. The Islamic kingdoms associated with Mali reached prominence in the 13th century.[129]
The Abbasids developed initiatives aimed at greater Islamic unity. Different sects of the Islamic faith and mosques, separated by doctrine, history, and practice, were pushed to cooperate. The Abbasids also distinguished themselves from the Umayyads by attacking the Umayyads' moral character and administration. According to Ira Lapidus, "The Abbasid revolt was supported largely by Arabs, mainly the aggrieved settlers of Marw with the addition of the Yemeni faction and their Mawali".[130] The Abbasids also appealed to non-Arab Muslims, known as mawali, who remained outside the kinship-based society of the Arabs and were perceived as a lower class within the Umayyad empire. Islamic ecumenism, promoted by the Abbasids, refers to the idea of unity of the Ummah in the literal meaning: that there was a single faith. Islamic philosophy developed as the Shariah was codified, and the four Madhabs were established. This era also saw the rise of classical Sufism. Religious achievements included completion of the canonical collections of Hadith of Sahih Bukhari and others.[131] Islam recognized to a certain extent the validity of the Abrahamic religions, the Quran identifying Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, and Sabians (commonly identified with the Mandaeans) as "people of the book". Toward the beginning of the high Middle Ages, the doctrines of the Sunni and Shia, two major denominations of Islam, solidified and the divisions of the world theologically would form. These trends would continue into the Fatimid and Ayyubid periods.
Politically, the Abbasid Caliphate evolved into an Islamic monarchy (unitary system of government.) The regional Sultanate and Emirate governors' existence, validity, or legality were acknowledged for unity of the state.[132] In the early Islamic philosophy of the Iberian Umayyads, Averroes presented an argument in The Decisive Treatise, providing a justification for the emancipation of science and philosophy from official Ash'ari theology; thus, Averroism has been considered a precursor to modern secularism.[133][134]
Golden Baghdad Abbasids
[edit]Early Middle Ages

According to Arab sources in the year 750, Al-Saffah, the founder of the Abbasid Caliphate, launched a massive rebellion against the Umayyad Caliphate from the province of Khurasan near Talas. After eliminating the entire Umayyad family and achieving victory at the Battle of the Zab, Al-Saffah and his forces marched into Damascus and founded a new dynasty. His forces confronted many regional powers and consolidated the realm of the Abbasid Caliphate.[135]

In Al-Mansur's time, Persian scholarship emerged. Many non-Arabs converted to Islam. The Umayyads actively discouraged conversion in order to continue the collection of the jizya, or the tax on non-Muslims. Islam nearly doubled within its territory from 8% of residents in 750 to 15% by the end of Al-Mansur's reign. Al-Mahdi, whose name means "Rightly-guided" or "Redeemer", was proclaimed caliph when his father was on his deathbed. Baghdad blossomed during Al-Mahdi's reign, becoming the world's largest city. It attracted immigrants from Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Persia and as far away as India and Spain. Baghdad was home to Christians, Jews, Hindus, and Zoroastrians, in addition to the growing Muslim population. Like his father, Al-Hadi[136] was open to his people and allowed citizens to address him in the palace at Baghdad. He was considered an "enlightened ruler", and continued the policies of his Abbasid predecessors. His short rule was plagued by military conflicts and internal intrigue.
The military conflicts subsided as Harun al-Rashid ruled.[137] His reign was marked by scientific, cultural and religious prosperity. He established the library Bayt al-Hikma ("House of Wisdom"), and the arts and music flourished during his reign. The Barmakid family played a decisive advisorial role in establishing the Caliphate, but declined during Rashid's rule.[138]
Al-Amin received the Caliphate from his father Harun Al-Rashid, but failed to respect the arrangements made for his brothers, leading to the Fourth Fitna. Al-Ma'mun's general Tahir ibn Husayn took Baghdad, executing Al-Amin.[139] The war led to a loss of prestige for the dynasty.
Rise of regional powers
[edit]
The Abbasids soon became caught in a three-way rivalry among Coptic Arabs, Indo-Persians, and immigrant Turks.[140] In addition, the cost of running a large empire became too great.[141] The Turks, Egyptians, and Arabs adhered to the Sunnite sect; the Persians, a great portion of the Turkic groups, and several of the princes in India were Shia. The political unity of Islam began to disintegrate. Under the influence of the Abbasid caliphs, independent dynasties appeared in the Muslim world and the caliphs recognized such dynasties as legitimately Muslim. The first was the Tahirids in Khorasan, which was founded during the caliph Al-Ma'mun's reign. Similar dynasties included the Saffarids, Samanids, Ghaznavids and Seljuqs. During this time, advancements were made in the areas of astronomy, poetry, philosophy, science, and mathematics.[142]
High Baghdad Abbasids
[edit]Early Middle Ages

Upon Al-Amin's death, Al-Ma'mun became Caliph. Al-Ma'mun extended the Abbasid empire's territory during his reign and dealt with rebellions.[143] Al-Ma'mun had been named governor of Khurasan by Harun, and after his ascension to power, the caliph named Tahir as governor of his military services in order to assure his loyalty. Tahir and his family became entrenched in Iranian politics and became powerful, frustrating Al-Ma'mun's desire to centralize and strengthen Caliphal power. The rising power of the Tahirid family became a threat as Al-Ma'mun's own policies alienated them and other opponents.
Al-Ma'mun worked to centralize power and ensure a smooth succession. Al-Mahdi proclaimed that the caliph was the protector of Islam against heresy, and also claimed the ability to declare orthodoxy. Religious scholars averred that Al-Ma'mun was overstepping his bounds in the Mihna, the Abbasid inquisition which he introduced in 833 four months before he died.[144] The Ulama emerged as a force in Islamic politics during Al-Ma'mun's reign for opposing the inquisitions. The Ulema and the major Islamic law schools took shape in the period of Al-Ma'mun. In parallel, Sunnism became defined as a religion of laws. Doctrinal differences between Sunni and Shi'a Islam became more pronounced.
During the Al-Ma'mun regime, border wars increased. Al-Ma'mun made preparations for a major campaign, but died while leading an expedition in Sardis. Al-Ma'mun gathered scholars of many religions at Baghdad, whom he treated well and with tolerance. He sent an emissary to the Byzantine Empire to collect the most famous manuscripts there, and had them translated into Arabic.[145] His scientists originated alchemy. Shortly before his death, during a visit to Egypt in 832, the caliph ordered the breaching of the Great Pyramid of Giza to search for knowledge and treasure. Workers tunnelled in near where tradition located the original entrance. Al-Ma'mun later died near Tarsus under questionable circumstances and was succeeded by his half-brother, Al-Mu'tasim, rather than his son, Al-Abbas ibn Al-Ma'mun.
As Caliph, Al-Mu'tasim promptly ordered the dismantling of al-Ma'mun's military base at Tyana. He faced Khurramite revolts. One of the most difficult problems facing this Caliph was the ongoing uprising of Babak Khorramdin. Al-Mu'tasim overcame the rebels and secured a significant victory. Byzantine emperor Theophilus launched an attack against Abbasid fortresses. Al-Mu'tasim sent Al-Afshin, who met and defeated Theophilus' forces at the Battle of Anzen. On his return he became aware of a serious military conspiracy which forced him and his successors to rely upon Turkish commanders and ghilman slave-soldiers (foreshadowing the Mamluk system). The Khurramiyyah were never fully suppressed, although they slowly declined during the reigns of succeeding Caliphs. Near the end of al-Mu'tasim's life there was an uprising in Palestine, but he defeated the rebels.

During Al-Mu'tasim's reign, the Tahirid family continued to grow in power. The Tahirids were exempted from many tribute and oversight functions. Their independence contributed to Abbasid decline in the east. Ideologically, al-Mu'tasim followed his half-brother al-Ma'mun. He continued his predecessor's support for the Islamic Mu'tazila sect, applying brutal torture against the opposition. Arab mathematician Al-Kindi was employed by Al-Mu'tasim and tutored the Caliph's son. Al-Kindi had served at the House of Wisdom and continued his studies in Greek geometry and algebra under the caliph's patronage.[146]
Al-Wathiq succeeded his father. Al-Wathiq dealt with opposition in Arabia, Syria, Palestine and in Baghdad. Using a famous sword he personally joined the execution of the Baghdad rebels. The revolts were the result of an increasingly large gap between Arab populations and the Turkish armies. The revolts were put down, but antagonism between the two groups grew, as Turkish forces gained power. He also secured a captive exchange with the Byzantines. Al-Wathiq was a patron of scholars, as well as artists. He personally had musical talent and is reputed to have composed over one hundred songs.[147]

When Al-Wathiq died of high fever, Al-Mutawakkil succeeded him. Al-Mutawakkil's reign is remembered for many reforms and is viewed as a golden age. He was the last great Abbasid caliph; after his death the dynasty fell into decline. Al-Mutawakkil ended the Mihna. Al-Mutawakkil built the Great Mosque of Samarra[148] as part of an extension of Samarra eastwards. During his reign, Al-Mutawakkil met famous Byzantine theologian Constantine the Philosopher, who was sent to strengthen diplomatic relations between the Empire and the Caliphate by Emperor Michael III. Al-Mutawakkil involved himself in religious debates, as reflected in his actions against minorities. The Shīʻi faced repression embodied in the destruction of the shrine of Hussayn ibn ʻAlī, an action that was ostensibly carried out to stop pilgrimages. Al-Mutawakkil continued to rely on Turkish statesmen and slave soldiers to put down rebellions and lead battles against foreign empires, notably capturing Sicily from the Byzantines. Al-Mutawakkil was assassinated by a Turkish soldier.
Al-Muntasir succeeded to the Caliphate on the same day with the support of the Turkish faction, though he was implicated in the murder. The Turkish party had al-Muntasir remove his brothers from the line of succession, fearing revenge for the murder of their father. Both brothers wrote statements of abdication. During his reign, Al-Muntasir removed the ban on pilgrimage to the tombs of Hassan and Hussayn and sent Wasif to raid the Byzantines. Al-Muntasir died of unknown causes. The Turkish chiefs held a council to select his successor, electing Al-Musta'in. The Arabs and western troops from Baghdad were displeased at the choice and attacked. However, the Caliphate no longer depended on Arabian choice, but depended on Turkish support. After the failed Muslim campaign against the Christians, people blamed the Turks for bringing disaster on the faith and murdering their Caliphs. After the Turks besieged Baghdad, Al-Musta'in planned to abdicate to Al-Mu'tazz but was put to death by his order. Al-Mu'tazz was enthroned by the Turks, becoming the youngest Abbasid Caliph to assume power.
| High Abbasids Jurisprudence |
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Four constructions of Islamite law
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| Early Abbasids Literature and Science |
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Al-Mu'tazz proved too apt a pupil of his Turkish masters, but was surrounded by parties jealous of each other. At Samarra, the Turks were having problems with the "Westerns" (Berbers and Moors), while the Arabs and Persians at Baghdad, who had supported al-Musta'in, regarded both with equal hatred. Al-Mu'tazz put his brothers Al-Mu'eiyyad and Abu Ahmed to death. The ruler spent recklessly, causing a revolt of Turks, Africans, and Persians for their pay. Al-Mu'tazz was brutally deposed shortly thereafter. Al-Muhtadi became the next Caliph. He was firm and virtuous compared to the earlier Caliphs, though the Turks held the power. The Turks killed him soon after his ascension. Al-Mu'tamid followed, holding on for 23 years, though he was largely a ruler in name only. After the Zanj Rebellion, Al-Mu'tamid summoned al-Muwaffak to help him. Thereafter, Al-Muwaffaq ruled in all but name. The Hamdanid dynasty was founded by Hamdan ibn Hamdun when he was appointed governor of Mardin in Anatolia by the Caliphs in 890. Al-Mu'tamid later transferred authority to his son, al-Mu'tadid, and never regained power. The Tulunids became the first independent state in Islamic Egypt, when they broke away during this time.
Al-Mu'tadid ably administered the Caliphate. Egypt returned to allegiance and Mesopotamia was restored to order. He was tolerant towards Shi'i, but toward the Umayyad community he was not so just. Al-Mu'tadid was cruel in his punishments, some of which are not surpassed by those of his predecessors. For example, the Kharijite leader at Mosul was paraded about Baghdad clothed in a robe of silk, of which Kharijites denounced as sinful, and then crucified. Upon Al-Mu'tadid's death, his son by a Turkish slave-girl, Al-Muktafi, succeeded to the throne.
Al-Muktafi became a favourite of the people for his generosity, and for abolishing his father's secret prisons, the terror of Baghdad. During his reign, the Caliphate overcame threats such as the Carmathians. Upon Al-Muktafi's death, the vazir next chose Al-Muqtadir. Al-Muqtadir's reign was a constant succession of thirteen Vazirs, one rising on the fall or assassination of another. His long reign brought the Empire to its lowest ebb. Africa was lost, and Egypt nearly. Mosul threw off its dependence, and the Greeks raided across the undefended border. The East continued to formally recognize the Caliphate, including those who virtually claimed independence.
At the end of the Early Baghdad Abbasids period, Empress Zoe Karbonopsina pressed for an armistice with Al-Muqtadir and arranged for the ransom of the Muslim prisoner[149] while the Byzantine frontier was threatened by Bulgarians. This only added to Baghdad's disorder. Though despised by the people, Al-Muqtadir was again placed in power after upheavals. Al-Muqtadir was eventually slain outside the city gates, whereupon courtiers chose his brother al-Qahir. He was even worse. Refusing to abdicate, he was blinded and cast into prison.
His son al-Radi took over only to experience a cascade of misfortune. Praised for his piety, he became the tool of the de facto ruling Minister, Ibn Raik (amir al-umara; 'Amir of the Amirs'). Ibn Raik held the reins of government and his name was joined with the Caliph's in public prayers. Around this period, the Hanbalis, supported by popular sentiment, set up in fact a kind of 'Sunni inquisition'. Ar-Radi is commonly regarded as the last of the real Caliphs: the last to deliver orations at the Friday service, to hold assemblies, to commune with philosophers, to discuss the questions of the day, to take counsel on the affairs of State; to distribute alms, or to temper the severity of cruel officers. Thus ended the Early Baghdad Abbasids.
In the late mid-930s, the Ikhshidids of Egypt carried the Arabic title "Wali" reflecting their position as governors on behalf of the Abbasids, The first governor (Muhammad bin Tughj Al-Ikhshid) was installed by the Abbasid Caliph. They gave him and his descendants the Wilayah for 30 years. The last name Ikhshid is Soghdian for "prince".
Also in the 930s, 'Alī ibn Būyah and his two younger brothers, al-Hassan and Aḥmad founded the Būyid confederation. Originally a soldier in the service of the Ziyārīds of Ṭabaristān, 'Alī was able to recruit an army to defeat a Turkish general from Baghdad named Yāqūt in 934. Over the next nine years the three brothers gained control of the remainder of the caliphate, while accepting the titular authority of the caliph in Baghdad. The Būyids made large territorial gains. Fars and Jibal were conquered. Central Iraq submitted in 945, before the Būyids took Kermān (967), Oman (967), the Jazīra (979), Ṭabaristān (980), and Gorgan (981). After this the Būyids went into slow decline, with pieces of the confederation gradually breaking off and local dynasties under their rule becoming de facto independent.[150]
Middle Baghdad Abbasids
[edit]Early High Middle Ages


At the beginning of the Middle Baghdad Abbasids, the Caliphate had become of little importance. The amir al-umara Bajkam contented himself with dispatching his secretary to Baghdad to assemble local dignitaries to elect a successor. The choice fell on Al-Muttaqi. Bajkam was killed on a hunting party by marauding Kurds. In the ensuing anarchy in Baghdad, Ibn Raik persuaded the Caliph to flee to Mosul where he was welcomed by the Hamdanids. They assassinated Ibn Raik. Hamdanid Nasir al-Dawla advanced on Baghdad, where mercenaries and well-organised Turks repelled them. Turkish general Tuzun became amir al-umara. The Turks were staunch Sunnis. A fresh conspiracy placed the Caliph in danger. Hamdanid troops helped ad-Daula escape to Mosul and then to Nasibin. Tuzun and the Hamdanid were stalemated. Al-Muttaqi was at Raqqa, moving to Tuzun where he was deposed. Tuzun installed the blinded Caliph's cousin as successor, with the title of Al-Mustakfi. With the new Caliph, Tuzun attacked the Buwayhid dynasty and the Hamdanids. Soon after, Tuzun died, and was succeeded by one of his generals, Abu Ja'far. The Buwayhids then attacked Baghdad, and Abu Ja'far fled into hiding with the Caliph. Buwayhid Sultan Muiz ud-Daula assumed command forcing the Caliph into abject submission to the Amir. Eventually, Al-Mustakfi was blinded and deposed. The city fell into chaos, and the Caliph's palace was looted.[151]
| Significant Middle Abbasid Muslims |
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Once the Buwayhids controlled Baghdad, Al-Muti became caliph. The office was shorn of real power and Shi'a observances were established. The Buwayhids held on Baghdad for over a century. Throughout the Buwayhid reign the Caliphate was at its lowest ebb, but was recognized religiously, except in Iberia. Buwayhid Sultan Mu'izz al-Dawla was prevented from raising a Shi'a Caliph to the throne by fear for his own safety, and fear of rebellion, in the capital and beyond.[152]
The next Caliph, Al-Ta'i, reigned over factional strife in Syria among the Fatimids, Turks, and Carmathians. The Hideaway dynasty also fractured. The Abbasid borders were the defended only by small border states. Baha' al-Dawla, the Buyid amir of Iraq, deposed al-Ta'i in 991 and proclaimed al-Qadir the new caliph.[153]
During al-Qadir's Caliphate, Mahmud of Ghazni looked after the empire. Mahmud of Ghazni, of Eastern fame, was friendly towards the Caliphs, and his victories in the Indian Empire were accordingly announced from the pulpits of Baghdad in grateful and glowing terms. Al-Qadir fostered the Sunni struggle against Shiʿism and outlawed heresies such as the Baghdad Manifesto and the doctrine that the Quran was created. He outlawed the Muʿtazila, bringing an end to the development of rationalist Muslim philosophy. During this and the next period, Islamic literature, especially Persian literature, flourished under the patronage of the Buwayhids.[154] By 1000, the global Muslim population had climbed to about 4 percent of the world, compared to the Christian population of 10 percent.
During Al-Qa'im's reign, the Buwayhid ruler often fled the capital and the Seljuq dynasty gained power. Toghrül overran Syria and Armenia. He then made his way into the Capital, where he was well-received both by chiefs and people. In Bahrain, the Qarmatian state collapsed in Al-Hasa. Arabia recovered from the Fatimids and again acknowledged the spiritual jurisdiction of the Abbasids. Al-Muqtadi was honoured by the Seljuq Sultan Malik-Shah I, during whose reign the Caliphate was recognized throughout the extending range of Seljuq conquest. The Sultan was critical of the Caliph's interference in affairs of state, but died before deposing the last of the Middle Baghdad Abbasids.[155]
Late Baghdad Abbasids
[edit]Late High Middle Ages

The Late Baghdad Abbasids reigned from the beginning of the Crusades to the Seventh Crusade. The first Caliph was Al-Mustazhir. He was politically irrelevant, despite civil strife at home and the First Crusade in Syria. Raymond IV of Toulouse attempted to attack Baghdad, losing at the Battle of Manzikert. The global Muslim population climbed to about 5 per cent as against the Christian population of 11 per cent by 1100. Jerusalem was captured by crusaders who massacred its inhabitants. Preachers travelled throughout the caliphate proclaiming the tragedy and rousing men to recover the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound from the Franks (European Crusaders). Crowds of exiles rallied for war against the infidel. Neither the Sultan nor the Caliph sent an army west.[154]
Al-Mustarshid achieved more independence while the sultan Mahmud II of Great Seljuq was engaged in war in the East. The Banu Mazyad (Mazyadid State) general, Dubays ibn Sadaqa[156] (emir of Al-Hilla), plundered Bosra and attacked Baghdad together with a young brother of the sultan, Ghiyath ad-Din Mas'ud. Dubays was crushed by a Seljuq army under Zengi, founder of the Zengid dynasty. Mahmud's death was followed by a civil war between his son Dawud, his nephew Mas'ud and the atabeg Toghrul II. Zengi was recalled to the East, stimulated by the Caliph and Dubays, where he was beaten. The Caliph then laid siege to Mosul for three months without success, resisted by Mas'ud and Zengi. It was nonetheless a milestone in the caliphate's military revival.[157]
After the siege of Damascus (1134),[158] Zengi undertook operations in Syria. Al-Mustarshid attacked sultan Mas'ud of western Seljuq and was taken prisoner. He was later found murdered.[159] His son, Al-Rashid failed to gain independence from Seljuq Turks. Zengi, because of the murder of Dubays, set up a rival Sultanate. Mas'ud attacked; the Caliph and Zengi, hopeless of success, escaped to Mosul. The Sultan regained power, a council was held, the Caliph was deposed, and his uncle, son of Al-Muqtafi, appointed as the new Caliph. Ar-Rashid fled to Isfahan and was killed by Hashshashins.[154]
Continued disunion and contests between Seljuq Turks allowed al-Muqtafi to maintain control in Baghdad and to extend it throughout Iraq. In 1139, al-Muqtafi granted protection to Patriarch Abdisho III of the Church of the East. While the Crusade raged, the Caliph successfully defended Baghdad against Muhammad II of Seljuq in the Siege of Baghdad (1157). The Sultan and the Caliph dispatched men in response to Zengi's appeal, but neither the Seljuqs, nor the Caliph, nor their Amirs, dared resist the Crusaders.
The next caliph, Al-Mustanjid, saw Saladin extinguish the Fatimid dynasty after 260 years, and thus the Abbasids again prevailed. Al-Mustadi reigned when Saladin became the sultan of Egypt and declared allegiance to the Abbasids.
An-Nasir, "The Victor for the Religion of God", attempted to restore the Caliphate to its ancient dominant role. He consistently held Iraq from Tikrit to the Gulf without interruption. His forty-seven-year reign was chiefly marked by ambitious and corrupt dealings with the Tartar chiefs, and by his hazardous invocation of the Mongols, which ended his dynasty. His son, Az-Zahir, was Caliph for a short period before his death and An-Nasir's grandson, Al-Mustansir, was made caliph.
Al-Mustansir founded the Mustansiriya Madrasah. In 1236 Ögedei Khan commanded to raise up Khorassan and populated Herat. The Mongol military governors mostly made their camp in Mughan plain, Azerbaijan. The rulers of Mosul and Cilician Armenia surrendered. Chormaqan divided the South Caucasus region into three districts based on military hierarchy.[160] In Georgia, the population were temporarily divided into eight tumens.[161] By 1237 the Mongol Empire had subjugated most of Persia, excluding Abbasid Iraq and Ismaili strongholds, and all of Afghanistan and Kashmir.[162]
Al-Musta'sim was the last Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad and is noted for his opposition to the rise of Shajar al-Durr to the Egyptian throne during the Seventh Crusade. To the east, Mongol forces under Hulagu Khan swept through the Transoxiana and Khorasan. Baghdad was sacked and the caliph deposed soon afterwards. The Mamluk sultans and Syria later appointed a powerless Abbasid Caliph in Cairo.
Caliph of Cairo (1261–1517)
[edit]The "shadow" caliph of Cairo
Late Middle Ages

The Abbasid "shadow" caliph of Cairo reigned under the tutelage of the Mamluk sultans and nominal rulers used to legitimize the actual rule of the Mamluk sultans. All the Cairene Abbasid caliphs who preceded or succeeded Al-Musta'in were spiritual heads lacking any temporal power. Al-Musta'in was the only Cairo-based Abbasid caliph to even briefly hold political power. Al-Mutawakkil III was the last "shadow" caliph. In 1517, Ottoman sultan Selim I defeated the Mamluk Sultanate, and made Egypt part of the Ottoman Empire.[163][164]
Fatimid Caliphate
[edit]The Fatimids originated in Ifriqiya (modern-day Tunisia and eastern Algeria). The dynasty was founded in 909 by ʻAbdullāh al-Mahdī Billah, who legitimized his claim through descent from Muhammad by way of his daughter Fātima as-Zahra and her husband ʻAlī ibn-Abī-Tālib, the first Shīʻa Imām, hence the name al-Fātimiyyūn "Fatimid".[165] Abdullāh al-Mahdi's control soon extended over all of central Maghreb and Egypt.[166][167] The Fatimids and the Zaydis at the time, used the Hanafi jurisprudence, as did most Sunnis.[168][169][170]
Unlike other governments in the area, Fatimid advancement in state offices was based more on merit than heredity. Members of other branches of Islam, including Sunnis, were just as likely to be appointed to government posts as Shiites. Tolerance covered non-Muslims such as Christians and Jews; they took high levels in government based on ability.[171] There were, however, exceptions to this general attitude of tolerance, notably Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah.
The Fatimid palace was in two parts. It was in the Khan el-Khalili area at Bin El-Quasryn street.[172]
Fatimid caliphs
[edit]Early and High Middle Ages

- Also see: Cairo Abbasid Caliphs (above)
During the beginning of the Middle Baghdad Abbasids, the Fatimid Caliphs claimed spiritual supremacy not only in Egypt, but also contested the religious leadership of Syria. At the beginning of the Abbasid realm in Baghdad, the Alids faced severe persecution by the ruling party as they were a direct threat to the Caliphate. Owing to the Abbasid inquisitions, the forefathers opted for concealment of the Dawa's existence. Subsequently, they travelled towards the Iranian Plateau and distanced themselves from the epicenter of the political world. Al Mahdi's father, Al Husain al Mastoor returned to control the Dawa's affairs. He sent two Dai's to Yemen and Western Africa. Al Husain died soon after the birth of his son, Al Mahdi. A system of government helped update Al Mahdi on the development which took place in North Africa.[173]

