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John Locke
John Locke
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John Locke (/lɒk/; 29 August 1632 (O.S.) – 28 October 1704 (O.S.))[11] was an English philosopher and physician, widely regarded as one of the most influential of the Enlightenment thinkers and commonly known as the "father of liberalism".[12][13][14] Considered one of the first of the British empiricists, following the tradition of Francis Bacon, Locke is equally important to social contract theory. His work greatly affected the development of epistemology and political philosophy.[15]

His writings influenced Voltaire, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and many Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, as well as the American Revolutionaries. His contributions to classical republicanism and liberal theory are reflected in the United States Declaration of Independence.[16] Internationally, Locke's political-legal principles continue to have a profound influence on the theory and practice of limited representative government and the protection of basic rights and freedoms under the rule of law.[17]

Locke's philosophy of mind is often cited as the origin of modern conceptions of personal identity and the psychology of self, figuring prominently in the work of later philosophers, such as Rousseau, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant. He postulated that, at birth, the mind is a blank slate, or tabula rasa. Contrary to Cartesian philosophy based on preexisting concepts, he maintained that we are born without innate ideas, and that knowledge is instead determined only by experience derived from sense perception, a concept now known as empiricism.[18] Locke is often credited for describing private property as a natural right, arguing that when a person—metaphorically—mixes their labour with nature, resources can be removed from the common state of nature.[19][20]

Early life

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John Locke's portrait by Godfrey Kneller, National Portrait Gallery, London

Locke was born on 29 August 1632, in a small thatched cottage by the church in Wrington, Somerset, about 12 miles (19 km) from Bristol. He was baptised the same day, as both of his parents were Puritans. Locke's father, also named John, was an attorney who served as clerk to the Justices of the Peace in Chew Magna,[21] and as a captain of cavalry for the Parliamentarian forces during the early part of the English Civil War. His mother was Agnes Keene. Soon after Locke's birth, the family moved to the market town of Pensford, about seven miles south of Bristol, where Locke grew up in a rural Tudor house in Belluton.

In 1647, Locke was sent to the prestigious Westminster School in London under the sponsorship of Alexander Popham, a member of Parliament and John Sr.'s former commander. At the age of 16, he was at school just half a mile away from the execution of Charles I; however, the boys were not allowed to go and watch. After completing studies at Westminster, he was admitted to Christ Church, Oxford, in the autumn of 1652 at the age of 20. The dean of the college at the time was John Owen, vice-chancellor of the university.[22]

Although a capable student, Locke was irritated by the undergraduate curriculum of the time. He found the works of modern philosophers, such as René Descartes, more interesting than the classical material taught at the university. Through his friend Richard Lower, whom he knew from the Westminster School, Locke was introduced to medicine and the experimental philosophy being pursued at other universities and in the Royal Society, of which he eventually became a member.[23]

Locke was awarded a bachelor's degree in February 1656 and a master's degree in June 1658.[1] He obtained a bachelor of medicine in February 1675,[24] having studied the subject extensively during his time at Oxford. In addition to Lower, he worked with such noted scientists and thinkers as Robert Boyle, Thomas Willis, and Robert Hooke. In 1666, he met Anthony Ashley Cooper, Lord Ashley, who had come to Oxford seeking treatment for a liver infection. Ashley was impressed with Locke and persuaded him to become part of his retinue. At Oxford, he was exposed to the writings of Islamic scholars, such as Ibn Tufayl's Hayy ibn Yaqdhan translated by Edward Pococke, who influenced his perspectives on philosophy and tabula rasa.[25][26][27][28]

Career

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Work

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Locke had been looking for a career and in 1667 moved into Ashley's home at Exeter House in London to serve as his personal physician. In London, Locke resumed his medical studies under the tutelage of Thomas Sydenham. Sydenham had a major effect on Locke's natural philosophical thinking—an effect evident in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke's medical knowledge was put to the test when Ashley's liver infection became life-threatening. Locke coordinated the advice of several physicians and was probably instrumental in persuading Ashley to undergo surgery (then life-threatening in itself) to remove the cyst. Ashley survived and prospered, crediting Locke with saving his life. During this time, Locke served as Secretary of the Board of Trade and Plantations and Secretary to the Lords Proprietors of Carolina, which helped shape his ideas on international trade and economics.[29]

Ashley, as a founder of the Whig movement, exerted great influence on Locke's political ideas. Locke became involved in politics when Ashley became Lord Chancellor in 1672 (Ashley was created 1st Earl of Shaftesbury in 1673). After Shaftesbury fell from favour in 1675, Locke spent some time travelling across France as a tutor and medical attendant to Caleb Banks.[30] He returned to England in 1679 when Shaftesbury's political fortunes took a brief positive turn. Around this time, most likely at Shaftesbury's prompting, Locke composed the bulk of the Two Treatises of Government.[31]

While it was once thought that Locke wrote the Treatises to defend the Glorious Revolution of 1688, recent scholarship has shown that the work was composed well before that.[31] The work is now viewed as a more general argument against absolute monarchy (particularly as espoused by Robert Filmer and Thomas Hobbes) and for individual consent as the basis of political legitimacy. Although Locke was associated with the influential Whigs, his ideas about natural rights and government are considered quite revolutionary for that period in English history.

Netherlands

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Locke fled to the Netherlands in 1683 in the company of Shaftesbury, under strong suspicion of involvement in the Rye House Plot, although there is little evidence to suggest that he was directly involved in the scheme. While in the Netherlands, he lived under the pen-name dr. Van Linden.[32] The philosopher and novelist Rebecca Newberger Goldstein argues that during his five years in Holland, Locke chose his friends "from among the same freethinking members of dissenting Protestant groups as Spinoza's small group of loyal confidants [Baruch Spinoza had died in 1677], Locke almost certainly met men in Amsterdam who spoke of the ideas of that renegade Jew who ... insisted on identifying himself through his religion of reason alone."[33]

While she says that "Locke's strong empiricist tendencies" would have "disinclined him to read a grandly metaphysical work such as Spinoza's Ethics, in other ways he was deeply receptive to Spinoza's ideas, most particularly to the rationalist's well thought out argument for political and religious tolerance and the necessity of the separation of church and state."[34] Among the friends he made in the Netherlands are Van Leeuwenhoek and Van Limborch, the leader of the Remonstrants.[32] In the Netherlands, Locke had time to return to his writing, spending a great deal of time working on the Essay Concerning Human Understanding and composing the Letter on Toleration.

Return to England

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Locke did not return home until after the Glorious Revolution. He accompanied Mary II back to England in 1689. The bulk of Locke's publishing took place upon his return from exile—An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration all appearing in quick succession. Locke's close friend Lady Masham invited him to join her at Otes, the Mashams' country house in Essex. Although his time there was marked by variable health from asthma attacks, he nevertheless became an intellectual hero of the Whigs. During this period, he discussed matters with such figures as John Dryden and Isaac Newton.

Death

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An engraved memorial plaque to Locke at Oxford

After a lengthy period of poor health,[35] Locke died on 28 October 1704. He is buried in the churchyard of All Saints' Church in High Laver, near Harlow in Essex, where he had lived in the household of Sir Francis Masham since 1691.[36] Locke never married or had children. Events that happened during Locke's lifetime include the English Restoration, the Great Plague of London, the Great Fire of London, the Glorious Revolution and war against France including the Battle of Blenheim just before his death.[37]

He did not live long enough to see the Act of Union of 1707, but the thrones of England and Scotland were held in personal union throughout his lifetime. Constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy were in their infancy during Locke's time. Locke has an engraved floor memorial plaque at Christ Church Cathedral, Oxford.[38]

Philosophy

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In the late 17th and early 18th centuries, Locke's Two Treatises were rarely cited. Historian Julian Hoppit said of the book "except among some Whigs, even as a contribution to the intense debate of the 1690s it made little impression and was generally ignored until 1703, though in Oxford in 1695 it was reported to have made 'a great noise'."[39]

John Kenyon, in his study of British political debate from 1689 to 1720, has remarked that Locke's theories were "mentioned so rarely in the early stages of the [Glorious] Revolution, up to 1692, and even less thereafter, unless it was to heap abuse on them" and that "no one, including most Whigs, [was] ready for the idea of a notional or abstract contract of the kind adumbrated by Locke".[40]: 200  In contrast, Kenyon adds that Algernon Sidney's Discourses Concerning Government were "certainly much more influential than Locke's Two Treatises."[i][40]: 51 

In the 50 years after Queen Anne's death in 1714, the Two Treatises were reprinted only once, except in the collected works of Locke. With the rise of American resistance to British taxation, the Second Treatise of Government gained a new readership. It was frequently cited in the debates in both America and Britain. The first American printing occurred in 1773 in Boston.[41]

Locke exercised a profound influence on political philosophy, in particular on modern liberalism. Michael Zuckert has argued that Locke launched liberalism by tempering Hobbesian absolutism and clearly separating the realms of Church and State. He had a strong influence on Voltaire, who called him "le sage Locke". His arguments concerning liberty and the social contract later influenced the written works of Thomas Jefferson. One passage from the Second Treatise is reproduced verbatim in the Declaration of Independence, the reference to a "long train of abuses". Of Locke, Jefferson wrote:[42][43][44]

Bacon, Locke and Newton ... I consider them as the three greatest men that have ever lived, without any exception, and as having laid the foundation of those superstructures which have been raised in the Physical and Moral sciences.

Locke's influence may have been even more profound in the realm of epistemology. He redefined subjectivity, or the self, leading intellectual historians such as Charles Taylor and Jerrold Seigel to argue that Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689/90) marks the beginning of the modern Western conception of the self.[45][46] Locke's theory of association heavily influenced the subject matter of modern psychology. At the time, Locke's recognition of two types of ideas, simple and complex—and, more importantly, their interaction through association—inspired other philosophers, such as David Hume and George Berkeley, to revise and expand this theory and apply it to explain how humans gain knowledge in the physical world.[47] Locke thought the state's borders and the functioning and enforcement of the existence of the state and its constitution were metaphysically tied to "the natural rights of the individual", and this inspired future liberal politicians and philosophers.[48]

Religious tolerance

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John Locke by Richard Westmacott, University College London

Writing his Letters Concerning Toleration (1689–1692) in the aftermath of the European wars of religion, Locke formulated a classic reasoning for religious tolerance, in which three arguments are central:[49]

  1. earthly judges, the state in particular, and human beings generally, cannot dependably evaluate the truth-claims of competing religious standpoints;
  2. even if they could, enforcing a single 'true religion' would not have the desired effect, because belief cannot be compelled by violence;
  3. coercing religious uniformity would lead to more social disorder than allowing diversity.

