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The moment when hijacker-pilot Marwan al-Shehhi carried out a suicide attack on the South Tower (left) during the September 11 attacks, New York City[a]
Two Kamikaze pilots: Lt. Yoshinori Yamaguchi's Yokosuka D4Y (left) in a suicide dive against USS Essex on 25 November 1944 and pilot Yukio Araki (right) died in a suicide attack on 27 May 1945, at age 17

A suicide attack (also known by a wide variety of other names, see below) is a deliberate attack in which the perpetrators intentionally end their own lives as part of the attack. These attacks are a form of murder–suicide that is often associated with terrorism or war. When the attackers are labelled as terrorists, the attacks are sometimes referred to as an act of suicide terrorism.[1] While generally not inherently regulated under international law, suicide attacks in their execution often violate international laws of war, such as prohibitions against perfidy and targeting civilians.[2]

Suicide attacks have occurred in various contexts, ranging from military campaigns—such as the Japanese kamikaze pilots during World War II (1944–1945)—to more contemporary Islamic terrorist campaigns—including the September 11 attacks in 2001. Initially, these attacks primarily targeted military, police, and public officials. This approach continued with groups like Al-Qaeda, which combined mass civilian targets with political leadership.[1] While only a few suicide attacks occurred between 1945 and 1980,[3] between 1981 and September 2015 a total of 4,814 suicide attacks were carried out in over 40 countries,[4] resulting in over 45,000 deaths. The global frequency of these attacks increased from an average of three per year in the 1980s to roughly one per month in the 1990s, almost one per week from 2001 to 2003,[5] and roughly one per day from 2003 to 2015.[4] In 2019, there were 149 suicide bombings in 24 countries, carried out by 236 individuals. These attacks resulted in 1,850 deaths and 3,660 injuries.[6] They have been used by a wide range of political ideologies, from far right (Japan and Germany in WWII) to far left (such as the PKK and JRA).[7][8]

According to Bruce Hoffman and Assaf Moghadam, suicide attacks distinguish themselves from other terror attacks due to their heightened lethality and destructiveness.[9][1] Perpetrators benefit from the ability to conceal weapons and make last-minute adjustments, and there is no need for escape plans or rescue teams. There is also no need to conceal their identities.[verification needed][b] In the case of suicide bombings, they do not require remote or delayed detonation.[9] Although they accounted for only 4% of all "terrorist attacks" between 1981 and 2006, they resulted in 32% of terrorism-related deaths at 14,599 deaths. 90% of these attacks occurred in Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.[verification needed][10] By mid-2015, approximately three-quarters of all suicide attacks occurred in just three countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.[11]

William Hutchinson describes suicide attacks as a weapon of psychological warfare[12] aimed at instilling fear in the target population,[13] undermining areas where the public feels secure, and eroding the "fabric of trust that holds societies together." This weapon is further used to demonstrate the lengths perpetrators will go to achieve their goals.[9] Motivations for suicide attackers vary. Kamikaze pilots acted under military orders, while other attacks have been driven by religious or nationalist purposes. According to analyst Robert Pape, prior to 2003, most attacks targeted occupying forces. For example, 90% of attacks in Iraq before the civil war started in 2003 aimed at forcing out occupying forces. Pape's tabulation of suicide attacks runs from 1980 to early 2004 in Dying to Win, and to 2009 in Cutting the Fuse.[14][15] According to American-French anthropologist Scott Atran, from 2000 to 2004, the ideology of Islamist martyrdom played a predominant role in motivating the majority of bombers.[16]

Definition and terminology

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Suicide bombing

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The term "suicide bombing" dates back to at least 1940 when a New York Times article mentioned the term in relation to German tactics.[17][non-primary source needed] Less than two years later, the New York Times referred to a Japanese kamikaze attempt on an American carrier as a "suicide bombing".[18] In 1945, The Times of London referred to a kamikaze plane as a "suicide-bomb".[19] Two years later, it referred to a new British pilot-less, radio-controlled rocket missile as originally designed "as a counter-measure to the Japanese 'suicide-bomber'."[20]

Kamikaze

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Kamikaze was a term initially used for Japanese suicide pilots in World War II, but is occasionally used in other contexts. Some reports at the time labelled the 1972 Lod Airport massacre in Israel by the Japanese Red Army (JRA) a "Kamikaze" attack, but others have criticized the label, including the surviving attacker's interpreter.[21][22] The Kamikaze were a unit of suicide bombers in for the Empire of Japan in WWII, which had a very different ideology to the JRA. Researchers from Duke University described the JRA's motives as "rooted in anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and anti-capitalism".[23] In more recent reports the 1972 JRA attack on Lod airport is described in modern terms such as "suicide attack" and "suicide mission", even when referring to the attacker who survived.[8] All three militants intended to die, but one survived.[8] He confessed and hoped to be quickly executed, but some attribute this to retrospective "survivor guilt".[24]

Labeling as terrorism

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Suicide attacks include both "suicide terrorism" and attacks targeting combatants. "Terrorism" is often defined as any action "intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants" for the purpose of intimidation.[25] This definition is often not used consistently, even those claiming to define terrorism this way sometimes describe attacks on their own military as "terrorism", while attacks on civilians by allied state actors are almost never called terrorism.[26]

An alternative definition provided by Jason Burke, a journalist who has lived among Islamic militants, suggests that most define terrorism as "the use or threat of serious violence" to advance some kind of "cause", stressing that terrorism is a tactic.[27] This definition is often referred to by the euphemism "political violence".[28][29]

Academic Fred Halliday has written that assigning the descriptor of "terrorist" or "terrorism" to the actions of a group is a tactic used by states to deny "legitimacy" and "rights to protest and rebel".[30] Israeli diplomacy has been very influential in defining terrorism as a concept.[26][31][32] This was largely led by Menachem Begin, who himself has been labelled as a terrorist leader, as commander of the Irgun militant group before Israel was recognized as a nation state by Western powers.[31][32]

Labeling as suicide

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The definition of "suicide" in this context is also a matter of debate. Suicide terrorism itself has been defined by Ami Pedahzur, a professor at the University of Haifa,[33] as "violent actions perpetrated by people who are aware that the odds they will return alive are close to zero".[34] Other sources exclude from their work "suicidal" or high risk attacks, such as the Lod Airport massacre or a "reckless charge in battle".[35][36] Despite the Lod Airport massacre being explicitly planned as a suicide attack, and modern mainstream Israeli and international media describing the event as a "suicide attack" or "suicide mission".[8] Yoram Schweitzer, from the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (an Israeli think tank), focuses only on true "suicide attacks", where the odds of survival are not "close to zero" but required to be zero, because "the perpetrator's ensured death is a precondition for the success of his mission".[35] The narrower definition would also exclude the actions of groups such as those by the Hashishiyeen, by the Moro juramentado, and in Aceh during WWII (see below). Adam Lankford also excludes from the definition are "proxy bombings", which may have political goals and be designed to look like a suicide bombing. The difference is that the "proxy" is forced to carry a bomb under threat, or the proxy isn't fully aware that they are delivering a bomb that will kill them. The definition also generally excludes mass shootings in which the perpetrators commit suicide, as the shooter committing suicide is a separate act from shooting their victims. Further distinction is how many of such shootings are driven by personal and psychological reasons, rather than political, social or religious motives, such as the Columbine High School massacre, the Virginia Tech shooting or Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting in the United States.[37][better source needed] However, in 1999 the Columbine High School massacre was widely labelled as a suicide attack: both attackers sport themselves, but they planned the attack as a bombing.[38][39] It is also a common trope that Muslim attackers are defined as terrorists while others are defined as mentally ill. It may not always be clear to investigators which type of killing is which as suicide attack campaigns sometimes use proxy bombers, as alleged in Iraq,[40] or manipulate the vulnerable to become bombers.[36][41] Adam Lankford, also argues that the motivation to kill and be killed connects some suicide attackers more closely to "suicidal rampage" murderers than is commonly thought.[37]

Religious terminology for attackers and victims

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All Abrahamic religions forbid suicide.[42][43] Suicide and suicide attempts have been decriminalised in most of the western world, but remain criminalised in some countries, such as Afghanistan,[44] Nigeria,[45] Palestine,[46] and others.[47][48][49] Terminology relating to this sin or crime is used by Jews, Christians, and Muslims to condemn suicide attackers (see also above), different terminology is usually used to describe self sacrifice that they believe is justified, including actions their enemies label suicide attacks (see below).

Martyrdom of attackers and victims

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Plaque marking the location of the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, written in Urdu. Translation: Place of Martyrdom, Ms. Benazir Bhutto martyred. Benazir Bhutto was killed by a suicide terrorist in 2007.[c]

Among Muslims, secular Arabs, and related cultures, the term martyr or shaheed has a broad meaning and can refer to leaders who have been assassinated or executed, civilian casualties of war, and combatants who did not intend to die.[50]

Victims of suicide bombings and the bombers are both commonly referred to as martyrs, by opposing groups, or when referring to different attacks. Some Arabic speaking militant groups and their supporters call suicide attacks "martyrdom operations" (Arabic: للعمليات الاستشهادية, romanizedaleamaliaat alistishhadia).[51] The term "suicide" is avoided by people who think an attack was justified, because Islam forbids taking one's own life in most circumstances.[citation needed] The concept of martyrdom in Islam is broad including people who died in plagues and women who died in childbirth, as well as fallen combatants who did not intend to die.[52] According to Israeli academic Assaf Moghadam, the term "martyrdom operation" has been used by Hamas, Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, Fatah's Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and other Palestinian factions.[53][verification needed] The term "martyrdom operation" was also used in March 2003 by the Iraqi administration to referred to suicide attacks on invading troops during the 2003 Iraq war, and in particular their promise to retake the Baghdad airport.

Victims of suicide attacks are also referred to as martyrs by a wide variety of cultures. Benazir Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan People's Party, is the most famous example of a progressive Muslim who is regarded as a martyr after being murdered in a suicide attack. Bhutto was assassinated in 2007 by a teenage Islamic extremist.[54][55] After her death many things in Pakistan, mostly related to education, were named or renamed in her honour, referring to her by the title "shaheed" (martyr).[c]

When an ISIS suicide bomber blew himself up at Rafah crossing in 2017, he was described as a suicide bomber (فجر انتحاري), not a martyr. The border guard who was killed attempting to stop him crossing into Egypt, a member of Hamas' Qassam Brigades, was described as a martyr (Arabic: الشهيد نضال الجعفري, romanizedal-Shaheed Nidal al-Jaafari) and his death was described as martyrdom (Arabic: استشهاد, romanizedIstishhad, Arabic: استشهاد نضال جمعة, lit.'Martyrdom of Nidal al-Jaafari').[56][57] This language was used by Palestinian media, some international media, and even the bomber's family. His family condemned him publicly, describing his actions as unpatriotic and criminal, and announced they would not be holding funeral services for him.[58][56] Gaza's clans referred to the bombing as suicide terrorism (Arabic: العمل الإرهابي الانتحاري).[58]

Illustration of Samson by Gustave Doré.[d]

Biblical references

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In Israel, acts of self sacrifice in battle are referred to by quoting Samson's words, from Judges 16:30 (Hebrew: תמות נפשי עם פלשתים, lit.'let me die with the Philistines', Biblical Hebrew: תָּמוֹת נַפְשִׁי עִם-פְּלִשְׁתִּים).[62][63][64] The same biblical quote is used in both praise and criticism of this approach to warfare.[62][65] Prior to Israel, this story was used by two of the anti-British pre-state militant groups to refer to premeditated plans.[66] One leader claimed that two militants who blew themselves up had not committed suicide, as such, due to allegedly mitigating circumstances.[67][68] Their modern critics claim the situation itself was largely self-inflicted.[69] Some within Israel view the Samson in a very negative light.[70] People from Christian backgrounds, or within majority-Christian communities, have carried out suicide attacks in Eastern Europe, Lebanon, the United States, New Zealand, and elsewhere (see below), but have not used religious language to explain or justify their actions. They have been part of secular movements, or have been isolated incidents that the attacker did not explain at length.[71][72][73][citation needed]

Redefining as homicide or genocide

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Some efforts have been made to replace the term "suicide bombing" with "homicide bombing", based on the assertion that "homicide" is a more apt adjective than "suicide" since the primary purpose of such a bombing is to kill other people. The only major media outlets to use it were the Fox News Channel and the New York Post, both of which are owned by News Corporation and have since mostly abandoned the term.[74][75] Robert Goldney, a professor emeritus at the University of Adelaide, has argued in favor of the term "homicide bomber". Goldney argued that studies show that there is little in common between people who blow themselves up intending to kill as many people as possible in the process and actual suicide victims.[76] Fox News producer Dennis Murray argued that a suicidal act should be reserved for a person who does something to kill only themselves. CNN producer Christa Robinson argued that the term "homicide bomber" was not specific enough, stating that "A homicide bomber could refer to someone planting a bomb in a trash can".[53][77][78]

"Genocide bombing" was coined in 2002 by Irwin Cotler, a member of the Canadian parliament, in an effort to focus attention on the alleged intention of Genocide by militant Palestinians in their calls to "wipe Israel off the map".[79][80]

In German-speaking areas the term "sacrifice bombing" (German: Opferanschlag) was proposed in 2012 by German scholar Arata Takeda [de]}.[81] This is different to the German word used by Nazi Germany to refer to self sacrifice attacks.[citation needed]

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Suicide protests

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Romas Kalanta was a 19-year-old Lithuanian student who self-immolated in 1972 to protest against the Soviet regime in Lithuania, sparking the 1972 unrest in Lithuania; another 13 people self-immolated in that same year.[82][additional citation(s) needed]

Hunger strikes are another use of self harm, and actual or potential suicide, that is used by some militant groups.[examples needed]

Self-sacrifice to prevent other casualties

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During the 2006 Lebanon War, IDF Major Roi Klein and his unit took part in the Battle of Bint Jbeil. During a Hezbollah ambush, a hand grenade was thrown over the wall that was between Hezbollah militants and Klein and his unit. Klein jumped on the live grenade and muffled the explosion with his body. The soldiers reported that Klein recited the Jewish prayer, Shema Yisrael, as he jumped on the grenade. After the grenade exploded and critically wounded him, he reported his own death, yelling "Klein's dead, Klein's dead" over the radio. In the following minutes, as he lay dying, he ordered soldiers who came to administer first aid and evacuate him to focus on Lieutenant Amichai Merhavia, another soldier who had been hit (and later died also) instead. He then handed over his encoded radio to another officer, who took command of the force, and died.[83][84][85][86][87] According to The Telegraph he yelled "Long live Israel",[88] although this was probably a misinterpretation of "Shema Yisrael" (שמע ישראל).[89]

Preventing capture

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During the First Jewish–Roman War, the letter of the Sicarii determined that the people in the besieged city of Masada should commit mass suicide, and even murder family members, to avoid capture during the Siege of Masada.[70] The story of Masada is prominent in Israeli culture.[70] The Sicarii Jewish sect are also sometimes described as carrying out "suicidal" attacks against their enemies (see below).[90]

Other than as a way to cause enemy casualties, another situation in which some militaries and related bodies (such as intelligence agencies) encourage their own members to commit suicide is too avoid being captured by the enemy. The concept also often includes the use of intentional friendly fire.[65] Either to avoid disclose of military secrets, avoid the need for a prisoner exchange, or for more intangible ideological motives.[90] Individuals are encouraged by a perception that capture is a fate worse than death, and the likelihood of torture is strongly emphasised in internal propaganda. Sometimes, to the point that even civilians embrace the concept of dying (or killing people on their own side) to avoid capture.[91][92]

In some cases, special forces of Western militaries have been provided with suicide pills to take if they are at risk of capture.[93][94] Some militaries of nation states avoid equipping their troops with any means specifically designed to facilitate suicide, but imply that soldiers are obliged to resort to extreme measures to avoid capture including taking their own lives, or killing their comrades, with whatever means are available.[65][95][96] Hand grenades have been repeatedly used or recommended.[97][65] In 1952, three Chinese soldiers reportedly killed themselves with hand grenades to avoid capture.[97][additional citation(s) needed] Military commanders have reportedly recommended explosives such as hand grenades as a means of suicide, for the advantage of killing as many of the would-be captors as possible, thus converting the situation into an improvised suicide attack.[65]

Attackers killed by their opponents

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Some sources define "suicide terrorism" and "suicide attack" broadly to include attackers who are killed by other people.[98] At the opposite extreme, militant leaders of from Jewish or Islamic militant groups – both religions that forbid suicide – claim that directly causing one's own death sometimes is not suicide (see above: suicide and religious terminology). However, followers of these religiously derived ideologies define their enemies as suicidal, even if their opponent uses the same technique, such as when an ISIS-linked suicide bomber killed al-Qassam border guard Nidal al-Jaafari at Rafah crossing (see above). During the colonial era and up to World War II, Muslims in Aceh and Moro, now part of Indonesia and the Philippines, attacked much more powerful opponents – principally the Dutch, the Japanese, and the Americans – despite near certain death. Some authors have characterised these as predecessors of modern suicide bombings.[99] Other sources say that suicide bombings in places like the Philippines arrose only recently, due to foreign influence from international cultists such as ISIS.[100][101][102]

Sicarii (first century AD)

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The Sicarii Jewish sect are sometimes described as carrying out "suicidal" attacks against their enemies. Riaz Hassan said that the first-century AD Jewish Sicarii sect carried out "suicidal missions to kill" Hellenized Jews they considered immoral collaborators.[90] An article in BBC Arabic originally called the Sicarii the first group to carry out suicide attacks.[additional citation(s) needed] In September 2023, over a year after initial publication, this attracted controversy in English language Israeli media, when a complaint led to a change in the article.[103][104] The Jerusalem Post classified the article under "antisemtitism".[103] The Sicarii sect play a central role in Israeli mythology.[70] The Sicarii killed themselves and their families to avoid capture (see above), but in their attacks they were killed by their opponents.[70] The Sicarii carried out attacks knowing it would lead to their own executions.[103] The revised BBC article claimed the first suicide attacks were by the Order of Assassins, who are also killed by their opponents (see next section).[103][104]

Hashishiyeen (1090 to 1275)

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The Order of Assassins (Arabic: حَشّاشِین, romanizedHashishiyeen; Persian: حشاشين, romanizedḤaššāšīn) were from a sect of Ismaili Shi'a Muslims. They assassinated two Caliphs, as well as many viziers, Sultans, and Crusade leaders over 300 years,[when?][105] before being annihilated by Mongol invaders. Hashishiyeen were known for targeting the powerful, using the dagger as a weapon (rather than something safer for the assassin such as a crossbow), and for not attempting to escape after completing their killing.[106]

Moro juramentado

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Juramentado, in Philippine history, refers to a male Moro swordsman (from the Tausug tribe of Sulu) who attacked and killed targeted occupying and invading police and soldiers. Death was expected, and considered martyrdom, undertaken as a form of jihad.[107][108][109][110][111][verification needed]

Moro people who performed suicide attacks were called mag-sabil, and the suicide attacks were known as parang-sabil.[112] The Spanish called them juramentados. The idea of the juramentado was considered part of jihad in the Moros' Islamic religion. During an attack, a juramentado would throw himself at his targets and kill them with bladed weapons such as barongs and kris until he was killed. The Moros performed juramentado suicide attacks against the Spanish in the Spanish–Moro conflict of the 16th to the 19th centuries, against the Americans in the Moro Rebellion from 1899 to 1913), and against the Japanese in World War II.[113]

The Moro (Spanish: juramentados) launched suicide[verification needed] attacks on the Japanese, Spanish, Americans and Filipinos, but did not attack the non-Muslim Chinese as the Chinese were not considered enemies of the Moro people.[114][115][116][117][118] The Japanese responded to these suicide attacks by massacring all known family members and relatives of the attackers.[119]

According to historian Stephan Dale, the Moro were not the only culture who carried out suicide attacks "in their fight against Western hegemony and colonial rule". In the 18th century, suicide tactics were used on the Malabar Coast of southwestern India, and in Aceh in Northern Sumatra as well (see above).[35][120][clarification needed]

Aceh War (1873–1904)

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The former Dutch East Indies (dark red) within the Empire of Japan (light red) at its furthest extent
Location of Aceh on a map of present day Indonesia.

Muslim Acehnese from the Aceh Sultanate performed suicide attacks known as parang-sabil against Dutch invaders during the Aceh War (1873–1904).[verification needed] It was considered part of personal jihad in Islam. The Dutch called it Atjèh-moord, (lit. Aceh murder).[121][122][123] The Acehnese work of literature the Hikayat Perang Sabil provided the background and reasoning for the Atjèh-moord as Acehnese suicide attacks upon the Dutch.[124][125][126][verification needed] The Indonesian translations of the Dutch terms are Aceh bodoh, Aceh pungo, Aceh gila, or Aceh mord.[127]

Aceh in WWII

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Atjèh-moord was also used against the Japanese by the Acehnese during the Japanese occupation of Aceh.[128] The Acehnese Ulama (Islamic Scholars) fought against both the Dutch and the Japanese, revolting against the Dutch in February 1942 and against Japan in November 1942. The revolt was led by the All-Aceh Religious Scholars' Association (PUSA). The Japanese suffered 18 dead in the uprising while they slaughtered either up to 100 or over 120 Acehnese.[129][130] The revolt happened in Bayu and was centred around Tjot Plieng village's religious school.[131][132][133][134] During the revolt, the Japanese troops armed with mortars and machine guns were charged by sword wielding Acehnese under Teungku Abduldjalil (Tengku Abdul Djalil) in Buloh Gampong Teungah on 10 November and Tjot Plieng on 13 November.[135][136] In May 1945 the Acehnese rebelled again.[137]

Disposable use of troops during WWI and WWII

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Supreme Allied Commander Lord Mountbatten claimed high casualties were justified during the Dieppe Raid, "For every man that died at Dieppe, ten were saved on D-Day".[94][138] From one frito of twelve (11 Canadians and one British), only two returned alive, the others were killed or captured.[93] One of the survivors was a British radar expert, who had been given a cyanide pill to take if he was captured.[93]

Suicide by cop

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Some people who are killed by police are described in sources sympathetic to the police as having committed "suicide by cop", an alleged phenomenon of individuals attacking or threatening police with the primary goal of ending their own life by supposedly forcing police to kill them. The concept arose in the United States where police violence is extremely prevalent.[139] In the United States over 1365 people were killed by police in 2024.[140] The terminology has now spread to other places such as Canada and Australia.[141]

The first attackers who killed themselves

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Several different events have been described as the first suicide attack in different sources.[142][143]

The oldest story that is widely described as a suicide attack or martyrdom operation in modern sources is the biblical story of Samson's destruction of the Philistine temple in Gaza in Judges 16:30.[144][145][146][147] A study by German scholar Arata Takeda [de] analyzes analogous behavior represented in literary texts from the antiquity through the 20th century, these being Ajax, Samson Agonistes, The Robbers, and The Just Assassins. The study concluded "that suicide bombings are not the expressions of specific cultural peculiarities or exclusively religious fanaticisms. Instead, they represent a strategic option of the desperately weak who strategically disguise themselves under the mask of apparent strength, terror, and invincibility".[147][146] Other writers have also interpreted his death as suicide attack.[148][149][150] A few have compared him to the hijackers who were responsible for the September 11 attacks.[148][149]

An article in BBC Arabic claimed the Sicarii were the first group to carry out suicide attacks. In September 2023 the BBC responded to a complaint, deleted the Sicarii and reworded the second example so that the revised article called the Order of Assassins (Ismaeli Shia) the first.[103][104] However, both groups were killed by their opponents (see above).