Cairo, Egypt; south of Bab Al-Futuh
"Islamic Cairo" building was named after Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, built by Fatimid vizier Gawhar Al-Siqilli, and extended by Badr al-Jamali.
Al Mahdi Abdullah al-Mahdi Billah established the first Imam of the Fatimid dynasty. He claimed genealogic origins dating as far back as Fatimah through Husayn and Ismail. Al Mahdi established his headquarters at Salamiyah and moved towards north-western Africa, under Aghlabid rule. His success of laying claim to being the precursor to the Mahdi was instrumental among the Berber tribes of North Africa, specifically the Kutamah tribe. Al Mahdi established himself at the former Aghlabid residence at Raqqadah, a suburb of Al-Qayrawan in Tunisia. In 920, Al Mahdi took up residence at the newly established capital of the empire, Al-Mahdiyyah. After his death, Al Mahdi was succeeded by his son, Abu Al-Qasim Muhammad Al-Qaim, who continued his expansionist policy.[174] At the time of his death he had extended his reign to Morocco of the Idrisids, as well as Egypt itself. The Fatimid Caliphate grew to include Sicily and to stretch across North Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to Libya.[175] Abdullāh al-Mahdi's control soon extended over all of central Maghreb, an area consisting of the modern countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, which he ruled from Mahdia, in Tunisia. Newly built capital Al-Mansuriya,[Note 3] or Mansuriyya (Arabic: المنصوريه), near Kairouan, Tunisia, was the capital of the Fatimid Caliphate during the rules of the Imams Al-Mansur Billah (r. 946–953) and Al-Mu'izz li-Din Allah (r. 953–975).
The Fatimid general Jawhar conquered Egypt in 969, and he built a new palace city there, near Fusṭāt, which he also called al-Manṣūriyya. Under Al-Muizz Lideenillah, the Fatimids conquered the Ikhshidid Wilayah (see Fatimid Egypt), founding a new capital at al-Qāhira (Cairo) in 969.[167] The name was a reference to the planet Mars, "The Subduer",[177] which was prominent in the sky at the moment that city construction started. Cairo was intended as a royal enclosure for the Fatimid caliph and his army, though the actual administrative and economic capital of Egypt was in cities such as Fustat until 1169. After Egypt, the Fatimids continued to conquer the surrounding areas until they ruled from Tunisia to Syria, as well as Sicily.
Under the Fatimids, Egypt became the center of an empire that included at its peak North Africa, Sicily, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Red Sea coast of Africa, Tihamah, Hejaz, and Yemen.[178] Egypt flourished, and the Fatimids developed an extensive trade network in both the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Their trade and diplomatic ties extended all the way to China and its Song dynasty, which eventually determined the economic course of Egypt during the High Middle Ages.
After the eighteenth Imam, al-Mustansir Billah, the Nizari sect believed that his son Nizar was his successor, while another Ismāʿīlī branch known as the Mustaali (from whom the Dawoodi Bohra would eventually descend), supported his other son, al-Musta'li. The Fatimid dynasty continued with al-Musta'li as both Imam and Caliph, and that joint position held until the 20th Imam, al-Amir bi-Ahkami l-Lah (1132). At the death of Imam Amir, one branch of the Mustaali faith claimed that he had transferred the imamate to his son at-Tayyib Abi l-Qasim, who was then two years old. After the decay of the Fatimid political system in the 1160s, the Zengid ruler Nūr ad-Dīn had his general, Shirkuh, seize Egypt from the vizier Shawar in 1169. Shirkuh died two months after taking power, and the rule went to his nephew, Saladin.[179] This began the Ayyubid Sultanate of Egypt and Syria.
Crusades
[edit]Beginning in the 8th century, the Iberian Christian kingdoms had begun the Reconquista aimed at retaking Al-Andalus from the Moors. In 1095, Pope Urban II, inspired by the conquests in Spain by Christian forces and implored by the eastern Roman emperor to help defend Christianity in the East, called for the First Crusade from Western Europe which captured Edessa, Antioch, County of Tripoli and Jerusalem.[180]
In the early period of the Crusades, the Christian Kingdom of Jerusalem emerged and for a time controlled Jerusalem. The Kingdom of Jerusalem and other smaller Crusader kingdoms over the next 90 years formed part of the complicated politics of the Levant, but did not threaten the Islamic Caliphate nor other powers in the region. After Shirkuh ended Fatimid rule in 1169, uniting it with Syria, the Crusader kingdoms were faced with a threat, and his nephew Saladin reconquered most of the area in 1187, leaving the Crusaders holding a few ports.[181]
In the Third Crusade armies from Europe failed to recapture Jerusalem, though Crusader states lingered for several decades, and other crusades followed. The Christian Reconquista continued in Al-Andalus, and was eventually completed with the fall of Granada in 1492. During the low period of the Crusades, the Fourth Crusade was diverted from the Levant and instead took Constantinople, leaving the Eastern Roman Empire (now the Byzantine Empire) further weakened in their long struggle against the Turkish peoples to the east. However, the crusaders did manage to damage Islamic caliphates; according to William of Malmesbury, preventing them from further expansion into Christendom[182] and being targets of the Mamluks and the Mongols.
Ayyubid dynasty
[edit]
The Ayyubid dynasty was founded by Saladin and centered in Egypt. In 1174, Saladin proclaimed himself Sultan and conquered the Near East region. The Ayyubids ruled much of the Middle East during the 12th and 13th centuries, controlling Egypt, Syria, northern Mesopotamia, Hejaz, Yemen, and the North African coast up to the borders of modern-day Tunisia. After Saladin, his sons contested control over the sultanate, but Saladin's brother al-Adil eventually established himself in 1200. In the 1230s, Syria's Ayyubid rulers attempted to win independence from Egypt and remained divided until Egyptian Sultan as-Salih Ayyub restored Ayyubid unity by taking over most of Syria, excluding Aleppo, by 1247. In 1250, the dynasty in the Egyptian region was overthrown by slave regiments. A number of attempts to recover it failed, led by an-Nasir Yusuf of Aleppo. In 1260, the Mongols sacked Aleppo and wrested control of what remained of the Ayyubid territories soon after.[183]
Sultans of Egypt
[edit]
Sultans and Amirs of Damascus
[edit]
Emirs of Aleppo
[edit]
Turco-Mongol conversion
[edit]Mongol period
[edit]
While the Abbasid Caliphate suffered a decline following the reign of al-Wathiq (842–847) and al-Mu'tadid (892–902),[184] the Mongol Empire put an end to the Abbasid dynasty in 1258.[185] The Mongols spread throughout Central Asia and Persia;[186] the Persian city of Isfahan had fallen to them by 1237.[187]
The Ilkhans of Chingisid descendence understood themselves as defenders of Islam, perhaps even as the legitimate heirs of the Abbasid Caliphate.[188](p59) Al-Nuwayri, stated that the Mongols had heavenly approval and would live in accordance with the restrictions of Islamic law.[189] Some Sufi Muslim writers, such as the Persian poet and mystic Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Rūmī and his biographer Šams al-Dīn Aḥmad Aflākī, regarded the Mongols and Turkic peoples from the Eurasian Steppe as more pious than the Muslim scholars, ascetics, and muftis of their time, and hence expressed favor of their conquests, considering the invasion as divine punishment from God.[188](p81) Aflaki identifies the invasion with a hadith, describing the Turks (and Mongols) as the army of Muhammad's wrath. In his Manaqib al-'Arifin, the Turks and Mongols are described as God's "punishment from hell", and by that, people who follow the will of the Creator.[190]
Many scholars had argued that the conversion of the Turks and Mongols has been filtered through the mediation of Persian and Central Asian culture.[186][191] Rather than converting to Islamic orthodoxy, they encountered Islam mostly through the preaching of Sufi Muslim wandering ascetics and mystics (fakirs and dervishes).[186][192] Recently this view has been challenged on grounds that a defined Islamic orthodoxy has not yet existed during the conversion of the Turks and Mongols.[186][190]
In the 13th to the 14th centuries, both Sunnī and Shīʿa practices were intertwined, and historical figures commonly associated with the history of Shīʿa Islam, like ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib and Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (respectively, the first and sixth Shīʿīte Imams), played an almost universal role for Muslim believers to understand "the Unseen" (al-Ghaib).[188](p24) A sharp distinction between Sunnī, Shīʿa, and heterodox Islamic beliefs did not exist. Therefore, ideas from foreign cultures were easier to integrate into the Islamic worldview.[186] During this era, the Persian Sufi poet and mystic Jalaluddin Rumi (1207–1273) wrote his masterpiece, the Masnavi, which he believed to be "sent down" from God and understood it as the proper explanation of the Quran (tafsīr).[188](p97) According to Aflaki, the invading Mongols were impressed by Rumi's devotion to God, so they did not assault him, believing it would cause the wrath of God upon them.[190]
On the other hand, Turks and Mongols also faced criticism. Opposition to them have been formulated by Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), who did not accept the Mongols' conversion to Sunnism.[193] Feeling threatened by the Crusaders and the Mongols, ibn Taymiyya called for elimination by a militant jihād against whom he deemed "heretic", including Shias, al-Ashʿariyya and falāsifa (philosophers),[194] and established his own theological doctrines.[195] His theology was characterized by a literal understanding of the Quran,[195][196] a physicalist ontology,[197] and a rejection of most philosophical and mystical approaches in favor of a simplistic and dogmatic theology.[195]
Another unique characteristic of his theological approach was the importance of a theocratic state. Prior to ibn Taimiyya, religious wisdom was meant to guide governmental authorities, while ibn Taymiyya demanded political power to promote religious piety.[195] Having a deep-rooting discern for the Mongols, ibn Taimiyya sought to pronounce takfīr (excommunication) upon the Turco-Mongol rulers, despite their profession of the shahada (Islamic testimony of faith), or regular observance of aṣ-Ṣalāh (obligatory prayers), sawm (fasting) and other expressions of religiosity.[198] His disciple ibn Kathir ( d. 1373), propounded the same belief in his tafsīr.[199]
During his lifetime, ibn Taimiyya played only a marginal role and most of his writings were rejected. He was repeatedly accused of blasphemy by anthropomorphizing God, and his disciple Ibn Kathir distanced himself from his mentor.[200] Yet, some of Ibn Taymiyya's teaching influenced Ibn Kathir's methodology on tafsīr, discounted much of the exegetical tradition since then.[201][202] Only centuries later, among Wahhabis and in 21st century Salafism, their writings gained notable importance.[194][195][196][203]
Islamic Mongol empires
[edit]
Ultimately, the Ilkhanate, Golden Horde, and the Chagatai Khanate – three of the four principal Mongol khanates – embraced Islam.[204][205][206] In power in Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, and further east, over the rest of the 13th century gradually all converted to Islam. Most Ilkhanid rulers were replaced by the new Mongol power founded by Timur (himself a Muslim), who conquered Persia in the 1360s, and moved against the Delhi Sultanate in India and the Ottoman Turks in Anatolia. Timur's ceaseless conquests were accompanied by displays of brutality matched only by Chinggis Khan, whose example Timur consciously imitated.[207] Samarqand, the cosmopolitan capital of Timur's empire, flourished under his rule as never before, while Iran and Iraq suffered large-scale devastation.[207] Muslim scholars, such as Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi, studied in the Maragheh observatory, erected by Hulegu Khan.[208]
The Middle East was still recovering from the Black Death, which may have killed one third of the population in the region. The plague began in China, and reached Alexandria in Egypt in 1347, spreading over the following years to most Islamic areas. The combination of the plague and the wars left the Middle Eastern Islamic world in a seriously weakened position. The Timurid dynasty would found many strong empires of Islam, including the Mughals of India.[209][210]
Timurid Renaissance
[edit]
The Timurid Empire based in Central Asia ruled by the Timurid dynasty saw a tremendous increase in the fields of arts and sciences, spreading across both the eastern and western world.[211]
Remarkable was the invention of Tamerlane Chess, reconstruction of the city of Samarkand, and substantial contributions made by the family of Sultan Shah Rukh, which includes Gawhar Shad, polymath Ulugh Begh, and Sultan Husayn Bayqara in the fields of astronomy, mathematics, and architecture. The empire received widespread support from multiple Islamic scholars and scientists. A number of Islamic learning centres and mosques were built, most notably the Ulugh Beg Observatory.
The prosperity of the city of Herat is said to have competed with those of Florence, the birthplace of the Italian Renaissance as the center of a cultural rebirth.[212][213]
The aspects of the Timurid Renaissance were later brought in Mughal India by the Mughal Emperors[214][215][216] and served as a heritage of states of the other remaining Islamic Gunpowder empires: the Ottoman Turkey and the Safavid Iran.[217]
Mamluk Sultanate
[edit]In 1250, the Ayyubid Egyptian dynasty was overthrown by slave regiments, and the Mamluk Sultanate was born. Military prestige was at the center of Mamluk society, and it played a key role in the confrontations with the Mongol Empire during the Mongol invasions of the Levant.
In the 1260s, the Mongols sacked and controlled the Islamic Near East territories. The Mongol invaders were finally stopped by Egyptian Mamluks north of Jerusalem in 1260 at the pivotal Battle of Ain Jalut.[218] The Mamluks, who were slave-soldiers predominantly of Turkic, Caucasian, and Southeastern European origins[219][220][221] (see Saqaliba), forced out the Mongols (see Battle of Ain Jalut) after the final destruction of the Ayyubid dynasty. The Mongols were again defeated by the Mamluks at the Battle of Hims a few months later, and then driven out of Syria altogether.[127] With this, the Mamluks were able to concentrate their forces and to conquer the last of the Crusader states in the Levant. Thus they united Syria and Egypt for the longest interval between the Abbasid and Ottoman empires (1250–1517).[222]
The Mamluks experienced a continual state of political conflict, military tension, proxy wars, and economic competition between the "Muslim territory" (Dar al-Islam) and "non-Muslim territory" (Dar al-Harb).[220] The Battle of Ain Jalut and the glorious Battle of Marj al-Saffar (1303), the latter partly led by Imam Ibn Taymiyyah, marked the end of the Mongol invasions of the Levant. Fatwas given during these conflicts changed the course of Political Islam.[223] As part of their chosen role as defenders of Islamic orthodoxy, the Mamluks sponsored many religious buildings, including mosques, madrasas and khanqahs. Though some construction took place in the provinces, the vast bulk of these projects expanded the capital. Many Mamluk buildings in Cairo have survived to this day, particularly in Old Cairo (for further informations, see Mamluk architecture).
Bahri Sultans
[edit]
Burji Sultans
[edit]
- See also: Islamic Egypt governors, Mamluks Era
Al-Andalus
[edit]
The Arabs, under the command of the Berber General Tarik ibn Ziyad, first began their conquest of southern Spain or al-Andalus in 711. A raiding party led by Tarik was sent to intervene in a civil war in the Visigothic kingdom in Hispania. Crossing the Strait of Gibraltar (named after the General), it won a decisive victory in the summer of 711 when the Visigothic king Roderic was defeated and killed on 19 July at the Battle of Guadalete. Tariq's commander, Musa bin Nusair crossed with substantial reinforcements, and by 718 the Muslims dominated most of the peninsula. Some later Arabic and Christian sources present an earlier raid by a certain Ṭārif in 710 and also, the Ad Sebastianum recension of the Chronicle of Alfonso III, refers to an Arab attack incited by Erwig during the reign of Wamba (672–80). The two large armies may have been in the south for a year before the decisive battle was fought.[224]
The rulers of Al-Andalus were granted the rank of Emir by the Umayyad Caliph Al-Walid I in Damascus. After the Abbasids came to power, some Umayyads fled to Muslim Spain to establish themselves there. By the end of the 10th century, the ruler Abd al-Rahman III took over the title of Caliph of Córdoba (912–961).[225] Soon after, the Umayyads went on developing a strengthened state with its capital as Córdoba. Al-Hakam II succeeded to the Caliphate after the death of his father Abd ar-Rahman III in 961. He secured peace with the Christian kingdoms of northern Iberia,[226] and made use of the stability to develop agriculture through the construction of irrigation works.[227] Economic development was also encouraged through the widening of streets and the building of markets. The rule of the Caliphate is known as the heyday of Muslim presence in the peninsula.[228]
The Umayyad Caliphate collapsed in 1031 due to political divisions and civil unrest during the rule of Hicham II who was ousted because of his indolence.[229] Al-Andalus then broke up into a number of states called taifa kingdoms (Arabic, Muluk al-ṭawā'if; English, Petty kingdoms). The decomposition of the Caliphate into those petty kingdoms weakened the Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula vis-à-vis the Christian kingdoms of the north. Some of the taifas, such as that of Seville, were forced to enter into alliances with Christian princes and pay tributes in money to Castille.[230]
Emirs of Al-Andalus
[edit]
Abd al-Rahman I and Bedr (a former Greek slave) escaped with their lives after the popular revolt known as the Abbasid Revolution. Rahman I continued south through Palestine, the Sinai, and then into Egypt. Rahman I was one of several surviving Umayyad family members to make a perilous trek to Ifriqiya at this time. Rahman I and Bedr reached modern day Morocco near Ceuta. Next step would be to cross to sea to al-Andalus, where Rahman I could not have been sure whether he would be welcome. Following the Berber Revolt (740s), the province was in a state of confusion, with the Ummah torn by tribal dissensions among the Arabs and racial tensions between the Arabs and Berbers. Bedr lined up three Syrian commanders – Obeid Allah ibn Uthman and Abd Allah ibn Khalid, both originally of Damascus, and Yusuf ibn Bukht of Qinnasrin and contacted al-Sumayl (then in Zaragoza) to get his consent, but al-Sumayl refused, fearing Rahman I would try to make himself emir. After discussion with Yemenite commanders, Rahman I was told to go to al-Andalus. Shortly thereafter, he set off with Bedr and a small group of followers for Europe. Abd al-Rahman landed at Almuñécar in al-Andalus, to the east of Málaga.
During his brief time in Málaga, he quickly amassed local support. News of the prince's arrival spread throughout the peninsula. In order to help speed his ascension to power, he took advantage of the feuds and dissensions. However, before anything could be done, trouble broke out in northern al-Andalus. Abd al-Rahman and his followers were able to control Zaragoza. Rahman I fought to rule al-Andalus in a battle at the Guadalquivir river, just outside Córdoba on the plains of Musarah (Battle of Musarah). Rahman I was victorious, chasing his enemies from the field with parts of their army. Rahman I marched into the capital, Córdoba, fighting off a counterattack, but negotiations ended the confrontation. After Rahman I consolidated power, he proclaimed himself the al-Andalus emir. Rahman I did not claim the Muslim caliph, though.[231] The last step was to have al-Fihri's general, al-Sumayl, garroted in Córdoba's jail. Al-Andalus was a safe haven for the house of Umayya that managed to evade the Abbasids.[232]
In Baghdad, the Abbasid caliph al-Mansur had planned to depose the emir. Rahman I and his army confronted the Abbasids, killing most of the Abbasid army. The main Abbasid leaders were decapitated, their heads preserved in salt, with identifying tags pinned to their ears. The heads were bundled in a gruesome package and sent to the Abbasid caliph who was on pilgrimage at Mecca. Rahman I quelled repeated rebellions in al-Andalus. He began the building of the great mosque [cordova], and formed ship-yards along the coast; he is moreover said to have been the first to transplant the palm and the pomegranate into the congenial climate of Spain: and he encouraged science and literature in his states. He died on 29 September 788, after a reign of thirty-four years and one month.[233]

Rahman I's successor was his son Hisham I. Born in Córdoba, he built many mosques and completed the Mezquita. He called for a jihad that resulted in a campaign against the Kingdom of Asturias and the County of Toulouse; in this second campaign he was defeated at Orange by William of Gellone, first cousin to Charlemagne. His successor Al-Hakam I came to power and was challenged by his uncles, other sons of Rahman I. One, Abdallah, went to the court of Charlemagne in Aix-la-Chapelle to negotiate for aid. In the meantime Córdoba was attacked, but was defended. Hakam I spent much of his reign suppressing rebellions in Toledo, Saragossa and Mérida.[234]
Abd ar-Rahman II succeeded his father and engaged in nearly continuous warfare against Alfonso II of Asturias, whose southward advance he halted. Rahman II repulsed an assault by Vikings who had disembarked in Cádiz, conquered Seville (with the exception of its citadel) and attacked Córdoba. Thereafter he constructed a fleet and naval arsenal at Seville to repel future raids. He responded to William of Septimania's requests of assistance in his struggle against Charles the Bald's nominations.[235]
Muhammad I's reign was marked by the movements of the Muwallad (ethnic Iberian Muslims) and Mozarabs (Muslim-Iberia Christians). Muhammad I was succeeded by his son Mundhir I. During the reign of his father, Mundhir I commanded military operations against the neighbouring Christian kingdoms and the Muwallad rebellions. At his father's death, he inherited the throne. During his two-year reign, Mundhir I fought against Umar ibn Hafsun. He died in 888 at Bobastro, succeeded by his brother Abdullah ibn Muhammad al-Umawi.
Umawi showed no reluctance to dispose of those he viewed as a threat. His government was marked by continuous wars between Arabs, Berbers and Muwallad. His power as emir was confined to the area of Córdoba, while the rest had been seized by rebel families. The son he had designated as successor was killed by one of Umawi's brothers. The latter was in turn executed by Umawi's father, who named as successor Abd ar-Rahman III, son of the killed son of Umawi.[236][237][238]
Caliphs of Al-Andalus
[edit]
Almoravid Iberia
[edit]
- Ifriqiyah, Iberian
Almohad caliphs
[edit]
Africa
[edit]The Umayyad conquest of North Africa continued the century of rapid Muslim military expansion following the death of Muhammad in 632. By 640 the Arabs controlled Mesopotamia, had invaded Armenia, and were concluding their conquest of Byzantine Syria. Damascus was the seat of the Umayyad Caliphate. By the end of 641 all of Egypt was in Arab hands. A subsequent attempt to conquer the Nubian kingdom of Makuria was however repelled.
Maghreb
[edit]
Kairouan in Tunisia was the first city founded by Muslims in the Maghreb. Arab general Uqba ibn Nafi erected the city (in 670) and, in the same time, the Great Mosque of Kairouan[239] considered as the oldest and most prestigious sanctuary in the western Islamic world.[240]
This part of Islamic territory has had independent governments during most of Islamic history. The Idrisid were the first Arab rulers in the western Maghreb (Morocco), ruling from 788 to 985. The dynasty is named after its first sultan Idris I.[241]
The Almoravid dynasty was a Berber dynasty from the Sahara flourished over a wide area of North-Western Africa and the Iberian Peninsula during the 11th century. Under this dynasty the Moorish empire was extended over present-day Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania, Gibraltar, Tlemcen (in Algeria) and a part of what is now Senegal and Mali in the south, and Spain and Portugal in the north.[242]
The Almohad Dynasty or "the Unitarians", were a Berber Muslim religious power which founded the fifth Moorish dynasty in the 12th century, and conquered all Northern Africa as far as Egypt, together with Al-Andalus.[243]
Horn of Africa
[edit]
The history of Islam in the Horn of Africa is almost as old as the faith itself. Through extensive trade and social interactions with their converted Muslim trading partners on the other side of the Red Sea, in the Arabian peninsula, merchants and sailors in the Horn region gradually came under the influence of the new religion.[244]
Early Islamic disciples fled to the port city of Zeila in modern-day northern Somalia to seek protection from the Quraysh at the court of the Emperor of Aksum. Some of the Muslims that were granted protection are said to have then settled in several parts of the Horn region to promote the religion. The victory of the Muslims over the Quraysh in the 7th century had a significant impact on local merchants and sailors, as their trading partners in Arabia had by then all adopted Islam, and the major trading routes in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea came under the sway of the Muslim Caliphs. Instability in the Arabian peninsula saw further migrations of early Muslim families to the Somali seaboard. These clans came to serve as catalysts, forwarding the faith to large parts of the Horn region.[244]
East African coast
[edit]
Islam came to the Swahili coast and South Eastern Africa along existing trade routes.[245] They learned from them the manners of the Muslims and this led to their conversion by the Muslim Arabs.
Local Islamic governments centered in Tanzania (then Zanzibar). The people of Zayd were Muslims that immigrated to the region. In the pre-colonial period, the structure of Islamic authority here was held up through the Ulema (wanawyuonis, in Swahili language). These leaders had some degree of authority over most of the Muslims in South East Africa before territorial boundaries were established. The chief Qadi there was recognized for having the final religious authority.[246]
West Africa
[edit]This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (March 2025) |
East Asia
[edit]Indian subcontinent
[edit]
On the Indian subcontinent, Islam first appeared in the southwestern tip of the peninsula, in today's Kerala state. Arabs traded with Malabar even before the birth of Muhammad. Native legends say that a group of Sahaba, under Malik Ibn Deenar, arrived on the Malabar Coast and preached Islam. According to that legend, the first mosque of India was built by Second Chera King Cheraman Perumal, who accepted Islam and received the name Tajudheen. Historical records suggest that the Cheraman Perumal Mosque was built in around 629.[247]
Islamic rule first came to the Indian subcontinent in the 8th century, when Muhammad bin Qasim conquered Sindh, though this was a short-lived consolidation of Indian territory. Islamic conquests expanded under Mahmud of Ghazni in the 12th century CE, resulting in the establishment of the Ghaznavid Empire in the Indus River basin and the subsequent prominence of Lahore as an eastern bastion of Ghaznavid culture and rule. Ghaznavid rule was eclipsed by the Ghurid Empire of Muhammad of Ghor and Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad, whose domain under the conquests of Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khalji extended until the Bengal, where Indian Islamic missionaries achieved their greatest success in terms of dawah and number of converts to Islam.[248][249][page needed] Qutb-ud-din Aybak conquered Delhi in 1206 and began the reign of the Delhi Sultanate,[250] a successive series of dynasties that synthesized Indian civilization with the wider commercial and cultural networks of Africa and Eurasia, greatly increased demographic and economic growth in India and deterred Mongol incursion into the prosperous Indo-Gangetic plain and enthroned one of the few female Muslim rulers, Razia Sultana.
Many prominent sultanates and emirates administered various regions of the Indian subcontinent from the 13th to the 16th centuries, such as the Qutb Shahi, Gujarat, Kashmir, Bengal, Bijapur and Bahmani Sultanates, but none rivaled the power and extensive reach of the Mughal Empire at its zenith.[251] The Bengal Sultanate in particular was a major global trading nation in the world, described by the Europeans to be the "richest country to trade with",[252] while the Shah Mir dynasty ensured the gradual conversion of Kashmiris to Islam.
Persian culture, art, language, cuisine and literature grew in prominence in India due to Islamic administration and the immigration of soldiers, bureaucrats, merchants, Sufis, artists, poets, teachers and architects from Iran and Central Asia, resulting in the early development of Indo-Persian culture.
Southeast Asia
[edit]
Islam first reached Maritime Southeast Asia through traders from Mecca in the 7th century,[127] particularly via the western part of what is now Indonesia. Arab traders from Yemen already had a presence in Asia through trading and travelling by sea, serving as intermediary traders to and from Europe and Africa. They traded not only Arabian goods but also goods from Africa, India, and so on which included ivory, fragrances, spices, and gold.[253]
According to T. W. Arnold in The Preaching of Islam, by the 2nd century of the Islamic calendar, Arab traders had been trading with the inhabitants of Ceylon, modern-day Sri Lanka. The same argument has been told by Dr. B.H. Burger and Dr. Mr. Prajudi in Sedjarah Ekonomis Sosiologis Indonesia (History of Socio Economic of Indonesia).[254] According to an atlas created by the geographer Al-Biruni (973–1048), the Indian or Indonesian Ocean used to be called the Persian Ocean. After Western Imperialist rule, this name was changed to reflect the name used today; the Indian Ocean.[255]
Soon, many Sufi missionaries translated classical Sufi literature from Arabic and Persian into Malay; a tangible product of this is the Jawi script. Coupled with the composing of original Islamic literature in Malay, this led the way to the transformation of Malay into an Islamic language.[256] By 1292, when Marco Polo visited Sumatra, most of the inhabitants had converted to Islam. The Sultanate of Malacca was founded on the Malay Peninsula by Parameswara, a Srivijayan Prince.
Through trade and commerce, Islam then spread to Borneo and Java. By the late 15th century, Islam had been introduced to the Philippines via the southern island of Mindanao.[257] The foremost[citation needed] socio-cultural Muslim entities that resulted from this are the Sultanate of Sulu and Sultanate of Maguindanao; Islamised kingdoms in the northern Luzon island, such as the Kingdom of Maynila and the Kingdom of Tondo, were later conquered and Christianised with the majority of the archipelago by Spanish colonisers beginning in the 16th century.
As Islam spread, societal changes developed from the individual conversions, and five centuries later it emerged as a dominant cultural and political power in the region. Three main Muslim political powers emerged. The Aceh Sultanate was the most important, controlling much of the area between Southeast Asia and India from its centre in northern Sumatra. The Sultanate also attracted Sufi poets. The second Muslim power was the Sultanate of Malacca on the Malay Peninsula. The Sultanate of Demak on Java was the third power, where the emerging Muslim forces defeated the local Majapahit kingdom in the early 16th century.[258] Although the sultanate managed to expand its territory somewhat, its rule remained brief.[127]
Portuguese forces captured Malacca in 1511 under naval general Afonso de Albuquerque. With Malacca subdued, the Aceh Sultanate and Bruneian Empire established themselves as centres of Islam in Southeast Asia. The Sultanate's territory, although vastly diminished, remains intact to this day as the modern state of Brunei Darussalam.[127]
China
[edit]
In China, four Sahabas (Sa'ad ibn abi Waqqas, Wahb Abu Kabcha, Jafar ibn Abu Talib and Jahsh ibn Riyab) preached in 616/17 and onwards after following the Chittagong–Kamrup (Sylhet)–Manipur route after sailing from Abyssinia in 615/16. After conquering Persia in 636, Sa'ad ibn abi Waqqas went with Sa'id ibn Zaid, Qais ibn Sa'd and Hassan ibn Thabit to China in 637 taking the complete Quran. Sa'ad ibn abi Waqqas headed for China for the third time in 650–51 after Caliph Uthman asked him to lead an embassy to China, which the Chinese emperor received.[259]
Early Modern period
[edit]In the 15th and 16th centuries three major Muslim empires formed: the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia, the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa; the Safavid Empire in Greater Iran; and the Mughal Empire in South Asia. These imperial powers were made possible by the discovery and exploitation of gunpowder and more efficient administration.[260]
Ottoman Empire
[edit]
According to Ottoman historiography, the legitimation of a ruler is attributed to Sheikh Edebali who interpreted a dream of Osman Gazi as God's legitimation of his reign.[261] Since Murad I's conquest of Edirne in 1362, the caliphate was claimed by the Turkish sultans of the empire.[262] During the period of Ottoman growth, claims on caliphal authority were recognized in 1517 as Selim I became the "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques" in Mecca and Medina through the conquering and unification of Muslim lands, strengthening their claim to the caliphate in the Muslim world.[263]
The Seljuq Turks declined in the second half of the 13th century, after the Mongol invasion of Anatolia.[264] This resulted in the establishment of multiple Turkish principalities, known as beyliks. Osman I, the founder of the Ottoman dynasty, assumed leadership of one of these principalities (Söğüt) at the end of the 13th century, succeeding his father Ertuğrul. Osman I afterwards led it in a series of battles with the Byzantine Empire.[265] By 1331, the Ottoman Turks had captured Nicaea, the former Byzantine capital, under the leadership of Osman's son and successor, Orhan I.[266] Victory at the Battle of Kosovo against the Serbian Empire in 1389 then facilitated their expansion into Europe. The Ottomans were established in the Balkans and Anatolia by the time Bayezid I ascended to power in the same year, now at the helm of a growing empire.[267]

Growth halted when Mongol warlord Timur (also known as "Tamerlane") captured Bayezid I in the Battle of Ankara in 1402, beginning the Ottoman Interregnum. This episode was characterized by the division of the Ottoman territory amongst Bayezid I's sons, who submitted to Timurid authority. When a number of Ottoman territories regained independent status, ruin for the Empire loomed. However, the empire recovered as the youngest son of Bayezid I, Mehmed I, waged offensive campaigns against his ruling brothers, thereby reuniting Asia Minor and declaring himself sultan in 1413.[127] Around 1512 the Ottoman naval fleet developed under the rule of Selim I,[268] such that the Ottoman Turks were able to challenge the Republic of Venice, a naval power which established its thalassocracy alongside the other Italian maritime republics upon the Mediterranean Region.[269] They also attempted to reconquer the Balkans. By the time of Mehmed I's grandson, Mehmed II (ruled 1444–1446; 1451–1481), the Ottomans could lay siege to Constantinople, the capital of Byzantium. A factor in this siege was the use of muskets and large cannons introduced by the Ottomans. The Byzantine fortress succumbed in 1453, after 54 days of siege. Without its capital the Byzantine Empire disintegrated.[127] The future successes of the Ottomans and later empires would depend upon the exploitation of gunpowder.[260]

In the early 16th century, the Shiʿite Safavid dynasty assumed control in Persia under the leadership of Shah Ismail I, defeating the ruling Turcoman federation Aq Qoyunlu (also called the "White Sheep Turkomans") in 1501. The Ottoman sultan Selim I sought to repel Safavid expansion, challenging and defeating them at the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514. Selim I also deposed the ruling Mamluks in Egypt, absorbing their territories in 1517. Suleiman I (nicknamed "Suleiman the Magnificent"), Selim I's successor, took advantage of the diversion of Safavid focus to the Uzbeks on the eastern frontier and recaptured Baghdad, which had fallen under Safavid control. Despite this, Safavid power remained substantial, rivalling the Ottomans. Suleiman I advanced deep into Hungary following the Battle of Mohács in 1526 – reaching as far as the gates of Vienna thereafter, and signed a Franco-Ottoman alliance with Francis I of France against Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire 10 years later. While Suleiman I's rule (1520–1566) is often identified as the apex of Ottoman power, the empire continued to remain powerful and influential until a relative fall in its military strength in the second half of the 18th century.[270][271]
Safavid Empire
[edit]
The Shīʿīte Safavid dynasty rose to power in Tabriz in 1501 and later conquered the rest of Iran.[272] They were of mixed ancestry, originally Kurdish,[273] but during their rule intermarried with Turcomans,[274] Georgians,[275] Circassians,[276][277] and Pontic Greeks.[278] The Safavid dynasty had its origin in the Safavid order of Sufism,[272] while the Iranian population was largely composed by Sunni Muslims.[279] After their defeat at the hands of the Sunni Ottomans at the Battle of Chaldiran, to unite the Persians behind him, Shah Ismail I made conversion mandatory for the largely Sunni population of Iran to the Twelver sect of Shīʿa Islam so that he could get them to fight against the Sunni Ottomans.[280]
This resulted in the Safavid conversion of Iran to Shīʿa Islam. Iranian Zaydis, the largest group amongst the Shīʿa Muslims before the Safavid rule, were also forced to convert to the Twelver denomination of Shīʿa Islam. The Zaydis at that time subscribed to the Hanafi jurisprudence, as did most Sunnis, and there were good relations between them. Abu Hanifah and Zayd ibn Ali were also very good friends.[168][169][170] The Safavid dynasty from Azarbaijan ruled from 1501 to 1736; they established Twelver Shīʿīsm as the official religion of Safavid Iran and united its provinces under a single sovereignty, thereby reigniting the Persian identity.[281][282]

In 1524, Tahmasp I acceded to the throne, initiating a revival of the arts. Carpetmaking became a major industry. The tradition of Persian miniature painting in manuscripts reached its peak, until Tahmasp turned to strict religious observance in middle age, prohibiting the consumption of alcohol and hashish and removing casinos, taverns, and brothels. Tahmasp's nephew Ibrahim Mirza continued to patronize a last flowering of the arts until he was murdered, after which many artists were recruited by the Mughal dynasty.
Tahmasp's grandson, Shah Abbas I, restored the shrine of the eighth Twelver Shīʿīte Imam, Ali al-Ridha at Mashhad, and restored the dynastic shrine at Ardabil. Both shrines received jewelry, fine manuscripts, and Chinese porcelains. Abbas moved the capital to Isfahan, revived old ports, and established thriving trade with Europeans. Amongst Abbas' most visible cultural achievements was the construction of Naqsh-e Jahan Square ("Design of the World"). The plaza, located near a Friday mosque, covered 20 acres (81,000 m2).[283] The Safavid dynasty was toppled in 1722 by the Hotaki dynasty, which ended their forceful conversion of Sunni areas to Twelver Shīʿīsm.
Mughal Empire
[edit]
Mughal Empire was a power that comprised almost all of South Asia, founded in 1526. It was established and ruled by the Timurid dynasty, with Turco-Mongol Chagatai roots from Central Asia, claiming direct descent from both Genghis Khan (through his son Chagatai Khan) and Timur,[284][285][286] and with significant Indian and Persian ancestry through marriage alliances;[287][288] the first two Mughal emperors had both parents of Central Asian ancestry, while successive emperors were of predominantly Indo-Persian ancestry.[289] The dynasty was Indo-Persian in culture,[290] combining Persianate culture[291][292] with local Indian cultural influences[290] visible in its court culture and administrative customs.[293]
The beginning of the empire is conventionally dated to the victory by its founder Babur over Ibrahim Lodi, the last ruler of the Delhi Sultanate, in the First Battle of Panipat (1526). During the reign of Humayun, the successor of Babur, the empire was briefly interrupted by the Sur Empire established by Sher Shah Suri, who re-established the Grand Trunk Road across the northern Indian subcontinent, initiated the rupee currency system and developed much of the foundations of the effective administration of Mughal rule. The "classic period" of the Mughal Empire began in 1556, with the ascension of Akbar to the throne. Some Rajput kingdoms continued to pose a significant threat to the Mughal dominance of northwestern India, but most of them were subdued by Akbar. All Mughal emperors were Muslims; Akbar, however, propounded a syncretic religion in the latter part of his life called Dīn-i Ilāhī, as recorded in historical books like Ain-i-Akbari and Dabistān-i Mazāhib.[294] The Mughal Empire did not try to intervene in native societies during most of its existence, rather co-opting and pacifying them through concilliatory administrative practices[295][296] and a syncretic, inclusive ruling elite,[297] leading to more systematic, centralized and uniform rule.[298] Traditional and newly coherent social groups in northern and western India, such as the Marathas, the Rajputs, the Pashtuns, the Hindu Jats and the Sikhs, gained military and governing ambitions during Mughal rule which, through collaboration or adversity, gave them both recognition and military experience.[299][300][301][302]