Locke's position on religious tolerance was influenced by Baptist theologians like John Smyth and Thomas Helwys, who had published tracts demanding freedom of conscience in the early 17th century.[50][51][52][53] Baptist theologian Roger Williams founded the colony of Rhode Island in 1636, where he combined a democratic constitution with unlimited religious freedom. His tract The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution for Cause of Conscience (1644), which was widely read in the mother country, was a passionate plea for absolute religious freedom and total separation of church and state.[54] Freedom of conscience had had high priority on the theological, philosophical, and political agenda, as Martin Luther refused to recant his beliefs before the Diet of Worms in 1521, unless he would be proved false by the Bible.[55]

Slavery and child labour

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Locke's views on slavery were multifaceted. Although he wrote against slavery in general, he was an investor and beneficiary of the slave-trading Royal Africa Company. While secretary to the Earl of Shaftesbury, Locke also participated in drafting the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, which established a quasi-feudal aristocracy and gave Carolinian planters absolute power over their enslaved chattel property; the constitutions pledged that "every freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his negro slaves".[56][57]

Philosopher Martin Cohen observes that Locke, as secretary to the Council of Trade and Plantations and a member of the Board of Trade, was "one of just half a dozen men who created and supervised both the colonies and their iniquitous systems of servitude".[58][59] According to American historian James Farr, Locke never expressed any thoughts about his contradictory opinions of slavery, which Farr ascribes to his personal involvement in the Atlantic slave trade.[60] Locke's positions on slavery have been described as hypocritical, and laying the foundation for the Founding Fathers to hold similarly contradictory thoughts regarding freedom and slavery.[61]

Historian Holly Brewer argues that Locke's role in the Constitution of Carolina has been exaggerated and that he was merely paid to revise and make copies of a document that had already been partially written before he became involved; she compares Locke's role to a lawyer writing a will.[62] She states that Locke was paid in Royal African Company stock in lieu of money for his work as a secretary for a governmental sub-committee, and that he sold the stock after a few years.[63] Brewer likewise argues that Locke actively worked to undermine slavery in Virginia while heading a Board of Trade created by William of Orange following the Glorious Revolution. He specifically attacked colonial policy granting land to slave owners and encouraged the baptism and Christian education of the children of enslaved Africans to undercut a major justification of slavery—that they were heathens who possessed no rights.[64]

In his Two Treatises of Government, Locke provided a justification for slavery that could never be met, thus rendering invalid all forms of slavery that existed. Moreover, because slavery is invalid, there is a moral injunction to try to throw off and escape from it.[citation needed] Locke also supported child labour, which was an intrinsic part of all pre-industrial societies.[65][66] In his "Essay on the Poor Law", he discusses the education of the poor; he laments that "the children of labouring people are an ordinary burden to the parish, and are usually maintained in idleness, so that their labour also is generally lost to the public till they are 12 or 14 years old".[67]: 190  Therefore, he suggests the setting up of "working schools" for poor children in each parish in England so that they will be "from infancy [three years old] inured to work".[67]: 190  He goes on to outline the economics of these schools, arguing not only that they will be profitable for the parish, but also that they will instil a good work ethic in the children.[67]: 191 

Animals

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Locke rejected the Cartesian view that animals are mere automata without consciousness. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, he argued that animals possess some cognitive faculties, particularly perception and memory, though not abstraction or reasoning in the human sense. Locke maintained that perception is present "in some degree, in all sorts of animals", including even oysters and cockles, though he described their sensations as "dull". He further held that animals are capable of retaining ideas, but he denied them the capacity for forming abstract or general ideas, which he regarded as a defining feature of human cognition.[68]

Locke used these observations to challenge Descartes's animal machine doctrine and to support the possibility that matter could think, if God so willed. This hypothesis, that God might superadd thought to matter, allowed Locke to argue that mental faculties could be distributed in varying degrees among animals and humans. Locke sometimes used these arguments rhetorically against theological opponents, but was cautious about committing to the immateriality or immortality of animal souls. Instead, he suggested that attributing mental faculties to animals did not necessitate belief in their immortality, thereby avoiding the theological implications Descartes sought to escape by denying animal sentience altogether.[68]

Government

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Locke's political theory was founded upon that of social contract. Unlike Thomas Hobbes, Locke believed that human nature is characterised by reason and tolerance. Like Hobbes, Locke believed that human nature allows people to be selfish. This is apparent with the introduction of currency. In a natural state, all people were equal and independent, and everyone had a natural right to defend their "life, health, liberty, or possessions".[69]: 198  Most scholars trace the phrase "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" in the American Declaration of Independence to Locke's theory of rights,[70] although other origins have been suggested.[71]

Like Hobbes, Locke assumed that the sole right to defend in the state of nature was not enough, so people established a civil society to resolve conflicts in a civil way with help from government in a state of society. But Locke never refers to Hobbes by name and may instead have been responding to other writers of the day.[72] Locke also advocated governmental separation of powers and believed that revolution is not only a right but an obligation in some circumstances. These ideas had a profound influence on the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States.

Accumulation of wealth

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According to Locke, unused property is wasteful and an offence against nature,[73] but, with the introduction of "durable" goods, men could exchange their excessive perishable goods for those which would last longer and thus not offend the natural law. In his view, the introduction of money marked the culmination of this process, making possible the unlimited accumulation of property without causing waste through spoilage.[74] He includes gold or silver as money because they may be "hoarded up without injury to anyone",[75] as they do not spoil or decay in the hands of the possessor. In his view, the introduction of money eliminates limits to accumulation. Locke stresses that inequality has come about by tacit agreement on the use of money, not by the social contract establishing civil society or the law of land regulating property. Locke was aware of a problem posed by unlimited accumulation, but did not consider it his task. He just implies that government would function to moderate the conflict between the unlimited accumulation of property and a more nearly equal distribution of wealth; he does not say which principles government should apply to solve this problem. Not all elements of his thought form a consistent whole. For example, the labour theory of value in the Two Treatises of Government stands side by side with the demand-and-supply theory of value developed in a letter he wrote titled Some Considerations on the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and the Raising of the Value of Money. Moreover, Locke anchors property in labour but, in the end, upholds unlimited accumulation of wealth.[76]

Ideas

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Economics

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On price theory

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Locke's general theory of value and price is a supply-and-demand theory, set out in a letter to a member of parliament in 1691, titled Some Considerations on the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and the Raising of the Value of Money.[77] In it, he refers to supply as quantity and demand as rent: "The price of any commodity rises or falls by the proportion of the number of buyers and sellers ... that which regulates the price ... [of goods] is nothing else but their quantity in proportion to their rent." The quantity theory of money forms a special case of this general theory. His idea is based on "money answers all things" (Ecclesiastes) or "rent of money is always sufficient, or more than enough" and "varies very little". Locke concludes that, as far as money is concerned, the demand for it is exclusively regulated by its quantity, regardless of whether the demand is unlimited or constant. He also investigates the determinants of demand and supply. For supply, he explains the value of goods as based on their scarcity and ability to be exchanged and consumed. He explains demand for goods as based on their ability to yield a flow of income. Locke develops an early theory of capitalisation, such as of land, which has value because "by its constant production of saleable commodities it brings in a certain yearly income". He considers the demand for money as almost the same as demand for goods or land: it depends on whether money is wanted as medium of exchange. As a medium of exchange, he states that "money is capable by exchange to procure us the necessaries or conveniences of life", and for loanable funds "it comes to be of the same nature with land by yielding a certain yearly income ... or interest".

Monetary thoughts

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Locke distinguishes two functions of money: as a counter to measure value, and as a pledge to lay claim to goods. He believes that silver and gold, as opposed to paper money, are the appropriate currency for international transactions. Silver and gold, he says, are treated to have equal value by all of humanity and can thus be treated as a pledge by anyone, while the value of paper money is only valid under the government which issues it.

Locke argues that a country should seek a favourable balance of trade, lest it fall behind other countries and suffer a loss in its trade. Since the world money stock grows constantly, a country must constantly seek to enlarge its own stock. Locke develops his theory of foreign exchanges, by which in addition to commodity movements, there are also movements in country stock of money, and movements of capital determine exchange rates. He considers the latter less significant and less volatile than commodity movements. As for a country's money stock, if it is large relative to that of other countries, he says it will cause the country's exchange to rise above par, as an export balance would do.

Locke prepares estimates of the cash requirements for different economic groups (landholders, labourers, and brokers). In each group he posits that the cash requirements are closely related to the length of the pay period. He argues the brokers—the middlemen—whose activities enlarge the monetary circuit and whose profits eat into the earnings of labourers and landholders, have a negative influence on both personal and the public economy to which they supposedly contribute.[78]

Theory of value and property

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Locke uses the concept of property in both broad and narrow terms: broadly, it covers a wide range of human interests and aspirations; more particularly, it refers to material goods. He argues that property is a natural right that is derived from labour. In Chapter V of his Second Treatise, Locke argues that the individual ownership of goods and property is justified by the labour exerted to produce such goods—"at least where there is enough [land], and as good, left in common for others" (para. 27)—or to use property to produce goods beneficial to human society.[79]

Locke states in his Second Treatise that nature on its own provides little of value to society, implying that the labour expended in the creation of goods gives them their value. From this premise, understood as a labour theory of value,[79] Locke developed a labour theory of property, whereby ownership of property is created by the application of labour. In addition, he believed that property precedes government and government cannot "dispose of the estates of the subjects arbitrarily". Karl Marx later critiqued Locke's theory of property in his own social theory.[80]

The human mind

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A portrait of John Locke by John Greenhill

The self

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Locke defines the self as "that conscious thinking thing, (whatever substance, made up of whether spiritual, or material, simple, or compounded, it matters not) which is sensible, or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends".[81] He does not wholly ignore "substance", writing that "the body too goes to the making the man".[82] In his Essay, Locke explains the gradual unfolding of this conscious mind. Arguing against both the Augustinian view of man as originally sinful and the Cartesian position, which holds that man innately knows basic logical propositions, Locke posits an 'empty mind', a tabula rasa, which is shaped by experience, sensations and reflections being the two sources of all our ideas.[83] He writes in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding:

This source of ideas every man has wholly within himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called 'internal sense.'[84]

Locke's Some Thoughts Concerning Education is an outline on how to educate this mind. Drawing on thoughts expressed in letters written to Mary Clarke and her husband about their son,[85] he expresses the belief that education makes the man—or, more fundamentally, that the mind is an "empty cabinet":[86]

I think I may say that of all the men we meet with, nine parts of ten are what they are, good or evil, useful or not, by their education.