1386 in Switzerland

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Arnold von Winkelried was considered a hero in the Swiss struggle for independence for sacrificing himself at the Battle of Sempach in 1386.[citation needed]

1780 in India

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In 1780, an Indian woman named Kuyili applied ghee and oil onto her body and set herself ablaze. She then jumped into an armoury of the East India Company, causing it to explode. This suicide attack helped to secure victory for her queen, Velu Nachiyar, in the battle.[151][142][143][152][153]

17th and 19th century Dutch

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In the late 17th century, Qing official Yu Yonghe recorded that injured Dutch soldiers fighting against Koxinga's forces for control of Taiwan in 1661 would use gunpowder to blow up both themselves and their opponents rather than be taken prisoner.[154] However, Yu may have confused such suicidal tactics with the standard Dutch military practice of undermining and blowing up overrun positions, which almost cost Koxinga his life during the Siege of Fort Zeelandia.[155]

On 5 February 1831, during the Belgian Revolution, a gale blew a Dutch gunboat under the command of Jan van Speyk into the quay of the port of Antwerp. As the ship was stormed by Belgians, van Speyk refused to surrender, instead igniting the ship's gunpowder with either his gun or cigar, blowing up the ship. The explosion killed 28 out of the 31 crewmen and an unknown number of Belgians.[156][additional citation(s) needed]

Ignaty Grinevitsky (1881) and others in Russia

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A Russian man named Ignaty Grinevitsky (also spelled: Ignacy Hryniewiecki) is sometimes described as the first known suicide bomber.[157][158] The invention of dynamite in the 1860s presented revolutionary and terrorist groups in Europe with a weapon nearly 20 times more powerful than gunpowder. However, using dynamite required overcoming the technical challenges of detonating it at the right time. One solution was to use a human trigger, which was the technique used to assassinate Tsar Alexander II of Russia in 1881.[159][160] A would-be suicide bomber killed Russian Minister of the Interior Vyacheslav von Plehve, in St Petersburg in 1904, but survived with major injuries.[161]

Personal disputes before WWII

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Commemorative plaque for the 1905 Murchison suicide attack

1905 in New Zealand

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The earliest known non-military suicide attack occurred in Murchison, New Zealand, on 14 July 1905. When a long-standing dispute between two farmers resulted in a court case, defendant Joseph Sewell arrived with sticks of gelignite strapped to his body. During the court proceedings, Sewell shouted "I'll blow the devil to hell, and I have enough dynamite to do just that." He was then ushered out of the building and when a police officer tried to arrest him on the street, Sewell detonated the charge, killing himself. No one other than Sewell was killed by the attack.[73][162][163][164][165][166][167]

1927 Bath School bombings in Michigan, USA

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The first reported car bombing was the Bath School bombings in Michigan, USA in 1927. Multiple separate explosions on the same day killed 45 people, including the bomber, and half of a school was destroyed.[according to whom?] The bombings were all carried out by Andrew Kehoe, motivated by a personal grievance. His death was possibly an intentional suicide, but the cause of the explosion was a gun shot that might not have been intended to set off the load. The explosion itself did not seem to form part of a suicide attack on a specific planned target other than possibly himself and his truck. The explosives in his truck detonated when he saw two men nearby had a gun, after he set off multiple other bombs.[168][169] The explosion may have been set off indirectly by him firing his own gun at the men.[170][171] Most of the deaths were caused by the earlier bombs.[172][173]

Military use before WWII

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Spanish civil war (1936 – 1939)

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There are a few reports of suicide bombers during the civil war in the 1930s.[145][additional citation(s) needed]

Chinese suicide squads

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Chinese suicide bomber putting on a 24 hand grenade-explosive vest prior to attack on Japanese tanks at the Battle of Taierzhuang.

During the Xinhai Revolution and the Warlord Era of the Republic of China, "Dare to Die Corps" (traditional Chinese: 敢死隊; simplified Chinese: 敢死队; pinyin: gǎnsǐduì; Wade–Giles: Kan-ssu-tui) or "suicide squads".[174] were frequently used by Chinese armies.[verification needed] China deployed these suicide units against the Japanese during the Second Sino-Japanese War.[verification needed]

In 1938 300 Chinese troops reportedly killed themselves with hand grenades to avoid being captured.[175] Hand grenade suicide to avoid capture has also been used by other militaries (see above), and allegedly the recommended by the Golani Brigades leader.[65]

In the Xinhai Revolution, many Chinese revolutionaries became martyrs in battle. "Dare to Die" student corps were founded for student revolutionaries wanting to fight against Qing dynasty rule. Sun Yat-sen and Huang Xing promoted the Dare to Die Corps. Huang said, "We must die, so let us die bravely."[176] Suicide squads were formed by Chinese students going into battle, knowing that they would be killed fighting against overwhelming odds.[177]

The 72 Martyrs of Huanghuagang died in the uprising that began the Wuchang Uprising. They were recognized as heroes and martyrs by the Kuomintang party and the Republic of China.[178] The martyrs in the Dare to Die Corps who died in battle wrote letters to family members before heading off to certain death. The Huanghuakang was built as a monument to the 72 martyrs.[179] The deaths of the revolutionaries helped the establishment of the Republic of China, overthrowing the Qing dynasty.[180] Other Dare to Die student corps in the Xinhai revolution were led by students who later became major military leaders in Republic of China, like Chiang Kai-shek[181] and Huang Shaoxiong with the Muslim Bai Chongxi against Qing dynasty forces.[182][183] Dare to Die troops were used by warlords.[184] The Kuomintang used one to put down an insurrection in Canton.[185] Many women joined them in addition to men to achieve martyrdom against China's opponents.[186][187] They were known as 烈士 (lit-she; martyrs) after accomplishing their mission.[188]

During the January 28 Incident (28 January – 3 March 1932), a Dare to Die squad struck against the Japanese.[citation needed]

Suicide bombing was also used against the Japanese. A Dare to Die Corps was effectively used against Japanese units at the Battle of Taierzhuang. They used swords[189][190] and wore suicide vests made out of grenades.[191][192]

A Chinese soldier detonated a grenade vest and killed 20 Japanese soldiers at Sihang Warehouse. Chinese troops strapped explosives such as grenade packs or dynamite to their bodies and threw themselves under Japanese tanks to blow them up.[193] This tactic was used during the Battle of Shanghai, to stop a Japanese tank column when an attacker exploded himself beneath the lead tank,[194] and at the Battle of Taierzhuang where Chinese troops with dynamite and grenades strapped to themselves rushed Japanese tanks and blew themselves up,[195][196][197][198] in one incident obliterating four Japanese tanks with grenade bundles.[199][200]

During the 1946–1950 Communist Revolution, coolies fighting the Communists formed Dare to Die Corps to fight for their organizations.[201] During the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, protesting students also formed "Dare to Die Corps" to risk their lives defending the protest leaders.[202]

During World War II

[edit]

Allied forces during WWII

[edit]

In 1941, some newspapers reported that, "While two New Zealand officers stood on a bridge in Greece holding up advancing Germans with their revolvers, a New Zealand sergeant placed two bared wires together and blew the bridge, the officers, and himself to smithereens".[203]

Germans during World War II

[edit]

Rudolf Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff intended to assassinate Adolf Hitler with a suicide bombing in 1943, but was unable to complete the attack.[204]

During the Battle for Berlin the Luftwaffe flew "self-sacrifice missions" (German: selbstopfereinsätze) against Soviet bridges over the River Oder. These "total missions" were flown by pilots of the Leonidas Squadron. From 17 to 20 April 1945, using any available aircraft, the Luftwaffe claimed the squadron had destroyed 17 bridges. However, military historian Antony Beevor believes this claim was exaggerated and only the railway bridge at Küstrin was definitely destroyed. He comments that "thirty-five pilots and aircraft was a high price to pay for such a limited and temporary success". The missions were called off when the Soviet ground forces reached the vicinity of the squadron's airbase at Jüterbog.[205][verify]

Against the Japanese Empire

[edit]

Japanese kamikaze

[edit]
Left: Kamikaze was a reference to two typhoons that sank or dispersed Kublai Khan's invading fleets. Right: Kamikaze damage to the destroyer USS Newcomb.

The most overt and prolific use of suicide attacks during World War II was by Empire of Japan. It remains the most intense and deadly, campaign of suicide attacks in history.[7] Kamikaze pilots on suicide missions flew aircraft full of bombs and improvised missiles at enemy targets.[7] The attacks used 2600 aircraft to kill 7000 allied naval personnel and 4000 Japanese suicide operatives.[7][206]

Kamikaze was a ritual[verification needed] act of self-sacrifice carried out by Japanese pilots of explosive-laden aircraft against Allied warships which occurred on a large scale at the end of World War II. About 3000 attacks were made and about 50 ships were sunk.[207]

Later in the war, as Japan became more desperate, this act became formalised and ritualised. Planes were outfitted with explosives specific to the task of a suicide mission.[208] Kamikaze strikes were a weapon of asymmetric war used by the Empire of Japan against United States Navy and Royal Navy aircraft carriers, although the armoured flight deck of the Royal Navy carriers diminished kamikaze effectiveness. Along with fitting existing aircraft with bombs, the Japanese also developed the Ohka, a purpose-built suicide aircraft that was air-launched from a carrying bomber and propelled to the target at high speed using rocket engines. The Japanese Navy also used piloted torpedoes called kaiten (heaven shaker) on suicide missions. Although sometimes called midget submarines, these were modified versions of the unmanned torpedoes of the time and are distinct from the torpedo-firing midget submarines used earlier in the war, which were designed to infiltrate shore defenses and return to a mother ship after firing their torpedoes. Although extremely hazardous, these midget submarine attacks were not technically suicide missions, as the earlier midget submarines had escape hatches. Kaitens, however, provided no means of escape.[209][210]

Pilot suicides in commercial aircraft

[edit]

Some passenger airline pilots appear to have committed mass murder-suicide, or attempted to, with no apparent political motives.[211][212][213]

Undisputed pilot suicides and attempted suicides

[edit]

Speculated and disputed pilot suicides

[edit]

During the Cold War

[edit]

After the Surrender of Japan, at the end of World War II in Asia, there was a massive reduction in the number of suicide attacks. The few that did occur were sometimes carried out by individuals for personal reasons such as pilot suicides in commercial aircraft (see above). For most of the Cold War suicide attacks were only sporadic, but suicide attacks began to become more frequent towards the end of the Cold War (see below).

Insurgency in Palestine (1944–1948)

[edit]

In the 1930s, Zionist insurgents in Palestine used proxy bombing and animal-borne bomb attacks in their attacks on civilian targets such as Haifa vegetable market.[215][216] By the 1940s they explored the possibility of using humans on their own side, resulting in at least two deaths.[217][60] The Lehi militant group used Judges 16:30 in discussions about potential suicide attacks. In a meeting about ways to assassinate General Evelyn Barker, the British Army commander in Mandatory Palestine, a young woman volunteered to do the assassination as a suicide bombing.[217] They referred to it as a "Let my soul die with the Philistines" proposal (Hebrew: תמות נפשי עם פלשתים), or a "Samson option".[217][64] On that occasion other members of the group allegedly rejected her offer.[e] However, the Lehi collaborated with the Irgun militant group on at least one joint "martyrdom operation" or "suicide operation" that killed one militant from each group, during their insurgency against the British (before the 1948 Palestine war).[219][66] The plan, named Operation Samson (Hebrew: מבצע שמשון, romanizedMivtsa Shimshon), was intended to be a suicide attack, but the two militants were the only casualties.[60][220][221] A Lehi militant and an Irgun militant blew themselves up in Jerusalem Central Prison.[222][223][224][219] They used improvised grenades that had been constructed by another Lehi prisoner. The explosives were disguised as oranges to hide them from the guards, and smuggled in with the prisoners' food.[225][226][66][224][227] The plan was to use the grenades as they were taken to the gallows to kill themselves, the executioners, and British officials who attended hangings.[225][228][229] But the explosives detonated early, while the two of them were alone together in their cell.[60] Allegedly when the pair learned that Rabbi Goldman [he] would be present at their hanging, they changed the plan and committed suicide alone together before they were scheduled to be taken to the gallows.[230][f] The Lehi militant who built the IEDs, later had a leadership role in the Israeli military's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons division (Hebrew: אב״כ).[g][h][i] The story of their deaths has featured in multiple speeches by Likud leaders.[j] In 2007, The Jerusalem Post described the double suicide as "One of the best-known stories of heroism leading to the creation of the State of Israel".[242]

Korean War (1950–1953)

[edit]

North Korean tanks were attacked by South Koreans with suicide tactics during the Korean War.[244][245]

American tanks in Seoul were attacked by North Korean suicide squads, who used satchel charges.[246] North Korean soldier Li Su-Bok is considered a hero for destroying an American tank with a suicide bomb.[247]

In 1952, three Chinese soldiers reportedly killed themselves with hand grenades to avoid capture.[97]

1953 in West Virginia

[edit]

In January 1953 at a magistrate's Court in West Virginia, 47-year-old Donzel McCray "turned himself into a human bomb" with sticks of dynamite strapped to his waist.[248][o] He killed himself and injured his ex-wife and her lawyer.[249][251][252][248] The couple had six children and had divorced the previous September.[72]

Israeli and Egyptian wars (1956–1970)

[edit]

Early suicide tactics in Gaza

[edit]

Some Israelis romanticize acts of self sacrifice in battle by analogy to the Biblical hero Samson, particularly if they take place in Gaza, where Israelis believe he committed suicide and killed thousands of enemy Philistines in the process.[62] In situations where death or severe injury is already difficult to avoid, it is seen as heroic to abandon efforts to save one's self and instead focus on causing as much harm as possible to the enemy, in the process of effectively committing suicide.[63] This includes some anecdotes of events during their wars with Egypt.[62]

Suez Crisis (1956)

[edit]

According to Egyptian media,[who?] during the Suez Crisis in 1956, an Arab Christian military officer from Syria, Jules Jammal, sunk a French ship with a suicide attack.[253] However, none of the French ships named by the sources were harmed during the crisis. It is unclear which actual ship he is supposed to have sunk. One source calls the ship at issue the "liner Jean D'Arc"[254] and another the "French warship, Jeanne D'Arc".[255] There was a French cruiser Jeanne d'Arc in service at that time, but it was decommissioned in 1964 rather than sunk. Some sources name the battleship Jean Bart.[256]

"War of Attrition" (1967–1970)

[edit]

On 21 March 1968, in response to persistent Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) raids against Israelis, Israel attacked the town of Karameh, Jordan, the site of a major PLO camp. The goal of the invasion was to destroy the Karameh refugee camp and capture Yasser Arafat in reprisal for the attacks by the PLO against Israelis.[citation needed] The PLO attacks had culminated in an Israeli school bus hitting a mine in the Negev.[257][258] According to a biography of an autobiography by Tass Saada – an alleged former PLO sniper who converted to Christianity in the United States – this battle marked the first known deployment of suicide bombers by Palestinian (Arab) forces.[259][260][additional citation(s) needed] Modern academics describe aspects of the way the Battle of Karameh is remembered as a "myth" or "distortion".[261]

Nuclear weapons

[edit]

United States nuclear weapons

[edit]

On 27 December 2018, the Green Bay Press-Gazette interviewed veteran[clarification needed] Mark Bentley, who had trained for the Special Atomic Demolition Munition (SADM) program to manually place and detonate a modified version of the W54 nuclear bomb. The report stated that he and other soldiers training for the program knew this was a suicide mission because either it would be unrealistic to outrun the timer on the bomb, or that soldiers would be obligated to secure the site before the timer went off. However, in theory the timer could be set long enough to give the team a chance to escape. Bently claimed:[262]

We all knew it was a one-way mission, a suicide mission […] You set your timer, and it would click when it went off, or it went ding or I forget what, but you knew you were toast. Ding! Your toast is ready, and it's you. […] The Army is not going to set a bomb like that and run away and leave it, because they don't know if someone else would get ahold of it. They have to leave troops there to make sure it's not stolen or compromised, and that would just be collateral damage. You didn't go out with the thought that it was anything other than a one-way mission. If you're Bruce Willis, you get away, but I ain't Bruce Willis.

However, employment manuals for atomic demolition munitions specifically describe the firing party and their guard retreating from the emplacement site, at which point the device is protected through a combination of passive security measures including concealment, camouflage and the use of decoys, as well as active security measures including booby-traps, obstacles such as concertina wire and landmines, and long ranged artillery fire.[263] Further, the SADM included a Field Wire Remote Control System (FWRCS). This device enabled the sending of safe/arm and firing signals to the weapon via a wire for safe remote detonation of the weapon.[264]

Samson Option

[edit]

Israel's alleged nuclear strategy, the "Samson Option", takes its name from Samson's suicide in Gaza City, the same Biblical story that the Lehi and Irgun militant group used to describe potential and attempted suicide attacks (see above).[217] The story is about an Israelite judge named Samson, who kills himself and the Philistines who captured him by pushing apart the pillars of a Dagon temple, bringing down the roof crushing everyone.[265][266] The Lehi militant who built the bombs intended the suicide attack in Jerusalem Central Prison in 1947, later had a leadership role in the Israeli military's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons division (Hebrew: אב״כ).[h][p][i]

Lod airport massacre (1972)

[edit]

One of the first incidents to be labelled "suicide terrorism" was the mass shooting at the airport in Lod, Israel's international airport.[citation needed][q] Two of the attackers died during the attack, one of whom deliberately committed suicide using a hand grenade.[269] According to France 24 and AFP, "The massacre was planned as a suicide attack and all three Japanese militants had intended to mutilate their faces with their grenades to make identification more difficult".[8]

It was carried out by three foreign fighters from the Japanese Red Army (a communist militant group from Japan) in corroboration with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – External Operations (PFLP-EO) division, led by Wadie Haddad, a rebellious offshoot of the PFLP.[270] Some reports at the time labelled the incident a "Kamikaze" attack,[21] but others have criticized the label, including the surviving attacker's interpreter.[22] The Kamikaze were a unit of suicide bombers in the airforce of imperial Japan in WWII, the Empire of Japan had a very different ideology to the JRA. Researchers from Duke University described the JRA's motives as "rooted in anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and anti-capitalism".[23] In 2010, Ze'ev Sarig, the former manager of Lod Airport, compared the attack to the September 11 attacks in New York, "This attack was for Israelis what the September 11th attacks were for Americans", when trying to sue North Korea for the attack in a United States court in Puerto Rico in 2010.[269]

Cold War era literature and mythology

[edit]
Left: Red uniforms in the death row cell in the Museum of Underground Prisoners. Right: Their most famous attack, the 1946 King David Hotel bombing, was not a suicide attack as such, one bomber was killed, but he was shot. Many of the technical and propaganda techniques they used have now become ubiquitous in modern terrorism, including the groups who use suicide bombing.[271][272][273]

The Revolt (1951)

[edit]

The Revolt, written by Menachem Begin before he became Prime Minister, tells the story of the Lehi (referred to by their translated name's acronym, F.F.I. "Freedom Fighters of Israel" in early English editions) and Begin's own Irgun fighters during the Jewish insurgency in Palestine.[274] The Revolt influenced groups from a wide variety of ideologies.[275] Some of these groups were the groups began using suicide attacks in the 1990s. The book was allegedly found Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization.[275] Begin praised his militants' willingness to die, "These two wonderful young men greeted the sentence with the singing of Hatikvah".[276] The "two wonderful young men" we're the two who blew themselves up in 1947, he described their deaths, "even before they put on their red uniforms. They too held their heads high when they faced their judges… But they did not reach the gallows. They too sang on the threshold of death — a song of faith in God: 'Lord of the world who reigned before creation'. But their song ended with a great explosion which shattered the silence of the prison in occupied Jerusalem".[277][r] In 1977 the author became prime minister, after previously being in opposition.[278] Historical militants featured prominently in his political speeches.[279][280][281] He praised the actions of his militants during the insurgency in Palestine in the 1940s, including the leader of the cell who bombed the King David Hotel (killing 91 people and 1 terrorist). His favourites were, again, the two young militants who blew themselves up in Jerusalem prison in 1947.[280][281][282]

The Turner Diaries (1978)

[edit]

The Turner Diaries is a work of fiction, but is confirmed to have inspired terrorist attacks and far right extremist movements.[citation needed] In the final scene before the epilogue, the main character carries out a suicide attack on The Pentagon, in an aircraft carrying a nuclear bomb. However, that specific scene is rarely linked to any specific attacks.