The reign of Shah Jahan (1628–1658) represented the height of Mughal architecture, with famous monuments such as the Taj Mahal, Moti Masjid, Red Fort, Jama Masjid and Lahore Fort being constructed during his reign.
The sharia reign of Muhammad Auranzgeb witnessed the establishment of the Fatawa-e-Alamgiri.[303][304] Muslim India became the world's largest economy, valued 25% of world GDP.[305] Its richest province, Bengal Subah, which was a world leading economy and had better conditions than 18th century Western Europe, showed signs of the Industrial Revolution, through the emergence of the period of proto-industrialization.[citation needed] Numerous conflicts such as the Anglo-Mughal War were also witnessed.[306][307]
After the death of Aurangzeb, which marks the end of Medieval India and beginning of the European colonialism in India, internal dissatisfaction arose due to the weakness of the empire's administrative and economic systems, leading to its break-up and declarations of independence of its former provinces by the Nawab of Bengal, the Nawab of Awadh, the Nizam of Hyderabad, the major economic and military power known as Kingdom of Mysore ruled by Tipu Sultan and other small states. In 1739, the Mughals were crushingly defeated in the Battle of Karnal by the forces of Nader Shah, the founder of the Afsharid dynasty in Persia, and Delhi was sacked and looted, drastically accelerating their decline.
In 1757, the East India Company overtook Bengal Subah at the Battle of Plassey. By the mid-18th century, the Marathas had routed Mughal armies and won over several Mughal provinces from the Punjab to Bengal.[308]
Tipu Sultan's Kingdom of Mysore based in South India, which witnessed partial establishment of sharia based economic and military policies i.e. Fathul Mujahidin, replaced Bengal ruled by the Nawabs of Bengal as South Asia's foremost economic territory.[309][310] The Anglo-Mysore Wars were fought between Hyder Ali, his son Tipu and their French allies, including Napoleon Bonaparte, and the East India Company. Rocket artillery and the world's first iron-cased rockets, the Mysorean rockets, were used during the war and the Jihad based Fathul Mujahidin was compiled.
During the following century Mughal power had become severely limited, and the last emperor, Bahadur Shah II, had authority over only the city of Shahjahanabad. Bahadur issued a firman supporting the Indian Rebellion of 1857. Consequent to the rebellion's defeat he was tried by the East India Company authorities for treason, imprisoned, and exiled to Rangoon.[311] The last remnants of the empire were formally taken over by the British, and the British parliament passed the Government of India Act to enable the Crown formally to nationalize the East India Company and assume direct control of India in the form of the new British Raj.
Modern period
[edit]Ottoman Empire partition
[edit]
By the end of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire had declined. The decision to back Germany in World War I meant they shared the Central Powers' defeat in that war. The defeat led to the overthrow of the Ottomans by Turkish nationalists led by the victorious general of the Battle of Gallipoli: Mustafa Kemal, who became known to his people as Atatürk, "Father of the Turks." Atatürk was credited with renegotiating the treaty of Sèvres (1920) which ended Turkey's involvement in the war and establishing the modern Republic of Turkey, which was recognized by the Allies in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Atatürk went on to implement an ambitious program of modernization that emphasized economic development and secularization. He transformed Turkish culture to reflect European laws, adopted Arabic numerals, the Latin script, separated the religious establishment from the state, and emancipated woman—even giving them the right to vote in parallel with women's suffrage in the west.[312]
During the First World War, the Allies cooperated with Arab partisans against the Ottoman Empire, both groups being united in opposition to a common enemy. The most prominent example of this was during the Arab Revolt, when the British, led by secret intelligence agent T. E. Lawrence—better known as "Lawrence of Arabia" cooperated with Arab guerillas against the Ottoman forces, eventually securing the withdrawal of all Ottoman troops from the region by 1918. Following the end of the war, the vast majority of former Ottoman territory outside of Asia Minor was handed over to the victorious European powers as protectorates. However, many Arabs were left dismayed by the Balfour Declaration, which directly contradicted the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence publicized only a year earlier.[313] Ottoman successor states include today's Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Egypt, Greece, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, Balkan states, North Africa and the north shore of the Black Sea.[314]
Arab–Israeli conflict
[edit]The Arab–Israeli conflict spans about a century of political tensions and open hostilities. It involves the establishment of the modern State of Israel as a Jewish nation state, the consequent displacement of the Palestinian people and Jewish exodus from Arab and Muslim countries, as well as the adverse relationship between the Arab world and the State of Israel (see: Israeli–Palestinian conflict). Despite at first involving only the Arab states bordering Israel, animosity has also developed between Israel and other predominantly Muslim-majority countries.
The State of Israel came into existence on 14 May 1948 as a polity to serve as the homeland for the Jewish people. It was also defined in its declaration of independence as a "Jewish state", a term that also appeared in the United Nations Partition Plan for British Palestine in 1947. The related term of "Jewish and democratic state" dates from a 1992 legislation by Israel's Knesset.
The Six-Day War of 5–10 June 1967, was fought between Israel and the neighbouring states of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The Arab countries closed the Suez Canal and it was followed in May 1970 by the closure of the "tapline" from Saudi Arabia through Syria to Lebanon. These developments had the effect of increasing the importance of petroleum in Libya, which is a short (and canal-free) shipping distance from Europe. In 1970, Occidental Petroleum broke with other oil companies and accepted the Arab demands for price increases.
In October 1973, a new war between Israel and its Muslim neighbours, known as the Yom Kippur War, broke out just as the oil companies began meeting with the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). Its leaders had been emboldened by the success of Sadat's campaigns and the war strengthened their unity. In response to the emergency resupply effort by the Western Bloc that enabled Israel to put up a resistance against the Egyptian and Syrian forces, the Arab world imposed the 1973 oil embargo against the United States and Western Europe. Faisal agreed that Saudi Arabia would use some of its oil wealth to finance the "front-line states", those that bordered Israel, in their struggle. The centrality of petroleum, the Arab–Israeli conflict, political and economic instability, and uncertainty about the future remain constant features of the politics of the region.
Many countries, individuals, and non-governmental organizations elsewhere in the world feel involved in this conflict for reasons such as cultural and religious ties with Islam, Arab culture, Christianity, Judaism, Jewish culture, or for ideological, human rights, or strategic reasons. Although some consider the Arab–Israeli conflict a part of (or a precursor to) a wider clash of civilizations between the Western world and the Muslim world,[315][316] others oppose this view.[317] Animosity emanating from this conflict has caused numerous attacks on supporters (or perceived supporters) of each side by supporters of the other side in many countries around the world.
Other Islamic affairs
[edit]In 1979 the Iranian revolution transformed Iran from a constitutional monarchy to a populist theocratic Islamic republic under the rule of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a Shi'i Muslim cleric and marja. Following the Revolution, a new constitution was approved and a referendum established the government, electing Ruhollah Khomeini as Supreme Leader. During the following two years, liberals, leftists, and Islamic groups fought each other, and the Islamics captured power.
The development of the two opposite fringes, the Safavid conversion of Iran to Shia Islam, the Twelver Shia version, and its reinforcement by the Iranian revolution and the Salafi in Saudi Arabia, coupled with the Iran–Saudi Arabia relations resulted in these governments using sectarian conflict to enhance their political interests.[318][319] Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (despite being hostile to Iraq) encouraged Saddam Hussein to invade Iran,[320] which resulted in the Iran–Iraq War, as they feared that an Islamic revolution would take place within their own borders. Certain Iranian exiles also helped convince Saddam that if he invaded, the fledgling Islamic republic would quickly collapse.
See also
[edit]- Decline and modernization of the Ottoman Empire
- Education in Islam
- History of homosexuality in the Muslim world
- History of the Quran
- History of slavery in the Muslim world
- Islam and democracy
- Islam and modernity
- Islam and secularism
- Islam and violence
- Islam and war
- Islam by country
- Islamic art
- Islamic attitudes towards science
- Islamic culture
- Islamic eschatology
- Islamic philosophy
- Islamic schools and branches
- Islamism
- List of Muslim military leaders
- List of Muslim states and dynasties
- Political aspects of Islam
- Political philosophy of the Islamic Golden Age
- Political quietism in Islam
- Pre-Islamic Arabia
- Religion in pre-Islamic Arabia
- Sectarian violence among Muslims
- Transformation of the Ottoman Empire
References
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ "Key themes in these early recitations include the idea of the moral responsibility of man who was created by God and the idea of the judgment to take place on the day of resurrection. [...] Another major theme of Muhammad's early preaching, [... is that] there is a power greater than man's, and that the wise will acknowledge this power and cease their greed and suppression of the poor."[8]
- ^ "At first Muhammad met with no serious opposition [...] He was only gradually led to attack on principle the gods of Mecca. [...] Meccan merchants then discovered that a religious revolution might be dangerous to their fairs and their trade."[8]
- ^ The name Mansuriyya means "the victorious", after its founder Ismāʿīl Abu Tahir Ismail Billah, called al-Mansur, "the victor."[176]
Citations
[edit]- ^ Watt, W. Montgomery (1998). Islam and the Integration of Society. Psychology Press. p. 5. ISBN 978-0-415-17587-6.
- ^ a b c d e f g h van Ess, Josef (2017). "Setting the Seal on Prophecy". Theology and Society in the Second and Third Centuries of the Hijra, Volume 1: A History of Religious Thought in Early Islam. Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 1: The Near and Middle East. Vol. 116/1. Translated by O'Kane, John. Leiden: Brill. pp. 3–7. doi:10.1163/9789004323384_002. ISBN 978-90-04-32338-4. ISSN 0169-9423.
- ^ a b c d e f Zimney, Michelle (2009). "Introduction – What Is Islam?". In Campo, Juan E. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Islam. Encyclopedia of World Religions. New York: Facts on File. pp. xxi–xxxii. ISBN 978-0-8160-5454-1.
- ^ Esposito, John L. (2016) [1988]. Islam: The Straight Path (5th ed.). Oxford University Press. pp. 9–12. ISBN 978-0-19-063215-1. S2CID 153364691.
- ^ a b c d Donner, Fred M. (2000) [1999]. "Muhammad and the Caliphate: Political History of the Islamic Empire Up to the Mongol Conquest". In Esposito, John L. (ed.). The Oxford History of Islam. Oxford University Press. pp. 5–10. ISBN 0-19-510799-3.
- ^ Peters, F. E. (2003). Islam: A Guide for Jews and Christians. Princeton University Press. p. 9. ISBN 978-0-691-11553-5.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Lewis, Bernard (1995). "Part III: The Dawn and Noon of Islam – Origins". The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years. New York: Scribner. pp. 51–58. ISBN 978-0-684-83280-7.
- ^ a b Buhl, F.; Ehlert, Trude; Noth, A.; Schimmel, Annemarie; Welch, A. T. (2012) [1993]. "Muḥammad". In Bearman, P. J.; Bianquis, Th.; Bosworth, C. E.; van Donzel, E. J.; Heinrichs, W. P. (eds.). Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd ed.). Leiden: Brill. pp. 360–376. doi:10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0780. ISBN 978-90-04-16121-4.
- ^ Campo (2009), "Muhammad", Encyclopedia of Islam, p. 494
- ^ Ramadan, Tariq (2007). In the Footsteps of the Prophet: Lessons from the Life of Muhammad. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 178. ISBN 978-0-19-530880-8.
- ^ Husayn Haykal, Muhammad (2008). The Life of Muhammad. Selangor: Islamic Book Trust. pp. 438–441. ISBN 978-983-9154-17-7.
- ^ Hitti, Philip Khuri (1946). History of the Arabs. London: Macmillan. p. 118.
- ^ Ramadan, Tariq (2007). In the Footsteps of the Prophet: Lessons from the Life of Muhammad. Oxford University Press. p. 177. ISBN 978-0-19-530880-8.
- ^ Richard Foltz, "Internationalization of Islam", Encarta Historical Essays.
- ^ a b c Polk, William R. (2018). "The Caliphate and the Conquests". Crusade and Jihad: The Thousand-Year War Between the Muslim World and the Global North. The Henry L. Stimson Lectures Series. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. pp. 21–30. doi:10.2307/j.ctv1bvnfdq.7. ISBN 978-0-300-22290-6. JSTOR j.ctv1bvnfdq.7.
- ^ a b Izutsu, Toshihiko (2006) [1965]. "The Infidel (Kāfir): The Khārijites and the origin of the problem". The Concept of Belief in Islamic Theology: A Semantic Analysis of Imān and Islām. Tokyo: Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies at Keio University. pp. 1–20. ISBN 983-9154-70-2.
- ^ a b c Lewis, Bernard (1995). "Cross-Sections – The State". The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years. New York: Scribner. p. 139. ISBN 978-0-684-83280-7.
- ^ Nanda, J. N (2005). Bengal: the unique state. Concept Publishing Company. p. 10. 2005. ISBN 978-81-8069-149-2.
Bengal [...] was rich in the production and export of grain, salt, fruit, liquors and wines, precious metals and ornaments besides the output of its handlooms in silk and cotton. Europe referred to Bengal as the richest country to trade with.
- ^ Imperato, Pascal James; Imperato, Gavin H. (25 April 2008). Historical Dictionary of Mali. Scarecrow. p. 201. ISBN 978-0-8108-6402-3.
- ^ Julie Taylor, Muslims in Medieval Italy: The Colony at Lucera, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 18.
- ^ Davis, Ian, ed. (2018). "SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security – V. Armed conflict in the Middle East and North Africa" (PDF). SIPRI Yearbook. Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. pp. 66–82. ISSN 0953-0282. Archived (PDF) from the original on 25 January 2023. Retrieved 14 January 2025.
- ^ Sampler & Eigner (2008). Sand to Silicon: Going Global. United Arab Emirates: Motivate. p. 15. ISBN 978-1-86063-254-9.
- ^ "International – U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)". eia.gov.
- ^ Vansina (1985)
- ^ Donner 2010, p. 628.
- ^ Borrut A., "From Arabia to the Empire - conquest and caliphal construction in early Islam", in The Historians' Quran , vol. 1 , 2019, pp. 249-289
- ^ Robinson 2010, p. 6.
- ^ Robinson 2010, pp. 4–5.
- ^ Under the Umayyad caliph ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Marwān, the Dome of the Rock was built in Jerusalem (691–692). There the word Islām appears for the first time. Until this moment the Muslims called themselves simply "believers", and coins were minted in the Arabic empire showing Christian symbols. Ibn Marwān also plays a major role in the reworking of the Quranic text. See: Patricia Crone / Michael Cook: Hagarism (1977) p. 29; Yehuda D. Nevo: Crossroads to Islam: The Origins of the Arab Religion and the Arab State (2003) pp. 410-413; Karl-Heinz Ohlig (Hrsg.): Der frühe Islam. Eine historisch-kritische Rekonstruktion anhand zeitgenössischer Quellen (2007) pp. 336 ff.
- ^ Donner 2010, pp. 629, 633.
- ^ Donner 2010, p. 630.
- ^ Donner 2010, p. 631.
- ^ Donner 2010, p. 632.
- ^ Donner 2010, p. 633.
- ^ Donner, "Quran in Recent Scholarship", 2008: p.30
- ^ Holland, In the Shadow of the Sword, 2012: p.45
- ^ Donner, "Quran in Recent Scholarship", 2008: p.29
- ^ a b c Robinson 2010, p. 9.
- ^ a b c d Christian Julien Robin (2012). Arabia and Ethiopia. In The Oxford Handbook of Late Antiquity. OUP USA. p. 302. ISBN 978-0-19-533693-1.
- ^ Christian Julien Robin (2012). Arabia and Ethiopia. In The Oxford Handbook of Late Antiquity. OUP USA. pp. 297–99. ISBN 978-0-19-533693-1.
- ^ a b c Rubin, Uri (2006). "Ḥanīf". In McAuliffe, Jane Dammen (ed.). Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān. Vol. II. Leiden: Brill Publishers. doi:10.1163/1875-3922_q3_EQCOM_00080. ISBN 978-90-04-14743-0.
- ^ a b Rogerson 2010.
- ^ a b Christian Julien Robin (2012). Arabia and Ethiopia. In The Oxford Handbook of Late Antiquity. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. p. 301. ISBN 978-0-19-533693-1.
- ^ Irving M. Zeitlin (19 March 2007). The Historical Muhammad. Polity. p. 49. ISBN 978-0-7456-3999-4.
- ^ Lester, Toby (1 January 1999). "What Is the Koran?". The Atlantic. Washington, D.C. ISSN 2151-9463. OCLC 936540106. Archived from the original on 25 August 2012. Retrieved 16 May 2022.
- ^ Peters, F. E. (1994). Muhammad and the Origins of Islam. SUNY series in Near Eastern Studies. Albany, New York: SUNY Press. pp. 68–75. ISBN 9780791418758. Retrieved 4 November 2023.
- ^ "The very first question a biographer has to ask, namely when the person was born, cannot be answered precisely for Muhammad. [...] Muhammad's biographers usually make him 40 or sometimes 43 years old at the time of his call to be a prophet, which [...] would put the year of his birth at about 570 A.D." F. Buhl & A.T. Welch, Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd ed., "Muhammad", vol. 7, p. 361.
- ^ Christian Julien Robin (2012). Arabia and Ethiopia. In The Oxford Handbook of Late Antiquity. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. p. 287. ISBN 978-0-19-533693-1.
- ^ Bleeker 1968, p. 32-34.
- ^ Sally Mallam, The Community of Believers
- ^ "Key themes in these early recitations include the idea of the moral responsibility of man who was created by God and the idea of the judgment to take place on the day of resurrection. [...] Another major theme of Muhammad's early preaching, [... is that] there is a power greater than man's, and that the wise will acknowledge this power and cease their greed and suppression of the poor." F. Buhl & A.T. Welch, Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd ed., "Muhammad", vol. 7, p. 363.
- ^ "At first Muhammad met with no serious opposition [...] He was only gradually led to attack on principle the gods of Mecca. [...] Meccan merchants then discovered that a religious revolution might be dangerous to their fairs and their trade." F. Buhl & A.T. Welch, Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd ed., "Muhammad", vol. 7, p. 364.
- ^ Robinson 2010, p. 187.
- ^ a b c d e Albert Hourani (2002). A History of the Arab Peoples. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. pp. 15–19. ISBN 978-0-674-01017-8.
- ^ W. Montgomery Watt (1956). Muhammad at Medina. Oxford at the Clarendon Press. pp. 1–17, 192–221.
- ^ For example, Maududi, the leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami organization, was one of the leading representatives of this view. According to Maududi, one of the purposes of sending prophets was the establishment of a state governed by divine laws (Maududi, 2006: 73) https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/1319648
- ^ It is not possible to find a verse that signifies any other characteristic of Muhammad rather than his prophethood and gives him the right of coercion explicitly, which is one of the essential requirements of ruling. The dilemma of the view that claims that Muhammad was given the task of establishing a state in addition to his duty of notification begins at this point. If Muhammad was given the duty of establishing a state by divine power, the privilege of using force on his followers should also have been given (Dabashi, 1989: 37-38).https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/1319648
- ^ "Hadith 7, 40 Hadith an-Nawawi - Forty Hadith of an-Nawawi - Sunnah.com - Sayings and Teachings of Prophet Muhammad (صلى الله عليه و سلم)". sunnah.com.
- ^ a b Poston, Larry (1992). "Daʻwah in the East: The Expansion of Islam from the First to the Twelfth Century, A.D.". Islamic Daʻwah in the West: Muslim Missionary Activity and the Dynamics of Conversion to Islam. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 11–12. ISBN 978-0-19-507227-3. OCLC 133165051.
- ^ Pakatchi, Ahmad; Ahmadi, Abuzar (2017). "Caliphate". In Madelung, Wilferd; Daftary, Farhad (eds.). Encyclopaedia Islamica. Translated by Asatryan, Mushegh. Leiden and Boston: Brill Publishers. doi:10.1163/1875-9831_isla_COM_05000066. ISSN 1875-9823.
- ^ Foody, Kathleen (September 2015). Jain, Andrea R. (ed.). "Interiorizing Islam: Religious Experience and State Oversight in the Islamic Republic of Iran". Journal of the American Academy of Religion. 83 (3). Oxford: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Academy of Religion: 599–623. doi:10.1093/jaarel/lfv029. eISSN 1477-4585. ISSN 0002-7189. JSTOR 24488178. LCCN sc76000837. OCLC 1479270.
For Shiʿi Muslims, Muhammad not only designated ʿAlī as his friend, but appointed him as his successor—as the "lord" or "master" of the new Muslim community. ʿAlī and his descendants would become known as the Imams, divinely guided leaders of the Shiʿi communities, sinless, and granted special insight into the Qurʾanic text. The theology of the Imams that developed over the next several centuries made little distinction between the authority of the Imams to politically lead the Muslim community and their spiritual prowess; quite to the contrary, their right to political leadership was grounded in their special spiritual insight. While in theory, the only just ruler of the Muslim community was the Imam, the Imams were politically marginal after the first generation. In practice, Shiʿi Muslims negotiated varied approaches to both interpretative authority over Islamic texts and governance of the community, both during the lifetimes of the Imams themselves and even more so following the disappearance of the twelfth and final Imam in the ninth century.
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- ^ a b c Albert Hourani (2002). A History of the Arab Peoples. Harvard University Press. pp. 22–23. ISBN 978-0-674-01017-8.
- ^ "The immediate outcome of the Muslim victories was turmoil. Medina's victories led allied tribes to attack the non-aligned to compensate for their own losses. The pressure drove tribes [...] across the imperial frontiers. The Bakr tribe, which had defeated a Persian detachment in 606, joined forces with the Muslims and led them on a raid in southern Iraq [...] A similar spilling over of tribal raiding occurred on the Syrian frontiers. Abu Bakr encouraged these movements [...] What began as inter-tribal skirmishing to consolidate a political confederation in Arabia ended as a full-scale war against the two empires."Lapidus (2002, p. 32)
- ^ "In dealing with captured leaders Abu Bakr showed great clemency, and many became active supporters of the cause of Islam." W. Montgomery Watt, Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd ed., "Abu Bakr", vol. 1, p. 110. "Umar's subsequent decision (reversing the exclusionary policy of Abu Bakr) to allow those tribes which had rebelled during the course of the Ridda wars and been subdued to participate in the expanding incursions into and attacks on the Fertile Crescent [...] incorporated the defeated Arabs into the polity as Muslims." Berkey (2003, p. 71)
- ^ [N]on-Muslim sources allow us to perceive an additional advantage, namely, that Arabs had been serving in the armies of Byzantium and Persia long before Islam; they had acquired valuable training in the weaponry and military tactics of the empires and had become to some degree acculturated to their ways. In fact, these sources hint that we should view many in Muhammad's west Arabian coalition, its settled members as well as its nomads, not so much as outsiders seeking to despoil the empires but as insiders trying to grab a share of the wealth of their imperial masters.Hoyland (2014, p. 227)
- ^ Album, Stephen; Bates, Michael L.; Floor, Willem (30 December 2012) [15 December 1992]. "COINS AND COINAGE". Encyclopædia Iranica. Vol. VI/1. New York: Columbia University. pp. 14–41. doi:10.1163/2330-4804_EIRO_COM_7783. ISSN 2330-4804. Archived from the original on 17 May 2015. Retrieved 23 May 2022.
As the Arabs of the Ḥejāz had used the drahms of the Sasanian emperors, the only silver coinage in the world at that time, it was natural for them to leave many of the Sasanian mints in operation, striking coins like those of the emperors in every detail except for the addition of brief Arabic inscriptions like besmellāh in the margins. [...] In the year 79/698 reformed Islamic dirhams with inscriptions and no images replaced the Sasanian types at nearly all mints. During this transitional period in the 690s specifically Muslim inscriptions appeared on the coins for the first time; previously Allāh (God) had been mentioned but not the prophet Moḥammad, and there had been no reference to any Islamic doctrines. Owing to civil unrest (e.g., the revolt of ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān b. Ašʿaṯ, q.v., against Ḥajjāj in 81/701), coins of Sasanian type continued to be issued at certain mints in Fārs, Kermān, and Sīstān, but by 84/703 these mints had either been closed down or converted to production of the new dirhams. The latest known Arab-Sasanian coin, an extraordinary issue, is dated 85/704-05, though some mints in the east, still outside Muslim control, continued producing imitation Arab-Sasanian types for perhaps another century.
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- ^ Esposito (2000, p. 38)
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- ^ R. B. Serjeant (1964). "The Constitution of Medina". Islamic Quarterly. 8: 4.
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- ^ Rahman (1999, p. 40)
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- ^ Schimmel, Annemarie; Barbar Rivolta (Summer, 1992). "Islamic Calligraphy". The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin, New Series 50 (1): 3.
- ^ Iraq a Complicated State: Iraq's Freedom War by Karim M. S. Al-Zubaidi p. 32
- ^ Wilferd Madelung (1998). The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate. Cambridge University Press. p. 232. ISBN 978-0-521-64696-3.
- ^ Bukhari, Sahih. "Sahih Bukhari: Book of "Peacemaking"".
- ^ Holt (1977a, pp. 67–72)
- ^ Roberts, J: History of the World. Penguin, 1994.
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- ^ The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate by Wilferd Madelung. p. 340.
- ^ Encyclopaedic ethnography of Middle-East and Central Asia: A-I, Volume 1 edited by R. Khanam. p. 543
- ^ Islam and Politics John L. Esposito 1998 p. 16
- ^ Islamic Imperial Law: Harun-Al-Rashid's Codification Project by Benjamin Jokisch – 2007 p. 404
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- ^ A Chronology of Islamic History by H. U. Rahman pp. 106, 129
- ^ Voyages in World History by Josef W. Meri p. 248
- ^ Lapidus (2002, p. 56); Lewis (1993, pp. 71–83)
- ^ Blankinship, Khalid Yahya (1994). The End of the Jihad State, the Reign of Hisham Ibn 'Abd-al Malik and the collapse of the Umayyads. State University of New York Press. p. 37. ISBN 978-0-7914-1827-7.
- ^ answering-ansar.org. ch 8. Archived 22 June 2011 at the Wayback Machine
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- ^ Kokab wa Rifi Fazal-e-Ali Karam Allah Wajhu, Page 484, by Syed Mohammed Subh-e-Kashaf AlTirmidhi, Urdu translation by Syed Sharif Hussein Sherwani Sabzawari, Published by Aloom AlMuhammed, number B12 Shadbagh, Lahore, 1 January 1963. p. 484.
- ^ History of the Arab by Philip K Hitti
- ^ History of Islam by prof.Masudul Hasan
- ^ The Empire of the Arabs by sir John Glubb
- ^ In the Al-Andalus (the Iberian Peninsula), North Africa and in the east populations revolted. In A.H. 102 (720–721) in Ifriqiyah, the harsh governor Yazid ibn Muslim was overthrown and Muhammad ibn Yazid, the former governor, restored to power. The caliph accepted this and confirmed Muhammad ibn Yazid as governor of Ifriqiyah.
- ^ *Eggenberger, David (1985). An Encyclopedia of Battles: Accounts of Over 1,560 Battles from 1479 BC. to the Present. Courier Dover Publications. ISBN 0-486-24913-1 p. 3.
- ^ von Ess, "Kadar", Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Ed.
- ^ Theophilus. Quoted Robert Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw It (Darwin Press, 1998), 660
- ^ a b J. Jomier. Islam: Encyclopaedia of Islam Online. accessdate=2007-05-02
- ^ Lewis 1993, p. 84
- ^ Holt 1977a, p. 105
- ^ Holt 1977b, pp. 661–63
- ^ a b c "Abbasid Dynasty", The New Encyclopædia Britannica (2005)
- ^ a b Brague, Rémi (2009). The Legend of the Middle Ages: Philosophical Explorations of Medieval Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. University of Chicago Press. p. 164. ISBN 9780226070803.
Neither were there any Muslims among the Ninth-Century translators. Almost all of them were Christians of various Eastern denominations: Jacobites, Melchites, and, above all, Nestorians... A few others were Sabians.
- ^ Hill, Donald. Islamic Science and Engineering. 1993. Edinburgh Univ. Press. ISBN 0-7486-0455-3, p.4
- ^ Rémi Brague, Assyrians contributions to the Islamic civilization Archived 2013-09-27 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Meri, Josef W. and Jere L. Bacharach. "Medieval Islamic Civilization". Vol. 1 Index A–K. 2006, p. 304.
- ^ "Islam", The New Encyclopædia Britannica (2005)
- ^ a b c d e f g Applied History Research Group. "The Islamic World to 1600". University of Calagary. Archived from the original on 10 April 2007. Retrieved 18 April 2007.
- ^ Andreas Graeser Zenon von Kition: Positionen u. Probleme Walter de Gruyter 1975 ISBN 978-3-11-004673-1 p. 260
- ^ "Islam". Encyclopaedia of Islam Online
- ^ Lapidus 2002, p. 54
- ^ Nasr 2003, p. 121
- ^ Khaddūrī 2002, pp. 21–22
- ^ Abdel Wahab El Messeri. Episode 21: Ibn Rushd, Everything you wanted to know about Islam but was afraid to Ask, Philosophia Islamica.
- ^ Fauzi M. Najjar (Spring, 1996). The debate on Islam and secularism in Egypt, Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ).
- ^ for more, see As-Saffah's Caliphate
- ^ An universal history: from the earliest accounts to the present time, Volume 2 By George Sale, George Psalmanazar, Archibald Bower, George Shelvocke, John Campbell, John Swinton. p. 319
- ^ Chamber's Encyclopaedia: A Dictionary of Universal Knowledge, Volume 5. W. & R. Chambers, 1890. p. 567.
- ^ Johannes P. Schadé (ed.). Encyclopedia of World Religions.
- ^ Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari History volume xxxi, "The War Between Brothers," transl. Michael Fishbein, SUNY, Albany, 1992
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- ^ Lapidus 2002, p. 129
- ^ Thomas Spencer Baynes (1878). The Encyclopædia Britannica: a dictionary of arts, sciences, and general literature. A. and C. Black. p. 578.
- ^ Hindu rebellions in Sindh were put down, and most of Afghanistan was absorbed with the surrender of the leader of Kabul. Mountainous regions of Iran were brought under a tighter grip of the central Abbasid government, as were areas of Turkestan. There were disturbances in Iraq during the first several years of Al-Ma'mun's reign. Egypt continued to be unquiet. Sindh was rebellious, but Ghassan ibn Abbad subdued it. An ongoing problem for Al-Ma'mun was the uprising headed by Babak Khorramdin. In 214 Babak routed a Caliphate army, killing its commander Muhammad ibn Humayd.
- ^ The Mihna subjected traditionalist scholars with social influence and intellectual quality to imprisonment, religious tests, and loyalty oaths. Al-Ma'mun introduced the Mihna with the intention to centralize religious power in the caliphal institution and test the loyalty of his subjects. The Mihna had to be undergone by elites, scholars, judges and other government officials, and consisted of a series of questions relating to theology and faith. The central question was about the state of the creation of the Qur'an: if the person interrogated stated he believed the Qur'an to be created, he was free to leave and continue his profession.
- ^ Had he been victorious over the Byzantine Emperor, Al-Ma'mun would have made a condition of peace be that the emperor hand over of a copy of the "Almagest".
- ^ Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari, History v. 32 "The Reunification of the Abbasid Caliphate," SUNY, Albany, 1987; v. 33 "Storm and Stress along the Northern frontiers of the Abbasid Caliphate," transl. C.E. Bosworth, SUNY, Albany, 1991
- ^ Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari History v. 34 "Incipient Decline," transl. Joel L. Kramer, SUNY, Albany, 1989. ISBN 0-88706-875-8, ISBN 978-0-88706-875-1
- ^ Its minarets were spiraling cones 55 metres (180 ft) high with a spiral ramp, and it had 17 aisles with walls paneled with mosaics of dark blue glass.
- ^ A sum of 120,000 golden pieces was paid for the freedom of the captives.
- ^ Examples of the former include the loss of Mosul in 990, and the loss of Ṭabaristān and Gurgān in 997. An example of the latter is the Kakūyid dynasty of Isfahān, whose fortunes rose with the decline of the Būyids of northern Iran.
- ^ Bowen, Harold (1928). The Life and Times of ʿAlí Ibn ʿÍsà: The Good Vizier. Cambridge University Press. p. 385.
- ^ R. N. Frye (1975). The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume Four: From the Arab Invasion to the Saljuqs. ISBN 0-521-20093-8
- ^ Hanne, Eric, J. (2007). Putting the Caliph in His Place: Power, Authority, and the Late Abbasid Caliphate. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ Press. p. 55. ISBN 978-0-8386-4113-2.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ a b c Muir, William (2000). The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline, and Fall. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-20901-4.
- ^ Jonathan Riley-Smith, The Oxford History of the Crusades, (Oxford University Press, 2002), 213.
- ^ ʻIzz al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, Donald Sidney Richards, The chronicle of Ibn al-Athīr for the crusading period from al-Kāmil fī'l-ta'rīkh: The years 491–541/1097–1146 : the coming of the Franks and the Muslim response.
- ^ Martin Sicker (2000). The Islamic World in Ascendancy: From the Arab Conquests to the Siege of Vienna. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-275-96892-2.
- ^ Richard, Jean (1979). The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. Vol. 1. Translated by Shirley, Janet. North-Holland Publishing Company. p. 36. ISBN 978-0-444-85092-8.
- ^ It is supposed by an emissary of the Hashshashins, who had no love for the Caliph. Modern historians have suspected that Mas'ud instigated the murder although the two most important historians of the period Ibn al-Athir and Ibn al-Jawzi did not speculate on this matter.
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- ^ Paul Salem Bitter Legacy: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World Syracuse University Press, 1994 ISBN 978-0-8156-2629-9 p. 117
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- ^ Sivan, Emmanuel (1990). "Four: The Sunni revolution". Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics. Vail-Ballou Press, Binghamton, N.Y., USA: Yale University Press. pp. 96–98. ISBN 0-300-04914-5.
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While Timur's capital, Samarqand, became a cosmopolitan imperial city that flourished as never before, Iran and Iraq suffered devastation at a greater degree than that caused by the Mongols. [...] Timur's conquests also consciously aimed to restore the Mongol Empire, and the deliberate devastation that accompanied them was a conscious imitation of the Mongol onslaught.
S. Starr, S. Frederick (2014). Lost Enlightenment: Central Asia's Golden Age from the Arab Conquest to Tamerlane. HarperCollins Publishers India. p. 411. ISBN 978-93-5136-186-2.Timur's ceaseless conquests were accompanied by a level of brutality matched only by Chinggis Khan himself. At Isfahan his troops dispatched some 70,000 defenders, while at Delhi his soldiers are reported to have systematically killed 100,000 Indians.
- ^ Kuru, A. T. (2019). Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment: A Global and Historical Comparison. Vereinigtes Königreich: Cambridge University Press. p. 128
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- ^ Stowasser, Karl (1984). "Manners and Customs at the Mamluk Court". Muqarnas. 2 (The Art of the Mamluks). Leiden: Brill Publishers: 13–20. doi:10.2307/1523052. ISSN 0732-2992. JSTOR 1523052. S2CID 191377149.