Locke also wrote, "the little and almost insensible impressions on our tender infancies have very important and lasting consequences".[86] He argues that the "associations of ideas" one makes when young are more important than those made later because they are the foundation of the self; they are, put differently, what first mark the tabula rasa. In his Essay, in which both these concepts are introduced, Locke warns, for example, against letting "a foolish maid" convince a child that "goblins and sprites" are associated with the night, for "darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful ideas, and they shall be so joined, that he can no more bear the one than the other".[87]

This theory came to be called associationism. It strongly influenced 18th-century thought, particularly educational theory, as nearly every educational writer warned parents not to allow their children to develop negative associations. It also led to the development of psychology and other new disciplines with David Hartley's attempt to discover a biological mechanism for associationism in his Observations on Man (1749).

Dream argument

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Locke was critical of Descartes's version of the dream argument, making the counter-argument that people cannot have physical pain in dreams as they do in waking life.[88]

Religion

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Religious beliefs

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Some scholars have seen Locke's political convictions as based on his religious beliefs.[89][90][91] Locke's religious trajectory began in Calvinist trinitarianism, but by the time of the Reflections (1695) Locke was advocating not just Socinian views on tolerance but also Socinian Christology.[92] Wainwright (1987) notes that in the posthumously published Paraphrase (1707) Locke's interpretation of one verse, Ephesians 1:10, is markedly different from that of Socinians like Biddle, and may indicate that near the end of his life Locke returned nearer to an Arian position, thereby accepting Christ's pre-existence.[93][92]

Locke was at times unsure about the subject of original sin, so he was accused of Socinianism, Arianism, or Deism.[94] Locke argued that the idea that "all Adam's Posterity [are] doomed to Eternal Infinite Punishment, for the Transgression of Adam" was "little consistent with the Justice or Goodness of the Great and Infinite God", leading Eric Nelson to associate him with Pelagian ideas.[95] However, he did not deny the reality of evil. Man was capable of waging unjust wars and committing crimes. Criminals had to be punished, even with the death penalty.[96]

With regard to the Bible, Locke was very conservative. He retained the doctrine of the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures.[50] The miracles were proof of the divine nature of the biblical message. Locke was convinced that the entire content of the Bible was in agreement with human reason (The Reasonableness of Christianity, 1695).[97][50] Although Locke was an advocate of tolerance, he urged the authorities not to tolerate atheism, because he thought denial of God's existence undermined the social order and led to chaos.[98] That excluded all atheistic varieties of philosophy and all attempts to deduce ethics and natural law from purely secular premises.[99] In Locke's opinion the cosmological argument was valid and proved God's existence. His political thought was based on Protestant Christian views.[99][100] Locke advocated a sense of piety out of gratitude to God for giving reason to men.[101]

Philosophy from religion

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Locke's concept of man started with the belief in creation.[102] Like philosophers Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, Locke equated natural law with the biblical revelation.[103][104][105] Locke derived the fundamental concepts of his political theory from biblical texts, in particular from Genesis 1 and 2 (creation), the Decalogue, the Golden Rule, the teachings of Jesus, and the letters of Paul the Apostle.[106] The Decalogue puts a person's life, reputation and property under God's protection. Locke's philosophy on freedom is also derived from the Bible. Locke derived from the Bible basic human equality, including equality of the sexes, the starting point of the theological doctrine of Imago Dei.[107]

To Locke, one of the consequences of the principle of equality was that all humans were created equally free and therefore governments needed the consent of the governed.[108] Locke compared the English monarchy's rule over the British people to Adam's rule over Eve in Genesis, which was appointed by God.[109] Following Locke's philosophy, the American Declaration of Independence founded human rights partially on the biblical belief in creation. Locke's doctrine that governments need the consent of the governed is also central to the Declaration of Independence.[110]

Library

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Manuscripts, books and treatises

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Locke's signature in Bodleian Locke 13.12. Photo taken at the Bodleian Library, Oxford.

Locke was an assiduous book collector and notetaker throughout his life. By his death in 1704, Locke had amassed a library of more than 3,000 books, a significant number in the seventeenth century.[111] Unlike some of his contemporaries, Locke took care to catalogue and preserve his library, and his will made specific provisions for how his library was to be distributed after his death. Locke's will offered Lady Masham the choice of "any four folios, eight quartos and twenty books of less volume, which she shall choose out of the books in my Library."[112] Locke also gave six titles to his "good friend" Anthony Collins, but Locke bequeathed the majority of his collection to his cousin Peter King (later Lord King) and to Lady Masham's son, Francis Cudworth Masham.[112]

Francis Masham was promised one "moiety" (half) of Locke's library when he reached "the age of one and twenty years."[112] The other "moiety" of Locke's books, along with his manuscripts, passed to his cousin King.[112] Over the next two centuries, the Masham portion of Locke's library was dispersed.[113] The manuscripts and books left to King remained with King's descendants (later the Earls of Lovelace), until most of the collection was bought by the Bodleian Library, Oxford in 1947.[114] Another portion of the books Locke left to King was discovered by the collector and philanthropist Paul Mellon in 1951.[114] Mellon supplemented this discovery with books from Locke's library which he bought privately, and in 1978, he transferred his collection to the Bodleian.[114]

image of locke's treatises of government
One of Locke's famous books on politics, Two Treatises of Government, written and published in his lifetime

The holdings in the Locke Room at the Bodleian have been a valuable resource for scholars interested in Locke, his philosophy, practices for information management, and the history of the book. Many of the books still contain Locke's signature, which he often made on the pastedowns of his books. Many also include Locke's marginalia. The printed books in Locke's library reflected his various intellectual interests as well as his movements at different stages of his life. Locke travelled extensively in France and the Netherlands during the 1670s and 1680s, and during this time he acquired many books from the continent.[115]

Only half of the books in Locke's library were printed in England, while close to 40% came from France and the Netherlands.[116] These books cover a wide range of subjects. According to John Harrison and Peter Laslett, the largest genres in Locke's library were theology (23.8% of books), medicine (11.1%), politics and law (10.7%), and classical literature (10.1%).[117] The Bodleian library currently holds more than 800 of the books from Locke's library.[114] These include Locke's copies of works by several of the most influential figures of the seventeenth century, including:

  • The Quaker William Penn: An address to Protestants of all perswasions (Bodleian Locke 7.69a)
  • The explorer Francis Drake: The world encompassed by Sir Francis Drake (Bodleian Locke 8.37c)
  • The scientist Robert Boyle: A discourse of things above reason (Bodleian Locke 7.272)
  • The bishop and historian Thomas Sprat: The history of the Royal-Society of London (Bodleian Locke 9.10a)

In addition to books owned by Locke, the Bodleian possesses more than 100 manuscripts related to Locke or written in his hand. Like the books in Locke's library, these manuscripts display a range of interests and provide different windows into Locke's activity and relationships. Several of the manuscripts include letters to and from acquaintances like Peter King (MS Locke b. 6) and Nicolas Toinard [fr] (MS Locke c. 45).[118] MS Locke f. 1–10 contain Locke's journals for most years between 1675 and 1704.[118]

Some of the most significant manuscripts include early drafts of Locke's writings, such as his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (MS Locke f. 26).[118] The Bodleian also holds a copy of Robert Boyle's General History of the Air with corrections and notes Locke made while preparing Boyle's work for posthumous publication (MS Locke c. 37 ).[119] Other manuscripts contain unpublished works. Among others, MS. Locke e. 18 includes some of Locke's thoughts on the Glorious Revolution, which Locke sent to his friend Edward Clarke but never published.[120]

One of the largest categories of manuscript at the Bodleian comprises Locke's notebooks and commonplace books. The scholar Richard Yeo calls Locke a "Master Note-taker" and explains that "Locke's methodical note-taking pervaded most areas of his life."[121] In an unpublished essay "Of Study," Locke argued that a notebook should work like a "chest-of-drawers" for organising information, which would be a "great help to the memory and means to avoid confusion in our thoughts."[122] Locke kept several notebooks and commonplace books, which he organised according to topic. MS Locke c. 43 includes Locke's notes on theology, while MS Locke f. 18–24 contain medical notes.[118] Other notebooks, such as MS c. 43, incorporate several topics in the same notebook, but separated into sections.[118]

Page 1 of Locke's unfinished index in Bodleian Locke 13.12. Photo taken at the Bodleian Library, Oxford.

These commonplace books were highly personal and were designed to be used by Locke himself rather than accessible to a wide audience.[123] Locke's notes are often abbreviated and are full of codes which he used to reference material across notebooks.[124] Another way Locke personalised his notebooks was by devising his own method of creating indexes using a grid system and Latin keywords.[125] Instead of recording entire words, his indexes shortened words to their first letter and vowel. Thus, the word "Epistle" would be classified as "Ei".[126]

Locke published his method in French in 1686, and it was republished posthumously in English in 1706. Some of the books in Locke's library at the Bodleian are a combination of manuscript and print. Locke had some of his books interleaved, meaning that they were bound with blank sheets in-between the printed pages to enable annotations. Locke interleaved and annotated his five volumes of the New Testament in French, Greek, and Latin (Bodleian Locke 9.103–107). Locke did the same with his copy of Thomas Hyde's Bodleian Library catalogue (Bodleian Locke 16.17), which Locke used to create a catalogue of his own library.[127]

Writing

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List of major works

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Major posthumous manuscripts

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  • 1660. First Tract of Government (or the English Tract)
  • c.1662. Second Tract of Government (or the Latin Tract)
  • 1664. Questions Concerning the Law of Nature.[129]
  • 1667. Essay Concerning Toleration
  • 1706. Of the Conduct of the Understanding
  • 1707. A paraphrase and notes on the Epistles of St. Paul to the Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Romans, Ephesians

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
John Locke (29 August 1632 – 28 October 1704) was an English philosopher, physician, and political theorist whose writings established the foundations of and . Born in , , to Puritan parents, Locke was educated at and , where he earned a in 1655 and a master's in 1658, later pursuing medical studies. He held administrative positions, including secretary to the and roles in the , while developing ideas amid political upheavals like the . Locke's (1689) posits that the mind begins as a , acquiring solely through sensory experience and internal reflection, thereby advancing against rationalist claims of innate ideas. In (1689), he rejected and divine right, asserting natural rights to life, , and property, with government legitimacy derived from popular consent and the protection of these rights, justifying resistance to tyrannical rule. These principles, alongside his (1689), promoted religious freedom limited to non-threatening sects and influenced Enlightenment thought, , and the American founders' emphasis on . Locke's empirical approach to and for individual rights over state authority remain central to liberal , though his era's context included involvement in colonial enterprises like the Carolina proprietorship, which tolerated despite his theoretical commitments to .