White Wolves (South Africa)

[edit]

The White Wolves, a loosely affiliated and semi mythical group of pro-apartheid terrorists in South Africa, expressed an overt willingness to die during attacks.[283][284][285][286][additional citation(s) needed] The White Wolves were thought to be the perpetrators of the Strijdom Square massacre.[citation needed]

Increased suicide attacks in the 1980s

[edit]

Cold War armed conflicts

[edit]

Sunni Muslims were possibly the last major branch of the Abrahamic religions to resort to overt suicide attacks. Islamic suicide bombing is a fairly recent phenomenon. It was absent from the 1979–1989 Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union,[287] an asymmetrical war where the mujahideen fought Soviet warplanes, helicopters and tanks primarily with light weapons. According to author Sadakat Kadri, "the very idea that Muslims might blow themselves up for God was unheard of before 1983, and it was not until the early 1990s that anyone anywhere had tried to justify killing innocent Muslims who were not on a battlefield". After 1983, the process was limited among Muslims to Hezbollah and other Lebanese Shia factions for more than a decade.[288]

The early 1980s saw an increase in the use of terrorist tactics in the Middle East, by ideologically diverse groups. The book The Revolt, written by the former Irgun commander Menachem Begin before he became Prime Minister, influenced groups from a wide variety of ideologies, allegedly including Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization.[289] In Rise and Kill First Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman wrote that Hezbollah's 1983 campaign of coordinated terrorist attacks against United States, French, and Israeli military installations in Beirut drew inspiration from the Irgun's 1946 bombing campaign against the British created an atmosphere of fear which eventually forced the British to withdraw.[290][verification needed] Bergman further asserts that the influence of Israeli-sponsored terrorist operations on the emerging Islamists was also of operational nature: the Israeli proxy Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners had carried out multiple deadly truck bombings in Lebanon long before the emergence of Hezbollah, a Mossad agent told Bergman: "I saw from a distance one of the cars blowing up and demolishing an entire street. We were teaching the Lebanese how effective a car bomb could be. Everything that we saw later with Hezbollah sprang from what they saw had happened after these operations".[290]

Arrival in the Arab world

[edit]
1983 suicide bombing of the US embassy in Beirut

The 1980s saw the first suicide attacks by Arabs, and by stricter definitions of suicide attack, the first suicide attacks in the Middle East. Earlier examples were the three Japanese foreign fighters in 1972, only one of whom killed himself as planned, the Ashkenazi and Kurdish-Iraqui duo who blew themselves up before reaching their target in 1947 (see above).[280][281] As well as stories such as Jules Jammal whose suicide attacks probably happened only in myth.[additional citation(s) needed] The Islamic Dawa Party's car bombing of the Iraqi embassy in Beirut in December 1981 and Hezbollah's bombing of the U.S. embassy in April 1983 and attack on United States Marines and French barracks in October 1983 brought suicide bombings international attention and began the modern suicide bombing era.[291] Other parties to the civil war were quick to adopt the tactic, and by 1999 factions such as Hezbollah, the Amal Movement, the Ba'ath Party, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party had carried out a total of roughly 50 suicide bombings.[citation needed] The Syrian Social Nationalist Party sent the first recorded female suicide bomber in 1985.[292][293][294][295]

Hezbollah

[edit]

One of the first bombing campaigns utilizing primarily suicide attacks had considerable political success. In the early 1980s, Hezbollah used these bombing attacks, targeting first foreign peacekeepers and then Israel. The result in both cases was the targets withdrawing from Lebanon.[296][better source needed]

Suicide bombings by individuals

[edit]

Some of the first 1980s suicide bombings were by individuals, for both political and personal motives, for example:

1981 Yangquan theatre bombing

[edit]

Yangquan theatre bombing was a suicide bombing that killed 32 people, in a cinema in Yangquan, Shanxi, China, on 22 July 1981. On 22 July 1981, 24-year-old Gao Haiping invited a girl, who had dumped him previously, to a film screening in Yangquan.[s] He intended to kill them both with a bomb made of about 3kg of ammonium nitrate and an electric detonator in a metal box. When the woman did not show up, Gao entered the theatre alone and took his place in seat 25 in the second row. At about 8 p.m., he put the bomb on his lap and detonated it, killing himself and 31 other people, wounding another 127, and severely damaging the theatre.[verification needed] Gao Haiping was an only child. He worked as a miner and was described as a loner who was pessimistic and dissatisfied with his life.[297] A suicide note and letters to his parents were found in a drawer in his home, as well as explosives wrapped in paper.[297][298]

Wanganui Computer Centre (1982)

[edit]

Not all politically motivated suicide attacks targeted other people. On 18 November 1982, Neil Roberts carried out a suicide bombing in Whanganui, New Zealand.[299] His target was a facility housing the main computer centre of the National Law Enforcement Database belonging to New Zealand Police, Courts, Ministry of Transport, and other law enforcement agencies, in Whanganui. The power of the explosion made it so that police were initially unable to determine the gender of the perpetrator.[300] The attacker, 22-year-old Neil Roberts, a "punk rock" anarchist, was the only person killed, and the computer system was undamaged.[301][302][better source needed] He had written on a piece of cardboard before the explosion, "Heres [sic] one anarchist down. Hopefully there is a lot more waking up. One day we'll win – one day". A public toilet nearby had the slogan "We have maintained a silence closely resembling stupidity" painted on it, a slogan which the police believe Roberts had painted,[303] and borrowed from the Revolutionary Proclamation of the Junta Tuitiva of 1809.[304] The phrase is still closely linked with the bombing by the New Zealand public.[305]

Sri Lankan civil war

[edit]

During the Sri Lankan civil war, the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) adopted suicide bombing as a tactic, using bomb belts and female bombers. The LTTE carried out their first suicide attack in July 1987.[t][307] Their Black Tiger unit committed 83 suicide attacks from 1987 to 2009, killing 981 people.[308] Those killed included former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi[309][310][311] and the president of Sri Lanka, Ranasinghe Premadasa.[312][313][314][315]

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, 1987–2009)

[edit]

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were thought[who?] to have mastered[tone] the use of suicide attacks and had a separate unit, "The Black Tigers", consisting "exclusively of cadres who have volunteered to conduct suicide operations".[316] The first prominent suicide bombing by the LTTE occurred in 1987 when Captain Miller drove a truck laden with explosives into a Sri Lankan army camp killing 40 soldiers.[317][318]

Use of suicide by the LTTE had mixed results. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) pioneered the use of suicide bombings against civilian and political targets. In 2000, Yoram Schweitzer called the LTTE "unequivocally the most effective and brutal terrorist organization ever to utilize suicide terrorism".[35] Their struggle for an independent state in the North and East of the island lasted for 26 years and led to the deaths of two heads of state or government, several ministers, and up to 100,000 combatants and civilians, from by a UN estimate.[319] Politically, its attacks succeeded in halting the deployment of the Indian peace keeping troops to Sri Lanka and the subsequent postponement of the peace-talks in Sri Lanka.[35] Nonetheless, the conflict ended in May 2009 not with an independent Eelam, but with the overrunning of LTTE strongholds and the killing of its leadership by the Sri Lankan military and security forces.[citation needed]

List of suicide attacks during the Cold War (1947–1991)

[edit]
Suicide attacks during the Cold War (1947 to 1991)
Year Date Location Event [u]
1982 Sep 16 Australia Attack on Bankstown Airport by Philip Henryk Wozniak in a stolen light aircraft
Nov 18 New Zealand Suicide bombing of Wanganui Computer Centre by Neil Roberts
1976 Mar 2 USA Mason County jail bombing

Statistics about the increase

[edit]
The number of suicide attacks grew enormously after 2000. Number of suicide attacks and deaths from attacks 1982–2014.[320]
Recent suicide attacks (by organization)
Group [verification needed] 1982 to mid‑2015 [321]
Attacks Deaths
Islamic State [v] 424 4949
Al-Qaeda (Central) 20 3391
Taliban (Afghanistan) 665 2925
Al-Qaeda in Iraq 121 1541
Tamil Tigers (LTTE) 82 961
Al-Shabab 64 726
Hamas 78 511
Al-Qaeda (Arabian Peninsula) 23 354
Ansar al-Sunna (Iraq) 28 319
Palestinian Islamic Jihad 50 225
Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades 40 107
Taliban (Pakistan) 7 92
Ansar Bait al‑Maqdis 10 84
PKK (Turkey) [verification needed] 10 32
Hezbollah 7 28
Other groups or unidentified attackers 2547 22877
Suicide attacks by location [needs update]
Country 1982 to mid‑2015
Attacks [322] Deaths [322]
Iraq 1938 20084
Pakistan 490 6287
Afghanistan 1059 4748
United States 4 2997
Syria 172 2058
Sri Lanka 115 1584
Nigeria 103 1347
Yemen 87 1128
Lebanon 66 1007
Somalia 91 829
Russia 86 782
Israel 113 721
Algeria 24 281
Indonesia 10 252
Egypt 21 246
Kenya 2 213
Iran 8 160
Libya 29 155
India 15 123
Turkey 29 115
United Kingdom 5 78
Palestine 59 67
All other countries 99 674

Post-Cold War and War on Terror

[edit]

Palestinian Intifadas

[edit]
Scene after a Palestinian suicide bombing in 1995.
Wreckage vehicles after a 2001 suicide bombing in Beit Lid Junction

Suicide bombing became a popular tactic among Palestinian militant organizations such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and occasionally by the PFLP.[323] The first suicide bombing in post-independence Israel was done by "Hamas" in 1994.[324][better source needed] Attacks peaked from 2001 to 2003 with over 40 bombings and over 200 killed in 2002.[325][326] Bombers affiliated with these groups often use so-called "suicide belts", explosive devices which often included shrapnel designed to be strapped to the body under clothing. To maximize the loss of life, the bombers seek out enclosed spaces, such as cafés or city buses crowded with people at rush hour.[327] Less common are military targets such as soldiers waiting for transport at the roadside. These bombings have had more popular support than in other Muslim countries. More music videos and announcements that promise eternal reward for suicide bombers can be found on Palestinian television, according to Palestinian Media Watch.[328][329][better source needed] Israeli sources observed that Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fatah operate "Paradise Camps", training children as young as 11 to become suicide bombers.[330][331] In 2004, due to increased effectiveness in Israel's security measures and stricter checkpoint protocols, terrorist organizations began employing women and children more frequently as operatives, assuming that they would raise fewer suspicions and undergo less rigorous inspections.[332][333]

Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)

[edit]

Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and their militant wing al-Qassam, were formed in the 1980s but avoided using suicide in their political violence until the following decade. The group have utilized suicide intermittently in specific situations.[334] Suicide attempts are a criminal offense in Palestine and many other majority Muslim countries.[46][47][48][49][44]

Hamas's most sustained suicide bombing campaign from 2003 to 2004 involved several members of Hebron's Masjad (mosque) al-Jihad soccer team. Most lived in the Wad Abu Katila neighborhood and belonged to the al-Qawasmeh hamula (clan). Several were classmates in the neighborhood's local branch of the Palestinian Polytechnic College. Their ages ranged from 18 to 22. At least eight team members were dispatched to suicide shooting and bombing operations by the Hamas military leader in Hebron, Abdullah al-Qawasmeh. Al-Qawasmeh was killed by Israeli forces in June 2003 and succeeded by his relatives Basel al-Qawasmeh, killed in September 2003, and Imad al-Qawasmeh, captured on 133 October 2004. In retaliation for the assassinations of Hamas leaders Sheikh Ahmed Yassin on 22 March 2004 and Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi on 17 April 2004, Imad al-Qawasmeh dispatched Ahmed al-Qawasmeh and Nasim al-Ja'abri for a suicide attack on two buses in Beer Sheva. The attack took place on 31 August 2004. In December 2004, Hamas declared a halt to suicide attacks.[335]

On 15 January 2008, the son of Mahmoud al-Zahar, the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, was killed. Another son had been killed in a 2003 assassination attempt on Zahar. Three days later, Israel Defense Minister Ehud Barak ordered the Israel Defense Forces to seal all border crossings with Gaza, cutting off the flow of supplies to the territory in an attempt to stop rocket barrages on Israeli border towns. Nevertheless, violence from both sides only increased. On 4 February 2008, friends Mohammed Herbawi and Shadi Zghayer, who were members of the Masjad al-Jihad soccer team, staged a suicide bombing at a commercial center in Dimona, Israel. Herbawi had previously been arrested as a 17-year-old on 15 March 2003 shortly after a suicide bombing on Haifa bus, which was done by Mamoud al-Qawasmeh on March 5, 2003. Herbawi had coordinated suicide shooting attacks on Israeli settlements by others on the team, such as on 7 March 2003 with an attack by Muhsein, Hazem al-Qawasmeh, Fadi Fahuri, and Sufian Hariz. He was also involved with another set of suicide bombings in Hebron and Jerusalem on 17 and 18 May 2003 by Fuad al-Qawasmeh, Basem Takruri, and Mujahed al-Ja'abri. Although Hamas claimed responsibility for the Dimona attack, the politburo leadership in Damascus and Beirut was initially unaware of who initiated and carried out the attack. It appears that Ahmad al-Ja'abri, military commander of Hamas's Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades in Gaza, requested the suicide attack through Ayoub Qawasmeh, Hamas's military liaison in Hebron, who knew where to look for eager young men who had self-radicalized together and had already mentally prepared themselves for martyrdom.[335][336]

Results of Palestinian suicide attacks

[edit]
Early Israeli construction of West Bank barrier in 2003.

It is more difficult to determine whether Palestinian suicide bombings have proved to be a successful political tactic. Hamas "came to prominence" after the first intifada as "the main Palestinian opponent of the Oslo Accords", the US-sponsored peace process that oversaw the gradual and partial removal of Israel's occupation in return for Palestinian guarantees to protect Israeli security.[337] according to the BBC.[337][338] The accords were sidetracked after the 1996 election of right-wing Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu. From 1994 to 1997, there were 14 suicide attacks that killed 159, not all of which were attributed to Hamas.[339] Hamas's suicide bombings of Israeli targets "were widely" credited for the popularity among Israelis of the hardline Netanyahu, from Menachem Begin's Likud party.[337]

The efficacy of suicide bombing, however, does not appear to have been demonstrated by the al-Aqsa Intifada. During this Intifada, the number of suicide attacks increased markedly. In the first campaign from 1994 to 1997, there were 14 suicide attacks, in the second from 2001 to 2005, there were 93 attacks.[340]

The drop in suicide bombings in Israel has been explained by the many security measures taken by the Israeli government,[341][342] especially the building of the "separation barrier",[343][344] and a general consensus among Palestinians that the bombings were a "losing strategy".[344] The suicides and other attacks on civilians had "a major impact" on the attitudes of the Israeli public.[345] Instead of creating demoralization, the attacks generated even greater support for the right-wing Likud party which brought to office another hardliner, the former general Ariel Sharon. In 2001, 89% of Israeli Jews supported the Sharon government's policy of "targeted assassinations" of Palestinian militants involved in terrorism against Israel, the number rising to 92% in 2003.[345] Opinion polls of the Jewish Israelis found 78–84% supported the "separation barrier" in 2004.[346]

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)

[edit]

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a secular group, have also been involved in suicide attacks.[citation needed] Their first militant action was an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Mehmet Celal Bucak [tr; ku].[347]

The PKK began their insurgency against the Turkish state in 1984.[clarification needed] However, they did not carry out their first suicide attack until the 1990s.

According to the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism's Suicide Attack Database, as of 2015, ten suicide attacks by the PKK from 1996 to 2012 killed 32 people and injured 116.[348][needs update]

On 12 May 2025, the Kurdistan Workers' Party announced it would disband as part of a peace initiative with Turkey.[349]

PKK supporters at 2003 march opposing the Iraq War, London

Al-Qaeda begin using suicide in the 1990s

[edit]
Mohamed Atta, the ringleader of the 9/11 attacks, who crashed American Airlines Flight 11 into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, is the deadliest suicide attacker in history, being directly responsible for over 1,600 deaths.
The U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in the aftermath of 7 August 1998, Al-Qaeda suicide bombing.

Al-Qaeda carried out its first suicide attack in the mid-1990s.[324][better source needed]

Analysis of the 9/11 al-Qaeda attackers found almost all had joined the group with someone else. About 70% of them joined with friends and 20% with kin. Interviews with friends of the 9/11 hijackers reveal they were not "recruited" into al-Qaeda. They were Middle Eastern Arabs isolated even among the Moroccan and Turkish Muslims who are predominate in Germany. Seeking friendship, they began socializing after services at the Masjad al-Quds and other nearby mosques in Hamburg, in local restaurants and the dormitory of the Technical University in the suburb of Harburg. Mohamed Atta, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Marwan al-Shehhi lived together as they self-radicalized. They wanted to go to Chechnya, then Kosovo.[335]

1999 Columbine High School suicide attack

[edit]

The perpetrators of the massacre both killed themselves during the attack.[38][39] The attack inspired numerous copycats, many of which were also suicidal attacks or suicide bombings.[350]

21st Century

[edit]

In early 2000, analyst Yoram Schweitzer saw a pause in bombing campaigns and argued that "most of the groups that were involved in suicide terrorism either stopped using it or eventually reduced it significantly".[35]

Narrowing definition of suicide attack

[edit]

The number of attacks using suicide tactics grew from an average of fewer than five per year during the 1980s to 81 suicide attacks in 2001 and 460 in 2005.[351] By 2005, the tactic had spread to dozens of countries.[352] The absolute number increased despite a narrowing of the definition of suicide attacks. The United States government defined "modern" suicide bombing has been defined as "involving explosives deliberately carried to the target either on the person or in a civilian vehicle and delivered by surprise".[353][verification needed] Noah Feldman's definition excludes attacks, such as the Lod Airport massacre (see above), where "the perpetrator's ensured death" was not "a precondition for the success of his mission"[35] (despite the Lod Airport attack being overtly planned as a suicide attack, and often referred to as such,[8] as well as the surviving attacker wanting the death penalty for himself).[24]

2001 September 11 attacks and after

[edit]

The September 11 attacks in 2001, orchestrated by al-Qaeda, were the deadliest attacks on American soil since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor which thrust the United States into World War II.[354] They involved the hijacking of four large passenger jet airliners. Unlike earlier airline hijackings, the primary focus was the planes instead of the passengers because their long transcontinental flight plans meant they carried more fuel, allowing a bigger explosion on impact.[71] American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 were deliberately flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, destroying both 110-story skyscrapers in less than two hours. American Airlines Flight 77 was flown into the Pentagon (U.S. Department Of Defense Headquarters) in Arlington County, Virginia, causing severe damage to the west side of the building. These attacks resulted in the deaths of 221 people (including the 15 hijackers) on board the three planes as well as 2,731 more in and around the targeted buildings.[355] United Airlines Flight 93 crashed into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania after a revolt by the plane's passengers, killing all 44 people (including the four hijackers) on board.[356][357][358] In total, the attacks killed 2,996 people and injured more than 6,000 others.[w] The U.S. stock market closed for four trading days after the attacks in the first unscheduled close since the Great Depression.[359] Nine days after the attack, U.S. President George W. Bush called for a "War on terror".[360][361][362][363][364] Shortly thereafter he launched the War in Afghanistan to find and capture Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda.[365][366] A copy of The Revolt, memoir of the Irgun commander, was found in one of al-Qaeda's training bases.[271][367]

United States Air Force
[edit]

South and Central Asia

[edit]

Afghanistan

[edit]

Other major locations of suicide attack are Afghanistan, with 1,059 attacks as of mid-2015,[11] and Pakistan, with 490 attacks.[11] In the first eight months of 2008, Pakistan overtook Iraq and Afghanistan in suicide bombings, with 28 bombings killing 471 people.[368] Suicide bombings have become a tactic in Chechnya, first being used in the conflict in 2000 in Alkhan Kala.[369] and spreading to Russia, notably with the Moscow theater hostage crisis in 2002 and the Beslan school hostage crisis in 2004.[370][better source needed]

Pakistan

[edit]

Shaheed (martyr) Benazir Bhutto, former Prime Minister of Pakistan and leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), was assassinated in a terrorist attack on 27 December 2007.[54][371][372] Benazir and 23 other people were killed by a 16-year-old suicide bomber using an explosive belt and used a gun.[55] Bhutto had already survived a previous assassination attempt in Karachi.[373][374][375] Following this, many schools and universities were named in honour of her martyrdom.[c]

United States invasion of Iraq

[edit]
The result of a car bombing in Iraq.

After the invasion of Iraq in 2003 led by the U.S., Iraqi and foreign insurgents carried out waves of suicide bombings. More attacks have been carried out in Iraq than in any other country, with 1,938 as of mid-2015.[11]

In addition to United States military targets, they attacked many civilian targets such as Shiite mosques as well as international offices of the UN and the Red Cross. Iraqi men waiting to apply for jobs with the new army and police force were targets. In the lead up to the Iraqi parliamentary election on 30 January 2005, suicide attacks upon civilian and police personnel involved with the elections increased. There were also reports of the insurgents co-opting disabled people as involuntary suicide bombers.[376]

Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)

[edit]

The self-declared "Islamic State" (ISIS)[x] use suicide attacks against government targets before they attack. The attackers use a wide range of methods, from suicide vests and belts to bomb trucks and cars and APCs filled with explosives. Usually, the suicide bomber involved in a "martyrdom operation" will record his last words in a martyrdom video before they start their attack, which will be released after the suicide attack is done.[citation needed] A study published by The Guardian in 2017 analyzed 923 attacks done between December 2015 and November 2016 and compared the military tactic to those used by kamikaze operations.[380] Charlie Winter, the author of the study, said that ISIS had "industrialized the concept of martyrdom". 84% of suicide attacks were directed towards military targets, usually with armed vehicles. About 80% of the attackers were of Iraqi or Syrian origin.[380] According to the Institute for National Security Studies, there were fewer suicide attacks worldwide in 2017, but more female suicide bombers participated in them. According to the institute, ISIS and al-Qaeda led the suicide terrorism.[381]

In 2017 and 2019, during the Sinai insurgency, there were suicide bombings in the Gaza Strip by local ISIS sympathizers. ISIS are a global extremist group, with an ideology that fundamentally opposes the Palestinian nationalism of Hamas and the other groups above.[382] In 2017 two Hamas government border guards were killed while attempting to intercept an ISIS suicide bomber at Rafah Crossing.[383][384] The Hamas government responded to that bombing with a crackdown on followers of "deviant ideologies" (meaning ISIS and similar groups).[385][386] In 2018, members of ISIS in the Sinai "declared war" on Hamas, demanding Hamas release ISIS militants held in Gaza's prisons.[387] Then in 2019, another suicide attack – also attributed to ISIS – directly targeted Gaza Strip police.[388] Three police officers were killed,[389][390][391] all three victims were allegedly members of Hamas.[392] Gaza's Security forces responded by arresting ten people whom they suspected were members of the cell who arranged the attack.