The Mamluk slave warriors, with an empire extending from Libya to the Euphrates, from Cilicia to the Arabian Sea and the Sudan, remained for the next two hundred years the most formidable power of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean – champions of Sunni orthodoxy, guardians of Islam's holy places, their capital, Cairo, the seat of the Sunni caliph and a magnet for scholars, artists, and craftsmen uprooted by the Mongol upheaval in the East or drawn to it from all parts of the Muslim world by its wealth and prestige. Under their rule, Egypt passed through a period of prosperity and brilliance unparalleled since the days of the Ptolemies. [...] They ruled as a military aristocracy, aloof and almost totally isolated from the native population, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, and their ranks had to be replenished in each generation through fresh imports of slaves from abroad. Only those who had grown up outside Muslim territory and who entered as slaves in the service either of the sultan himself or of one of the Mamluk emirs were eligible for membership and careers within their closed military caste. The offspring of Mamluks were free-born Muslims and hence excluded from the system: they became the awlād al-nās, the "sons of respectable people", who either fulfilled scribal and administrative functions or served as commanders of the non-Mamluk ḥalqa troops. Some two thousand slaves were imported annually: Qipchaq, Azeris, Uzbec Turks, Mongols, Avars, Circassians, Georgians, Armenians, Greeks, Bulgars, Albanians, Serbs, Hungarians.
- ^ a b Ayalon, David (2012) [1991]. "Mamlūk". In Bosworth, C. E.; van Donzel, E. J.; Heinrichs, W. P.; Lewis, B.; Pellat, Ch. (eds.). Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Vol. 6. Leiden: Brill Publishers. doi:10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0657. ISBN 978-90-04-08112-3.
- ^ Poliak, A. N. (2005) [1942]. "The Influence of C̱ẖingiz-Ḵẖān's Yāsa upon the General Organization of the Mamlūk State". In Hawting, Gerald R. (ed.). Muslims, Mongols, and Crusaders: An Anthology of Articles Published in the "Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies". Vol. 10. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 27–41. doi:10.1017/S0041977X0009008X. ISBN 978-0-7007-1393-6. JSTOR 609130. S2CID 155480831.
{{cite book}}:|journal=ignored (help) - ^ Hourani 2003, p. 85
- ^ Kadri, Sadakat (2012). Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law from the Deserts of Ancient Arabia ... macmillan. p. 187. ISBN 978-0-09-952327-7.
- ^ Collins 2004, p. 139
- ^ Hourani 2003, p. 41
- ^ Glubb, John Bagot (1966). The course of empire: The Arabs and their successors. Prentice-Hall. p. 128.
- ^ Glick, Thomas F. (2005). Islamic and Christian Spain in the early Middle Ages. BRILL. p. 102. ISBN 978-90-04-14771-3.
- ^ Luscombe, David Edward; Jonathan Riley-Smith (2004). The new Cambridge medieval history. Cambridge University Press. p. 599. ISBN 978-0-521-41410-4.
- ^ O'Callaghan, Joseph F. (1983). A History of Medieval Spain. Cornell University Press. p. 133. ISBN 978-0-8014-9264-8.
- ^ Constable, Olivia Remie (1997). "The Political Dilemma of a Granadan Ruler". Medieval Iberia: Readings from Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Sources. University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 103. ISBN 978-0-8122-1569-4.
- ^ This was likely because al-Andalus was a land besieged by many different loyalties, and the proclamation of caliph would have likely caused much unrest. Abd al-Rahman's progeny would, however, take up the title of caliph.
- ^ Michael Hamilton Morgan. Lost History: The Enduring Legacy of Muslim Scientists, Thinkers, and Artists. National Geographic Books, 2008.
- ^ The Penny Cyclopædia of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. Vol. 15–16. C. Knight. 1839. pp. 385–.
- ^ PP. M. Holt; Peter Malcolm Holt; Ann K. S. Lambton; Bernard Lewis (21 April 1977). The Cambridge History of Islam. Cambridge University Press. p. 411. ISBN 978-0-521-29137-8.
- ^ Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press.
- ^ Fierro, Maribel (2005). Abd-al-Rahman III of Córdoba. Oxford: Oneworld Publications. ISBN 978-1-85168-384-0.
- ^ Ibn Idhari (1860) [Composed c. 1312]. Al-Bayan al-Mughrib (in Spanish). Vol. 1. Translated by Francisco Fernández y González. Granada: Francisco Ventura y Sabatel. OCLC 557028856.
- ^ Lane-Poole, Stanley (1894). The Mohammedan Dynasties: Chronological and Genealogical Tables with Historical Introductions. Westminster: Archibald Constable and Company. OCLC 1199708.
- ^ "Kairouan Capital of Political Power and Learning in the Ifriqiya". Muslim Heritage. Archived from the original on 2 November 2012. Retrieved 18 February 2010.
- ^ Clifford Edmund Bosworth (2007). Historic Cities of the Islamic World. BRILL. p. 264. ISBN 978-90-04-15388-2.
- ^ Y. Benhima, "The Idrisids (789–974) Archived 10 June 2013 at the Wayback Machine". qantara-med.org, 2008.
- ^ Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). . Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press.
- ^ History of the Almonades, Reinhart Dozy, Second edition, 1881.
- ^ a b "A Country Study: Somalia from The Library of Congress".
- ^ Nicolini, B., & Watson, P.-J. (2004). Makran, Oman, and Zanzibar: Three-terminal cultural corridor in the western Indian Ocean, 1799–1856. Leiden: Brill. p. 35
- ^ Nimtz, August H. Jr. (1980). Islam and Politics in East Aftrica. the Sufi Order in Tanzania. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- ^ "World's second oldest mosque is in India". Bahrain tribune. Archived from the original on 6 July 2006. Retrieved 9 August 2006.
- ^ The preaching of Islam: a history of the propagation of the Muslim faith By Sir Thomas Walker Arnold, pp. 227-228
- ^ Majumdar, Dr. R.C., History of Mediaeval Bengal, First published 1973, Reprint 2006, Tulshi Prakashani, Kolkata, ISBN 81-89118-06-4
- ^ Srivastava, Ashirvadi Lal (1929). The Sultanate Of Delhi 711–1526 AD. Shiva Lal Agarwala & Company.
- ^ Holden, Edward Singleton (1895). The Mogul emperors of Hindustan, A.D. 1398 – A.D. 1707. New York : C. Scribner's Sons.
- ^ Nanda, J. N (2005). Bengal: the unique state. Concept Publishing Company. p. 10. 2005. ISBN 978-81-8069-149-2. Bengal [...] was rich in the production and export of grain, salt, fruit, liquors and wines, precious metals and ornaments besides the output of its handlooms in silk and cotton. Europe referred to Bengal as the richest country to trade with.
- ^ Gustave Le Bon. (1956). Hadarat al Arab. Translation of La Civilisation-des Arabes. 3rd Print. Cairo. p. 95.
- ^ Suryanegara, Ahmad Mansyur. (2009). Sedjarah Ekonomis Sosiologis Indonesia (History of Socio-Economic of Indonesia). API Sejarah. Bandung. Indonesia. pp. 2–3
- ^ Sir Thomas Arnold and Alfred Guilaume, (eds.), (1965). The Legacy of Islam. Oxford University Press, New York, p. 87.
- ^ Nasr 2003, p. 143
- ^ Spencer Tucker (2009). The Encyclopedia of the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars: A Political, Social, and Military History. Vol. 1. ABC-CLIO. pp. 419–. ISBN 978-1-85109-951-1.
- ^ Bloom & Blair 2000, pp. 226–30
- ^ Khamouch, Mohammed. "Jewel of Chinese Muslim's Heritage". FTSC.
- ^ a b Armstrong 2000, p. 116
- ^ Jens Peter Laut Vielfalt türkischer Religionen Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg (German) p. 31
- ^ Holt, P.M.; Lambton, Ann; Lewis, Bernard, eds. (1995). The Cambridge History of Islam: The Indian sub-continent, South-East Asia, Africa and the Muslim west. Vol. 2. Cambridge University Press. p. 320. ISBN 978-0-521-22310-2. Retrieved 13 March 2015.[verification needed]
- ^ Drews, Robert (August 2011). "Chapter Thirty – "The Ottoman Empire, Judaism, and Eastern Europe to 1648"" (PDF). Coursebook: Judaism, Christianity and Islam, to the Beginnings of Modern Civilization. Vanderbilt University.
- ^ Holt 1977a, p. 263
- ^ Kohn, G. C. (2006). Dictionary of wars. New York: Facts on File. p. 94.
- ^ Koprulu 1992, p. 109
- ^ Koprulu 1992, p. 111
- ^ Ágoston, Gábor (2021). "Part I: Emergence – Conquests: European Reactions and Ottoman Naval Preparations". The Last Muslim Conquest: The Ottoman Empire and Its Wars in Europe. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. pp. 123–138, 138–144. doi:10.1515/9780691205380-003. ISBN 978-0-691-20538-0. JSTOR j.ctv1b3qqdc.8. LCCN 2020046920.
- ^ Lane, Frederic C. (1973). "Contests for Power: The Fifteenth Century". Venice, A Maritime Republic. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 224–240. ISBN 978-0-8018-1460-0. OCLC 617914.
- ^ Ágoston, Gábor; Masters, Bruce, eds. (2009). "Introduction". Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire. New York: Facts on File. p. xxxii. ISBN 978-0-8160-6259-1. LCCN 2008020716.
- ^ Faroqhi, Suraiya (1994). "Crisis and Change, 1590–1699". In İnalcık, Halil; Donald Quataert (eds.). An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914. Vol. 2. Cambridge University Press. p. 553. ISBN 978-0-521-57456-3.
In the past fifty years, scholars have frequently tended to view this decreasing participation of the sultan in political life as evidence for "Ottoman decadence", which supposedly began at some time during the second half of the sixteenth century. But recently, more note has been taken of the fact that the Ottoman Empire was still a formidable military and political power throughout the seventeenth century, and that noticeable though limited economic recovery followed the crisis of the years around 1600; after the crisis of the 1683–99 war, there followed a longer and more decisive economic upswing. Major evidence of decline was not visible before the second half of the eighteenth century.
- ^ a b Baltacıoğlu-Brammer, Ayşe (2021). "The emergence of the Safavids as a mystical order and their subsequent rise to power in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries". In Matthee, Rudi (ed.). The Safavid World. Routledge Worlds (1st ed.). New York and London: Routledge. pp. 15–36. doi:10.4324/9781003170822. ISBN 978-1-003-17082-2. S2CID 236371308.
- ^ "RM Savory. Ebn Bazzaz". Encyclopædia Iranica
- ^
- Roemer, H.R. (1986). "The Safavid Period" in Jackson, Peter; Lockhart, Laurence. The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 6: The Timurid and Safavid Periods. Cambridge University Press. pp. 214, 229
- Blow, David (2009). Shah Abbas: The Ruthless King Who Became an Iranian Legend. I.B.Tauris. p. 3
- Savory, Roger M.; Karamustafa, Ahmet T. (1998) ESMĀʿĪL I ṢAFAWĪ. Encyclopaedia Iranica Vol. VIII, Fasc. 6, pp. 628-636
- Ghereghlou, Kioumars (2016). ḤAYDAR ṢAFAVI. Encyclopaedia Iranica
- ^ Khanbaghi, Aptin (2006). The Fire, the Star and the Cross: Minority Religions in Medieval and Early. London & New York: IB Tauris. ISBN 1-84511-056-0., pp. 130–1
- ^ Yarshater 2001, p. 493.
- ^ Khanbaghi 2006, p. 130.
- ^ Anthony Bryer. "Greeks and Türkmens: The Pontic Exception", Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Vol. 29 (1975), Appendix II "Genealogy of the Muslim Marriages of the Princesses of Trebizond"
- ^ Peter B. Golden (2002) "An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples"; In: Osman Karatay, Ankara, p. 321
- ^ "Ismail Safavi" Encyclopædia Iranica
- ^ Why is there such confusion about the origins of this important dynasty, which reasserted Iranian identity and established an independent Iranian state after eight and a half centuries of rule by foreign dynasties? RM Savory, Iran under the Safavids (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980), p. 3.
- ^ Alireza Shapur Shahbazi (2005), "The History of the Idea of Iran", in Vesta Curtis ed., Birth of the Persian Empire, IB Tauris, London, p. 108: "Similarly the collapse of Sassanian Eranshahr in AD 650 did not end Iranians' national idea. The name "Iran" disappeared from official records of the Saffarids, Samanids, Buyids, Saljuqs and their successor. But one unofficially used the name Iran, Eranshahr, and similar national designations, particularly Mamalek-e Iran or "Iranian lands", which exactly translated the old Avestan term Ariyanam Daihunam. On the other hand, when the Safavids (not Reza Shah, as is popularly assumed) revived a national state officially known as Iran, bureaucratic usage in the Ottoman empire and even Iran itself could still refer to it by other descriptive and traditional appellations".
- ^ Bloom & Blair 2000, pp. 199–204
- ^ Richards, John F. (1995), The Mughal Empire, Cambridge University Press, p. 6, ISBN 978-0-521-56603-2
- ^ Schimmel, Annemarie (2004), The Empire of the Great Mughals: History, Art and Culture, Reaktion Books, p. 22, ISBN 978-1-86189-185-3
- ^ Balabanlilar, Lisa (15 January 2012), Imperial Identity in Mughal Empire: Memory and Dynastic Politics in Early Modern Central Asia, I.B.Tauris, p. 2, ISBN 978-1-84885-726-1
- ^ Jeroen Duindam (2015), Dynasties: A Global History of Power, 1300–1800, p. 105, Cambridge University Press
- ^ Mohammada, Malika (2007). The Foundations of the Composite Culture in India. Aakar Books. p. 300. ISBN 978-81-89833-18-3.
- ^ Dirk Collier (2016). The Great Mughals and their India. Hay House. p. 15. ISBN 978-93-84544-98-0.
- ^ a b "Indo-Persian Literature Conference: SOAS: North Indian Literary Culture (1450–1650)". SOAS. Archived from the original on 23 September 2009. Retrieved 28 November 2012.
- ^ John Walbridge. God and Logic in Islam: The Caliphate of Reason. p. 165.
Persianate Mogul Empire.
- ^ John Barrett Kelly. Britain and the Persian Gulf: 1795–1880. p. 473.
- ^ "Indian History-Medieval-Mughal Period-AKBAR". Webindia123.com. Retrieved 28 November 2012.
- ^ Roy Choudhury, Makhan Lal. The Din-i-Ilahi:Or, The Religion of Akbar.
- ^ Asher & Talbot 2008, p. 115.
- ^ Robb 2001, pp. 90–91.
- ^ Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, p. 17.
- ^ Asher & Talbot 2008, p. 152.
- ^ Catherine Ella Blanshard Asher; Cynthia Talbot (2006). India before Europe. Cambridge University Press. p. 265. ISBN 978-0-521-80904-7.
- ^ Burjor Avari (2013). Islamic Civilization in South Asia: A History of Muslim Power and Presence in the Indian Subcontinent. Routledge. pp. 131–. ISBN 978-0-415-58061-8.
- ^ Erinn Banting (2003). Afghanistan: The people. Crabtree Publishing Company. pp. 9–. ISBN 978-0-7787-9336-6.
- ^ Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, pp. 23–24.
- ^ Islamic and European Expansion: The Forging of a Global Order, Michael Adas, Temple University Press (Philadelphia, PA), 1993.
- ^ Chapra, Muhammad Umer (2014). Morality and Justice in Islamic Economics and Finance. Edward Elgar Publishing. pp. 62–63. ISBN 978-1-78347-572-8.
- ^ Maddison, Angus (2003): Development Centre Studies The World Economy Historical Statistics: Historical Statistics, OECD Publishing, ISBN 92-64-10414-3, pages 259–261
- ^ Hasan, Farhat (1991). "Conflict and Cooperation in Anglo-Mughal Trade Relations during the Reign of Aurangzeb". Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient. 34 (4): 351–360. doi:10.1163/156852091X00058. JSTOR 3632456.
- ^ Vaugn, James (September 2017). "John Company Armed: The English East India Company, the Anglo-Mughal War and Absolutist Imperialism, c. 1675–1690". Britain and the World. 11 (1).
- ^ Sailendra Nath Sen (2010). An Advanced History of Modern India. Macmillan India. p. Introduction 14. ISBN 978-0-230-32885-3.
- ^ Binita Mehta (2002). Widows, Pariahs, and Bayadères: India as Spectacle. Bucknell University Press. pp. 110–111. ISBN 978-0-8387-5455-9.
- ^ B. N. Pande (1996). Aurangzeb and Tipu Sultan: Evaluation of Their Religious Policies. University of Michigan. ISBN 978-81-85220-38-3.
- ^ John Capper (1918). Delhi, the Capital of India. New Delhi: Asian Educational Services. pp. 28–29. ISBN 978-81-206-1282-2.
{{cite book}}: ISBN / Date incompatibility (help) - ^ Bentley & Ziegler 2006, pp. 961, 969
- ^ Bentley & Ziegler 2006, pp. 971–72
- ^ McNeill, Bentley & Christian 2005, p. 1402
- ^ Causes of Anti-Americanism in the Arab World: a Socio-Political perspective [2] Archived 3 August 2018 at the Wayback Machine by Abdel Mahdi Abdallah (MERIA Journal). Volume 7, No. 4. December 2003
- ^ Arab-Israeli Conflict: Role of religion (Israel Science and Technology)
- ^ Arab-American Psychiatrist Wafa Sultan: There is No Clash of Civilizations but a Clash between the Mentality of the Middle Ages and That of the 21st Century Archived 9 August 2007 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Heather S. Gregg; Hy S. Rothstein; John Arquilla (2010). The Three Circles of War: Understanding the Dynamics of Conflict in Iraq. Potomac Books, Inc. p. 66. ISBN 978-1-59797-499-8.
- ^ Said Amir Arjomand (2009). After Khomeini: Iran Under His Successors. Oxford University Press. p. 195. ISBN 978-0-19-974576-0.
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Further reading
[edit]- Ágoston, Gábor (2021). The Last Muslim Conquest: The Ottoman Empire and Its Wars in Europe. Princeton, New Jersey and Woodstock, Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press. doi:10.2307/j.ctv1b3qqdc. ISBN 978-0-691-20538-0. JSTOR j.ctv1b3qqdc. LCCN 2020046920. OCLC 1224042619. S2CID 243417695.
- Anthony, Sean W. (2020). "Introduction: The Making of the Historical Muhammad – Part I: Muhammad the Merchant". Muhammad and the Empires of Faith: The Making of the Prophet of Islam. Berkeley and Oakland: University of California Press. pp. 1–84. doi:10.1525/9780520974524-004. ISBN 978-0-520-34041-1. LCCN 2019035331. OCLC 1153189160. S2CID 240957346.
- Black, Antony (2014) [2001]. History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present (2nd ed.). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 978-0-7486-8878-4. OCLC 855017249.
- Conrad, Lawrence I.; Jabbur, Suhayl J., eds. (1995). The Bedouins and the Desert: Aspects of Nomadic Life in the Arab East. SUNY Series in Near Eastern Studies. Albany, New York: SUNY Press. ISBN 978-0-7914-2852-8.
- Haider, Najam (2019). "Modeling Islamic Historical Writing". The Rebel and the Imām in Early Islam: Explorations in Muslim Historiography. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1–25. doi:10.1017/9781139199223.001. ISBN 978-1-139-19922-3. OCLC 1164503161. S2CID 216606313.
- Hughes, Aaron W. (2013). "Part I: Origins". Muslim Identities: An Introduction to Islam. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 15–40. ISBN 978-0-231-53192-4. LCCN 2012036923. OCLC 809989049.
- Khatab, Sayed (2006). The Power of Sovereignty: The Political and Ideological Philosophy of Sayyid Qutb. Routledge Studies in Political Islam (1st ed.). London and New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-203-08694-0. OCLC 433839891.
- Kurzman, Charles (1998). "Liberal Islam and Its Islamic Context". In Kurzman, Charles (ed.). Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–26. ISBN 978-0-19-511622-9. OCLC 37368975.
- Milani, Milad (2018). Sufi Political Thought. Routledge Religion in Contemporary Asia Series (1st ed.). London and New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-367-87025-6. LCCN 2017023114. OCLC 1010957516.
- Oliver-Dee, Sean (2009). The Caliphate Question: The British Government and Islamic Governance. Lanham, Maryland and Plymouth, U.K.: Lexington Books. ISBN 978-0-7391-3603-4. LCCN 2009018328.
- Sahner, Christian C. (June 2017). ""The Monasticism of My Community is Jihad": A Debate on Asceticism, Sex, and Warfare in Early Islam". Arabica. 64 (2). Leiden: Brill Publishers: 149–183. doi:10.1163/15700585-12341453. ISSN 1570-0585. S2CID 165034994.
- Saikal, Amin (2021) [2019]. Iran Rising: The Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic. Princeton, New Jersey and Woodstock, Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press. doi:10.1515/9780691184197. ISBN 978-0-691-18419-7. JSTOR j.ctvc77cbb. LCCN 2018936897. S2CID 241721596.
- Soleimani, Kamal (2016). "Religious (Islamic) Thought, Nationalism, and the Politics of Caliphate". Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926. The Modern Muslim World. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 19–70. doi:10.1057/978-1-137-59940-7. ISBN 978-1-137-59940-7. LCCN 2016939591.
- Tibi, Bassam (2002) [1998]. "The Context: Globalization, Fragmentation, and Disorder". The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder. Comparative Studies in Religion and Society (Updated ed.). Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. pp. 1–19. doi:10.1525/9780520929753-002. ISBN 978-0-520-92975-3.
- Yılmaz, Hüseyin (2018). Caliphate Redefined: The Mystical Turn in Ottoman Political Thought. Princeton, New Jersey and Woodstock, Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press. doi:10.2307/j.ctvc77bv4. ISBN 978-1-4008-8804-7. JSTOR j.ctvc77bv4. LCCN 2017936620. OCLC 1203056833.
External links
[edit]History of Islam
View on GrokipediaHistoriography and Sources
Reliability of Traditional Islamic Sources
The Quran, regarded in Islamic tradition as the literal revelation to Muhammad from 610 to 632 CE, was primarily transmitted orally during his lifetime, with fragmentary written records by companions. A preliminary compilation occurred under Caliph Abu Bakr (r. 632–634 CE) to preserve recitations amid losses in battles like Yamama, where many memorizers (huffaz) perished. The standardized Uthmanic codex, produced around 650 CE under Caliph Uthman (r. 644–656 CE), involved a committee led by Zayd ibn Thabit selecting variants based on Qurayshi dialect and Medina recitations, followed by the destruction of divergent manuscripts to enforce uniformity. This process, while aimed at unification, suppressed documented regional variants (ahruf) and qira'at readings, as evidenced by surviving differences in early transmissions and manuscripts like the Sana'a palimpsest, which overlays pre-Uthmanic text differing in wording and order from the canonical version.[10][11] Hadith literature, comprising reports of Muhammad's sayings, actions, and approvals, forms the basis for much of Islamic jurisprudence and biography, with major collections like Sahih al-Bukhari (d. 870 CE) and Sahih Muslim (d. 875 CE) claiming authenticity through rigorous scrutiny of transmission chains (isnad) and narrator reliability (jarh wa ta'dil). Al-Bukhari reportedly evaluated 600,000 narrations, accepting about 7,000 as sahih after verifying continuous chains from trustworthy transmitters back to the Prophet. Yet, Islamic scholars themselves, including al-Nawawi (d. 1277 CE), identified issues even in these "most authentic" works, such as anomalous matn (content) contradicting established facts or Quran. Widespread fabrication (tadlis and wada') was acknowledged, driven by political factions (Umayyad vs. Abbasid), theological disputes, or piety, with estimates of forged hadith exceeding 100,000 by the 9th century; critical analysis highlights subjective criteria in isnad evaluation, common-link fabrication where chains converge on late 8th-century figures, and retrospective projection of later practices onto Muhammad's era.[12][13] The Sira, or biographical genre, begins with Ibn Ishaq's Sirat Rasul Allah (c. 767 CE), compiled roughly 135 years after Muhammad's death in 632 CE, drawing from oral akhbar (anecdotes), poetry, and hadith-like reports without the later isnad rigor. Ibn Ishaq included tribal poetry and stories from sources like descendants of companions, but contemporaries such as Malik ibn Anas (d. 795 CE) criticized him for lax verification, fabricating links, and incorporating suspect maghazi (expedition) tales; the work survives only in Ibn Hisham's edited recension (d. 833 CE), which excised "reprehensible" elements like Muhammad's Satanic verses incident or certain raids. While foundational, the Sira's hagiographic tone, reliance on memory across generations, and integration of pre-Islamic poetry of disputed dating undermine its verbatim historical accuracy, as later historians like al-Tabari (d. 923 CE) treated it selectively.[14][15] In aggregate, these sources exhibit internal consistencies in core doctrines but discrepancies in chronology, numbers (e.g., battle casualties varying widely), and motives, compounded by oral mediation prone to embellishment for edification or legitimacy. Traditional Islamic historiography developed isnad as a safeguard, yet empirical scrutiny reveals its limitations: narrator trustworthiness assessments were influenced by doctrinal alignment, and no contemporary Muslim autographs exist, with earliest papyri post-650 CE showing non-Quranic content. Revisionist scholars argue the corpus reflects 8th–9th-century Abbasid redaction more than 7th-century Arabia, prioritizing soteriological narrative over verifiable events, though defenders maintain collective memorization and cross-corroboration suffice for reliability absent archaeological contradiction.[16][17]Non-Muslim Contemporary Accounts
The earliest non-Muslim references to the rise of Islam appear in Greek, Syriac, and Armenian texts from the mid-7th century, composed amid the Arab conquests of Byzantine and Sasanian territories. These accounts, primarily from Christian authors, confirm the emergence of a monotheistic Arab movement under a prophetic leader but depict it through lenses of alarm, polemic, or strategic analysis, often emphasizing military aggression over doctrinal details.[18][3] Their scarcity—fewer than a dozen datable texts before 700 CE—highlights the challenges of reconstructing early Islamic history from external perspectives, yet they provide chronological anchors absent in later Muslim sirah traditions, which date to the 8th century or beyond.[3] The Doctrina Jacobi nuper baptizati, a Greek anti-Jewish dialogue composed in Carthage around July 634 CE, contains the first datable allusion to Muhammad. In it, a Jewish merchant reports from Palestine that "a prophet has appeared, coming with the Saracens," who claims the "keys of paradise" and urges followers to circumcise and follow Mosaic law, while wielding a sword to enforce submission. The text portrays this figure as a violent deceiver rejecting the Christian Christ, aligning with the timing of Muhammad's reported death in 632 CE and the subsequent invasions.[19][20] This reference, though anonymous and secondhand, predates Muslim biographical compilations by over a century and underscores an early perception of the prophet as a militarized reformer drawing on Abrahamic precedents.[18] Syriac chroniclers offered contemporaneous observations of the conquests. Thomas the Presbyter's annals, dated to 640 CE, record that in 634 CE, "the Arabs of Muhammad" clashed with Roman forces near Gaza, marking the initial phase of expansions into Palestine. Similarly, Patriarch Sophronius of Jerusalem, in sermons from 634–636 CE, decried "godless Saracens" desecrating holy sites and blocking access to Bethlehem, framing the invasions as divine punishment while noting their unprecedented speed. The anonymous Chronicle of Khuzistan (ca. 660 CE), a Nestorian Syriac text from southwestern Persia, details the fall of Sasanian cities like Tustar in 642 CE to Arab forces, attributing the collapses to internal Persian disarray and Arab numerical superiority, with minimal theological exposition on the invaders' beliefs. These Syriac sources, rooted in eyewitness regions, verify the Arab armies' cohesion and momentum from the 630s but attribute success to tactical advantages rather than ideological fervor.[3][21] The Armenian History attributed to Sebeos, finalized around 661–662 CE, yields the most extensive early non-Muslim narrative. It names "Mahmet," a merchant from the Ishmaelite kin, who preached monotheism to quarrelsome Arab tribes, forbidding carrion, wine, and false oaths while invoking Abraham's God and promising land conquests. Sebeos links this to the 622 CE hijra-like unification and subsequent raids on Palestine and Persia, portraying Muhammad as a pragmatic unifier who leveraged Jewish alliances before turning against them. Composed near the conquered frontiers, the account draws on oral reports and aligns with archaeological evidence of rapid 7th-century takeovers, though it simplifies motivations as tribal ambition fused with scriptural claims.[22][23] Collectively, these texts establish Muhammad's historicity and the conquests' timeline—beginning circa 630–634 CE—while revealing biases: Christian authors emphasize eschatological threats or barbarian hordes, potentially understating religious drivers evident in later Muslim sources.[18][3] Their independence from Islamic tradition lends credibility to core events, cautioning against overreliance on hagiographic sirah for causal explanations.Modern Revisionist Scholarship and Archaeological Evidence
Modern revisionist scholarship on early Islam, emerging prominently in the 1970s, challenges the traditional narrative derived from Islamic literary sources compiled in the 8th and 9th centuries CE, positing instead that these accounts reflect later ideological constructs rather than contemporaneous history. Scholars such as Patricia Crone and Michael Cook, in their 1977 work Hagarism: The Making of the Islamic World, argued that the origins of Islam are better understood through non-Muslim contemporary texts, including Syriac, Armenian, and Greek chronicles, which describe Arab expansions as tribal or messianic movements rather than a fully formed monotheistic faith centered on Muhammad's revelations. They proposed that early "Hagarenes"—a term drawn from biblical Hagar to denote non-Israelite Semites—initially aligned with Jewish eschatological expectations in a Palestinian-Syrian context, with distinctively Islamic elements, including the Quran's canonization, developing only in the late 7th century under Umayyad rulers like Abd al-Malik. This approach privileges external evidence over internal traditions, highlighting discrepancies such as the absence of Mecca's prominence in pre-Islamic trade routes or 7th-century geography.[24] ![Pseudo-Byzantine coin from Rashidun period][float-right] Subsequent revisionists, including John Wansbrough and Andrew Rippin, extended this skepticism to the Quran's formation, suggesting its textual stabilization occurred post-700 CE in Abbasid Iraq, influenced by sectarian Jewish-Christian polemics, rather than during Muhammad's lifetime. Crone's 1987 monograph Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam further questioned the economic viability of Mecca as a commercial hub, arguing that archaeological and textual data indicate Arabia's marginal role in late antique trade networks dominated by Syrian and Yemenite corridors, undermining the sira's depiction of Muhammad's mercantile background. These views, while criticized for over-reliance on fragmentary non-Muslim sources potentially biased by Christian perspectives, underscore a methodological shift toward causal analysis of power dynamics, where Arab conquests (circa 630–650 CE) initially consolidated tribal federations under loose monotheistic banners before crystallizing into "Islam" amid Umayyad state-building.[25] Archaeological evidence corroborates this phased development, revealing scant material traces of a distinct Islamic identity before the 690s CE. Excavations in Arabia yield no 7th-century structures or artifacts linking to Muhammad or Meccan origins; for instance, early Arab-Byzantine coins (minted circa 630–680 CE) mimic imperial designs without Islamic formulae, shahada, or aniconic reforms until Abd al-Malik's standardization around 696 CE. In conquered territories like Syria and Egypt, settlements show administrative continuity with Byzantine and Sasanian precedents—evident in reused churches and fiscal papyri—rather than abrupt Islamization, with the Dome of the Rock (completed 691–692 CE) marking the first monumental Islamic edifice explicitly invoking Quranic motifs.[26] Epigraphic records amplify this evidential gap: of the sparse 7th-century Arabic inscriptions, none predating circa 660 CE reference Muhammad, the Quran, or jihadist ideology, contrasting with the profusion of later Umayyad graffiti proclaiming the shahada. Non-Arabic epigraphy, such as the 663 CE Greek inscription at Hammat Gader attributing restorations to Muawiya without Islamic terminology, portrays early caliphs as pragmatic rulers akin to Roman emperors, not prophetic successors. Syriac and Armenian texts from the 630s–660s CE allude to Arab "prophets" or conquerors but frame incursions as opportunistic raids by monotheistic nomads (termed "Tayyaye" or Saracens), lacking details of Medinan polity or Koranic recitations until the 690s. This paucity—attributable to oral traditions, perishable media, or deliberate later retrojection—fuels revisionist caution against accepting the Ridda Wars or rapid conquests as verbatim history, favoring instead a gradual ethnogenesis of "Muslim" identity amid fiscal and doctrinal consolidations.[27][28]Pre-Islamic Arabia
Socio-Religious Landscape
Pre-Islamic Arabia was predominantly characterized by polytheistic beliefs, with tribes venerating a pantheon of deities associated with natural forces, celestial bodies, and ancestral spirits, often represented by idols and sacred stones. Central to this landscape was the Kaaba in Mecca, a cubic sanctuary that housed up to 360 idols, serving as a focal point for tribal pilgrimages and rituals that fostered temporary intertribal alliances amid otherwise fractious relations.[29] [30] Key deities included Hubal, regarded as the chief god in Mecca and depicted as a human figure made of red agate with a golden hand for divination via arrows; the goddesses Al-Lat, Al-Uzza, and Manat, invoked as daughters of Allah, the supreme creator figure who was acknowledged but not exclusively worshipped; and numerous tribal patrons like Dhu al-Shara for the Nabataeans. Religious practices encompassed animal sacrifices to appease gods and ensure prosperity, circumambulation of the Kaaba, and seasonal fairs during sacred months when warfare was suspended, blending spiritual observance with economic exchange. Divination through arrows cast before Hubal's idol and veneration of sacred trees, springs, and meteorites further permeated daily socio-religious life, reinforcing tribal identities and social hierarchies.[31] [32] Monotheistic traditions formed enclaves amid the polytheistic majority, with Judaism established in southern Arabia, particularly the Himyarite kingdom where kings like Dhu Nuwas adopted it as state religion around 380–525 CE, imposing it on subjects and clashing with Christian neighbors. Jewish communities also thrived in the northwest Hejaz, including Yathrib (later Medina), where tribes such as Banu Qurayza, Banu Nadir, and Banu Qaynuqa maintained agricultural settlements and synagogues. Christianity penetrated northern and eastern regions via trade and Byzantine/Sassanian influences, with Arab Ghassanid clients of Byzantium adopting Miaphysite Christianity by the 6th century, and Nestorian communities in Najran facing persecution from Himyarite Jews in 523 CE, prompting Ethiopian intervention. Zoroastrian elements appeared in eastern Arabia under Sassanian control, though less pervasive.[30] [33] A marginal group known as Hanifs rejected idolatry in favor of monotheism attributed to Abraham, practicing without formal scripture or priesthood; figures like Zayd ibn Amr, a Quraysh clansman, reportedly abstained from idol worship and sought divine truth, influencing early Islamic self-conception as restoration of primordial faith. Historical evidence for organized Hanifism remains scant and derived largely from later Islamic sources, suggesting these were isolated individuals rather than a cohesive movement, amid a broader landscape where polytheism dominated social cohesion and conflict resolution.[34] [35]Economic and Tribal Structures
Pre-Islamic Arabian society was organized into tribes (qabila), which served as the fundamental social, political, and economic units, comprising groups claiming descent from a common ancestor through patrilineal kinship ties.[36] Tribes consisted of multiple clans (bani), each formed by extended families, with leadership typically vested in a sheikh selected for wisdom, generosity, and prowess in raids rather than hereditary rule.[37] This structure fostered intense loyalty ('asabiyya) to the tribe over individuals, manifesting in practices like collective responsibility for blood feuds (tha'r) and protection of guests under the code of hospitality (diyafa), which could last up to three days.[38] Nomadic Bedouin tribes dominated the interior deserts, while sedentary groups inhabited oases and coastal areas, yet intertribal alliances were fluid and often dissolved amid conflicts.[39] The economy of pre-Islamic Arabia relied heavily on nomadic pastoralism, with Bedouins herding camels, sheep, and goats for milk, meat, wool, hides, and transport, enabling survival in arid environments where rainfall averaged less than 100 mm annually in central regions.[40] Camels, domesticated by around 1000 BCE, were pivotal, providing up to 20 liters of milk daily and carrying loads over 200 kg across vast distances, sustaining tribes through seasonal migrations between pastures.[41] Limited agriculture occurred in fertile oases like Yathrib (Medina) and Ta'if, producing dates, grains, and olives via irrigation systems such as aflaj channels in eastern Arabia, but yields were constrained by soil salinity and water scarcity.[42] Trade formed a critical economic pillar, particularly along overland caravan routes traversing the peninsula, including the Incense Road from Yemen's frankincense and myrrh producers northward to Syrian markets via Mecca and Petra.[43] The Quraysh tribe of Mecca monopolized much of this commerce by the 6th century CE, escorting seasonal caravans of spices, leather, and slaves, profiting from tolls and partnerships while mitigating risks through truces like the sacred months.[44] Periodic markets (suq), such as 'Ukaz near Mecca, facilitated barter exchanges of pastoral products for agricultural goods, with no widespread coinage until later influences.[44] Raiding (ghazw) supplemented incomes, targeting weaker caravans or rivals for livestock and goods, integral to Bedouin subsistence amid scarce resources, though governed by unwritten codes prohibiting harm to non-combatants.[45] These intertwined structures perpetuated a decentralized, kin-centric order vulnerable to feuds and resource competition, with wealth disparities evident in Mecca's merchant elite versus peripheral nomads, setting the stage for emerging unifiers.[46] Archaeological evidence from sites like Qaryat al-Faw supports trade's role, revealing imported pottery and inscriptions, though textual accounts from later Islamic sources require cross-verification due to potential idealization of pre-Islamic vitality.[47]External Influences and Judaism/Christianity