Early Life and Education

Family Background and Upbringing

John Locke was born on 29 August 1632 in , a village in , , approximately 12 miles from , and baptized the same day in the local church. His father, also named John Locke, worked as a and clothier of modest means, managing a small estate while serving as a captain in a Parliamentarian troop during the early phases of the , which began when Locke was about ten years old. Locke's mother, Agnes Keene, came from a family of tanners and shared her husband's Puritan convictions, fostering a household environment steeped in religious discipline and moral rigor. The family relocated shortly after Locke's birth to the nearby village of , where his father continued legal and administrative work, including as clerk to a local . This Puritan upbringing emphasized literacy, biblical study, and ethical conduct amid the religious and political upheavals of the period, with Locke's early years marked by the visible effects of civil strife, including troop movements and ideological divisions between royalists and parliamentarians. Locke had at least one younger brother, Thomas, reflecting a typical middling family structure without significant wealth or nobility. Locke's initial occurred informally at under his father's guidance, prioritizing practical skills, religious instruction, and rudimentary Latin, which laid a foundation for his later scholarly pursuits despite the era's turbulent conditions. This domestic setting, influenced by paternal and maternal piety, instilled in Locke a pragmatic outlook shaped by Puritan emphasis on individual and resistance to arbitrary , evident in his father's alignment with Oliver Cromwell's forces.

Oxford Studies and Influences

Locke matriculated at Christ Church, Oxford, in the autumn of 1652 at the age of twenty, later than typical for undergraduates of the era. The university's curriculum at the time centered on Aristotelian scholasticism, emphasizing logic, metaphysics, and classical languages such as Greek and Latin, which Locke later critiqued as unproductive and obscurantist in fostering genuine knowledge. He completed a Bachelor of Arts in 1656 and proceeded to a Master of Arts in 1658, after which he was elected a Student—equivalent to a fellow—at Christ Church, allowing him to remain at the university and tutor undergraduates. During his Oxford tenure, extending to 1667, Locke grew disillusioned with the dominant philosophical tradition and gravitated toward empirical and experimental approaches to and . He encountered the nascent at , including figures like Bishop and architect-astronomer , who advocated observation and experimentation over deductive . Robert Boyle, the leading chemist and proponent of the mechanical philosophy, served as Locke's primary scientific mentor, introducing him to rigorous experimentation and corpuscular theories of matter; Boyle's influence is evident in Locke's early notebooks, which record chemical trials and Boyle's lectures. Locke's reading extended to Francis Bacon's emphasis on inductive methods and natural histories, as well as continental authors like —whose mechanistic worldview he engaged critically—and Jean-Baptiste van Helmont's chemical theories, shaping his rejection of innate ideas in favor of sensory-derived knowledge. These influences redirected his studies toward medicine, culminating in a Bachelor of Medicine in 1674–1675, though practical dissections and clinical pursuits were informal and self-directed amid Oxford's rigid structure. By the mid-1660s, Locke held administrative roles, such as Censor of Moral Philosophy in 1664, where he lectured on rather than abstract metaphysics, reflecting his preference for utility over speculation.

Professional and Political Career

Medical Practice and Intellectual Circles

Locke commenced formal medical studies at , where he engaged with experimental approaches influenced by contemporaries like , culminating in his conferral of the Bachelor of Medicine degree on February 28, 1675, alongside a to practice medicine. In 1667, following his relocation to , Locke assumed the role of personal physician to Anthony Ashley Cooper, later the First , a prominent statesman whose shaped Locke's career trajectory. Locke's medical duties in Shaftesbury's household were sporadic, often subordinated to administrative and advisory responsibilities, with consultations sought primarily for specific ailments rather than routine care. A pivotal episode in Locke's medical career occurred in the summer of 1668, when he collaborated with surgeons Thomas Lister and Charles Borde to address Shaftesbury's chronic liver abscess—a hydatid cyst threatening fatal rupture—by performing a novel drainage procedure that inserted a silver tube (seton) into the lesion to facilitate continuous suppuration and prevent recurrence, an intervention that extended Shaftesbury's life by over a decade. This operation, documented in Locke's correspondence and medical notes, reflected his adherence to empirical observation over speculative theory, aligning with the era's shift toward clinical experimentation amid high mortality from such conditions. Locke also contributed to pediatric care, advocating practical remedies like cold baths and plain diets for children's ailments in his 1693 work Some Thoughts Concerning Education, though his direct involvement remained incidental to philosophical pursuits. Concurrently, Locke's medical endeavors intersected with burgeoning intellectual networks, particularly through his election as a on November 18, 1668, where he engaged with pioneers of the new , including Boyle and , fostering exchanges on corpuscular theory and empirical methodology that informed his later epistemological writings. His association with physician , dating from circa 1666–1667 in , proved instrumental; Locke endorsed Sydenham's observational approach to —emphasizing natural histories of diseases over dogmatic systems—and penned a to Sydenham's 1676 Observationes Medicae, praising its inductive rigor as a model for advancing medical knowledge through repeated trials rather than hypothetical deductions. These circles, centered in and , exposed Locke to mechanistic views of the body as a machine governed by discoverable laws, reinforcing his rejection of scholastic medicine in favor of , though he never achieved widespread clinical prominence due to his divided attentions.

Service under Shaftesbury and Colonial Involvement

In 1667, John Locke relocated from to and entered the household of Anthony Ashley Cooper, Baron Ashley (created 1st in 1672), initially as his personal physician following an introduction through a mutual acquaintance. Locke successfully treated Ashley for a severe in 1668 via surgical drainage, earning lasting patronage that expanded Locke's role to include secretarial duties, such as managing correspondence, drafting documents, and providing counsel on policy matters. Shaftesbury, a prominent Restoration statesman and opponent of , rose to in 1672, during which Locke served as his secretary for ecclesiastical business, handling matters related to church appointments and dissenters. Locke also acted as secretary to the Council of Trade and Plantations from 1673 to 1675, advising on mercantile policies, colonial , and overseas trade regulations under royal charters. Locke's colonial involvement centered on the Province of Carolina, granted to eight Lords Proprietors in 1663, with as a leading proprietor. In collaboration with , Locke contributed to drafting the in July 1669, a comprehensive code of 120 articles establishing a hierarchical, quasi-feudal system with a governor, landgraves, cassiques, and barons holding hereditary estates, alongside mechanisms for a representative and religious limited to . The document explicitly permitted chattel , defining slaves as inheritable across generations and exempt from protections, while distinguishing them from "leet-men" (bound serfs with limited rights). Though revised multiple times (notably in 1682 and 1698), the Constitutions faced practical resistance from Carolina settlers preferring simpler assemblies and were never fully ratified or enforced, leading to their formal revocation in 1698 amid mismanagement. Locke's precise authorship remains debated, with manuscript evidence indicating Shaftesbury's dominant revisions, but Locke's secretarial position and philosophical emphasis on property rights aligned with the framework's provisions for land distribution tied to quitrents and labor obligations. This experience informed Locke's later views on colonial property acquisition through , though the Constitutions' aristocratic structure diverged from his eventual advocacy for consent-based government.

Exile in the Netherlands

Following the death of , on January 21, 1683, in the , and amid intensified government suspicion of Whig plotters after the exposure of the Rye House Plot—a conspiracy to assassinate Charles II and —Locke left for the in September 1683 to avoid arrest. Although never formally charged, Locke's close association with , whose faction had opposed absolutist tendencies, rendered his position untenable in Restoration , where dissenters faced expulsion from offices and . Traveling incognito under the pseudonym Dr. van der Linden—borrowed from a deceased Dutch physician—Locke initially settled in before moving primarily between and , where the Republic's commercial prosperity and confessional pluralism offered refuge from English . This period, spanning until early 1689, allowed him respite from chronic respiratory ailments exacerbated by England's damp climate, while exposing him to Arminian and Remonstrant influences that reinforced his views on religious liberty. In exile, Locke advanced his philosophical output, drafting revisions to —outlining empiricist —and composing Epistola de Tolerantia in Latin during 1685, a tract addressed to theologian Philipp van Limborch arguing that civil government should not coerce conscience, as true faith arises from persuasion, not force. He also engaged Dutch intellectual circles, reviewing Isaac Newton's for the Bibliothèque universelle et historique in 1688 and interacting with radical groups like the Collegiants, whose emphasis on individual interpretation and rejection of creeds paralleled his advocacy for beyond orthodox churches. Locke cultivated ties with English Protestant exiles in the , many of whom supported of Orange's stadtholderate against James II's Catholic-leaning policies, positioning himself intellectually for the . His Oxford studentship at Christ Church was revoked in absentia in 1684 by royal order, underscoring the political motivations behind his flight. The Dutch interlude thus served as a for Locke's maturation, enabling works that would underpin liberal constitutionalism upon his return amid 's 1688 invasion of .

Return to England and the Glorious Revolution

Locke returned to England from the in February 1689, following the successful overthrow of James II during the of 1688–1689, an event that installed William III and Mary II as joint monarchs without widespread bloodshed. His exile had stemmed from association with the and suspected involvement in the Rye House Plot against Charles II, prompting flight amid rising Catholic influence under James II. During his Dutch sojourn, Locke maintained ties to English exiles and Dutch stadtholder William of Orange, whose invasion of England on November 5, 1688, precipitated James's abdication after the birth of his Catholic heir in June 1688 threatened Protestant succession. Upon arrival, Locke received a warm welcome from supporters of the new regime, reflecting alignment between his advocacy for contractual , consent-based authority, and resistance to absolutism—as outlined in his pre-revolution drafts—and the revolution's principles of and religious toleration for Protestants. He published anonymously in late 1689, arguing against divine-right monarchy and justifying dissolution of tyrannical rule, ideas resonant with the Convention Parliament's Declaration of Rights that limited and affirmed no taxation without consent. Though not a direct participant in the invasion or parliamentary debates, Locke's intellectual contributions bolstered Whig justifications for the events, emphasizing that derived from the people's trust rather than hereditary absolutism. Locke initially declined a proffered government position due to fragile health but accepted appointment as commissioner of appeals in the customs office later in 1689, a role involving adjudication of trade disputes amid economic adjustments post-revolution. This period marked his shift from to establishment figure, enabling publication of in 1690, while the revolution's outcomes—such as the 1689 Toleration Act granting limited nonconformist freedoms—partially realized his calls for moderated religious coercion without endorsing full . Critics later noted the revolution's incomplete radicalism, preserving much monarchical structure, yet it empirically validated Locke's causal view that breaches of invite justified rebellion, averting through negotiated settlement rather than conquest.