In the following years, ISIS members also carried out suicide attacks in different locations. In December 2018, according to the director of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Rami Abdel Rahman, at least three suicide bombers blew themselves up inside the city of As-Suwayda in the Jabal al-Druze of southern Syria. This was in addition to suicide bombers who attacked seven villages in the surrounding suburbs.[393] According to The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, In January 2019, ISIS carried out a suicide bombing attack using a car bomb against a joint American-Kurdish patrol.[394] 2021 Kabul airport attack was suicide bombing attack. In January 2021, ISIS claimed responsibility for a double suicide bombing in a Baghdad market that killed at least 32 people and wounded more than 100. It was the first major suicide attack by the Islamic State group in the previous three years.[395] In June 2025, the Syrian Interior Ministry announced a suicide attack carried out by a member of the Islamic State cult in Church. According to the statement, he shot at worshippers in a church and then blew himself up inside.[396][397]

Africa

[edit]

Since 2006, al-Shabaab has carried out major suicide attacks in Somalia,[398] the worst year so far being 2016 with 28 attacks.

Western Europe

[edit]

In Europe, four Islamist suicide bombers exploded home-made peroxide explosives on three London underground trains and a bus on 7 July 2005, during the morning rush hour. These "7/7" bombings killed 52 civilians and injured 700.[399]

On 22 May 2017, the Manchester Arena bombing occurred which resulted in 23 deaths and 1,017 injuries. The attack was carried out as people were leaving an Ariana Grande concert.[400]

Car bomb suicides in the 2020s

[edit]

2020 in Nashville, Tennessee

[edit]

On 25 December 2020, a suicide bombing occurred in Nashville, Tennessee.[citation needed]

2025 in Palm Springs, California

[edit]

On 17 May 2025, a 2010 silver Ford Fusion sedan loaded with explosives detonated outside the American Reproductive Centers fertility clinic in Palm Springs, California, resulting in the death of the perpetrator, 25-year-old Guy Edward Bartkus, and injuries to four others.[401][402][403] Nearby buildings were damaged and windows were shattered.[404][405] A tripod and camera were found at the scene.[406][403] The FBI called it an "intentional act of terrorism".[407][404] Bartkus reportedly identified himself as the perpetrator of the bombing in a video posted online, an audio recording, and manifesto in which he described himself as a "pro-mortalist" and said people did not give consent to exist.[408] A 32-year-old man named Daniel Jongyon Park was arrested for possible involvement.[409][410] Park was expelled from Poland to face prosecution on the United States.[411]

Response

[edit]

Suicide bombings are often followed by heightened security measures and reprisals by their targets. Because a deceased suicide bomber cannot be targeted, the response is often a targeting of those believed to have sent the bomber. Because the threat of retaliation cannot deter future attacks if the attackers were already willing to kill themselves, pressure is great to employ intensive surveillance of virtually any potential perpetrator, "to look for them almost everywhere, even if no evidence existed that they were there at all".[412]

In the West Bank, the IDF has at times demolished homes that belong to families whose children or landlords whose tenants had volunteered for such missions, whether completed or not.[413] An internal review starting in October 2004 brought an end to the policy, but it was resumed in 2014.[414] Other military measures taken during the suicide attack campaign included: a widescale re-occupation of the West Bank and blockading of Palestinian towns; "targeted assassinations" of militants, an approach used since the 1970s; raids against militants suspected of plotting attacks; mass arrests; curfews; stringent travel restrictions; and physical separation from Palestinians via the 650 kilometres (400 mi) Israeli West Bank barrier in and around the West Bank.[342][415] The Second Intifada and its suicide attacks are often dated as ending around the time of an unofficial ceasefire with some of the most powerful Palestinian militant groups in 2005.[342] A new "knife intifada" started in September 2015. Still, although many Palestinians were killed in the process of stabbing or attempting to stab Israelis, their deaths were not "a precondition for the success" of their mission and so are not considered suicide attacks by many observers.[35]

In the United States, the element of suicide in the 9/11 attacks persuaded many that previously unthinkable, "out of the box" strategic policies in a "war on terrorism" were necessary. This included "preventive war" against countries not immediately attacking the U.S., to almost unlimited surveillance of virtually any person in the United States by the government without normal congressional and judicial oversight.[412] These responses "produced their own costs and risks—in lives, national debt, and America's standing in the world".[412]

The "heightened security measures" also affected the target populations. During the bombing campaign, Israelis were questioned by armed guards and given a quick pat down before being let into cafés.[416] In the U.S., the post-9/11 era meant "previously inconceivable security measures—in airports and other transportation hubs, hotels and office buildings, sports stadiums and concert halls".[416]

In the case of the 9/11 attacks in the U.S., at least in the short term, the results were negative for Al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban. Since the attacks, Western nations have diverted massive resources towards stopping similar actions, as well as increasing border security, and military actions against various countries believed to have been involved with terrorism.[417] Critics of the War on Terrorism suggest the results were negative, as the subsequent actions of the United States and other countries has increased the number of recruits and their willingness to carry out suicide bombings.[citation needed]

Recent attacker profiles and motivations

[edit]

Studies of who becomes a suicide attacker and what motivates them have often come to different conclusions. According to Riaz Hassan,[10]

apart from one demographic attribute—that the majority of suicide bombers tend to be young males—the evidence has failed to find a stable set of demographic, psychological, socioeconomic and religious variables that can be causally linked to suicide bombers' personality or socioeconomic origins.

Anthropologist Scott Atran wrote, "[Terrorists] are not sufficiently different from everyone else. Insights into homegrown jihadi attacks will have to come from understanding group dynamics, not individual psychology. Small-group dynamics can trump individual personality to produce horrific behavior in otherwise ordinary people.[5] Atran's research has found that the attacks are not organized from the top down, but occur from the bottom up. It is usually a matter of following one's friends and ending up in environments that foster groupthink. Atran is also critical of the claim that terrorists simply crave destruction; rather, they are often motivated by beliefs they hold sacred, as well as their moral reasoning.[418]

A study of the remains of 110 suicide bombers in Afghanistan for the first part of 2007 by Afghan pathologist Yusef Yadgari found 80% were suffering from physical ailments such as missing limbs (before the blasts), cancer, or leprosy. Also, in contrast to earlier findings of suicide bombers, the Afghan bombers were "not celebrated like their counterparts in other Arab nations. Afghan bombers are not featured on posters or in videos as martyrs".[419] Menachem Begin called his only known suicide militant as "Meir the Stump", a reference to his amputated left arm.[420]

Robert Pape, director of the Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism, found the majority of suicide bombers came from the educated middle classes. For example, Humam Balawi, who perpetrated the Camp Chapman attack in Afghanistan in 2010, was a medical doctor.[421]

A 2004 paper by Harvard University Professor of Public Policy Alberto Abadie "cast[s] doubt on the widely held belief that terrorism stems from poverty, finding instead that terrorist violence is related to a nation's level of political freedom", with countries "in some intermediate range of political freedom" more prone to terrorism than countries with "high levels" of political freedom or countries with "highly authoritarian regimes". "When governments are weak, political instability is elevated, so conditions are favorable for the appearance of terrorism".[422][423] A 2020 study found that while well-educated and economically well-off individuals are more likely to be behind suicide terrorism, it is not because these individuals self-select into suicide terrorism, but rather because terrorist groups are more likely to select high-quality individuals to commit suicide terrorist attacks.[424]

Pape found that among Islamic suicide terrorists, 97 percent were unmarried and 84 percent were male. If the Kurdistan Workers' Party was excluded, this changed to be 91 percent male.[3] A study conducted by the U.S. military in Iraq in 2008 found that suicide bombers were almost always single men without children aged 18 to 30, with a mean age of 22, and were typically students or employed in blue-collar occupations.[425] In a 2011 doctoral thesis, anthropologist Kyle R. Gibson reviewed three studies documenting 1,208 suicide attacks from 1981 to 2007 and found that countries with higher polygyny rates correlated with greater production of suicide terrorists.[426][427] Political scientists Valerie M. Hudson and Bradley Thayer noted that countries where polygyny is widely practiced tend to have higher homicide rates and rates of rape. The pair have argued that because Islam is the only major religious tradition where polygyny is still largely condoned, the higher degrees of marital inequality in Islamic countries compared to most of the world causes them to have larger populations susceptible to suicide terrorism. Hudson and Theyer contended that promises of harems of virgins for martyrdom serves as a mechanism to mitigate in-group conflict within Islamic countries by redirecting their violence towards out-groups.[428]

Along with his research on the Tamil Tigers, Scott Atran found that Palestinian jihadist groups such as Hamas provide monthly stipends, lump-sum payments, and prestige to the families of suicide terrorists.[429][430] Cognitive scientist Steven Pinker argues in The Better Angels of Our Nature (2011) that because the families of men in the West Bank and Gaza often cannot afford bride prices and that many potential brides end up in polygynous marriages, the financial compensation of an act of suicide terrorism can buy enough brides for a man's brothers to have children to make the self-sacrifice pay off in terms of kin selection and biological fitness.[431]

Motivations vary greatly and are different in the case of each individual. Fanaticism (nationalist, religious, or both) may result from brain-washing, negative experiences regarding "the enemy", and the lack of a perspective in life. Suicide attackers may want to hurt or kill their targets because they hold them responsible for all bad things that have happened to them or in the world, or simply just because they want to escape misery and poverty.[432] Based on biographies of more than seven hundred foreign fighters uncovered at an Iraqi insurgent camp, researchers believe that the motivation for suicide missions at least in Iraq was not "the global jihadi ideology", but "an explosive mix of desperation, pride, anger, sense of powerlessness, local tradition of resistance, and religious fervor".[433]

Criminal justice professor Adam Lankford argues that suicide terrorists are not psychologically normal or stable. They are motivated to suicide and killing to mask their desire to die beneath a "veneer of heroic action" because of the religious consequences of killing themselves outright.[434] He has identified more than 130 individual suicide terrorists, including 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta, with classic suicidal risk factors such as depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, other mental health problems, drug addictions, serious physical injuries or disabilities, having suffered the unexpected death of a loved one, or other personal crises.[435]

Nationalist resistance and religion

[edit]
A 2002 Commemorative poster of Palestinian Islamic Jihad suicide bomber Ashraf Sallah Alasmar in Jenin.

According to Robert Pape, director of the Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism, as of 2005, 95 percent of suicide attacks have the same specific strategic goal. This goal is to cause an occupying state to withdraw forces from a disputed territory, making nationalism their principal motivation rather than religion.[436]

Alternately, another source found that in Lebanon from 1983 to 1999, it was Islamists who influenced secular nationalists. Their use of suicide attacks spread to the secular groups. Five Lebanese groups "espousing a non-religious nationalist ideology" followed the lead of Islamist groups in attacking by suicide, "impressed by the effectiveness of Hezbollah's attacks in precipitating the withdrawal of the 'foreigners' from Lebanon".[35] In Israel suicide attacks by Islamist Islamic Jihad and Hamas also preceded those of the secular PFLP and the Al-Fatah-linked Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades.[citation needed] However, the first suicide attack in post-independence Israel was in 1972, by foreign fighters from the Japanese Red Army (a secular militant group) allied to PFLP-EO unit (a secular group, led by Wadie Haddad).[8][270]

Pape found other factors associated with suicide attacks. This included the government of the targeted country being democratic and the public opinion of the country playing a role in determining policy. He also found that a difference in religion between the attackers and occupiers, and[437] grassroots support for the attacks[438] contributed. Other factors include attackers being disproportionately from the educated middle classes,[439] high levels of brutality and cruelty by the occupiers,[440] and competition among militant groups fighting the occupiers.[441]

Other researchers, such as Yotam Feldner, argue that perceived religious rewards after death are instrumental in encouraging Muslims to commit suicide attacks.[442][443] These researchers contend that Pape's analysis is flawed, particularly his contention that democracies are the main targets of such attacks.[444] Other scholars have criticized Pape's research design, arguing that it cannot draw any conclusions on the causes of suicide terrorism.[445]

Atran argues that suicide bombing has moved on from the days of Pape's study,[439] where non-Islamic groups have carried out very few bombings since 2003. Instead, bombing by Muslim or Islamist groups associated with a "global ideology" of "martyrdom" has skyrocketed. In 2004 in Iraq alone, there were 400 suicide attacks and 2,000 casualties.[446] Other researchers question why prominent anti-occupation secular terrorist groups have not used suicide, such as the Provisional IRA, ETA, or anti-colonialist insurgents in Vietnam, Algeria, and elsewhere.[447][448] They also question Pape omits that the first suicide attack in Lebanon targeted the embassy of Iraq, a country that was not occupying Lebanon.[447]

Mia Bloom agrees with Pape that competition among insurgents groups is a significant motivator, arguing the growth in suicide as a tactic is a product of "outbidding". That is, the need by competing insurgent groups to demonstrate their commitment to the cause to the broader public. This is achieved as making the ultimate sacrifice for the insurgency is a "bid" impossible to top.[449] This explains its use by Palestinian groups, but not that by the Tamil Tigers.[448] Still other researchers have identified sociopolitical factors as more central in the motivation of suicide attackers than religion.[450][451]

According to Atran,[452] and former CIA case officer Marc Sageman,[453] support for suicide actions is triggered by moral outrage at perceived attacks against Islam and sacred values. However, this is converted to action as a result of small-world factors, such as being part of a football club with other jihadis. Millions express sympathy with global jihad. According to a 2006 Gallup study involving more than 50,000 interviews in dozens of countries, seven percent of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims consider the 9/11 attacks "completely justified".[454][455]

Assaf Moghadam also argues that the increase in "suicide terrorism" since 2001 is driven by Salafi jihadist ideology and Al-Qaeda.[456][457][458]

Updating his work in a 2010 book Cutting the Fuse, Pape reported that a close analysis of the time and location of attacks strongly support his conclusion that "foreign military occupation accounts for 98.5%—and the deployment of American combat forces for 92%—of all the 1,833 suicide terrorist attacks around the world" between 2004 and 2009.[459] Pape wrote that, "the success attributed to the surge in 2007 and 2008 was actually less the result of an increase in coalition forces and more to a change of strategy in Baghdad and the empowerment of the Sunnis in Anbar".[460]

The same logic can be seen in Afghanistan. In 2004 and early 2005, NATO occupied the north and west, which was controlled by the Northern Alliance, whom NATO had previously helped fight the Taliban. An enormous spike in suicide terrorism only occurred later in 2005 as NATO moved into the south and east, which had previously been controlled by the Taliban, and locals were more likely to see NATO as a foreign occupation threatening local culture and customs.[461] Critics argue the logic cannot be seen in Pakistan,[447][462][463] which has no occupation and the second highest number of suicide bombing fatalities as of mid-2015.[verification needed]

[edit]

What connection the high percentage of suicide attacks executed by Islamist groups since 1980 has to do with the religion of Islam is disputed. Specifically, scholars, researchers, and others disagree over whether Islam forbids suicide in the process of attacking enemies, or the killing of civilians. According to a report compiled by the Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism, 224 of 300 suicide terror attacks from 1980 to 2003 involved Islamist groups or took place in Muslim-majority countries.[464][original research?] Another tabulation found more than a fourfold increase in suicide bombings in the two years following Pape's study and that the overwhelming majority of these bombers were motivated by the ideology of Islamist martyrdom.[446] For example, as of early 2008, 1,121 Muslim suicide bombers have blown themselves up in Iraq.[465]

Recent emergence of suicide attacks by Muslims
[edit]

Sunni Muslims were possibly the last major branch of the Abrahamic religions to resort to overt suicide attacks. Islamic suicide bombing is a fairly recent phenomenon. It was absent from the 1979–1989 Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union,[287] an asymmetrical war where the mujahideen fought Soviet warplanes, helicopters and tanks primarily with light weapons.[verification needed] According to author Sadakat Kadri, "the very idea that Muslims might blow themselves up for God was unheard of before 1983, and it was not until the early 1990s that anyone anywhere had tried to justify killing innocent Muslims who were not on a battlefield". After 1983, the process was limited among Muslims to Hezbollah and other Lebanese Shia factions for more than a decade.[288]

Since then, according to Noah Feldman, videotaped pre-confession of faith by attackers known as the "vocabulary of martyrdom and sacrifice" have become part of "Islamic cultural consciousness" and these confessions are "instantly recognizable" to Muslims.[tone][287] The tactic has spread through the Muslim world "with astonishing speed and on a surprising course".[287] "First the targets were American soldiers, then mostly Israelis, including women and children. From Lebanon and Israel, the technique of suicide bombing moved to Iraq, where the targets have included mosques and shrines, and the intended victims have mostly been Shia Iraqis. ... [In] Afghanistan, ... both the perpetrators and the targets are orthodox Sunni Muslims. Not long ago, a bombing in Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand Province, killed Muslims, including women, who were applying to go on pilgrimage to Mecca. Overall, the trend is definitively in the direction of Muslim-on-Muslim violence. By a conservative accounting, more than three times as many Iraqis have been killed by suicide bombings in just three years (2003–6) as have Israelis in ten (from 1996 to 2006). Suicide bombing has become the archetype of Muslim violence;– not just to Westerners but also to Muslims themselves".[287]

Recent research on the rationale of suicide bombing has identified both religious and sociopolitical motivations.[466][467] Those[who?] who cite religious factors as an important influence note that religion provides the framework because the bombers believe they are acting in the name of Islam and will be rewarded as martyrs. Since martyrdom is seen as a step towards[clarification needed] paradise, those who commit suicide while discarding[clarification needed] their community from a common enemy believe that they will reach an ultimate salvation after they die.[466]

In the media attention given to suicide bombing during the Second Intifada and after 9/11, sources hostile to radical Islamism quoted radical scholars promising various heavenly rewards, such as 70 virgins (Arabic: houri) as wives, to Muslims who die as martyrs, specifically as suicide attackers.[468][469] Other alleged rewards for those dying are being cleansed of all sin and brought directly to paradise, and not having to wait for the Day of Judgement.[470][471]

Others, such as As'ad AbuKhalil, maintain that "the tendency to dwell on the sexual motives" of the suicide bombers "belittles" the bombers "sociopolitical causes", and that the alleged "sexual frustration" of young Muslim men "has been overly emphasized in the Western and Israeli media" as a motive for terrorism.[451] Suicide is criminalised many in majority-Muslim countries (see above).

Support for "martyrdom operations" and analogous concepts
[edit]

Islamist militant organizations including al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad argue that, despite what some Muslims claim is Islam's strict prohibition of suicide and murder,[472][473] suicide attacks fulfill the obligation of jihad against the "oppressor", "martyrs" will be rewarded with paradise, and have the support of some Muslim clerics.[who?][citation needed] Clerics have supported suicide attacks largely in connection with the Palestinian issue. Prominent Sunni cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi had previously supported such attacks by Palestinians in perceived defense of their homeland as heroic and an act of resistance.[474] Shia Lebanese cleric Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the spiritual authority recognized by Hezbollah, holds similar views.[287]

The articles maintains that Abu Huraira, a companion of the Muhammad, and Umar ibn Khattab, the second caliph of Islam, approved acts which Muslims knew would lead to certain death. The Islamic prophet Muhammad also approved of such acts, according to authors Maulana Muawiya Hussaini and Ikrimah Anwar who cited numerous Hadith of Muhammad on the authority of Islamic jurist Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj. "The Sahaba [companions of the Islamic prophet Muhammad] who carried out the attacks almost certainly knew that they were going to be killed during their operations but they still carried them out and such acts were extolled and praised in the sharia."[475]

Opposition and responses from Muslim scholars
[edit]

Others, such as Middle East historian Bernard Lewis, disagree: "... a clear difference was made between throwing oneself to certain death at the hands of an overwhelmingly strong enemy, and dying by one's own hand. The first, if conducted in a properly authorized [ jihad ], was a passport to heaven; the second to damnation. The blurring of their previously vital distinction was the work of some twentieth-century theologians who outlined the new theory which the suicide bombers put into practice".[106]

The distinction from engaging in an act where the perpetrator plans to fight to the death but where the attack does not require their death is important to at least one Islamist terror group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).[where?] While the group extols "martyrdom" and has killed many civilians, LeT believes suicide attacks where the attackers die by their own hand, such as by pressing a detonation button, are haram (forbidden). Its "trademark" is that of perpetrators fighting "to the death" but escaping "if practical". "This distinction has been the subject of extensive discourse among radical Islamist leaders".[476]

Several Western and Muslim scholars of Islam have posited that suicide attacks are a clear violation of classical Islamic law, and characterized such attacks against civilians as murderous and sinful.[477][478]

According to Bernard Lewis, "the emergence of the now widespread terrorism practice of suicide bombing is a development of the 20th century. It has no antecedents in Islamic history, and no justification in terms of Islamic theology, law, or tradition."[478] Islamic legal rules of armed warfare or military jihad are covered in detail in the classical texts of Islamic jurisprudence,[287] which forbid the killing of women, children, or non-combatants, and the destruction of cultivated or residential areas.[287][479][480]

For more than a millennium, these tenets were accepted by Sunnis and Shiites. However, since the 1980s militant Islamists have challenged the traditional Islamic rules of warfare to justify suicide attacks.[287][479]

Several respected Muslim scholars have provided scholastic refutations of suicide bombings, condemning them as terrorism prohibited in Islam and leading their perpetrators to hell.[477] In his over 400 page long Fatwa on Terrorism condemning suicide attacks, Muslim Islamic scholar Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri directly disputed the rationale of Islamists. He argues that indiscriminately killing both Muslims and non-Muslims is unlawful, and brings the Muslim ummah into disrepute, no matter how lofty the killers intentions.[481] Tahir-ul-Qadri states terrorism "has no place in Islamic teaching, and no justification can be provided to it [...] good intention cannot justify a wrong and forbidden act".[477]

Grand Mufti Saudi Arabia , Abdul-Aziz ibn Abdullah Al Shaykh, issued a fatwa on 12 September 2013 that suicide bombings are "great crimes" and bombers are "criminals who rush themselves to hell by their actions". Al Shaykh described suicide bombers as "robbed of their minds [...] who have been used [as tools] to destroy themselves and societies".[482] "In view of the fast-moving dangerous developments in the Islamic world, it is very distressing to see the tendencies of permitting or underestimating the shedding of blood of Muslims and those under protection in their countries. The sectarian or ignorant utterances made by some of these people would benefit none other than the greedy, vindictive and envious people. Hence, we would like to draw attention to the seriousness of the attacks on Muslims or those who live under their protection or under a pact with them|Al Shaykh, quoting a number of verses from the Qur'an and Hadith".[483] Even countries that have a history of suicide attacks, and have regarded them as martyrdom, have condemned them in situations they see as illegitimate.