Judaism entered pre-Islamic Arabia through trade routes and migrations, establishing communities as early as the 2nd century BCE in southern regions like Yemen.[48] The Himyarite Kingdom, centered in what is now Yemen, saw its elites convert to Judaism around 380 CE, with kings adopting Jewish monotheism and suppressing polytheistic practices; this Jewish phase lasted until approximately 525 CE, when Aksumite (Ethiopian) forces, backed by Byzantium, overthrew the last Jewish ruler, Yusuf As'ar Yath'ar.[49][33] In northern Arabia, particularly in oases like Yathrib (later Medina), Jewish tribes such as Banu Qurayza, Banu Nadir, and Banu Qaynuqa formed agricultural settlements and engaged in commerce, maintaining rabbinic traditions and Aramaic-influenced liturgy.[50] Archaeological inscriptions from northwest Arabia, dating to the 1st-3rd centuries CE, attest to Jews holding administrative roles and invoking a singular God, indicating integration with local Arab societies while preserving distinct identity.[50] Christianity spread to Arabia via Roman, Aksumite, and Persian influences, forming communities primarily in border regions by the 4th century CE. In southern Arabia, Najran hosted a significant Christian center, likely introduced through Syriac and Monophysite missions, with a notable church known as the "Ka'ba of Najran"; this community faced persecution in 523 CE when Himyarite king Dhu Nuwas massacred up to 20,000 Christians, prompting Aksumite intervention.[51] Northwestern Arab tribes like the Ghassanids, migrating from Yemen in the 3rd century CE, adopted Miaphysite Christianity and served as Byzantine foederati, protecting frontiers against Persian-allied Arabs while building monasteries and churches in the Levant and Syrian desert. In the northeast, the Lakhmids at al-Hira embraced Nestorian Christianity under Persian suzerainty from the 5th century CE, fostering a Christian Arab elite that translated Syriac texts and maintained ties with Mesopotamian bishoprics.[52] These Abrahamic faiths exerted causal influence on pre-Islamic Arabian polytheism by introducing monotheistic concepts through proselytism and cultural exchange, leading to hybrid practices among some Arabs. Jewish and Christian traders and missionaries established colonies, converting Bedouin groups and eroding veneration of local deities like those in the Kaaba pantheon; terms like raḥmān (the Merciful), rooted in South Arabian inscriptions, appear in both pagan and Abrahamic contexts, suggesting syncretism where monotheistic mercy supplanted animistic rituals.[53] Hanifs, pre-Islamic monotheists like Zayd ibn Amr, rejected idols in favor of a singular creator god, drawing explicitly from Jewish and Christian narratives of Abraham while critiquing Trinitarianism and anthropomorphism.[48] Tribal alliances with monotheistic empires—Ghassanids with Byzantium, Lakhmids with Persia—facilitated doctrinal exposure, fostering awareness of scriptural prophecy and eschatology among Meccan and Medinan Arabs, though polytheism remained dominant inland due to geographic isolation and economic incentives tied to pilgrimage.[54] Traditional Islamic sources, while later compilations, corroborate this penetration via hadith referencing interactions, but archaeological epigraphy provides independent verification less prone to hagiographic distortion.[55]Origins with Muhammad
Meccan Period and Revelations
Muhammad ibn Abdullah, born circa 570 CE in Mecca to the Banu Hashim clan of the Quraysh tribe, grew up in a polytheistic society centered on trade and pilgrimage to the Kaaba, which housed idols venerated by Arabian tribes.[56] Orphaned early, he worked as a merchant and married the wealthy widow Khadija bint Khuwaylid around 595 CE, gaining modest social standing but no significant political power.[56] Traditional accounts, drawn from 8th-century biographical compilations like Ibn Ishaq's Sirat Rasul Allah, describe Muhammad developing a contemplative habit of retreating to the Cave of Hira on Mount Jabal al-Nour for reflection amid Mecca's idolatrous practices.[57] The Meccan period of revelations began around 610 CE, when Muhammad, aged approximately 40, reported an angelic visitation from Gabriel (Jibril) commanding him to "Recite!"—the opening words of Quran 96:1-5 (Surah al-Alaq), emphasizing creation from a clot of blood and divine knowledge.[58] This event marked the start of intermittent revelations over 13 years, comprising about 86 surahs (chapters) of the Quran, delivered orally in Arabic and focused on tawhid (monotheism), rejection of idols, resurrection, and moral accountability, without detailed legal prescriptions.[59] Revelations occurred sporadically, sometimes in response to events, with Muhammad experiencing physical distress (wadj'), sweating, or trance-like states, as per early Muslim reports; followers memorized and some scribes like Zayd ibn Thabit recorded portions on materials such as bones, leather, and palm leaves.[60] Scholarly analysis notes these accounts rely on chains of transmission (isnad) compiled generations later, lacking contemporary corroboration, though the Quran's linguistic style and internal consistency are cited by traditionalists as evidence of authenticity.[57] Initial preaching was private, converting close kin including Khadija (the first), his cousin Ali ibn Abi Talib (around 610 CE), and friend Abu Bakr (who brought in early elites like Uthman ibn Affan), forming a core group of perhaps a dozen by 613 CE.[61] Public proclamation followed, urging abandonment of the 360 Kaaba idols and submission to one God (Allah), which alarmed Quraysh leaders whose wealth derived from pilgrimage traffic and tribal alliances tied to polytheism.[56] Opposition escalated from ridicule to economic boycott (616–619 CE) against Banu Hashim and Banu Muttalib clans, confining them to a Meccan ravine where supporters reportedly starved, though archaeological evidence for the boycott remains absent.[60] Persecution targeted vulnerable converts, such as the enslaved Bilal ibn Rabah, tortured by dragging and exposure under scorching stones by his master Umayya ibn Khalaf until ransomed by Abu Bakr.[62] In 615 CE, about 80–100 Muslims fled to Abyssinia (modern Ethiopia) under Negus Ashama ibn Abjar, a Christian ruler tolerant of monotheism, evading Quraysh pursuit; a second migration followed in 616 CE.[60] The "Year of Sorrow" (619 CE) saw Khadija's death and that of Muhammad's uncle-protector Abu Talib, removing tribal safeguards and intensifying assassination plots by Quraysh figures like Abu Lahab.[56] Amid this, Muhammad reported the Isra (night journey to Jerusalem) and Mi'raj (ascension to heaven) circa 621 CE, establishing five daily prayers, though skeptics in Mecca dismissed it as delusion.[59] By 622 CE, revelations urged perseverance (e.g., Quran 74:1-7), but mounting hostility from Quraysh—fearing loss of trade dominance and social order—culminated in pledges to kill Muhammad, prompting the Hijra to Medina.[58] These events, per traditional sources, reflect causal tensions between monotheistic disruption of Meccan polytheistic economics and tribal hierarchies, with no non-Muslim records from the period to independently verify details.[63]Hijra, Medina Constitution, and Early Community
In 622 CE, facing intensifying persecution from Meccan Quraysh leaders, Muhammad and a core group of his followers undertook the Hijra, or migration, from Mecca to the oasis settlement of Yathrib, later renamed Medina.[64] This event, prompted by assassination plots against Muhammad, commenced with his secret departure from Mecca alongside Abu Bakr, evading pursuers by hiding in the Thawr cave before proceeding northward.[65] The Hijra established the Islamic calendar's epoch, designated as 1 AH (Anno Hegirae), symbolizing a shift from a persecuted sect to a nascent political entity.[64] Upon arriving in Quba on the outskirts of Yathrib around September 622 CE, Muhammad oversaw the construction of the Quba Mosque, recognized as the first mosque in Islam, before entering the main settlement proper.[66] In Medina, comprising Arab tribes like the Aws and Khazraj alongside Jewish clans such as Banu Qurayza, Nadir, and Qaynuqa, Muhammad positioned himself as a mediator amid longstanding tribal feuds.[66] To consolidate authority and foster unity, he promulgated the Constitution of Medina, a pact delineating communal obligations among Muslim emigrants (Muhajirun), Medinan converts (Ansar), and Jewish tribes.[67] The Constitution, comprising approximately 47 clauses in its preserved form, framed the inhabitants as a single ummah (community) bound by mutual defense against external threats, with provisions for blood money compensation, prohibition of internal feuds, and recognition of Muhammad as the ultimate arbiter in disputes.[68] Jewish tribes retained religious autonomy and contributed to collective security, while polytheists were excluded from the core alliance.[69] Scholarly consensus, including among revisionists skeptical of broader sira narratives, affirms the document's authenticity due to its early attestation in 7th-8th century compilations and linguistic features consistent with late Hijra-era Arabic.[67] Accounts derive mainly from Ibn Ishaq's 8th-century Sirat Rasul Allah and Abu Ubayd's Kitab al-Amwal, transmitted orally before codification, introducing potential for later idealization but supported by internal coherence absent in fabricated texts.[70] The early Medinan community evolved around the Masjid an-Nabawi (Prophet's Mosque), erected adjacent to Muhammad's residence using mud-brick and palm trunks, serving as a multifunctional hub for prayer, governance, education, and welfare distribution.[71] To address economic vulnerabilities of the Muhajirun, who arrived largely destitute, Muhammad instituted mu'akhat (brotherhood pairings) between approximately 40-50 Meccan emigrants and Ansar hosts, facilitating resource sharing and social integration.[72] This structure transformed Medina from a fractious tribal confederation into a centralized polity under prophetic leadership, enabling defensive preparations against Meccan reprisals and laying groundwork for subsequent expeditions.[66] By emphasizing collective fidelity over kin-based loyalties, the community prioritized religious adherence and jihad (struggle) as unifying principles, though tensions with Jewish tribes persisted over alliance terms and prophetic claims.[73]Military Expeditions and Treatment of Opponents
Following the Hijra to Medina in 622 CE, Muhammad authorized or led approximately 80 military expeditions over the next decade, including 27 ghazawat in which he personally participated and around 50 sariya dispatched under commanders, primarily targeting Meccan Quraysh caravans, hostile Bedouin tribes, and Jewish clans accused of disloyalty.[74] [66] These operations shifted from defensive raids to offensive campaigns, enabling the Muslim community's economic survival through captured spoils while weakening opponents and enforcing tribute or conversion.[75] The first major engagement, the Battle of Badr in March 624 CE (2 AH), involved 313 Muslims confronting about 1,000 Quraysh forces; the Muslims prevailed, killing 70 enemies and capturing 70, with 14 Muslim fatalities, marking a turning point that boosted morale and provided significant booty.[75] Subsequent clashes included the Battle of Uhud in 625 CE, where initial Muslim gains reversed due to archers abandoning their posts, resulting in around 70 Muslim deaths and Quraysh withdrawal without full pursuit, and the Battle of the Trench in 627 CE (5 AH), a defensive siege against a 10,000-strong confederation that failed amid harsh weather, leading to minimal casualties on the Muslim side.[75] These battles underscored tactical evolution, from open combat to fortifications and alliances. Jewish tribes in Medina faced expulsion or execution for alleged treaty violations. The Banu Qaynuqa were besieged and exiled in 624 CE after a market dispute escalated, with their property confiscated; the Banu Nadir were similarly expelled in 625 CE following an assassination plot against Muhammad, fleeing to Khaybar with assets seized to fund further campaigns.[76] Most severely, after the Trench battle, the Banu Qurayza surrendered; arbitrator Sa'd ibn Mu'adh, from the Aws tribe, ruled for execution of adult males (estimates 600–900 beheaded) and enslavement of women and children, a judgment upheld by Muhammad as aligning with Deuteronomy's penalties for treason, distributing captives and spoils among fighters.[77] Later expeditions expanded influence northward, such as the 630 CE campaign to Tabuk, where a 30,000-strong army deterred Byzantine mobilization, securing pacts and jizya from local tribes without battle. The Conquest of Mecca in January 630 CE (8 AH) involved 10,000 Muslims entering with little resistance; Muhammad declared general amnesty for former persecutors, executing only a few direct assassins while pardoning leaders like Abu Sufyan, who converted, thereby integrating Quraysh elites and dismantling pagan idols.[78] This clemency contrasted earlier retributory actions, prioritizing consolidation over vengeance, though unrepentant polytheists faced ultimatums to convert, emigrate, or face hostility per subsequent revelations.[79]Rashidun Era (632–661 CE)
Abu Bakr's Caliphate and Ridda Wars
Abu Bakr ibn Abi Quhafa, a close companion of Muhammad and one of the earliest converts to Islam, assumed the role of the first caliph following Muhammad's death on 8 June 632 CE. His election occurred rapidly at the Saqifa assembly in Medina, where Ansar and Muhajirun leaders gathered to prevent anarchy amid competing claims to leadership, including from Ali ibn Abi Talib, whose pledge of allegiance came later. This swift succession addressed immediate threats from Bedouin tribes questioning Medina's authority, as many alliances forged under Muhammad were personal rather than institutional, leading to refusals to remit zakat—interpreted by Abu Bakr as both religious obligation and political tribute.[80][81] The Ridda Wars, or Wars of Apostasy (632–633 CE), ensued as tribes across Arabia renounced central allegiance, withheld zakat, or followed self-proclaimed prophets, challenging the nascent Muslim polity's cohesion. Key rebels included Tulayha ibn Khuwaylid of the Banu Asad, who claimed prophecy and rallied northern tribes; Musaylima of the Banu Hanifa in Yamama, who amassed a large following; and earlier figures like al-Aswad al-Ansi in Yemen, whose uprising was quelled before Abu Bakr's full campaigns. Not all rebels fully abandoned Islam; many professed faith but rejected Medina's fiscal demands, viewing zakat as tied to Muhammad's personal leadership rather than a perpetual caliphal structure—a causal dynamic rooted in Arabia's tribal confederations rather than wholesale religious reversion. Abu Bakr, prioritizing unified enforcement of Islamic tenets, dispatched eleven armies from Medina, refusing negotiations that compromised zakat, and appointed commanders like Ikrimah ibn Abi Jahl and Shurahbil ibn Hasana for southern fronts.[82][81] Khalid ibn al-Walid emerged as the pivotal commander, redeployed from the Iraqi border, leading decisive strikes in the north and center. Early engagements included the Battle of Zhu Qissa (July 632 CE), where Abu Bakr repelled Tulayha's forces, followed by Khalid's victory at Buzakha (August 632 CE), forcing Tulayha's flight to Syria. The climactic Battle of Yamama (December 632 CE) saw Khalid's 13,000 troops confront Musaylima's 40,000, suffering heavy casualties—estimated at 1,200 Muslim dead, including key Quran memorizers—before breaching defenses and slaying Musaylima, securing central Arabia. Controversial incidents, such as Khalid's execution of Malik ibn Nuwayra for withholding zakat (framed as apostasy but disputed as political defiance), underscored tensions between religious orthodoxy and tribal autonomy, with Abu Bakr upholding Khalid's actions despite internal dissent.[82][81] By spring 633 CE, rebellions in regions like Hadhramaut and Bahrain were subdued, unifying the Arabian Peninsula under Medina's authority for the first time beyond loose confederation. This consolidation, achieved through military coercion rather than consensus, eliminated rival prophetic claims and enforced zakat collection, generating resources for external expansion. The wars' toll prompted Abu Bakr to commission Zayd ibn Thabit's compilation of the Quran from oral and written fragments to preserve it amid memorizer losses at Yamama. While traditional accounts emphasize religious apostasy (ridda), the conflicts pragmatically centralized power, transforming Islam from a Meccan-Medinan movement into a proto-state apparatus capable of challenging Byzantine and Sasanian empires.[82][81]Umar's Conquests of Persia and Byzantium
Umar ibn al-Khattab, the second Rashidun caliph ruling from 634 to 644 CE, directed rapid military campaigns that dismantled the Byzantine presence in the Levant and Syria while initiating the collapse of the Sassanid Persian Empire.[83] These efforts built on initial raids under Abu Bakr, leveraging Arab tribal cohesion and the exhaustion of both empires following their mutual 602–628 war, which left them internally divided and militarily depleted.[84] Byzantine forces, strained by religious schisms between Chalcedonian orthodoxy and Monophysite populations in Syria and Egypt, faced defections, while Persian central authority fragmented after the 628 regicide of Khosrow II.[85] Against the Byzantines, the pivotal Battle of Yarmouk in August 636 CE pitted approximately 20,000–40,000 Muslim troops under Khalid ibn al-Walid against a larger Byzantine army of 80,000–120,000 commanded by Vahan, ending in a decisive Arab victory after six days of intense fighting exacerbated by a dust storm.[85] Muslim casualties numbered around 4,000, while Byzantine losses were catastrophic, with most of the army annihilated, paving the way for the conquest of Damascus in September 636 and subsequent advances into Palestine.[85] Jerusalem surrendered peacefully in 638 CE to Umar himself, who entered the city on foot and negotiated terms guaranteeing Christian and Jewish rights under dhimmi status, including protection of holy sites.[86] In parallel, campaigns against Persia commenced with the Battle of al-Qadisiyyah in late 636 to early 637 CE, where 30,000 Muslims led by Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas defeated a Sassanid force of 50,000–100,000 under Rostam Farrokhzad, whose death in combat shattered Persian command structure.[83] This triumph enabled the capture of Ctesiphon, the Sassanid capital, in 637 CE, stripping Emperor Yazdegerd III of his treasury and administrative heartland.[84] Umar authorized multi-pronged invasions by 642 CE, securing Mesopotamia and pushing into Fars and Khurasan, though he halted deeper penetrations to consolidate gains amid logistical strains.[83] The conquest of Egypt, launched in 639 CE by Amr ibn al-As with 4,000 troops, culminated in the fall of Alexandria by 642 CE after victories at Heliopolis and the Babylonian fortress, incorporating the province into the caliphate despite initial hesitations from Umar over naval vulnerabilities.[87] These expansions, totaling over 2 million square miles by Umar's death, stemmed from high Arab morale, flexible cavalry tactics, and the adversaries' overreliance on heavy infantry and elephants, which proved ineffective against desert-adapted raiders.[84] The Sassanid Empire fully dissolved by 651 CE under continued Rashidun pressure, marking the end of ancient Persian imperial continuity.[84]Uthman, Ali, and the First Civil War
Uthman ibn Affan, a member of the Umayyad clan and one of the earliest converts to Islam, was selected as the third Rashidun caliph in November 644 CE (23 AH) by a six-member consultative council (shura) appointed by his predecessor Umar ibn al-Khattab. The council, which included Ali ibn Abi Talib and Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf, chose Uthman after deliberations emphasizing his piety and early companionship with Muhammad; Ali reportedly supported the decision despite later rivalries.[88] Early in his reign, Uthman continued military expansions, securing Armenia and completing conquests in Persia and North Africa, while maintaining administrative continuity from Umar's policies. He also initiated the standardization of the Quran, compiling an official codex based on Hafsa's copy and distributing it to provincial centers around 650 CE, mandating the destruction of variant personal recensions to ensure textual uniformity amid growing empire-wide recitation differences.[89] By the mid-650s, grievances mounted against Uthman's governance, particularly his appointments of Umayyad relatives to high posts, including Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan as governor of Syria (retained from Umar's era), Abdallah ibn Saad in Egypt, and others like Marwan ibn al-Hakam as secretary. Critics, including companions like Ammar ibn Yasir, alleged nepotism, corruption, and favoritism toward Quraysh elites over provincial non-Arabs (mawali) and earlier merit-based governors, though Uthman defended these as family loyalty and competence in managing distant frontiers. Provincial unrest escalated with delegations from Kufa, Basra, and Fustat (Egypt) arriving in Medina around 650-655 CE to protest perceived injustices, such as unequal stipends and governor abuses; Uthman dismissed some officials but rejected broader reforms or abdication, framing dissent as rebellion against caliphal authority.[90][91] In spring 656 CE, Egyptian rebels, numbering around 600-1000 led by figures like Muhammad ibn Abi Hudhayfa, returned to Medina after clashing with governor Abdallah ibn Saad, initiating a siege of Uthman's residence that lasted roughly 40-49 days. Ali ibn Abi Talib mediated, supplying Uthman's household with food and urging restraint, while Uthman refused armed defense against fellow Muslims and rejected calls to flee or fight. On 17 June 656 CE (18 Dhu al-Hijjah 35 AH), assailants stormed the house, killing Uthman, aged about 82, as he recited the Quran; accounts describe his wife Na'ila wounded in defense and the body mutilated, with assassins including Sudanese and Egyptian dissidents escaping reprisal initially. Sunni historical narratives, such as those in al-Tabari's Tarikh, portray Uthman as a martyr victimized by agitators, while Shia sources emphasize his policies as precipitating the upheaval; empirical consensus holds the killing stemmed from unchecked provincial factionalism rather than unified ideology.[92] Ali was swiftly acclaimed caliph in Medina by most companions and residents, pledging to uphold justice but delaying punishment of Uthman's killers to stabilize the umma and avoid further bloodshed, arguing many rebels were not direct assassins. Opposition arose from Talha ibn Ubaydallah, Zubayr ibn al-Awwam, and Aisha bint Abi Bakr, who from Mecca demanded immediate trials for the murderers before recognizing Ali, viewing his hesitation as complicity. This faction, numbering 3,000-10,000, marched to Basra, seizing treasury funds, prompting Ali's army of similar size to confront them at the Battle of the Camel on 7-8 December 656 CE (10-11 Jumada al-Awwal 36 AH) near Basra. Ali's forces prevailed after intense fighting, with 5,000-10,000 total casualties; Talha was slain by an arrow (possibly Marwan's), Zubayr deserted and was killed fleeing, and Aisha was unharmed, escorted back to Medina with respect, marking the first combat between Muslim armies and highlighting tribal and personal rivalries over vengeance.[93][94] Concurrently, Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan, Uthman's kinsman and Syria's governor since 639 CE, refused allegiance to Ali, displaying Uthman's bloodied shirt as a rallying symbol for avenging the caliph before succession questions. Ali relocated his capital to Kufa in early 657 CE for better support, marching 80,000-100,000 strong against Muawiya's 120,000 at Siffin on the Euphrates from late May to July 657 CE (Safar 37 AH). After 90 days of skirmishes causing thousands of deaths, Muawiya's commander Amr ibn al-As ordered Quran copies raised on spears to demand arbitration per Islamic law, halting Ali's momentum; Ali acquiesced amid army mutiny threats, appointing Abu Musa al-Ash'ari as arbitrator and Muawiya selecting Amr. The 658 CE arbitration at Dumat al-Jandal yielded no clear verdict—Abu Musa deposed both, but Amr reinstated Muawiya—exposing procedural flaws and eroding Ali's authority, as it equated the parties despite Uthman's kin ties.[95][96] The arbitration fractured Ali's supporters: Kharijites (about 12,000), rejecting human judgment over God's as kufr, seceded and raided civilians, prompting Ali to defeat them at Nahrawan in July 658 CE with heavy losses on both sides. Surviving Kharijites, viewing Ali as apostate, assassinated him on 28 January 661 CE (21 Ramadan 40 AH) in Kufa mosque by Abd al-Rahman ibn Muljam via poisoned sword; Ali succumbed two days later, naming his son Hasan successor. The First Fitna (656-661 CE) thus concluded with Hasan's brief caliphate ending in abdication to Muawiya in 661 CE, transitioning to hereditary Umayyad rule and crystallizing divisions—Shia emphasizing Ali's divine right and opposition to first three caliphs, Sunnis upholding all Rashidun legitimacy while lamenting the strife, and Kharijites advocating puritan rejection of flawed rulers. Causal analysis reveals the war's roots in rapid imperial growth straining tribal egalitarianism, unequal wealth distribution, and ambiguous succession norms post-Muhammad, rather than purely doctrinal splits, with later sectarian narratives retrofitting events.[91]Umayyad Caliphate (661–750 CE)
Territorial Expansion via Jihad
The Umayyad Caliphate's territorial expansion was framed doctrinally as jihad, an obligation to wage war against non-Muslims to extend the domain of Islam and secure submission or conversion, though practical drivers included access to resources, tribal raiding incentives, and exploiting weakened neighboring empires. Under Caliph Muawiya I (r. 661–680 CE), initial campaigns focused on consolidating Syria and launching probes into Byzantine territories, including naval raids on Constantinople in 674–678 CE that established Muslim sea power in the Mediterranean.[97] These efforts built on Rashidun gains but emphasized sustained pressure rather than immediate conquest, with jihad rhetoric mobilizing Arab tribes through promises of booty and martyrdom rewards.[98] Western expansion accelerated in North Africa, where Uqba ibn Nafi led expeditions from 670 CE, founding the garrison city of Kairouan as a base for further jihad against Berber tribes and Byzantine remnants.[99] By 682 CE, Uqba's forces reached the Atlantic but faced fierce resistance, culminating in his death in battle near modern Algeria; subsequent governors under Caliphs Abd al-Malik (r. 685–705 CE) and Al-Walid I (r. 705–715 CE), including Musa ibn Nusayr, subdued Berber revolts and completed the conquest of Ifriqiya by 709 CE, incorporating the region through tribute (jizya) and selective conversions.[97] This paved the way for the 711 CE invasion of Hispania, where Berber commander Tariq ibn Ziyad crossed the Strait of Gibraltar with 7,000–12,000 troops, defeating Visigothic King Roderic at the Battle of Guadalete (or Río Barbate) on July 19, 711 CE, and rapidly overrunning most of the Iberian Peninsula by 718 CE amid internal Visigothic divisions.[100] ![Kairouan Mosque overview][center] ![Umayyad empire extent circa 750 AD][float-right] Eastern campaigns targeted Central Asia and the Indian frontier, with Qutayba ibn Muslim, governor of Khorasan under Al-Walid I, conducting annual jihad expeditions from 705 CE that captured Bukhara (709 CE), Samarkand (712 CE), and Khwarezm, extending Umayyad control to the Amu Darya River by 715 CE through sieges, alliances with local Turkic groups, and imposition of Islamic governance.[97] Simultaneously, Muhammad ibn al-Qasim invaded Sindh in 711–712 CE, defeating Raja Dahir at the Battle of Aror and establishing Muslim rule over the Indus Valley, justified as jihad against polytheists but yielding tribute from Hindu princes.[100] Northern thrusts into Anatolia and Europe included raids reaching Constantinople (717–718 CE siege, repelled by Byzantine defenses and Bulgarian allies) and a 732 CE incursion into Francia under Abd al-Rahman al-Ghafiqi, halted at the Battle of Tours (or Poitiers) by Charles Martel, marking a limit to unchecked expansion.[101] These conquests, averaging thousands of kilometers traversed annually by mobile Arab-Berber armies, relied on superior cavalry tactics and ideological fervor but strained logistics, contributing to overextension by the mid-8th century.[98]Administrative Innovations and Arab Supremacy
Muawiya I (r. 661–680 CE) established foundational administrative practices by centralizing authority in Damascus and introducing hereditary succession, diverging from elective caliphal traditions to stabilize governance over vast territories.[102] He reorganized the bureaucracy, drawing on Byzantine and Sassanid models, including the expansion of the diwan system for military stipends and registers, which systematized payments to Arab troops from conquest revenues.[103] This ensured fiscal accountability and loyalty, with the diwan al-kharaj overseeing land taxes (kharaj) and poll taxes (jizya) on non-Muslims, funding the state's military apparatus.[104] Under Abd al-Malik (r. 685–705 CE), administrative reforms intensified with the Arabization of officialdom, mandating Arabic as the language of administration and coinage by 696 CE, replacing Greek and Persian scripts to assert Islamic and Arab cultural dominance.[105] His monetary reform introduced purely Islamic gold dinars and silver dirhams, free of figural imagery, standardized in weight (4.25 grams for dinars) and inscribed with Quranic phrases, unifying the economy across the empire and reducing reliance on Byzantine and Sassanid currencies.[106] The barid postal network, enhanced for rapid communication, connected provinces to the capital, facilitating oversight by governors (amirs) appointed from Arab elites.[107] These innovations entrenched Arab supremacy, positioning Arabs as the privileged ruling class with exclusive access to diwan stipends, land grants (iqta), and high offices, while non-Arab Muslim converts (mawali) faced systemic discrimination despite clientage ties to Arab tribes.[108] Mawali, often more numerous and economically vital in Persia and Iraq, paid higher taxes post-conversion and were barred from equal military integration, fostering resentment that fueled egalitarian movements like the Shu'ubiyya, which challenged Arab cultural hegemony.[104][109] Efforts by Umar II (r. 717–720 CE) to equalize stipends for mawali proved short-lived, as entrenched Arab tribal interests resisted dilution of privileges, exacerbating ethnic tensions that contributed to the Abbasid overthrow in 750 CE.[105][110]Internal Dissents and the Abbasid Revolution
The Umayyad Caliphate faced mounting internal challenges from the mid-7th century onward, including tribal factionalism between Qaysi and Yamani Arab clans, which fueled civil strife and weakened central authority.[111] Non-Arab Muslim converts, known as mawali, encountered systemic discrimination, such as exclusion from full fiscal equality despite conversion, higher taxation burdens compared to Arabs, and limited access to military and administrative roles, fostering resentment particularly in Persian-dominated regions like Khurasan.[112] [110] Shi'a groups, emphasizing descent from Ali, viewed Umayyad rule as illegitimate usurpation, while Kharijites launched sporadic revolts against perceived un-Islamic governance, exacerbating sectarian divisions.[113] These dissents were compounded by perceptions of caliphal excess, with rulers like Yazid III (r. 744–744 CE) and subsequent weak successors failing to quell unrest amid economic strains from overexpansion.[114] The Abbasid family, descendants of Muhammad's uncle al-Abbas, capitalized on this discontent by launching a clandestine propaganda campaign from around 718 CE, initially framing their movement as a restoration of Hashimite (broader clan including Ali's line) rule without explicit Shi'a allegiance to avoid alienating Sunnis.[115] Operating from Khurasan, they recruited mawali and Persian elements disillusioned with Arab supremacy, promising equality and justice under a caliph from the Prophet's kin.[116] Abu Muslim al-Khurasani, a non-Arab freedman of obscure origins possibly Persian or mawla, emerged as the key organizer; in June 747 CE, he unfurled black banners symbolizing revolt, assembling an army of 100,000–120,000 troops from diverse ethnicities to challenge Umayyad governor Nasr ibn Sayyar.[112] [117] The revolution accelerated in late 749 CE when Abbasid forces captured Kufa, Iraq, proclaiming Abu al-Abbas as-Saffah caliph on 28 November 749 CE, leveraging the city's strategic and symbolic importance as an anti-Umayyad hub.[118] Marwan II, the last Umayyad caliph, mobilized defenses but suffered defeat at the Battle of the Zab River on 25 January 750 CE near Mosul, where Abbasid numerical superiority and morale overwhelmed Umayyad lines, leading to Marwan's flight and death in Egypt by August 750 CE.[119] The Abbasids systematically massacred Umayyad elites, sparing few, to consolidate power, though Abu Muslim's growing influence prompted his execution by al-Mansur in 755 CE to prevent rivalry.[116] This upheaval shifted the caliphate's center eastward, integrating Persian administrative traditions and diluting Arab ethnocentrism, though underlying sectarian tensions persisted.[115]Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258 CE)
Establishment and Baghdad's Ascendancy
The Abbasid Revolution commenced in 747 CE in the eastern province of Khorasan, where discontented groups including Persian mawali (non-Arab converts) and elements disillusioned with Umayyad Arab-centric policies mobilized against the ruling dynasty.[120] Propagandizing under black banners as descendants of Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib, the Prophet Muhammad's uncle, the Abbasids garnered support from Shia sympathizers and anti-Umayyad factions by promising justice and equality, though their rule ultimately affirmed Sunni orthodoxy.[121] The uprising gained momentum through victories led by commanders like Abu Muslim al-Khorasani, culminating in the decisive Battle of the Zab in early 750 CE, where Umayyad forces under Caliph Marwan II were routed, leading to the fall of Damascus.[120] Abu al-Abbas al-Saffah, meaning "the blood-shedder," was proclaimed the first Abbasid caliph in Kufa later that year, marking the formal establishment of the dynasty after a ceremonial massacre of Umayyad elites at Abu Futrus to eliminate rivals.[122] His brief reign until 754 CE focused on consolidating control amid ongoing revolts, including the betrayal and execution of Abu Muslim in 755 CE by his successor al-Mansur to curb potential threats from powerful lieutenants.[122] Al-Mansur (r. 754–775 CE), al-Saffah's brother, stabilized the caliphate by suppressing Alid rebellions and centralizing administration, shifting emphasis from Syrian Arab dominance to a more inclusive Persian-influenced bureaucracy that integrated mawali into governance.[121] To escape the volatile politics of Kufa and Damascus, al-Mansur founded Baghdad in 762 CE on the western bank of the Tigris River, strategically positioned at the crossroads of trade routes linking Persia, Syria, and Mesopotamia.[123] Designed as a circular fortified city—known as Madinat al-Salam (City of Peace)—with concentric walls, four gates, and a central palace and great mosque, it symbolized Abbasid authority and facilitated control over irrigation canals that boosted agriculture in the surrounding fertile alluvial plains.[124] By the late 8th century, Baghdad's ascendancy as the caliphal capital was evident in its rapid population growth to over 1 million inhabitants, driven by mercantile prosperity from silk and spice trades, and its role as an administrative hub where diwans (bureaucratic departments) systematized taxation and military recruitment.[123] Under al-Mansur's successors, notably Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809 CE), Baghdad evolved into the empire's economic and intellectual nerve center, with state-sponsored workshops (karkhanas) producing luxury goods and a postal system (barid) enhancing communication across territories stretching from North Africa to Central Asia.[125] This relocation eastward from Umayyad strongholds empowered Persian elites in vizier roles, fostering administrative innovations like the adoption of paper for records, which improved efficiency over traditional materials, though it also sowed seeds for later ethnic tensions between Arab and Persian factions.[121] The city's strategic defensibility and access to the Tigris for transport underscored its causal role in enabling Abbasid longevity, contrasting with the peripheral vulnerabilities that had plagued Umayyad rule.[124]Scientific and Cultural Flourishing