Final Years and Death

Locke returned to in 1689 after the and initially resided in , where he focused on publishing key works amid ongoing health challenges from and respiratory ailments. In 1691, seeking relief from urban conditions that exacerbated his conditions, he moved to Oates, the Essex estate of Sir Francis Masham, 3rd Baronet, and his wife, the intellectual Damaris Cudworth Masham, with whom Locke had corresponded since the 1680s. He remained there for the final 14 years of his life, benefiting from the rural air and the Mashams' hospitality, though he contributed financially to household expenses. At Oates, Locke continued scholarly pursuits despite frailty, producing Some Thoughts Concerning Education in 1693 and The Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures in 1695, while engaging in correspondence on , , and with figures like William Molyneux. He declined public offices, including an ambassadorship to in 1699, citing insufficient health. Progressive decline marked his later years: by 1700, in his legs required extended , compounded by near-total and bronchial weakness. In his final months, Locke prepared for death with composure, dictating revisions to his will and reflecting on mortality. On 28 October 1704, aged 72, he died quietly at Oates around 3 p.m., as Lady Masham read to him; no specific terminal cause beyond chronic is recorded. He was buried three days later in the churchyard of St. Mary's, High Laver, with a simple inscription noting his birth in 1632 and death in 1704, emphasizing his philosophical legacy over worldly honors.

Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind

Rejection of Innate Ideas and Tabula Rasa

In his , first published in 1690, John Locke devotes Book I to refuting the doctrine of innate ideas, which posited that certain principles or knowledge are imprinted on the mind independently of experience, as defended by philosophers like . Locke contends that no such innate speculative principles—such as the logical "whatever is, is"—exist, because they lack universal assent among rational beings; infants, children under the age of reason, and those deemed idiots or lacking full intellectual capacity show no awareness of them without instruction. He argues that if these principles were truly innate, they would be perceived immediately and effortlessly by all upon acquiring the use of reason, without variation across cultures or individuals, yet historical and observational evidence demonstrates otherwise, as principles are learned through teaching and reflection rather than emerging spontaneously. Locke extends this critique to innate practical or moral principles, such as "one ought not to harm another" or the golden rule, asserting that these too fail the test of innateness due to counterexamples in human behavior and cross-cultural practices. He observes that children and "wild" or uneducated individuals often act contrary to such maxims before any moral education, and societies exist where customs endorse actions violating these supposed universals, like infanticide or ritual harm, indicating that moral knowledge arises from societal conditioning and experience rather than an inborn disposition. Locke dismisses claims of latent or dispositional innateness by emphasizing that true innateness requires actual, conscious apprehension, not mere potential; thus, the absence of evident universality undermines the doctrine entirely. As a direct consequence of rejecting innate ideas, Locke proposes the mind as a tabula rasa, or blank slate—"white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas"—at birth, furnished exclusively through sensory experience (sensation) from the external world and internal observation of one's own mental operations (reflection). This empiricist framework holds that all simple ideas originate externally via the five senses or internally via perceiving thoughts, pleasures, and volitions, with no pre-existing content; complex ideas then form through combination, , and by the mind's active faculties. Locke qualifies that the mind is not utterly passive or empty of capacities—possessing powers like and retention—but lacks any substantive or principles prior to empirical input, a view grounded in observable development from infancy, where ideas accumulate gradually rather than erupting fully formed. This rejection prioritizes causal origins in over hypothetical , aligning with Locke's broader commitment to evidence-based .

Theory of Simple and Complex Ideas

In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), John Locke delineates his empiricist theory of ideas, positing that the mind begins as a and acquires all content through experience, with simple ideas serving as the foundational, indivisible units of cognition. Simple ideas enter the mind passively, either via sensation—through the senses perceiving external objects, yielding impressions such as yellow, cold, or soft—or via reflection, through internal operations like perceiving, thinking, doubting, believing, or willing. Locke emphasizes that the mind has no power to invent or destroy these simple ideas; it can only receive them as they are conveyed by sensory input or introspective awareness, ensuring their uniformity and fidelity to their sources. For instance, the simple idea of sweetness arises directly from tasting sugar, while the idea of remembrance derives from reflecting on prior mental acts, without alteration or combination at this stage. Locke classifies simple ideas into categories based on their provenance: those of sensation (e.g., visible colors, tangible shapes, audible sounds), those of reflection (e.g., , , existence), and those blending both (e.g., as a mix of and willing). He argues that these ideas possess a such that they cannot be analyzed into constituent parts; any attempt to divide them, such as separating whiteness from its extension, fails because they appear as unified wholes to the understanding. This indivisibility underscores Locke's rejection of innate or fabricated primitives, insisting instead that external objects cause sensory ideas via mechanisms like and motion, though the mind perceives only the ideas, not the objects themselves. Primary qualities (, extension, figure, motion) produce simple ideas resembling the objects, while secondary qualities (colors, tastes) yield ideas that vary with the perceiver's constitution. Complex ideas, by contrast, arise actively from the mind's operations on simple ideas, involving , composition, and to form representations of substances, modes, and relations. Locke identifies three principal kinds: substances, which represent collections of simple ideas supposed to subsist together (e.g., the complex idea of combines yellowness, fusibility, and heaviness); modes, dependent ideas without independent existence, subdivided into simple modes (repetitions or alterations of a simple idea, like a or a ) and mixed modes (combinations like or , framed arbitrarily by the mind); and relations, arising from comparing one idea with another (e.g., as a relation between male and ). Unlike simple ideas, complex ones lack archetypes in nature for mixed modes, relying on societal conventions, which introduces potential for error if the mind deviates from clear simple foundations. Locke warns that inadequate complex ideas occur when simple components are omitted or misrepresented, as in supposing substances have unknown "real essences" beyond observable qualities. This distinction facilitates Locke's broader , where derives from perceiving agreements or disagreements among ideas, with simple ideas providing the reliable building blocks for reasoning in areas like , while complex ideas enable probabilistic judgments about the world. He illustrates the mind's role through analogy to a "dark room" illuminated only by , where simple ideas are the raw influx and complex ideas the assembled structures, underscoring human cognitive limits without innate templates.

Knowledge, Probability, and Limits of Certainty

Locke defined as "the of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas," emphasizing that arises solely from this direct apprehension rather than from innate principles or unexamined assumptions. He identified three degrees of , each providing varying levels of assurance: intuitive , which involves immediate without intermediary steps, as in recognizing that "white is not black" or one's own ; , achieved through chains of reasoning where each step is intuitively evident, though subject to potential error in longer proofs; and sensitive , derived from sensory of the of finite external objects, such as observing a particular tree. Intuitive holds the highest due to its directness, while and sensitive forms, though still certain within their scope, are practically constrained by human faculties. Despite these foundations, Locke maintained that human knowledge is inherently limited, confined to relations among ideas derivable from and incapable of penetrating the intrinsic natures or "real essences" of substances beyond their qualities. For instance, while one can know mathematical truths demonstratively or sensory particulars sensitively, broader inquiries—such as the ultimate causes of natural phenomena or the precise mechanisms of substance interactions—elude because ideas do not fully connect to external realities independent of . Locke rejected absolute but argued that claims exceeding these bounds, like comprehensive knowledge of divine intentions or unobserved historical events, must rely on probability rather than knowledge proper, as the mind lacks infinite scope to verify all agreements. Locke further explained the origins of irrational beliefs through the association of ideas, where ideas become connected not by rational perception but by chance, custom, or habit, leading to propositions that mimic knowledge yet lack true agreement. Knowledge consists of propositions formed by combining ideas and perceiving their rational agreement or disagreement, such as "gold is yellow," where the connection stems from clear observation. In contrast, associations produce involuntary links, often erroneous, that generate unquestioned assents; for example, a child may fear darkness after hearing horror stories in the dark, associating the idea of night with terror irrespective of reason, or develop an aversion to cats from a childhood scratch, treating the connection as evident truth. These associations, detailed in Book II, Chapter 33 of the Essay, explain how prejudices and false judgments arise, blending with propositional structure to form a model where much everyday "knowledge" derives from irrational grounds rather than evidence. Probability, in Locke's view, supplies the basis for rational assent where terminates, defined as "the appearance of agreement or disagreement of two ideas by the intervention of proofs whose connection is not constant and immutable, but is, or may be, fallible." Its grounds include the of an idea with other ideas already known with , to generally observed patterns (such as the sun rising daily), from credible witnesses, and from similar cases. Locke stressed that assent must be proportioned to these grounds—stronger probabilities warrant firmer , while weaker ones demand caution—to minimize error, particularly in practical affairs like history, , or where full demonstration is impossible. He distinguished probability from by its fallibility, noting that even probable judgments can mislead if not grounded in , yet they enable prudent action in an uncertain world. These limits underscore Locke's empiricist caution against dogmatism: revelation and faith may compel assent when evident, but reason must judge their probability against sensory and rational , preventing blind . In domains like , where experiments yield probable regularities rather than universal necessities, Locke advocated incremental , acknowledging that humanity's finite senses and reasoning impose boundaries on while probability guides ethical and empirical . This framework positioned as reliable but narrow, with probability as the indispensable tool for navigating life's complexities.

Personal Identity and Consciousness

Locke's account of personal identity appears in Chapter 27 of Book II of (1690), where he introduces as the defining criterion for the persistence of a over time. He defines a as "a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it the same thing in different times and places; which it does only by that , which is inseparable from thinking." This forensic notion of emphasizes for actions, tying identity to the capacity for and rather than mere biological or substantial continuity. Locke rejects substance-based accounts of identity, arguing that neither the sameness of the (a "man") nor an immaterial soul suffices for . For instance, he posits that if transfers to a different body or substance while preserving of past actions, the person remains the same, as " depends on , not on Substance." Conversely, a without continuity of —such as in cases of total —would not constitute the same person, even if the body persists. , for Locke, involves the immediate of one's own mental operations and extends backward through , enabling appropriation of past experiences as one's own. This memory-linked consciousness addresses diachronic identity, where personal sameness requires a of remembered actions linking present to past states, without gaps severing the continuity. Locke illustrates this through thought experiments, such as the Day of Judgment, where demands of earthly deeds for reward or , independent of bodily recomposition. He acknowledges potential circularity in defining via memory but maintains that the relation is non-transitive yet sufficient for practical identity, as divine could ensure memory continuity in . Critics later noted challenges, like quasi-memories in hypothetical transplants, but Locke's framework prioritizes empirical self-appropriation over metaphysical substrates.