Following the 2005 Bangladesh bombings by the banned outfit Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), chief cleric of Bangladesh Ubaidul Haq led a protest of ulema denouncing terrorism.[484] He said: "Islam prohibits suicide bombings. These bombers are enemies of Islam. [...] It is a duty for all Muslims to stand up against those who are killing people in the name of Islam".[verify]

In January 2006, Shia Marja (high ranking cleric) Ayatollah al-Udhma Yousof al-Sanei decreed a fatwa against suicide bombing, declaring it a "terrorist act".[485][486] In 2005, Muhammad Afifi al-Akiti also issued a fatwa "Against The Targeting Of Civilians".[487]

Ihsanic Intelligence, a London-based Islamic think-tank, published their two-year study into suicide bombings in the name of Islam titled The Hijacked Caravan.[488] The study concluded that, "The technique of suicide bombing is anathema, antithetical and abhorrent to Sunni Islam. It is considered legally forbidden, constituting a reprehensible innovation in the Islamic tradition, morally an enormity of sin combining suicide and murder and theologically an act which has consequences of eternal damnation".[489]

American[clarification needed] based Islamic jurist and scholar Khaled Abou Al-Fadl argues, "The classical jurists, nearly without exception, argued that those who attack by stealth, while targeting noncombatants in order to terrorize the resident and wayfarer, are corrupters of the earth. "Resident and wayfarer" was a legal expression that meant that whether the attackers terrorize people in their urban centers or terrorize travelers, the result was the same: all such attacks constitute a corruption of the earth. The legal term given to people who act this way was muharibun (those who wage war against society), and the crime is called the crime of hiraba (waging war against society). The crime of hiraba was so serious and repugnant that, according to Islamic law, those guilty of this crime were considered enemies of humankind and were not to be given quarter or sanctuary anywhere .... Those who are familiar with the classical tradition will find the parallels between what were described as crimes of hiraba and what is often called terrorism today nothing short of remarkable. The classical jurists considered crimes such as assassinations, setting fires, or poisoning water wells – that could indiscriminately kill the innocent – as offenses of hiraba. Furthermore, hijacking methods of transportation or crucifying people in order to spread fear are also crimes of hiraba. Importantly, Islamic law strictly prohibited the taking of hostages, the mutilation of corpses, and torture".[490]

According to When Religion Becomes Evil, by Baptist minister Charles Kimball, "There is only one verse in the Qur'an that contains a phrase related to suicide" (4:29).[491] "O you who have believed, do not consume one another's wealth unjustly but only [in lawful] business by mutual consent. And do not kill yourselves. Indeed, Allah is to you ever Merciful".[492][non-primary source needed]

Some commentators posit that "do not kill yourselves" is better translated "do not kill each other", and some translations, such as those by M. H. Shakir, reflect that view. Mainstream Islamic groups such as the European Council for Fatwa and Research also cite the Quranic verse Al-An'am 6:151[493]) as prohibiting suicide: "And take not life, which Allah has made sacred, except by way of justice and law".[494] The Hadith, including Bukhari 2:445, states: "The Prophet said, '...whoever commits suicide with a piece of iron will be punished with the same piece of iron in the Hell Fire', [and] 'A man was inflicted with wounds and he committed suicide, and so Allah said: 'My slave has caused death on himself hurriedly, so I forbid Paradise for him'".[495][496]

Other Muslims have also noted Quranic verses in opposition to suicide, to taking of life other than by way of justice such as the death penalty for murder, and to collective punishment.[497][better source needed]

The international community considers the use of indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations[324][498] as illegal under international law.[499]

Age and gender

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26 May 1945. Corporal Yukio Araki, holding a puppy, with four other pilots of the 72nd Shinbu Squadron at Bansei, Kagoshima. Araki died the following day, at the age of 17, in a suicide attack on ships near Okinawa.

Children and teenagers

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Araki Yukio was born on 10 March 1928, at the age of fifteen he joined the Imperial Japanese Army Air Service's Youth Pilot Training Program.[500] On 27 May 1945, Araki took off from Bansei Airfield, in Kagoshima Prefecture, on a kamikaze mission, flying a Mitsubishi Ki-51.[501] At the age of seventeen, Araki is one of the youngest known kamikaze pilots. It has been speculated that his plane was one of two that struck the USS Braine, killing 66 of her crew; however, the ship did not sink.[500][502]

There was a heated dispute surrounding the death penalty trial of the Irgun militant who blew himself up in 1947 (see above). He was sentenced to death alongside another militant for their role in the bombing of Jerusalem Train Station [he], but the other militant later had his sentence commuted to life in prison.[503][504] There was heated debate about the age of the Irgun suicide militant when he was sentenced. His mother and brother claimed he was 17, too young to be executed according to the law of the British authorities.[59][505][506][507][508] The court claimed he was 23, because he had served in the British military during World War II, and the British refused to believe they had recruited a minor who was lying about his age.[505] Yehuda Lapidot and the IDF say he was born on 5 October 1927.[509] Surviving relatives disagree, maintaining that he was born in July 1929.[59]

Mohammed Hossein Fahmideh, a 13-year-old Iranian boy who fought in the Iran–Iraq War, is said – by former CIA operative Robert Baer – to be the first Muslim to have participated in such an attack in contemporary history.[510][additional citation(s) needed] The boy strapped rocket-propelled grenades to his chest and blew himself up under an Iraqi tank in November 1980.[better source needed] A near identical tactic was used by Chinese Nationalists in the 1930s and 1940s (see above). Ayatollah Khomeini declared Fahmideh a national hero.[511] According to Robert Baer, the boy was used as an inspiration for further volunteers for martyrdom.[510] The Iranian website, Tebyan Cultural Institute describes the child's death as heroic.[511] According to former CIA officer Robert Baer, "Ayatollah Khomeini's embattled Islamic republic adopted Fahmideh as a national hero and as an inspiration for further bloodshed and martyrdom".[510]

In Lebanon on 9 April 1985, Sana'a Mehaidli, a 16-year-old member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), detonated an explosive-laden vehicle that killed two Israeli soldiers and injured twelve more. She is often described as the first female suicide bomber.[292][293][294][295] She is known as "the Bride of the South".[512][verification needed] During the Lebanese Civil War, female SSNP members bombed Israeli troops and the Israeli proxy militia, the South Lebanon Army.[citation needed]

Women

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A U.S. Navy servicewoman poses as a captured female suicide bomber during the OPFOR exercise in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
Female suicide bombers are women who undertake suicide attacks, wherein the bomber kills herself while simultaneously killing targeted people. Suicide bombers are normally viewed as male political radicals, but since the 1960s, female suicide attacks have been on the rise. Through 1985–2006, 15% of all suicide attacks were conducted by female suicide bombers.[513] There are many organizations, such as Boko Haram (which is the first group to use females in a majority of their suicide bombings and surpassed the Tamil Tigers in using more female suicide-bombers than any other terrorist group in history),[514] ISIS, and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, that recently started using women as tools in their attacks, since they are normally viewed as less of a threat than their male counterparts. This includes women having the element of surprise, a hesitancy to search females, increased publicity for female suicide bombing attacks, and the female stereotype as non-violent.[515]

Gendered motivations

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In some traditions,[who?] women are customarily seen as peace-makers rather than as front-line actors in conflicts.[516] This stereotype has made them useful as suicide bombers, because they might be underestimated and thus be able to enter target areas inconspicuously, leading to more lethal suicide attacks.[517] Whether women's motivations for becoming suicide bombers generally differ from men's remains a pertinent question. Bloom has suggested some salient reasons for women to turn to suicide bombings, such as "to avenge a personal loss, to redeem the family name, to escape a life of sheltered monotony and achieve fame, or to equalize the patriarchal societies in which they live".[518] Some earlier literature suggested that women tend to be motivated by personal trauma rather than by ideological reasons.[518] Other researchers disagree with this assessment and state that it reduces women's political agency, seeing as they are just as capable of making a choice based on ideology.[519] Women's as well as men's usual motivations for becoming suicide bombers should be assumed to be nuanced and complex.[520]

Tactics and strategies

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Devices

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Various groups adapt their strategies to suit specific targets. For example, in the 1980s, Hezbollah favored the use of explosive-laden cars, while the LTTE in Sri Lanka employed tactics involving explosive-laden boats. Palestinian organizations in the 1990s refined an approach involving suicide bombers with explosive belts, influencing groups like the Chechens and the PKK. In contemporary Iraq, local factions have utilized explosive-laden vehicles to target heavily guarded military facilities.[1] Decades earlier, the Lehi militant group were discovered to have constructed a "coat bomb", with explosives concealed by being stitched inside the coat.[521] They appear to have attempted to use it in a non-suicide bombing, taking it off and leaving it behind in the targeted building, but it failed to detonate for unclear reasons.[522] They also used it for smuggling explosives into England.[521]

Strategic advantages

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According to author Jeffrey William Lewis, success campaigns of suicide bombing require: willing individuals, organisations to train and use them, and a society willing to accept such acts in the name of a greater good.[71] The organisations work to guarantee individual suicide bombers that they "will be remembered as martyrs dying for their communities". By imbuing suicide attacks with "reverence and heroism", it becomes more attractive to recruits.[71] According to Yoram Schweitzer, modern suicide terrorism is "aimed at causing devastating physical damage, through which it inflicts profound fear and anxiety". Its goal is not to produce a negative psychological effect only on the victims of the actual attack, but on the entire target population.[35] Attackers themselves have often framed suicide attacks as acts of courageous self-sacrifice made necessary by the superior military or security strength of the enemy. The technique has also been called "the atomic weapon of the weak".[341] According to Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the martyred (assassinated) leader of Hamas, "Once we have warplanes and missiles, then we can think of changing our means of legitimate self-defense. But right now, we can only tackle the fire with our bare hands and sacrifice ourselves".[523]

A major reason for the popularity of suicide attacks, despite the sacrifice involved for its perpetrators, is its tactical advantages over other types of terrorism such as the ability to conceal weapons, make last-minute adjustments, an increased ability to infiltrate heavily guarded targets, and the lack of need for remote or delayed detonation, escape plans or rescue teams. Robert Pape observed that "Suicide attacks are an especially convincing way to signal the likelihood of more pain to come, because if you are willing to kill yourself you are also willing to endure brutal retaliation. [...] The element of suicide itself helps increase the credibility of future attacks because it suggests that attackers cannot be deterred".[524] Other scholars have criticized Pape's research design, arguing that it cannot draw any conclusions on the efficacy of suicide terrorism.[445]

Bruce Hoffman described the characteristics of suicide bombing as "universal" — "Suicide bombings are inexpensive and effective. They are less complicated and compromising than other kinds of terrorist operations. They guarantee media coverage. The suicide terrorist is the ultimate smart bomb. Perhaps most important, coldly efficient bombings tear at the fabric of trust that holds societies together".[416]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
A suicide attack is an event in which one or more perpetrators deliberately kill themselves to harm or kill others, typically by detonating explosives strapped to their body, using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, or crashing aircraft into targets.[1] Such tactics have appeared sporadically in history, including ancient examples like the biblical Samson collapsing a temple on himself and his Philistine captors, but systematic employment emerged in modern warfare during World War II, when Imperial Japan's kamikaze operations involved approximately 2,600-4,000 aircraft deliberately crashed into Allied ships, achieving about 19% success rate in hits while inflicting over 7,000 naval fatalities and damaging or sinking around 400 vessels, though failing to alter the war's outcome due to resource depletion.[2][3] In the contemporary era since 1982, suicide attacks have proliferated as a core method of non-state militant groups in asymmetric conflicts, with the Chicago Project on Security and Threats' Database on Suicide Attacks (DSAT) documenting over 5,000 incidents through 2019, predominantly bombings that caused tens of thousands of deaths and injuries worldwide, often targeting civilians and military personnel to maximize terror and coerce stronger adversaries into territorial concessions.[4][5] Empirical analyses reveal these attacks follow a strategic logic, where weaker actors leverage the tactic's low cost per operation and high psychological impact to impose asymmetric costs, though effectiveness varies by context—succeeding in localized withdrawals like U.S. forces from Lebanon in 1983 but failing against determined occupations—and motivations blend organizational coercion with ideological promises of posthumous rewards, enabling recruitment despite the perpetrators' certain death.[5][6] Defining characteristics include the attacker's intent to die as integral to mission success, distinguishing it from high-risk missions or accidental self-destruction, and controversies center on causal factors, with data indicating primary use by Islamist and secular separatist groups against perceived occupiers, countering narratives of inherent psychopathology by emphasizing rational, group-directed calculus over individual suicide ideation.[7][8]

Definition and Characteristics

Core Elements and Distinctions

A suicide attack constitutes a violent act in which the perpetrator deliberately causes their own death to inflict harm on targeted individuals or groups, most commonly by detonating an explosive device strapped to their body, contained in a vehicle, or through ramming with an aircraft or vessel.[9] This method ensures precise delivery of the payload, as the human operator can navigate security measures, adjust to real-time conditions, and detonate at optimal impact, distinguishing it from remote-detonated or timed explosives where the operator seeks survival.[10] The core intent is instrumental: the attacker's death is not incidental but engineered to maximize casualties and psychological terror, often within organized campaigns by non-state actors against perceived occupiers or adversaries.[5] Key elements include premeditated self-sacrifice, where the attacker accepts or embraces mortality as integral to mission success, typically under ideological, strategic, or coercive motivations rather than isolated psychological despair.[7] Unlike spontaneous violence, these operations involve preparation, such as recruitment, training, and equipping with lethal devices like vests packed with high explosives and shrapnel for enhanced lethality.[11] The tactic's efficacy stems from its asymmetry: low cost to perpetrators (often a single volunteer) yields disproportionate effects, including fear amplification beyond physical damage, as targets must anticipate infiltrators willing to die.[9] Distinctions from related phenomena are critical. Suicide attacks differ from conventional bombings, where survival is possible, by guaranteeing the operator's demise and enabling penetration of defended sites that fixed or drone-delivered munitions might evade detection but lack adaptive guidance.[10] They are not equivalent to battlefield self-sacrifice, such as a soldier charging with a grenade where survival remains feasible; in suicide attacks, death is predetermined via mechanisms like locked cockpits or fail-safe detonators.[11] Psychologically, perpetrators are seldom clinically suicidal in the individualistic sense—evidence indicates most exhibit no prior self-harm history and view their act as altruistic duty or coercion-driven obedience, not personal psychopathology.[7] This contrasts with homicide-suicides driven by intimate grudges, which lack political aims or group orchestration, and from mass-casualty shootings where the attacker may intend escape or negotiation.[11] Further delineations exclude non-violent self-immolations or hunger strikes, which protest without direct kinetic harm, emphasizing suicide attacks' focus on offensive destruction.[12] While terminology like "suicide terrorism" or "martyrdom operations" varies— the former neutral and tactical, the latter ideologically charged by groups framing death as divine reward—core operational reality prioritizes the attacker's role as a guided munition over symbolic gloss.[11] Empirical databases catalog over 5,000 such incidents since 1982, predominantly Islamist but spanning secular causes, underscoring their tactical adaptability across contexts rather than inherent religious monopoly.[5]

Evolution of Terminology

The term "suicide attack" emerged in Western discourse during the late 20th century to describe deliberate acts where perpetrators intentionally kill themselves to maximize harm to targets, distinguishing such tactics from earlier high-risk missions where survival was possible. Prior to this, historical precedents like the Japanese kamikaze operations in World War II—over 3,800 pilots crashing aircraft into Allied ships between October 1944 and August 1945—were denoted by culturally laden terms emphasizing divine intervention rather than self-annihilation, reflecting the Imperial Japanese Navy's framing of the acts as honorable sacrifices rather than suicides. Similarly, 19th-century instances, such as Russian revolutionary Ignacy Hryniewiecki's 1881 bomb attack on Tsar Alexander II, were retrospectively labeled "suicide bombings" in modern analyses but lacked contemporaneous generic terminology, often described simply as assassinations or bombings without emphasis on the attacker's death.[13] The phrase "suicide bombing" gained traction in media and policy circles following Hezbollah's 1983 truck bombings of U.S. and French barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 American and 58 French personnel on October 23, 1983, marking one of the earliest uses of explosive-laden vehicle assaults by non-state actors. These events prompted descriptors like "suicide mission" or "human bomb" in contemporary reports, evolving into standardized "suicide attack" by the 1990s amid the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) campaign in Sri Lanka, where over 378 suicide bombings occurred between 1987 and 2009, often termed "Black Tiger" operations by the group itself to glorify participants. Academic literature, such as Robert Pape's analysis, formalized "suicide terrorism" to denote attacks where the perpetrator's death is integral to success, citing over 300 such incidents globally from 1980 to 2003, primarily driven by strategic coercion rather than ideological fanaticism alone.[14][15] Perpetrators and their ideological backers frequently reject "suicide" terminology, opting for euphemisms like "martyrdom operations" (amaliyyat istishhadiyya in Arabic) to align with religious or nationalist narratives that recast self-destruction as redemptive sacrifice, circumventing doctrinal prohibitions—such as Islam's explicit ban on suicide in Quran 4:29—while promising rewards in the afterlife. This framing, evident in groups like Hamas and al-Qaeda since the 1990s, contrasts with neutral scholarly preferences for "suicide attack" to maintain analytical objectivity, as debated in terrorism studies where terms like "homicide bombing" are critiqued for obscuring the self-sacrificial intent central to the tactic's psychological and coercive impact. Post-9/11, the broader "suicide attack" encompassed non-explosive methods, such as aircraft ramming in the September 11, 2001, assaults that killed 2,977, reflecting a terminological expansion beyond bombings to include any vehicle or body weaponization. Such evolution underscores a tension between descriptive precision in Western analysis and motivational rhetoric in insurgent propaganda, with empirical data from databases like the Chicago Project on Security and Threats documenting over 5,700 suicide attacks from 1982 to 2018, predominantly in asymmetric conflicts.[11][16][5]

Debates on Classification

Scholars debate whether suicide attacks inherently constitute terrorism or represent a broader tactical category applicable to both warfare and insurgent operations, with classification often hinging on targets, perpetrators, and context. In military settings, such as the Imperial Japanese Navy's kamikaze operations from October 1944 to August 1945, which involved over 3,800 pilots deliberately crashing aircraft into Allied warships, these actions targeted combatants and were sanctioned as part of state-directed warfare, thereby excluding them from terrorism definitions that emphasize non-state actors and civilian victims to generate fear beyond immediate destruction.[17] Similarly, the 1980 attack by 10-year-old Mohsen Fahmideh, who detonated explosives against Iraqi forces during the Iran-Iraq War, exemplifies a suicide bombing against military personnel in an interstate conflict, which some analysts classify as defensive warfare rather than terrorism.[12] A key contention arises over the emphasis in terminology like "suicide terrorism" or "suicide bombing," which critics argue unduly centers the perpetrator's self-destruction while sidelining the strategic imperatives of sponsoring organizations, such as resource constraints or signaling commitment in asymmetric conflicts.[11] This focus can obscure parallels with high-risk missions where death is probable but not explicitly intended, as in some special forces raids, versus deliberate self-immolation for ideological ends. Proponents of narrower definitions, however, maintain that terrorism requires attacks on non-combatants, disqualifying military-oriented suicide missions like kamikaze strikes, which inflicted damage on vessels such as the USS Essex in 1945 without the indiscriminate civilian targeting prevalent in post-1980s campaigns by groups like Hezbollah.[18][17] Further disputes involve framing suicide attacks as "martyrdom operations" rather than suicides, particularly in Islamist contexts where self-killing is religiously prohibited, yet reframed to emphasize sacrificial intent against perceived occupiers or infidels; this semantic shift, evident in Hezbollah's 1983 Beirut barracks bombing that killed 241 U.S. personnel, influences classification by aligning acts with sanctioned jihad over pathological self-destruction.[12] Empirical analyses reveal that while modern suicide attacks since the 1990s predominantly target civilians—accounting for campaigns by Tamil Tigers and al-Qaeda—their lethality stems from precision delivery rather than explosive yield alone, prompting debates on whether method alone suffices for terrorist labeling absent strategic coercion goals.[12] These classifications carry causal implications for counter-strategies, as mislabeling military suicides as terrorism may inflate perceived fanaticism, while underemphasizing organizational incentives risks underestimating adaptability in groups facing superior state power.[19]