The Abbasid Caliphate's scientific advancements were propelled by a translation movement initiated in the late 8th century, centered in Baghdad, where scholars rendered works from Greek, Syriac, Persian, and Indian sources into Arabic, enabling synthesis of diverse intellectual traditions.[126] This effort, patronized by caliphs such as Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809 CE) and al-Ma'mun (r. 813–833 CE), involved paying translators by weight in gold for manuscripts, fostering an environment of scholarly collaboration that preserved texts like Euclid's Elements and Ptolemy's Almagest. While often associated with the "House of Wisdom" (Bayt al-Hikma), historical evidence suggests this was more a metaphorical hub of libraries, observatories, and academies rather than a singular institution, with translations building on pre-Islamic Nestorian and Syriac Christian scholarship in regions like Gundishapur.[127] In mathematics, Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi (c. 780–850 CE) authored Al-Kitab al-Mukhtasar fi Hisab al-Jabr wal-Muqabala around 820 CE, introducing methods for solving linear and quadratic equations through completion and balancing, which formed the basis of algebra (from "al-jabr").[128] His works on Hindu-Arabic numerals and algorithms (derived from his name) influenced European mathematics via Latin translations in the 12th century.[129] Astronomy advanced through figures like al-Battani (c. 858–929 CE), who refined Ptolemaic models, accurately measuring the solar year at 365 days, 5 hours, 46 minutes, and 24 seconds—closer to modern values than Ptolemy's.[130] Medical knowledge progressed notably with Abu Bakr al-Razi (Rhazes, 865–925 CE), who differentiated measles from smallpox based on clinical observation and authored over 200 treatises, including systematic studies of pediatrics and the nervous system, emphasizing empirical testing over ancient authorities.[131] Later, Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 980–1037 CE) compiled the Canon of Medicine (c. 1025 CE), an encyclopedic synthesis of Galenic and Arabic pharmacology that standardized diagnostics and treatments, remaining a primary text in European universities until the 17th century.[131] Optics benefited from Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen, 965–1040 CE), whose Book of Optics (c. 1011 CE) pioneered the scientific method by experimenting with refraction and the camera obscura, rejecting emissions theory in favor of intromission.[130] Culturally, the era saw literary innovation, with Arabic poetry flourishing under Abbasid patronage—poets like Abu al-Tayyib al-Mutanabbi (915–965 CE) refined classical forms, blending panegyric with philosophy.[132] The compilation of One Thousand and One Nights emerged around the 9th–10th centuries, incorporating Persian and Indian folktales into Arabic prose, exemplifying narrative complexity.[133] Architectural achievements included the Great Mosque of Samarra (built 848–852 CE), featuring innovative hypostyle halls and a spiral minaret (Malwiya), which influenced later Islamic design while adapting Sassanid and Byzantine elements.[132] The adoption of papermaking from Chinese captives after the 751 CE Battle of Talas revolutionized manuscript production, enabling widespread dissemination of knowledge.[129] These developments, while innovative in application and preservation, largely synthesized pre-existing knowledge from conquered civilizations rather than originating ex nihilo, with empirical progress tempered by religious constraints on dissection and certain philosophical inquiries.[134] Patronage from caliphal courts and relative cosmopolitanism in Baghdad—drawing scholars from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds—drove this flourishing until increasing orthodoxy and political fragmentation curtailed it by the 11th century.[134]Sectarian Schisms and Decentralization
The Abbasid Caliphate experienced significant theological schisms in the 9th century, particularly surrounding the Mu'tazilite doctrine of the created Quran, which emphasized rationalism and divine justice over literalist interpretations. Caliph al-Ma'mun initiated the Mihna, or inquisition, in 833 CE to enforce this view among scholars, resulting in the imprisonment and flogging of prominent traditionalists like Ahmad ibn Hanbal, who insisted on the Quran's uncreated, eternal nature.[135] This policy, continued under al-Mu'tasim and al-Wathiq until 847 CE, alienated the broader Sunni scholarly community and fueled resentment against perceived caliphal overreach into religious matters.[136] Caliph al-Mutawakkil reversed course in 847 CE, abolishing the Mihna, dismissing Mu'tazilite judges, and patronizing orthodox Sunni schools like Hanbalism while persecuting Mu'tazilites and Shi'a groups, including the destruction of Husayn's tomb in Karbala.[137] This shift marked the decline of Mu'tazilism as state doctrine and the rise of traditionalist theology, later formalized in Ash'arism by al-Ash'ari (d. 936 CE), which sought a middle path between rationalism and literalism but prioritized revelation. Ongoing Sunni-Shi'a tensions persisted, with Abbasid rulers suppressing Shi'a revolts and claims to the caliphate, though initial Abbasid legitimacy drew from anti-Umayyad Shi'a sentiments that were later discarded. Political decentralization accelerated amid these schisms, exacerbated by reliance on Turkish mamluk troops who gained unchecked power. The Anarchy at Samarra (861-870 CE) followed al-Mutawakkil's assassination by Turkish guards, leading to the rapid deposition and murder of four caliphs amid factional strife between Turks, Maghariba Berbers, and palace eunuchs, severely undermining central authority.[138] Provincial governors exploited this vacuum, with the Tahirids establishing hereditary rule in Khorasan from 821 CE under al-Ma'mun's appointment, followed by the Saffarids' rise in Sistan around 861 CE under Ya'qub ibn al-Layth, a former coppersmith who expanded through rebellion against Abbasid appointees.[139] By the 10th century, further fragmentation occurred as Iranian dynasties like the Buyids, Twelver Shi'a of Daylamite origin, seized Baghdad in 945 CE, reducing Abbasid caliphs to ceremonial puppets while exercising real power over Iraq and western Iran until the Seljuk conquest in 1055 CE.[140] This era of semi-independent amirates, including the Samanids in Transoxiana (819-999 CE), fostered regional autonomy and cultural patronage but eroded the caliphate's unified political and military cohesion, reflecting the causal limits of centralized governance over vast, ethnically diverse territories.[141] The interplay of theological enforcement failures and military decentralization thus transitioned the Abbasids from imperial dominance to symbolic spiritual leadership.Mongol Sack of Baghdad
The Mongol invasion of Baghdad culminated in its sack in 1258, effectively dismantling the Abbasid Caliphate's political authority after nearly five centuries. In 1253, Great Khan Möngke dispatched his brother Hulagu Khan westward with an army estimated at 100,000 to 150,000 troops, including Mongol cavalry, auxiliary Persian and Turkic forces, and Chinese engineers skilled in siege warfare, to subdue remaining Isma'ili strongholds and the Abbasid realm. Hulagu's campaign progressed methodically: he eradicated the Nizari Ismaili Assassins by capturing their Alamut fortress in 1256, then advanced into Syria, seizing Aleppo in January 1258 after a brief siege that killed thousands of defenders and civilians. Caliph al-Musta'sim, whose Baghdad garrison numbered only about 10,000 ill-equipped soldiers amid a city population exceeding 1 million, received multiple ultimatums from Hulagu demanding submission and tribute but procrastinated, relying on Baghdad's outdated walls and diplomatic maneuvering rather than mobilization.[142][143] The siege began on 29 January 1258 when Hulagu's forces encircled the city from multiple directions, deploying massive trebuchets—some requiring hundreds of oxen to transport—and sappers who undermined fortifications using incendiary devices. By 4 February, breaches in the eastern walls allowed Mongol troops to overrun key defenses, prompting fierce but uncoordinated resistance that lasted days. Al-Musta'sim surrendered unconditionally on 10 February, personally visiting Hulagu's camp with his family and 3,000 notables to plead for mercy, after which he ordered the city's inhabitants to lay down arms. Hulagu initially promised protection for disarmed civilians, scholars, and religious figures—including sparing Nestorian Christians at the intercession of his Christian wife Dokuz Khatun—but rescinded these upon reports of continued defiance, unleashing troops for unrestricted plunder.[142][144][145] The ensuing sack, lasting approximately one week from mid-February, involved systematic looting, arson, and mass executions, with Mongol soldiers diverting the Tigris River's waters to drown resistors and filling streets with corpses. Contemporary estimates of civilian deaths vary widely; Hulagu himself reported over 200,000 killed, while Persian chronicler Ata-Malik Juvayni, an eyewitness in Mongol service, detailed the slaughter of entire quarters and the destruction of landmarks like the House of Wisdom, whose manuscripts reportedly blackened the river for days. Irrigation canals and dams were deliberately sabotaged, exacerbating famine and long-term agricultural collapse in Mesopotamia. Al-Musta'sim and his heirs were detained; the caliph, denied food until emaciated, was reportedly suffocated or trampled to death inside a carpet to symbolically avoid spilling royal blood, a method rooted in Mongol aversion to direct execution of rulers. Surviving elites, including some Shi'a Alids, were granted exemptions, reflecting Hulagu's strategic favoritism toward certain groups.[144][142][146] The sack's immediate aftermath saw Baghdad reduced from a cosmopolitan hub to a depopulated ruin, with perhaps 90% of its infrastructure razed and its role as an intellectual center shattered, though many scholars had already dispersed amid prior Abbasid decline. Politically, it terminated the Abbasid line's effective caliphal claims in the east, shifting nominal Abbasid continuity to Mamluk Cairo, while Hulagu established the Ilkhanate in Persia, initially non-Muslim but converting under Ghazan Khan in 1295, which integrated Mongol rule into Islamic governance and facilitated cultural exchange. Ecologically and demographically, the destruction of hydraulic systems contributed to salinization and desertification, hindering regional recovery for centuries, yet the broader Islamic world persisted through centers like Damascus and Cairo, where scientific patronage continued unabated; claims of a total "end to the Islamic Golden Age" overstate the event's causality, as intellectual stagnation predated 1258 and Mongol successors later patronized Persianate scholarship.[144][147][148]Shi'a Dynasties and Parallel Developments
Fatimid Caliphate in North Africa and Egypt
The Fatimid Caliphate was established in 909 CE when Abdullah al-Mahdi Billah, an Ismaili Shi'i leader claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima and son-in-law Ali, proclaimed himself caliph after his followers, primarily Berber Kutama tribesmen, defeated the Sunni Aghlabid dynasty in Ifriqiya (modern Tunisia).[149] [150] This victory consolidated control over parts of North Africa, including modern Algeria and Tunisia, where the Fatimids relied on a network of da'is (missionaries) to propagate Ismaili doctrine, emphasizing the imamate's esoteric knowledge and rejection of Sunni caliphal legitimacy.[151] The regime's early governance blended religious proselytization with tribal military support, enabling raids into Sicily by 912 CE and challenges to the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad, though initial expansion stalled against Zirid resistance in the Maghreb.[151] Under Caliph al-Mu'izz li-Din Allah (r. 953–975 CE), the Fatimids shifted focus eastward, dispatching general Jawhar al-Siqilli with 100,000 troops to conquer Egypt in 969 CE from the Ikhshidid dynasty, which had weakened under Tulunid fragmentation and Byzantine pressures.[150] Jawhar's forces captured Fustat on July 6, 969 CE, founding al-Qahira (Cairo) as the new capital in 973 CE adjacent to Fustat, with al-Mu'izz relocating the court there to leverage Egypt's agricultural wealth and Nile trade routes.[152] [151] This move marked the caliphate's peak territorial extent, spanning North Africa, Sicily, and parts of the Levant and Hijaz, with Cairo becoming a hub for Ismaili scholarship; al-Azhar Mosque, established in 970 CE, served as both a center for da'wa and a university attracting Sunni, Shi'i, Jewish, and Christian scholars under policies of pragmatic religious tolerance to maintain administrative efficiency amid a Sunni majority.[153] Governance evolved into a centralized bureaucracy with viziers wielding executive power, supported by a multi-ethnic army including Berbers, Turks, and Sudanese slaves, though ethnic factionalism eroded cohesion.[151] Caliphs like al-Aziz Billah (r. 975–996 CE) fostered economic prosperity through Red Sea trade in spices and textiles, minting dinars that circulated widely, while al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah (r. 996–1021 CE) pursued erratic policies, including transient persecutions of Jews and Christians—such as sumptuary laws in 1004 CE and the 1009 CE destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem—and suppression of Sunni rituals to enforce Ismaili observance.[154] These actions, rooted in the caliph's claimed divine authority, alienated subjects and fueled revolts, yet the regime persisted through vizierial interventions like those of Badr al-Jamali (appointed 1073 CE), a Sunni Armenian who stabilized rule but highlighted the dynasty's reliance on non-Ismaili elites.[151] Decline accelerated after 1057–1059 CE failed bids for Baghdad, undermined by Seljuk Turk advances, Bedouin incursions, and internal vizier-caliph power struggles; by the 12th century, the caliphate fragmented, losing Syria to Crusaders and Zengids while facing Norman threats in North Africa.[151] The end came in 1171 CE when Kurdish general Saladin, vizier under the child-caliph al-Adid (r. 1160–1171 CE), abolished Fatimid rule on September 2, restoring Sunni Abbasid suzerainty and founding the Ayyubid dynasty, with Ismaili da'wa networks surviving underground in Yemen and Persia.[150] The Fatimids' 262-year tenure challenged Sunni hegemony, advancing Ismaili theology and urban infrastructure but ultimately succumbing to sectarian divisions and military overextension.[153]Buyid and Seljuk Intermediaries
The Buyid dynasty, composed of Shiʿi Daylamites from the mountainous region of Gilan in northern Iran, rose to prominence in the 10th century through the campaigns of three brothers: ʿImād al-Dawla (r. 932–949), Rukn al-Dawla (r. 932–976), and Muʿizz al-Dawla (r. 945–967).[155] In 945 CE, Muʿizz al-Dawla captured Baghdad, deposing the Hamdanid ruler and assuming the title of amir al-umaraʾ (commander of commanders), thereby subordinating the Sunni Abbasid caliph al-Mustakfi to Buyid authority without abolishing the caliphate.[156] This arrangement positioned the Buyids as de facto rulers over Iraq and western Iran, collecting taxes, commanding armies numbering up to 20,000 Daylamite infantry and Ghulam cavalry, and patronizing Shiʿi scholars while tolerating Sunni institutions to maintain stability.[155] The caliphs, such as al-Muti (r. 946–974), retained nominal religious legitimacy, issuing investitures and fatwas, but Buyid emirs dictated policy, including the appointment of viziers and suppression of Sunni revolts like the 946 Hanbali uprising in Baghdad.[156] Buyid rule peaked under Adud al-Dawla (r. 949–983), who unified the dynasty's territories from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf, constructing infrastructure such as the Band-e Amir dam in Fars capable of irrigating 40,000 hectares and fostering trade that generated annual revenues exceeding 10 million dinars.[140] Despite their Shiʿi leanings—evident in public mourning rituals for Husayn and endowments to Twelver shrines—the Buyids avoided overt sectarian persecution, allowing the Abbasid caliph al-Qadir (r. 991–1031) to promulgate Sunni creedal texts like the Baghdad Manifesto of 1017 CE to counter Shiʿi influence.[157] Dynastic fragmentation after Adud al-Dawla's death, compounded by internal strife and Ghaznavid incursions, weakened Buyid control; by 1055 CE, their hold on Baghdad had eroded amid fiscal deficits and military defeats.[155] The Seljuk Turks, nomadic Oghuz converts to Sunni Islam from Central Asia, supplanted the Buyids as intermediaries following Tughril Beg's (r. 1037–1063) conquest of Baghdad in December 1055 CE, where he expelled the last Buyid emir, al-Malik al-Rahim.[158] Caliph al-Qaʾim (r. 1031–1075) formally invested Tughril with the title of sultan—derived from Arabic for "authority"—and the mantle of deputy, affirming Seljuk temporal sovereignty while preserving the caliph's role in religious jurisprudence and legitimacy grants.[159] This symbiotic structure enabled the Seljuks to expand an empire spanning Anatolia to Khorasan, mobilizing armies of 40,000–50,000 horsemen, including Turkmen auxiliaries, to combat Shiʿi Buyid remnants, Fatimid agents, and Byzantine forces, as at the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 CE.[158] Under Alp Arslan (r. 1063–1072) and Malik Shah (r. 1072–1092), the Seljuks centralized administration through Persian viziers like Nizam al-Mulk, who established the madrasa system to propagate Ashʿari Sunni theology, countering Shiʿi and Ismaili ideologies with over 20 institutions by 1092 CE.[159] The caliphs, such as al-Muqtadi (r. 1075–1094), mediated Seljuk succession disputes and issued diplomatic letters, but sultans controlled Baghdad's revenues—estimated at 5–6 million dinars annually—and military garrisons, occasionally clashing over autonomy, as in al-Mustarshid's (r. 1118–1135) failed rebellion against Mahmud II.[160] Seljuk intermediary rule endured until fragmentation into successor states post-1157 CE, sustaining the Abbasid framework amid Turkic Islamization and external threats.[158]Isma'ili and Twelver Shi'ism Evolutions
Twelver Shi'ism traces its imamate through Musa al-Kazim as the seventh Imam following Ja'far al-Sadiq's death in 765 CE, rejecting Isma'il ibn Ja'far's succession due to reports of his predecease or disqualifying conduct, thereby extending the line to twelve Imams ending with Muhammad al-Mahdi.[161] The eleventh Imam, Hasan al-Askari, died in 874 CE (260 AH), after which the twelfth Imam entered minor occultation (ghayba sughra), communicating via four deputies until 941 CE (329 AH), marking the onset of major occultation (ghayba kubra) wherein the Imam remains hidden yet infallible and authoritative over the faith.[162] This doctrine of prolonged occultation, rooted in traditions attributing prophetic foresight to the Imams, sustained Twelver communities amid Abbasid persecution by promising eschatological justice through the Mahdi's return.[163] Under Buyid rule in the 10th–11th centuries CE, Twelver scholarship flourished in Baghdad and Iran, compiling hadith collections like al-Kulayni's al-Kafi (d. 941 CE) that emphasized the Imams' exclusive interpretive authority, taqiyya for survival, and rational theology (kalam) to defend infallibility against Mu'tazili rationalism.[164] Jurisprudential evolution saw the Akhbari approach, dominant by the 11th century, restrict rulings to explicit Imam narrations, limiting clerical innovation, while proto-Usuli thinkers like Shaykh al-Mufid (d. 1022 CE) began integrating reason.[165] The Usuli revival intensified with al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli (d. 1277 CE), who systematized ijtihad—personal exertive reasoning by qualified mujtahids—using intellect, consensus, and analogy alongside traditions, enabling adaptation post-occultation and elevating mujtahids as near-proxies for the hidden Imam.[166] Isma'ili Shi'ism, upholding Isma'il as seventh Imam despite Twelver objections, developed esoteric (batini) exegesis prioritizing the Imams' inner knowledge over literal sharia, structured around seven pillars (including walaya to the Imam) and prophetic cycles culminating in the qutb (pole) Imam.[167] After Muhammad ibn Isma'il's disappearance around 813 CE, the tradition shifted to concealed Imams, fueling da'wa networks that propagated cyclical revelations and ta'wil (allegorical interpretation). The Fatimid era (909–1171 CE) manifested this through caliph-Imams claiming universal authority, but post-Fatimid schisms redefined branches.[168] The pivotal Nizari-Musta'li divide occurred in 1094–1095 CE upon al-Mustansir's death, with Nizaris affirming his son Nizar as Imam against the designated al-Musta'li; Nizar's execution in 1095 CE prompted Hasan-i Sabbah to seize Alamut fortress in 1090 CE, establishing an autonomous Nizari state in Persia with missionary (da'i) hierarchies, economic self-sufficiency via castles, and selective confrontations against Seljuk Sunnis until Mongol forces razed Alamut in 1256 CE, killing the Imam ala dhikrihi al-salam.[169] Surviving Nizaris dispersed into taqiyya-based communities, with Imams relocating to Anjudan (14th–18th centuries CE) and sustaining esoteric teachings amid Sunni dominance, later emerging publicly under Aga Khan I (imamate asserted 1817 CE) who formalized hereditary succession.[170] Musta'lis, rejecting Nizar, fragmented further after al-Amir's death in 1130 CE into Tayyibi (recognizing al-Tayyib's concealment) and Hafizi lines; Tayyibis evolved into Dawoodi and Sulaymani Bohra sects led by da'is mutlaq (absolute missionaries) in Yemen and India, preserving Fatimid-era texts and rituals without a visible Imam.[167] These evolutions underscore Isma'ili adaptability through concealment and delegation, contrasting Twelver centralization on the absent Mahdi.Iberian and North African Islam
Umayyad Emirate and Caliphate of Cordoba
Following the Abbasid Revolution that overthrew the Umayyad Caliphate in Damascus in 750 CE, Abd al-Rahman I, a Umayyad prince who escaped the ensuing massacre of his family, fled westward and reached al-Andalus in Iberia by 755 CE. Rallying Arab loyalists, Berber troops, and local Muslim governors amid the region's instability after the initial 711 CE conquest, he defeated the incumbent emir Yusuf al-Fihri at the Battle of the Musara near Cordoba on May 15, 756 CE, thereby founding the independent Umayyad Emirate of Cordoba. This marked the continuation of Umayyad dynastic rule outside the Abbasid domain, with Cordoba established as the capital and administrative center, superseding the previously dominant Damascus-oriented governance.[171] Abd al-Rahman I (r. 756–788 CE) focused on consolidation against internal threats, including revolts by Muladi (Muslim converts of Iberian origin) and Mozarabs (Christians under Muslim rule), as well as external raids from Christian kingdoms in the north. He reorganized the administration into provinces (koras), built fortifications, and expanded irrigation systems to bolster agricultural output, which formed the economic backbone through taxes on crops like olives and grains.[172] Successors maintained this centralization, suppressing Berber unrest and conducting campaigns that secured borders, such as the defeat of Charlemagne's forces at Roncevaux in 778 CE, though the emirate nominally recognized Abbasid suzerainty until independence was asserted.[171] The emirate transitioned to the Caliphate of Cordoba under Abd al-Rahman III (r. 912–961 CE), who inherited a fragmented realm plagued by factional strife upon ascending as emir in October 912 CE. After stabilizing rule through decisive military actions against rivals and rebels, he proclaimed himself caliph on January 16, 929 CE, rejecting Abbasid spiritual authority and countering Fatimid claims from North Africa.[171] This elevation symbolized political autonomy and imperial ambition, supported by a professional army including Slavic mercenaries and a navy that controlled Mediterranean trade routes, facilitating imports of silk, spices, and slaves while exporting leather, textiles, and metals. Abd al-Rahman III's reign represented the caliphate's peak, with victories over Christian forces—capturing cities like Zamora in 981 CE under his successors—and infrastructural projects that enhanced Cordoba's status as a major urban center housing perhaps 100,000–500,000 residents by the 10th century, though estimates vary due to limited census data.[171] He commissioned Madinat al-Zahra (936–940 CE), an extravagant palace-city near Cordoba featuring gardens, mosques, and administrative halls, which served as a symbol of Umayyad legitimacy and hosted diplomatic receptions, though its construction strained resources amid ongoing border skirmishes.[171] Economic prosperity derived from land taxes (kharaj), poll taxes on non-Muslims (jizya), and commerce, but relied on coercive measures like forced conversions and enslavement during campaigns to maintain fiscal health.[173] Decline accelerated after 961 CE under weaker rulers like Hisham II (r. 976–1013, 1013–1027 CE), exacerbated by the Fitna of al-Andalus beginning in 1009 CE with the assassination of the influential vizier Abd al-Rahman Sanchuelo (son of the de facto ruler Almanzor), which unleashed palace coups, Berber mercenary revolts, and ethnic factionalism between Arabs, Berbers, and Muladis.[174] Financial exhaustion from incessant civil wars and northern expeditions eroded central authority, culminating in the sack of Madinat al-Zahra in 1010 CE and the deposition of multiple puppet caliphs.[171] By 1031 CE, the caliphate dissolved entirely, fragmenting al-Andalus into over 30 taifa (party) kingdoms, which lacked unified defense against Christian Reconquista advances and invited external interventions like Almoravid invasions.[171] This collapse stemmed from dynastic infighting and overreliance on transient military alliances rather than institutional resilience.Taifa Kingdoms and Reconquista Pressures
The collapse of the Umayyad Caliphate of Córdoba in 1031 CE fragmented al-Andalus into multiple independent taifa kingdoms, or "party kingdoms," governed by local warlords, Arab clans, Berber groups, and Slavic freedmen (saqaliba).[175] [176] By the 1040s, prominent taifas included those of Seville under the Abbadids, Toledo under the Dhunnunids, Zaragoza under the Banu Hud, Badajoz, and Valencia, with estimates of over 20 major entities and smaller vassals totaling up to 50 polities at their peak.[177] These states prioritized internal rivalries and luxury patronage over unified military strength, fostering ethnic tensions between Arab elites and Berber or saqaliba rulers while relying on imported mercenaries for defense.[176] Christian kingdoms in northern Iberia, invigorated by the Reconquista, exploited taifa disunity through conquests and extortionate tributes called parias, which taifa rulers paid in gold dinars, silver, commodities, or even artisans to secure nominal protection or postpone attacks.[175] For instance, Seville's Abbadid ruler al-Mu'tamid paid massive parias to Alfonso VI of León-Castile, enabling Christian expansion while draining Muslim treasuries—Toledo alone contributed vast sums before its fall.[175] This system reversed earlier dynamics where Muslims had dominated, as Christian forces like those of Ferdinand I of Castile-León extracted parias from Zaragoza and Badajoz by the 1060s, using the influx to bolster armies and fortifications. A turning point came in May 1085 when Alfonso VI besieged and captured Toledo after decades of tribute dependency, establishing direct Castilian control over its strategic central position, multicultural population of around 30,000, and symbolic Visigothic heritage, which Alfonso leveraged to claim imperial titles. The conquest triggered panic among remaining taifas, with rulers like al-Mu'tamid of Seville and al-Qadir of Toledo appealing to North African Almoravid leader Yusuf ibn Tashfin for aid, highlighting the taifas' military incapacity against coordinated Christian offensives.[175] Subsequent Christian gains, including Valencia's fall to El Cid in 1094, intensified pressures until Almoravid invasions from 1086 onward subsumed most taifas by 1094, temporarily staving off further Reconquista advances through brutal centralization.[177]Almoravid and Almohad Berber Empires
The Almoravid dynasty originated among the Sanhaja Berber tribes of the western Sahara in the 1040s, coalescing around the religious reformer Abdullah ibn Yasin, who established a ribat (fortified monastery) to enforce rigorous adherence to Maliki jurisprudence and ascetic practices.[178] Under leaders Yahya ibn Ibrahim and later Yusuf ibn Tashfin, the Almoravids expanded northward, subduing the Maghrib by the 1070s through military campaigns that integrated disparate Berber confederations and suppressed local rulers, culminating in the foundation of Marrakesh as capital in 1070.[179] This consolidation introduced innovations such as a standardized gold currency, the Almoravid dinar, which facilitated trade across the Sahara and Mediterranean.[180] In al-Andalus, the Almoravids intervened at the invitation of beleaguered taifa kingdoms facing Christian incursions, decisively defeating Alfonso VI of León-Castile at the Battle of Sagrajas (Zallaqa) on 23 October 1086, where Berber cavalry tactics inflicted heavy casualties and halted advances toward Seville.[181] By 1094, under Tashfin's campaigns, they had annexed most Muslim principalities in Iberia, imposing centralized rule from Marrakesh and enforcing strict Islamic orthodoxy, including patrols by jurists to curb perceived laxity in urban centers like Córdoba and Granada.[182] [183] Their governance stabilized al-Andalus temporarily against the Reconquista but strained resources through continuous warfare and religious purges, contributing to internal dissent among Andalusian elites accustomed to more pluralistic taifa autonomy.[184] The Almohad movement arose in opposition to Almoravid rule among the Masmuda Berber tribes of the High Atlas Mountains, initiated by the theologian Muhammad ibn Tumart around 1121, who proclaimed himself the Mahdi and advocated a unitarian doctrine emphasizing absolute tawhid (divine unity), rejecting anthropomorphic interpretations of God and Almoravid scholasticism.[185] After Ibn Tumart's death in 1130, his successor Abd al-Mu'min unified followers through jihad, launching systematic conquests that captured Marrakesh in 1147 following a prolonged siege, massacring Almoravid elites and dismantling their infrastructure.[186] [187] By 1160, the Almohads had extended dominion over the entire western Maghrib, including Ifriqiya, and proclaimed a caliphate under Abd al-Mu'min, who died in 1163 after campaigns that integrated administrative reforms like tribal militias and tax systems to sustain the empire's vast territory. Almohad forces completed control of al-Andalus between 1148 and 1172, relocating taifa remnants and imposing doctrinal uniformity that included forced conversions and suppression of non-Muslims, exacerbating tensions amid ongoing Christian pressures.[181] Their military zenith featured victories against Iberian Christians, but overextension and rigid theology alienated subjects; the empire fragmented after the catastrophic defeat at the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa on 16 July 1212, where a coalition of Castile, Aragon, and Navarre routed Almohad armies, exposing vulnerabilities in Berber cohesion and paving the way for Marinid and Nasrid successors.[186] [184] By the 1260s, Almohad authority had collapsed in Iberia and much of the Maghrib due to revolts, succession disputes, and renewed Christian offensives, marking the end of unified Berber imperial dominance in the region.[185]Eastern Expansions and Turkic Islamization
Conversion of Turks and Ghaznavids
The conversion of Turkic peoples to Islam occurred gradually from the 8th century onward, primarily through contact with Muslim merchants, Sufi missionaries, military captives, and the political influence of Persianate dynasties like the Samanids in Transoxiana.[188][189] Initial individual conversions among Turkic elites in Sogdiana preceded mass adoption, driven by the prestige of Islamic culture and economic incentives along the Silk Road.[188] By the early 10th century, these interactions culminated in the official Islamization of the Karakhanid Khanate, the first Turkic state to embrace Islam as its religion, marking a pivotal shift from Tengrism and shamanistic practices to Sunni orthodoxy.[190][191] Satuq Bughra Khan, ruler of the Karakhanids around 955 CE, converted to Islam under the tutelage of a Muslim captive from Artux, prompting widespread adoption among his subjects and kin; this event, dated variably between 934 and 960 CE, transformed the khanate into a vehicle for Islamic expansion in Central Asia.[190][192] The Karakhanids' embrace of Islam facilitated alliances with the Samanids and accelerated the faith's penetration into nomadic tribes, with over 200,000 tents of one Turkish group reportedly converting by 960 CE.[193] This state-level conversion influenced subsequent Turkic groups, such as the Oghuz, whose elites adopted Islam for political unity and military advantage against non-Muslim rivals, though full tribal Islamization often lagged behind elite decisions.[194] Parallel to these developments, the Ghaznavid dynasty, founded by Turkic mamluks (slave soldiers) of pagan origin who had converted in Samanid service, exemplified the integration of Islam into Turkic military culture. Sabuktigin, a purchased Turkic slave who embraced Islam prior to 977 CE, established Ghazni as a base and ruled as a devout Sunni governor, suppressing Isma'ili Shi'ism and aligning with Abbasid caliphal authority.[195][196] His son, Mahmud of Ghazni (r. 998–1030 CE), intensified this process by conducting 17 raids into India between 1000 and 1027 CE, framing them as jihads to expand Islam's frontiers, destroy Hindu temples, and enslave thousands who were subsequently converted or integrated into Islamic society.[195][197] Mahmud's campaigns amassed wealth that funded madrasas and patronage of Persianate Sunni scholarship, solidifying the Ghaznavids' role in transitioning Turkic warriors from peripheral mercenaries to central pillars of Islamic imperial power.[198][199] The Ghaznavids' reliance on converted Turkic ghulams not only bolstered their army—numbering tens of thousands—but also propagated Islam among Afghans and eastern Iranian populations through conquest and administrative imposition of Sharia.[200][201] This militarized Islamization contrasted with the Karakhanids' more organic tribal diffusion, yet both dynamics eroded pre-Islamic Turkic traditions, paving the way for later dynasties like the Seljuks to dominate the Islamic world.[202] By the mid-11th century, these conversions had shifted the demographic center of Islam eastward, with Turkic Muslims comprising key forces in countering Buyid Shi'a influence and Byzantine pressures.[198]Seljuk Sultanate and Crusader Encounters
The Seljuk Turks, originating from Oghuz tribes who converted to Sunni Islam in the 10th century, rose as a military force serving the Ghaznavids before asserting independence under Tughril Beg, who defeated the Buyid dynasty and captured Baghdad in 1055, securing recognition as sultan from Abbasid Caliph al-Qaʾim and thereby restoring Sunni political dominance over Shiʿa interlopers in the caliphal domains.[203] Under Tughril's successor Alp Arslan (r. 1063–1072), the sultanate expanded aggressively into Byzantine territories, leveraging mobile horse archer tactics against heavier infantry formations.[204] The Battle of Manzikert on August 26, 1071, exemplified this expansion: Alp Arslan's forces, numbering around 40,000–50,000, employed feigned retreats to isolate and rout Byzantine Emperor Romanus IV Diogenes' approximately 40,000-strong army, whose cohesion fractured due to mercenary desertions and command splits, resulting in Romanus' capture and the cession of key Anatolian fortresses.[205][206] This victory facilitated mass Turkish migration into Anatolia, eroding Byzantine control and prompting Emperor Alexios I Komnenos to appeal to Western Europe in 1095, a factor in Pope Urban II's summons of the First Crusade as a counter to perceived Islamic encroachment.[206][205] Malik Shah (r. 1072–1092) oversaw the empire's territorial peak, encompassing Iran, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine, bolstered by vizier Nizam al-Mulk's administrative reforms, including the establishment of Nizamiyya madrasas to propagate Ashʿari Sunni theology against Shiʿa and philosophical deviations.[203] However, Nizam al-Mulk's assassination by Nizari Ismailis in 1092, followed by Malik Shah's sudden death later that year, triggered succession disputes among heirs, fragmenting the sultanate into autonomous branches such as the Sultanate of Rum under Kilij Arslan I in Anatolia and various Syrian atabegates, weakening centralized resistance to external threats.[203] The fragmented Seljuks faced the First Crusade (1096–1099) primarily through regional emirs: Crusader armies, after initial People's Crusade setbacks, compelled Kilij Arslan I to relinquish Nicaea to Byzantium in 1097 following a siege, then repulsed his counterattack of roughly 10,000–20,000 horsemen at the Battle of Dorylaeum on July 1, 1097, where disciplined Frankish heavy cavalry and infantry held against hit-and-run tactics before reinforcements arrived.[207] Advancing to Syria, the Crusaders endured the prolonged Siege of Antioch (October 1097–June 1098), defeating a Seljuk relief force of about 35,000–40,000 under atabeg Kerbogha through a daring sally and purported discovery of the Holy Lance, which boosted morale despite internal Crusader divisions.[207] These victories enabled the capture of Jerusalem from Fatimid control on July 15, 1099, though Seljuk principalities retained influence in northern Syria and Anatolia.[207] Post-1099 Crusader states—the Kingdom of Jerusalem, Principality of Antioch, County of Edessa, and County of Tripoli—clashed repeatedly with Seljuk emirs, as in the Battle of Harran (May 7, 1104), where a combined Crusader force of around 1,000 knights suffered defeat by a Mosul-based Seljuk coalition, stalling Edessa's expansion.[207] The Sultanate of Rum, hemmed between resurgent Byzantines and Crusader incursions, endured pressures but stabilized under later sultans like Mesud I (r. 1116–1155), who navigated alliances and conflicts, including aiding Danishmend Turks against Crusader raids.[203] These encounters underscored the Seljuks' role in channeling Turkic military prowess into Sunni defense, though internal disunity limited decisive counteroffensives until later unifications under Zengi and Nur ad-Din, precursors to Saladin's campaigns.[207]Delhi Sultanate in India