Political Theory

Natural Law, State of Nature, and Social Contract

John Locke's conception of natural law derives from divine creation, asserting that God endowed humanity with reason to discover moral obligations inherent in the natural order. This law, eternal and universal, obliges individuals to preserve themselves and others, prohibiting harm to life, health, liberty, or possessions, as reason dictates that all men, being equal and independent, ought not infringe upon one another. Locke emphasized that natural law functions as the measure of right and wrong even absent civil authority, with violations subject to retribution in this life or the next, underscoring its binding force independent of human legislation. In Locke's , prior to organized society, individuals exist in perfect freedom to direct their actions, dispose of their possessions, and govern their persons as they deem fit, provided they adhere to natural law's bounds; simultaneously, all are equal, with no natural subordination granting one dominion over another. This condition, unlike Thomas Hobbes's depiction of , permits peaceable coexistence among rational actors who consult reason, yet it proves inconvenient due to the absence of established laws, impartial judges to resolve disputes, and enforced execution against transgressors, often leading to self-interested biases and escalated conflicts. Locke argued that these deficiencies—lack of settled , unbiased , and coercive power—prompt men to seek mutual preservation through collective agreement rather than inherent depravity. The social contract, for Locke, emerges as rational individuals consent to unite into political society, surrendering their natural right to enforce the law of nature to the community for better security of their rights, particularly property in its broadest sense encompassing life, liberty, and estate. This compact forms civil society first, wherein members collectively authorize a legislative power as supreme but trust-based, tasked solely with protecting natural rights without arbitrary rule; government arises as an extension of this societal trust, delegating execution and federation powers under legislative oversight. Consent, whether express through agreement or tacit via enjoyment of societal benefits, binds individuals, but the contract remains conditional: if government exceeds its ends or invades rights, the trust dissolves, reverting society to a state permitting resistance. Locke's framework, outlined in the Second Treatise of Government published in 1689, posits government as a fiduciary instrument derived from popular consent, not divine right or conquest, ensuring limited authority revocable upon betrayal. In Locke's Second Treatise of Government (1689), political society originates from the voluntary consent of free and equal individuals emerging from the state of nature, where no one can be subjected to another's political power without their own agreement. This consent establishes a commonwealth as a single body politic, wherein the majority's agreement binds all members to submit to the decisions of the collective for the preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates. Locke distinguishes express consent, given through explicit acts like oaths or compacts, from tacit consent, inferred from individuals' continued residence and enjoyment of the society's protections, such as highways or market privileges, which obligates obedience to its laws. The government thus formed remains limited in scope and authority, deriving its legitimacy as a fiduciary trust placed by the people in the legislative body—the supreme power within the commonwealth—to enact standing laws for the public good rather than arbitrary decrees. These laws must be promulgated, general in application, and aimed at protecting property (encompassing life, liberty, and goods), with no taxation or appropriation of property permissible without the people's consent through representatives. Locke emphasizes that legislative power, though predominant, is not absolute; it operates under the ends for which society was constituted and can be altered or revoked if it acts contrary to trust, implying a separation of powers where executive and federative functions support but do not usurp legislative authority. This structure prevents any branch from exercising unchecked dominion, ensuring government serves as a trustee accountable to its principals. When government exceeds these bounds—through invasion of subjects' properties, suspension of laws without consent, or subjection to foreign powers—the trust dissolves, reverting authority to the people. Locke defines tyranny as "the exercise of power beyond right," which inherently lacks legitimacy and justifies resistance, as no one can rightfully wield such authority. The people, as the origin of power, become the judges of breaches and may "appeal to heaven" by resisting oppressors to reestablish a government aligned with its protective purpose, though Locke cautions against hasty appeals, noting dissolution occurs only upon clear transgression of societal fundamentals rather than mere policy disputes. This doctrine of resistance underscores the conditional nature of obedience, positioning the populace as the ultimate safeguard against abuse.

Property Acquisition, Labor, and Wealth Accumulation

Locke posited that the foundation of originates from , whereby God granted the earth's resources to humanity in common for sustenance, but individuals hold proprietary rights over their own persons and the labor they exert. In the Second Treatise of Government (1689), he asserted: "Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person... The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his" (§27). By mixing this labor with unappropriated natural materials—such as gathering acorns, picking apples, or tilling uncultivated land—one removes them from the common stock and annexes them as private property, provided the act aligns with rational . This labor theory underscores that value derives primarily from human effort rather than inherent qualities; for instance, labor might enhance the utility of land tenfold through cultivation. Acquisition remains bounded by two principal provisos in the to prevent arbitrary : the spoilage limitation and the sufficiency condition. Locke stipulated that one may appropriate "as much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils" (§31), ensuring no waste of perishable goods like uneaten fruit or unused portions beyond personal needs. Additionally, appropriation must leave "enough and as good" for others (§27, §33), preserving access to equivalent resources for subsequent laborers; thus, enclosing all fertile land while degrading for others would violate this rule. These constraints, derived from first-principles of equitable use and non-harm, limit initial wealth hoarding to consumable extents, reflecting causal realities of in pre-monetary economies. The invention of , as a durable, consensual , effectively dissolves the spoilage barrier, permitting indefinite accumulation and engendering . Locke observed that "the invention of " enabled individuals to store without decay, fostering and disproportionate possessions: "Men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the " (§50). This shift, tacitly consented to via societal participation, transforms labor's fruits into accumulable , justifying enclosures and commerce so long as they stem from productive effort rather than force. Scholarly interpretations debate the proviso's persistence post-—some, like James Tully, argue it curtails excessive holdings to avert , while others, like , view it as historically superseded by consent-based civil laws protecting accumulations. Nonetheless, Locke's framework causally links labor-driven property to societal consent for , which safeguards against arbitrary while enabling its expansion through market exchange.

Economic Implications: Value, Money, and Trade

Locke's conception of economic value rooted in the labor theory, as outlined in Chapter V of the Second Treatise of Government (), held that individuals acquire property rights by mixing their labor with unowned natural resources, thereby creating value where none existed in a state sufficient for common use. For instance, tilling uncultivated land or gathering acorns attaches proprietary claims proportional to the labor expended, with the proviso that acquisition must not exceed what can be consumed before spoilage to avoid waste. This labor-based value addition justified private appropriation from the , provided it aligned with the divine command to improve the earth for human sustenance. The invention of fundamentally altered these dynamics by introducing a durable, non-perishable —such as and silver—that individuals tacitly consented to use as a , thereby dissolving the spoilage limitation and enabling unlimited accumulation. Locke explained in the Second Treatise (§§ 47–50) that this consensual adoption of , agreed upon in the , allowed men to exchange perishable for imperishable metals, fostering and wealth disparities as "riches got by the use of " exceeded natural bounds without violating others' . Consequently, facilitated by standardizing value measurement and promoting division of labor, though it introduced inequality as industrious accumulators enclosed more and resources via market exchanges. In Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and the Raising of the Value of Money (1691), Locke elaborated on 's role in , arguing that its intrinsic value derives from relative to available , prefiguring a theory where increasing depreciates its worth without boosting real wealth. He opposed legislative caps on rates, asserting that rates should equilibrate with the natural of —typically around 3–6% in England's context—to prevent , reduced lending, and contraction, as artificially low rates distort incentives for savers and investors. Locke advocated recoining clipped silver at full intrinsic value to restore 's , estimating that had halved effective specie circulation, and warned that such manipulations exacerbate economic instability over genuine productivity gains. Regarding trade, Locke viewed international as a vehicle for national prosperity, favoring policies that boosted exports of manufactured goods over raw imports to maintain a favorable balance, though he critiqued extreme mercantilist of as misguided since money's utility lies in circulation rather than accumulation. He supported Africa's initially for its role in supplying slaves to colonies—enhancing labor productivity and thus value creation—but later opposed perpetual monopolies, arguing in parliamentary submissions that open competition spurred and efficiency in sectors like shipping and textiles. Locke's framework thus linked free exchange, sound money, and labor productivity as causal drivers of , cautioning against state interventions that ignore market signals from supply, demand, and .

Religious and Moral Philosophy

Rational Christianity and Revelation

Locke posited that , properly understood from the Scriptures, accords with reason and requires no assent beyond what rational evidence supports. In his 1695 treatise The Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures, he identified the central tenet as the in Jesus Christ as the , substantiated by historical miracles, fulfilled prophecies, and moral doctrines that reinforce principles discernible by unaided reason. Locke emphasized that these elements render not an irrational leap but a conclusion from credible and observable effects, such as Christ's attested by multiple witnesses. He further argued that the Scriptures' ethical teachings, including and obedience, simplify and clarify the moral law that reason imperfectly grasps, making divine a rational supplement rather than a substitute for human inquiry. Central to Locke's framework was the distinction between natural religion, knowable through reason alone—encompassing God's existence via cosmological arguments, the soul's immortality from self-reflection, and rudimentary duties like preserving mankind—and revealed religion, which supplies salvific specifics such as atonement for sin and resurrection details unattainable by speculation. Revelation, however, submits to reason's scrutiny: it cannot introduce absurdities or contradict demonstrable truths, for God, as rational author, communicates proportionally to human faculties. Locke insisted that apparent conflicts arise from human error in interpretation, not divine inconsistency, and that reason must proportion assent to revelation's evidence, treating it as high-probability knowledge rather than intuitive certainty. The authentication of revelation hinged on miracles as extraordinary signs of divine intervention, requiring examination of witnesses' credibility, the miracles' proportionality to the message, and their historical attestation over private claims. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), Book IV, Chapter 18, Locke delineated faith as assent to divinely proposed propositions on testimony's strength, distinct yet harmonious with reason, which evaluates revelation's coherence and origins. He rejected "enthusiasm"—unfounded inner convictions masquerading as revelation—as a delusion stemming from overheated imagination, devoid of rational or scriptural grounding, which undermines evidence-based belief and fosters fanaticism. True revelation remains public and verifiable, aligning with Locke's broader epistemology where probability governs non-demonstrative domains like historical testimony.