Historical Origins and Early Examples

Ancient and Medieval Instances

One of the earliest recorded instances resembling a suicide attack appears in the Hebrew Bible, where Samson, a judge of Israel, collapsed a Philistine temple in Gaza upon himself after being blinded and captured by the Philistines around the 12th century BCE. According to Judges 16:28-30, Samson prayed for divine strength, grasped the central pillars, and brought down the structure, killing approximately 3,000 Philistines assembled there along with himself. This act, while rooted in personal vengeance and divine empowerment, exemplifies deliberate self-sacrifice to inflict mass casualties on enemies, though its classification as a "suicide attack" is debated among scholars due to the absence of organized tactical intent beyond individual heroism.[20] In the Hellenistic period, during the Maccabean Revolt against Seleucid rule, Eleazar Avaran, brother of Judas Maccabeus, undertook a suicidal assault at the Battle of Beth Zechariah in 162 BCE. As described in 1 Maccabees 6:43-46, Eleazar charged beneath a heavily armored war elephant presumed to carry King Antiochus V, thrusting his sword into its underbelly to slay the beast, only to be crushed under its falling weight. This desperate maneuver aimed to disrupt the enemy formation and symbolized resistance, resulting in Eleazar's death but inspiring Maccabean forces amid their defeat.[21] Josephus corroborates the account in his Antiquities of the Jews, portraying it as an act of valorous self-immolation in asymmetric warfare. During the Roman era, the Sicarii, a radical Jewish faction active in the 1st century CE, employed tactics akin to suicide missions by concealing daggers (sicae) under cloaks and stabbing Roman officials or collaborators in public crowds, accepting capture and execution as inevitable. Operating amid the First Jewish-Roman War (66-73 CE), these stealth assassinations sought to terrorize occupiers and provoke unrest, with perpetrators often fighting to the death rather than surrendering.[22] Historian Flavius Josephus documents their fanaticism in The Jewish War, noting how such acts escalated tensions leading to the siege of Jerusalem. In medieval Europe, the legendary Swiss patriot Arnold von Winkelried is credited with a self-sacrificial breach during the Battle of Sempach on July 9, 1386, against Habsburg forces. According to chronicles, Winkelried gathered multiple Austrian pike points into his chest, creating an opening in the enemy phalanx for Swiss infantry to exploit, ultimately securing victory at the cost of his life.[23] While the tale's historicity is questioned, emerging in Swiss lore by the 15th century, it reflects cultural veneration for individual martyrdom in communal defense. The Nizari Ismailis, known as Hashashin or Assassins, from the 11th to 13th centuries, conducted targeted killings of political and religious foes across the Islamic world and Crusader states, with fedayeen operatives often embracing death post-strike. Operating from mountain fortresses like Alamut, these missions prioritized precision assassination over mass destruction, motivated by esoteric Shia ideology rather than guaranteed self-annihilation, though capture was rarely sought.[24] Contemporary accounts by historians like Ibn al-Qalanisi highlight their psychological terror tactics, but evidence indicates survival was possible, distinguishing them from modern suicide paradigms.[25]

19th-Century Cases

On March 13, 1881, Ignaty Grinevitsky, a member of the Russian revolutionary group Narodnaya Volya (People's Will), carried out what some historians regard as the first recorded instance of a modern suicide bombing by throwing a five-pound dynamite bomb at Tsar Alexander II during his carriage procession in St. Petersburg, Russia.[26][27] The explosion killed the Tsar from shrapnel wounds and fatally wounded Grinevitsky himself, who had positioned himself close enough to ensure the blast's impact despite the high personal risk.[26] Grinevitsky's action followed multiple failed attempts by the group to assassinate the Tsar, reflecting a tactical shift enabled by the recent invention of dynamite in the 1860s, which allowed for more portable and powerful explosives.[26] Narodnaya Volya, founded in 1879, aimed to overthrow the autocratic Russian regime through targeted violence against high officials, viewing such acts as necessary to spark broader revolution.[26] Grinevitsky, a 25-year-old Polish student radicalized by the group's ideology, reportedly wrote a note the night before the attack expressing his readiness to die for the cause, stating it was his duty to sacrifice himself if needed.[26] While the primary intent was regicide rather than self-destruction per se, the attack's design—delivering the explosive by hand at lethal proximity—distinguished it from prior bombings where perpetrators sought escape, marking an early embrace of the attacker's death as integral to success.[26] The site of the bombing later became the Church of the Saviour on Spilled Blood.[27] Such tactics remained exceptional among 19th-century revolutionaries, even within Russian nihilist and anarchist circles, where dynamite-enabled bombings proliferated but typically avoided deliberate self-immolation.[26] No other verified cases of comparable suicide attacks are documented from the era, underscoring their rarity before the 20th century's mechanized warfare and ideological martyrdom cults amplified the method.[26] The 1881 event, however, prefigured later uses by illustrating how political desperation and technological advances could incentivize perpetrators to weaponize their own bodies for maximum lethal certainty.[26]

20th-Century Developments

Pre-World War II Military and Insurgent Uses

During the Second Sino-Japanese War, which commenced on July 7, 1937, Chinese Nationalist forces facing mechanized Japanese advances employed rudimentary suicide tactics against armored targets. Soldiers strapped bundles of Model 24 hand grenades to their bodies, forming improvised explosive vests, and charged enemy tanks to detonate the charges at point-blank range. This method compensated for the lack of anti-tank weaponry, leveraging human proximity for impact.[28] The tactic saw documented application at the Battle of Taierzhuang, fought from March 24 to April 7, 1938, in Shandong Province. There, over 100,000 Chinese troops engaged approximately 70,000 Japanese forces supported by tanks and artillery. In one engagement, Chinese suicide attackers destroyed four Japanese tanks using grenade bundles.[28][29] The battle resulted in a rare Chinese victory, with Japanese casualties exceeding 11,000, though suicide actions formed only a fraction of the infantry assaults amid hand-to-hand combat and supply disruptions.[29] These operations marked an early instance of organized military suicide attacks in 20th-century warfare, distinct from individual assassinations or charges without explosives. No widespread pre-1938 insurgent uses of comparable suicide bombings appear in historical records, with tactics limited to state armies confronting technological disparities.[30]

World War II Applications

During the Battle of Taierzhuang from March 24 to April 7, 1938, Chinese Nationalist forces employed suicide tactics against Japanese armored vehicles by strapping bundles of Model 24 hand grenades to infantrymen's bodies, forming improvised explosive vests for close-range detonation under tank treads.[31] This marked an early instance of organized body-borne improvised explosive devices in modern warfare, driven by China's material disadvantages against superior Japanese mechanized units.[31] Such assaults contributed to the Chinese victory in encircling and inflicting heavy casualties on Japanese troops, though at significant human cost to the attackers.[31] In Nazi Germany, isolated suicide assassination attempts occurred amid internal resistance efforts. On March 21, 1943, Colonel Rudolf-Christoph von Gersdorff, a Wehrmacht officer, volunteered for a solo operation during Adolf Hitler's visit to an exhibition of captured Soviet weaponry at the Berlin Zeughaus.[32] Gersdorff concealed two one-kilogram bombs with ten-minute fuses in his coat pockets, intending to detonate them in Hitler's proximity and accept his own death.[32] The plan failed when Hitler departed the venue after only eight to ten minutes, sooner than anticipated; Gersdorff then retreated to a secluded area to disarm the devices manually.[32] The Imperial Japanese military systematized suicide attacks on a large scale from late 1944, primarily in response to mounting defeats and Allied naval superiority in the Pacific. Kamikaze operations, involving pilots deliberately crashing explosive-laden aircraft into enemy ships, commenced on October 25, 1944, during the Battle of Leyte Gulf.[2] Approximately 3,800 kamikaze sorties were executed by war's end, striking around 350 Allied vessels: sinking 47 ships, mostly destroyers and smaller craft, while damaging over 300 others.[2] These attacks inflicted roughly 5,000 Allied sailor deaths, with peak intensity during the Battle of Okinawa from April to June 1945, where they caused significant but ultimately non-decisive disruption to invasion support.[33] Complementing aerial kamikaze were naval suicide weapons like the Kaiten, modified Type 93 torpedoes piloted by single crewmen for ramming Allied submarines and surface ships.[34] Deployed from submarines starting November 1944, around 330 Kaiten were launched, achieving limited successes such as sinking the destroyer escort USS Underhill on July 24, 1945, but suffering high malfunction rates and pilot losses due to the craft's cramped, uncontrollable design.[34] Overall, Japanese suicide tactics reflected strategic desperation rather than doctrinal innovation, yielding tactical damage without altering the war's outcome amid overwhelming Allied material advantages.[2]

Post-World War II to 1980s

Following World War II, documented instances of suicide attacks remained exceedingly rare until the early 1980s, with no major verified cases reported between 1945 and 1980 despite numerous insurgencies and terrorist campaigns worldwide.[30] This lull contrasted sharply with earlier historical precedents, as conventional bombings and assassinations dominated post-colonial and Cold War-era violence, such as in Algeria's independence war (1954–1962) or various Palestinian fedayeen operations.[35] The reemergence occurred amid Lebanon's civil war (1975–1990), exacerbated by the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which inspired Shia militant networks to adopt self-sacrificial tactics against foreign presences and sectarian rivals.[36] The first notable modern suicide bombing took place on December 15, 1981, when a truck laden with explosives rammed into the Iraqi embassy in Beirut, detonated by the driver and killing at least 61 people, including embassy staff and bystanders.[37] Attributed to the Iraqi Islamic Dawa Party—a Shia group opposed to Saddam Hussein's secular Ba'athist regime—this attack targeted Iraq's diplomatic mission due to its alignment with Tehran’s adversaries, reflecting early Iranian-influenced proxy operations in Lebanon.[38] The method involved a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) driven intentionally into the target, establishing a template for high-impact, low-cost asymmetric strikes that evaded perimeter defenses.[36] This tactic proliferated in 1983 amid Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the deployment of multinational peacekeeping forces, including U.S. Marines. On April 18, a suicide truck bomb struck the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people, among them 17 Americans, in an operation linked to emerging Shia Islamist cells backed by Iran's Revolutionary Guards.[39] Six months later, on October 23, two nearly simultaneous VBIED attacks devastated barracks housing U.S. and French contingents: the first killed 241 American service members, primarily Marines, while the second claimed 58 French paratroopers.[40] These bombings, executed by drivers who accelerated into the structures before detonating equivalents of 12,000 pounds of TNT, were orchestrated by precursors to Hezbollah, a Shia militant organization formed with Iranian support to expel Western "occupiers" and resist Israeli forces.[35] The attacks' scale—responsible for the deadliest single-day loss for U.S. Marines since Iwo Jima—demonstrated suicide tactics' efficacy in inflicting disproportionate casualties on superior militaries.[41] Further incidents underscored the method's adoption by non-Hezbollah actors. On November 4, 1983, a suicide truck bomb targeted the Israeli military headquarters in Tyre, southern Lebanon, killing around 60 soldiers and civilians in a blast equivalent to the Beirut embassy attack.[36] By April 9, 1985, Sana'a Mehaidli, a 17-year-old member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, became the first recorded female suicide bomber, driving an explosive-laden car into an Israeli checkpoint near Sidon, though causing limited damage with no fatalities beyond herself.[30] These operations, concentrated in Lebanon, relied on religious framing of martyrdom—drawing from Shia veneration of self-sacrifice, as in the Battle of Karbala—to recruit operatives, contrasting with secular or nationalist motivations in later waves.[36] Iranian clerical endorsements post-1979 provided ideological justification, portraying attackers as mujahideen defending Islam against infidel incursions, though tactical innovation stemmed from practical needs in urban guerrilla warfare.[35] By the late 1980s, the tactic had spread modestly beyond Lebanon, with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) conducting their inaugural suicide attack on July 5, 1987—a speedboat laden with explosives ramming a Sri Lankan naval patrol vessel off Jaffna, killing 40 sailors.[42] The LTTE, a secular Tamil separatist group, adapted VBIED principles to maritime contexts, innovating suicide vests and cadres trained for explosive delivery without religious compulsion.[42] Overall, the era's fewer than a dozen verified suicide attacks—primarily VBIEDs yielding hundreds of deaths—highlighted their novelty and potency in protracted conflicts, setting precedents for organizational recruitment, target selection against military installations, and evasion of intelligence through human delivery systems.[30] Unlike World War II's state-directed kamikaze campaigns, these were decentralized, ideologically driven by anti-imperialist grievances, yet empirically effective in forcing policy shifts, such as the U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon in 1984.[35]

Modern Era (1990s–Present)

Rise of Coordinated Campaigns

The 1990s witnessed the emergence of suicide attacks as a tactic in sustained, organizationally directed campaigns by non-state militant groups, shifting from sporadic uses to systematic employment for strategic objectives such as territorial control or political disruption. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka pioneered this approach among secular-nationalist insurgents, innovating the explosive vest and conducting over 200 suicide operations overall, with a concentration in the 1990s targeting military installations, political figures, and economic infrastructure. Notable examples include the May 21, 1991, assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by LTTE operative Thenmozhi Rajaratnam using a belt bomb, which advanced the group's campaign for Tamil separatism.[42][43] In parallel, Islamist groups in the Middle East adopted coordinated suicide bombings to amplify asymmetric warfare against perceived occupiers. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad launched their campaigns against Israeli civilian and military targets starting in 1993, with early attacks like the October 19, 1994, bombing of a Tel Aviv bus killing 22, escalating tensions during peace process breakdowns. These operations, often involving multiple attackers in vests or vehicles, aimed to inflict mass casualties and derail negotiations, with Palestinian factions responsible for dozens of such strikes by decade's end.[44][45] Al-Qaeda exemplified transnational coordination in the late 1990s, executing the August 7, 1998, near-simultaneous truck bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, by suicide operatives, resulting in 224 deaths and over 4,500 injuries. This operation, planned under Osama bin Laden's direction, demonstrated logistical synchronization across continents to target Western interests, foreshadowing escalated global jihad. The October 12, 2000, suicide boat attack on USS Cole in Yemen, killing 17 U.S. sailors, further illustrated Al-Qaeda's campaign refinement using maritime delivery.[45][9] The early 2000s accelerated this trend, with Al-Qaeda's September 11, 2001, hijackings of four commercial aircraft used as guided missiles against U.S. symbols, killing 2,977 and marking the deadliest coordinated suicide assault. Post-2001 invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq fueled proliferation, as groups like the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) integrated suicide tactics into insurgencies, with the Chicago Project on Security and Threats recording a surge from dozens annually in the 1990s to hundreds by mid-decade, peaking amid Iraq's sectarian violence. AQI, under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, conducted over 500 suicide bombings in Iraq alone from 2003-2006, often targeting Shiite civilians to provoke retaliation and sustain chaos. This phase highlighted how state failures enabled militant networks to scale operations, prioritizing high-lethality explosives and human guidance for penetration.[4][45]

Islamist-Dominated Phase

The Islamist-dominated phase of suicide attacks, spanning from the early 1990s to the present, is characterized by the widespread adoption and refinement of the tactic by jihadist organizations, primarily motivated by Salafi-jihadist ideologies promising martyrdom and divine reward. This period saw Islamist groups account for the overwhelming majority of global suicide attacks, with empirical data from comprehensive databases indicating that such operations shifted from sporadic uses to systematic campaigns aimed at maximizing civilian and military casualties to coerce political concessions or inspire global recruitment. Hezbollah's Shiite precedents in the 1980s, including the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings that killed 241 U.S. personnel and 58 French troops, influenced Sunni groups, but the 1990s marked the expansion among Palestinian factions like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).[4][46] While Hezbollah's Shiite precedents in the 1980s (such as the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings) pioneered modern suicide attacks against foreign forces, later Shia militant groups—particularly in Iraq—largely refrained from using suicide vests or indiscriminate bombings. This restraint stems partly from Shia clerical hierarchy and jurisprudence: Iranian Supreme Leaders Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei glorified "martyrdom operations" (istishhad) as legitimate self-sacrifice in defensive or revolutionary contexts (e.g., human-wave assaults in the Iran-Iraq War and support for proxies), without issuing fatwas declaring them haram (forbidden). In contrast, senior marja' like Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani have explicitly condemned indiscriminate suicide bombings as haram, distinguishing them from permissible defensive jihad and emphasizing prohibitions against suicide and harming innocents. This divergence, combined with strategic pragmatism (access to advanced weaponry via Iran) and political considerations (integration into governance), contributed to Shia militias favoring IEDs, rockets, and conventional tactics over suicide vests, unlike the widespread adoption by Sunni Salafi-jihadist groups (Al-Qaeda, Islamic State) that faced fewer doctrinal brakes.[47][45] Hamas initiated suicide bombings against Israeli targets in April 1994 with an attack on a bus in Afula, killing eight, followed by further operations in 1996, such as the Jaffa Road bus bombings that claimed 26 lives. These tactics escalated during the Second Intifada (2000–2005), where Hamas and PIJ executed over 130 suicide bombings, primarily targeting civilians in urban areas, resulting in approximately 1,000 Israeli casualties, including more than 500 deaths; the Dolphinarium discotheque bombing on June 1, 2001, alone killed 21 youths. Al-Qaeda's 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, using truck bombs driven by suicide operatives, killed 224 and injured over 4,000, demonstrating the tactic's scalability for transnational jihad.[27][44][48] The September 11, 2001, attacks by al-Qaeda represented a paradigm shift, employing hijacked airliners as guided missiles in coordinated suicide operations against the World Trade Center and Pentagon, killing 2,977 people and injuring over 6,000; this event, planned by Osama bin Laden, aimed to provoke U.S. overreaction and draw it into draining conflicts. Post-invasion insurgencies amplified the tactic's use: in Iraq, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi conducted hundreds of suicide bombings from 2003–2010, including the 2004 Ashura attacks killing over 170 Shiites, contributing to sectarian violence that claimed tens of thousands of lives. In Afghanistan, the Taliban and allied groups executed over 500 suicide attacks between 2005 and 2015, often targeting NATO forces and civilians, with the July 2008 Indian embassy bombing killing 58.[48][49][45] The rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) from 2014 onward integrated suicide bombings into hybrid warfare, deploying thousands of vests in urban battles like the 2016–2017 Mosul offensive and exported attacks, such as the November 2015 Paris operations killing 130. CPOST data reveals that between 2000 and 2018, suicide attacks by groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and ISIS clusters caused over 20,000 deaths globally, with lethality averaging 11 fatalities per incident, underscoring the tactic's efficiency in asymmetric warfare despite countermeasures like fortified barriers and intelligence disruptions. This phase's persistence, even amid territorial losses, reflects ideological entrenchment, with attacks continuing in Afghanistan post-2021 Taliban takeover and in Syria against regime forces.[50][45][51]

Non-Islamist and Lone Actor Variants

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a secular Marxist-Leninist separatist group seeking an independent Tamil homeland in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, conducted the majority of non-Islamist suicide attacks in the modern era through its elite Black Tigers unit. Active from 1987 until the group's military defeat in May 2009, the LTTE pioneered tactical innovations in suicide operations, including belt bombings, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), and maritime vessel rammings, targeting Sri Lankan military personnel, political leaders, and infrastructure. These attacks numbered in the hundreds, with estimates from security analyses placing LTTE suicide operations at over 270 confirmed incidents between 1987 and 2009, responsible for approximately 1,000 deaths.[52][53] The LTTE's approach emphasized operational efficiency over religious martyrdom, recruiting volunteers—including a significant proportion of women (around 30-40% of Black Tigers)—through appeals to ethnic nationalism and coerced loyalty, rather than theological incentives.[53] The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a secular Kurdish nationalist organization with Marxist roots engaged in insurgency against Turkey since 1984, employed suicide bombings sporadically from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s as part of urban guerrilla tactics. Notable examples include the 30 June 1996 suicide bombing in Tunceli by a female PKK operative targeting security forces, and subsequent attacks in 1999 and 2007 using VBIEDs and body-borne explosives in southeastern Turkey and major cities like Ankara. The PKK executed fewer than 20 such operations, often involving female attackers to exploit cultural perceptions of vulnerability, aiming to disrupt Turkish counterinsurgency efforts and draw international attention to Kurdish grievances. These incidents declined after 2010 amid leadership shifts and tactical pivots toward asymmetric warfare, with no confirmed PKK suicide attacks post-2013.[54] Lone actor suicide attacks, executed by individuals without direct affiliation to organized groups, represent a decentralized variant that gained prominence in the 2010s, facilitated by online radicalization and accessible weaponry. Empirical data from global terrorism databases show these operations are disproportionately linked to Islamist ideologies, with attackers citing jihadist manifestos or propaganda from groups like ISIS, as in the 2016 Berlin Christmas market truck ramming by Anis Amri or the 2017 Stockholm attack by Rakhmat Akilov. Non-Islamist lone actor suicide attacks remain empirically rare, comprising under 5% of documented cases since 2000, and typically involve improvised methods like vehicle rammings or incendiary devices driven by personal ideologies such as anti-government extremism or white supremacism, though few result in the attacker's deliberate self-immolation as a core tactic. For instance, isolated incidents in Western contexts have included self-detonating parcel bombs or arson-suicides motivated by conspiracy theories, but lethality is lower without organizational support, and mental health factors often co-occur with ideological drivers.[45][55] This scarcity reflects the tactical preference of non-Islamist lone actors for survivable attacks like shootings, as suicide methods demand higher commitment and reduce opportunities for escape or repeated action.[56]