The Delhi Sultanate, established in 1206 CE following the death of Muhammad of Ghor, marked the inception of sustained Muslim rule over northern India, originating from the Ghurid dynasty's invasions that began with the decisive Battle of Tarain in 1192 CE, where Muhammad defeated the Rajput king Prithviraj Chauhan.[208] Qutb al-Din Aibak, a Turkic slave general under Ghor, declared himself sultan in Lahore before shifting the capital to Delhi, initiating the Mamluk (Slave) Dynasty (1206–1290 CE), which relied on military slavery to consolidate power amid threats from Mongol incursions and Hindu kingdoms.[209] Successive rulers like Shams al-Din Iltutmish (r. 1211–1236 CE) expanded control over Bihar and Bengal, introduced silver tanka coinage to stabilize the economy, and secured recognition from the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, linking the regime to orthodox Sunni Islam despite its peripheral status.[210] The sultanate's five dynasties—Mamluk, Khalji (1290–1320 CE), Tughlaq (1320–1414 CE), Sayyid (1414–1451 CE), and Lodi (1451–1526 CE)—governed through a centralized iqta land-grant system, where military officers administered provinces in exchange for troops, fostering administrative efficiency but recurrent revolts due to noble-sultan tensions.[211] Under Jalal al-Din Khalji and especially Alauddin Khalji (r. 1296–1316 CE), the realm reached its territorial zenith, conquering Gujarat, the Deccan, and repelling Mongols at the Ravi River in 1299 CE; Alauddin's reforms included price controls, market regulations, and a standing army of 475,000 cavalry, funded by agrarian taxes yielding 50% of produce from Hindu peasants under jizya and kharaj levies.[209] Muhammad bin Tughlaq (r. 1325–1351 CE) attempted ambitious shifts, like token currency and capital relocation to Daulatabad, which caused economic disruption and rebellions, while Firoz Shah Tughlaq (r. 1351–1388 CE) emphasized public works, including canals irrigating 200,000 hectares, and welfare like free hospitals, though his policies reinforced Islamic orthodoxy by destroying non-Sunni structures.[210] The sultanate fragmented after Timur's sack of Delhi in 1398 CE, which killed 100,000 civilians and depopulated the city, enabling regional Muslim kingdoms like the Bahmanis in the Deccan.[208] In the context of Islamic expansion, the sultanate facilitated the subcontinent's gradual Islamization, primarily through elite conversions among Rajputs and artisans via political incentives rather than widespread coercion, as Muslim demographics remained under 15–20% until the 16th century; Sufi orders, notably the Chishti silsila founded by Moinuddin Chishti (d. 1236 CE) in Ajmer, emphasized personal devotion and syncretic practices, attracting Hindu followers through music, charity, and tomb cults (dargahs) that numbered over 100 by 1400 CE.[212] Suhrawardi and Naqshbandi orders provided state-aligned mysticism, with saints like Nizamuddin Auliya (d. 1325 CE) influencing rulers while promoting tolerance.[213] However, chronicles record targeted temple desecrations, such as Alauddin's destruction of 20–30 sites in Rajasthan for loot and symbolism, and Firoz Shah's conversion of 12 major temples into mosques like the Adina in Pandua, often tied to revenue extraction from Brahmin endowments rather than doctrinal mandates alone, though Islamic iconoclasm against idolatry contributed; estimates of verified desecrations across the period total around 80, concentrated in conquest phases, per inscriptional evidence, countering inflated claims of thousands.[214] [215] Architecturally, the sultanate pioneered Indo-Islamic styles, blending Persian domes and minarets with Hindu corbelled arches, as in the Qutb Minar (completed 1236 CE, 73 meters tall) and Alai Darwaza gateway (1311 CE), using red sandstone and marble inlays; over 50 mosques and forts emerged, symbolizing Islamic sovereignty while incorporating local labor.[216] Administratively, Persian replaced Sanskrit in courts, with iqbal-nama histories like Zia al-Din Barani's (c. 1357 CE) justifying rule via sharia-infused realpolitik, though Hindu zamindars retained village autonomy under protection for taxes. The Lodi Dynasty's Afghan rulers, ending with Ibrahim Lodi's defeat by Babur at Panipat in 1526 CE (fielding 100,000 vs. 12,000), transitioned to Mughal rule, but the sultanate's legacy endured in fused governance and accelerated coastal trade with Arabs, boosting GDP through urban growth in Delhi (population 400,000 by 1300 CE).[211]Mongol Impact and Recovery
Invasions and Devastation of Islamic Heartlands
The Mongol invasions of the Islamic heartlands began with the conquest of the Khwarezmian Empire from 1219 to 1221, initiated after Khwarezm Shah Muhammad II executed Mongol envoys and seized their caravan, prompting Genghis Khan to assemble an army of approximately 100,000-200,000 troops for retaliation.[217] Cities such as Otrar, Bukhara, Samarkand, and Merv faced systematic siege and massacre; at Merv in 1221, contemporary accounts reported up to 1.3 million inhabitants killed over several days, though modern estimates adjust for exaggeration while confirming near-total depopulation through executions, enslavement, and flight.[218] This campaign devastated Transoxiana and Khorasan, core regions of Persianate Islamic culture, with irrigation systems destroyed, agricultural lands abandoned, and urban centers reduced to ruins, contributing to long-term economic collapse in Central Asia.[147] Under Genghis Khan's successors, the invasions intensified in the 1250s under Hulagu Khan, who led a force of 100,000-150,000 into Persia and Mesopotamia as part of Möngke Khan's directives to subdue remaining Islamic strongholds.[219] Hulagu first eradicated the Nizari Ismaili fortresses between 1256 and 1260, culminating in the surrender of Alamut in 1256 after prolonged sieges that dismantled their network of mountain redoubts.[220] Advancing to Baghdad, the Abbasid capital, Hulagu's army besieged the city starting January 29, 1258, breaching defenses by February 10 through bombardment and flooding tactics; Caliph al-Musta'sim surrendered, only to be executed along with much of the royal family.[221] The sack of Baghdad resulted in catastrophic losses, with estimates of 200,000 to over 800,000 civilian deaths from slaughter, drowning, and starvation, alongside the destruction of the House of Wisdom's libraries, whose books reportedly clogged the Tigris River.[219][221] This event terminated the Abbasid Caliphate, symbolizing the rupture of centralized Islamic authority, while broader campaigns razed cities like Aleppo and Damascus in 1260, though halted by Mamluk forces at Ain Jalut.[218] The invasions caused demographic collapses—Persia's population fell from around 2.5 million to 250,000 in some estimates—disrupted trade routes, and severed scholarly lineages, though some transmission occurred via fleeing ulama to regions like Anatolia and India.[147] Irrigation qanats and farmlands were systematically wrecked to prevent recovery, fostering salinization and desertification that persisted for centuries.[222]Ilkhanid Conversion and Cultural Synthesis
Ghāzān Khān, ascending the Ilkhanid throne in 1295, publicly converted to Islam alongside his court and military elite, marking the dynasty's official shift from Buddhism, Nestorian Christianity, and shamanistic practices to Sunni Islam.[223] This conversion, influenced by his advisor Nawrūz and aimed at consolidating rule over a predominantly Muslim Persian population resentful of prior Mongol religious tolerance and fiscal impositions, involved mass baptisms—though termed "conversions"—and the destruction of non-Islamic religious sites like Buddhist temples.[224] Ghāzān's decree mandated Islamic observance among Mongols, prohibiting alcohol and promoting prayer, while his successor Öljeitü briefly adopted Twelver Shi'ism in 1310 before reverting to Sunnism amid unrest.[225] The conversion facilitated administrative reforms, with Ghāzān adopting Persian bureaucratic norms, standardizing weights and measures, and curbing nomadic disruptions to agriculture, thereby stabilizing the economy ravaged by earlier Mongol invasions. Culturally, it spurred a synthesis blending Mongol imperial structures with Persian intellectual traditions, evident in the patronage of historiography: Rashid al-Dīn, a Jewish physician converted to Islam and appointed vizier in 1304, compiled the Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh, a comprehensive world history incorporating Mongol, Chinese, and Islamic sources, commissioned under Ghāzān and Öljeitü.[226] Ilkhanid rulers fostered advancements in sciences and arts, translating Greek, Sanskrit, and Chinese texts into Persian, supporting astronomers like Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī—who earlier under Hülegü established the Maragheh Observatory in 1259—and funding medical encyclopedias.[227] In visual arts, manuscript illumination flourished, merging Persian figural styles with Chinese landscape motifs and European perspectives, as seen in illustrated Shahnameh copies where Mongol patrons identified with pre-Islamic Iranian heroes, producing over 20 known Ilkhanid manuscripts by 1330.[228] This Persianate-Mongol fusion, peaking until the dynasty's fragmentation after Abu Saʿīd's death in 1335, revived Iranian cultural agency post-Abbasid collapse, influencing subsequent Timurid and Safavid eras despite the Ilkhanids' eventual dilution into local dynasties.Timurid Empire and Renaissance
The Timurid Empire, established by Timur (1336–1405), emerged in the late 14th century from the remnants of the Chagatai Khanate in Transoxiana, with Timur consolidating power by 1370 through military campaigns that subdued local Mongol-Turkic tribes and expanded into Persia starting in 1383, capturing Herat. As a Sunni Muslim of Turco-Mongol descent who invoked Genghis Khan's legacy while adhering to Islamic law, Timur's conquests devastated Islamic heartlands, including the sack of Baghdad in 1393, Isfahan's massacre of 70,000 inhabitants in 1387, and Delhi's plunder in 1398, where an estimated 100,000 prisoners were executed, contributing to a death toll across his campaigns of approximately 17 million people, or 5% of the global population at the time. These invasions temporarily halted Ottoman expansion after the Battle of Ankara in 1402, where Timur captured Sultan Bayezid I, but also fragmented the Islamic world further by destroying urban centers and irrigation systems, exacerbating post-Mongol decline.[229][230][231] Following Timur's death in 1405 en route to conquer China, his empire fragmented among successors, with Shahrukh (r. 1405–1447) stabilizing rule from Herat and promoting Persianate culture, while grandson Ulugh Beg (r. 1410–1449 in Samarkand) focused on intellectual patronage. The Timurids, ruling until 1507, shifted from pure conquest to governance blending Mongol administrative traditions with Islamic jurisprudence, fostering a cultural revival often termed the Timurid Renaissance, centered in Samarkand and Herat as hubs of Sunni scholarship and arts. This period saw synthesis of Persian, Turkish, and Islamic elements, with Timurid rulers commissioning madrasas, mosques, and caravanserais using turquoise tilework and geometric designs derived from Seljuq precedents, as in the Gur-e Amir mausoleum in Samarkand completed around 1405.[232][233][234] Scientific and artistic achievements marked this renaissance, exemplified by Ulugh Beg's construction of the Samarkand Observatory around 1420, equipped with a massive sextant over 40 meters long for precise stellar observations, leading to the Zij-i Sultani catalog of 1,018 stars with positional accuracy surpassing Ptolemy's by up to 20 arc minutes in declination. Ulugh Beg, who prioritized astronomy over warfare, employed scholars like al-Kashi for trigonometric advancements, including sine tables to seven decimal places, advancing Islamic mathematical astronomy amid a broader patronage of poetry, miniature painting, and historiography by figures such as Nizam al-Din Shami. This efflorescence influenced later Islamic empires, including the Mughals via Timurid descendant Babur, but was undermined by internal strife and Uzbek invasions by 1507, transitioning Central Asia toward nomadic confederations.[235][236][237]Gunpowder Islamic Empires (16th–19th Centuries)
Ottoman Conquests and Millet System
The Ottoman principality, founded by Osman I circa 1299 in Söğüt, northwest Anatolia, initiated expansion through raids and battles against weakened Byzantine forces, defeating them at Bapheus in 1302 and capturing Bursa in 1326 under Orhan, who established it as the first capital.[238] Orhan further secured İznik in 1331 and İzmit in 1337, consolidating Anatolian holdings amid the beyliks' fragmentation.[238] Entry into the Balkans occurred around 1345 via alliances and invasions, with Murad I seizing Adrianople (Edirne) in 1361, shifting the capital there and enabling deeper penetration into Thrace and Bulgaria.[238] The Battle of Kosovo on June 28, 1389, saw Murad I's forces defeat a Serbian-led coalition, resulting in his assassination but vassalizing Serbia and opening paths to Bosnia and Wallachia.[238] Recovery from the 1402 defeat at Ankara by Timur allowed Mehmed I and successors to rebuild, culminating in Mehmed II's siege and conquest of Constantinople on May 29, 1453, ending the Byzantine Empire after a 53-day blockade involving massive artillery, including urban cannons cast by Hungarian engineer Orban.[238][239] Renaming it Istanbul, Mehmed II proclaimed himself Caesar of Rome, integrating the city's resources and population; he subsequently annexed Serbia fully by 1459, the Morea despots in 1460, Trebizond in 1461, and Bosnia in 1463, while suppressing the Venetian-Ottoman War (1463–1479) to secure naval dominance.[238] Under Selim I (r. 1512–1520), the empire doubled in size through the Ottoman–Mamluk War, defeating the Mamluks at Marj Dabiq on August 24, 1516, securing Syria and Palestine, and at Raydaniyah on January 22, 1517, capturing Cairo and Egypt, thereby gaining control of Mecca, Medina, and Red Sea trade routes.[238][240] Suleiman I (r. 1520–1566) extended reaches with the capture of Belgrade in 1521, the decisive victory at Mohács on August 29, 1526, annihilating Hungarian forces (killing King Louis II and much of the nobility), partitioning Hungary, and the 1534–1535 conquest of Baghdad and Mesopotamia from Safavids, establishing Ottoman hegemony over the Middle East and threatening Vienna.[238][241] To administer the conquered multi-ethnic, multi-religious territories—spanning Muslims, Orthodox Christians, Armenians, Jews, and others—the Ottomans developed the millet system, rooted in Islamic dhimmi protections but pragmatically formalized post-1453 to ensure loyalty and tax revenue amid diversity.[242] Non-Muslim communities, classified as protected peoples, gained autonomy in personal law (marriage, divorce, inheritance), education, and internal governance under religious leaders accountable to the sultan, who handled external security, military conscription exemptions (via jizya tax), and foreign relations.[242] This devolved authority prevented widespread revolts in Balkan and Levantine provinces, with leaders like the Ecumenical Patriarch for the Rum millet (encompassing Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians) appointed by Mehmed II in 1454 via Gennadios Scholarios.[242] Principal millets included the Rum (Eastern Orthodox), Armenian Apostolic (recognized 1461), and Jewish (under the Haham Başı chief rabbi), each maintaining synagogues, churches, and schools while paying the poll-based jizya—higher than Muslim zakat—to incentivize fiscal stability over forced conversions, though periodic pressures and ghettoization occurred.[242] The system's hierarchical structure bound community elites to Ottoman interests, fostering relative stability compared to Europe's inquisitions, but it reinforced second-class status, with non-Muslims barred from high military or judicial roles and subject to sporadic pogroms or devshirme levies for Janissaries until the 17th century.[242] By the 19th century, Tanzimat reforms eroded millets toward legal equality, exacerbating ethnic tensions rather than resolving them.[242]Safavid Shi'ization of Persia
The Safavid dynasty initiated the systematic conversion of Persia to Twelver Shiism in 1501, when Shah Ismail I, at age 14, captured Tabriz and declared himself shah while proclaiming Twelver Shiism the official state religion of the newly unified territories.[243] This marked a departure from the region's predominant Sunni adherence under prior dynasties like the Timurids and Kara Koyunlu, where Sunnism had prevailed since the 11th century.[244] Ismail's claim of descent from Imam Musa al-Kazim, the seventh Twelver imam, provided ideological legitimacy, transforming the Safavid Sufi order—originally Sunni-leaning—into a militant Shia movement supported by Qizilbash Turkic tribes who viewed Ismail as a semi-divine figure akin to the hidden imam.[244] The policy aimed to consolidate power by differentiating the Safavid state from Sunni rivals, particularly the Ottoman Empire, though it provoked immediate border conflicts, such as the Ottoman-Safavid War of 1514–1515, where Ismail's defeat at Chaldiran underscored the military costs of religious divergence.[245] Conversion efforts under Ismail relied heavily on coercion, with military enforcement against Sunni populations and clergy who resisted the shift. In Tabriz, the Safavid capital, up to 20,000 Sunnis were killed for opposing the imposition of Shia rituals and doctrines, setting a pattern of violence that extended to other cities like Baghdad and Herat during subsequent conquests.[246] Sunni scholars faced ultimatums to publicly curse the first three caliphs—a core Shia taqiyya practice—or face execution, exile, or forced recantation, leading to the flight of many to Sunni territories and the destruction of Sunni madrasas.[245] To fill the doctrinal vacuum, Ismail imported Shia theologians from Jabal Amil in present-day Lebanon and Bahrain, numbering in the hundreds by the early 1500s, who were tasked with disseminating Twelver jurisprudence through newly established seminaries and Friday sermons emphasizing imamate loyalty over caliphal authority.[244] Under Shah Tahmasp I (r. 1524–1576), the process evolved from raw force to institutionalized propagation, with state decrees mandating Shia adhan calls, mourning rituals for Imam Husayn, and the compilation of Shia texts for mass distribution.[247] By the mid-16th century, an estimated 90% of Persia's urban elite had outwardly adopted Shiism, though rural and tribal resistance persisted, requiring ongoing purges and land confiscations from Sunni endowments to fund Shia institutions.[244] Shah Abbas I (r. 1588–1629) further entrenched the faith by relocating Shia holy sites' administration under royal control and executing remaining Sunni holdouts, achieving a Shia majority by the 17th century through intermarriage incentives, tax exemptions for converts, and suppression of Sunni Uzbek incursions from the east.[245] This engineered demographic shift, while stabilizing Safavid rule against Ottoman and Uzbek threats, sowed long-term sectarian enmity, as evidenced by recurring massacres and the empire's reliance on ghulams—Christian converts to Shiism—for military loyalty.[246] The Safavid Shi'ization ultimately forged a confessional identity that persisted beyond the dynasty's fall in 1736, distinguishing Iran from its Sunni neighbors and influencing modern Persian nationalism.[244] However, the coercive foundations—rooted in state survival rather than theological consensus—left legacies of superficial adherence in some regions, with Sunni undercurrents resurfacing during periods of weak central authority.[245]Mughal India and Syncretic Rule
The Mughal Empire was established in 1526 by Babur, a Timurid prince of Central Asian descent, following his victory over the Delhi Sultanate at the Battle of Panipat, marking the advent of sustained Muslim rule over much of northern India under a dynasty claiming Islamic legitimacy while adapting to local demographics dominated by Hindus.[248] Babur's memoirs reflect an orthodox Sunni piety, yet his governance pragmatically incorporated Hindu zamindars and revenue systems inherited from prior Indo-Turkic regimes to consolidate control over a vast, multi-religious populace.[249] Under Akbar (r. 1556–1605), syncretic rule reached its zenith through the doctrine of sulh-i kul (universal peace), which prioritized administrative harmony over strict Islamic orthodoxy, enabling alliances with Rajput Hindu clans via marriage and military integration into the mansabdari system, where over 20% of high-ranking nobles were non-Muslims by the late 16th century.[248] [250] Akbar abolished the jizya poll tax on non-Muslims in 1564, convened interfaith debates at the Ibadat Khana hall from 1575, and promulgated Din-i Ilahi around 1582—a personal ethical code drawing from Sufi, Zoroastrian, Jain, and Hindu elements, though it attracted few adherents beyond court elites and served more as a symbol of imperial eclecticism than a mass conversion movement.[248] [251] This approach fostered cultural synthesis, evident in the evolution of Urdu as a Persian-Hindi vernacular for administration and poetry, and in architectural patronage blending Islamic domes with Hindu chhatris, as seen in Fatehpur Sikri's complexes built from 1571.[248] Jahangir (r. 1605–1627) and Shah Jahan (r. 1628–1658) largely perpetuated Akbar's tolerant framework, maintaining Hindu appointments in the bureaucracy and avoiding religious coercion to sustain revenue from agrarian Hindu majorities, though intermittent temple grants and destructions occurred amid political expediency.[252] Syncretism manifested in courtly arts, such as miniature paintings fusing Persian techniques with Indian motifs, and in music patronage under Tansen, integrating dhrupad styles with Sufi qawwali.[248] Aurangzeb's reign (1658–1707) marked a pivot toward orthodox enforcement, reimposing jizya on April 2, 1679, as a fiscal and symbolic assertion of Islamic supremacy, which strained alliances and fueled rebellions among Sikhs, Marathas, and Rajputs, contributing to imperial overextension.[253] [254] While earlier syncretism had pragmatically accommodated India's religious pluralism to bolster rule—yielding administrative stability and cultural efflorescence—Aurangzeb's policies, rooted in Hanafi jurisprudence, prioritized sharia application, including temple demolitions estimated at dozens for political offenses, underscoring the tension between ideological purity and governance over a non-Muslim majority.[254] This shift weakened the empire's cohesion, as syncretic precedents had better aligned with causal realities of demographic and fiscal interdependence.[248]Decline and Colonial Encounters
European Advances and Capitulations
In the 18th century, European military and technological superiority, particularly in naval power and artillery, reversed the Ottoman Empire's earlier expansionist momentum, forcing defensive postures and territorial concessions. Defeats in wars against the Holy League culminated in the Treaty of Carlowitz on January 26, 1699, ceding Hungary, Transylvania, and parts of Croatia to Austria, while the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718 temporarily gained Morea but overall signaled ongoing losses.[255][256] The Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774 ended with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca on July 21, 1774, granting Russia navigation rights in the Black Sea, commercial privileges akin to expanded capitulations, and nominal independence for the Crimean Khanate, which facilitated Russian influence over Orthodox Christians within Ottoman lands.[257] These advances compelled the Ottomans to preserve trade flows through capitulations—unilateral grants of extraterritorial rights and low tariffs to European merchants—initially renewed without reciprocity, but increasingly interpreted by Europeans as perpetual treaties immune to renegotiation.[258] By the 19th century, capitulations exacerbated economic vulnerabilities as European powers leveraged military interventions for broader concessions. The Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Treaty of Balta Limanı, signed on August 16, 1838, amid the Ottoman-Egyptian crisis where Britain supported Sultan Mahmud II against Muhammad Ali, abolished internal monopolies, fixed import/export duties at 3% (later 5% for some), and opened ports to British subjects, effectively imposing free trade on unequal terms.[259] This flooded Ottoman markets with cheap British manufactured goods, devastating local industries such as textiles in Anatolia and Istanbul, where production collapsed due to uncompetitive pricing and lack of protective tariffs—conditions unavailable to Ottoman exporters in protectionist Europe.[260] Exports shifted to raw materials like cotton and silk, fostering dependency, budget shortfalls, and eventual foreign loans with European oversight, while extraterritoriality shielded foreign merchants and their Ottoman protégés from local courts and taxes, eroding fiscal sovereignty.[258] Tanzimat reforms from 1839 onward, including the Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane on November 3, 1839, sought legal modernization to counter capitulatory privileges by standardizing commercial codes and taxation, yet failed to abolish them, as confirmed in the 1856 Treaty of Paris post-Crimean War.[261] France and other powers secured similar extensions, amplifying imbalances; for instance, French capitulations, renewed in 1740 and expanded, privileged Mediterranean trade but hindered Ottoman reciprocity. In parallel, European advances extended beyond the Ottomans: Russian conquests in the Caucasus (e.g., Georgia annexed 1801) and Britain's Persian engagements via the 1812 treaty imposed analogous trade asymmetries, while France's 1830 invasion of Algeria marked direct colonial seizure.[259] These mechanisms collectively undermined Islamic polities' autonomy, prioritizing European commercial interests over equitable exchange and accelerating internal fiscal-military decay.[262]Wahhabi Movement and Neo-Orthodoxy
The Wahhabi movement emerged in the early 18th century in the Najd region of central Arabia, founded by the Hanbali scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), who sought to purify Islam by returning to the practices of the salaf, the first three generations of Muslims.[263] Ibn Abd al-Wahhab criticized prevalent customs such as veneration of saints' tombs, seeking intercession from the dead, and certain Sufi rituals, viewing them as shirk (polytheism) that compromised tawhid (the oneness of God).[264] Influenced by earlier reformers like Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), he advocated takfir (declaration of unbelief) against Muslims engaging in such practices and called for enforcement of sharia through jihad against innovators.[265] His teachings gained traction amid tribal fragmentation and Ottoman suzerainty's perceived laxity, positioning Wahhabism as a response to doctrinal decay. In 1744, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab forged a pivotal alliance with Muhammad ibn Saud, ruler of Diriyah, promising religious legitimacy and doctrinal enforcement in exchange for military protection and expansion of the dawah (call to faith).[266] This pact, sealed by intermarriage including Ibn Saud's union with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's daughter, launched the First Saudi State, which by 1803–1806 had conquered most of the Arabian Peninsula, including the Shia oases of eastern Arabia and approaches to the Hijaz.[265] Wahhabi forces under Saud leadership demolished shrines in Karbala in 1802 and imposed strict moral codes, destroying graves and libraries deemed idolatrous, which provoked Ottoman backlash.[267] The movement's rapid growth reflected causal dynamics of tribal mobilization under religious zeal, contrasting with the bureaucratic stagnation of Ottoman and Persian empires. Wahhabism exemplified neo-orthodoxy by insisting on literal adherence to Quran and Sunna, rejecting taqlid (blind imitation of legal schools) in favor of ijtihad (independent reasoning) grounded in foundational texts, thereby challenging established Sunni authorities accommodating local customs.[264] This rigor appealed in an era of imperial decline, where European encroachments exposed Islamic polities' vulnerabilities, fostering a causal realism that attributed weakness to religious deviation rather than geopolitical factors alone. The Ottomans, viewing Wahhabis as rebels, dispatched Egyptian forces under Muhammad Ali, who sacked Diriyah in 1818, reducing the state to remnant principalities.[265] Despite setbacks, the movement's endurance through Saudi revival in the 19th century—culminating in the Third Saudi State by 1902—enshrined Wahhabi doctrine as Saudi Arabia's basis, influencing global Salafi currents by exporting orthodoxy via pilgrimage and patronage.[266] Critics, including Ottoman ulema, labeled it a deviant sect for its takfiri extremism, yet adherents maintained it restored authentic Islam against syncretism.[267]19th-Century Reforms and Nationalist Stirrings
In the Ottoman Empire, the Tanzimat reforms, initiated by the Edict of Gülhane on November 3, 1839, under Sultan Abdülmecid I, sought to centralize administration, modernize the military, and equalize legal rights among Muslim and non-Muslim subjects to stem territorial losses and fiscal decline amid European pressures. These measures included reorganizing taxation, establishing secular schools, and reforming conscription, driven by recognition of military and economic backwardness relative to industrialized powers like Britain and France. However, implementation faced resistance from conservative ulema and provincial elites, leading to uneven adoption and persistent corruption, as reforms prioritized state survival over deep societal transformation.[268] In Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha, who consolidated power after 1805, pursued aggressive modernization from the 1820s, building a conscript army trained by European advisors, nationalizing land to fund industry, and establishing factories for textiles and munitions, which temporarily boosted exports like cotton but strained peasants through corvée labor. His successors, inheriting debt from these ventures, faced European financial control via the 1875 Caisse de la Dette Publique, sparking the Urabi Revolt in 1881–1882, where army officer Ahmed Urabi rallied fellahin and officers against Khedive Tewfik's Turco-Circassian elite and foreign influence, demanding parliamentary rule and Egyptianization of the military. The revolt's suppression by British forces in 1882 marked the onset of occupation, underscoring how reformist ambitions clashed with imperial dependencies.[269][270] Intellectual stirrings emerged through figures like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897), who from the 1870s advocated pan-Islamism as a unifying force against colonial domination, urging Muslims to blend rational ijtihad with Western science while rejecting blind taqlid, influencing reformers in Iran, India, and the Ottoman domains. The Young Ottomans, active in the 1860s–1870s, critiqued absolutism via clandestine journals, pushing for constitutional limits on sultanic power and sharia-compatible liberties, which contributed to the 1876 constitution under Abdülhamid II, though later suspended. These movements presaged nationalist fractures, as Arab intellectuals in Beirut and Damascus began articulating cultural revival (Nahda) distinct from Ottoman Turkish dominance, fostering early ethnic consciousness amid Tanzimat-era Arabic printing and education.[271][272]20th-Century Transformations
World War I, Caliphate Abolition, and Partition
The Ottoman Empire formally entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers after signing a secret alliance with Germany on August 2, 1914, motivated by prospects of military modernization through German aid, recovery of lost territories such as Egypt and Cyprus, and strategic alignment against Russian expansionism.[273] [274] The empire's belligerency commenced on October 29, 1914, when Ottoman naval squadrons, under German command, bombarded Russian Black Sea ports at Odessa, Sevastopol, and Feodosia, prompting declarations of war from Russia, Britain, and France by November 5.[273] [275] Sultan Mehmed V, acting in his capacity as Caliph, issued a jihad fatwa on November 14, 1914, endorsed by sheikhs of Islam and ulama, calling on Muslims worldwide to wage holy war against the Allied powers and their colonial subjects, with the intent to undermine British, French, and Russian control over approximately 100 million Muslims in India, North Africa, and Central Asia.[276] [277] German propaganda amplified this call through figures like Max von Oppenheim, but uprisings were sporadic and limited—such as the 1915 Singapore Mutiny involving 850 Indian Muslim troops and minor Senussi revolts in Libya—due to effective Allied counter-propaganda, loyalty to colonial rulers, and the Caliphate's perceived weakness as a political institution under Young Turk secularism.[276] [278] Ottoman campaigns inflicted heavy casualties, including 2.8 million mobilized troops with over 700,000 dead, across fronts like Gallipoli (where 250,000 Allied casualties were sustained in failed 1915 landings) and Mesopotamia, but resource strains and defeats eroded imperial cohesion.[279] The Armistice of Mudros, signed on October 30, 1918, aboard HMS Agamemnon by Ottoman Minister of Marine Affairs Rauf Bey and British Admiral Somerset Gough-Calthorpe, halted hostilities effective noon on October 31, mandating Ottoman demobilization, Allied occupation of strategic forts, and surrender of the fleet while allowing provisional control over non-Turkish territories.[280] [281] [282] This paved the way for partition under the Treaty of Sèvres, imposed on August 10, 1920, which dismantled the empire by ceding eastern Thrace and Smyrna to Greece, granting Armenia independence with Allied oversight, allocating Kurdish autonomy provisions, assigning Arab provinces to British and French spheres (per the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement), establishing international zones at Istanbul and the Straits, and limiting the Turkish army to 50,000 men.[283] [284] The treaty, rejected by Turkish nationalists under Mustafa Kemal Pasha—who organized resistance from Anatolia, culminating in victories like the August 1921 Battle of Sakarya—never took effect, superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923, which recognized Turkish sovereignty over Anatolia and eastern Thrace but confirmed the loss of Arab lands and other provinces.[283] [285] Amid these transformations, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, dominated by Kemal's Republican People's Party, abolished the Sultanate on November 1, 1922, and the Caliphate on March 3, 1924, deposing the incumbent Caliph Abdülmecid II and his family, framing the move as incompatible with republican secularism and national sovereignty.[286] [287] [288] By 1924, the Caliphate had long ceased effective political authority, functioning symbolically since the 19th-century Tanzimat reforms and Young Turk centralization, yet its abolition marked the definitive end of unified Islamic governance, eliciting protests in cities like Damascus, Cairo, and Lucknow—where Indian Khilafat Movement leaders like Muhammad Ali Jauhar decried it as a Western-imposed rupture—but failing to produce consensus for revival due to sectarian divides, colonial fragmentation, and emerging nationalisms.[289] [290] This vacuum accelerated the crystallization of sovereign Muslim-majority states, from the Hashemite kingdoms to secular Turkey, while fostering long-term Islamist aspirations for restoration amid perceived disunity.[287] [291]Arab Revolt, Mandate System, and State Formations