Toleration: Scope and Exclusions

In A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), Locke defined the scope of religious as encompassing the free exercise of worship by individuals and separate churches, provided such practices neither harm nor interfere with the magistrate's authority over temporal matters like life, , , and . He maintained that the church's role is confined to the care of souls and through voluntary , distinct from the state's duty to enforce outward for public , arguing that "the business of [consists] in the inward and full of the mind" rather than coerced uniformity. This toleration extended beyond Protestants to include "neither Pagan nor Mahometan, nor Jew" in civil rights, as long as their doctrines promoted peaceable conduct and moral uprightness, emphasizing that "those whose doctrine is peaceable and whose manners are pure and blameless ought to be upon equal terms with their fellow-subjects." Locke explicitly excluded atheists from toleration, asserting that "those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a " because "promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human , can have no hold upon an atheist," thereby dissolving the mutual trust essential to civil order. He similarly barred Roman Catholics (referred to as papists), not due to doctrinal errors per se, but because membership in their church entailed allegiance to a foreign —the —whose claims to temporal over princes rendered Catholics incapable of undivided to the civil , as "all those who enter into it do thereby ipso facto deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince." Beyond these, Locke opposed tolerating any sect promoting doctrines "contrary to human " or moral rules, such as those inciting , , or , which the state must suppress regardless of religious pretext to preserve communal bonds. These limits reflected Locke's view that served civil stability, not absolute liberty, and required reciprocal non-interference between ecclesiastical and political spheres.

Education, Child Rearing, and Virtue

In Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693), Locke outlined a practical regimen for raising sons of the , emphasizing the formation of virtuous habits over rote scholarship, with physical robustness as the foundation for mental and . He argued that children's minds begin as a , shaped indelibly by early impressions, thus requiring deliberate nurture to instill self-mastery rather than indulgence. , defined as the capacity for and rational restraint, takes precedence: "I place Virtue as the first and most necessary of those endowments that belong to a man." Locke prioritized bodily health to build resilience, advising abundant open air, vigorous exercise such as dancing or , a plain diet devoid of wine or delicacies, and habitual cold-water exposure—even washing children's feet in cold water daily—to foster hardiness and avert the "cockering and tenderness" that weakens constitutions and invites vice. Child rearing, in Locke's view, demands vigilant prevention of spoiling through overindulgence, which he saw as the root of unruly appetites; instead, parents should habituate offspring to moderation from infancy, denying whims to cultivate temperance. eschews where possible, favoring the psychological levers of esteem and : children respond keenly to and , with "the shame of doing amiss, and deserving chastisement, [as] the only true restraint belonging to ." He recommended gentle progression in instruction—"Proceed by gentle and insensible steps"—to avoid overwhelming young minds, integrating learning into play, such as conversational Latin or practical , before abstract or logic. Early exposure to manual trades or writing reinforces diligence, while constant practice embeds habits like or fortitude, rendering second nature. At the core of Locke's moral philosophy lies as , the "great and foundation of all and worth," whereby one denies desires, crosses inclinations, and submits appetites to reason and . This capacity, honed through habitual restraint—such as forgoing pleasures for higher ends—enables rational adherence to and Christian precepts, including the Ten Commandments and teachings, presented via simplified narratives like those of or to foster without dogmatism. Locke contended that without ingrained self-command, intellectual pursuits serve no purpose, as "languages and sciences... will be to no purpose" absent settled ; formation thus precedes and sustains , equipping individuals for self-government and civic .

Controversies

Theoretical vs. Practical Views on Slavery

In his Second Treatise of Government (1689), Locke articulated a theoretical framework that restricted legitimate to the condition of captives in a just war who had forfeited their lives through aggression deserving death, framing it as a continuation of the state of war rather than an absolute, arbitrary dominion over innocents. He emphasized that natural liberty entails freedom from subjection to any earthly superior's unconstrained will, with permissible only where the master's power derives from the captive's prior violation of , not from birth, purchase of innocents, or hereditary status. This view positioned as incompatible with under consent-based government, serving Locke's broader critique of patriarchal absolutism and divine-right , which he likened to illegitimate "despotical power." Locke's theory explicitly rejected perpetual, inheritable chattel of non-combatants, as it violated the inalienable and absent personal forfeiture; he argued that no or individual could justly enslave those not convicted in a state of , rendering practices like the enslavement of debtors or peaceful traders illicit. Scholars note this framework aimed to undermine defenses of monarchical tyranny by analogy to , insisting that even a conqueror's power over a justly defeated foe does not extend to arbitrary rule but is bounded by the rationale of punishment for existential threat. However, the theory's reliance on "just " criteria left room for interpretive expansion, potentially rationalizing conquests of framed as defensive wars, though Locke did not directly apply it to justify transatlantic enslavement of Africans captured without individualized guilt. In practice, Locke participated in institutions enabling African chattel slavery, which diverged from his theoretical constraints. As secretary to the and member of the (1673–1675), he contributed to drafting the (1669), which granted proprietors "absolute power and authority over his negro slaves, of what or soever" in Article 110, embedding hereditary into the colony's feudal-aristocratic structure without requiring just-war justification. These constitutions, revised multiple times until 1698, protected slaveholding as a of , with Locke initialing documents in Shaftesbury's hand and holding stock in the Bahamas Adventurer, a (RAC) subsidiary chartered for slave trading from 1660. Locke personally invested in RAC shares around 1672, profiting from its monopoly on transporting enslaved Africans to American colonies, including Carolina, where imports exceeded 100 annually by the 1680s. The discrepancy arises because transatlantic slavery involved mass capture of non-combatants via raids or judicial sales in —practices Locke theoretically deemed unjust, as they lacked the personal forfeiture required—yet he neither publicly condemned nor divested from them, suggesting pragmatic accommodation to economic and imperial realities over strict application of natural rights. Defenders argue his roles were administrative, not ideological authorship, with Carolina's slave provisions reflecting Shaftesbury's feudal vision rather than Lockean , while critics, including those highlighting archival evidence of his handwriting on slave-related orders, contend this enabled a system contradicting his anti-tyranny principles. Empirical records confirm no explicit Lockean endorsement of African slavery as just, but his sustained involvement—amid growing RAC shipments of over 100,000 slaves by 1700—indicates tolerance for practices causal to colonial wealth accumulation, prioritizing political alliances over theoretical purity.

Colonial Constitutions and Imperial Expansion

Locke served as secretary to the Lords Proprietors of Carolina from 1668 and co-authored the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina in March 1669 with Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury. The 120-article document established a stratified feudal structure, including eight palatines led by a governor, landgraves and cassiques as hereditary nobles holding large baronies of 4,000–48,000 acres, and provisions for county courts, a parliament, and religious freedom for all non-atheists except Quakers in some drafts. It aimed to replicate English aristocratic order in the colony while incorporating manorial estates and guild-like corporations to promote settlement and trade, though implementation was partial and abandoned by 1698 due to resistance from settlers favoring simpler governance. In his economic writings, such as Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and the Raising of the Value of (1691), Locke defended colonial expansion as a means to increase national wealth, arguing that territorial acquisitions should proportion to to maximize labor productivity and avoid waste under constraints on spoilage. He critiqued Spanish-style conquests for disregarding and favored English settler models where unenclosed, uncultivated lands—prevalent in America per travel accounts—could be legitimately appropriated through mixing labor, thereby justifying dispossession of Native American groups who, in Locke's view, underutilized territory via nomadic or communal practices. This rationale aligned with causal mechanisms of empire-building, where industry drove improvement over mere dominion, influencing policies that prioritized economies despite tensions with his theoretical rejection of . Appointed to the Council of Trade and Plantations (later Board of Trade) in 1696 under William III, Locke shaped imperial administration by drafting reports on colonial governance, including a 1698 reform plan for that sought to centralize authority, enforce , promote staple exports like tobacco, and integrate missions to civilize inhabitants and counter French influence. These efforts, amid post-1688 economic recovery needs, embedded Lockean principles of consent and property in colonial charters but accommodated hierarchies, including as a consequence of just war against aggressors, revealing practical divergences from his abstract advocacy for . Critics, drawing from primary state papers, note this involvement advanced revenue extraction and labor coercion systems, prioritizing imperial utility over universal application of natural rights.

Treatment of Labor, Animals, and Subordinate Groups

Locke's philosophical treatment of labor centered on its transformative role in generating and economic value. In the Second Treatise of Government (1689), he contended that individuals own the products of their labor, stating, "The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his," and that mixing this labor with unowned natural resources appropriates them from the provided by . He emphasized labor's contribution to value, noting that it accounts for the greater part—estimated at nine-tenths—of the worth in commodities, as uncultivated land yields far less than land improved by tilling and planting. This theory justified individual appropriation without consent from others, provided it left "enough and as good" for all, though Locke viewed spoilage and non-use as natural limits rather than communal vetoes. Locke regarded animals, or "brutes," as sentient beings capable of pain, memory, and limited reason, rejecting ' mechanistic denial of their feelings. In (1693), he advised against allowing children to abuse animals, warning that familiarity with such cruelty accustoms the mind to barbarity and disposes it toward inhumanity against fellow humans. Despite this concern for moral formation, Locke upheld human dominion over animals, derived from superior reason and labor, without extending to them natural rights or moral status equivalent to persons; animals existed for human use, with no reciprocal obligations. Within subordinate groups, Locke delineated authority structures in domestic society, distinguishing them from civil government's consent-based power. Children fall under parental rule for nurture and education until reaching rational maturity, with authority ceasing once they can govern themselves. In conjugal relations, wives consent to marriage for mutual aid and procreation but subordinate to husbands in household decisions requiring unity, as the husband's stronger faculties suit him for tie-breaking, though this ends with the marital compact and women retain personal liberties. Servants, as free agents, bind themselves contractually to masters for labor in exchange for wages, retaining the right to exit upon fulfillment, unlike slaves who, as captives in just wars, suffer absolute, perpetual subjection short of civil society membership. This framework reflected Locke's acceptance of natural hierarchies tempered by purpose, consent where applicable, and rejection of absolute dominion, critiquing patriarchal absolutism in his First Treatise while preserving familial order.

Major Works and Manuscripts

Principal Publications During Lifetime

Locke's major philosophical and political works appeared primarily after his return from exile in the following the of 1688, often published anonymously to evade persecution amid ongoing political tensions. These texts laid foundational arguments for empiricist , , religious , and practical , reflecting his engagement with contemporary debates on , , and . The Epistola de Tolerantia (), first published in Latin in 1689, advocated , arguing that true faith cannot be coerced and that civil government should not enforce religious orthodoxy except against threats to public order, such as or militant sects. An English translation followed the same year, broadening its influence in Britain. , released in 1689, rejected innate ideas and proposed that all knowledge derives from sensory experience and reflection, positing the mind as a at birth and distinguishing simple ideas, complex ideas, and the limits of human understanding, including critiques of and . The , published in 1689 (dated 1690 on the title page), critiqued patriarchal absolutism, particularly Filmer's , and outlined a framework where individuals possess rights to life, liberty, and property in the , forming governments via consent for mutual protection, with dissolution justified if rulers violate trust. , issued in 1693, applied empirical principles to child-rearing, emphasizing physical health, moral habituation over rote learning, and the cultivation of reason and to counter innate tendencies toward , drawing from Locke's advisory role to aristocratic families. The Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures, appearing anonymously in 1695, contended that core Christian doctrines like the Messiahship of align with reason, serving as a historical to reinforce morality, while rejecting Trinitarian complexities as non-essential for amid deist challenges. These works, revised in subsequent editions during Locke's life, elicited controversies, prompting defenses such as his exchanges with Stillingfleet on the Essay's implications for substance and identity, underscoring their role in shaping Enlightenment discourse.