Perpetrators and Organizational Dynamics

Profiles of Key Groups

Imperial Japanese Forces
During World War II, the Imperial Japanese military systematically employed kamikaze tactics starting with the first organized attack on October 25, 1944, during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, where pilots deliberately crashed explosive-laden aircraft into Allied ships.[57] Over the course of the war, approximately 2,600 aircraft were expended in such operations, resulting in the deaths of more than 7,000 Allied naval personnel and damage to over 300 vessels, though the strategy failed to reverse Japan's strategic defeats due to limited impact relative to overall naval losses.[2] These attacks were framed as acts of ultimate loyalty to the emperor, drawing on bushido traditions, but empirical analysis shows they inflicted only about 10-15% of total Allied shipping damage in the Pacific theater.[2]
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
The LTTE, a separatist group fighting for Tamil independence in Sri Lanka from 1983 to 2009, pioneered the systematic use of ground-based suicide bombings by a secular organization through its Black Tigers unit, conducting operations that included vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and female attackers to target military and civilian sites.[43] Notable attacks included the 1991 assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a female suicide bomber and multiple strikes on Sri Lankan economic targets like the Central Bank in 1996, which killed over 90 people.[52] The LTTE executed hundreds of such attacks, innovating tactics like belt bombs and underwater explosives, which accounted for a disproportionate share of suicide terrorism globally before the rise of Islamist groups, driven by nationalist goals rather than religious doctrine.[52] This approach maximized psychological impact and recruitment through cult-like indoctrination, though it contributed to the group's military defeat in 2009.[43]
Hezbollah
Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shia militant group established in 1982 amid Israel's invasion of Lebanon, introduced large-scale suicide truck bombings to modern asymmetric warfare, with early operations including the April 18, 1983, attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut that killed 63 people and the October 23, 1983, bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks that killed 241 American servicemen.[58] These tactics, influenced by Iranian Revolutionary Guard training, targeted foreign military presence and were part of a broader campaign that forced Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon by 2000, using suicide attacks sporadically thereafter, such as the 1992 Israeli embassy bombing in Argentina killing 29.[59] Hezbollah's operations emphasized martyrdom ideology rooted in Shia theology, contrasting with prior ad hoc uses, and demonstrated high lethality through massive explosives payloads, though post-2006 the group shifted toward rocket warfare.[36]
Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda, founded in the late 1980s by Osama bin Laden to wage global jihad, elevated suicide attacks to spectacular scale, most notably the September 11, 2001, hijackings where 19 operatives crashed commercial airliners into U.S. targets, killing 2,977 people and causing widespread economic disruption.[60] Earlier operations included the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa, incorporating suicide elements, and the 2000 USS Cole attack, which killed 17 sailors using a small boat laden with explosives.[61] The group's strategy fused Salafi-jihadist ideology with tactical innovation, viewing suicide as martyrdom to inspire followers and coerce policy changes, though data indicates such attacks often backfired by strengthening counterterrorism resolve rather than achieving strategic gains like U.S. withdrawal from Muslim lands.[15] Affiliates continued variants, but core al-Qaeda's direct suicide operations declined post-2001 due to leadership losses.[60]
Islamic State (ISIS)
The Islamic State, emerging from al-Qaeda in Iraq around 2006 and declaring a caliphate in 2014, industrialized suicide attacks through "inghimasi" (drowning-in) tactics, deploying at least 923 fighters in such operations between December 2015 and November 2016 alone, often using VBIEDs, body-borne explosives, and even wheelchair bombs in urban battles like Mosul.[62] In Iraq and Syria, ISIS conducted thousands of attacks, with nearly 300 suicide bombings during the 2016-2017 Mosul offensive, prioritizing volume over precision to defend territory and terrorize populations.[63] Tactics included foreign fighters and coerced locals, framed as divine reward in propaganda, but empirical outcomes showed high failure rates against prepared defenses and contributed to territorial losses by 2019, as attackers were expendable in a doctrine emphasizing apocalyptic warfare.[64]

State and Military Involvement

During the Second Sino-Japanese War, Chinese Nationalist forces employed suicide tactics against Japanese armor at the Battle of Taierzhuang in March-April 1938. Soldiers strapped bundles of Model 24 hand grenades to their bodies, forming improvised explosive vests, and charged tanks to detonate upon contact, marking one of the earliest documented uses of such methods in modern warfare.[65] These acts were individual or small-unit responses to overwhelming armored superiority rather than formalized doctrine, contributing to the Chinese victory in the battle despite heavy casualties. Imperial Japan's military formalized suicide attacks during World War II, most notably through the kamikaze program initiated in October 1944 amid defensive operations in the Philippines and later intensified at Okinawa. Approximately 2,600-4,000 aircraft and pilots were expended in these missions, with a success rate of about 19%, sinking around 47 Allied ships and damaging hundreds more while inflicting over 7,000 naval fatalities.[2][66] The tactic involved deliberately crashing loaded aircraft into enemy vessels, driven by imperial decree and promises of posthumous honors, though empirical outcomes showed limited strategic impact against superior Allied air defenses and numbers.[67] Post-World War II, direct employment of suicide tactics by state militaries has been exceedingly rare, with no large-scale doctrinal adoption comparable to Japan's kamikaze. Instead, states have primarily facilitated suicide attacks through sponsorship of proxy militant groups. Iran, designated a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984, has provided funding, training, and ideological support via the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to organizations employing suicide bombings, including Hezbollah's 1983 attacks on U.S. and French barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 and 58 personnel respectively.[68][69] Iran's Qods Force has extended this to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, enabling campaigns of suicide bombings during the Second Intifada (2000-2005), where over 130 such attacks occurred in Israel.[70] Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has similarly backed groups like the Afghan Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which integrated suicide tactics post-2001, though official denials persist amid evidence of logistical and financial aid.[71] These involvements reflect strategic outsourcing to proxies for deniability, contrasting with overt military use, while raising questions about state accountability given the asymmetric lethality of sponsored operations.

Individual and Small-Cell Actors

Individual perpetrators of suicide attacks, often termed lone actors, operate without direct support from organized groups, relying on self-radicalization through ideological materials or personal motivations. These actors face significant logistical barriers to executing complex operations like bombings, as acquiring explosives typically requires networks for procurement and assembly. Consequently, lone individual suicide attacks more frequently involve low-tech methods such as vehicle ramming or shootings culminating in the attacker's death, rather than dedicated explosive vests. Empirical analyses indicate that true lone wolf suicide bombings remain rare globally due to these constraints, with most documented cases involving rudimentary or failed attempts.[72][15] Historical precedents include the 21 March 1943 attempt by German Wehrmacht officer Rudolf-Christoph von Gersdorff, who concealed a 10-minute timed explosive device on his person during an exhibition at the Zeughaus in Berlin, intending to detonate it in proximity to Adolf Hitler; the plan failed when Hitler unexpectedly departed early, allowing von Gersdorff to disarm the device and survive. In modern contexts, examples encompass the 25 December 2009 attempted aircraft bombing by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who concealed PETN explosives in his underwear on Northwest Airlines Flight 253, acting as a self-radicalized individual inspired by al-Qaeda propaganda but without operational direction from the group. Such cases highlight how individual actors adapt suicide tactics to available resources, often resulting in lower lethality compared to group-orchestrated efforts.[73] Small-cell actors, typically comprising 2 to 5 individuals with loose ideological alignment but minimal external coordination, bridge the gap between lone operations and larger campaigns. These cells often emerge from local radicalization networks, enabling pooled resources for attack preparation while evading detection through limited communication. Notable instances include the 7 July 2005 London bombings, executed by four British-Pakistani men who detonated homemade bombs on public transport, killing 52; the cell self-financed and trained informally, drawing inspiration from al-Qaeda but operating autonomously. Data from terrorism databases show small cells accounting for a subset of suicide attacks in Western Europe and North America since the 2000s, particularly amid calls for decentralized jihad by groups like ISIS via publications such as Rumiyah, which outlined tactics for small-group or solo assaults. This model enhances operational security but limits scale, with cells frequently dismantled pre-attack due to internal leaks or behavioral indicators.[74][75]

Tactics and Operational Methods

Explosive Delivery Systems

Body-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIEDs), including suicide vests and belts, form a core explosive delivery system in suicide attacks, allowing perpetrators to approach targets undetected in pedestrian environments. These devices typically comprise 2–10 kilograms of high explosive filler, such as triacetone triperoxide (TATP), a primary explosive produced from common precursors like acetone, hydrogen peroxide, and an acid catalyst. TATP's crystalline structure renders it highly sensitive to friction, impact, static electricity, and heat, enabling reliable manual detonation but posing significant risks during assembly and transport.[76] Detonation mechanisms often involve a booster charge linked to a simple electrical initiator, such as a battery-powered switch activated by the wearer.[77] To maximize lethality, PBIEDs incorporate fragmentation enhancers, embedding shrapnel like nails, ball bearings, or screws into the explosive charge for radial dispersal upon blast. This configuration enhances injury patterns through both overpressure and penetrating fragments, with empirical analyses of post-blast scenes confirming shrapnel travel distances correlating to explosive yield and standoff.[78] Notable deployments include the 2015 Paris attacks, where multiple attackers utilized TATP-filled vests at sites including the Bataclan theater and cafes, resulting in 130 fatalities, and the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing, employing a TATP backpack that killed 22.[76] Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), a secondary explosive with higher stability than TATP, has also featured in concealed variants, as in the 2009 "underwear bomber" attempt aboard Northwest Airlines Flight 253.[79] Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) enable delivery of far greater explosive masses, often 500–5,000 kilograms or more, suited for high-value or hardened targets. These involve packing commercial or improvised fillers—such as ammonium nitrate-fuel oil (ANFO) mixtures—into a vehicle's cargo area, with the suicide operator ramming the target before triggering via wired or wireless means. VBIEDs leverage vehicular momentum for breaching and position the blast epicenter precisely, amplifying effects through confined-space detonation.[77] The 1983 Beirut barracks bombings exemplify this, with a truck laden with explosives equivalent to 5,400 kilograms of TNT detonated by a suicide driver, destroying the U.S. Marine compound and killing 241 personnel.[80] In Iraq post-2003, VBIEDs accounted for a surge in such attacks, often combining bulk ANFO with artillery shells for boosted yield.[81] Less prevalent systems include waterborne variants for port or naval assaults, where boats mimic legitimate traffic before detonation, and rare adaptations like animal-borne charges, though these lack the precision of human-directed methods. Across configurations, delivery systems emphasize the attacker's sacrificial role to ensure proximity, overriding remote alternatives for tactical certainty.[77]

Targeting and Execution Strategies

Suicide attacks target locations selected for their potential to inflict maximum casualties, generate widespread media coverage, and exert coercive pressure on adversaries, often prioritizing "soft" civilian sites like markets, buses, and public gatherings over hardened military installations due to higher accessibility and lethality yields. Empirical analysis of 315 suicide terrorist campaigns from 1980 to 2003 reveals that 95% occurred in contexts of perceived foreign occupation, with targets chosen to symbolize the occupier's presence, such as checkpoints or expatriate neighborhoods, aiming to compel policy changes like troop withdrawals through sustained fear and economic disruption.[9][82] In Islamist campaigns, such as those by al-Qaeda affiliates, selection emphasizes "far enemy" assets like Western embassies or tourist sites to globalize impact, as seen in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed 224 and targeted symbols of American influence in Muslim lands.[83] Execution strategies typically follow a structured operational sequence to minimize interception risks and optimize detonation efficacy, beginning with reconnaissance to map vulnerabilities, such as unguarded entry points or predictable crowd patterns, followed by bomber preparation including disguise and rehearsal walks. A documented nine-phase planning model outlines identification of recruits, ideological conditioning, physical training, device assembly, target finalization, transportation to site, infiltration, and self-detonation at the point of highest concentration, ensuring the attacker's proximity guarantees blast radius maximization even if secondary measures fail.[84] Timing exploits peak occupancy—e.g., rush hours or religious festivals—to elevate death tolls, as in Hamas's 1994 Dizengoff Street bus bombing in Tel Aviv, which killed 22 during evening crowds, while coordinated multi-bomber assaults, like the 2004 Madrid train series (191 deaths), synchronize strikes across dispersed sites to overwhelm response capacities.[15] Adaptations in execution reflect countermeasures, such as using female or child bombers to bypass gender-biased profiling, evidenced in Palestinian attacks where women conducted 10-15% of operations post-2000 to exploit relaxed searches, or vehicle ramming precursors to explosives for initial chaos, as refined by ISIS in urban battles like Mosul 2016-2017, where VBIEDs breached lines before infantry follow-up.[64] These tactics leverage the attacker's willingness to die for uncontested delivery, yielding higher per-attack fatalities—averaging 13 deaths versus 4.7 for non-suicide bombings in comparable datasets—though success hinges on operational secrecy, with failures often from premature detection during transit phases.[85][10]

Countermeasures and Adaptations

Countermeasures against suicide attacks emphasize disrupting operational chains through intelligence collection and network interdiction, which empirical analyses identify as more effective than passive detection technologies. Human intelligence, surveillance, and targeted operations have proven instrumental in preempting plots by identifying recruiters, bomb-makers, and bombers during preparation phases, as evidenced by sharp declines in attack frequency following intensified efforts. For instance, sensor-based detectors for concealed explosives yield low operational effectiveness due to high false positives and adaptability by attackers, whereas proactive intelligence reduces the pool of viable operations by increasing detection risks upstream.[86][87] Physical and procedural barriers, such as checkpoints, fences, and access controls, limit perpetrator mobility and force tactical adjustments, with data from Israel's West Bank security barrier illustrating substantial impact. Constructed starting in 2002 amid peak suicide bombings during the Second Intifada, the barrier correlated with a near-elimination of successful attacks from northern West Bank areas by 2005, reducing incidents from dozens annually to isolated cases through heightened interception probabilities at borders and roads. Complementary measures like behavioral profiling at checkpoints—focusing on pre-incident indicators such as nervous demeanor or inconsistent stories—further enhanced detection without relying solely on technology.[88][89][87] Perpetrators have adapted by exploiting countermeasures' limitations, shifting to alternative delivery methods or demographics to bypass hardened targets. In response to fortified checkpoints and barriers, groups like Hamas transitioned from pedestrian bombings to rocket fire and tunnel infiltration post-2005, maintaining pressure while evading physical obstacles. Urban environments have seen innovations like vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) to ram barriers or drones for scouting and delivery, as observed in Mosul operations where ISIS integrated suicide tactics with unmanned systems to counter coalition defenses. Female and child bombers have also been employed to subvert gender- or age-based profiling, though intelligence penetration of recruitment networks mitigates such shifts by targeting ideological indoctrination early.[87][64]

Motivations and Ideological Drivers

Religious and Theological Rationales

Religious rationales for suicide attacks typically recast self-destruction as divinely sanctioned martyrdom, emphasizing eternal rewards, communal salvation, or fulfillment of sacred duty over individual survival. In theological frameworks, perpetrators are portrayed not as suicides—often prohibited—but as proactive seekers of paradise through combat against perceived enemies of faith. This distinction hinges on interpretations distinguishing intentional self-killing from death incurred while advancing holy war.[90] In Islam, jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda and Hamas invoke Quranic verses and hadith to justify "martyrdom operations" (istishhad), promising martyrs immediate entry to paradise with rewards like companionship with houris (celestial beings). Quran 9:111 describes a covenant where believers trade their lives for paradise by fighting and being slain in God's cause, a verse frequently cited by ideologues to frame attacks as contractual exchanges rather than forbidden suicide (intihar). Hadith collections, including Sahih Bukhari, elaborate on martyrs' privileges, such as intercession for 70 relatives and sensory experiences in afterlife, which extremists extend to suicide bombings as offensive jihad tactics. Clerics like Yusuf al-Qaradawi have issued fatwas endorsing such acts against occupiers, arguing they differ from passive suicide by intending enemy harm first, though mainstream Sunni scholars, including those from Al-Azhar, condemn them as innovations violating prohibitions in Quran 4:29 against self-destruction.[91][92] Historical precedents outside Islam include the biblical account of Samson in Judges 16:28-30, where he prays for strength to collapse a Philistine temple, killing over 3,000 enemies alongside himself, an act God empowers despite its self-terminating nature. Theological interpretations view this as sacrificial warfare service, not suicide, as Samson's intent prioritized Philistine defeat over self-preservation, aligning with divine nazirite vows against Israel's oppressors; however, it has been invoked sparingly in modern debates but rejected as endorsement for indiscriminate bombing due to contextual specificity to ancient tribal conflict.[93][94] In Shinto-influenced Japanese militarism during World War II, kamikaze pilots embraced self-sacrifice as honorable duty to the divine emperor, drawing on bushido codes and Zen detachment from ego, without explicit suicide taboos in Shinto cosmology that reveres ancestral spirits and imperial divinity. State Shinto propaganda framed crashes as extensions of the "divine wind" legendkami winds repelling Mongol invasions in 1274 and 1281—imbuing attacks with spiritual legitimacy, though motivations blended religious fatalism with nationalist loyalty rather than paradise guarantees. Over 3,800 pilots died in such operations from October 1944 to August 1945, inflicting significant damage on Allied ships.[33][95]

Nationalist, Political, and Strategic Incentives

Nationalist incentives for suicide attacks often arise in contexts of existential threats to sovereignty, where individuals sacrifice themselves to defend the homeland against superior forces. During World War II, Imperial Japan's kamikaze operations exemplified this, with pilots deliberately crashing aircraft into Allied warships to inflict maximum damage amid resource shortages and impending defeat.[96] From October 1944 onward, over 3,800 kamikaze pilots participated, sinking or damaging more than 300 ships and causing approximately 5,000 Allied deaths, driven by a cultural emphasis on loyalty to the emperor and national preservation rather than personal survival.[17] This tactic stemmed from the strategic calculus that conventional aerial attacks had become ineffective against advanced Allied defenses, positioning self-sacrifice as a rational means to prolong resistance and potentially deter invasion.[97] The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) represented a prominent secular nationalist application in modern asymmetric conflicts, conducting over 378 suicide attacks between 1987 and 2009 to establish an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka.[52] These operations targeted military installations, political leaders, and economic assets, such as the 1991 assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, which aimed to disrupt foreign intervention supporting Sri Lanka's government.[98] LTTE cadres, including a dedicated Black Tigers unit, were motivated by ethnic grievances and the pursuit of self-determination, viewing suicide bombings as a high-commitment strategy to demonstrate resolve and coerce territorial concessions without relying on religious doctrine.[99] Politically, suicide attacks serve to destabilize regimes and alter power dynamics by eliminating key figures or symbolizing unyielding opposition. In the LTTE's case, attacks like the 1996 Central Bank bombing in Colombo, which killed 91 and injured over 1,400, sought to undermine the Sri Lankan state's legitimacy and economic stability, pressuring it toward negotiation or collapse.[98] Strategically, such tactics exploit asymmetry, delivering precise, high-impact strikes with minimal resources while generating widespread fear and media amplification to amplify political leverage. Analysis of global suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003 indicates that over 95% targeted perceived occupiers or foreign military presence, with secular groups like the LTTE employing them to compel withdrawal or policy shifts through sustained coercion rather than territorial conquest alone.[100] This approach leverages the attacker's death to maximize psychological and operational effects, deterring aggression by signaling limitless commitment to the cause.[101]

Individual Psychological Factors

Empirical research on the psychological profiles of suicide attackers reveals that they generally do not exhibit the clinical psychopathology or suicidal ideation typical of conventional suicides. A review of five published empirical studies on suicide terrorism found no evidence that perpetrators were driven by personal despair, depression, or mental disorders; instead, their actions aligned with rational commitment to a perceived greater cause, distinguishing them from clinically suicidal individuals who seek to end personal suffering.[102] Similarly, analyses of profiles from groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaeda indicate that attackers were often educated, socially integrated, and psychologically stable, with no disproportionate rates of mental illness compared to the general population.[7] A prominent individual-level factor is the pursuit of personal significance, where perceived threats to self-worth—such as humiliation from conflict or failure—motivate individuals to restore meaning through acts framed as heroic self-sacrifice. This "quest for significance" model posits that suicide attacks compensate for existential voids by offering glory, eternal reward, or group validation, drawing on cognitive needs for purpose rather than emotional instability.[103] Supporting data from interrogations and biographies of attackers, including those in Iraq and Palestine, show recurring themes of resolving identity crises via martyrdom, where the act reaffirms agency and transcendence over mundane failures.[104] Cognitive mechanisms, such as moral disengagement and selective empathy, further enable these actions at the individual level. Attackers often dehumanize targets while viewing their sacrifice as altruistic defense of innocents or divine will, bypassing inhibitions against self-harm through ideological reframing. Empirical profiles from over 100 Lebanese and Palestinian cases confirm this pattern, with no reliance on dissociative states or impulsivity; decisions were deliberate, often following prolonged preparation.[105] While rare instances of trauma or stress exist, they do not predict attacks independently, as most exposed individuals do not radicalize.[106] Attempts at psychological profiling for prediction have largely failed due to the heterogeneity of backgrounds and the overriding role of situational ideology over fixed traits. Studies emphasize resilience and goal-directedness, with attackers displaying high conscientiousness in execution but vulnerability to significance loss as a trigger.[107] This underscores that individual psychology operates within ideological constraints, where personal agency aligns with group narratives rather than isolated pathology.[108]

Effectiveness and Empirical Outcomes

Casualty and Lethality Data

Suicide attacks demonstrate higher lethality compared to other forms of terrorist violence, with empirical analyses indicating they cause 6 to 13 times more fatalities per incident than non-suicide bombings or conventional attacks.[7][109] This enhanced deadliness stems from the attacker's ability to deliver explosives directly to optimal targets, maximizing blast effects in confined or crowded spaces.[10] Data from Robert Pape's examination of suicide terrorism campaigns found an average of approximately 10 fatalities per attack across 188 incidents from 1980 to 2001.[110] From 1981 to June 2008, 1,944 documented suicide attacks resulted in 21,167 deaths and 49,717 injuries, yielding an average of about 11 fatalities and 25-26 injuries per attack.[45] Attacks by Salafi-jihadi groups during 2000-2008 were particularly lethal, averaging 23 deaths and over 46 injuries per incident, roughly 7.5 times deadlier in fatalities than those by other perpetrators.[45] The Chicago Project on Security and Threats maintains a comprehensive database of suicide attacks from 1982 to 2019, coding over 60 variables including casualty counts, though aggregate totals are derived from integrated analyses like those above.[4]
PeriodAttacksDeathsAvg. Fatalities per Attack
1981–1999165Not specified separatelyLower than post-2000 avg.[45]
2000–June 20081,779Majority of 21,167 total~23 for Salafi-jihadi[45]
1981–June 20081,94421,167~11[45]
In more recent years, lethality has varied with operational contexts; for instance, 61 suicide bombings in 2021 produced 1,797 total casualties (deaths plus injuries), reflecting an average of nearly 30 casualties per attack amid a global decline in frequency.[111] These patterns underscore suicide attacks' efficiency in inflicting harm relative to resource expenditure, though overall incidence has decreased since peaks in the mid-2000s.[45]

Strategic Success Rates

Empirical assessments of suicide attacks' strategic success focus on whether they compel target states to concede core political objectives, such as territorial withdrawal, regime change, or policy reversals, rather than merely inflicting tactical damage. Analyses of historical campaigns reveal limited overall efficacy, with successes confined to asymmetric conflicts against democracies vulnerable to public pressure from casualties and perceived weakness. For instance, Robert Pape's examination of 315 suicide attacks from 1980 to 2003 identifies partial or full achievement of goals in approximately half of major campaigns against occupied territories, such as the U.S. Marine withdrawal from Lebanon following the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing (killing 241 Americans) and Israel's 2000 exit from southern Lebanon after Hezbollah operations.[82] Pape attributes this to suicide tactics' coercion potential, exploiting democratic leaders' electoral incentives to avoid sustained casualties.[9] However, critiques highlight methodological issues in causal attribution, noting that withdrawals often stem from multifaceted factors like military overextension or negotiated settlements rather than attacks alone; for example, France's 1983 Lebanon pullout involved broader strategic recalibrations beyond the Beirut blast. Post-2003 data from expanded databases, including over 5,000 suicide attacks through 2020, show declining strategic yields, particularly against resolute targets. Al-Qaeda's 9/11 attacks (2001), which killed nearly 3,000, aimed to expel U.S. forces from Muslim lands but instead provoked invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), eroding the group's capabilities without policy concessions.[100] Similarly, the Second Intifada's 140+ Palestinian suicide bombings (2000-2005) failed to secure statehood, prompting Israel's West Bank barrier construction, which reduced such attacks by over 90% by 2006 through physical and intelligence countermeasures.[112] Broader patterns indicate suicide attacks excel at short-term disruption—elevating group visibility and recruitment—but rarely sustain long-term victories without complementary conventional forces or enemy collapse. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) conducted over 200 suicide operations from 1987 to 2009, securing temporary ceasefires and concessions in Sri Lanka, yet ultimate military defeat in 2009 underscores reliance on broader insurgency failure. In Iraq (2003-2011), Sunni insurgents' 1,000+ suicide attacks peaked lethality but fragmented cohesion and alienated locals, enabling U.S.-backed stabilization without insurgent governance gains. Quantitative reviews confirm this: of documented campaigns, fewer than 20% yield enduring strategic concessions, often in low-intensity occupations, while provoking backlash that strengthens targets' resolve and capabilities.[15] Such outcomes align with causal realism, where attackers' asymmetric desperation signals weakness, inviting decisive responses over appeasement.