The Arab Revolt erupted on June 5, 1916, when Sharif Hussein bin Ali, the Hashemite emir of Mecca, declared independence from the Ottoman Empire and ordered attacks on Ottoman garrisons, beginning with Mecca and Medina led by his sons Ali and Faisal.[292] Hussein's motivation stemmed from Ottoman centralization under the Young Turks, which threatened Hashemite autonomy in the Hejaz, compounded by pan-Islamic appeals from Sultan Mehmed V that Hussein viewed as incompatible with Arab aspirations for self-rule.[293] The revolt's forces, numbering around 30,000 irregulars by 1917, disrupted Ottoman supply lines along the Red Sea coast and Hijaz Railway, capturing Aqaba in July 1917 with British naval support and T.E. Lawrence's coordination, though they failed to take Medina until after the war.[294] Britain provided over £11 million in subsidies and arms, motivated by strategic needs to weaken the Ottoman ally during World War I, as outlined in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence from July 1915 to March 1916, where High Commissioner Henry McMahon pledged recognition of Arab independence in territories excluding parts of Iraq and Syria.[295][296] However, these assurances conflicted with the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916, whereby Britain and France partitioned Ottoman Arab provinces into spheres of influence—Britain controlling southern Iraq, Jordan, and Haifa; France dominating coastal Syria, Lebanon, and northern Iraq—while designating an Arab state or confederation in the interior under international oversight, a plan revealed by Bolsheviks in 1917 and perceived by Arabs as a betrayal of unification promises.[297][298] Hussein's revolt, framed as a jihad against Ottoman "tyranny" rather than Islam itself, aligned temporarily with British interests but yielded no pan-Arab state; Faisal's northern forces entered Damascus in October 1918, proclaiming the Arab Kingdom of Syria, only for French troops to expel him in July 1920.[299] Post-armistice, the San Remo Conference of April 1920 formalized the League of Nations Class A mandates, assigning Britain administration of Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Palestine (including Transjordan), and France control over Syria and Lebanon, ostensibly to prepare these territories for self-governance while incorporating the 1917 Balfour Declaration's provision for a Jewish national home in Palestine.[300][301] Under British mandate, Iraq was consolidated in 1920 from three Ottoman vilayets, with Faisal installed as king in August 1921 following a rigged plebiscite claiming 96% support, securing oil interests and suppressing the 1920 Shia-Sunni-Kurdish revolt that killed 6,000-10,000; formal independence came in 1932 after treaties granting Britain military bases and oil concessions.[302] Transjordan, detached from Palestine in 1921 as a semi-autonomous emirate under Abdullah, Hussein's son, avoided the Balfour provisions and achieved independence as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1946.[303] French rule in Syria involved crushing the 1920 Greater Syria movement, partitioning the region into states like Aleppo and Damascus before merging most into the Syrian Republic, with independence granted in 1946 amid revolts such as the 1925-1927 Great Syrian Revolt that killed over 6,000. Lebanon's mandate carved a Maronite Christian-majority state from Syria, formalized in 1926. Hussein's Hejaz kingdom, proclaimed in 1916, collapsed by 1925 under Saudi conquest led by Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, who unified the Arabian Peninsula as Saudi Arabia by 1932, ending Hashemite claims to caliphal legitimacy.[304] These mandates fragmented the former Ottoman Islamic domains into secular nation-states, prioritizing European strategic and economic control over Arab unity or pan-Islamic governance, fostering enduring resentments and nationalist movements that supplanted caliphal ideals with territorial sovereignty.[305][306]Rise of Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist Ideologies
The Muslim Brotherhood was established on March 22, 1928, in Ismailia, Egypt, by Hassan al-Banna, a schoolteacher and Islamic scholar who sought to counter the perceived moral decay and Western secular influences following the British occupation of Egypt and the 1924 abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate.[307] [308] Al-Banna viewed modern nationalism and liberal reforms as eroding Islamic principles, advocating instead for a return to the Quran and Sunnah as a total system encompassing politics, economics, and society; he famously declared "Islam is the solution" to revive Muslim unity and sovereignty.[308] [309] The organization's early structure combined da'wa (proselytization), social welfare programs like schools and clinics, and paramilitary training, drawing initial support from laborers and students amid Egypt's economic grievances under colonial rule.[307] The Brotherhood's ideology emphasized jihad as both personal struggle and defensive warfare against perceived aggressors, rejecting secular governance in favor of sharia-based rule, while critiquing Western materialism and imperialism as antithetical to Islamic values.[310] Influenced by reformist thinkers like Rashid Rida and elements of Wahhabi puritanism, al-Banna promoted gradual societal Islamization through grassroots networks rather than immediate revolution, though the group engaged in anti-British agitation and clashed with Egyptian authorities.[310] By the 1930s, it expanded beyond Egypt, establishing branches in Syria (1930s), Palestine, and Sudan, capitalizing on post-World War I disillusionment with the Mandate system and the collapse of pan-Arab secular hopes.[311] Membership surged to an estimated 500,000 by the 1940s, fueled by opposition to Zionist immigration in Palestine and involvement in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, where Brotherhood volunteers fought alongside Egyptian forces.[307] Sayyid Qutb, joining the Brotherhood in 1952 after earlier literary pursuits, radicalized its doctrine during imprisonment following the 1952 Free Officers' coup and 1954 crackdown, authoring Milestones (1964) which framed modern Muslim societies as jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance) under apostate rulers deserving takfir (declaration of unbelief) and revolutionary overthrow.[312] [313] Executed in 1966 for alleged conspiracy, Qutb's emphasis on vanguard jihadism diverged from al-Banna's gradualism, inspiring later groups like al-Qaeda while embedding anti-Western and anti-secular militancy in Brotherhood offshoots.[312] [313] The organization's tolerance for violence, including the 1948 assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Nuqrashi and plots against Gamal Abdel Nasser, led to repeated bans but sustained its ideological resilience across the Arab world.[307] Post-1967 Six-Day War defeats eroded confidence in secular Arab nationalism, propelling Islamist ideologies as alternatives; Brotherhood networks in Jordan, Kuwait, and Algeria adapted by focusing on electoral participation and charity, masking deeper calls for caliphate revival.[307] This shift marked Islamism's mainstreaming, blending political activism with doctrinal purity against both leftist ideologies and monarchial complacency, though internal debates persisted between moderates and hardliners on confronting "un-Islamic" regimes.[314] By century's end, the Brotherhood influenced movements like Hamas (chartered 1987 as its Palestinian branch), prioritizing resistance to Israel through Islamic governance over negotiated peace.[307]Contemporary Developments (Post-1945)
Arab-Israeli Conflicts and Palestinian Question
The Arab-Israeli conflicts emerged following the establishment of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948, amid the collapse of the British Mandate for Palestine, prompting immediate invasion by coalition forces from Egypt, Jordan (then Transjordan), Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.[315] This 1948 war, known to Israelis as the War of Independence and to Arabs as the Nakba (catastrophe), stemmed from the Arab Higher Committee's rejection of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 on November 29, 1947, which proposed partitioning Palestine into Jewish and Arab states despite Arabs comprising two-thirds of the population but receiving less viable territory.[315] [316] Arab leaders viewed the plan as illegitimate, asserting historical and religious claims to the land as part of the Islamic ummah, leading to pre-invasion civil violence and the subsequent interstate war that ended in 1949 armistices, with Israel controlling 78% of Mandate Palestine, Jordan annexing the West Bank, and Egypt holding Gaza.[315] Approximately 700,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled during the fighting, creating a refugee crisis that Arab states refused to resolve through integration, instead instrumentalizing it for political leverage against Israel.[315] Subsequent escalations included the 1956 Suez Crisis, where Israel, alongside Britain and France, responded to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's blockade of the Straits of Tiran and fedayeen raids, but the core interstate wars of 1967 and 1973 defined the pattern of Arab-initiated aggression met with Israeli military superiority. In the Six-Day War of June 5–10, 1967, Israel launched preemptive strikes against Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian forces after Egypt mobilized 100,000 troops in Sinai, expelled UN peacekeepers, and closed the Straits of Tiran—actions constituting casus belli under international norms—resulting in Israeli capture of the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank (including East Jerusalem), and Golan Heights, tripling Israel's territory while inflicting over 20,000 Arab fatalities against 776 Israeli deaths.[317] The 1973 Yom Kippur War began with a coordinated Egyptian-Syrian surprise attack on October 6 against Israeli positions in Sinai and Golan, exploiting the Jewish holy day for initial gains that breached the 1967 lines, but Israeli counteroffensives encircled Egyptian forces and advanced toward Damascus, leading to UN-brokered ceasefires on October 22 and 24 after Arab losses exceeding 18,000 dead and Israel suffering 2,656 killed.[318] These defeats eroded secular Arab nationalism, fostering Islamist resurgence as religious framing—portraying the conflict as defensive jihad to reclaim dar al-Islam from Jewish occupation—gained traction among Muslim populations.[318] The Palestinian question, intertwined with these wars, crystallized as a distinctly Islamic cause in the post-1948 era, with Muslim leaders emphasizing the land's status as waqf (inalienable religious endowment) under Sharia, rendering compromise heretical. Palestinian Arabs, predominantly Muslim, initiated hostilities against the 1947 partition through the Arab Higher Committee's call for jihad, escalating into the 1947–48 civil war phase where irregular forces attacked Jewish communities, prompting retaliatory operations.[316] The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), founded in 1964 under Arab League auspices, pursued armed struggle but lacked explicit Islamic doctrine until the rise of Hamas in 1987 as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose 1988 charter explicitly rejects Israel's existence, citing Quranic imperatives and hadiths mandating Muslim victory over Jews as precursors to Judgment Day: "The Day of Judgment will not come about until Muslims fight the Jews and kill them."[319] Hamas frames resistance as fard ayn (individual religious duty), blending nationalism with Salafi-jihadist ideology, leading to suicide bombings in the Second Intifada (2000–2005) that killed over 1,000 Israelis and drew Israeli responses causing thousands of Palestinian deaths.[319] Efforts like the 1993 Oslo Accords faltered amid Palestinian Authority corruption and incitement, while Hamas's 2007 Gaza takeover entrenched governance under Islamic principles hostile to Jewish sovereignty, perpetuating cycles of rocket attacks and Israeli operations like Cast Lead (2008–2009) and Protective Edge (2014), where Hamas's charter-derived antisemitism—viewing Zionism as a Jewish conspiracy against Islam—undermines two-state viability.[319] Empirical data from these conflicts reveal consistent Arab rejectionism: despite territorial concessions post-1973 (Sinai returned to Egypt in 1982), core demands for Israel's dismantlement persist in Islamist discourse, contrasting with Israel's survival through defensive victories.[318]Oil Boom, Gulf States, and Petro-Islam
The discovery of commercially viable oil reserves in Saudi Arabia in 1938 marked the beginning of the Gulf region's transformation from economic marginality to global influence, with initial production ramping up significantly after World War II.[320] Other Gulf states followed: Kuwait's oil exports began in 1946, Qatar's in 1949, and the United Arab Emirates' in the 1960s, concentrating vast hydrocarbon wealth in monarchies aligned with conservative Islamic governance.[321] This resource endowment enabled rapid state-building, infrastructure development, and social welfare systems, but also fiscal dependence on oil rents, which constituted over 80% of government revenues in Saudi Arabia by the 1970s.[322] The 1973 oil crisis accelerated this boom when Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—founded in 1960 by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela—imposed an embargo on nations supporting Israel during the Yom Kippur War, cutting production by 5% monthly and quadrupling crude prices from approximately $3 to $12 per barrel within months.[323] [322] Saudi Arabia's revenues exploded from $4.3 billion in 1972 to $22.5 billion in 1974, generating "petrodollars" that funded domestic modernization while reinforcing ruling families' legitimacy through religious patronage.[321] Gulf states like Kuwait and the UAE similarly amassed surpluses, investing in sovereign wealth funds and alliances with Western powers for security against regional threats.[323] Petro-Islam refers to the deployment of these petrodollar windfalls by Saudi Arabia and allied Gulf monarchies to export Wahhabi-influenced doctrines globally, countering secular Arab nationalism and Shiite Iran after its 1979 revolution.[324] Saudi funding, channeled through state-linked charities like the Muslim World League (established 1962), built or supported thousands of mosques and madrasas worldwide, with estimates of $2–3 billion annually devoted to dawah (proselytization) by the 1980s.[325] [326] The Islamic University of Medina, founded in 1961 and expanded with oil revenues, trained over 10,000 students from 170 countries by the 1990s, disseminating Salafi interpretations emphasizing scriptural literalism and rejection of innovations (bid'ah).[327] This export prioritized doctrinal purity over political quietism, influencing Islamist networks in South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and Europe, though its causal role in extremism remains debated as a facilitator rather than direct instigator.[325] In Pakistan, Saudi grants exceeding $1 billion in the 1980s supported Deobandi-Wahhabi hybrid madrasas, which educated mujahideen fighters during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), amplifying transnational jihadist currents.[324] Similar investments in India and Southeast Asia shifted local Muslim practices toward stricter orthodoxy, funding puritanical curricula that critiqued Sufi traditions.[325] Qatar and Kuwait contributed through entities like the International Islamic Charitable Organization, but Saudi dominance—leveraging its custodianship of Mecca and Medina—positioned Petro-Islam as a tool for soft power, sustaining Wahhabi resilience amid domestic reforms.[326] By the 1990s, this funding had constructed over 1,500 mosques in non-Muslim countries, embedding Gulf-backed Islamism in diaspora communities and challenging modernist reforms elsewhere.[325]Global Jihadism, 9/11, and Counter-Terrorism
Global jihadism emerged as a transnational Islamist movement in the late 20th century, drawing ideological inspiration from thinkers like Sayyid Qutb and Abul A'la Maududi, who advocated offensive jihad against perceived apostate Muslim regimes and non-Muslim powers to establish Islamic governance under hakimiyyah (divine sovereignty). This ideology gained momentum during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), where Afghan mujahideen, supported by U.S., Saudi, and Pakistani funding totaling over $3 billion from the CIA alone, repelled the Soviet invasion through guerrilla warfare framed as defensive jihad. The conflict attracted thousands of foreign Arab fighters, known as Afghan Arabs, fostering networks that transitioned from local resistance to global ambitions post-1989, with the war often cited as the crucible for modern jihadist mobilization.[328] Osama bin Laden, a Saudi financier who joined the Afghan jihad in 1980, formalized al-Qaeda in 1988 as a vanguard organization to export revolution worldwide, targeting the "far enemy"—Western powers, especially the United States—for propping up secular Muslim governments and occupying holy lands. In his August 23, 1996 fatwa, bin Laden declared war on American forces in Saudi Arabia, citing their presence since the 1990–1991 Gulf War as desecration and invoking Quranic calls to expel infidels. This escalated in the February 23, 1998 fatwa, co-signed by allies including Ayman al-Zawahiri, which mandated killing Americans and their allies "in any country in which it is possible" as a religious duty, blending anti-imperial grievances with Salafi-jihadist exegesis of jihad as perpetual struggle against jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance equated with modern non-Sharia systems). Al-Qaeda's prior attacks, such as the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (killing 224) and the 2000 USS Cole bombing (killing 17 sailors), demonstrated operational capacity rooted in this worldview.[329][330] The attacks of September 11, 2001, represented the apex of al-Qaeda's strategy to provoke a clash of civilizations, with 19 hijackers—mostly Saudis trained in Afghanistan—seizing four U.S. airliners. Two struck the World Trade Center's Twin Towers in New York City at 8:46 a.m. and 9:03 a.m., causing their collapse and killing 2,753 people; American Airlines Flight 77 hit the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m., killing 184; and United Airlines Flight 93 crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at 10:03 a.m. after passenger intervention, killing 40 aboard. Total fatalities reached 2,977, excluding hijackers, with over 6,000 injured, marking the deadliest terrorist incident in history and inflicting $100 billion in immediate economic damage. The operation, planned since 1999 under Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's direction and approved by bin Laden, aimed to compel U.S. withdrawal from Muslim lands, though it instead unified international condemnation of al-Qaeda's interpretation of jihad as indiscriminate violence against civilians.[331][332] In response, President George W. Bush declared a Global War on Terror on September 20, 2001, framing it as a campaign against networks exploiting Islam for tyranny rather than a clash with the faith itself, though jihadist ideologues viewed it as validation of their prophetic narrative. The U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan began October 7, 2001, under Operation Enduring Freedom, toppling the Taliban regime by December after coalition airstrikes and Northern Alliance ground forces dismantled al-Qaeda bases; bin Laden escaped to Pakistan, where he was killed in 2011. Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) on September 14, enabling worldwide operations, while enhanced intelligence-sharing, the USA PATRIOT Act (October 26, 2001), and drone programs targeted jihadist leadership, disrupting plots but also inspiring retaliatory narratives of crusader aggression. By 2003, the Iraq invasion expanded the front, eliminating Saddam Hussein but fracturing the region and enabling al-Qaeda in Iraq's evolution into ISIS, underscoring the resilience of jihadist ideology despite tactical setbacks.[333][334]Migrations, Secularism Debates, and Apostasy Issues
Large-scale Muslim migration to Europe accelerated after World War II, initially driven by labor demands in rebuilding economies. In Germany, the 1961 guest worker agreement with Turkey brought over 800,000 Turkish Muslims by 1973, many of whom stayed via family reunification policies enacted in the 1970s.[335] Similar patterns emerged in France with Algerians following independence in 1962, numbering around 1 million by the 1980s, and in the UK with Pakistanis, exceeding 100,000 arrivals by the late 1960s.[335] Post-2010 refugee inflows, particularly 1.3 million Syrians between 2015 and 2016 under EU asylum policies, further swelled numbers, raising Europe's Muslim population from 25.8 million (4.9%) in 2016 to projections of 7.4% by 2050 under zero-migration scenarios or up to 14% with high migration.[336] These shifts have fostered debates on integration, with empirical data indicating higher welfare dependency and criminality among certain non-EU migrant cohorts; for instance, German studies from 2008-2019 link immigrant inflows to localized crime increases in districts with rapid demographic changes.[337][338] Secularism in Muslim-majority states has provoked ongoing contention since the mid-20th century, often framed as a clash between imported Western models and Islamic governance principles. In Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's 1924 reforms abolished the caliphate, banned religious attire in public institutions, and enshrined laïcité in the 1928 constitution, suppressing Islamist currents until the 1980s rise of parties like the Welfare Party.[339] Under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party since 2002, policies such as lifting the 1937 headscarf ban in universities and expanding religious education have eroded strict secularism, prompting accusations of creeping Islamization amid 2017 constitutional changes granting executive powers.[339] In Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser's 1950s-1960s secular nationalism suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood, but Anwar Sadat's 1970s liberalization allowed Islamist resurgence, culminating in the Brotherhood's 2012 electoral win post-Arab Spring before the 2013 military ouster under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who balanced nominal secularism with anti-Islamist crackdowns.[340] These debates reflect broader tensions, where secularists advocate procedural democracy detached from Sharia, while Islamists argue sovereignty derives from divine law, leading to electoral volatility in countries like Bangladesh and Tunisia.[341][342] Apostasy remains a punishable offense under Sharia-derived laws in 13 Muslim-majority countries, with death penalties codified in Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and others, rooted in classical interpretations of prophetic traditions mandating execution for public renunciation of Islam.[343] Enforcement varies: Iran executed at least one apostasy convict in 2019, while Pakistan's blasphemy statutes, often conflated with apostasy, led to 17 death sentences that year, including cases like Asia Bibi's 2010 conviction for allegedly insulting Islam, overturned in 2019 amid mob violence.[344] Surveys indicate widespread support, with 86% of Egyptian Muslims and 79% in Jordan favoring execution for apostasy per 2013 Pew data, reflecting doctrinal emphasis on communal fidelity over individual liberty.[345] In diaspora communities, formal penalties are absent, but informal sanctions persist, including family disownment or honor-based violence; the 1989 fatwa against Salman Rushdie for The Satanic Verses exemplifies transnational enforcement pressures.[346] These issues underscore causal links between orthodox Islamic jurisprudence and restrictions on religious exit, contrasting with secular norms prioritizing personal autonomy.[347]Enduring Controversies
Doctrinal Debates on Jihad and Conquest
In classical Islamic jurisprudence, jihad encompassed both defensive efforts against aggression and offensive campaigns to expand the domain of Islam (dar al-Islam) over non-Muslim territories, with the latter classified as jihad al-talab or offensive jihad.[348] This distinction arose from interpretations of Quranic injunctions and prophetic traditions, where military exertion was deemed a communal obligation (fard kifaya) when undertaken by qualified authorities to establish Islamic supremacy and collect jizya from subdued populations.[349] Defensive jihad (jihad al-daf), by contrast, was an individual duty (fard ayn) binding all able Muslims during direct threats to Muslim lands.[350] Quranic verse 9:29 explicitly commands: "Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day and who do not consider unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful... from among the People of the Book, until they give the jizya willingly while they are humbled."[351] This verse, revealed around 631 CE during preparations for campaigns against Byzantine and Sassanid remnants, was interpreted by early exegetes as authorizing offensive warfare against non-Muslims who resisted Islamic governance, rather than mere self-defense. Complementing this, a hadith in Sahih al-Bukhari (2946) records Muhammad stating: "I have been ordered to fight with the people till they say: 'None has the right to be worshipped but Allah,' and whoever professed it, his wealth and life would be saved."[352] Such sources formed the doctrinal foundation for the rapid conquests under the Rashidun Caliphs (632–661 CE), which expanded Islamic rule from Arabia to Persia, Syria, and Egypt within two decades.[348] Among the four Sunni schools of law, consensus held that offensive jihad was permissible and often obligatory under a legitimate caliph to propagate Islam and secure tribute, though nuances existed. The Shafi'i school, founded by al-Shafi'i (d. 820 CE), viewed it as a perpetual duty unless truce conditions warranted suspension, emphasizing expansion to manifest Islamic dominance.[353] Hanafi jurists, more pragmatic, permitted offensive jihad only after securing borders but still endorsed it for conquest when feasible, as seen in rulings allowing campaigns against distant non-Muslim states.[353] Maliki and Hanbali schools aligned closely, with Hanbalis like Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328 CE) later reinforcing offensive jihad against any who obstructed da'wa or Islamic law's application.[349] Debates centered on prerequisites—such as caliphal authority, sufficient forces, and absence of internal discord—rather than the principle's validity; for instance, Hanafis debated whether offensive jihad required prior invitation to Islam, but all schools affirmed its role in historical expansions like the Umayyad conquests reaching Spain by 711 CE.[353] These doctrines directly informed the early Islamic conquests, rationalizing the subjugation of over 2 million square miles by 750 CE as fulfillment of divine mandate, with non-Muslims offered conversion, dhimmi status under jizya, or resistance met by warfare.[348] Later juristic works, such as those by al-Mawardi (d. 1058 CE), codified rules for offensive jihad, including treatment of captives and spoils, underscoring its integration into statecraft.[349] Enduring controversies persist, as contemporary reformists often reinterpret jihad solely as defensive to align with international norms, contrasting classical texts that prioritized offensive expansion; this shift reflects geopolitical pressures rather than unaltered primary sources, with jihadist groups invoking traditional views to justify aggression.[354][353]Historical Slavery, Concubinage, and Dhimmi Status
In the formative period of Islam, slavery was not prohibited but regulated through Quranic injunctions and prophetic example, allowing the enslavement of prisoners of war and their descendants while promoting manumission as a pious act without requiring abolition.[355] The Prophet Muhammad owned slaves, including the African Bilal ibn Rabah whom he freed, and participated in capturing and trading slaves during expeditions, such as distributing 20 slaves among companions after the Battle of Badr in 624 CE.[355] Islamic law classified slaves as property (mamluk), permitting their use for labor, military service, and domestic roles, with rules mandating humane treatment but enforcing perpetual bondage unless freed by owner consent or contractual terms.[355] The Arab-Muslim slave trade, spanning from the 7th to the 20th century, primarily sourced captives from sub-Saharan Africa via trans-Saharan and Indian Ocean routes, with estimates of 11 to 17 million Africans enslaved overall, exceeding the Atlantic trade in duration but comparable in scale when adjusted for time.[356] Male slaves faced systematic castration to produce eunuchs for harems and administration, a practice with mortality rates up to 90% due to rudimentary surgery, as documented in medieval accounts of Zanzibar and Ottoman markets where boys were emasculated en route.[357] Female slaves were routinely subjected to sexual exploitation, with the trade's demand peaking under Abbasid caliphs who imported thousands annually for Baghdad's palaces by the 9th century.[356] Slave rebellions, such as the Zanj Revolt of 869–883 CE led by African slaves in Iraq, highlighted the brutality, resulting in over 500,000 deaths before suppression by Abbasid forces.[358] Concubinage, termed ma malakat aymanukum ("those whom your right hands possess") in the Quran (e.g., Surah 4:3, 23:6), explicitly permitted Muslim men sexual access to female slaves without marriage, treating such relations as lawful despite the women's captive status.[359] Muhammad exemplified this by cohabiting with concubines like Rayhana bint Zayd, captured at Khaybar in 628 CE, and Mariya the Copt, gifted by the Byzantine governor in 628 CE, who bore him a son, Ibrahim.[359] Offspring from concubines gained free status if acknowledged by the owner, elevating the mother to umm walad (mother of a child) with immunity from sale but no spousal rights, a system that incentivized breeding slaves while perpetuating gender-based enslavement across caliphates.[359] This practice persisted institutionally, with Ottoman sultans maintaining harems of thousands of concubines by the 16th century, sourced largely from Caucasian and African raids.[357] The dhimmi system accorded non-Muslim "People of the Book" (Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians) protected but subordinate status under Muslim rule, requiring payment of jizya poll tax—levied at rates often double those of Muslim zakat—in exchange for exemption from military service and nominal security from enslavement or arbitrary execution.[360] Originating in Muhammad's Treaty of Hudaybiyyah (628 CE) and codified in the Pact of Umar (circa 637 CE) attributed to Caliph Umar I, dhimmis faced enforceable restrictions: prohibition on bearing arms, riding horses or camels, building new houses of worship, ringing bells, or proselytizing, alongside mandates for distinctive clothing and lowered physical posture in Muslim presence to signify inferiority.[360] [361] Enforcement varied by ruler—tolerant under Abbasid caliphs like Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809 CE) but punitive under Almohads in 12th-century North Africa, who forced conversions or exile—but the framework institutionalized second-class citizenship, with jizya collections funding conquests and dhimmis barred from public office or testimony against Muslims.[360] Violations, such as church bells in Umayyad Spain, prompted demolitions or riots, underscoring the system's role in maintaining Islamic dominance through ritualized humiliation.[361]Gender Roles, Polygamy, and Child Marriage Practices
Islamic teachings on gender roles emphasize complementary responsibilities between men and women, with men designated as maintainers and protectors of women due to their financial obligations. Quran 4:34 states that men are qawwamun (maintainers) over women because God has favored some over others and because they spend from their wealth. This framework assigns men primary responsibility for family provision, while women are entitled to maintenance without obligation to contribute financially from their earnings. In inheritance, males receive twice the share of females in most cases, as per Quran 4:11, reflecting men's duty to support dependents post-inheritance, whereas women retain their shares for personal use. Women's testimony in financial transactions is valued at half that of a man's, requiring two women to equal one man in Quran 2:282, attributed to potential forgetfulness in such matters rather than inherent inferiority. Modesty norms for women include drawing outer garments (jilbab) over their bodies, as instructed in Quran 33:59 to Prophet Muhammad for his wives, daughters, and believing women, to be recognized and avoid harassment. Hadith literature reinforces wifely obedience to husbands in permissible matters, with narrations in Sahih Bukhari stating that a woman's prayer is not accepted if she angers her husband without cause, and paradise lies at the husband's feet if obeyed. (related obedience hadith; direct Bukhari refs vary but align). These roles persisted historically, though women's public participation varied; early examples include Khadijah's pre-Islamic business role, but post-revelation norms emphasized domestic focus with seclusion in urban centers like Medina. Polygyny—marriage to multiple wives—is permitted under Quran 4:3, allowing men up to four wives provided they treat them justly, originally contextualized to protect orphans but extended generally; however, Quran 4:129 acknowledges the impossibility of perfect emotional equity. The Prophet Muhammad practiced polygyny with eleven wives at peak, often for political alliances or widow support. In Islamic history, prevalence was low outside elites; Ottoman records show polygyny at about 2-5% among Muslims, mostly two wives due to economic constraints, concentrated in urban and ruling classes.[362] Practices declined with modernization but remain legal in many Muslim-majority countries under Sharia-derived codes, though banned or restricted in secular reforms like Turkey's 1926 civil code. Child marriage, defined as under 18, traces to pre-Islamic Arabian norms but was exemplified by Aisha's union with Muhammad: betrothal at six, consummation at nine, as recorded in Sahih Bukhari 5134 and multiple narrations.[363] No minimum age is specified in core texts, with puberty often as a marker for consummation; this precedent influenced juristic views permitting marriage post-puberty or earlier with guardian consent. Historically, child marriages were widespread in early caliphates and medieval societies for alliances and economics, continuing into Ottoman and colonial eras; rates exceeded 20% in some 19th-20th century Arab regions per demographic studies.[364] Persistence varies, with higher incidence in rural Yemen (32% girls under 18 by 2010s) versus urban declines, tied to interpretations allowing guardian-arranged unions without fixed age floors.[365] Modern reforms in places like Tunisia (minimum 17 since 1956) contrast ongoing practices justified via prophetic sunnah, amid debates over consent and maturity.Quranic Transmission and Variant Readings
Following the death of Muhammad in 632 CE, the Quran existed primarily in oral form among memorizers (huffaz) and scattered written fragments on materials like bones, leather, and palm stalks.[366] The Battle of Yamama during the Ridda Wars shortly thereafter resulted in the deaths of approximately 70 huffaz, prompting Caliph Abu Bakr to initiate the first compilation to prevent loss.[367] Zayd ibn Thabit, a scribe who had written revelations during Muhammad's lifetime, was tasked with collecting verses verified by at least two witnesses, cross-referencing oral recitations with written pieces; this produced a single codex kept by Abu Bakr, then passed to Umar and Hafsa.[366] [367] Under Caliph Uthman (r. 644–656 CE), around 650 CE, regional disputes arose over recitations due to dialectal differences and competing codices, such as those of Ubayy ibn Ka'b and Ibn Mas'ud, which varied in content and order.[368] Uthman formed a committee led by Zayd to produce standardized copies based on Hafsa's codex, using the Quraysh dialect; multiple exemplars were dispatched to major cities like Medina, Mecca, Kufa, Basra, and Damascus.[366] He then ordered the destruction of all non-conforming variants to enforce uniformity, an action that eliminated diverse early textual traditions but stabilized the consonantal skeleton (rasm).[368] [369] This Uthmanic recension, while achieving early fixation, reflects editorial selection amid pre-existing variation, as evidenced by reports of resistance in Kufa where Ibn Mas'ud's version persisted briefly.[368] [370] Variant readings, known as qira'at, emerged within the framework of seven ahruf (modes or dialects) attributed to Muhammad's permission for linguistic flexibility among Arab tribes.[369] Canonical qira'at, standardized later (e.g., seven by Ibn Mujahid in the 10th century CE, expanded to ten or fourteen), permit differences in pronunciation, vowels, and occasionally wording while adhering to the Uthmanic rasm; examples include Hafs (dominant today, ~95% usage) versus Warsh, where surah 2:132 varies "wa wassna" (Hafs) from "wa awsna" (Warsh).[369] [371] These are defended in Islamic tradition as divinely sanctioned equivalents, not corruptions, but scholarly analysis notes semantic shifts in some cases, such as imperative versus subjunctive moods altering commands.[369] [372] Archaeological evidence from early manuscripts supports transmission stability post-Uthman but confirms pre-standardization variants. The Birmingham manuscript (radiocarbon dated 568–645 CE) aligns closely with the modern text, indicating early conformity.[373] In contrast, the Sana'a palimpsest (7th century CE) reveals an erased lower text with non-Uthmanic word order, omissions, and additions (e.g., variant surah 9 sequences), overwritten by the standard version, suggesting suppression of divergent traditions during canonization.[374] [370] Textual critics assess the Quran's transmission as remarkably consistent compared to ancient texts like the New Testament, with fewer viable variants due to centralization, yet reliant on oral chains (isnad) whose reliability varies by scholarly scrutiny.[370] [375] Over 60,000 manuscript witnesses exist, but pre-Uthmanic scarcity limits reconstruction of the original oral corpus.[370]References
- https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Revisionist_history_of_Early_Islam