Posthumous and Unpublished Texts

Several of John Locke's manuscripts were published posthumously, primarily through the efforts of his literary executors, including his cousin Peter King and physician friend Attwood, following his death on October 28, 1704. The 1706 volume Posthumous Works of Mr. John Locke compiled unfinished and previously unprinted texts, including Of the Conduct of the Understanding, an essay on improving reasoning processes composed around 1697 but left incomplete; An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God, critiquing the French philosopher's occasionalism; A of Miracles, outlining criteria for authenticating miraculous claims; and the unfinished Fourth Letter for Toleration, extending arguments from his earlier letters against Proast's defenses of persecution. Locke's A and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul, a detailed exegetical work begun in the 1690s and covering Galatians, 1–2 Corinthians, Romans, and Ephesians, appeared in installments starting in 1705, with editions through 1707 edited from his manuscripts to clarify Pauline against perceived misinterpretations. This text emphasized rational interpretation of scripture, aligning with Locke's broader views on subordinate to reason. Additionally, A Collection of Several Pieces of Mr. John Locke (1706), drawn from manuscripts held by associates like Anthony Collins, included vindications of his Reasonableness of Christianity and other fragments not extant in prior editions. Numerous manuscripts remained unpublished during Locke's lifetime and for decades after, preserved in collections such as the Locke Manuscripts at the , encompassing over 3,000 items including journals from 1675–1704, theological drafts, medical treatises, economic analyses (e.g., on interest rates and trade), and correspondence exceeding 3,600 letters. These cover topics like experiments, , and political notes, with many edited only in the 20th-century Clarendon Edition, which incorporates verified unpublished material alongside correspondence. Later discoveries, such as a 1698 manuscript on executive power limits identified in 2019 from a 1928 dealer catalog, highlight ongoing revelations from scattered holdings, though core unpublished economic and scientific jottings underscore Locke's empirical approach beyond printed philosophy.

Library Holdings and Intellectual Resources

John Locke assembled a personal library comprising approximately 3,000 volumes by the time of his death in 1704, encompassing works in , , , , , natural sciences, and , which served as a primary resource for his empirical inquiries and writings. He maintained detailed catalogs of his holdings, including an interleaved version of the Bodleian 's catalog adapted for his own collection, allowing systematic indexing and annotations that reveal his active engagement with texts through and cross-references. These catalogs, preserved in manuscripts such as those at the Bodleian and analyzed in scholarly reconstructions, demonstrate Locke's methodical approach to , prioritizing editions and practical treatises over purely scholastic works. The library's subject distribution underscores Locke's interdisciplinary breadth: at his death, it held 269 volumes in , slightly fewer than the 275 in and , with substantial sections in (reflecting his physician training under ) and theology (including patristic fathers and reformed divines, despite his rationalist leanings). Notable holdings included medical texts by and , philosophical critiques of and , and historical accounts such as those by and in Latin translations, which informed his empiricist and political theory by providing empirical data and causal analyses from diverse domains. Locke frequently borrowed from and returned books via networks like the Royal Society, augmenting his fixed collection with transient resources that exposed him to cutting-edge experiments in chemistry and anatomy by figures like . This repository not only fueled Locke's original compositions—evident in parallels between owned texts and passages in —but also positioned him as a bibliophile who valued utility over accumulation, discarding or critiquing outdated authorities in favor of verifiable . Posthumously, the was dispersed among and friends, with portions entering institutional collections like ; a comprehensive inventory was reconstructed by John Harrison and Peter Laslett in 1965 (revised 1971), enabling modern scholars to trace influences while accounting for losses and verifying ownership through Locke's notations. Such resources highlight the causal role of accessible, annotated books in Locke's rejection of innate ideas, grounding his philosophy in accumulated sensory evidence rather than speculative deduction.

Intellectual Legacy

Foundations of Empiricism and Liberalism

Locke's , as detailed in (1690), rejected the rationalist doctrine of innate ideas, proposing instead that the mind begins as a —a blank slate—upon which experience inscribes all content. He distinguished between simple ideas derived directly from sensation (e.g., colors, sounds) and those from reflection on internal operations (e.g., thinking, doubting), arguing that complex ideas form through combination, comparison, and abstraction of these basics. This framework grounded knowledge in empirical observation, limiting certainty to what sensory data and reason could verify, while acknowledging probable knowledge for matters beyond direct experience, such as inferred from constant conjunctions. These principles challenged Cartesian and scholastic traditions, establishing empiricism's core tenet that no propositions—moral, mathematical, or speculative—are universally assented to without experiential foundation, as evidenced by the absence of agreement on supposed innate truths across cultures. Locke's emphasis on ideas as representations rather than direct apprehensions of introduced distinctions between primary qualities (inherent, like shape and motion) and secondary (observer-dependent, like color), influencing subsequent debates on and substance. In , Locke's (1690) laid liberalism's groundwork by articulating natural rights to , , and as pre-political endowments derived from , which obliges individuals to preserve themselves and others. emerges when one mixes labor with unowned natural resources—e.g., tilling soil or picking acorns—provided enough and as good remains for others, a proviso ensuring non-wasteful acquisition without initial . Civil society forms via explicit or tacit to a , entrusting government with impartial adjudication to secure these rights against inconveniences of the , such as biased enforcement. Legitimate remains and limited, with dissolution justified if rulers violate trust—e.g., by arbitrary taxation or suspending laws—restoring the right of resistance to avert tyranny. This consent-based mechanism prioritized individual agency over divine-right absolutism, fostering liberalism's commitment to , , and protection of private enterprise as extensions of .

Influence on American Founding and Revolutions

John Locke's Two Treatises of Government, published in 1689, articulated principles of natural rights, limited government, and the right of revolution that profoundly shaped the intellectual foundations of the American Revolution and the subsequent founding of the United States. In the Second Treatise, Locke argued that governments derive legitimacy from the consent of the governed and exist to protect inherent rights to life, liberty, and property; when rulers violate these rights through tyranny, the people retain the authority to dissolve such governments and establish new ones. This framework provided a philosophical justification for colonial resistance to British policies perceived as infringing on self-governance, such as the Stamp Act of 1765 and the Intolerable Acts of 1774. Thomas Jefferson explicitly drew upon Locke's ideas when drafting the Declaration of Independence in 1776, adapting the triad of "life, liberty, and property" into the more resonant "life, and the pursuit of Happiness," while echoing Locke's assertion that governments instituted among men to secure these rights may be altered or abolished if they become destructive of those ends. Jefferson's phrasing reflected Locke's emphasis on as self-evident truths, positioning the document not as a mere list of grievances but as a universal appeal to reason against arbitrary power. Contemporary observers noted this direct lineage, with Locke's justification of revolt serving as the doctrinal backdrop for the Continental Congress's vote for on July 2, 1776. During the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Locke's concepts of checks and balances, separation of powers, and protection of property rights influenced framers like James Madison, who incorporated similar mechanisms to prevent factional tyranny and ensure legislative supremacy derived from popular consent. Madison's Federalist No. 10 (1787) addressed the dangers of factions in a manner resonant with Locke's warnings against majority oppression in the Second Treatise, advocating a republican structure to refine and enlarge public views. Locke's ideas on religious toleration, outlined in his 1689 Letter Concerning Toleration, also informed Madison's advocacy for the First Amendment's establishment clause, ratified in 1791, by arguing that civil magistrates hold no jurisdiction over conscience or belief. Beyond the founding era, Locke's principles permeated revolutionary rhetoric in pamphlets like Thomas Paine's (1776), which popularized the social contract and right to independence, selling over 100,000 copies in months and galvanizing public support for separation from Britain. While Locke's influence was not solitary—drawing alongside Enlightenment thinkers like —his empiricist grounding in observable rights and causal mechanisms of governance provided a pragmatic bulwark against absolutism, evident in the enduring structure of the U.S. Constitution and .

Conservative Appropriations and Modern Critiques

Conservative thinkers have appropriated John Locke's emphasis on natural rights, particularly to life, , and , as a bulwark against expansive state power, viewing these as divinely ordained limits on government that align with ordered . In American conservatism, Locke's (1689) underpin arguments for constitutional restraints, as an extension of through labor, and consent as the basis of legitimate authority, influencing fusionist coalitions that blend Lockean with traditional virtues. For instance, post-World War II conservatives like and fusionists such as Frank Meyer drew on Locke to defend free markets and anti-totalitarianism, positing that his fosters moral responsibility and economic independence essential to . This appropriation extends to Locke's role in republican liberty, where government exists to secure individual rather than pursue collective ends, a echoed in critiques of welfare statism and central planning by organizations like . Locke's proviso against waste in appropriation—requiring resources to be used productively—has been invoked to support sustainable property use and oppose environmental extremism, framing conservation as a rational extension of rather than regulatory overreach. However, such uses often selective, harmonizing Locke's with anthropology to counter charges of secular . Modern critiques from conservative perspectives, particularly traditionalists and post-liberals, fault Locke for engendering a contractual society that erodes communal bonds, prioritizing abstract over inherited , , and . Thinkers like argued that Locke's reliance on rational calculation for neglects the necessity of national loyalty and symbolic communal ties, fostering a deracinated vulnerable to ideological manipulation, as evidenced in 20th-century mass societies. Similarly, critics such as contrast Locke's universalist rationalism with empirical rooted in historical precedent, claiming it promotes a homogenized polity detached from particularist traditions like those of . These critiques portray Lockean liberalism as inadvertently fueling modernity's ills—materialistic , family dissolution, and —by subordinating to self-preservation and , with property rights seen as enabling crass acquisitiveness over communal goods. Manent and others in declinist narratives identify Locke as central to this shift, where individual supplants teleological views of , leading to procedural states ill-equipped for cultural preservation. Despite appropriations, such analyses urge conservatives to temper Locke with Aristotelian or , recognizing his ideas' causal role in liberal excesses while salvaging their anti-tyrannical core.

References

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