Long-Term Societal Impacts

Suicide attacks inflict enduring psychological trauma on broader populations, extending beyond immediate victims to include widespread anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and depression. Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, surveys of Manhattan residents revealed acute PTSD prevalence of 11.2% and depression at 9.7% within five to eight weeks, with symptoms persisting in subsets of the population for years due to media replay and collective memory.[113] Repeated exposure to such events, including through visual documentation, correlates with heightened long-term mental health risks, as seen in ongoing support needs for 9/11 responders and witnesses manifesting chronic conditions.[114] This fear amplification stems from the attacks' randomness and the attackers' demonstrated commitment, eroding public sense of safety and altering daily behaviors like avoidance of public spaces.[15] Policy responses to suicide attacks have reshaped governance, prioritizing security over certain civil liberties and entrenching surveillance apparatuses. The 9/11 suicide hijackings prompted the U.S. PATRIOT Act of 2001, enabling expanded domestic intelligence gathering, which critics argue facilitated overreach into privacy rights without commensurate threat reductions.[115] Internationally, similar dynamics emerged, with states adopting proactive measures like shoot-to-kill protocols against suspected bombers, influencing legal frameworks under UN Security Council resolutions post-2001.[115] These adaptations, while reducing some attack frequencies, have sustained debates over rights erosions, as evidenced by persistent expansions in counterterrorism laws through 2025.[116] Socially, suicide attacks exacerbate polarization by intensifying ideological cleavages and prejudice toward associated groups. Empirical analysis of terrorist incidents shows they aggravate affective polarization, reinforcing partisan worldviews and mutual distrust within societies.[117] In the U.S., 9/11 shifted public opinion durably, with 2021 surveys indicating 60% of Americans viewing the world as more dangerous and favoring isolationist foreign policies, alongside heightened scrutiny of Muslim communities.[118] Such dynamics perpetuate cycles of suspicion, hindering social cohesion and informing electoral shifts toward security-focused platforms, though causal attribution requires controlling for confounding media amplification.[119] Economic repercussions compound these effects, with trillions in global counterterrorism expenditures triggered by high-profile suicide operations like 9/11, including U.S. War on Terror costs exceeding $8 trillion by 2021 estimates, diverting resources from domestic priorities.[120] In targeted regions, sustained fear depresses tourism and investment; for instance, post-attack declines in visitor numbers to affected cities like New York persisted for quarters, though recovery varied with policy interventions. These impacts underscore suicide tactics' role in imposing asymmetric burdens, leveraging low-cost operations for high societal disruption.[9]

Demographic and Sociological Patterns

Age, Gender, and Recruitment

Suicide attack perpetrators are overwhelmingly male, with females accounting for a small minority of cases globally. Empirical analyses of attacks from 1982 to 2003, covering over 300 incidents, indicate that women constituted fewer than 5% of bombers in most datasets, though this rises in specific contexts such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), where females executed approximately 30-40% of suicide operations due to the group's secular nationalist ideology and tactical use of women to evade searches.[121][122] In Islamist groups like al-Qaeda affiliates or Boko Haram, females have been deployed more frequently since the 2010s, often in child or coerced roles, but still represent under 10% overall, prized for their ability to bypass security due to lower suspicion levels.[123][124] This gender disparity aligns with broader patterns in violent extremism, where males predominate due to cultural norms around combat roles and higher exposure to radicalizing networks.[125] The typical age of suicide attackers falls in the young adult range, with empirical data from major conflicts showing averages between 20 and 25 years. In the Israeli-Palestinian context, biographical data on over 100 bombers reveal a mean age of approximately 21, with higher-educated and older attackers (above 25) associated with more lethal outcomes due to better planning.[126] Similarly, analyses of Taliban-linked attacks in Afghanistan describe perpetrators as predominantly young Pashtun males, often semi-literate and in their late teens to early 20s, selected for physical fitness and ideological zeal rather than advanced skills.[127] Cross-national studies confirm this youth bias, attributing it to recruitment targeting impressionable individuals in conflict zones, where life expectancies are low and martyrdom narratives appeal to those with limited future prospects.[106] Recruitment into suicide operations emphasizes selection of ideologically committed volunteers over coercion, facilitated through personal networks, religious institutions, and organizational vetting. Empirical profiles from failed and successful bombers indicate that most are recruited via kin, peers, or community ties, with groups like Hamas or the Taliban using mosques and madrasas for indoctrination, followed by psychological testing to ensure resolve—such as simulated missions—excluding those showing hesitation or clinical suicidality.[128][7] Interviews with intercepted attackers reveal motivations rooted in group loyalty, revenge for perceived grievances, and promises of familial honor or afterlife rewards, rather than personal desperation; coercion occurs but is rarer, often in female or underage cases by groups like ISIS or Boko Haram.[129][130] Modern shifts include online propaganda targeting youth, but physical vetting remains key to operational security.[131]

Socioeconomic and Cultural Correlates

Empirical analyses of suicide attackers' backgrounds reveal that they often hail from middle-class or above-average socioeconomic strata relative to their communities, rather than the most impoverished segments. A study of 129 Palestinian suicide bombers responsible for attacks between 1993 and 2003 found that 57% had completed at least 12 years of schooling, compared to 33% in the broader Palestinian population, while only 11% came from families qualifying for welfare assistance versus 30% population-wide.[132] Similarly, examination of 164 Hezbollah militants killed in action from 1985 to 1994 in Lebanon showed higher education attainment, with over half having post-secondary education, exceeding national averages.[132] At the macro level, cross-country regressions across 110 nations from 1971 to 2007 indicate no significant positive association between low socioeconomic development—measured by GDP per capita, literacy rates, or inequality indices—and the incidence of suicide terrorism, challenging assumptions of poverty as a primary driver.[133] Instead, adverse economic conditions like elevated youth unemployment correlate with the recruitment of more educated and experienced operatives, enhancing attack lethality by enabling strikes on higher-value targets.[134][135] Culturally, suicide attacks exhibit strong correlations with environments featuring narratives of martyrdom and collective redemption, particularly in Islamist milieus where self-immolation is framed as a pathway to paradise and communal honor. Global datasets document over 6,000 such incidents since 1981, with more than 90% perpetrated by groups invoking jihadist ideologies, concentrated in regions like the Middle East and South Asia where these motifs permeate religious discourse and media.[6] Secular cases, such as the Tamil Tigers' 200+ attacks from 1987 to 2009, similarly align with cultural emphases on sacrificial devotion to ethno-nationalist causes, though these represent outliers amid predominant religious patterns.[130] Diffusion of the tactic often hinges on cultural resonance, where adopter groups adapt martyrdom symbolism to local grievances, amplifying adoption in honor-bound, collectivist societies over individualistic ones.[136]

International Law Frameworks

International humanitarian law (IHL), primarily codified in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977, does not explicitly prohibit suicide attacks but subjects all methods of warfare to fundamental principles such as distinction between combatants and civilians, proportionality, and military necessity.[137] A suicide attack could theoretically comply with IHL if directed solely at legitimate military objectives without excessive civilian harm, as the attacker's self-destruction does not inherently violate rules on perfidy or treachery unless it involves feigning protected status.[138] However, in practice, most documented suicide attacks fail these criteria due to their indiscriminate nature, often targeting civilian areas with explosives that cannot be precisely controlled post-detonation, rendering them unlawful under Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I, which bans attacks not directed at specific military objectives.[137] Counter-terrorism frameworks treat suicide attacks by non-state actors as prohibited acts of terrorism, distinct from lawful combat. The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997) criminalizes the delivery of explosives with intent to cause death or injury in public places to intimidate populations or coerce governments, applicable outside armed conflicts where IHL exclusions do not hold; between 1981 and 2015, over 5,000 such bombings were recorded globally, predominantly by terrorist groups.[137] UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), adopted post-9/11 attacks involving hijacked aircraft as suicide weapons, mandates states to prevent and suppress terrorist financing, safe havens, and planning, implicitly encompassing suicide operations as threats to international peace.[139] Resolution 1566 (2004) further defines terrorism to include acts causing civilian deaths for coercive purposes, aligning suicide bombings—averaging 35 casualties per incident in analyzed datasets—with punishable offenses under domestic and international law. In non-international armed conflicts, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II prohibit violence to life and person against non-combatants, extending scrutiny to suicide tactics employed by insurgents, which often violate these by blending attackers with civilian populations.[140] State responses, including targeted killings of planners, must themselves adhere to IHL to avoid reciprocal illegality, as affirmed in UN reports on counter-terrorism human rights compliance.[141] While historical precedents like World War II kamikaze pilots were not deemed illegal under contemporaneous laws of war when targeting military vessels, contemporary suicide terrorism—prevalent since the 1980s in Lebanon and escalating post-2000—universally contravenes these frameworks due to civilian targeting and lack of combatant privilege for perpetrators.[137]

Morality of Intentional Self-Sacrifice in Conflict

Intentional self-sacrifice in conflict, such as a soldier throwing oneself on a grenade to protect comrades, is often distinguished ethically from suicide attacks targeting civilians, with the former viewed as potentially justifiable under principles of proportionality and necessity in defensive warfare.[142] In just war theory, such acts may align with jus in bello if the primary intent is to neutralize a threat rather than self-destruction, though they risk violating the moral prohibition against suicide by prioritizing collective survival over individual preservation.[143] Philosophers like Michael Walzer argue that military service inherently demands self-sacrificial labor, but this must be coerced through duty rather than voluntary suicidal missions, as the latter dehumanizes combatants by eliminating shared risk.[144][145] Suicide missions, particularly those involving bombings of non-combatants, challenge traditional ethical frameworks by breaching the tacit assumption of equality in combat, where adversaries share mortal risks; risk-free or one-sided killing via self-detonation undermines this reciprocity and is deemed immoral.[146] From a natural law perspective, suicide bombing contradicts the intrinsic value of human life and the double effect principle, as the act's intent inseparably merges self-killing with indiscriminate harm, rendering it unjust even in defensive wars.[147] Catholic doctrine explicitly condemns suicide bombings as gravely sinful, irrespective of context, due to suicide's intrinsic immorality and violation of just war criteria like discrimination and proportionality.[148] Utilitarian analyses may endorse self-sacrifice if it maximizes net welfare, such as preventing greater casualties, but empirical studies reveal a psychological preference for approving self-sacrifice over equivalent harm to others, suggesting an intuitive moral weighting toward altruism in dilemmas.[149] Deontological critiques, drawing from Kantian imperatives, prohibit using one's life as a means to an end, viewing intentional self-destruction—even for a cause—as a categorical wrong that erodes personal autonomy and rational agency.[150] Critics of altruism as virtue, such as objectivists, argue that self-sacrifice in conflict fosters a tyranny of collective need over individual rights, potentially justifying tyrannical demands rather than true moral heroism.[151] These debates underscore causal tensions: while self-sacrifice can enable strategic victories through commitment,[142] it often correlates with ideological indoctrination that blurs rational defense with fanaticism, as seen in historical cases where belief systems motivate extreme acts beyond empirical utility.[152]

Perspectives on Rationality vs. Irrationality

Scholars applying rational choice theory to suicide attacks argue that perpetrators often engage in a calculated cost-benefit analysis, where the perceived rewards—such as ideological victory, martyrdom in the afterlife, financial support for families, or group cohesion—outweigh the cost of death.[153] In jihadist contexts, for instance, bombers may view the act as rationally advancing collective goals like expelling occupiers, with incentives structured by organizations to minimize defection risks.[85] This perspective posits that rationality is relative to the attacker's utility function, which incorporates non-material elements like eternal paradise or communal honor, rendering the choice logical within their worldview rather than a product of delusion.[154] Empirical psychological profiles support this rational actor model, revealing that most suicide attackers exhibit no clinical signs of mental illness or suicidal ideation prior to recruitment; instead, they display purposeful commitment driven by strategic grievances, such as foreign occupation or retaliation.[7] Studies of failed bombers and interrogations indicate normal cognitive functioning, with only about 35% showing any history of mental health issues, far below rates implying pathology as the primary driver.[155] From a game-theoretic standpoint, the act aligns with club goods theory in religious extremism, where self-sacrifice enforces group discipline and signals resolve, enhancing bargaining power against stronger foes despite low individual survival odds.[154] Critics framing suicide attacks as irrational emphasize the disregard for self-preservation and the typically low strategic success rates, where immediate tactical gains rarely translate to enduring political objectives, suggesting fanaticism overrides pragmatic calculation.[156] This view, prevalent in Western analyses, attributes the behavior to indoctrination or emotional overreach, portraying attackers as victims of manipulative networks that exploit vulnerabilities rather than autonomous agents.[157] However, such interpretations risk ethnocentric bias, undervaluing how culturally embedded beliefs in posthumous rewards can render the calculus coherent, as evidenced by the persistence of these tactics across diverse ideologies from secular Tamil Tigers to Islamist groups.[7] Ultimately, the rationality debate hinges on whether one privileges the perpetrator's internalized incentives or external metrics of efficacy, with data leaning toward instrumental intent over unadulterated madness.[106]

Regional Hotspots and Resurgences

In the period from 2010 to 2025, suicide attacks persisted as a tactic primarily employed by Islamist militant groups, with hotspots concentrating in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa following the territorial peak of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria around 2014–2017. Data from global terrorism tracking indicates that while overall suicide attack frequency declined in the Middle East after coalition operations degraded core Islamic State capabilities, affiliates and rival groups like Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) drove resurgences elsewhere, often targeting security forces, civilians, and minority communities to sow instability and challenge state authority.[45][158] Afghanistan emerged as a primary hotspot, particularly under ISKP operations post-2021 Taliban takeover, with suicide bombings used to contest Taliban control and target Shia Hazara communities. A notable resurgence included the August 26, 2021, Kabul airport suicide bombing that killed 13 U.S. service members and approximately 170 Afghan civilians during evacuation efforts.[159][160] ISKP claimed responsibility for a September 3, 2024, Kabul suicide attack killing at least six people, amid a pattern of intensified bombings against perceived apostates.[161] By 2025, ISKP attacks showed signs of tactical adaptation but reduced frequency compared to 2021 peaks, though the group retained capacity for high-impact operations from Afghan bases.[162] In Pakistan, the TTP experienced a marked resurgence in suicide attacks after a 2022 ceasefire breakdown, leveraging cross-border sanctuaries in Afghanistan to strike security forces in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. This uptick, with a 93% rise in overall attacks in border provinces since 2022, included a October 17, 2025, suicide bombing in Waziristan that killed seven soldiers.[163][164] TTP's strategy emphasized suicide tactics for asymmetric gains, drawing on recruited fighters with documented mobility patterns favoring high-casualty hits on military convoys and checkpoints.[165][166] Sub-Saharan Africa saw parallel resurgences, notably in Nigeria where Boko Haram revived suicide bombings after a four-year lull ending in 2024, using female perpetrators to bypass security in crowded areas. Attacks included multiple 2024 incidents in Borno State and the first confirmed 2025 bombing in the region, killing at least 12 people, signaling tactical return amid group fragmentation and competition with Islamic State West Africa Province.[167][168][169] In Somalia, Al-Shabaab maintained consistent suicide operations, exemplified by an October 18, 2024, Mogadishu cafe bombing killing seven, as part of broader efforts to undermine federal forces and African Union missions.[170] Iraq and Syria experienced diminished but sporadic ISIS-linked suicide activity post-2019, shifting toward guerrilla ambushes rather than mass-casualty bombings due to sustained counterterrorism pressure. UN monitoring noted residual capabilities in 2024, with attacks in Syria surging numerically but rarely employing suicide vests amid territorial losses.[171][172] These patterns reflect causal dynamics where weakened central commands devolved tactics to provincial branches, prioritizing low-cost, high-impact suicide methods in ungoverned spaces.[173]

Technological and Tactical Shifts

Since the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) around 2014, suicide attacks have incorporated hybrid tactics combining explosives with direct assault, exemplified by the "inghimasi" method, where attackers wear suicide vests but initially engage targets with firearms to sow chaos and increase casualties before detonating.[174] This shift from passive bombing to active combat roles maximized impact in confined urban spaces, as seen in the 2016 Istanbul Atatürk Airport attack, where three inghimasi fighters killed 45 people using rifles and grenades prior to suicide detonation.[175] ISIS adapted this Al-Qaeda-derived tactic for propaganda value in the digital era, filming assaults to recruit and inspire globally.[174] In vehicle-based attacks, ISIS innovated with suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs), mass-producing modified trucks and cars with added armor plating, reinforced ramming prows, and camouflaged exteriors to penetrate defenses and navigate urban rubble.[176] During the 2016-2017 Battle of Mosul, approximately 70% of over 900 suicide operations involved up-armored four-wheel-drive vehicles, enabling attackers to breach Iraqi barriers and detonate payloads equivalent to several tons of explosives.[64] Tactics evolved to include coordinated waves—up to 58 attacks in a single week—and diverse operator profiles, such as drugged or coerced locals, disabled fighters in explosive-laden wheelchairs, women, and children to evade detection.[64] Post-2017 territorial losses, affiliates like ISIS-Khorasan shifted toward low-technology vehicle ramming as a suicide method, requiring minimal resources and bypassing bomb-making scrutiny, with jihadist propaganda promoting it since 2010 for "crowd-smashing" effects.[177] This trend persisted into the 2020s, as in ISIS-K's 2021 Kabul airport attack combining gunfire, bombs, and ramming elements, killing 170, and inspired lone-actor incidents abroad.[68] Overall, these adaptations reflect a move from standalone bombings to integrated, resilient operations resilient to counterterrorism pressures, prioritizing volume over sophistication in decentralized networks.[178]

Global Statistical Overview

From 1982 to 2019, the Chicago Project on Security and Threats' Database on Suicide Attacks (DSAT) catalogs all verified suicide attacks worldwide, providing detailed records including locations, dates, targets, and casualties, with incidents verified against at least two independent sources.[4] Analysis of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) indicates that suicide attacks caused a rising share of terrorism fatalities after the September 11, 2001, assaults, frequently accounting for around 25% of global terrorism deaths in the ensuing decade.[179] This proportion began declining from 2016 onward, falling to approximately 5% of terrorism deaths by 2021, reflecting reduced reliance on the tactic amid territorial losses by major perpetrators like the Islamic State.[179] Between 1981 and June 2008, 1,944 suicide attacks occurred globally, killing 21,167 people and injuring 49,717, with an average of about 11 fatalities per incident; attacks surged over tenfold in the 2000s compared to prior decades, concentrated in Iraq (over 50% of total) and Afghanistan.[45] Over two-thirds of these early attacks targeted the Middle East, followed by Asia excluding the Middle East at 28%, while Salafi-jihadi groups drove heightened lethality, averaging 23 deaths per attack versus far fewer for other perpetrators.[45] Post-2015 trends show further contraction in suicide attack frequency, correlating with the dismantling of Islamic State's caliphate by 2019, though affiliates in Africa and South Asia continue limited use, contributing to persistent but diminished global impact.[179]

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